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Dietrich Eichholtz

History of the German war economy 1939-1945

Volume I: 1939-1941

Volume 11/1 and 2: 1941-1943

Volume 111/1 and 2: 1943-1945

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Dietrich Eichholtz

History of the German war economy 1939-1945

Volume II

1941-1943

With a chapter
by Joachim Lehmann

Part 1

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Preface

This volume continues the three-volume project of a history of the German economy in the Second World War after a long interruption caused by the author's collaboration on other publications.

The overall project represents the first closed, comprehensive Marxist investigation of the topic and thus fundamental aspects of the strategy and politics of the ruling class in imperialism, especially the most aggressive and reactionary elements of finance capital. The fundamental concern of the work is to expose those who are driving towards war and on Forces interested in war and their criminal methods.

The subject of the investigation is the material basis for the warfare of fascist German imperialism and, beyond that, the entirety of those economic forces and interests that underlie the imperialist drive for reaction and violence, for exploitation, expansion, conquest and war and which, in the final analysis are causally responsible for imperialist and fascist politics and ideology.

The project thus meets an extremely current political task and moves into a central area of the confrontation with the imperialist forces of the present that threaten peace.

In the second volume, the investigation extends to the most important phase of the war, which began with the criminal attack on the USSR and in which the victory or defeat of German imperialism and fascism was decided on the German-Soviet front. Viewed from an economic-historical perspective, it ranges from the highest development and the immediately following fiasco of the economic blitzkrieg concept to the climax of the concentration of power in the armaments organization of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production in the fall of 1943.

Nothing has changed in the basic concept of the entire work. The main problems and factual focal points dealt with in the first volume are continued in the second volume (development of the state monopoly regulatory mechanism; situation of the working people including foreign forced laborers; war target program and planning of German finance capital; economic policy in the occupied areas), with different emphasis, one A more concise treatment of sufficiently examined issues and a concentration on essential new and controversial questions appeared to be necessary. Where the author has gone beyond certain findings in the first volume, this will be noted where possible in this volume.

New thematic focuses, which are discussed here in a summarized or longitudinal manner

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can be found in Chapters V, VII and VIII. Others must be reserved for the third volume. • The source

basis for the volume has improved significantly compared to the first, primarily thanks to the diverse efforts of the GDR State Archives Administration.
Of the numerous people and institutions to whom the author owes thanks for advice and criticism, only the always helpful employees of the Central State Archives of the GDR (Potsdam) should be mentioned here. Thanks are due to Ms. Jutta Grimann, Ms. Melitta Helbig and Mr. Eckhard Kruggel for their extensive scientific and technical collaboration and assistance.

Dietrich Eichholtz

• Previous publications by the author from this volume, which are only cited in special cases, include three essays (documentations) in the Yearbook for History and two articles in the magazine Military History (see bibliography). The chapters on the war economy in Germany in the Second World War (6 volumes, Berlin 1974 ff.) are also included

only cited in special cases.

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List of abbreviations

A4	Aggregate 4 (code name for rocket V 2)
AA	Foreign Office
Dept.	Department
AEG	General Electric Company
AEI	Work assignment - engineer(s)
AFA	Accumulators-Fabrik AG (Group)
Affid.	Affidavit (declaration under oath)
AG	Public company
AGK	Export community for military equipment
AT	File note, note
AO	arrangement
AR	Supervisory Board
ATG	General Transportanlagen GmbH, Leipzig
BA	Federal Archives
BdE	Commander of the reserve army
Assistant	Supplement
BfV	Representative for the four-year plan Berg-
BHO	u. Hüttenwerksgesellschaft Ost mbH Bayerische
BMW	Motoren-Werke AG Brotherly
BSW (Russian)	cooperation of prisoners of war German labor front
DAF	
DAP	German agricultural policy
DCGG	German Continental Gas Company
Div. (n)	Division(s)
DNB	German news office
DR	Service news from the Reichsnährstand
DRA	German Reichs-Anzeiger and Prussian State-Anzeiger
DRK	German Red Cross
DVO	Implementing regulation
DWM	German weapons and ammunition factories AG
DZW	Germany in the Second World War (see literature list)
Esge	Iron and Steel Community Iron-
Esl	making industry Foreign worker
FAP	policy of imperialism "Leader meeting(s)" (see
FB	source list)
Fe	Ferrum [iron] (alloy metals)
(-alloy metals)	
FH	Field howitzer
Fi	Fieseler

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Flam. W.	flamethrower
FS	Film collection (see source list); Telex Focke-Wulf
FW	General
GB	Representative
GBA	General representative for labor deployment, general
GB	representative for the regulation of construction, general
Construction GB	representative for special issues relating to chemical production
Chemistry; GB Chem.	
GBN	General Plenipotentiary for Communications General
GB Armament	Plenipotentiary for Armaments (in the four-year plan)
Born	Mountain gun(s)
GEC	General Electric Comp.
Gen. Maj.	Major General
Gen Qu; G Qu	Quartermaster General
Gen StaH	Staff of the Army
gep.	armored
Gestapo	secret State Police
wt.	Guns
GIVE	General representative for operational implementation
GFM	Field Marshal General
GG	General Government
G.I	Inspector General
GIWE	Inspector General of Water and Energy
GKBZHP	(Archive of) Gl6wna Komisja Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w Polsee· (Warsaw)
GL(M)	Aircraft Master General
GmbH	Limited liability company
GPO	General Plan East
GrW	Grenade launcher
GWK	Chamber of Commerce(s)
GWKAV	Chamber of Commerce Structure Ordinance
GWKVO	Chamber of Commerce Ordinance
GWU	History in science and education
HA	Main committee, committees
Hasag	Hugo Schneider AG
Hey	Heinkel
HGW	Hermann Göring works
HPA	Trade Policy Committee (of the Reich Chamber of Commerce)
MR	main ring(c)
HRüst/BdE	(Chief of) Army Armaments/Commander of the Reserve Army
(Head of HRüst/BdE)	
hs.	handwritten
HTO	Main trust office East
HWA	Army Weapons Office
IAR	International Agricultural Review of
IG; Inf. G.	Infantry Guns
IG (colors)	Farbenindustrie AG interest group
IHK	Chamber of Commerce and Industry
IMG	Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (trial materials)
Inf.	infantry
yeah	tons per year
JfG	History Yearbook

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JfW	Yearbook for Economic History
jhl.	annually
Ju	Junkers
K	carbine ; cannon
motor vehicle	motor vehicle
KL;KZ	concentration camp
Account oil	Continental Oil AG
KPD	Communist Party of Germany
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union War
KTB	Diary War
KVR	Administrative Council
kW(h)	Kilowatt(hours)
CHP	Battle Car Cannon
KWVO	War Economy Ordinance (September 4, 1939)
LAA(LAÄ)	State employment office(s)
Laf.	Light
1. (e)	carriage(s).
TRUCK	Trucks
LSO	Principles for determining prices based on the cost price for services for public clients
MAN	Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg AG
MAR	Member of the Supervisory Board
MBH	military commander
M boats	Minesweepers
Me	Messerschmitt
memo	Memorandum
MG	machine gun
MK	Autocannon
praise.-	mobilization
Montana	Collecting Society for Montan-Industriewerke mbH
moto	tons per month
MP	Submachine gun
Mrs.	mortar
MTW	Personnel transport vehicle
Mun.	ammunition
MV	Member of the board
MWT	Central European Business Day
Nb.(W.)	Fog lights)
NE (metals)	Non-ferrous (metals)
NNP	non-natural persons
NS	National Socialist(er, e, it)-
NSBDT	National Socialist Association of German Technicians
NSDAP	National Socialist German Workers' Party (vehicle
NSU	factory) see company directory.
ObdL	Commander-in-Chief of the
ÖAF	Luftwaffe Österreichische Automobil- Fabriks-A.-G.
OKH	Army High Command
OKM	Naval High Command
OKW	High Command of the Wehrmacht
OT	Organization Todt
PAFK	Problems of the agricultural history of feudalism and capitalism
PG; Pg.	Party comrade

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Piss.	Pistols
car	Passenger cars
Pkzl.	Party Chancellery
PWK	Armored car cannon
Pz. Jg.	Tank destroyer
Pz. (Kpfwg.)	Armored car)
WHEEL	Reich Labor Service
RArb.M	Reich Labor Ministry
R-Boats	Clearance boats
REF	Armament final production
REM	Reich Food Minister(ium)
REl.	Circular
RGBI.	Reich Law Gazette
RGI	Reich Industry Group
RHA	Reich Main Department
RKF	Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of the German Nationality
RKTL	Reich Board of Trustees for Technology in Agriculture
Rkzl.	Reich Chancellery
RLA	Armaments Supply Office (of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition)
RLM	Reich Aviation Minister(ium)
RM	Reichsmark
	Reich Marshal
RMdJ	Reich Minister(ium) of Justice
RMdF	Reich Ministry of Finance
RMEL	Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture
RMfhO	Reich Minister(ium) for the occupied eastern territories
RMfBuM	Reich Minister(ium) for Armament and Ammunition
RMfRuK	Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production
RPostM	Reichpostminister(ium)
Rs.	Circular
RSHA	Reich Security Main Office
RSO	Crawler tractor East
RuSHA	Race and Settlement Main Office (of the SS)
RTA	Reich trustee of work
Rüln	arms inspection(s); Armaments inspector(s)
RüKdo	Armament Command(s)
RVE	Imperial Iron Association
RVfg(g)	circular(s)
RVK	Reich Coal Association
RWE	Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrowerk AG
RWiM	Reich Minister of Economics
RWK	Reich Chamber of Commerce
RWKS	Rhenish-Westphalian coal syndicate
SAT	Special Committee
	Storm Department(s) of the NSDAP
S-companies	Barrier operations or protection operations
S-boats	Speedboats
Quickb.	Quick report(s)
SD	Security service
SdKfz.	Special vehicle(s)
SE action	Special collection campaign

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SF(L)	self-propelled gun
Sipo	Security police
SM	Siemens-Martin (steel)
SPW	Armored personnel carrier
S.R	Sondering(s)
SS	Schutzstaffel (of the NSDAP)
SSW	Siemens Schuckertwerke (AG)
StAD	Dresden State Archives
StAM	Magdeburg State Archives
StAS	Schwerin State Archives•
StAW	Weimar State Archives
StRA	Reich Statistical Office
Sts.	Secretary of State
Stu. story; StG Stu.	assault gun(s)
Hau.	Assault howitzer
TB	Diary
TB 26	Technical Battalion 26 (motorized) Mining Technical
TBM	Brigade Mineral Oil Torpedo Boats
T-boats	Tons
t(o)	
UAH	Halle University Archives
USSBS	United States Strategy Bombing Survey
VAR	Chairman of the Supervisory Board
VAW	United Aluminum Works AG
VB	National observer
VDI	Association of German Engineers
VEB	publicly-owned business
Available(g).; V fg(g).	disposition(s)
VfZ	Quarterly magazines for contemporary history
vH	by Hundred (% information)
VIAG	United Industrial Enterprises AG
from	regulation
	Liaison officer
VStW	United Steelworks AG
VV	Chairman of the Board of Directors
V-weapons	Revenge weapons)
WaA	(Army) Weapons Office
Wasag	Westphalian-Anhaltische Sprengstoff-AG
WFSt(b)	Wehrmacht command staff
WiAmt	Military Economics Office
Wifo	Economic Research Society mbH
Wigru	Economic group
Wiln	Economic inspection(s)
WiRüAmt	Military Economics and Armaments Office (of the OKW)
WK	Chamber of Commerce(s)
WM	Wehrmacht
WNE(plan)	New military production plan Liaison officer of the
WNV(o)	Wehrmacht intelligence system Wehrmacht part(s)
WT	
Wumba	Weapons and Ammunition Procurement Office (World War I)
WVHA	Economic Administration Main Office (of the SS)
WWiStab	Military Economic Staff

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WZ	**Scientific journal**
ZAA	**Journal of agricultural history and agricultural sociology**
ZdR	**Magazine service of the Reichsnährstand**
ZfG	**Journal of historical science**
Zgkw.	**Traction vehicle**
ZHO	**Zentrale Handelsgesellschaft Ost mbH**
ZP-E	**see source**
ZP-P	**directory. see source list.**

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When Hitler signed Directive No. 21 "Barbarossa Case" on December 18, 1940, those in power in Germany were still intoxicated by the military successes of the spring and summer of 1940. And yet they felt that, compared to their war program, had not yet achieved a truly resounding success. Great Britain was undefeated, and their rule in Western and Northern Europe was therefore constantly at risk. The decisive threshold for domination over Europe and the world, namely the defeat of the Soviet Union, still had to be crossed. The political and economic motivation and objectives of the planned new campaign in the East were fundamentally unchanged.3 However, the war had now created irreversible facts and was now increasingly dictating its terms to those who had unleashed it. The military-strategic and war-economic problems, the domestic political and social concerns of the fascists and, above all, the resistance of the oppressed peoples against their enslavement and exploitation made the German imperialists seek ever more impatiently to bring about the "central decision" 4 that would lead them to... should ensure irrevocably ce
In November 1940, Göring named the current motives for the planned war and at the same time its objective when he ordered General Georg Thomas, the head of the Defense Economics and Armaments Office of the OKW, to obtain documents for the economic raid on the USSR: “The Führer decided on this war because 1. the Bolshevik will attack us one day and his industry must be destroyed before he is ready for war (the lying argument of preventive war here only poorly concealed the class hatred of the Fascism - DE); 2. the war against England will last longer than we expected and we will therefore have to break through the English blockade to the east for food reasons. Central Europe can only be fed with the help of Ukrainian harvests; 3. We have to push through to the Caucasus in order to take control of the Caucasian oil areas, since without them a generous air warfare against England and America is not possible."5 When the "Oldenburg" economic staff6 on June 4, 1941 for t
When the working session met, during which a simulation game also took place, Thomas formulated the fundamental political goal of the "Barbarossa" company in its close connection with the economic one in laconic brevity in his opening speech: "Two main demands arise ... in addition to the first goal of destruction of the enemy Wehrmacht: a) the destruction of the Bolshevik system, b) an early exploitation of Russia's economic potential, especially in the areas of food and fuel." 7 This time it was clear from the outset to those involved that the economic robbery goals would have a significant influence on the military decisions. Thomas, as head of the Defense Economics and Armaments Office of the OKW,

3 See *concept for the “reorganization” of the world,* pp. 24 ff. and 74 ff.
4 Ibid., p. 80ff.
5 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1826, statement by Georg Thomas, August 16, 1945.
6 See Volume I of this “History of the German War Economy 1939-1945”, Berlin 1969 (2nd ed. 1971; 3rd ed. 1984); cited below in *Volume I* (p. 231 ff.).
7 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 1741, Ms. d. Speech by Thomas on June 4, 1941.-The aim, Thomas continued, was to "put Russian economic power into the fight against England through German energy" (ibid.). See also *Germany in the Second World War.* By a collective of authors under the direction of by Wolfgang Schumann (hereinafter *DZW),* Vol. 1, Berlin 1974, p. 557.

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the Continental Oil AG (Konti Öl)8, foresaw this and demanded: “The military leadership must always be reminded that a campaign against Russia largely has economic reasons and that the demands of the economy in this campaign must be taken into account more than usual." 9 On the eve of the war against the USSR, the economic strategic ideas and demands of German finance capital took on a more concrete form, which focused on the exploitation of the economic resources of the Soviet country and on the continuation of the struggle for the World domination by German imperialism.10 The monopoly group under the leadership of the IG Farben Group and Deutsche Bank was decisive in the formulation of such “global perspectives” 11 . It viewed the overthrow of the Soviet Union and the plunder of its vast wealth, primarily oil and Ukrainian wheat, as the most important goal of the planned new "lightning campaign" and as a key decision of the entire war, but not as the actual long-term goal of German imperialism the way to the East. They saw this - similar to the times of the construction of the Baghdad Railway and the First World War - in the domination of the Near and Middle East and the exploitation of its oil sources. Only then was the land bridge to the Suez Canal and to Africa (Egypt) and gained the springboard to India - goals that seemed to her to be identical with the overthrow of England. From this position she rethought the future conflicts with the other "major economic areas" and spheres of influence dominated by the Anglo-American powers to take over the world. Leading representatives of the IG Farben group such as Krauch have proven to support this line. The same applied to the controllers of Deutsche Bank and to the heads of other banks and large corporations, many of whom came together on the supervisory board of Continental Oil AG and who had been essential pillars of the four-year plan group 12 since the beginning .

Hitler and the OKW proceeded along the lines of the most far-reaching expansion plans outlined last. "The Russian region contains immeasurable riches," said Hitler in January 1941. Once they are under German control, Germany will have "every opportunity to wage war against continents in the future; then no one can beat it anymore." .13 At the General Assembly on March 30 , 1941, Hitler made a similar statement about the “justification of the need to rectify the Russian situation. Only in this way will we be able to master our tasks in the air and on the world's oceans in terms of material and personnel in two years, if we finally and thoroughly solve the land issues." 14 Jm Draft of Directive No. 32 finally

8 See *Volume I,* p. 235 ff.; *DZW,* Vol. 1, p. 555 f.

9 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 17H, Ms. d. Speech by Thomas on June 4, 1941.

10 See *Volume I,* p. 197 ff.

11 *Hallgarten, George WFI Radkau, Joachim,* German industry and politics from Bismarck to today, Frankfurt a. M.! Cologne 1974, p. 401.

12 See *Volume I,* p. 36ff. and passim.

13 *Barbarossa case.* Documents on the preparation of the fascist Wehrmacht for aggression against the Soviet Union (1940/41). Selected and introduced by Erhard Moritz, Berlin 1970, p. 148, Doc. 37, statements by Hitler v. January 9, 1941.

14 *The Second World War.* Documents. Selected and introduced by Gerhard Förster and Olaf Groehler, 2nd edition Berlin 1974, p. 102, Doc. 21, diary entry by the Chief of the Army General Staff (Halder) about. Hitler's speech March 30, 1941.

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The military-strategic objective "for the period after Barbarossa" corresponded entirely to what the founders of Konti Oil expected: "Continuation of the fight against the British position in the Mediterranean and the Near East through a concentric attack, from Libya through Egypt, from Bulgaria through the Turkey and possibly also from Trans-Caucasus through Iran" .

b) The state of armaments during the attack on the USSR

In September 1940, the armament program for the attack on the USSR ("August Program"), designed in August, was finalized in detail. It was given the name "Armament Program B" ("Barbarossa"). Hitler's decree on the "increase in armaments" of September 28, 1940 16 concluded a phase of feverish activity lasting several weeks and numerous preparatory discussions in the OKW and in the armament departments of the Wehrmacht parts with the demand that "the highest possible level of equipment in the required divisions be achieved by April 1, 1941". 17 The entire "War Army 1941" should have the strength of at least 200 divisions within seven months, on May 1, 1941. The field army was to be increased to 180 divisions, including 20 tank and 10 motorized infantry divisions. 18 Compared to the "June program" 19, which was set up after the armistice with France, army strength and armament were to be increased in the short term to around one and a half times. In addition, the major armament programs for the navy and air force remained in place and were even expanded. It stood So the following huge armament program is set for the next six to seven months 20 : For the army: equipment for 180 field and corresponding crew divisions, in particular forced reinforcement of tank weapons and motorization; for the navy: indefinite continua

15 *Barbarossa case,* p. 74, Doc. 11.

16 Ibid., p. 212ff., Doc. 61.

17 Ibid., p. 214.

18 See *Volume I,* p. 212ff.

19 The "June program" (see *DZW,* vol. 1, p. 341f.) in the version of the "Führer decision" of July 13, 1940 envisaged an army of 146 (shortly previously 120) field divisions and 15 occupation divisions as well as a corresponding army armament program, the objectives of which were to be achieved within three years (for example, Thomas explains this in detail in his speech at the meeting with the armaments inspectors on September 13, 1940 (ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1777); see also the *war diary of the high command of the Wehrmacht (Wehrmacht command staff) 1940-1945* (hereinafter: *KTB des OKW),* vol. 1, Frankfurt a. M. 1965, p. 78 E, AN WiRüAmt "Increasing armaments", November 4, 1940.

20 After *the Barbarossa case,* p. 212f., Doc. 61 (as note 16); ibid., p. 221, Doc. 63, report WiRüAmt v. July 10, 1941. Wagner cites the associated "levels of urgency" in armaments production. *(Wagner, Raimund,* The war-economic preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union and the role of the military economic organization of the high command of the fascist Wehrmacht, in *On the anti-Soviet war km·s.* Studies on the military preparation of German imperialism for aggression against the USSR (1933-1941), Berlin 1970, p. 274f.).

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beyond January 1 , 1942 , and the completion of the large surface forces (including four battleships); for the *Air Force:* Implementation of
"Procurement Program 18" (ie increased production of around 30 aircraft types), as well as the fastest increase in the production of anti-aircraft guns and anti-aircraft ammunition.

The military strategic situation foreseeable for the coming year made it appear advisable for the German imperialists to equip the large army as well as possible for the "lightning campaign" and to equip the navy and air force as much as possible for the tasks assigned to them in the near and further future . The two-front war, which was planned for 1941 - even if only for a few months - had to make the situation for Hitler's Germany much more complicated. While the army was supposed to invade the Soviet Union, the fascist military reckoned that the western and northern flanks of the continent would be against the British For this and for the planned major new offensive operations against Great Britain, they considered the strongest possible surface and underwater fleet to be absolutely necessary.

As far as the Luftwaffe was concerned, in the ten months before the attack on the USSR (August 1 , 1940 to May 31 , 1941), especially during the "Battle of England", it suffered losses that were one and a half times higher than during the campaigns in Poland, Northern and Western Europe combined.21 A loss of 5,681 aircraft in these months (including a total loss of 3,648) was offset by an addition of 8,119 ; in terms of fighter aircraft (bombers), the new arrival of 2,588 only barely outweighed the loss of 2,426 aircraft .22 It seemed urgent to the fascists to bring their combat power in the air to a peak in both the East and the West.

Given the given degree of mobilization of war economic potential, the projects of "Armaments Program B" exceeded the economic possibilities of Hitler's Germany. Among the leading representatives of the Wehrmacht and the armaments industry, the opinion was widespread that these projects "far exceeded the capabilities of German industry and economy exceed"23. In the fall of 1940, a furious tug-of-war began over regulatory powers, levels of urgency, raw material quotas and workers. The Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs accused the OKW of causing "a complete mess of the entire economy" 24; the OKW turned with suspicion against the Reich Ministry of Armament and Ammunition's ambitions for power with regard to production and labor control; the Wehrmacht parts made capacity for each other and urgencies are disputed.

The armament program ordered for "Barbarossa" did not remain unchanged. New requirements arose. During the winter of 1940/41 , the production of all types of ammunition that were heavily stockpiled was reduced, but new, additional armament requirements arose in all three branches of the Wehrmacht. The army was affected which provides the tropical equipment for the Afrika Korps ("Axis" armament program) and the training

21 See ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 2317, OKW edition. "Loss and consumption figures of the Wehrmacht August 1, 1940-31. 5. 1941". Approximately corresponding total loss figures for around 11 or 12 months (until June 22, 1941) from Groehler *(Groehler, Olaf,* History of the Air War 1910 to 1970, Berlin 1974, p. 334; *the same,* Zum Aufbau und zur Development of the fascist air force up to the attack on the Soviet Union, in *On an anti-Soviet course of war,* p. 416f.).
22 Same as note 21 (film 2317).
23 *Barbarossa case,* p. 215, Doc. 62, AN WiRüAmt on the "August program", December 6, 1940.
24 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1777, AN ex. Meeting at the RWiM on November 1st, 1940.

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armament "for a possible gas war" 25 against the Soviet Union, the Navy's considerably increased ammunition requirements for anti-aircraft, medium and heavy artillery and the Air Force's requirements of the "procurement program 19", i.e. a general increase in aircraft production by around 40 percent compared to the " Procurement program 18"26 as well as increased production of anti-aircraft ammunition 2 7.

At the end of 1940/beginning of 1941, the armaments machinery of Hitler's Germany was obviously gearing up for "re-equipment"; from then on it ran at an accelerated pace. Although the experts from the OKW were initially plagued by strong doubts as to whether armaments program B could be fulfilled their later reports indicated increasing satisfaction with the successes achieved. In the final report on the fulfillment of the armaments program B 28 , the Defense Economics and Armaments Office stated that, despite the numerous program changes over the course of the winter, “the ones for the reporting period "The planned production programs of the Wehrmacht parts are largely fulfilled despite great difficulties". This means that “a huge increase in the material equipment of the Wehrmacht has been achieved under the greatest strain on the entire manufacturing potential available in the greater German economic area and the occupied territories... This was ensured by expanding new capacities for the priority programs of the three parts of the Wehrmacht "That the increases planned for the near future will actually be achieved."

However, this tension in the war economy was not enough to realize all of the top Wehrmacht's plans. "Therefore, only the most important part of the program could be fully implemented given the war situation."

Over the course of the months, armaments had become increasingly important as a priority. The construction of warships was therefore lagging behind; Especially in armament, the production figures were "sometimes very far behind target (by 26 percent to 90 percent) due to a lack of capacity." The expanded submarine program was also "not fully fulfilled", although here The increase was "considerable". The Air Force reported large backlogs in equipping the air defense with weapons, equipment and ammunition and in dropped ammunition (explosive and incendiary bombs). The production of anti-aircraft artillery was, apart from the heavy calibers (8.8 and 10.5 cm) “far behind target”; However, the stockpiling of “all explosive grenades” for the heavy calibers was “completely inadequate”.

The army, on the other hand, had a "completely sufficient" supply of ammunition, with the exception of a few types of ammunition, that is, "usually well over twelve times the monthly consumption of large-scale combat." The planned production volume of guns and small arms w

25 *Barbarossa case,* p. 222, Doc. 63, report WiRüAmt v. July 10, 1941. - Regarding the gas war and the production of poison gas, Keitel noted on May 9, 1941: "This question is of increased importance with regard to Barbarossa." (ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1742, lecture note WFSt/ Abt .L for boss L: „Overview of the armament status of the army, as of April 1, 1941 (Red Booklets)", April 29, 1941, Keitel's marginal note dated May 9, 1941 (there hs.: April 9).

26 *Barbarossa case,* p. 221 (see note 23). - However, the Air Force Procurement Program 19 remained largely on paper and was already outdated by the “Goering Program” in June 1941 (see Section 2).

27 Ibid., p. 222 (as note 25).

28 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 2313, "Report on the achievements in the field of material armament of the Wehrmacht in the period from September 1st, 1940 to April 1st, 1941" (WiRüAmt), with appendices, v. July 10, 1941. Hereafter also the following (partial reprint in *Barbarossa case,* p. 221ff., Doc. 63).

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"Mostly achieved." However, the equipment of the troops was not yet complete; "the necessary overall equipment of the military army in 1941 will - with minor exceptions - be covered by August 1941."

The army's ammunition situation, which in the opinion of the OKW could be described as "very good" **29,** caused the Wehrmacht's armaments departments to "extensively restrict and even partially shut down production from April 1, 1941" in the production of ammunition. 30. The Orders for various types of guns were placed in favor of the Anti-aircraft production also reduced.

The armament efforts of the German imperialists since the summer of 1940 reached peaked in the first months of 1941. On the eve of the attack

In the USSR, the fascist military machine actually represented a huge, technically modern and quantitatively well-equipped apparatus of destruction, albeit

Their equipment and the modernization of their weaponry did not fully keep pace with the sharp increase in the number of divisions.

The monthly production of tanks averaged 306 in the second quarter of 1941, compared to 109 in the same period of the previous year.31 The army's inventory of tanks and assault guns of all types grew from September 1, 1940 to June 1, 1941 from 3,506 to 5,639; that meant compared to September 1st

In 1939 an increase of 76 percent, compared to May 1, 1940, an increase of 66 percent.32

The army's total inventory of guns and grenade launchers with a caliber of

7.5 cm and above amounted to 27901.33 on June 1, 1941

Table 1

Stock of army artillery and grenade launchers (caliber 7.5 and above) April 1940 and June 1941 (in pieces)

	As of April 1 , 1940	**As of June 1 ,** 1941
Light infantry gun 7.5 **cm**	3327	4176
Heavy infantry gun 15 **cm**	465	867
Light field howitzer 10.5 **cm**	5381	7076
Heavy field howitzer 15 **cm**	2330	2867
Cannon 10 **cm**	700	760
Mortar 21 **cm**	124	388
Heavy grenade launcher 8 **cm**	6796	11767

Source: Müller-Hillebrand, **vol.** 3, **p.** 29, **p .** 42, **p .** 180 **and p.** 266-274 **(table): *Müller-Hillebrand,*** **vol.** 2, **p.** 55, **p.** 92; **see *Lachmann, Manfred,*** **The development of the armament of the fascist German army up to the attack on the USSR, in *On an anti-Soviet course of war,*** **p.** 378.

29 **ZStA Potsdam, FS, film** 1742, **lecture notes WFSt/Abt. L: "Overview...",** April 29, 1941.

30 **As note** 28.

31 ***The Effects of Strategy Bombing on the German War Economy.*** **The United States Strategic Bombing Survey. (Edit by) Overall Economic Effects Division, o. 0, October** 1945 **(hereinafter: *The Ef(ects),*** **p.** 278, **tab. 104.**

32 ***Müller-Hillebrand, Burkhart,*** **The Two-Front War. The army from the beginning of the campaign against the Soviet Union to the end of the war (=The Army** 1933-1945. **Development of the organizational structure, vol.** 3), **Frankfurt a. M.** 1969 **(hereinafter: *Müller-Hillebrand,*** **vol.** 3), **pp.** 274/275 **(table).**

33 **Ibid., p.** 180. **Here and in the following figures without taking the captured weapons into account.**

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The inventory of anti-tank weapons (anti-tank weapons and anti-tank rifles) increased from 13,950 to 40,987 units in the period covered by Table 1. However, only smaller caliber cannons (mainly 3.7 cm) and anti-tank rifles were available. In comparison to the army's weapons inventory on April 1, 1940 and the ammunition consumption
during the campaign against France from May 10 to 1940 June 20, 1940 -

42 “major battle days” - the inventory on June 1, 194135 was:

for light infantry guns 7.5 cm: for weapons 1.26
times and for ammunition 21 times
for heavy infantry guns 15 cm:
for weapons 1.86 times and for ammunition 15 times
for light field howitzers 10.5 cm:
for weapons 1.31 times and for ammunition 18 times
for heavy field howitzers 15 cm:
for weapons 1.23 times and for ammunition 9 times for 10 cm
cannons:
for weapons 1.09 times and for ammunition 10 times
for grenade launchers 8 cm:
for weapons 1.73 times and for ammunition 28 times
for mortars 21 cm:
for weapons 3.13 times and for ammunition 29 times.

For almost ten months, from July 1940 to April 1941, the fascist Wehrmacht did not wage war on land in Europe. During this time, ammunition, weapons and equipment - not to mention the enormous loot - accumulated into extensive stocks with which, compared to the campaign in the West in 1940, one could have waged war for many months. However, the armament of the army divisions did not quite keep pace with their increase.
The army was relatively less equipped with artillery than in the previous year because there were not enough motor vehicles, especially tractors.36 Despite the significant increase in the number of tanks, the rate of equipping the tank divisions with tanks decreased; While in the summer of 1940 the existing ten tank divisions were equipped with an average of 258 tanks each, a year later 21 tank divisions had an average of 196 tanks each.37 The supply of modern tank types also did not correspond to the fascists' wishes and expectations.

From the Panzer IV, the most modern of the types in series production at the time,

3', *Müller-Hillebrand, Burkhart,* **The Blitz Campaigns 1939-1941. The army in the war until the beginning of the campaign against the Soviet Union in June 1941 (=The army 1933-1945. Development of the organizational structure, vol. 2), Frankfurt a. M. 1956 (hereinafter:** *Müller-Hillebrand,* **Vol. 2), p. 108.**

35 *The same,* **vol. 3, pp. 43 and 180.**
36 *Dersame,* **Vol. 2, p. 105. - This situation arose even though the occupied territories brought significant relief; At this time, no fewer than 88 infantry, three motorized infantry and one armored divisions were equipped with vehicles newly produced in France and captured vehicles alone (ibid.; see** *Höhn, Hans,* **The construction of the fascist army into an instrument of aggression against the USSR, in** *On an anti-Soviet course of war,* **p. 336).**

37 Ibid., p. 107.

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Only 188 units were produced in the first half of the year, i.e. almost 12 percent of all tanks produced.38

In the field of raw material production, the German imperialists had impressive potential in Germany and in the occupied parts of Europe. The practical pessimism that the analyzes of the Wehrmacht's armaments departments often spread about the raw material situation was aimed at the "total" mobilization of this potential, especially in the occupied and yet to be occupied countries. This was obviously the case with non-ferrous metals, but especially with mineral oil and Iron and steel, which it was hoped to obtain in the USSR. In the case of mineral oil, among other things, calculations by the OKW's Military Economics and Armaments Office for the second half of 1941 were missing over 40 percent of the war requirements until October and around 30 percent from October, where one with the At the end of the campaign he calculated: "The missing
quantities must be imported from Russia." 39 In the months before the attack on the USSR, defense agencies and corporations increased their investments in those sectors of basic industry and heavy chemicals that were direct suppliers to the defense industry. This period became one of the most successful and profitable for the IG Farben Group and other companies associated with the Reich Office for Economic Development and the GB Chemicals. As it was stated in the report of the Military Economics and Armaments Office of July 10, 1941, "the expansion of the basic industries crucial for Wehrmacht production (Buna, fuel, aluminum, powder and explosives productio The capacity for the synthetic production of mineral oil grew from 1940 to 1941 from 3.5 to 4.2 million t,41 for rubber (Buna), production rose from 40,000 to 69,000 t.42 In 1942 around 100,000 t of Buna were to be produced.43 What As far as powder and explosives were concerned, Krauch reported with satisfaction to the General Council of the Four-Year Plan on June 24, 1941: "The supply situation can
be viewed as very secure."44 According to the figures, the aggressor had a predominance over the Soviet Union in numerous areas of production important to the war effort .(Ta For some time now, the USSR's defense policy has been increasingly aimed at increasing the country's defense preparedness. The decisions of the XVIII. The CPSU party conference (March 1939) took into account the growing threat of war. They were aimed at accelerating the development of the defense industry and strengthening the combat effectiveness of the armed forces.

The increased11 armament efforts in the early period of the Second World War began to bear their first fruits at the time of the attack. The Soviet air forces were still inferior to the German ones. Modern types of war aircraft first went into production or were gradually introduced to the troops.45 However, Soviet industry was by no means behind in the production of artillery and tanks

38 Ibid.

39 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 1746, "Current situation in the raw materials sector", July 4, 19H.

40 As note 28.

41 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 8322, Minutes of the meeting of the General Council of the Four-Year Plan on June 24, 1941 (statements by Krauch).

42 *The Effects,* p. 83, table 43.

43 As note 41.

44 As note 41.

45 See *Groehler,* History of the LuftkTicg, p. 298ff.

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Table 2

Production figures for Hitler's Germany (with annexed and occupied territories) and the USSR in 1941 and 1940, respectively

	Unit of measurement	"Greater Germany" and occupied areas (1941)	USSR (1940)
Coal (lignite in Hard coal units around expected)	Mill. t	402.8 *	153.7
pig iron	"	24.4	14.9
steel	"	31.8	18.3
rolled mill products	"	22.5	13.1
oil	"	4.7 **	31.1°
cement	"	13,400	5.7
Electrical	billion kWh	70,000	48.3
energy Metalworking machines	pcs.	19796000	58500
Motor vehicles and tractors	"	374000000	211700
including trucks	"	64 900000	136000
locomotives	"	191800	914
freight cars	"	4484500	30900

• **Coal year** 1940/41 • • **Without synthetic production** (4.1 **million t), but with imports from Romania and Hungary** (2.8 **million t)**

O Sometimes the incorrect figure of 44.5 **million t is found** (see ***DZW,*** **Vol. 1, pp.** 532 **and** 570) **oo Only "Greater Germany"**

000 For reasons of comparability, information for 1938 **(Germany and Austria)**

Source: Sovetskaja ekonomika v period Velikoj otecestvennoj vojny 1941-1945, **editor** I. **A. Gladkov, Moscow** 1970, **pp.** 10, 29 **and** 314; ***Kravcenko, GS,*** **Ekonomika SSSR v gody Velikoj Otecestvennoj vojny** (1941-1945 **gg.),** 2nd **ed., Moscow** 1970, **p.** 35ff.; ***Statistical yearbook for the German Reich,*** **ed. v. Statistical Reich Office, year** 1941/42, **p.** 215; ***The Effects,*** **p.** 75, **table** 37 **and passim; *Wagenühr, Rolf,*** **German industry during the war** 1939-1945, 2nd **edition, Berlin (West)** 1963, **pp.** 52, 171 **and** 167; ***Bleyer, Wolfgang,*** **The secret report on the armament of fascist Germany from January** 27 , 1945, **in *JfW,*** 1969, **T.** 2, **p.** 363; ***DZW,*** **Vol.** 1, **p.** 570.

the Germans back. Modemes, tank types superior to the Germans, were already rolling off the assembly line. While German tank output in the first half of 1941 totaled 1,617 units , 46 the Soviet industry alone produced 393 **heavy KW tanks and** 1,110 T-34 medium tanks.47 **The German imperialists, on the other hand, made a gross misjudgment the situation as early as the spring of 194148,**

the possibilities of a drastic shift in armaments

46 ***The Effects,*** **p.** 278, **table** 104.

47 ***History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.*** **Edited by Institute of Marxism Leninism home Central Committee of the CPSU, Vol.** 5, Book 1 , **Moscow** 1974, **p.** 141.

48 **See *Moritz, Erhard,*** **On the misjudgment of the Soviet war potential by the company. schist Wehrmacht leadership in the years** 1935 **to** 1919, **in *On anti-Social Warfare,*** p. 150ff.

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{from the army to the air force and navy - DE) with the conclusion of the summer campaign".49 According to the blitzkrieg concept, the campaign against the USSR was to be followed in the usual manner by a military and, above all, armaments breathing space, a re-equipment and "re-reduced and equipment" phase. At an early stage, "in mental work" the army should be "reduced by about a third, while maintaining 20 armored divisions, 10 motorized divisions, 10 mounted divisions." being checked. SO The head of the OKW, Field Marshal Keitel, at least, according to his marginal note on the cited draft, considered it "right" to "order the measures only when the summer campaign makes the desired clear decision foreseeable."

2. The “re-equipment” of summer 1941 and its failure

a) The “Goering Program”

When 153 German divisions attacked the USSR at dawn on June 22, 1941, throwing the war torch into hundreds of Soviet villages and towns, it was a terrible day for the Soviet country, but at the same time the blackest day in German history . The German imperialists had dragged the German people into a criminal and adventurous war against the first socialist country in the world.

At this point in time, the outlines of their war economy concept for the following months and years were already established. It fully corresponded to their ideas about the further course of the struggle for world domination. His core point and the focus of the renewed "re-equipment" that literally began on June 22nd was a concentration of all forces on air armament, especially on the production of bomber aircraft. The fascists saw this as the key to penetrating the Middle and Middle East East to India, for further successes in the Mediterranean and in Africa, for the fight for the British Isles and finally for later conflicts across the Atlantic. From the outset they had firmly taken into account the destruction of the USSR within a few months and the control over the country's economic wealth, especially oil.

49 As note 29. Hereafter also the following.

50 Ibid. - The GB Chemie had already laid down a similar concept of "re-equipment" under a different aspect in January 1941 in a secret memorandum that dealt with the "development of the raw material situation during a long war." The euphemistic predictions of this memorandum were linked to the "basic demand" of "aviation security for the German industry", which in turn was linked to the "elimination of the English island as an American (! - DE) aircraft carrier" through an effective supply blockade, which alone would lead to "collapse". England could lead. The conclusions for the war economy were: submarine(s), air force, raw material chemistry in the front line . Everything else takes a back seat." The "solution", it was concluded, lay solely in the "labor deployment question", namely through the "reduction of the army in favor of securing raw materials, strengthening the air force and submarines". (ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1726, Memorandum “On the development of the raw material situation during a long war” dated January 28, 1941 (= Nuremberg Doc. NI-8835).

51 *DZW,* Vol. 2, p. 25. - Around 40 divisions from allied and satellite states as well as a total of 4,300 tanks, 42,000 guns and grenade launchers and over 4,000 aircraft were also involved in the attack.

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At the beginning of April 1941, the air force leadership "explained in the form of diagrams, based on planning documents that had already been largely developed, what course their armaments program was likely to take in the next few years and what capacities, raw materials and people would be required for this."52 Published by the Military Economics and Armaments Office "these demands were very high" .53 Göring and his advisors simultaneously prepared the Luftwaffe's armaments organization for the major future armaments program. On May 14, Göring, unmistakably modeled on and in competition with the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition and the Armaments Advisory Council, appointed an "Industrial Council of the Reich Marshal for the Production of Air Force Equipment" made up of six representatives from leading monopolies, chaired by Colonel-General Ernst Udet , general aircraft master and head of the Technical Office (Office C) of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, "had to utilize the experiences of leading industrial leaders to the greatest possible extent for the increase in armaments of the air force industry." The permanent representative of the chairman was William Werner, a leading representative of the Junkers/Auto Union Group. He was considered the industrial council's rationalization expert. He was assisted by Richard Bruhn from the same group. Heinrich Koppenberg, who began his career as Flick's protege and gave Göring all the powers to supply the air force with light metals, as the former chairman of the board of the Junkers Group, greatly increased the predominance of this group in the Industrial Council. Through Karl Fr , there were also Henschel Flugzeugwerke AG (Henschel Group), through Rudolf Egger (Büssing NAG/AEG), the head of the vehicle industry business group, the leading automobile and engine manufacturing companies and through Karl Lange, the general manager of the business group Mec
Although the Air Force Industrial Council was superficially modeled on the Armaments Advisory Council and was created for the purpose of rationalization and "increasing performance" in the armaments industry, it still had no organizational support in the form of committees and working groups. The powers of its members were limited by the absence of its own executive branch. All planned projects and measures were to be confirmed by the General Aircraft Master, who initially even reserved the right to "execute them in detail."55 The industrial council's personnel base was narrow and its composition was one-sided. His support from the Reich Industry Group was apparently inadequate. Initially, not even the head of the aviation industry business group was appointed as a member. The mining, electrical and chemical industries were not represented.

The new form of state-monopoly regulation in air force armaments, which key circles of the high air force bureaucracy hereby enforced, allowed them to maintain the strong position within the state-monopoly power structure that they had so far - by exploitingthe competition between the aircraft companies

52 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 2313, AN WiRüAmt, April 4, 1941. According to *Groehler,* History of the Air War, p. 338, discussions about the new air armament program mentioned had been ongoing since February 1941.

53 Ibid (Film 2313).

54 *Anatomy of War.* New documents on the role of German monopoly capital in the preparation and implementation of the Second World War. Edited by Dietrich Eichholtz and Wolfgang Schumann, Berlin 1969, p. 331, Doc. 161, RVfg. Udets v. May 22, 1941.

55 Ibid.

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were completely dependent on government contracts, on government loans and subsidies - could claim. After all, they paid for this with the fact that the Industrial Council remained severely limited and inhibited in its ability to work and its effectiveness. In October 1941 it was finally significantly expanded and reorganized.56 On June 20 , 1941, two days before the attack on the USSR, a short but content-heavy decree from Hitler about the "Air Force Special Program" cleared the way for the plans of the Luftwaffe leadership : "By restricting the army's armament, production facilities and workers can be freed up. These freed-up operating resources are to be made available through the Reich Minister for Armament and Ammunition primarily for the expanded air force program... The distribution of the released operating resources for the special air force program and The Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition regulates the most urgent programs of the army and navy."57 The fact that the Minister of Ammunition, who obviously drafted the decree himself and had Hitler sign it immediately without involving the OKW, 58 is given such a key position in the coming "re-equipment" was reserved, would soon prove to be significant. In his basic “guidelines” of July 14th for “personnel and material armament”59, which explicitly referred to Directive No. 32 , Hitler once again categorically reaffirmed the priority of air force armament: “The focus of armament is on the Air force, which needs to be strengthened on a large scale. the Navy had to limit itself to the V-boat program. “All forces and resources available from the Wehrmacht and the economy” must be used for the “expanded large-scale air armaments program”. "Its realization by the spring of 1942 is of crucial importance for the overall conduct of the war." Hitler once again reaffirmed the powers of the Reich Minister for Armament and Ammunition within the framework of the entire "re-equipment".

The thick paper bundle of the “Göring Plan” or “Goering Program” was dated June 23 , 1941 , as the special air force armament program was christened, which, according to the intentions of its authors, was to be the focus of all war economic efforts of German imperialism for years to come. The Göring program was by no means just an aircraft construction program. It included extensive plans for the production of light metals and aircraft fuel as well as for the production of powder and explosives, especially for air warfare purposes, and included huge plans for the expansion of corresponding production capacities, especially for aluminum. It was easy to foresee that ultimately all areas of the war economy would be affected by the effects of the "Goering program."
The core of this program was to quadruple the strength of the air force in two to two and a half years. The air armament chiefs assumed a monthly production of 1,200 machines, as the German total production of aircraft

56 See p. 32.

57 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 2312, Hitler decree v. June 20, 1941; Facsimiles in ***DZW,*** Vol. 2, p. 99.

58 ***Tlwmas, Georg,*** history of the German defense and armaments industry (1918-1943/45). Edited by Wolfgang Birkenfeld, Boppard 1966, p. 533, Thomas to Keitel, June 29, 1941.

59 ***Hitler's instructions for waging war 1939-1945.*** Documents from the Wehrmacht High Command. Edited by Walther Hubatsch, Frankfurt a. M. 1962, p. 136ff., Instruction No. 32b (incorrectly reproduced in ***Thomas,*** p. 452ff.). Hereafter also the following.

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including training and transport aircraft, at its peak in March 1941 the number had reached 1,174.6 ° By the summer, however, it had fallen again by over ten percent.61 The first interim goal was a "doubling by 1,200 combat machines" ("Moose program ").62 On June 1 , 1942 , two and a half times the "today's production" - i.e. 3,000 aircraft per month - was to be achieved.63 In four months, an aircraft engine factory with a capacity of 1,000 engines per month was to be built.64 Three huge ones new aircraft factories were to be built; for the three companies in question - most likely Junkers, Heinkel and Messerschmitt - " factory buildings with a total of 300,000 m2 of hall space" were to be built by December 1, 1941.65 At least 400 machines per month were to be produced, Field Marshal Milch explained on June 26 1941, would soon be produced "in the well-established companies in the Russian region".66 Milch demanded that at least another 3.5 million workers be recruited in addition to the 1.3 million who were already employed in air armaments would.67 On July 2nd , Todt, in his capacity as "General Representative for the Regulation of the Construction Industry" (GB Bau), commissioned the architect of the fascist ostentatious buildings and "General Building Inspector for the Redesign of the Reich Capital", Albert Speer, to "im Orders from the Reich Marshal to carry out the construction measures of the Göring Plan" _68 At the meeting on June 23 , 1941 at Göring69, the date of which was the then approved Göring program, the "Light Metal Expansion Plan"70, one of the most important components of that program, was discussed in detail. The Reich Office for Economic Development had drawn up this plan under Krauch. The Reichsamt summarized the capacities of all of Europe, including the Soviet ones - regardless of "the uncertainty of the production available in Russia" - and calculated an existing total capacity of 531,000 t of annual production for the beginning of 1941 (of which Germany and "Russia" had 220,000 124000 t). Based on

60 The Effects, p. 277, table 102.
61 Ibid.
62 Thomas, p. 449, minutes (WiRüAmt) of the meeting with State Secretary Milch (RLM) v. June 26, 1941.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 4566. Transcript above. d. 2nd session d. “Community of experience Armament expansion" from July 31, 1941.
66 As note 62.
67 As note 62.
68 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 4566, Vfg. GB Bau v. July 2, 1941.
69 BA Koblenz, R 2/5481, minutes of the meeting; printed in Petriclc, Fritz, Two key documents on the fascist "division of the European aluminum industry", in *JfW,* 1977, T. 1, (hereinafter: Two key documents), p. 260ff.
70 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 10763, “Göring plan from June 23, 1941. Aviation fuel and light metal expansion plan", 1st version from June 25th/26th, 1941; 2nd version "As of July 15th, 1941", from 7/22 1941. Hereafter also the following.
71 Ibid., film 1742, lecture note WiRüAmt f. Keitel "Expanded Air Armament Program", July 6, 1941; Anlaize: "Effects of the Air Armament Program in the Raw Materials Area."

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Table 3

Production planning for light metal in the fascist sphere of power 1942-1945 (in 1000 t annual production)

	aluminum	Alumina (pre-product magnesium of aluminum)	
Production 1941	460	905	35.4
of which: “Greater Germany”	247	495	30.2
Capacity at the end of 1941	630.9	1211.4	50.7
" " 1942	805.9	1537.9	70.6
" " 1943	931.9	1818.9	88.6
" " 1944	1028.9	2018.9	100.6
of which: “Greater Germany”	336	653	68.3
,,Russia"	150	278	0.5
Norway	249	178	10
France	116	364	11
Italy	100	200	10
Balkans	45.2	145.9	—

Source: As note 70 (1st version); Numbers increased in the second version.

This program was based on adventurous ideas and unrealistic assumptions. As it could be read in its preamble, it included the "complete reconstruction not only of the light metal production facilities, but of all preliminary products and their production sites, as well as a reconstruction of the extensive necessary quantities of energy." . Its centerpiece was the plan to concentrate light metal production in Norway on the basis of its rich energy sources and to increase Norwegian annual production from around 30,000 t (1938/39) to 260,000 t final capacity. Koppenberg estimated the costs for this, who had general authority for the Norway project, to one and a half billion marks.72 The raw material bauxite was to be transported primarily from Hungary across Europe to Norway. The day after the attack on the USSR, the bauxite warehouses in the north of the Soviet Union were allocated in advance to the future Norwegian aluminum smelters assigned.73 The concept for a "Light Metal Plan Norway" had already emerged in the four-year plan organization and in the Air Force in the spring of 1940 after the conquest of Norway. The plan first took shape at the end of 1940.74 Even

72 As note 69. - Koppenberg intended to pocket as large a share of the profits as possible from this huge business into his own pocket and had the plans for the project drawn up by Mineralölbau-Gesellschaft mbH, which he completely controlled (ibid.).

73 Ibid.

74 *Petrick,* Two Key Documents, p. 249ff; *Milward, Alan S.,* The Fascist Economy in Norway, Oxford 1972, p. 171ff.; *Eichholtz, Dietrich,* The Norway memorandum of the IG Farben Group from 1941, in: *Bulletin of the “Second World War” working group,* No. 1-2/1974, p. 4ff.; ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 8322, Ms. v. Eberhard Neukirch (Reich Office for Economic Development): "The development of light metal expansion in the four-year plan with special consideration of the period of the Greater German freedom struggle from 1939", June 5, 1943.

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of the banks (Dresdner Bank, Bank of Deutsche Aviation) in the back, the approach was too high-handed for the liking of the monopolies previously leading in the aluminum business, the United Aluminum Works (VA W), the Deutsche Bank and also the IG Farbenindustrie AG. Above all, the ministry had rejected Krauch's and the VAW's financing plan, pushed through 100 percent state financing 75 and even declared that it would claim "the majority and leadership in all circumstances even after the war . " 76 **Although now the main component of the Light metal plan in the Göring program, the Norway project remained an expression of internal contradictions between the two competing groups.**

When drawing up the "aviation fuel expansion plan", however, the IG Farben Group and the Reich Office for Economic Development, headed by its supervisory board chairman Krauch, and the department of the GB Chemicals Department, also represented by Krauch, completely dominated. This project represented the third cornerstone of the Göring program.

The fuel situation of German imperialism was precarious compared to its intentions and goals. In this regard, the Wehrmacht's armaments departments had already predicted dismal conditions for the fall of 1941 before June 22, 1941. According to calculations by the Defense Economics and Armaments Office from May 1941, the Wehrmacht's fuel stocks of almost 1 million tons had to shrink to 220,000 tons within three months, ie by September 1941, of which around 210,000 were the aviation fuel stocks alone to 31,000 t. 77

According to the aviation fuel plan of the Göring program, starting from a level of 160,000 t per month, a capacity of 260,000 t (3.12 million t annually) was to be achieved within one year (mid-1942), and at the beginning of 1943 even 390,000 t (4.68 million t annually).78 For the associated construction of several large hydrogenation and petroleum processing plants - the "total conversion to petroleum processing" was planned for the large hydrogenation plants in Pölitz, Wesseling and Magdeburg - the GB Chemistry demanded enormous amounts of iron and steel, in construction volume, in workers, foreign currency, etc. Among the "further requirements" of the plan, the first priority was the "supply of suitable Russian crude oil in the amount of up to 4 million tons per year", which was full from mid-1943, amounting to 1.5 million tons of annual volume were to be processed in Germany as early as spring 1942 (!) The total volume was to flow from spring 1943 via a pipeline from Odessa to Silesia and to Brüx, which would later flow to Pölitz near Stettin or to the Baltic Sea would have to be extended. From the beginning, it was the Soviet Union's oil sources that had to be conquered

75 Ibid. (Ms. Neukirch).

76 BA Koblenz, R 2/5481, AN RMdF above. meeting of November 25, 1940.

77 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 1781, "Probable supply situation in the summer months of 1941", May 20, 1941. - The fuel situation actually became critical from the end of October 1941 ***(Reinhardt, Klaus,*** The turnaround before Moscow. The failure of Hitler's strategy in the winter 1941/42, Stuttgart 1972, p.116ff.; ***Birkenfeld, Wolfgang,*** The synthetic fuel 1933-1945. A contribution to National Socialist economic and armaments policy, Göttingen/Berlin (West)/ Frankfurt a. M. 1964, (hereinafter: fuel), p. 155 f.

78 As note 70. Hereafter also the following. - The Air Force even demanded that the entire (additional) production of aviation fuel should consist of the incredibly complex and labor-intensive high-performance fuel (hundred-octane gasoline) (ibid., 2nd version of the document). aviation fuel plan).

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The main item in the fuel planning of the Göring program. Immediately with the beginning of the war against the USSR, the "extension of the general authority of the GB-Chem to the occupied and yet to be occupied areas as well as the countries with close economic ties to the Reich" took place.79 All of Krauch's demands for future petroleum imports from the USSR amounted to 9 million t80 annually, that of the Military Economics and Armaments Office to 9.3 million t for 1942 and to 12.2 million t for 1943.81 In contrast, in 1941 there was a total production of less than 9 million t of mineral oil, which the German imperialism actually decreed at that time in the part of Europe it controlled.82 This explains General Thomas's sigh: "Without possession of the Caucasus, there is no longer any point in continuing to pursue Krauch's aviation fuel program ." 83 From now on, the GB Chemie's investment projects in the fuel sector were at the highest level of urgency in the war economy; its requirements for manpower, for example, had to be "satisfied on an equal footing with the requirements of engine construction for the Luftwaffe". "Apart from the last months of the war - that's all there is."85 What the last quoted author, however, fails to mention 86 is the brutalization of exploitation that increased by leaps and bounds with the extent and adventurousness of the "programs", which had its counterpart in the brutalization of the fascist military leadership and how this It was an expression of the gaping contradiction between war aims and plans on the one hand, and the real economic and military circumstances and possibilities on the other. The GB Chemie had already begun, with Göring's help, at the end of 1940/beginning of 1941 to work on new construction projects in the area of fuel and Buna production to develop material and labor resources. He took advantage of the economic potential of the SS's sphere of influence and formed a close alliance with Himmler. He envisaged Auschwitz as the location for one of the largest hydrogenation plants for the production of high-performance aviation fuel. And so the sweat, tears and blood of tens of thousands of victims of the Nazi regime on the construction sites of the Auschwitz concentration camp sealed the inhumane alliance that the Germans

79 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1741, lecture by Dr. Ritter (GB Chemie) at the conference of armaments inspectors: “About the work of the general representative for special questions in chemical production, Prof. Dr. C. Krauch", January 21, 1942; my emphasis.

80 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 8273, KTB d. WiRüAmt/Staff, entry from July 23, 1941 (see discussion Krauch-Thomas).

81 As note 71. - For the last quarter of 1941, Thomas calculated the deficit at 1.74 million. Tons (ibid.).

82 The Effects, p. 75, table 35 (without inventory disposal). The figure given here (8.9: million t) includes other mineral oil products in addition to fuel; However, the figure in the "fuel balance" (6.9 million t) drawn up by Wagenühr (Wagenühr, Rolf, Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege 1939-1945, 2nd ed., Berlin 1963, p. 171) is incomplete Detection and too low.

83 As note 80; Entry v. July 29, 1941.

84 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 4566, RVfg. RMfBuM to the chairmen of the examination committee, July 16, 1941.

85 Birkenfeld, Fuel, p. 164.

86 Ibid., p. 165f., p. 174.

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Armaments monopolies, especially the IG Farben Group, and the SS had concluded a deal
with each other.87 The Göring program was the result of a war economy concept of extreme aggressiveness and brutality. The adventurousness of the plans was as obvious as their danger.88 The German imperialists' economic blitzkrieg concept reached its climax - precisely at a time when, despite all initial successes in the East, it was irrevocably doomed to failure.

b) Approaches td' Conversion"

The "redirection of armaments" to the Göring program did not start nearly as quickly and smoothly as the rigorous orders from Hitler and Göring would have led one to expect. The confusion and conflict in the state-monopoly mechanism of the war economy was greater at no other time during the war than in the second half of 1941. The main reason for this was increasingly the military events on the German-Soviet front. At the beginning, however, other factors and contradictions that were inherent in the system also became noticeable.
The German imperialists' insatiable greed for expansion and world domination encountered limits in the available economic potential. Of course, these limits were not absolute. But the dialectic of the regime's policy was such that the barbarism and ruthlessness with which the fascists waged war, subjugated, robbed and murdered other peoples, with their scruples and doubts about the strength of their own hinterland, including the mass base of their dictatorship, corresponded contradictorily.

To a certain extent this was linked to the fact that they were temporarily unable to effectively concentrate the regulatory powers in the war economy in one place and to create a state-monopoly central authority that could have consistently carried out the interventions in the national economy that were necessary for the planned "re-equipment" on a large scale would have been necessary. It was the competitive laws of the system that initially proved to be stronger than the "iron necessity" of the war.

With the Jcm Göring program, the air force leadership and the four-year plan group announced their claim to state monopoly sole rule. If the program were to be implemented or at least successfully tackled, they would have to concentrate the power to regulate the war economy to an extent never before seen. A long-standing fundamental question of state-monopoly capitalism in Germany appeared in a new light: to which group of forces would leadership in armaments and the war economy be transferred?
Implementing the ambitions of the air force and the four-year plan was unthinkable at a time when the army in the east was fighting with its full strength against what turned out to be the strongest and most determined opponent. The army would have largely lost its influence on the course of the war economy; it

87 See p. 220f.

88 Petzina blames Göring alone for the "unreality" of the Göring program; the Krauch office bears no responsibility for it (Petzina, Dieter, Autarky Politics in the Third Reich. The National Socialist Four-Year Plan, Stuttgart 1968 (hereinafter: Autarky Politics), p. 147).

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would no longer have been able to significantly regulate the development and effective level of production of its equipment.

Apart from the armaments departments of the army, it was above all the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition under Fritz Todt whose interests had a say in this. For just over a year, Hitler and Göring had given him significant regulatory powers, particularly in the area of army armament production. General Thomas later judged, looking back to 1941: "It became increasingly clear that the RMfBuM was striving to unite the entire armament in the long term." 89 Behind the ammunition minister stood the leadership of the Reich Industry Group. His ministry was the executive branch of the large arms monopolies that produced tanks, weapons and ammunition for the army. Among these, the mining companies, especially the Ruhr companies, played the leading role.

Todt indicated early on that the manpower situation would not allow the Air Force program to be tackled straight away. "A general relief on the labor market can, in Dr. Dead only in the fall." 90 As for the machine tools that were originally intended for export to the USSR, after the camouflage of "Barbarossa" was lifted, they were to be "distributed to the air force, tank and anti-aircraft program."91 All of this did not indicate any great inclination on the part of the !Vlinister to reduce the army's armaments in favor of the air force in the foreseeable future.

The fact that Todt managed to reserve a central position in the "re-equipment" in Hitler's decree of June 20, 194192 came as a surprise not only to the Luftwaffe command, but also to the OKW. Sal of the "re-equipment" largely depended on the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition.

On the same day, nine decrees were issued by Göring93, which Todt had "initiated" without consulting the Wehrmacht leadership in advance.94 They mainly concerned the regulation of the labor market and gave the Minister of Ammunition important new powers in this area, in which he had already been involved At the beginning of the year he had held a very strong position. He had apparently presented the package of decrees to Göring with the argument that he wanted to better supply the air force program with manp

As GB Construction, Göring also gave him the authority to distribute the entire contingent of building iron and wood 95 - also a sensitive encroachment on the power of the OKW, the Reich Office for Economic Development and other bodies.

The Army Weapons Office and its superior head of army armaments and commander of the reserve army, Colonel-General Friedrich Fromm, had no choice but to recognize that their interests were now closely linked to those of the Ministry of Ammunition, which had previously been violently hostile. In view of Todt's consolidated position, Fromm felt so encouraged that he openly opposed "the Führer's order" of June 20, ie against the Göring program.96

89 **Thomas,** p. 257.

90 **ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film** 2325, **AN ex. Discussion between Thomas and Todt on** June 11, 1941, June 13, 1941.

91 **Ibid.** 92 **See p.** 13.

93 **ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film** 2312, **nine decrees from Göring v.** June 20, 1941, **with Rs. Todt v.** June 21, 1941.

94 **Thomas, p.** 533, **Thomas to Keitel about. Discuss with Todt on** June 27, 1941, June 29, 7 p.m.

95 **ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film** 1746, **BfV decree,** July 3, 1941.

96 **Ibid., Film** 2313, **TO WiRüAmt via. "OKH statement on the Führer's order of** June 20th," June 23, 1941.

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Todt immediately took advantage of the Army Armament Chief's willingness to make concessions and, on June 21, together with him, issued the decree on the formation of a tank commission, which he had been preparing for some time. The decree began with a clear demand for maintaining and strengthening the "striking power of the army" and thus the army's armament: "The army's large tank program is the first priority within the framework of the army's armament and is of the highest level of urgency. It represents the backbone for the development of the army fast formations and thus for the striking power of the army in general. It is therefore essential and immediately necessary to bring together all military, technical and manufacturing forces from official and civilian sources and to bring them together for uniform planning, testing and production."98 The result is The tank program mentioned was planned for two years; Hitler had ordered "the number of panzer divisions to be increased from 20 to 36"99 and to equip them with new types of heavy tanks. In view of this and other extensive armament projects in the army, Fromm insisted that the limitation of the army's armament had to be done "via the OKW by the Führer to its extent before the practical conclusions can be drawn from it."100 In other respects, the formation of the Tank Commission, the first of a whole series of "development commissions" of the Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions, soon had its dark side for the army departments show. The defense companies were represented in the commission by their leading directors, designers and engineers and, together with the officials of the ministry, were already numerically superior to the representatives of the Wehrmacht. All arms orders in the field of tank production should be submitted to the commission "for prior review in the sense of "simplified, performance-enhancing production".10i The army had to subordinate its type requests to the commission's decisions. In fact, the ability to design different types of weapons yourself became increasingly restricted. The commission was chaired by Ferdinand Porsche, the chairman of the board of the Volkswagen factory, as the permanent representative of the minister. This meant that significant competencies were taken away from the Army Weapons Office, albeit initially only for armored vehicles, and these largely and directly ended up in the hands of the major tank producers among the arms companies. The army had to give up its claim to make decisions alone in technical and construction matters, a claim that, according to the experience of the armaments companies, was profitable.

97 See ibid., Film 2312, AO Todts v. January 11, 1941. In accordance with this order, director Oskar Hacker (Steyr-Daimler-Puch/Reichswerke Group), previously managing director of the Armored Car Special Committee, was appointed "Special Representative for Armored Cars" at the RMfBuM.

98 *Anatomy of War,* **p. 336, Doc. 164, decree of Todt and Fromm, June 21, 1941.**

99 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 8273, KTB d. WiRüAmt/Staff, entry from July 14, 1941; sa ibid, entry from. June 26, 1941. Reinhardt mentions a directive from Hitler on July 13, 1941, according to which "the existing armored and infantry divisions (motorized) were to be increased to 36 and 18 respectively by May 1, 1942," which, however, were to consist of three full regiments *(Reinhardt,* **p. 29) The month before, Hitler had already expressed the "desire" to increase the tank program from 600 to 900 armored vehicles per month (see note 94). The average monthly output from January to June 1941 was 270!** *(The Effects,* **p. 278, table 104).**

100 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 2313, FS Fromm to Warlimont (WFSt/Department L), June 23, 1941.
101 As note 98.

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had a reducing effect. The monopolies thus solved, in their own way and to their benefit, the contradiction between the requirements of the rationalized and profitable series production of tanks and the Wehrmacht's insistence on constantly and quickly adapting the designs to modern military technology requirements and to the conditions in each respective country Theater of war.

The Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition had prepared himself well for the expected confrontation with the air force leadership over crucial regulatory powers in the war economy. When General Field Marshal Erhard Milch, Inspector General of the Air Force and State Secretary in the Reich Aviation Ministry, explained the Göring program to top representatives of the Wehrmacht's armament departments and the four-year plan on June 26, 1941 and emphasized his "special, comprehensive powers" 102 , he was reprimanded - in Todt's absence : "The Führer's order of June 20th to Reich Minister Todt is in certain contradiction to the authority and statements of Field Marshal Milch." 103 Milch and Todt then had a violent clash the following day.1C14 Thomas reported this after a discussion with Todt: "Todt had apparently threatened to ask the Führer to replace him if Milch retained this authority." 105 The Inspector General of the air force

However, he was not very sure of his powers, since Göring, as he expressed himself to Thomas, had "two hearts in his chest", "one for the Luftwaffe and one as chairman of the Reich Defense Council" 106, i.e. as the person in charge for the remaining areas of Wehrmacht armament and war economy.

For a period of weeks, or at most a few months, the outcome of this internal conflict remained uncertain, which was not least due to the far from decisive situation on the German-Soviet front. This was an opportunity for the OKW's Military Economics and Armaments Office. It thought it was in a particularly favorable situation in the fight for a central command post for the war economy. The idea of creating and directing such a position had been in the head of the office's head, General Thomas, for years and had appeared again and again in his memoranda and lecture notes since the beginning of the war.

The Military Economics and Armaments Office still had a strong position in the war economy regulatory mechanism. Since the beginning of 1941, his position had been weakened in certain sensitive points in favor of the Ministry of Munitions but overall the importance of the office for the emerging dispute over the "re-equipment" had increased, especially since Göring gave him the entire preparation for the economic plunder of the USSR in the autumn of 1940, later had transferred the management and lead management for the East Economic Management Staff and the supervision of the East Economic Staff. 107 At that time the office was t

i02 Tlwmas, p. 448, protocol WiRüAmt (Hünermann) about. Discuss b. State Secretary Milk on June 26th 1941.

103 Ibid., p. 450. See also Groehler, History of the Air War, p. 338.

104 As note 94. - Albert Speer was a witness to this incident (Speer, Albert, Memories, Berlin (West) 1971 (9th ed.), p. 198). Ludwig reports on two such disputes (on June 26th and 27th); Ludwig, Karl-Heinz, Technology and Engineers in the Third Reich, Düsseldorf 1974 (hereinafter: Ludwig, Technology), p. 372f.

105 As note 94.

106 Same as note 94 (p. 534). i07 See Volume I, p. 233f.

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extensive assurances from Göring that Todt was “deployed solely for production and that the management of armaments, including the distribution of raw materials and labor deployment, could lie solely with the OKW, which had to inform him (Göring - DEJ in his capacity as chairman of the Council of Ministers for Reich Defense " .108 Todt received similar information when, at the end of June 1941, he directly approached Hitler with the demand that "a body must now be created that will ruthlessly decide against the three commanders-in-chief (of the Wehrmacht parts - DE)."109 This is what he was looking for In order not to leave the field to the Luftwaffe, he first reached a compromise with the Military Economics and Armaments Office. Since Milch also approached this office for help at the same time, Thomas felt strengthened in his opinion that "the situation is particularly favorable at the moment "to take control of armaments management at the OKW again".110

In the weeks that followed, the Defense Economics and Armaments Office talked at length about the "impossibility" of implementing the Göring program or even all of the Wehrmacht's armaments projects at the same time, while it made the uncomfortable demands for the "ruthless cutting" of the armaments programs of the Army and... Marine111 and was again approached about a "central Wehrmacht planning office" 112, the Ministry of Munitions acted without delay. Todt's decree of July 11, 1941 113 appeared before Hitler's decree of July 14 and left no doubt that the Minister of Munitions did not intend to cede to anyone the central position reserved for him in the "re-equipment" in the decree of June 20th. "Todt has," Thomas noted on July 14, "issued an order on his own initiative about the transfer of armaments to the new air force program... In doing so, Todt also takes over the distribution of capacity." 114 Todt's decree stated at the beginning of the new air force program that it would require a "significant increase" in air force armaments. 115 However, the "tank program, pure submarine production including torpedoes and the Anti-aircraft ammunition and
anti-aircraft tube production and special production are excluded based on the highest decision." A "capacity committee" appointed by Todt under his long-serving employee Georg Rickhey (Demag), to which the OKW and Wehrmacht parts were each to send a representative, made a decision on the transfer of armaments capacities everything from the army to the air force. The transfer - always called "exchange of capacities" (!) in the decree - should, if possible, be carried out in such a way that entire companies are freed from army orders. With these orders, "only a few forms should be kept in full employment if possible"; They should be concentrated on those companies "that work most efficiently." This could only mean that the large, leading army suppliers continued to produce and possibly even more exclusively for army armaments. At the same time, the ammunition

108 ZStA Potsdam, Case XI, No. 415, Bl. 153, Doc. PS-14.56, TO Thomas' ex. Lecture given by Göring, November 6, 1940.

109 As note 94.

110 As note 94 (p. 534).

111 Same as note 99; various entries June-August 1941 (bsd. June 26th, July 1st, August 1st, August 4th, August 8th).

112 *Barbarossa case,* p. 225, Dole 63, report WiRüAmt v. July 10, 1941.

113 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 4186, Todt's decree regarding "exchange of capacities", July 11, 1941.

114 As note 99; Entry v. July 14, 1941.

115 Like Aum. 113. Hereafter also the following.

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Minister, for example, introduced special representatives in all 31 companies that included spare parts for tanks in their production program - including Alkett, Daimler-Benz, Krupp, Henschel and Maybach. "Shortage spare parts" for the Eastern Front were to be produced with the utmost urgency in order to make up for the frightening tank failures. The commissioners had to "program all the necessary machines for 24-hour working hours" for the "next few weeks".116 The sole power of disposal over the The labor force that became available was assigned to the examination commissions, which also reported to the Minister of Ammunition.117 The general aircraft master had to communicate his requirements to the ministry or the capacity committee. Like the departments of the army and navy, he was "not authorized" Give instructions directly to the companies. All final decisions rested with the Minister of Ammunition.

With his decree, Todt committed himself to a specific process of "re-equipment" in favor of arming the Luftwaffe; however, he concentrated important powers for the regulation of this process in his hands, and it was largely left to him to determine the pace of the procedure. In During the course of August, the air force command repeatedly complained "that Todt's capacity reallocation is proceeding too slowly" 118 and that the "redirection of armaments" had "practically ... not had any effect yet". 1Hl After all, in July 1941, the OKH began compiling long lists of the "cancellation and reduction of Wehrmacht orders", first for less important military equipment and accessories, and soon also for "large weapons". The OKM followed this example. "Throttling lists" were sent to the armaments inspections and commands, which in turn made "throttling suggestions" and finally the companies received corresponding "throttling letters" .120 The resulting changes in the structure of German war production did not, however, correspond in scope to the what the authors of the Göring program considered necessary. Their pace slowed to the same extent as the advance of the fascist armies on Soviet soil. How they actually affected the Luftwaffe's armament is not easy to assess, especially since these effects were regional and were very different depending on the branch of industry. There were armaments inspections that, after a quarter of a year, reported the "redirection of army production" as "completely completed" and expressly noted about their result that instead of a generous layoff, it ultimately resulted in "only a purely internal relocation of the workforce " took place; because instead of the canceled or shortened army orders, new weapons and equipment were put into production.121

116 At the same time, for example, the Minister of Ammunition appointed special representatives in all 31 companies that had spare parts for tanks in their production program - including Alkett, Daimler-Benz, Krupp, Henschel and Maybach. :\lit with utmost urgency, "shortage spare parts" should be produced for the Eastern Front in order to reduce the frightening tank failures. The commissioners had to "program all the necessary machines for 24-hour working hours" for the "next few weeks" (Ludwig, Technology, p. 375; quoted by Vfgg. RMfBuM from July 12 and 21, 1941).

117 See p. 180f.

118 As note 99, entry from August 2, 1941.

119 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1781, (monthly) situation report of Rüin III (Berlin), August 15, 1941.

120 div. Mat. on this for July-October 1941 in: ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 2313 and 3643.

121 Ibid., film 1781, (monthly) situation report of Rüin VI (Münster), November 14, 1941.

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In situation reports from the Chambers of Commerce and Industry and Commerce to the Reich Chamber of Commerce for the period August/September 1941 it was said that the ordered exchange of capacities in favor of the Luftwaffe had “not yet had any further i The previous orders essentially continue." 122 Those responsible for army armament in the OKH and in the armaments inspections were, however, still worried. They turned with increasing vigor against the planned rapid dismantling of army armament out of fear that " "The capacities ordered by the OKH could one day only be on paper". "are no longer available to the army."124 Finally, on October 1st, the Reich Minister for Armament and Ammunition stated bluntly to the Reich Labor Minister on the occasion of the withdrawal of French forced laborers from construction projects of the army (tank production) and the navy, " that this one-sided promotion of air force production, while completely neglecting the most important armaments construction projects, is not in the interest of the overall rearmament." 125 The production of war aircraft actually developed in a direction exactly opposite to the wishes and plans of the strategists of the Göring program. From its peak in March 1941 to November, it fell from 1,174 to 895 machines - this despite the rapidly increasing losses in the East - and only significantly exceeded this level from the spring of 1942.126 However, it was precisely during this time that very large new ones were created Plants for the aircraft industry. The office of the "General Construction Inspector for the Reich Capital", ie Albert Speers, which carried out these buildings, was in almost daily working contact with both the Inspector General of the Air Force and, above all, with the Minister of Ammunition, who was also the general representative for the regulation of the According to the labor force balance of the companies producing mainly armaments and directly supervised by Wehrmacht services, the so-called W or A companies, in which around 45 percent of all those employed in the industry worked in mid-1941 127, the number of employees grew The companies working mainly for the air force were not insignificant, although the factories working for the army did not lose a large number of workers.

The increase in the number of companies working for the Air Force was based almost exclusively on the fact that workers outside the W companies, exclusively foreign forced laborers, were hired for them. After all, a certain - small - number of workers can also be expected who were "relocated" within the Army and Navy's companies to fulfill orders from the Air Force. (Table 4)
In a later study, the OKW concluded that "the Führer's decrees of June 20 and July 14, 1941 had relatively little effect on the armaments sector."

122 BA Koblenz, R 11178, excerpts from the situation reports for mid-August/mid-September 1941.
123 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 3643, AN RKdo Augsburg, Army Group, above. Discussed on September 2, 1941, September 3, 1941.
124 Ibid., film 2313, Chief HRüst/BdE to Chief OKW, September 18, 1941.
125 Ibid., Film 4566, RMfBuM to RArbM, October 1, 1941.
126 The Effects, p. 277, table 102.
127 Ibid., p. 214, table 13; p. 213, table 11.

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Table 4

Employees of W companies (in 1,000)

	In total	of that army	air force	Navy
March 31, 1941	4325.7	1395.6	1341.6	545.4
June 30, 1941	4516.5	1397.4	1519.1	598.4
December 31, 1941	4694.0	1390.7	1762.4	620.6

Source: **ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film** 8297, **RMfBuM list of the workforce situation in W companies,** August 10, 1932.

industry" and that the "re-equipment" overall had brought about "not such drastic changes" in the war economy.128

-e) The crisis of the economic blitzkrieg concept

The conflicts within the state-monopoly mechanism of the war economy were by no means an indication that the ruling circles of Hitler's Germany did not agree on the strategic and armaments line on which the Göring program was based. On the contrary, the hope for a
·1, the decisive victory over the USSR within a few months united them, and the re-equipment A future fight against the Anglo-American-dominated hemisphere was the focus of their strategic conception. Since June 1941, **Todt and Speer, who he entrusted with the buildings for the aircraft industry, also spent a large part of their energy on implementing the conversion concept.**
What made the entire "re-equipment" illusory from the start were the conflicts mentioned :stirred up and made the Göring program disappear into obscurity within a short time, it was rather the events in the theater of war in the East. The course of the fighting
After just a few weeks of the Wehrmacht's first initial successes on the German-Soviet front, it was demonstrably influenced by the war economy.
With its heroic resistance, the Red Army severely thwarted the aggressors' timetable. At the end of July, Army Group Center had to go on defense for a long period of time in front of Smolensk. In the north, the advance of the German troops stalled in front of Leningrad, in the south in front of Kiev. By the beginning of September, for example, the Hitler's Wehrmacht in the East had lost over 1,800 **tank fighting vehicles, ie** 53 **percent of their original inventory.129 The total losses were in July and August alone .to a total of** 1,350 **tanks.130: The fascists only suffered monthly losses of this magnitude again in** 1943. **The army's personnel losses on the German-Soviet front amounted to** 410,000 **men by the end of August.131 In September and October things slowed down in the face of urgent demands of the army for supplies of ammunition**

128 **ZStA Potsdam, FS, film** 2325, **study about. "Conversion" by Colonel Dr. Hedler, undated {around May/June** 1942).
129 ***Müller-Hillebrand,* Vol.** 3, p. 205.
130 **Ibid., table p.** 274/75.
131 ***DZW,* Vol. 2, p.** 67.

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and after new weapons, the pace of "re-equipment" increased. At the end of October, the first offensive of the fascist troops against Moscow and at the end of November the second offensive against Moscow came to a standstill. During the great Soviet counter-offensive, which began on December 5th/6th , the Blitzkrieg strategy and with it the Göring program finally and completely together.

This development was the actual cause of the failure of the "re-equipment" in the second half of 1941. It was only the Soviet counter-offensive in December that caused the German imperialists to seriously prepare for the new wartime economic situation; but the events had already become apparent since mid-August on the German-Soviet front as the decisive causal factor for the failure of the economic blitzkrieg concept.

In view of the high losses of people and armaments material, important circles of the regime considered it too risky to cut the army's armament as drastically as the "re-equipment" would have required. It was the Wehrmacht leadership that first unexpectedly did so registered the enemy's tough resistance and its own exceptionally high losses and therefore gave the signal to slow down the "re-equipment" and to make significant reductions in it. On August 16 , 1941, after two days of preliminary discussions, General Field Marshal Keitel discussed the implementation of Hitler's decree of July 14 with the ammunition minister and the heads of the Wehrmacht's armament departments . The course of this meeting testified to the completely vain effort to continue to view the decree and thus the "re-equipment" as a real planning orientation. The highest authorities of the Wehrmacht's armament and the war economy had to admit that the prerequisites for this - the victory over the USSR and the control of their economic wealth - was completely unclear.

Keitel announced with hollow boasting that the Wehrmacht could "no longer face a serious opponent in ground combat" 132; but at the same time he had to highlight the great shortage of manpower and raw materials as "retarding moments" 133 for the ordered "re-equipment". Although he said "that the main demands could be met", he explained in the same breath: " I cannot meet the demands submitted (by the Wehrmacht parts - D.E.) ." 134 He announced as certain that the tank program was based on the monthly production output of 600 tanks - instead of the previously planned 900 or even the "ideal requirements" for 2000 tanks 135 - plus a certain number of newly developed heaviest (Tiger) tanks (first 50, then 25 pieces of t36). This meant that the June/July goal of setting up 36 panzer divisions became an immeasurable distance; a few days after the meeting, Hitler and his generals also postponed the plan, which had already been reduced on August 8th which envisaged the formation of 30 such divisions.137

132 *Thomas,* p. 459, minutes d. “Head of the OKW meeting with the Wehrmacht units on August 16th. 41", v. 1p. 8. 19'11.

133 Ibid., p. t,60.

134 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1742, concept by Keitel f. "Hustungsbriefung August 16, 1941: Keywords for my statements".

135 Ibid., AN ex. d. Tank Committee meeting on i7. 7. 1941; plus cover letter Thomas to Keitel v. July 19, 1941.

136 Ibid., initial note from Keitel (August 16) to Thom's letter dated July 19, 1941.

137 Ibid., film 1828, to boss/department. L for WiRüAmt 20. 8. 1()41 ex. Determine between Hitler, Keitel, Brauchitsch and Fromm regarding army armaments; *Reinhardt,* p. 38 (according to Keilcl's orders

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The core of the "redirection of armaments", the Göring program, had already shrunk beyond recognition. Milch described the shortage of manpower, which made it impossible for the Luftwaffe to "transfer even a single man to the expanded air armament program".138 The Luftwaffe was out Already made a virtue of necessity and announced the so-called moose program. The Moose program was originally conceived as the first phase of the Göring program and envisaged a doubling of the Luftwaffe's strength by the spring of 1942. Now it sounded completely different: “1) The Moose program: The air force should be brought back to the level it was at before the start of the eastern operation (i.e. the target strength as of April 1st - EN). There will be no plans to expand the air force for the time being, but perhaps from the summer of 1942 onwards. Then 2) the continuation of the Göring program occurs. This envisages a quadrupling of the air force, but this will not be feasible as it fails due to the aluminum and fuel issues... The head of the department ..., (General Thomas DE), GFM Milch and Colonel General Udet agree that, in the best case, a doubling could be considered." 139 Even the moose program in its current version, Milch explained at the meeting on August 16th, must “already reduced by 20 percent”; This would mean that "only 60 percent of the target level of the necessary front and home equipment would be achieved."140 He alluded to the high losses on the German-Soviet front: "The production and disposal of aircraft are currently in balance." In contrast to Keitel, Todt said more clearly that the military development was different than the fascists had expected: “The plan for the tank program and the expanded air armament program came about at a time when it was believed that around 1 million would be available after the end of the Eastern campaign To be able to free up workers from the army for the economy. However, the situation has changed today Free 300,000 men for the armaments industry and also replace 200,000 men from older generations.1"3 A positive result was not to be expected under the given circumstances. General

From August 8, 1941, only 30 tank and 15 motorized infantry divisions were to be set up, each with two instead of three regiments).

138 Same as note 132 (p. 466).

139 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1826, AN WiRüAmt/Stab "about the chief meetings at GFM Keitel from August 14th to 16th, 1941", from August 17th, 1941. For the changes to the Göring and Elch programs that followed in quick succession, see . *Ir11ing, Da11id,,* The Tragedy of the German Air Force. From the files and memories of Field Marshal Milch, Frankfurt a. M./Berlin (West)/Vienna 1970, p. 189ff. Wrong assessment and classification of the Elk and Göring program in *The Effects,* p. 151, p. 153.

140 *Thomas,* p. 466f. (see note 132).

141 Ibid., p. 467. - On June 30, Milch had already commented on the high losses that production could not make up for due to a lack of aluminum: "If things continued like this, the air force would be ready in Russia in a month." (ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 2313, TO Chief WiRüAmt about call Milch, June 30, 1941) See also *Groehler,* History of the Air War, p. 318 (ff.).

142 *Thomas,* p. 465 (as note 132).

143 Ibid., p. 467.

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For self-understanding, Thomas recorded a devastating result as a conclusion to the three-day meetings: “1. Restriction of the tank program, 2. Killing the gas war preparations in the army, 3. Killing the Sea Lion preparations, 4. Restrictions on the anti-aircraft program, 5. Aligning the air force program with the existing possibilities."144Hitler's decree of July 14th was valid on paper it is still considered “unchangeable” 145; In reality, however, just a month after its announcement it was "practically outdated" 146 because its core point, the Göring program, had not been tackled comprehensively or in a concentrated manner and the tank program had been significantly shortened.

The completely new standards and requirements that now applied to the German war economy in view of the military situation in the East had a direct impact on the planning of military operations. The controversies in the Wehrmacht leadership since the end of July 1941 about the primary direction of the following attacks were ended by a "Führer directive" of August 21, 1941, in which the most important goal for the near future was "not the capture of Moscow, but the taking of the Crimea, of the industrial and coal region on the Donets and the cutting off of the Russian oil supply to the Caucasus" 147 because, as Hitler justified this order in a "study", "the destruction or removal of vital sources of raw materials is even more crucial than the occupation or destruction of industrial processing sites". 148 The wartime economic situation and the economic strategic motive that arose from it - the "taking away" of Ukraine's agricultural resources, the Dnepr-Donec industrial area (coal, manganese, iron ore) and, above all, the oil sources of the Caucasus - had a direct and significant influence on the military Decision.

Hitler's decree of September 11, 1941,149, which came about during the time of the successful fascist offensive in Ukraine, was also an attempt - by different means - to turn things around and still get on the armament course that the decrees of June and July had set out had. The Wehrmacht units were encouraged to concentrate on their armament priorities. Your arms orders to industry should be controlled and coordinated by the OKW; All “requirements of the Wehrmacht parts for procurement and development to the procurement offices” should be passed through the OKW. This is where the “comparison” of what cannot be fulfilled should take place.

The Military Economics and Armaments Office saw this as an opportunity to gain a central war-economic command position, but very soon had to realize that the office lacked the prerequisites for "adapting and aligning the Wehrmacht's procurement needs with the performance of industry" 150 were missing. The OKW needed a month to formulate implementing provisions for the decree151. Keitel had tempered expectations early and with foresight: It should-

144 As note 139.
145 As note 134.
146 *Tlwmas,* p. 287.
147 *KTB of the OKW,* Vol. I, p. 1062; *DZW,* Vol. 2, p. 48ff.
148 *KTB of the OKW,* Vol. I, p. 1062; *ReinhardJ,,* p. 42f.
149 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 1818. Hereafter also the following.
150 Ibid., Film 5682, Keitel's Order v. October 19, 1941.
151 Ibid.

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Only the “bare necessities” are to be regulated by the OKW.152 At the same time, he reassured the Wehrmacht parts: “The Wehrmacht High Command does not intend to intervene in the previous procurement process of the Wehrmacht parts, which remain responsible for the implementation of the programs set by the Führer. " 153 From the outset, the Wehrmacht parts evaded the obligation to disclose their orders and, above all, their development projects to the OKW, and were quite reluctant to let them control their direct cooperation with the armaments companies. The air force leadership in particular took advantage of its strong position to circumvent the new regulations. At the beginning of November, Göring had Hitler expressly exempt the air force from the requirement to disclose its development
projects to the OKW.1M The Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition was not entirely opposed to the idea of the Wehrmacht units being independent and empowered in matters of armaments to prune. Because of his close contact with Hitler, he had a much stronger position in negotiations with the OKW than in separate disputes with the Wehrmacht. In the Defense Economics and Armaments Office it was noted: "Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition wants to strengthen the position of the OKW vis-à-vis the WT with regard to the design of the armaments programs, otherwise the WT will do what they want 'in a cold way'." 155 But about this At the beginning of October 1941, there were already increasing voices in the OKW that were preemptively citing "too great responsibility and workload for OKW" 156 as the reason for the foreseeable failure of the project, and attributed the arms planning and economic organization of the Wehrm

From the end of September/beginning of October 1941, the German imperialists concentrated their forces again on the attack towards Moscow. By taking the city, they intended to deal the USSR the “final powerful blow” that would “shatter this enemy before the onset of winter.”15 7 The failure of the offensive at the end of October and a second attempt at the end of November intensified the war -economic situation drastic. From October 1941 onwards, concerns about revamping the offensive units in the East, re-equipping them and re-supplying them gradually replaced all other war economic problems. From week to week the idea that the war against the Soviet Union must be continued in 1942 became more widespread. Hitler and the military planned a longer break during which they wanted to restore the army's fighting strength and prepare for the next year's offensive.158 The army's
casualties on the German-Soviet front continued

152 Ibid., Film 8274, KTB WiRüAmt/Staff, entry from. September 17, 1941.

153 Ibid., Film 2325, OKW decree from October 10, 1941, quoted in study about. “Conversion” by Colonel Dr. Hedler, undated (around May/June 1942).

154 Ibid., film 2313, lecture notes WiRüAmt (Rü II) f. Head of Office, November 4, 1941.

155 As note 152 (entry dated October 1, 1941).

156 Ibid.

157 *DZW,* Vol. 2, p. 58 (Hitler's daily order of October 2, 1941).

158 Temporary successes in the offensive against Moscow caused waves of optimism to bubble over again among the fascist leadership; So a “special radio connection from Maikop to Bucharest was planned, which should be in place on December 1st” (see note 152, entry dated October 23rd, 1941).

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The number was frighteningly high and amounted to 141,000 men in September and 115,000 in October.159 As early as October 1st, the bulk of the 1922 class, which included a total of 270,000 conscripts, was drafted, which caused a noticeable loss of young skilled workers to the war economy. 160 Compared to around
4,300 tanks with which the Wehrmacht attacked the USSR, on November 10, 2090 armored vehicles 16 1 were destroyed or put out of action. Over time, only 601 tanks and assault guns were supplied to the army as replacements. 16 2 On November 10, the German side reported a shortage of 1,697 armored vehicles. 163 The OKH assessed the combat effectiveness of the tank divisions as only "35% of their normal strength." 164 At the same time, the Army Quartermaster General registered 25,777 trucks, 19,242 cars, 30,423
motorcycles, 1,729 tractors and 4,410 other vehicles as "departures." 165 In mid-November, only 15 percent (75,000) of the 500,000 vehicles that the army had at its disposal at the beginning of the attack were actually ready to drive. 166

This meant that the prerequisites for the plan to expand the army's rapid troops to 30 tank and 15 motorized infantry divisions were no longer applicable and the associated tank program became illusory. The OKH judged that the severely damaged units would no longer be sufficiently refreshed for "far-reaching, rapid operations" by the spring of 1942. 167 The previous, already inadequate army motorization could no longer be maintained. 168 The ammunition reserves of most types of projectiles were used up in November. The
Quartermaster General stated on November 26th that only by “resuming or increasing the production of most types of ammunition” could “connection to supplies be guaranteed”.169 From the autumn of 1941 onwards, widespread uncertainty was characteristic of the situation in all of them Armament
departments. The military economics and armaments office complained: “The clear order that the WT Army must be significantly restricted in approving claims in the field of armaments in favor of the WT Air Force and Navy after the end of the Eastern campaign is often accompanied by short instructions from the OKW bosses to push ahead with production again that do not fall under the priority programs have been abolished or its 100% implementation has been made impossible." 170 On November 19, 1941, Thomas summarized to Keitel the significant demands placed on the army's armament "recently." were: “1. Further production of heavy artillery..., 2. Another significant increase in the

159 ***DZW,*** **Vol.** 2, p. 67.
160 ***Reinhardt,*** p. 102f.
161 ***DZW,*** **Vol. 2, p. 25; *Reinhardt,* p.** 115.
162 ***Reinhardt,*** p. 115.
163 **Ibid.**
164 ***KTB*** *of the* ***OKW,*** **Vol. 1, p.** 1074, **Doc.** 106, **"Assessment of the combat power of the Eastern Army",** November 6, 1941.
165 ***Reinhardt,*** **p.** 115 **{according to OKH report from November 25,** 1941).
166 **Ibid. (Report dated** November 18, 1941).
167 **Ibid., p.** 116, **report from** 11/3/1941 . _
168 **Ibid., report by** November 18, 1941.
169 **Ibid., p.** 114, **report from November** 26, 1941.
170 **ZStA Potsdam, FS, film** 2313, **lecture notes WiRüAmt {Rü** II) **f. Head of Office,** November 13, 1941.

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Production of various types of ammunition, 3. Focus on Panzerkampfwagen production for the Panzerkampfwagen IV, 4. Accelerated production of the 7.5 cm anti-tank gun in the largest possible number." 171 On October 25th, the
Wehrmacht's Economics and Armaments Office still had the Wehrmacht parts for the year 1942 in the form of a decree “Raw material quantities for production forecasts”172.

Table 5

OKW raw material specifications for the Wehrmacht units for 1942 (in t! month)

	army	Navy	air force
iron and Steel (machinery and construction iron)	180000	185000	335000
aluminum	1750	3000	24000
copper	700	2900	3500
Lead	825	2950	2400
tin	52.5	175	150
chrome	296	382.5	552.5
rubber	140	610	1300

Source: ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 8288, WiRüAmt order, October 25, 1941, appendix.

These forecast figures, according to which the Air Force was at the top and the Army at the very bottom, were still a result of blitzkrieg thinking. They still corresponded completely to the concept of "re-equipment" and the Göring program. A few weeks later, when they had long since proven to be an anachronism, the head of the army armament once again explicitly objected to the forecast figures and stated sharply that they were for the The quantities of raw materials intended for the Army “do not allow the Rapid Forces program to be carried out in its entirety, ... do not allow the Army’s additional ammunition program and [that] additional raw materials are necessary for this alone,” in short, that “the maintenance of the Army in a state of war is not possible to the necessary extent."173 The documents from the Army Weapons Office, on which Fromm relied, showed that even with a sharp focus on the "priority programs" -
tanks, heavy anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft guns - only 30 percent of the iron and steel required for them must be covered from the quantities specified by the Defense Economics and Armaments Office and that this number is further reduced by the lack of N E0 and alloy metals (chromium, molybdenum, tungsten, nickel, copper, aluminum) and rubber. The head of the HW A, General Emil Leeb, concluded that "only the following output could probably be achieved for 1942: Fast troops (armored vehicles and armored vehicles) s. Pak

25-30 percent
100 percent
Flak (2 cm) until March 1942 67 percent; from April 1942 0 percent.

171 Ibid., WiRüAmt lecture note for head of the OKW, November 19, 1941.
172 Ibid., Film 8288, Vfg. WiRüAmt, October 25, 1941, appendix.
173 Ibid., Film 2313, Memo Chef HRüst/BdE ex. "The ammunition situation", n.d. (hands. Marg.: "For discussion with Chief HRüst-Chief WiRü at Min. Todt on December 4th, 4 p.m.").

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while all other production e.g. T. remain significantly below or fail completely."174 The air force leadership and the four-year plan group, including the aircraft industry companies, were now concerned with saving what could be saved from the Göring program, effectively expanding the state monopoly mechanism in this sector of the war economy and the to thoroughly rationalize the aircraft industry.

The activities of the air force command were temporally and materially related to those of the Chemical Division, which at about the same time was pushing for the accelerated completion of "some major projects in the mineral oil plan from the 1942 annual plan" and for 13 such projects from the OKW "automatic preference over all others orders".175 On

October 4th, the office of general aircraft master was reorganized.176 Two days later, Albert Vögler, chairman of the supervisory board of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke group, and Rudolf Labs, head of the aviation industry business group, joined the industrial council for air force equipment and instead of Koppenberg, Ludger Westrick, chairman of the board of Vereinigte Aluminumwerke AG, the largest German aluminum company, became a member of the industrial council. The entry of Westrick and especially Vögler into the Industrial Council demonstrated the decided intention of the leaders of German finance capital to push ahead with air armament as much as possible and to make their state-monopoly organization more effective. At the same time, the reorganization of the Industrial Council demonstrated that those circles did not give up hope that the Göring program would also realize the political-strategic concept on which it was ba

Through a decree from Göring "on the establishment of production rings within the German air force industry and on the tasks of the ring leaders"177, "at the suggestion of the Industrial Council, all similar branches of industry that are involved in the air force industry were brought together to form production rings."178 Under the leadership of the Industrial Council, so-called rings or production rings should work according to the model of the special committees and working groups of the Reich Ministry for Armament and Ammunition. They were under the leadership of a lead company and a key representative of this company, the ring leader, and had significant powers over the other armaments and supplier companies for the distribution of orders and for the rationalization of production.

At the same time, Field Marshal Milch replaced Aircraft Master General Ernst Udet from the direct management of the Luftwaffe armaments departments. Milch took over the de facto chairmanship of the Industrial Council. A scapegoat was found for this in Udet Failure of the Luftwaffe's blitzkrieg concept. He had to use his head for it too

174 *Reinhardt,* p. 111f., memorandum HWA (Leeb) about. “The armaments situation of the army. As of November 5, 1941", November 1941.

175 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 5682, GB Chemistry to OKW WiRüAmt, November 10, 1941. In a study based on the fuel consumption and inventory figures for the second half of 1941, the Defense Economic and Armaments Office described it as "absolutely impossible" to carry out the Göring program from this point of view. (Ibid., film 10667, Study WiRüAmt (Tomberg), undated, around January/February 1942). On the acute fuel difficulties from autumn 1941, see *Reinhardt,* p. 116ff.

176 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 2312, Order of the General Aircraft Master (Ernst Udet) v. October 4, 1941.

177 Ibid., film 2325, Göring decree, October 1941 (with cover letter dated November 20, 1941).

178 *Anatomy of War,* p. 367, Doc. 186, report d. Industrial Council for Air Force Equipment v. 12/12/1941.

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that there was still a confusion of types and fierce competition among the aircraft companies, that even the series in production were repeatedly disrupted by new technical requests from the General Staff and the Technical Office of the Air Force, and that the desired "American" There could be no question of mass production. On November 17th, he committed suicide.179 On October 22nd , 1941 , Thomas and Milch discussed the "new air armament program".

This time William Werner (Auto-Union/Junkers), the deputy chairman of the Luftwaffe Industrial Council, was present. Milch initially presented a reduced but still ambitious plan for air armament, according to which the production of war aircraft (of which around 80 percent were front-line aircraft) was increased from around 12,500 in the current year to 16,500 in 1942 and to 20,600 in 1943. ie by 32 or 24 and a total of 65.5 percent.180 Werner was then given the floor. He “explains his program in detail. It is based on

a significant rationalization of production, which envisages the American methods of mass production, and also on modern manufacturing processes. Today we do antediluvian work in 75 percent of our industry because we mainly manufacture shavings. Up to now there has essentially been a lack of competition, and it was wrong to pay any price, since the higher price also involved more effort, but this higher effort also tied up more workers and materials than cheaper production, ie production with less Expense. The same parts should only be manufactured in two, at most three places. All companies have to adapt to the company with the least effort in their production, whereby the manufacturing methods of the company with the least effort are available to all others. The educational work will have to be supported by a lower allocation of raw materials and workers." 181 Werner propagated the system of "best companies", a system of rationalization of war production, which is essentially based on a centralization of production and profits among the most modern, the so-called best companies, ie usually at the large aircraft companies. The respective ring leader -

himself the leading representative of a best company or the industrial council - should enforce centralization using his state-monopolistic regulatory authority. A very similar system had long been the basis for the work in the committees and working groups of the Reich Ministry for Armament and Ammunition.182 The appointment of Vögler, the eminence grise of the Ministry of Ammunition, to the Air Force Industrial Council was certainly connected with the fact that this system was now being implemented should find the air armament.

However, a resounding success - multiplication of production and profits - remained dependent on whether continuous production of large series was possible; this in turn depended largely on the fate of the ruling class's conception of air warfare and air armament.

In view of the failure of the fascists' October offensive against Moscow, he stiffened

179 The Göring decree on the reorganization of the Industrial Council was dated inaccurately ("in October 1941") and was only sent with a GL circular on November 20, 1941, ie after Udet's death (!) (see note 177).See also Groehler, History of the Air War, p. 340f.

180 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 8288, protocol WiRüAmt (Thomas) about. d. meeting b. milk v. October 22, 1941.

181 Ibid.

182 See Volume I, Chapter. 3.

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The resistance of the army and the ammunition ministry against the air armament program increased. "The army practically does not release any significant capacity or manpower," the military economics and armaments office stated at the beginning of November.183 By November 10th, the air force had already had 5,180 front-line aircraft on the German-Soviet front, of which 2,966 were a total loss. lost and only 5,124 aircraft received as new acquisitions.184 Further supplies of bombers and fighter aircraft were no longer available on November 10th , so that the losses had not been able to be offset since the beginning of the month. Current production was too low, especially in fighter aircraft to compensate for future losses.18.'i

At the same time that the starting positions for the Göring program had deteriorated dramatically in this way, the poor prospects for manpower, machinery and raw material allocations for 1942 made it completely illusory. As Milch named serious "bottlenecks" in his study on the "prerequisite for the implementation of the 'Göring program'" - special machines for crankshaft production, aluminum, copper and especially chrome.186 In the first half of November, Göring called on the top representatives of the German war industry several consecutive large conferences. The conference began on November 7th with a discussion about the “alignment of the war economy with the armaments program.”187 On the same day, Göring chaired another meeting that dealt with the labor situation, especially with the forced use of Soviet prisoners of war and civilian workers On November 8th he gave new, programmatic guidelines for the exploitation of the occupied territories of the USSR known.

The ostentatious emergence of Göring - his last major appearance as the supreme head of all defense departments and military economic organs - can be seen as an attempt to implement the strategic concept of "re-equipment" and the Göring program or the now modified air armament program, even in the face of resistance and under the condition realize that the Wehrmacht would have to continue the war against the USSR in the coming year. This required, above all, rapidly expanded industrial capacities, large additional quantities of raw materials and millions of new workers. The capacities should be freed up by rationalization; raw materials and workers should be ruthlessly pumped out of the occupied countries, primarily the Soviet Union.

In contrast to the topics of the last-mentioned conferences, at which Göring announced binding new guidelines of great importance, he dealt with the comprehensive topic of the first meeting apparently without initiative, without enthusiasm and without any discernible result. He only summarized the long-discussed demands for rationalization of war production without giving clear instructions or at least making concrete suggestions. The incantation, “the current lead over

183 ZStA Po!sdam, FS, Film 2313, AN {„Draft") WiRüAmt (Chief Rü), November 5th, 1941. 18t, *Ileinhardt,* p. 110f (Report ObdL/GenSt. from November 14th, 1941).

185 Ibid. The production of fighter aircraft fell from the annual peak in April 1941 (476) to half (232) by November, and that of bombers also fell sharply from August {454) to November (331) (The *Effects,* p. 277, table 102) .

186 *Reinhardt,* p. 109f. (Study dated November 10, 1941).

187 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 2325, results report. d. Session i. RLM v. November 7, 1941. Hereafter also the following.

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the enemy's armaments economy must be maintained at all costs," he combined with the warning that "from 1943 onwards, an increased level of armaments in the United States can be expected." He called for “flow work in large series”. Every production should be “distributed among as few companies as possible” so that the machines could be used in two or even three shifts.

But at the same time he warned - not without a hint of demagoguery - of consequences that were unpleasant for the regime during the war: "The legal form of the companies themselves should remain untouched, and in particular no agglomerations into large corporations should arise." That's exactly what he was talking about Man whose war economic program always coincided with the line of the largest German corporate polyp, the IG Farben Group, and under whose leadership another giant corporation, the Reichswerke AG "Hermann Göring", grew up through profit-making and robbery on the grandest scale! The warning signal was apparently aimed at the most important competitors of those monopoly giants, namely the Ruhr mining companies, and thus at the armaments organization of the Reich Minister for Arms and Ammunition. Göring did not acknowledge the experience of the Ministry of Munitions in the field of rationalization; He acted as if they did not exist and demanded that the “necessary consequences of an organizational nature (ring formation) -

as in the aircraft industry - ... to "pull quickly and energetically".
In the period that followed, the rationalization of war production became the field of internal disputes in which the struggle for centralized, uniform regulatory power in *the* war economy mainly continued. Göring's intervention here had no result, except in the area of air armament. Hitler himself took up this question, which claimed the increasingly burning general interest of the ruling class, regardless of what happened to the concept of "re-armament".

When the fascists' last attempt to conquer Moscow failed in the second half of November and the Red Army began successful offensive operations in the south and north, Reitel and Todt resorted to earlier "Thoughts of the Leader" 188 and draft decrees on the promotion of " of simple and therefore robust constructions" for weapons and military equipment189 and about the "preference for primitive mass production over high-performance machines"190 and caused Hitler to issue a decree on December 3, 1941 about the " simplifying and increasing the performance of our armaments production"191 sign. Although the OKW was in charge of the preparatory work for the decree, Hitler's first informant when drafting the decree was Todt. Without Todt's consent, none of the OKW's drafts had a chance of receiving Hitler's signature.

In the decree, Hitler called for a thorough "rationalization of our production methods", in particular "a fundamental change in such a way that the designs are adjusted to mass production and the manufacturing methods are set up accordingly". The designs of weapons and military equipment should be simplified “down to the last detail” by means of constant checks and corrections.

188 Ibid., film 2313, lecture notes WFSt/Dept. L, May 29, 1941.
189 Ibid., Film 8288, RVfg. Chief of the OKW regarding “Technical Equipment of the Wehrmacht” September 19, 1941.
190 As note 188.
191 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 5682, Hitler decree v. December 3, 1941. Hereafter also the following.

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The Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition and the head of the OKW were made responsible for the realization of these demands.
Hitler had already particularly insisted to Keitel in the preliminary discussions that "according to page 4, 2nd paragraph [of the draft decree - D.E.], all companies, other suitable companies and individual technicians should take part in the 'suggestions for production improvements ' should participate." 19 2 Keitel told Thomas: "How this is to be done in practice is of no concern to the Führer; but he demands that the OKW give orders to the Wehrmacht's parts and intervene when the demands are recognized as correct and suggestions are not followed."
The line of the decree clearly reflected the tendency to subordinate the Wehrmacht leadership to the armaments industry in matters of production and construction and to view it more and more as the executive organ of the Ministry of Munitions. This corresponded exactly to the concept of the Minister of Ammunition and the arms companies behind him. The more weight Hitler attached to the demands for the involvement of the arms monopolies, the greater the influence and radius of action of the system of "industrial self-responsibility" had to become. Explainably, Todt and Keitels could not agree on how this should be "practically done" and initially left it at that. that "the procedure in implementing provisions takes place later".

d) The legend of the missed war economic opportunities

Representatives of bourgeois historiography describe the restriction of the army's armament in 1941 as Hitler's first fatal mistake in the war against the Soviet Union. Without this decision - this is said openly or between the lines - the "Eastern campaign" and thus the Second World War could have ended differently, that is, victoriously for the German imperialists. This "theory" preserves and stimulates anti-communism, anti-Sovietism and revanchism -chauvinistic megalomania, is based on baseless assumptions and in no way corresponds to historical facts. It corresponds to the more general theses about Germany's inadequate economic preparation for the war and about the "total" mobilization of the economy during the war that occurred too late. 193

Only uncertain figures are available about the development of industrial production and armaments production in 1941. The two existing production indices - from the USSBS publications and from the German Institute for Economic Research - have very different numbers. The methodological differences between them (reference period, territorial status, calculation basis, weighting, price adjustment) are significant. (Table 6)
It can be assumed with certainty that between 1940 and 1941, armaments production rose considerably faster compared to overall industrial production , especially when it includes the production of the supplier industry and the consumer goods industry for Wehrmacht purposes, the production of raw materials and primary materials companies (e.g. the " W

192 Ibid., Film 2313, Keitel to Thomas (hs.), November 29, 1941. Hereafter also the following.
193 See ***Engelberg, Ernst,*** On the West German theory of missed opportunities in fascist rearmament, in ***German Imperialism and the Second World War,*** Vol. 3, Berlin 1962, p. 213ff.; also ***Volume 1,*** p. 17ff. and passim.

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Table 6

Industrial production and armaments production 1939-1942 (1939=100)

Year	Industrial production		including armaments equipment (IfW) and metal • processing industry (USSBS)	
	IfW	USSBS	IfW	USSBS
1939	100	100	100	100
1940	96.6	106.5	176	120.5
1941	98.9	116.6	176	145.9
1942	100	118.1	256	159

Source: IfW: *Wagenühr,* p. 191; USSBS: *The Effects,* p. 27, Table 5. - The USSBS index used in *DZW* covers pre-war Germany (1939=100). It is apparently overweighted towards the armaments side (metal processing industry) or not adjusted for armaments prices.
If you put it in relation to the declining number of employees in industry, the result is an incredibly high rate of increase in labor productivity (see also p. 265f.). The IfW index (1943=100) probably refers to “Greater Germany” including annexed areas and “Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia”. The numbers for "armament equipment" only include weapons or weapon systems and ammunition; the most dubious - too high - figure is that for 1940.

"Scientific new production plan" of the Chemical Division) and the production of equipment and machines for defense companies.
It must be taken into account that by the summer of 1941 a 200-division army had been set up. There were 1.7 million fewer German workers on May 31, 1941 than at the same time in the previous year; By May 1942, a further 1.8 million people had been withdrawn from the national economy.4 These losses were not offset by new forced transports of foreign workers to Germany. Meanwhile, however, the number of people employed by the Wehrmacht increased in absolute and relative terms.195 The constant shortage of workers throughout 1941 is an impressive indication against the thesis of “missed” war economic opportunities.

The production of ammunition, which had reached a peak in June/July 1940, was then greatly reduced. From the beginning to the middle of 1941 it rose again, although not to the previous level. In view of the extraordinarily large stocks of weapons and ammunition, including the loot from 1940, the shift of certain capacities from the army armament sector (especially ammunition) to other armament sectors that were supposedly crucial for further warfare (air armament) had already been necessary since the spring of 1941. a demand that arose logically from the fascist blitzkrieg concept and became the official war economic strategy since June 1941 under the term "re-equipment".
Ammunition production fell from then until the end of 1941. The decline in production particularly affected ammunition for infantry weapons, artillery and launchers. Anti-aircraft ammunition, however, ammunition for battle vehicle guns and various other types of ammunition were produced in increasing quantities.

194 *The Effects,* p. 207, table 6.
195 Ibid., p. 37, table 15 and p. 213, table U.

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The production of weapons, ie rifles, machine guns, cannons and launchers, showed a similar development. Here, however, total production in 1941 was higher than in the previous year, something that bourgeois historians tend to conceal.

Table 7

Production 110n weapons and ammunition 1939-1942

(January/ February 1942=100)

quarter or year	ammunition	Ammunition weapons (Army)		weapons (Army)
1939/IV	74	186	63	?
1940/1	82	195	68	86
1940/11	125	268	79	101
1940/III	139	299	83	97
1940/IV	102	185	86	101
1940 (average)	112	237	79	96
1941/1	105	178	107	127
1941/11	106	142	118	144
1941/III	100	94	109	132
1941/IV	95	86	90	90
1941 (average) 1942/1	102	125	106	123
1942/11	105	117	105	109
	147	267	132	148
1942/III	193	419	145	156
1942/IV	220	534	167	179
1942 (average)	166	334	137	148

Source: The Effects, p. 275, p. 283 and p. 286, tables 100, 111, 112 and 115.

The restriction on the production of weapons and especially ammunition was essentially limited to the army. Incidentally, it was caught up again at a very rapid pace in 1942. The rapid increase in production this year was due not least to the fact that the producers of bullet parts and accessories as well as powder and explosives had not "converted" nearly as early or as strongly and therefore had large inventories at the beginning of 1942.
That of tanks had a completely different production curve than the production of ammunition.

Table 8

Production of 110n tanks 1939-1942 (tanks and assault guns)

		pcs.	Weight **(t)**
1939 (Sept.-Dec.) 1940		247	5500
1941		1643	34820
of		3790	76720
which 1st half of	1617		
which 2nd half	2173		
1942		4961	113860

Source: The Effects, p. 163 and p. 278ff., tables 104 and 105.

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In May 1941, more than 300 tanks per month were produced for the first time. In the first half of 1941, output almost reached that of the whole of 1940; in the second half of the year it exceeded it by 32 percent. Total production in 1941 was 231 percent compared to the previous year (by combat weight: 220 percent). In November 1941, production reached its peak for the year.196 Investment activity in *the* armaments industry reached an extraordinarily large scale in 1941. This fact was closely related to the restrictions in certain areas of immediate arms production and, like these, was part of the long-term strategic - military and economic - conception of the regime's ruling circles. As early as May 18, 1941, the future war concept after "Barbarossa" was the subject of discussions between Hitler, Todt and Keitel. The following day, Keitel informed the responsible department head (representing General Thomas): "Chief OKW states that For further warfare, the production of weapons and ammunition does not play the main role, but as a prerequisite for this production and for further warfare, the expansion of the basic industries must first be continued, namely for rubber, gasoline, energy, aluminum." 197 Numerous important armaments projects were started or accelerated, especially in the aircraft and aircraft engine industries and in the raw material industries (synthetic fuel and rubber, aluminum, rayon) that were particularly supported by the state through the four-year plan. For the most part, these investments only had an impact on actual arms production in the following years.

In 1941, mechanical engineering delivered more capital goods to industry in all important product groups, with the exception of rolling stock (locomotives and wagons), than in any other year of the war.

Table 9

Sales of the mechanical engineering industry 1939-1942 (in million RM)

	Machinery equipment for	Energy systems	Rolling material	In total
1939	4874	1571	478	6923
1940	4769	1947	563	7278
1941	5210	2253	698	8161
1942	5139	2231	838	8209

QueUe: Tlze Effects, **p. 218, table 17.**

The armament efforts of German imperialism did not decrease overall in 1941, although in the second half of the year production in certain sectors of army armament was reduced in favor of production and investment programs in the area of air force armament. On the contrary, the war economy machinery of Hitler's Germany worked more tensely than before. The production

196 Ibid.

197 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1742, AN WiRüAmt (Hünermann) ex. Discuss b. Keitel on May 19th, v. May 20, 1941.

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Restrictions and changes only shifted the proportions between different areas and focuses of armament. Not only did they not limit their capacity, they expanded it considerably.

The armament conversion of 1941, like that of 1940, was in every respect a typical product of the Blitzkrieg strategy and ideology 19 8 - but this time it was based on a catastrophic miscalculation: that the USSR would collapse in a few months. In terms of content and sequence, both "re-equipment" corresponded to the changing military-strategic objectives of the German imperialists, who gradually eliminated one enemy after another on their way to world domination "through devastating strikes right at the beginning of hostilities" (Carl Krauch) 199 wanted to. The Blitzkrieg strategy was designed to provide breathing space between phases of great military effort and high economic stress.

Such breaks should enable restructuring in the armaments industry due to changed arms programs without causing strong tensions in the structure of the capitalist economy and, if possible, without losses in production.

In addition, the intention of the ruling circles in Hitler's Germany was unmistakable to use the blitzkrieg strategy to achieve their goals with the expenditure of economic forces that corresponded not only to the available economic potential, but also to the degree of its mobilization that they considered justifiable. The negative effects of armaments and war on one's own people should be kept within controllable, albeit deferrable, limits so that social shocks and conflicts can be prevented. On average, the misery associated with war should not fall below a certain low point - at the expense of the subjugated and plundered peoples of other countries. The ruling class still remembered the shock of 1918 all too vividly. In her own way, she had drawn certain conclusions from it.

From June 1941 onwards, the economic blitzkrieg concept of German imperialism was to be implemented in a comprehensive, almost "classic" manner. The heroic resistance of the Soviet people, which thwarted the military planning of the aggressors from the outset, immediately revealed its deeply illusory character this concept.

198 See fundamentally Förster, Gerhard, Total War and Blitzkrieg. The theory of total war and blitzkrieg in the military doctrine of fascist Germany on the eve of the Second World War, Berlin 1967, p. 87ff., p. 94.

199 Eichholtz, Dietrich, On the share of the IG Farben Group in the preparation of the Second World War, in *JfW,* 1969, T. 2, p. 99f., Report of the GB Chemistry before the General Council of the Four-Year Plan (draft from 20./ April 21, 1939).

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The collapse of the economic blitzkrieg concept. Concentration of state monopoly regulatory power

1. Effects of the defeat before Moscow

At the beginning of December, the Wehrmacht's last attempt to break through to Moscow collapsed. Immediately afterwards, the Soviet counteroffensive began. On November 27th, the Army Chief of Staff, Colonel General Franz Halder, had already stated: "We are at the end of our personnel and material strength." 1 The Soviet offensive in front of Moscow, which began on December 5th/6th, 1941 and in 1942, which continued on a broader front until March/April, finally revealed that the strategic calculation of the fascist aggressors and thus the entire planning of the predatory and class war against the USSR had failed. The basic concept of the "Blitzkrieg" on which German imperialism relied in the second attempt to establish its world hegemony had proven to be a failure.

At the same time, the hard military facts revealed that the previous military economy concept and thus the state monopoly regulatory mechanism in its previous mode of operation and structure were unsuitable for the future. It wasn't just about making up for the front's material losses, which had reached completely new standards. Those responsible for the German war economy were faced with the task of organizing a long-term, functional and significantly more efficient production apparatus in the midst of a serious defeat and bitter defensive battle with the loss of hundreds of thousands of workers who were withdrawn to restore the army's strength, without them being over were able to dispose of all the riches of the Soviet country, which had already been on the credit side in their blitzkrieg calculations.

By the end of November 1941, the war against the Soviet Union had cost the fascist army more than 750,000 men in dead, missing or prisoners and the wounded and sick transported to the hinterland - all previous campaigns since 1939, however, had cost less than 100,000 men.2 The information about Wehrmacht losses from

1 *Halder, Franz,* war diary. Daily notes of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army 1939-1942, Vol. 3, Stuttgart 1964, p. 311.

2 *KTB of the OKW ,* vol . p _ _ , p. 88) considers these figures as the results of preliminary surveys and comes to a total of 822,000 men (of which around 420,000 men were irretrievable losses).

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December 1941 to April 1942 amounts to a further 560,000 men.3 The army alone lost 1.29 million on the German-Soviet front from June 22, 1941 to April 30, 1942.
Man; That was 93.5 percent of its total losses and around 40 percent of the units deployed in the attack on the USSR.4

Table 10

Losses on the German-Soviet front (selection)
June 22, 1941 to January 30, 1942

	until November 1, 1941	until November 30, 1941	until December 31, 1941	until January 30, 1942
Armored vehicles Motor	1812	3290	3730	4241
vehicles Airplanes	76488	93326	116440	121529
(front losses)	3838	4219	4643	5100
1. FH s.	538	651	1103	1300
FH l. IG	310	354	554	642
see IG	640	721	919	1067
	196	228	302	352
l. Gr. W.	2378	2638	3162	3572
s.Gr. W.	1315	1501	1974	2318
Kan.10cm	65	75	108	132
3.7cm Pak	2479	2698	3349	3787
5cm Pak	274	291	426	475
carbine MG	49963	54422	60732	66432
	16211	17676	21062	24247
horses	85899	120494	143503	179132

Source: Reinhardt, p. 316, appendix 7 (source: 10-day reports from the army and air force).

From June to November 1941, the army suffered a total loss of 2,326 tanks and assault guns, almost all of which were lost on the German-Soviet front.5 Accordingly, around 55 percent of the tank fleet deployed there on June 22nd was completely destroyed. From December 1941 to March 1942, a further 1,234 tanks and 107 assault guns were lost.6 The figures do not include the loss of repairable tanks, which then amounted to around two thirds of the total losses. 7 Of the 16 tank divisions deployed on the German-Soviet front, only 140 operational tanks were counted on March 30, 1942.8 Losses in infantry weapons and artillery continued until the end of the war

3 *Grigoleit,* Appendix p. 23, app. 8.
4 Ibid.; *DZW,* Vol. 2, p. 274 (according to Halder: 1.168 million).
5 *Müller-Hillebrand,* Vol. 3, p. 21 and list according to p. 274. According to *The Effects,* p. 165, only 500 German tanks were lost on the German-Soviet front by the end of September, whereas 2,500 were lost in the next three months (Only: tanks and assault guns).
6 *Müller-Hillebrand,* Vol. 3, list according to p. 274.
7 Ibid., p. 205. *Reinhardt* (p. 258) gives the total losses of the Eastern army up to January 31, 1942 4,241 tanks and assault guns (see Table 10).
8 *Reinhardt,* p. 258.

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By the end of the fall, it was still essentially within the limits estimated by the German military. In the retreat from Moscow, however, the Wehrmacht lost significant amounts of weapons and equipment. Losses were particularly high in terms of artillery, disproportionately higher than in the entire campaign against France in 1940 .

Table 11

Losses and inventory of army guns in 1940 and 1941/42 (in pieces)

	Duration June 1, 1941	Losses December 1941 to February 1942 (90 days)	Losses 5/10-20 6. 1940 1.2.1942 (42 days)	Duration
Pak (3.7 and 5 cm)	15506	1771	636	
l. lf. G. (7.5cm) s. lf.	4176	510	154	?
G. (15 cm)	867	165	23	
IFH (10.5 cm) see	7076	800-900 •	137	3775
FH (15 cm)	2867	361	88	791 6155 2514

• My estimation; in the source incorrectly 147; Total loss June 22, 1941 to March 15, 1942 = 1307.

•*Source: DZW,* Vol. 2, p. 275 (some differences there); *Müller-Hillebrand,* Ed. 3, p. 29 and p. 42 .

. By November 10th , almost 81,600 motor vehicles had been lost.9 From December 1941 to March 1942 , the total losses of motor vehicles amounted to a further 31,100 trucks, 18,300 cars and 22,500 motorcycles, as well as 2,250 tractors.

These failures of a total of around 74,200 motor vehicles were offset by new allocations of only 7,441 units.10 The Luftwaffe suffered a total loss of 6,894 machines in the period from June 1941 to January 1942.11 The consumption of ammunition, especially artillery ammunition, exceeded in the autumn and winter months production increases several times over. 12 The "catastrophic railway performance" 13 worsened the supply of the front. At the turn of the year 1941/42 , the troops only had one to two tenths of their normal supply of infantry and artillery ammunition and 0.1 to 0.5 daily allowances of fuel.14 At the end of December 1941 , the OKH turned to the armaments inspectorate and requested in telexes that the production of army ammunition, especially artillery ammunition, be "quickly increased to maximum output".15 Such attempts by the OKH, immediately to intervene in production continued for weeks. “The General Staff is clamoring for the capacity of the 10.5 cm” (field howitzer high-explosive grenade), the Augsburg Armaments Command noted at the beginning of February 1942 16; the OKH demanded capacities

9 *Reinhardt,* p. 115.

10 *Müller-Hillebrand,* vol. 3, p. 29; *DZW,* Vol. 2, p. 275.

11 of which 4,903 were total departures *(Reinhardt,* p. 260; see also *Groehler,* History of the Air War, p. 333).

12 *Müller-Hillebrand,* Vol. 3, p. 43.

13 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1829, AN WiRüAmt (Rü II) ex. Thomas' lecture to Keitel on January 13, 1942, v. January 14, 1942. On the collapse of the Wehrmacht's transport system in the winter of 1941/42 in the USSR, see *Reinhardt,* p. 280ff.

14 As note 13 (film 1829).

15 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 3398, FS OKH Chief (HRüst/BdE) v. December 24 and 30, 1941). t6 Ibid., film 4826, AN RüKdo Augsburg, February 8, 1942.

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to switch from 8.8 cm to 10.5 cm high-explosive grenade production, "because the 8.8 cm is no longer sufficient to fight the Russian tanks."17 The fascist regime was going through a crisis, the effects of which had an impact on the future war situation and the economic, domestic and foreign policy situation the German imperialists wanted to use all means to counteract the situation. They saw themselves forced, particularly in the economic area, to abandon their blitzkrieg illusions - "short wars with long periods of rest" 18 - and tried to do so now to prepare the war economy for the conditions of a longer, exhausting war. The defeat in front of Moscow was the decisive moment in this development, which had already begun one or two months earlier. The entry of the USA into the war (Germany's declaration of war on December 11, 1941) strengthened the German imperialists' policy of significant changes in the state-monopoly mechanism of the war economy, but did not change the course that had now been taken and had been prepared for some time.

The process in which this course took hold had, of course, a chaotic character, in keeping with the basic character of the capitalist order, which was strengthened rather than weakened by its urgency. There were fierce internal disputes among the groups, institutions and people involved over the various concepts until, in February 1942, one clearly emerged as the dominant one.

The first officially announced admission of the bankruptcy of German imperialism's previous war economy concept was the "Implementing Regulations No. 1" of November 28, 194119 to the OKW's armament guidelines of October 23, which de facto repealed them. The program of the "Relocation of forces" and "distribution of forces", which the guidelines of October 23rd provided for, were based on the premise that 49 divisions of the army and part of the army troops, in total the fourth part of the entire army, would be disbanded after a victorious campaign and become part of the army The majority of the war economy should be made available.20 The implementing regulations of November 28th, on the other hand, began with the succinct sentence: "A dissolution of army divisions to the planned extent is not to be expected."21

However, if a new concept were to be developed, Hitler's "re-equipment"--
Decree of July 14, 194122 falls. Thomas stormed Keitel on December 9th with the question of what should happen in 1942; he let it be known that the “Führer directive” of July 14th could not be maintained and "that something must be renounced . "23 It soon became clear in the OKW that Hitler's decree was no longer valid and that it had to be withdrawn as quickly as possible

17 Ibid.

18 BA Koblenz, R 3/1547, Speer's speech to the district economic advisors, district officials for Technology and district representatives of the DAF on April 18, 1942.

19 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 2325.

20 Ibid., "Guidelines in the field of personnel", October 23, 1941 (army troops = self-employed Units under OKH, e.g. E.g. artillery, engineer and intelligence units).

21 Ibid., "Implementing Regulations No. 1", November 28, 1941.

22 See p. 13.

23 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1742, Thomas' lecture notes for chief OKW ("preliminary draft") v. December 9, 1941.

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is: "Overall, there is ... a fundamentally new situation compared to the conditions of July 14, 1941."24 In December and around the turn of the year 1941/42, the Wehrmacht leadership worked on its drafts25 for Hitler's new decree on "armament 1942" from January 10, 1942, in which the blitzkrieg concept from the summer of 1941 in the field of war economics was tacitly shelved. The basic draft was already drawn up by the Wehrmacht command staff on December 13, 1941.26 In Hitler's new decree 27 the armament changeover in the summer of 1941, undamaged a few lame excuses, in "adaptation to the changed war situation". This was not done expressly and only with the proviso that the old armament strategy The objective, the "expansion of the air force and navy to fight against the Anglo-Saxon powers", as it was said, would remain "unchanged in the long term". The further one The general validity of the outdated decree of July 14, 1941 in "economic" and technical" terms was even confirmed in the final passage and its "increased significance" was postulated. But the revocation was clearly evident in the prohibition against allowing a "decrease in the armament of the army" and, above all, in the quintessence of the decree: "The means of armament should therefore first of all be made to serve the increased needs of the army." The main part of the decree dealt with the necessary change in armaments production and the distribution of raw materials in favor of the army and with the urgency of the armaments programs.

The most important goal of the armaments effort was, according to Reitel's template, for Hitler of January 3, the "reformation and refreshment of strong offensive formations".28 Hitler set May 1, 1942 as the date for the formation of such formations and for equipping them "with the necessary supplies for at least four months".29 The Fast Troops of the Army should - as already demanded in the tank program of August 1941 - be expanded to 24 to 30 armored divisions and 15 motorized divisional units.30 For this purpose, it was now decided to cut naval armaments and the air armament program, which had already collapsed, and to reduce the production of bombs and aircraft ammunition. In particular, copper and aluminum quotas should be freed up for armaments.

With the decree of January 10, 1942, the Göring program and the entire "re-armament" of 1941 were buried. The way was clear for an official redistribution of the Raw material contingents and manpower for the benefit of arming the army and for the revocation of the "throttling lists" and "throttling letters" sent out in the fall of 1941. Not clear

24 Ibid., film 1775, lecture notes WFSt v. December 13, 1941.

25 See e.g. *Thomas,* p. 470ff., memorandum WiRüAmt v. December 23, 1941; ibid., p. 478ff., Memorandum WFSt v. January 3, 1942.

26 Dr. in *EichhoUz, Dietrich,* The history of the "General Plenipotentiary for Labor Deployment" (with documents), in *JfG,* 1973, Vol. 9 (hereinafter: History of the GBA), p. 372 ff., Doc. 2.

See in more detail *Reinhardt,* p. 265ff.

27 *Thomas,* p. 483ff. Hereafter also the following.

28 Ibid., p. 479, memorandum WFSt v. January 3, 1942.

29 Ibid., p. 484, Hitler's decree "Armament 1942" dated January 10, 1942.

30 Ibid., p. 479, memorandum WFSt v. January 3, 1942. Drafts from the previous days contained a requirement for 30 tanks and 20 motor vehicles. Various (ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 8630, OKW drafts from the end of December (?) and January 1, 1942).

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However, it was still a question of which new war economy concept would be implemented in the long term and in whose hands the powers for this would lie. Solving these problems was particularly important to the leading monopoly circles, and they already had clear ideas about how to solve them.

The failure of the economic blitzkrieg concept was an expression of the deep contradiction between the goals and the real possibilities of the German imperialists. Their economic potential was disproportionate to the military tasks and war goals they set for themselves. Even when they occupied, plundered and exploited a good part of Europe, all their optimistic calculations of the total potential they now controlled had to remain wrong calculations. There was no chance for them to subjugate the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it was impossible to keep the subjugated peoples of Europe under control in the long term, to appropriate their economic resources and to exploit them to the death. In its own country, due to the rule of capital and the laws of profit, the fascist regime was unable to fully exploit the existing economic potential for its war, especially since it was waging it for the worst imperialist cause, that of the vital interests of the German people people was diametrically opposed.

Bourgeois authors, on the other hand, often start from the premise that the war, once started, could have been won economically or at least ended with a profit - if it had been prepared thoroughly enough "in depth" - if in the first years of the war , especially in 1941, the pace of armaments would have been increased quickly enough and not, as they claim, slowed down; if a tight, central state-monopoly regulation had covered the entire war economy from the start. These three most important arguments, which keep cropping up in different combinations and weightings, leave the point finally come to a common denominator: the blitzkrieg strategy was wrong; the war should have been waged "totally" from the outset. To the extent that this happened towards the end of the war, it was done “too late”.

When General Thomas wrote his comprehensive activity report in 1943/44, he saw that he was right in his skepticism about the blitzkrieg strategy, but he wrongly concluded that his "deep armament" concept 3 1 would have been more realistic. But he himself had to state that "the deep armament (provision of supplies, industrial preparations, stockpiling of raw materials) had to be greatly neglected given the weakened foreign exchange situation of the Reich." 3 2 Milward realizes something about this dilemma. He undertakes to weigh up the chances of the economic blitzkrieg concept and those of "armament in depth." After all, he admits that "Russia's ability to survive the 'Five Month War'" contributed to the end of the blitzkrieg.33 But the key to explaining the change For him, "to full war production" lies "in Hitler's thinking", into which, to his regret, he does not have full insight.:14

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31 For this concept, see *Volume I,* p. 18; It is inadmissibly simplified and brought down to the main denominator Hitler in *The German Reich and the Second World War,* Vol. 1: Causes and Prerequisites of German War Policy. Edited by Military history Research Office, Stuttgart 1979, p. 281, p. 315f.

32 *Thomas,* p. 145.

33 *Milward, Alan S.,* The German War Economy 1939-1945 (hereinafter: *Milward,* War economy), Stuttgart 1966, p. 52.

34 Ibid., p. 60.

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All such discussions about the blitzkrieg concept in the economy amount to the thesis that it was a "representation of Hitler's strategic considerations" and that, in contrast to the "real war economy", it corresponded to the "basic principles of the National Socialist economy" 35; his "Causes and internal conditions" - according to Birkenfeld - "ultimately lie with Adolf Hitler himself" _36 This superficial, contentless characterization leads to the criticism already outlined from the standpoint of "total" imperialist warfare.

2. The reorganization of the system of state onopolistic power organs in the war economy (second phase)

a) The reorganization of the Reich Ministry for Armament and Ammunition

On January 13, 1942, the management of the Reich Industry Group called its large advisory board together for a consultation. The Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition gave a le "At the gates of Moscow," Todt began, "there was a standstill, essentially because the Russians had an enormous base in the city of Moscow, which has a population of many millions, right behind them."37 He saw no reason to join in in front of his audience to keep certain insights behind the scenes and described the Soviet people who offered such stubborn resistance as a "tremendous force."38 He came to the conclusion that "we must be more prepared to wage a total war." 39 Drawing the consequences from this means "that not only the Wehrmacht, but the entire German people must feel the severity of the war more strongly than before in order to be persuaded to give up the last thing."40 Of course, Todt's listeners did not interpret his demands as if by "surrendering the last" he was demanding a renunciation of the war profits of the monopolies.

The head of the Reichsgruppe Industrie, Wilhelm Zangen, chairman of the Mannes-mann Group and member of the supervisory board of Deutsche Bank, expressed his and the RGI's full agreement with Todt's statements. He expressed the connection between the military setback and the increased importance he attached to increasing war production and its regulation by the leading monopolies with a quote from Frederick II: “Battles are won by bayonets, wars are only won by the Economy." 41 Todt and Zangen called for the mobilization of domestic and foreign labor potential for the German armaments industry.

Rationalization through concentration of production in the “most efficient” companies and through increased exploitation was their slogan.

35 Ibid., p. 29; p. 45.

36 *Tlwmas,* p. 32 (introduction by B.). Reinhardt , on the other hand, provides a relatively balanced and well-founded presentation of the objective causes for the failure of the military and economic blitzkrieg concept .

37 *Anatomy of War,* p. 373, Doc. 189, note by Karl Albrecht, Wigru precision mechanics and optics, ex. d. Meeting on January 13, 1942.

38 BA Koblenz, R 13 1/654, recording of Todt's speech (Wigru Es!).

39 Ibid.

40 As note 37.

41 As note 37.

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The period from December 1941 to February 1942 was filled with the strenuous search by the ruling circles of the regime for a way out of the critical state of the war economy, a search that increased into hectic activity over the course of January. It was clear to those involved that they had to prepare for a longer war. The basic problem was twofold; The relevant authorities were “as concerned with the question of who should control the German economy as with what type of economy it should be.” [42]

The demand for a “supreme command position” **43 and** for a “arms management central control center” 44 now became unavoidable, which those directly affected - the armaments industry and the regional armaments departments of the Wehrmacht - raised with particular vehemence.

The main opponents in the fight for control of the desired central economic command position were the OKW, the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition and finally the Luftwaffe/Four-Year Plan group (Göring, Milch, Krauch). The Ministry of Munitions was, of course, ahead of its competitors in that it could rely directly on the majority of the large arms companies, that it worked very closely with the management of the Reich Industry Group and that, in the form of its Armaments Advisory Board, it had a committee of leading monopolists for constant consultation on all crucial aspects of the war economy Questions were available.

This was not about a mere redistribution of powers and competencies, but about supplying the front with weapons and ammunition and also soldiers in new dimensions, immediately and in the long term. The unanimously pursued goal of the regime's ruling circles was a thorough conversion to a more "total" and effective war economy for precisely this purpose. The grouping of forces ultimately had to acquire the decisive regulatory powers that had the most promising method for such a conversion, the greatest potential for it their implementation and the most striking concrete evidence of the intended military success.

The key problem for everyone involved, at least since Hitler's decree of December 3, 1941, was a comprehensive rationalization of the entire armaments production,45- which should also have a deep impact on the other areas of the economy. Secondarily, the goal of a "total"

The capture of all those who are not able to work for armaments production by means of compulsory work is once again coming to the fore, but this is happening quickly

42 *Alilward,* War Economy, p. 64.

43 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 8273, KTB WiRüAmt/Stab, entry from. January 16, 1942: “There has to be one highest management position." (Zangen's statement to Thomas).

44 Ibid., film 5382, situation report of Rüln V (Stuttgart) v. December 13, 1941.

45 Earlier conceptions and approaches for the rationalization of the arms industry are mentioned by Wagner *(Wagner, Raimund,* Effects of the Collapse of the Fascist Blitzkrieg Strategy on the German War Economy, in *lJas Fiasco of Anti-Soviet Aggression.*
Studies on the warfare of German imperialism against the USSR (1941-1945).
Edited by Erhard :\foritz, Berlin 1978 (hereinafter: Effects), p. 169 ff., who, with regard to the Göring program, stated in an exaggerated and unconvincing manner that in the air armaments industry the aim was "at the earliest to achieve comprehensive rationalization" (ibid , p. 172).

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The effect was not expected to the desired extent and remained highly controversial because of its social and domestic political consequences.
The transition to the comprehensive mobilization of military resources and the associated centralization of state monopoly regulatory power were neither the result of Hitler's solitary decisions nor the main work of Todt or Speer. It was the tops of German finance capital, especially the leadership of the Reich Industry Group, who initiated this development. As an executive they made use of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition and supported the minister - first Todt, then Speer - in decisive ways. They expanded the ministerial executive apparatus and ensured an expansion of its powers, which within a few months made it, if not the only, at least the clearly dominant regulatory mechanism in the war economy.

They inaugurated the ministry's new course by quickly developing a rationalization concept for the entire armaments industry in December 1941 and January 1942, which was examined and confirmed at a meeting of the ministry's main committees lasting several days at the beginning of February 1942. In the weeks and months that followed, they implemented this concept in the armaments factories with the help of the ministerial executive apparatus, for which they - especially in the form of the heads of the committees and rings - provided the personnel management.46 Undoubtedly, the resulting comprehensive, centralized state-monopoly regulatory system and the extensive subordination of production to the demands of war is not unrestricted and not always to the interests of the monopolists. They understandably preferred the quick successes and low risks of blitzkrieg. However, in view of the critical situation, they considered drastic measures in the overall imperialist interest to be urgently required and reacted without delay. They concentrated the necessary central regulatory power largely in their own hands.

Until February 8, 1942

Walter Rohland, then deputy chairman of the board of the United Steel Works Group and one of the ammunition minister's closest confidants, said after the war: "Already Dr. Todt had recognized the need to centralize all branches of industry that were directly or indirectly necessary for war production and had paved the way for this through discussions with Hitler. The decision to create a kind of war ministry under the direction of Dr. "To create Todt had fallen shortly before his death." 47 Hans Kehr 1, then general advisor in the Reich Ministry of Economics, reports in his memoirs that Todl, whom he met at Göring's birthday party on January 12, 1942, told him about a Previous conversation communicated: “With

With the approval of the Führer, I decided to do everything on my own

46 For more detailed information on rationalization, see p. 295 ff.

47 *Milward,* Kriegswirtschaft, p. 66. The same quote in a different back translation in *the same one,* Fritz Todt as Minister for Armaments and Ammunition, in *V{Z,* 1/1966, p. 57. Rohland and Todt probably had the War Office from the First World War as a model.

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and to use the economy on a broad basis."48 The sources largely confirm these statements.

When the serious defeat became apparent in front of Moscow, the ammunition minister and the monopolies that supported him began to vehemently put their plans into action. The reorganization of the apparatus of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition, which Todt initiated with his decree of December 22, 1941, and the increased activity of the corporate owners, in particular the heads of the special committees and the management of the Reich Industry Group, in enforcing the The minister's rationalization decree of December 23rd in the branches and companies of the defense industry should create a fait accompli.

Todt's decree of December 22, 1941 on the "self-responsibility of the armaments industry" 49 - this, like almost all other unpublished decrees and regulations, had a secret character - was based on the "need for significantly greater rationalization"; It must meet the “even greater demands” of 1942 on the armaments industry. “The self-responsibility organization of the armaments industry, ie the Armaments Advisory Council, the armaments committees, etc., must be adapted to these demands”. The double structure of the state monopoly mechanism of the ministry - armaments committees in the military districts and a larger number of special committees directly under the ministerial headquarters - was supplemented, highly centralized and unified by the formation of five main committees. Members of the main committees were the heads of the respective special committees. The main committees for ammunition, for tanks and for weapons corresponded to the previous regulatory area of the ministry. Main committees for “General Wehrmacht Equipment” and for machines included new, large areas of the defense industry in the regulation. Chairman or members of the board of five of the most powerful arms companies, which have always been the mainstays, were appointed to head the main committees of the ministry.

The main committees and their leaders

Main Committee (1) Ammunition	Philipp Keßler, Chairman of the Armaments Advisory Board (Bergmann-Elektricitäts-Werke AG/ Siemens and AEG Group)
Main Committee (II) Weapons	Erich Müller (Krupp)

1.3 Kehrl, Hans, crisis manager in the Third Reich. 6 years of peace - 6 years of war. Memories, Düsseldorf 1973, p. 219. - This important date attests to a remarkably early agreement between Hitler and Todt about the changes in the war economy that followed - and which Speer has continued to implement since February 8th. At the same time, the ground is removed from the questionable and apologetic claim that Todt recognized that the war was lost militarily and economically, informed Hitler of this on November 29, 1941 and asked him to end the war "politically" *(Ludwig, Karl-Heinz,* The German anti-aircraft missiles in the Second World War, in *Military History Notices,* 1/1969, p. 89; *the same,* The well-recognized "memories" of Albert Speer, in *GWU,* 11/1970, p. 699; with a different date (December 4, 1941) *Janssen, Gregor,* The Speer Ministry. Germany's Armament in War, Berlin (West)/Frankfurt am Main/Vienna 1968, p. 33; also reported by *Reinhardt,* p. 184).

49 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 2312. Hereafter also the following. See also *Wagner,* Effects, p. 173f.

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Main Committee (III) Armored cars and tractors	Walter Rohland (United Steelworks)
Main Committee (IV) General (Wehrmacht) device	Wilhelm Zangen, head of the Reichsgruppe Industry (Mannesmann)
Main Committee (V) Machines	Hanns Benkert (Siemens)

The minister's Armaments Advisory Board and the special committees remained in place.SO A new "Sense Advisory Board" of the Ministry of Ammunition was formed under the chairmanship of Todt. It should include the chairman of the Armaments Advisory Council, the heads of the main committees and a representative each from the Air Force and Naval Armaments Industrial Councils. It is unlikely that this narrow advisory board, which was supposed to "advise" the minister, actually came into being and ever met in full; the intention that had already been harbored in November, the "entire planning of the armaments industry", was probably too clearly evident in the composition of the new body "to control from the Ministry of Munitions and to majorize OKW and Wehrmacht parts.51 While the decree of December 22nd defined
the area of activity of the main committees in its general outline, Todt's "Implementation Regulations for the Führer Order of December 3rd, 1941" of December 23rd laid down the The tasks of the entire "self-responsible organization of the defense industry" 52 in the field of rationalization were presented in detail. This decree contained the conceptual guidelines and the detailed program for a comprehensive rationalization of war production.53 Important preliminary decisions were thus made about how and in whom The further concentration of war
economy regulatory power would take place. The decrees of December 22 and 23, 1941 announced a new stage of development of state-monopoly capitalism in the war economy. In addition to the production of tanks, weapons and ammunition, the regulatory and issuing powers of the armaments monopolies grouped around the Ministry of Ammunition and their "self-responsibility" bodies now also extended directly to the means of production for armaments (Main Committee).

machines) and the consumer goods industry (main committee for general Wehrmacht equipment). This greatly diminished the direct influence of the Wehrmacht departments on the construction and production of weapons and military equipment; the OKW had to accept this under the pressure of the military crisis. The sphere of power of the Reich Ministry of Economics was also affected.

In the coming weeks, Todt and the management of the RGI, especially Wilhelm Zangen, were extremely active in expanding and reorganizing the ministry and the system of committees, as decided, and in carrying out the rationalization according to their conception "with all speed " 54. With his order of January 9, 1942, Zangen set the powerful apparatus of the RGI and all economic groups in motion in order to equip the new Main Committee for General Wehrmacht Equipment with a broad base of working groups and special committees.55

50 See *Volume I,* p. 126 ff.
51 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 2325, AN WiRüAmt, 22nd H. 191.1.
52 So in the decree of 11/22/19'11 (see note 49).
53 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 2312.
54 Ibid., HMfBuM an Zangen, December 29, 191.1.
55 Ibid., AO Zangens v. January 9, 1942.

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Immediately, numerous commissions and rationalization committees began working in the companies throughout the main committee area. The mining industry, which was highly organized in monopoly associations, also took part and used the well-established apparatus of these associations.56 At the meeting of armaments inspectors and commanders from January 21st to 23rd, 1942 in the Transportation and Armaments Office of the OKW once again brought together everything that was important in armaments and the war economy. In his introductory speech, head of office Thomas explained that the rationalization of the war economy must be “centrally controlled” and was “handed over to the Reich Industry Group, which will carry it out according to the instructions of the Ministry of Munitions and the Ministry of Economic Affairs”.57

However, Todt was not in a prominent position on the list of speakers, but rather next to Milch and a representative of naval armaments; Colonel Neef, head of the armaments department of the office, and Gerhard Ritter (IG Farben) as a representative of GB Chemistry spoke before him.

In his speech, the Minister of Ammunition announced the simplification of design and production, rationalization throughout the industry and the introduction of fixed prices. Those present certainly did not understand how far the balance had already shifted in favor of the Reich Ministry of Armament and Ammunition.

It may have been difficult for General Thomas to recognize that at this time, as he put it several months later, the struggle of "industry against the soldier"58 was already in full swing, that is, that the struggle within the ruling class, especially between Wehrmacht and Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition, the central regulatory authority in the war economy had entered a decisive stage. Given the military display of the OKW armaments organization, which he had called together, he probably expected himself and his office to have great opportunities to achieve that central position To gain a position of power in the war economy.59 Events such as the formation of the "Industrial Organization of the General Plenipotentiary for Communications" and the appointment of Jakob Werlin as "Inspector General of the Führer for Motor Vehicles" also played a role in this internal dispute.

Erich Fellgiebel, General of the Intelligence Corps, appointed General Plenipotentiary for Intelligence (GBN) at the end of 1941, built his own "industrial organization" with "around 35 production rings"60, summarized (industry) departments and one, based closely on the Air Force's Industrial Council The "Advisory Board of the Communications Industry" was composed of speakers. The voluntary heads of the rings and departments also held senior positions in the Air Force's Industrial Council61; they were leading representatives of such corporations and arms companies as AEG, Siemens, Lorenz and Telefunken. The organization of the GBN was apparently a common

56 See p. 306ff.

57 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1741, speech by Thomas v. January 21, 1942. Inaccurate date of the conference in Milward, War Economy, p. 64.

58 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1741, Thomas' speech to the Rüln (in Hanover) on August 29, 1942.

59 See also Reinhardt, p. 270f.; 11, Filward, War Economy, p. 61d.

60 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 2312, Speech by Fellgiebel at the “Commitment of the Advisory Board and. Ring leaders" on December 20th, 1941.- The Industrial Council of the Air Force included over 100 production rings (ibid., RErl. 0101 from February 10th, 1942).

61 Ibid., GBN to WiRüAmt, February 16, 191.2.

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Corporate founding of OKH and Air Force Command under the patronage of Göring, intended to strengthen the state monopoly positions of the armaments departments of the army and air force in the war economy.

On January 16 , 1942, **Hitler appointed Jakob Werlin, a member of the board of the Daimler-Benz Group and a confidant of Deutsche Bank, an old fascist partisan and personal "friend of the Führer,"62 as "General Inspector of the Führer for Motor Vehicles."63 It can be assumed that the influence of Todt, who had been close to Werlin and the Daimler-Benz group for many years as general inspector for German roads and as head of the NSDAP main office for technology, played a role in this appointment. It took place without Werlin's relationship with Major General Adolf v. Schell was clarified, who had served as General Plenipotentiary for Motor Vehicles - an institution of the Four Year Plan -** since the end of 1938 **64 and as such held the rank of Undersecretary in the Reich Ministry of Transport. Werlin's urgent task was to refresh and renew the Wehrmacht's motor vehicle fleet, which had been decimated on the German-Soviet front, to create a network of repair workshops in the East and much more. However, through demands such as those for his own "Reich Motor Vehicle Group"65 he soon found himself in opposition to the leadership of the RGI, to Todt, to Speer and to Funk, so that his further activity remained of a subordinate nature.**

On January 24th , **the Minister of Ammunition addressed his five closest colleagues and advisors from the industry - the chairman of his armaments advisory board and the other main committee chairmen - and invited them to the report on** February 6th **on the "extraordinary number of suggestions" from the armaments industry for which the path was "paved" by Hitler's rationalization decree of December** 3 , 1941.66 **The discussions between the main committees and the management of the RGI in Berlin, which were also called together, with the minister ultimately lasted three days, from the 4th to the** 6th. **February** 1942. **They represented the culmination of the efforts of Todt and the large arms monopolies gathered around his ministry to put their war economy concept into practice, and directly prepared the upcoming important discussion between the minister and Hitler, in which Walter Rohland was originally supposed to take part.67 The main committees met permanently during this time. The Minister of Ammunition, who spoke before them several times, highlighted three principles in his speeches as essential to solving the "great task"68, regardless of the impending production**

62 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 9086, BI. 50, AN vd Goltz, November 1934; see ***Radandt, Hans,*** On the relationships between the Deutsche Bank group and the state apparatus in the preparation and implementation of the Second World War, in ***German Imperialism and the Second World War.*** Scientific materials Conference of the Commission of Historians of the GDR and the USSR. December 14th to 19th, 1959 in Berlin, Vol. 2, Berlin 1961, p. 21f.

63 *RGBl.* 1942 I, p. 25f., "Decree of the Führer on the appointment of an Inspector General of the "Fuhrer for the Motor Vehicle Industry" dated January 16, 1942.

64 See ***Kirchberg, Peter,*** typification in the German motor vehicle industry and the general representative for the motor vehicle industry, in *J{VV* 1969, T. 2, p. 131f.

65 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 9088, BI. 1.7 f., telegram from Werlin to RWiM, January 23, 1942.

66 Ibid., FS, Film 2312, Rs. RMfBuM v. 24. 1. 19li2.

67 See ***Janssen,*** p. 33.

68 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 2312, additional version <l. Speeches by Todt on the t,. and February 5, 191.2, v. February 17, 1942. Hereafter also the following.

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With the withdrawal of eight percent of armaments workers to the Wehrmacht - namely half a million men. This was primarily the "elimination of the most expensive companies"; if such a company did not succeed in working more efficiently despite the exchange of experience, "then workers and machines would have to be withdrawn from it... The efficient worker must be removed from that unhealthy business."
Todt further pointed out that simply increasing work intensity would make "another 10 percent increase in performance possible." However, he suspected that the German imperialists could not count on such a voluntary mass initiative among the working people as shown by the Soviet people <l which he slandered as “brutal use of the masses”. His prescription was the "right treatment of the worker." The German workers, intimidated and held down by the fascist terror machine, had to be "enthusiastic" to forge more weapons for victory. The minister advocated various forms of propaganda and ideological influence in order to "make it clear to everyone why these weapons have to be finished."

Ultimately, Todt was particularly keen to emphasize the extensive powers of the main committees: "By setting up the main committees, the industry largely has the power to help itself." He told the representatives of the Army Weapons Office that the main committees would "independently carry out a type adjustment -lead"; The office should, if possible, give the industry's rationalization proposals its "immediate approval." The leading representatives of the armaments industry followed this line and expressed numerous additional "wishes", all of which amounted to a curtailment of the powers of the Army Weapons Office and the Defense Economics and Armaments Office.69 During the course of the consultation days, the Minister of Ammunition made several important ones Issue out.

Above all, it granted the chairmen of the main committees the right to make decisive proposals for the employment of workers who had been "laid out" in rationalization measures.7 ° A number of other ministerial orders, guidelines and orders also came as a direct result The three-day deliberations, after To<lt's death, formed starting points for the further reorganization of the ministry.71

This also includes Todt's letter, which was later sent by Albert Speer to <lie Gauleiter of the Nazi Party.72 With this letter, Todt wanted to establish a permanent, regular connection with the Gauleiters. The idea of making greater use of the potential of the tightly organized, powerful fascist party and of integrating it more closely into the state monopoly mechanism of the war economy was not a sudden inspiration from the Minister of Ammunition. Did the German imperialists want to lift the burdens of rationalism?

69 Anatomy of War, p. 379f., Doc. 194, WiRüAmt report on. d. HA conference RMfBul\l on February 6, 1942.
70 BA Koblenz, R 13 1/1012, REl. RMfBuM to the chairmen of the examination commissions, February 4, 1942; ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 8630, RErl. RMfBuM to the chairmen of the IIA, February 6, 1942.
71 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 2312, Guidelines for the "Preparation of Best Work Plans", February 10, 1942; ibid, "Orders that RM Dr. Todt gave in the main committee meetings on February 5 and 6, 1942", v. February 17, 1942.
72 Ibid., Rs. Speers to the Gauleiter, February 18, 1942.

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To burden the people with sation, the direct support of the Nazi party was needed more urgently than before. Such an approach was also required by the growing contradictions within the bourgeoisie as economic regulatory power was sharply concentrated in the hands of a small clique of leading arms monopolies. As early as the fall of 1941, when the fiasco of the Blitzkrieg strategy became apparent, no less a person than Wilhelm Zangen propagated the idea that "the organization should be connected to the... The nation's political power network must find more than before".73

The change of ministers

On February 7, 1942, the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition flew to Rastenburg to meet Hitler and held long discussions with him. On February 8th, he died in a plane accident on his return journey. Since the reorganization process that had been initiated in the war economy obviously did not tolerate any delay, Hitler designated the architect, construction and armaments manager Albert Speer as Todt's successor on the same day. On February 9th, the Reich Chancellery announced the appointment of the new minister, and on February 15th it was officially announced in the Reich Law Gazette.74 The assertion by bourgeois historians that Todt asked Hitler to end the war as hopeless is absurd75; In this case, it is also absurd to assume that the SS had his death on their murder account.76Todt traveled to Hitler to report to him about the armaments conference from February 4th to 6th and to ask him to comply with the wishes of the leading armaments monopolies to give the Ministry of Munitions dictatorial powers to regulate the war economy. This demand had to fall on fertile ground with Hitler; because the intentions of Todt and the monopolies corresponded entirely to the new armaments concept that Hitler himself had put into effect by signing the decrees of December 3, 1941 and January 10, 1942. After all, a clear decision in Todt's favor may not have been easy for him, as it would involve serious interference in the sphere of power of other departments and institutions of the

73 *Radarult, Hans,* A Re<le by Wilhelm Zangen, in *JfW,* 1962, T. 2, p. 205.

7'1 *RGBl.* 1942.I, p. 80.

75 *Janssen,* p. 33. - The source for this invention are the already mentioned "communications" by Walter Rohland long after the war, in which Rohlan claims for transparent reasons that Todt declared the war lost and Hitler in agreement with him pressured to end the war. The only thing that can be assumed is that Todt (and Rohland) recognized and considered the economic risks of a long, unfolding war on two fronts, since by the end of 1941, as can easily be seen, the war could no longer be won. Particularly compact apology from Todt as resistance heroes with Ludwig *(Ludwig,* Technik, p. 388 ff. and passim); recently with *Schmidt, Matthias,* Albert Speer: The end of a myth. Speer's true role in the Third Reich, Bern/Munich 1982, p. 71ff.

76 *The Pro::;eß against the main war criminals before the International Filitiirgericlitshof,* Nuremberg (1947ff.) (hereinafter: *[MG),* vol. 16, p. 477, interrogation of Speers, June 19, 1946; *Schwerin v. Krosigk, Lutz Graf,* It happened in Germany. Images of humanity in our century, Tübingen and Stuttgart 1951, p. 299f.; *Thorwald, Jürgen,* The Unexplained Cases, Stuttgart (1950), p. 140f. Recently, *Schmidt,* p. 75f., is critical of this.

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regimes, especially the Wehrmacht and Göring as representative of the four-year plan, as well as Funk, Ley and other satraps. For example, one of Todt's topics of conversation with Hitler - the only one recorded in writing - was the demand for a ban on Dr. Leys on armament without prior voting (against commission work)".77 Goebbels' diary notes show that at this point in time Goebbels and especially Ley still had high hopes of taking the leading position in the field of "performance improvement", that is, above all to increase the exploitation of German and foreign workers: “The Führer would like to empower Dr. Ley and I will talk again about the question of work commitment and increasing performance. Until then, our announcements will be withheld. It has now turned out that the problem is more difficult than we first thought. I will delve into the details again and then give the Führer a talk in connection with the whole problem of the shortage of workers." 78 On the day of Todt's meeting with Hitler, Goebbels noted: "The problem of increasing performance is now become very acute.

The Führer wants to deal with it himself and even has the intention of possibly coming to Berlin on this matter in order to clarify the details in a large meeting. Perhaps he himself will speak out publicly on this problem." 79 The version of an assassination attempt on Todt is pure
speculation. However, political gangsterism and murder are tried and tested means of imperialism and especially of every fascist regime. The possibility that Todt will be assassinated by competitors and opponents, cannot therefore be completely ruled out. If one looks for forces that were hostile to the Minister of Ammunition's plans for serious motives, the first and foremost sources were the air force leadership and the monopolies grouped around the four-year plan organization under the leadership of the IG Farben, so Göring should be considered as its political exponent.SO This faction of the ruling class has always been particularly stubborn in its support of the blitzkrieg strategy or the blitzkrieg concept in the war economy. They could not be in any doubt that comprehensive war economy powers for Todt would finally achieve that meant the end of their conception, especially their exceptional position and dominance in armaments and the war economy.

Countless legends are also spread about Speer in reactionary bourgeois histories and memoirs: Although he had previously had little to do with the matter as an artist, he was actually the first to get the war economy off the ground with ingenious intuition and improvisation and to bring it to unprecedented heights guided.
Speer was a long-time hired architect for Hitler and the Nazi Party. He was responsible for the hollow gigantism of the buildings on the so-called Nazi party rally grounds in Nuremberg and the Reich Chancellery in Berlin. In the huge projects that he called “general

77 BA Koblenz, R 3/1989, Karl-Otto Saur's "Keywords for the Armaments Index" (hereinafter: Saur, Keywords), February 7th, 1942. - Milward mentions the introduction of fixed prices as another topic of discussion between Hitler and Todt on February 7th . ***(Milward,*** War Economy, p. 65).

78 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 10803, TB Goebbels, entry from. February 6, 1942.

79 Ibid., entry from February 7, 1942.

80 Todt crashed in a plane that Air Force Marshal Hugo Sperrle made available to him ; Milch led the inconclusive investigation into the accident. According to Speer's testimony, Göring appeared at Hitler's house surprisingly shortly after the accident and tried to have Todt's powers transferred to himself ***(Speer,*** Memoirs, p. 211).

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"Hauinspektor for the Reich Capital" project, the desire for world domination of fascist German imperialism found its architectural expression. In his position he was very familiar with the conditions of the building industry and with the

He was intimately known to the rulers of the large corporations in the construction industry. The head of the construction industry economic group was Eugen Vögler, who was influential in fascist circles, an old Nazi and brother of Albert Vögler; Eugen Vögler was chairman of the board of Hochtief AG, one of the largest companies in the German construction industry. Official cooperation and personal acquaintance linked Speer with Todt, who was his immediate superior in his capacity as GB Bau. His and Todt's offices in Berlin were adjacent to Pariser Platz.

After the start of the war, Speer took over the management of the armaments facilities of the Luftwaffe Bi and in this position was able to gain extensive experience in important areas of the war economy. Since then, he has been primarily responsible for the construction projects of the Ju-88 program.82 Since mid-1941 he has been in charge of the major construction projects for the Göring program.83 His particularly close relationships with the Luftwaffe, especially with Field Marshal Milch, and with the corporations of the German Air Force stem from those years aircraft, mechanical engineering and electrical industries. His are

Boat program for the Navy and for the Army Command, especially the expansion of the Peenemünde rocket testing facility, as well as the large air raid shelters (bunkers) in Berlin.84

On October 1, 1941, 1,352 armaments projects in the air force and submarine programs were under the supervision of the "Speer Construction Staff", 83 of which were new large-scale works.85 At this time, 98,000 men were also the highest number employed by the construction staff manpower was reached; approximately two-thirds of them worked for the air

armaments.86 Speer ultimately occupied a considerable position in the party hierarchy. He himself belonged to Hitler's immediate entourage and had good connections to Gauleiters and Reich Governors, to heads of major city administrations and to numerous other notables of the regime. In the DAF he headed the “Beauty of Work Office”, which was created with his significant involvement.87 In addition to the leadership of air

81 On November 10, 1939 (BA Koblenz R 43 ll/607).

-82 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 1754, Protok. d. Discussion Thomas' with the Rüln on 8.19. 1. 1940; ***Speer,*** Memories, p. 197. Speer himself highly valued his work in air armaments and the experience he gained there: “Before taking up my position, I played a significant role in the rapid development of the Luftwaffe's armaments industry. However, from below I saw many fundamental errors that would have remained hidden from me at the top.

Many of my current findings were already available back then and some of today's measures were only brought about by this work." (BA Koblenz, R 3/1547, speech to the district economic advisors, district managers for technology and district representatives of the DAF, April 18, 1942).

83 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 4566, Explanation GB Bau v. 7/2/19li1: Speer had to “carry out the construction work of the Göring Plan on behalf of the Reich Marshal”. See p. 14.

84 BA Koblenz, R 3/1:i91, Speer an Milch, November 19, 1941; ***Speer,*** Memories, p. 182 and p. 197.

85 ***Chronicle of the llM(BuM,*** 1941, p. 71, entry regarding Speer's lecture to Hitler on October 17, 1941; ibid., p. 87. December 19, 1941. - The construction projects of the Speer construction staff devoured September 1939 to September 1940 722 million RM, from October 1940 to June 1941 380 million RM and from July 1941 to September 1942 should amount to another 700 million RM (ibid., p. 71).

86 Ibid.

87 BA Koblenz, R 3/1GG0, Autograph CV Speers, undated (1945).

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Weapons and the Navy also linked him with many threads with the army generalship; Field Marshal von Reichenau was "particularly close" to him.88

Speer was appointed by Hitler at the end of December 1941, **at his own suggestion, to be responsible for the repair and expansion of the railway systems in the Ukraine and had set up a new department "Baustab Speer - Ostbau". "For this purpose, primarily all technicians, the supervisory and construction management staff and then the German construction workers were recorded and removed from the redesign (Berlin - DE). Secondly, in order to carry out these tasks, I had to make very significant interventions in the number of construction workers and technicians in the Luftwaffe armaments buildings that I had looked after since the beginning of the war."89 Of the** 65,000 **German construction workers who were still under his command Speer** transported 30,000 **to the East.90 From mid-January** 1942 , **trains with construction workers and machines for the "Eastern construction program" rolled continuously into the Ukraine.91 On the day he was commissioned with the "operational tasks in the East"92, December 27,** 1941, **Speer a confidential conversation with Todt93, in which it was discussed how serious the situation was and how urgent urgent measures were. On this and the following day, both divided the areas of operation in the occupied parts of the USSR between Organization Todt (OT) and Baustab Speer.94 Under these circumstances, Speer's election as the successor to the Minister of Ammunition was not a coincidence and did not come as a complete surprise to those involved.95 It was also clear to Hitler that after the defeat at Moscow, Speer would put a stop to urban development and party buildings, at least to the extent that they had hitherto Speer's good acquaintance and close professional relationship with Todt were known. Hitler had already wanted to transfer parts of Todt's area of responsibility to Speer in** 1940.96 **Todt and Speer undoubtedly met by chance at Hitler's headquarters** on February 7 , 1942 . **However, it cannot be ruled out that in the long and serious discussions between Todt and Hitler, Speer came up as a possible replacement for Todt - at least for certain areas of the minister's work from which he could have been relieved.**

Göring had no part in Speer's appointment. After all, after his own ambitions had been ignored, the new minister, who had helped build the Luftwaffe's armaments buildings for years and was also his private architect, seemed to him the most useful and least suspicious of all possible successors. He saw in him a good support for his armaments chief Milch and did not yet suspect a threat to his own position as representative of the four-year plan.

On the morning of February 9 , 1942, **"the armaments people were informed of the appointment**

88 Ibid., R 3/1593, Speer to v. Reichenau, July 30, 1942.

89 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 3385, AN Speer v. January 22, 1942. See also ***chronicle of the RMfBuM,*** 1941, BI. 87 ff.; ***Speer,*** Memories, p. 199 f.

90 ***Speer,*** Memories, p. 200.

91 ***Chronicle of the RMfBnM,*** 191.2, BI. 3; ***Speer,*** Memories, p. 541 note 1.

92 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 3385, AN Speer, v. January 22, 1942.

93 ***Speer,*** Memories, p. '.100.

94 ***Chronicle of the RMfBul\J,*** 19"1, lll. 88f., December 27 and 28, 1941.

95 Speer himself tried as a prisoner in 1Vi5 to present his appointment as a coincidence and as a surprise ***(Milward,*** Kriegswirtschaft, p. 69).

96 ***Speer,*** Memories, p. 210.

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informed". 97 This meant that both the heads of the Wehrmacht's armaments and the heads of German finance capital prepared for the new event. On the same day, Speer was appointed Todt's successor as GB Construction and as head of the OT, as general inspector for German roads9 8 and as general inspector for water and energy, appointed on February 11th, with the high party rank of senior commander, as the new head of the NSDAP's main office for technology and head ("Reichswalter") of the NSBDT.99

The change in the ministerial post made it easier for Hitler to equip the new minister with greatly expanded powers and powers from the outset. Through this
The monopolistic forces grouped around the ministry managed to significantly accelerate and deepen the restructuring of the state monopoly mechanism in the war economy. But it still took the immediate intervention of the financial oliarchy before the final decision was made on the military command center demanded by all sides in favor of the Reich Ministry of Armaments and Ammunition.

Other central military authorities and leading representatives of the regime saw the opportunity as a good opportunity to reduce the ammunition minister's sphere of power for their own benefit. "Hanneken wants the energy back to the Ministry of Economics," it was noted in the Ministry of Munitions on February 9th.100 A day later, Ley claimed in the press "the DAF's claim to leadership in technology."101 On February 12th the new one equipped Minister to counterattack. In the afternoon he gave Hitler his first lecture "on increasing the performance of the armaments industry".102 One can assume with certainty that beforehand - possibly in the morning, on the occasion of the pompous funeral service for Todt - he met the leading monopoly representatives, at least Zangen and Vögler or Rohland, who presumably took the opportunity to speak to Hitler. On that day, Speer demanded and received from Hitler great powers and freedom of action for possible disputes, which he was able to immediately make use of in a subsequent meeting with Bormann and Ley 103 and which he would urgently need the next day. The "Chronicle"

of the Ministry of Munitions initially noted on February 12th: "Attempted intrusions into the minister's area of work, which were attempted by various quarters (Funk, Ley, Milch) in the first days when he took over the new offices, were immediately recognized and in the bud suffocated'. The minister found the full support of the Führer and the Reich Marshal." 104

97 *Janssen,* p. 37 (based on a “personal communication” from Milch to J.).
98 Since a Hitler decree of April 3, 1941 (ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, film 19622) “The powers of a Reich Minister”.
99 Saur, keywords, February 9 and 11, 1942. Appointment to party offices by decree. Hitler's v. February 11, 1942 (ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 14155). - According to Speer's own curriculum vitae (1945) all of these appointments took place by Hitler on February 8th (BA Koblenz, R3/1660). Speer then had the Speer building staff incorporated into the OT *(Chronicle of the RMf BuM,* 1942, p. 19, February 14, 1942).
100 Saur, keywords, February 9, 1942.
101 Ibid., February 10, 1942.
102 *Chronicle of the RMf BuM,* 1942, page 14, February 12, 1942. This was de facto the first of Speer's "leader meetings", about which he had been keeping minutes since February 19th. i03 Ibid.; Saur, Keywords, February 15th, 1942.
104 *Chronicle of the RMfBuM,* 1942, page 14, February 12, 1942; see *Janssen,* p. 38f.

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On February 13, 1942, the top representatives of the military and civilian armaments departments met under Milch's leadership in order to discuss the question of overall planning (of armaments - D.E.) in detail on behalf of Göring.105 The original intention of the The organizers of this meeting were clearly judged afterwards in the Ministry of Munitions: "10 (a.m.) meeting with Field Marshal Milch with the attempt to ensure uniform management of armaments by Milch." 106 It was not the first meeting on this crucial topic; apparently there was On February 10th and 12th there were preliminary discussions among the inner circle of representatives of the Wehrmacht, in which no full agreement was reached.107 But for the first time, the new Reich Minister, who had been appointed five days earlier, saw all the key representatives of armaments and

War economy opposite, and for the first time Wilhelm Zangen, leader, also took part of the Reich Industry Group, Albert Vögler and Philipp Keßler, Chairman of the Minister's Armament Advisory Board, took part in a meeting on this topic. As heads of the main committee, Zangen and Keßler themselves held leading positions in the apparatus of the Ministry of Munitions. Vögler was a member of the Air Force Industrial Council; but he appeared - an extraordinary event! - at this meeting as the senior member of German finance capital and at the same time as the gray eminence of the Ministry of Ammunition, which he has been since its founding. The appearance of the three most influential monopolists imaginable could only have the clear meaning of the position of the Minister of Ammunition with regard to the
to strengthen the expected decisions.

Significantly, after Milch opened the consultation, Vögler was the first to speak. His - according to Speer's account - "extraordinarily sensible explanations"
culminated in “that it was time to create clear conditions. Someone has to...
"decide everything." To concentrate munitions, he could certainly imagine it at the time that Milch, to whom he was in direct contact via the Air Force Industrial Council, who also had old, familiar relationships with Deutsche Bank and could directly derive Göring's power from him, could also do so made a useful armaments manager for the German monopolies - provided that the course taken under Todt was continued and the "self-responsibility" of the armaments companies was not affected.

This much was clear that the organization and new way of working of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition, both because of its effectiveness, which had just been proven at the "Performance Show at the Zoo" and because of the military situation in the East, which put army armament above all else, was now for was indispensable to German imperialism. The Air Force Command/Four-Year Plan grouping, in contrast, declined in importance and had to - temporarily, as its representatives believed -
come to terms with their loss of position. However, no final personnel decision had been made as to who of the two most promising candidates -
Spear and milk - would rise to the top "arms dictator". The probability

105 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 2312, “Protocol about. the key points of the inspector•
meeting on February 13, 1942".
106 Saur, keywords, 13. 2. 19t,2.
107 *Janssen,* p. 38f. (according to Milch's message to J.).
108 *Speer,* Memories, p. 216.

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ality spoke no less strongly for Milch than for Speer, who was Göring's exponent and, as a long-time, experienced arms manager with a variety of connections in the regime's military, political and economic oligarchy, was still a lot ahead of his rival. In this case, the leading arms monopolies that represented Vögler, Zangen and Keßler could in fact be indifferent to the personnel question in principle, always on the condition that Todt's concept - their own concept - would be pursued further.

In fact, the matter was already decided in Speer's favor at this meeting: "Field Marshal Milch today, together with the Minister of Ammunition, the Air Force and the OKW - General Directors Zangen and Vögler from the industry were present - made the decision to carry out this planning (the entire armor - D. E.) to be summarized under Speer. This question will be presented to the Führer this afternoon." i09 Reich Economics Minister Funk, Göring and the representatives of the Wehrmacht had obviously seen their candidate in milk. 110 But Speer was able to defend himself with a reference to the "mission of the "Fuhrer" that was issued to him.

In the afternoon, Hitler confirmed this decision with great aplomb in the cabinet room of the Reich Chancellery in front of the participants in the morning meeting. 111 Speer reports in his memoirs about a subsequent personal conversation with Hitler and Bor-mann, in which Hitler "again (! - D.E.) gave him the advice" to "make use of industry as much as possible" since he " would find the most valuable forces there." 112
During the same day or the next day (February 14th), Hitler finally decided that only Speer should receive all powers in the area of "performance improvement". Bormann instructed the party apparatus on February 15th that after this decision, "everyone should be given the power improvement related questions are dealt with centrally by the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition. 113 publications and speeches on this topic would have to be coordinated with the minister.
The DAF had to hand over the processing of all technical questions, especially questions of rationalization, to the Minister of Ammunition or to the Main Office for Technology of the NSDAP.
On February 13th, Speer had milk “in terms of improving the performance of the

109 As note 105.

110 **Saur, Keywords,** February 13, 1942. **Unclear and contradictory information about the detailed circumstances of this meeting in *Speer,* Memories, p.** 215 **ff.; *Janssen,* p.** 39; ***Milward,* War Economy, p.** 70 **f.; *Irving,* The Tragedy of the German Air Force, p.** 213 **f. For more details see *Eichholtz, Dietrich,* Manager of State-Monopoly Capitalism, in *JfW,*** 1974, **T.** 3, p. 225 **f.**

111 **Saur, keywords, February 13 ,** 1942; **Afterwards, in addition to Hitler and Speer, the following were present: Funk, Dorp-müller, Ley, Hupfauer, Marrenbach, Vögler, Zangen, Milch, Witzell, Schulze-Fielitz, Schaede, Fromm, Leeb, Keitel, Thomas, Keßler, Landfried. - The role of the three monopoly masters present is trivialized and turned into that because *Irving* (The Tragedy of the German Air Force, p.** 213) **and *Speer* (Memoirs, p.** 215) **inventively speak of a “big meeting of many leading industrialists”. interested extras devalued.**

112 ***Speer,* Memories, p.** 218.

113 ***Reichsverfügungsblatt of the NSDAP - Parleiha,dei,*** 5/1942 **v.** February 16, 1942, **AO Bormanns No. A** 6/42 **v.** 15. 2. 19'12. - **Goebbels noted on** February 14th that **Hitler and Bormann had meant to Ley, "that in the question of increasing performance nothing could be done without the Ministry of Munitions." *(Goebbels.* Diaries from the years** 191.2-1943 **with other documents ed . by Louis P. Lochner, Zurich** (1948), **p.** 86).

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Air force industry and the integration of air force production into the new organization of the defense industry".114 A few days later, he and Walther Schieber spoke in detail with the leading industrial representatives of the Air Force Industrial Council - Werner, Fr ydag and Harten - about the "expansion of the rings of air armament to the entire supply and uniform reorganization of the organs of self-responsibility of the industry under Speer" _115 On February 14th and 15th , Speer began to familiarize himself with his ministry.116 In the following days,
the minister clarified things in several consultations with top representatives of the war economy Conditions. With Reich Economics Minister Funk "the minister (on February 16th - D. E.) clarified the increase in performance in the armaments industry and its impact on civilian production. The following two days brought meetings with Field Marshal Milch, General Thomas, Colonel General Fromm and the General Directors Pleiger and Zangen. In a meeting with the users of the armed forces and the representatives of the defense industry, the minister gave an insight into the new organizational plan of the defense industry, the impact of the industry's self-responsibility." 117 It was already part of the minister's working style to have the leading representatives at the most important meetings of the arms monopolies.

On February 18, the heads of the highest armaments departments of fascist Germany signed - not without "considerable reservations"118 - a document in which they recognized the new war economy concept of the German monopolies represented by the Minister of Munitions as binding.119 The first thing they did was confirm this Minister of Ammunition that "the overall performance within the German economy" would be "uniformly controlled" by him. Speer thereby expressly established his claim to leadership over the "entire self-responsibility organization of the economy" and at the same time announced the significant expansion of this organization. The armaments departments of the Wehrmacht undertook to leave the distribution of armaments orders and the actual management of armaments production to them - that is, above all to the committees and rings of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition. The Ministry of Munitions immediately carefully recorded the result of this important meeting: "Joint meeting chaired by Speer on uniform management of armaments. Signing of a corresponding resolution by Milch, Witzell (with reservations), Fromm, Lech, Lange, Schell, Hanneken, Funk, Thomas, Zangen. For the first time, the formulation contains as a basis the comprehensive idea of the tasks of committees and rings." 120 Speer had Zangen at his side that day too.

114 *Chronicle of the RMf BuM,* 1942, Bl. February 14, 13, 1942.
115 Saur, keywords, February 16 and 17, 1942. In the source Hartung is incorrectly referred to as Harten (managing director of the Air Force Industrial Council).
116 *Chronicle of the RMfBuM,* 1942, Bl. 19f., February 14 and 15, 1942.
117 Ibid., Bl. 20, 16-18. 2. 1942.
118 *Thomas,* p. 353.
119 ZStA Potsdam, RMfRuK, No. 51, printed "News from the Reich Minister for Armament and Ammunition" (hereinafter: *News from the RMfBuM),* No. 3, May 6, 1942, "Determination" about.
"Collaboration v. Requirements and Main Committees", n.d. The following is also included hereafter.
120 Saur, keywords, February 18, 1942; see *Speer,* Memories, p. 219. According to the *news from the RMfBuM* (see note 119), Sts. Kleinmann also signed "Agreed", but Funk and Lange were not mentioned.

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In just a few days, the balance of power within the regime's war economy authorities had shifted significantly in favor of the Reich Ministry for Arms and Ammunition. A phase of temporary instability in the state monopoly mechanism in the war economy was over.

It was the top brass of monopoly capital, especially Vögler and Zangen, who gave the new minister the necessary support, introduced him to office and watched over his first steps, as they had done with his predecessor two years earlier. 121 Only this fact, which bourgeois historiography prefers to deny or conceal, explains why the Minister of Ammunition, as Todt began, expanded the ministry's power apparatus and its industrial base, the system of "self-responsibility" of the armaments monopolies, so quickly and successfully and could make it by far the strongest, dominant command center of the war economy.

Peak of the reorganization (spring 1942)

The new minister, based on the preparatory work of his predecessor and guided by advisors such as Vögler and Zangen, had as his goal the reorganization of the state-monopolistic regulatory apparatus in the war economy to concentrate the regulatory power as completely as possible with his authorities and with the “self-responsible people”. "-organs of the armaments industry as a prerequisite for uniform control of the entire war economy. The bundle of measures taken, which were essentially implemented with the help of the direct support of Hitler, clearly demonstrated this.

At the first attempt, the advocates of a radical centralization of the state mono-

political mechanism, although they went to work with great energy and penetrating power, in view of the many conflicting interests and competencies of groups, cliques and apparatuses of the ruling class, they still had many failures and often found themselves forced to compromise. Nevertheless, they came significantly closer to their goal in the spring months of 1942. The balance of power in the state monopoly mechanism changed significantly within a few months, much more so than the significant organizational changes indicated.

The biggest obstacle on the way to a unified command center in the war economy was the general economic policy authority that Göring held as the representative for the four-year plan. With Hitler's backing, Speer determined the reluctant Göring to, on March 1st, "decree on the appointment of a general representative for armament tasks in the four-year plan" 122, which was drawn up according to Speer's draft, "all departments entrusted with armament tasks in the four-year plan to be subject to uniform control in armaments matters" and to appoint the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition as the "General Plenipotentiary for Armaments Tasks" (GB Rüst) for this purpose. The GB Rüst was given the authority to all "business groups, general representatives, authorized representatives, etc. in the Framework of the four-year plan ... on questions of armaments in my (Görings - DE) order to give instructions”.

121 See *Volume I,* p. 121ff.

122 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 8442, Bl. 18 R. Hereafter also the following.

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The short, general decree was justified by the "necessities of armament" to which "all other needs should be subordinated" in war, and was supplemented on the same date by a very important, unpublished letter from Göring to Speer and Körner, in which the Comprehensive powers that go far beyond the actual armament were mentioned in detail, which Göring transferred to GB Rüst: "This includes all measures to simplify the procurement system, to combine orders, to rationalize common products (including preliminary and... Semi-finished products) to increase performance in German companies - regardless of whether they are armaments or other armaments-related companies. Furthermore, the general representative for armaments tasks within the framework of the four-year plan is entitled to take the lead in questions of quotas, in questions of labor deployment, etc. for the armaments and their sub-companies and to issue instructions here too." 123 As Speer said, that was by far the most important thing "most comprehensive authority within the four-year plan that has been granted to date".1:½

The core of the reorganization measures undertaken was the expansion of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition and the "self-responsibility" Organization of the armaments industry at the expense of the armaments organization of the OKW and the army and in the creation of the "Central Planning", which, under the direction of the Minister of Ammunition, regulated the distribution of the most important production conditions - key raw materials, labor, machines - within the framework of the entire war economy. Also the Regulatory bodies that continued to exist independently alongside the Ministry of Ammunition, especially the armaments offices of the Air Force and Navy, the Reich Ministry of Economics and the GB Chemistry, were brought into strong economic-political dependence and were subject to indirect regulation of their activities by central planning.

All important organizational and personnel changes outside the area of the Ministry of Ammunition were also essentially due to the influence of the Minister of Ammunition and the new war economy conception of the circles of finance capital that supported him, in particular - the reorganization measures

in the area of the Reich Ministry of Economics

above all the creation of the Imperial Iron Association,

-: the dismissal of the General Plenipotentiary for Motor Vehicles, Undersecretary Major General Adolf v. Schell, and the General Plenipotentiary for Iron and Steel Management, Undersecretary of State Lieutenant General Hermann v. Hanneken,

- the appointment of a "general representative for labor deployment", -

the reorganization of the leadership of the Reich Ministry of Transport and the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture 12.5.

The five main committees inherited from Todt and their substructure formed the starting point for the creation of a system of committees and rings, exclusively

123 Ibid., Göring to Speer and Körner, March 1, 1942. - Speer immediately made use of his general authority as GB Rüst; Before mid-March, when Hitler had agreed and Speer handed over Göring's decree to the press, even the Reich Chancellery and the BfV office "did not know anything about this title of Minister of Munitions" (ZStA Potsdam, Reichs-kanzlei, film 19467, AN Reich Chancellery, March 4, 1942; see *Speer,* Memories, p. 220f.).

124 BA Koblenz, R 3/1547, Speer's speech to the district economic advisors, district officials for Technology and district leaders of the DAF, April 18, 1942.

125 See Chapter 8.

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Led by leading representatives of the defense companies, the intention was to centrally control the entire defense industry.
After reshuffles in leadership, the existing main committees were led without exception by representatives of heavy industry, primarily the Ruhr companies and here again the United Steelworks group (as of the end of April 1942) :126

Main Committee	ammunition	*Edmund Geilenberg* (Reichswerke Group)
Main committee and tractors	Armored car	*Walter Rohland* (United Steelworks)
Main Committee	weapons	*Arthur Tix* (Hanomag/Bochum Club/ United Steel Mills) 127
Main Committee Wehrmacht device	General	*Wilhelm Zangen* (Mannesmann), head of the Reich Industry Group
Main Committee	machinery	*Karl Lange* (General Manager of the Mechanical Engineering Economic Group and representative of the four-year plan for the machine production)

The appointment of Geilenberg and Lange instead of the representatives of the large electrical companies (Keßler, Benkert) was certainly technically justified, but at the same time it was a concession to the four-year plan group around Göring, Krauch and Pleiger. If this concession was associated with the intention of including the apparatus of GB Chemistry under the name of Main Committee Chemistry 128 in the area of the Ministry of Munitions, this plan definitely failed. 1 29 By the beginning of April, seven new main committees had been formed, of which only three were permanently integrated into the apparatus of the Ministry of Munitions :13 0

Main Committee of Warships 131	*Rudolf Blohm* (Blohm & Voss)
Main Committee of Railway Vehicles	*Gerhard Degenkolb* (Demag)
Main Committee of Motor Vehicles	*Paul Werners* (Büssing NAG/AEG); since November 1942: *Wilhelm Schaaf* (BMW)
Airframe Main Committee	*Karl Frydag* (Henschel Flugzeugwerke, later Heinkel)

126 *Anatomy of War,* p. 398, Doc. 207 *(=News from the RMfBuM,* No. 3, May 6, 1942).
127 Tix was chairman of the board of Hanomag and a board member of its parent company, the Bochum Association for Gußstahlfabrikation AG, a subsidiary of the Vereinigte Steel mills.
128 See, for example, *News of the RMfBuM,* No. 3, May 6, 1942, "Cooperation between users and main committees"; BA Koblenz, R 3/1570, structural diagram of the committee and ring organization of the RMfBuM, probably from May 1942 (where “HA Krauchplan” appears).
129 Since the Krauch plan was essentially an investment program and not a production program, Göring and Krauch were able to put forward factual arguments against incorporation by the RMfBuM. The - not smooth - cooperation in planning and regulation took place mainly via the central planning (see p. 82f.). See also *Weyres-P. Levetzow, Hans Joachim.* The German arms industry from 1942 to the end of the war, Rer. pole. Diss. Munich 1975, p. 28. Erroneous representation in *Janssen,* p. 46, which assumes that the establishment of a HA "Krauch plan" has happened.
130 As note 126.
131 In the summer of 1942, due to the inclusion of merchant shipbuilding, it was renamed HA Schiffbau.

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Engine Main Committee	***William Werner*** **(Auto Union/Junkers)**
Main Committee Aircraft Equipment I	***Hans Heyne*** **(AEG)**
Main Committee Communications Equipment	***Friedrich Lüschen*** **(Siemens)**

The three main committees in the aircraft industry were "from the area of the Industrial Council of the Air Force", the main communications committee "from the area of the industrial organization of the General Plenipotentiary for Communications", ie General Fellgiebel (OKH), although they were more or less closely related to that apparatus of the Ministry of Ammunition. The Main Warships Committee was also not clearly subordinate to the Ministry of Munitions, as the naval weapons offices insisted on their regulatory powers, as did the General Aircraft Master. According to Speer, the main committees for air force and naval armaments remained largely inactive as long as contract awarding and production regulation remained with the weapons offices of the air force and navy, i.e. until 1944 **and** 1943, respectively.

The formation of the Main Committee for Rail Vehicles meant that, through Speer's intervention with Hitler, the previous State Secretary in the Reich Transport Ministry, Wilhelm Kleinmann, was replaced by Albert Ganzenmüller. Transport Minister Dorpmüller was confronted with the fait accompli on May 23rd **at the Führer's headquarters.132 Ganzenmüller, who was well known to Speer, was easily launched as the "savior" of the traffic situation during Hitler's Soviet winter offensive and proved to be so until the end of the war reliable member of the state monopoly force group represented by the Minister of Ammunition.**

A month later, the key regulatory powers of the General Representative for Motor Vehicles were transferred to the Minister of Ammunition (Motorization Department) or. to the Main Committee on Motor Vehicles - without Göring being appointed representative for the four-year plan, which v. Schell was interviewed. 133 A little later Hitler removed v. Schell from all of its functions.134

From then on, the relevant monopoly companies operated and governed both main committees without interference from military or civilian authorities. The leading company representatives regulated production with their own authority, which was derived only from the power of the ammunition minister.

What was new and of great importance was the establishment of main rings and special rings. The idea of rationalizing and regulating the production of important supplier products that represented "bottlenecks", for example crankshafts and other forgings, ball bearings or gears, through "industrial rings" was already fixed as a main point in the agreement of February 18th been. 135 The term “industrial rings” was apparently chosen based on the rings of the Air Force Industrial Council, but had a different content than the Air Force ring organization, which was divided according to aircraft types; as was generally the case in the Air Force and the Air Force Army armament uses the terms committees and rings in completely different senses,

132 FB, May 24, 1942, speech by Hitler v. May 23, 1942; see FB, May 18, 1942, point 9; May 13, 1942 point 20; March 19, 1942, point 36; see also *Speer,* Memories, p. 236ff.; *Reinhardt,* p. 280ff.

133 FB, June 23, 1942, point 10 ("The Führer approves the agreement with General Schell that the production of motor vehicles will be transferred to us."); FB, June 29, 1942, point 8.

134 FB, July 8, 1942, point 2. Goring issued the corresponding decree only on September 10, 1942 (ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, Film 19 476).

135 *Anatomy of War,* p. 381, Doc. 196, Agreement of. February 18, 1942.

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but at the same time were not clearly differentiated from each other. According to the agreement mentioned, an industrial ring should have the authority to issue instructions "to all companies in its
area of responsibility".136 Main rings were quickly created as a central grouping of the industrial rings (special rings) of the Ministry of Munitions, which later covered more and more numerous production areas. During Wilhelm Zangen had long been considered - together with Todt - as the main advocate of the committees and ensured the close personal connections and functional exchange between the Reich Industry Group and the economic groups on the one hand, and the system of committees and rings on the other. 137 It was above all Albert Vögler, who specifically promoted and implemented the idea of ring formation. Vögler apparently pursued the purpose of using the rings to tacitly transfer essential competencies of the Reich Ministry of Economics to the Ministry of Ammunition and its "self-responsibility" organization, adding a new dimension to the central regulatory mechanism of this ministry and finally to include the affected economic and specialist groups - including important ones such as the iron industry economic group, the mechanical engineering economic group and the electrical industry economic group - firmly in this mechanism.
As a result, resistance to the formation of the ring came from the Reich Ministry of Economics. "In any case," said Ministerial Councilor Solveen at a meeting in the Reich Ministry of Economics on March 17, "he (Solveen - DE) sees great difficulties in managing the new rings, as Dr. Vögler has in mind." 138 Vögl<'r and Speer, however, quickly prevailed against the opponents of the ring formation and also against skeptics 139 from their own ranks who, like Ernst Poensgen, spoke of and of "over-organization" feared increased influence from the official administration.

At the beginning of April there are four main rings: 14 0

Main ring iron and steel	Albert Nöll (United Steelworks)
Main ring metals	Otto Fitzner (head of the economic group metal industry; Giesche Group)
Main ring production means and machine elements	Hans Kluy (Reichswerke Group)
Hauptring Elektrotechnik ores	Friedrich Lüschen (Head of the Electrical Industry Economic Group; 14 1 Siemens)

As of June 1, 1942, the Ministry of Munitions stated the number of main committees as 14 and the number of main rings as five.1'12 The main iron and steel ring was divided and two new main committees were formed:

136 Ibid.

137 See ibid., p. 385 ff., Doc. 199, AN by Karl Albrecht üb. Speech of Zangen v. March 5, 1942; ibid, p. 399, Doc. 207 (as note 126).

138 BA Koblenz, R 13 1/1066, protocol. (Wigru Esl) d. Meeting in the RWiM on March 17, 1942.

139 Ibid.; see ibid., R 13 1/621, minutes. d. Meeting of the small circle of 3/16 191.2.

11.0 As note 126.

141 The replacement of the position of head of the Wigru with Lüschen (from May f9/j2) was requested by Zangen from the R\ViM on the grounds that the RMfBu11 considered a personal union between the HA and Wigru heads to be necessary (Zangen to RWiM, 29. 4. 1942, facsimile print in *DZW,* vol. 2, p. 288).

142 BA Koblenz R 3/1570, structural diagram of the committee and ring organization of the Rl\UBu f, probably v. May 1942; Weyres v. Levet:;ow, p. 25f.

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Main Committee of Marine Underwater Weapons (also: Marine Special Equipment) 143	**Gottlieb Paulus (Daimler-Benz)**
Main Committee for Powder and Explosives	**Otto Sarrazin (Wasag/IG Farben)**
Main ring iron production	**Hermann Röchling (Röchling Group) 144**
Main ring iron processing	**Albert Nöll (United Steelworks)**

The organization of the main committees and rings remained in this basic structure without any significant changes or expansions until late autumn 1943.
The actual main work of order control, quota setting and rationalization was carried out by the 178 special committees and special rings i 45 and numerous other working committees and working rings as a broad substructure of the main committees and main rings mentioned. In accordance with these, they were generally led by key representatives of the most efficient firm in each case, i.e. in the vast majority of cases the plant of a leading arms company. For example, the head of the SA PZ II tank development was Deutsche Edelstahlwerke (Group company of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke) 146, SA PZ VII engine production was dominated by Maybach-Motorenbau GmbH, which had a monopoly position in the construction of tank engines and, like Zahnradfabrik Friedrichshafen AG, was responsible for the Zeppelin -Group belonged; The SA PZ VIII gearbox production was headed by the deputy chairman of the supervisory board of the Zahn-radfabrik Friedrichshafen, H. v. Westermann, directed; The head of the SA Ship Electrics was Siemens-Schuckertwerke AG, and the SA Optical and Precision Mechanical Armament Equipment was headed by a key representative from Carl Zeiss Jena.

In **the "intersections" of both organizational forms - the committees and the rings -**
As Speer put it, "are in personal union - and that is the crucially important thing - those specialists who, on the one hand, are responsible for crankshaft construction for tank engines in the special committee (of the HA Armored Cars - D.E.), **but on the other hand, in the associated ring (the main iron and steel ring - D.E.) within the entire crankshaft production, the interests of the Panzerwehr are represented." .147 With Speer's decree "on the area of responsibility and the rules of procedure for the self-responsibility bodies (Committees and Rings) in the Armaments Industry" of April 20, 1942 148 , the committees and rings were commissioned to "provide the most appropriate accommodation in the companies and companies or company departments affiliated to them**

and execution of orders in the most efficient way with the least amount of raw materials and labor and with the best utilization of capacities.
You have to simplify production through technical and organizational means and to achieve the highest possible performance." They had to concentrate
Production in the "best companies" should be taken care of and the introduction of modern ones should be taken into account Series production and overall further rationalization in their area take care.

143 Disbanded in autumn 1943 or divided into HA weapons, ammunition and precision mechanics and optics.
144 Röchling formally led the HR as head of the Reich Iron Association (see p. 88 f.); His deputy, Walter Rohland, was actually in charge.
145 We yres-P. Leretzow, p. 27; Stand v. June 1, 1942.
146 This and the following examples are based on information there, p. 27 f.
147 As note 124.
148 messages from the RMfBuM, No. 3, May 6, 1942, appendix 1 (1st DVO to the decree, April 20, 1942).

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This meant that the committees and rings had comprehensive economic and political powers in their area. Its leaders were expressly instructed not to "try to achieve their goals with companies solely through their power of persuasion" in the future, but rather to "lead the industry by giving clear instructions and orders to the industry."149 The system of regulation created in this way in the armaments industry represented a new stage in the development of state monopolistic organs in the war economy of German imperialism and meant a new climax in the fusion of state and monopoly power. A main committee, for example, now carried out the tasks of an industrial branch ministry on the one hand, and the functions of the headquarters of an oversized trust on the other. The commanding heights in armaments passed directly into the hands of the most powerful monopolies, for whom war was a source of enormous enrichment.

Supported by the system of "self-responsibility" of the monopolies, which became the core of the entire state-monopoly regulatory system of the war economy, the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition expanded its functions and strengthened its executive power. It expanded its regional organization and constantly enlarged its official apparatus. The dictatorial position of the minister was consolidated step by step.

The ministerial bureaucracy swelled noticeably. Todt's staff, which was still limited in numbers, became an extensive ministerial apparatus with offices, office groups and departments. After the war, Speer explained, it was "in line with our ministry's personnel policy" to transfer the management of the ministerial departments to long-serving armaments managers with "private industrial training."150 Karl-Otto Saur, head of the technical office, technical employee of the August-Thyssen-Hütte before 1933 (United Steelworks), later district head for technology in Essen, since 1937 Todt's deputy as "Reichswalter" of the NSBDT, was a key employee in the Ministry of Munitions from the beginning. Walther Schieber, head of the armaments supply office, as SS brigade leader Himmler's informant in the ministry, Director of the IG Farben group (Dormagen factory) until the mid-thirties and later still associated with it as a result of certain payments and pension entitlements, he then served as chairman of the board of the state-controlled cellular wool group Thüringische Zellwolle AG. He was a member of the state advisory board of the Dresdner Bank and regional economic advisor under Gauleiter Sauckel in Thuringia. Since 1940 he was Todt's official advisor on chemical production issues. Karl Maria Hettlage, general officer for finance, also head of the Armaments Office, the ministry's house bank, was and remained a member of the board of Commerzbank AG; He was Speer's trusted financial advisor during his time as the architect of the fascist

Magnificent buildings.

The Armaments Office was an exception. His backstory had dramatic accents.
For the ammunition minister, the question of whether the regulatory power in the military districts and military districts remained in the hands of the Wehrmacht or whether the ministry, committees and rings exercised the decisive influence here was a matter of the realization or failure of his concept. There it was discussed about the order and capacity

149 Ibid., Speer's statement “To the leadership of the committees and rings,” undated.
150 Archiwum GKBZHP, Warsaw, Proc. Nor. 5 (Flick process), shorthand, vol. 30, p. 8844, Interrogation of Speer v. October 21, 1947.

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occupancy of the individual armaments factories, the concentration of production, the allocation and saving of workers and materials, and series production and rationalization.

The arms inspections (in the military districts) and armaments commands (in the military districts) had their organizational leadership in the Defense Economics and Armaments Office of the OKW. In the opinion of the circles around the ammunition minister, this office had to give up essential powers; The many thousands of officers working there, "whose aspirations and professional qualifications," as Speer once said maliciously, "should lie in completely different areas," should give way to those forces "which lie in the initiative of private companies "151: "The execution of comprehensive industrial tasks can only be directed by men who have emerged from industry itself." 152 The Military Economics and Armaments Office under General Thomas was finally split in May into an Armaments Office, which was incorporated into the Ministry of Munitions, and the Military Economics Office, which remained with the OKW. A decree from Hitler of May 7, 1942153 established this division and the transfer of the Armaments Office to Speer's authority "for the duration of the war", but left it with a military character. This final determination could only limit the weight of the Ministry of Ammunition in relation to the rest of the armed forces -power offices, especially the weapons offices of the Wehrmacht parts, increase and promote the amalgamation of the power organs of monopolies, ministerial and military departments into a single, state-monopoly complex.154 This was "only the first step", as Thomas later commented on Hitler's decree, "to displace the soldier from armament management." 155 For half a year, Thomas headed both parts of the former military economics and armaments office. Then he had to vacate the position at the head of the ammunition ministry in favor of the consistent concentration of regulatory power and from the armaments office and from the ministry.156 From now on, Speer discussed all essential questions that affected the armament programs and weapons systems of the Wehrmacht as a whole directly and exclusively with Hitler and usually brought about his immediate decision.

The Armaments Office under Lieutenant General Kurt Waeger retained the function of managing the armaments inspections and armaments commands. This so-called middle instance of the war economic authority apparatus was amputated from the OKW by Hitler's decree. From now on it formed the core of the middle authority of the Ministry of Munitions. The Armaments Office also dealt centrally with labor force issues

151 BA Koblenz, R 3/1550, Speer's speech to the armaments industry in Essen v. June 9, 1944 (concept).

152 Ibid.

153 ***News from the RMfßuJ1,*** No. 4, May 22, 1942, “Decree of the Führer on the unified Control of the armaments industry", May 7, 1942.

154 The dissolution of the WiRüAmt is reported in the bourgeois literature from various sources, e.g. For reasons that are sometimes contradictory (exoneration of the military; "declaration" of the total defeat; glorification of Todt or Speer) there is often a greatly disproportionate treatment, which is favored by the source situation (see, for example, ***Carroll, Berenice A.,*** Design for Total War. Armsand Economics in the Third Reich, The Hague/Paris 1968, p. 232 ff.; ***Tlwmas,*** p. 307 ff.)

155 ***Tlwmas,*** p. 310.

156 See ***Chronicle of the RM{BuJf,*** 1942, BI. 88ff. (92f.), October 1942 (about negotiations between Speer and Thomas); ***Carroll,*** p. 239f.

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provided the documents on the basis of which Speer negotiated with Hitler and the General Plenipotentiary for Labor Deployment regarding conscriptions and manpower requirements.

The die was thus cast as far as the influence of the OKW on the war economy was concerned.

As early as March, the Army Weapons Office's remaining direct influence on armaments production had been significantly curtailed. After negotiations with Speer, the head of the office, General Emil Leeb, signed an order according to which the HW A had to stop constructing weapons and military equipment itself. 157 The design was passed on to the development commissions or to the technical offices of the ammunition ministry committees. Within a few months, in addition to the tank commission under Porsche, a weapons commission (April) under Erich Müller (Krupp), an ammunition commission (April) under Albert Wolff (DWM), and a powder and explosives commission (July) under Paul Müller (Dynamit Nobel/IG Farben) were created) and a communications commission (August) under Karl Küpfmüller (Siemens & Halske). The Army Weapons Office was only responsible for registering the needs and technical requirements for weapons and equipment with the Ministry of Ammunition and accepting the finished equipment.

When an Industrial Council of the Army High Command was formed on April 30, 1942, parallel to the Air Force Industrial Council, under the leadership of General Leeb, the balance of power between officers and representatives of the Ministry of Ammunition and the arms companies was already in favor of the latter - unlike in the Air Force decided. Around a dozen of the most important monopolistic representatives and employees of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition were assigned to the HWA as "advisory support to the head of the Army Weapons Office", including the heads of six main committees (Zangen, Rohland, Geilenberg, Tix, Lange and - since July - Lüschen) and by the three development commissions (Erich Müller, Porsche, Wolff), as well as Albert Vögler, Paul Müller (Dynamit Nobel AG/IG Farben) and Erich l\fatthias (Westfälisch-Anhaltische Sprengstoff AG/IG Farben). Rohland acted as “executive chairman”.158 The formation of the Industrial Council of the OKH was a representative consolation for the Army Weapons Office. Obviously without a real function, it was of course not an equivalent for the regulatory powers that had been taken away from the office, but rather its composition symbolized the absolute dominance of the monopoly rulers in all questions of military armament.

“The Industrial Council of the OKH as well as the Industrial Council of the Air Force,” it said in the announcement from the Ministry of Munitions about the formation of the Industrial Council of the OKH, “each have their area of work in a sector of armaments, while the Armaments Council of the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition. .. is available for the entire area of armaments." financial capital (certainly Vögler and Zangen, probably Borbct, Bücher, Poensgrn, Fitzner, etc.). He was a committee

157 News from the RM{BuM, No. 2, 25. !i. 19'12, miss Leebs v. 3/17/19!i2.
158 Ibid., No. 5, June 9, 19!i2; partly printed in Anatomy of War, p. 396, Doc. 205.
159 Ibid.

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was exclusively made up of monopoly representatives and, organized by the RGI and the economic groups associated in the Iron and Metal Industry Association, had at times actually performed an advisory and coordination function. The body now called the Armaments Council, sometimes also called the Reich Armaments Council, had a completely different character. In April 1942 , under Speer's chairmanship, it included the five top heads of the Wehrmacht's armaments departments - Milch (ObdL), Fromm and Leeb (OKI-1), Carl Witzell (OKM) and Thomas (OKW) - and eight of the most prominent armaments industrialists (Books , Keßler, Pleiger, Poensgen, Röch-ling, Roehnert, Vögler and Zangen).160 In July, Hans Malzacher (Berg-hütte Group), Alfried Krupp v. Bohlen and Haibach and William Werner were appointed to the Armaments Council.161 Since
the times of the "General Council of the German Economy" (1933), there had not been such an open exposure of leading representatives of monopoly capital.162 The arms powerhouses now considered it necessary and It is also possible to step out of the anonymity that has so far been carefully maintained.

The Armaments Council clearly belonged to the predominant type of “councils” in the fascist dictatorship that had no real function. After all, it manifested the power of the Minister of Ammunition and the monopolistic forces behind him. Its constitution was intended to be given to the heads of the Wehrmacht armaments to sweeten their loss of power in the armaments sector and at the same time tie them to the newly created state-monopoly regulatory system; the aim was to demonstrate to the outside world the "connection between the Wehrmacht and the economy" 163. General Thomas reported, "that this council never met as a whole, but that its members were only called upon individually by the minister."164 A special
advisory body was no longer necessary.

The corporate giants no longer only advised the military and civilian military authorities, but also sat in the Ministry of Ammunition and in its "self-responsible" positions directly protected the [illegible]everyone is at the controls of the war economy
monopoly interests with state authority.

If the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition achieved a clearly leading position in the war economy organization of Hitler's Germany within a few weeks and months, the exceptionally close connection to Hitler was one of the minister's greatest assets. From the very beginning, Speer had requested constant contact and direct cooperation from Hitler. Hitler, who had taken over command of the army in December 1941 , discussed the matters of arming the army and all other urgent war economic problems in detail with Speer. After a meeting at Speer's with the heads of the armaments offices of the three branches of the Wehrmacht, General Thomas stated: "The Führer sees Speer as his main organ, his confidant for all economic areas.

160 Ibid., No. 3, May 6, 1942, noted. ex. “Armaments Council, committees and rings, commissions” sions", n.d.

161 Ibid., No. 7, July 20, 1942.

162 DNB published on May 6, 19,12 the news about the formation of the Armaments Council by the RMfBuM "in these days" (ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, film 19622).

163 *Thomas,* p. 316. The list of members of the Armaments Council is incomplete here.

164 Ibid.

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Speer alone has something to say today. He can intervene in all departments. He is already ignoring all departments." 165 From March to May 1942 , Speer met with Hitler on a total of 19 days, i.e. on average every fifth day. These so-called leader conferences or leader meetings later took place at greater intervals , but continued until 1945. According to Speer's own statement, he regularly took a number of "experts", ie primarily armaments specialists from large corporations, to the meetings; A few of them were invited into the consultation room for the various discussion points.166 With their help, he got Hitler to make statements and decisions, which he, Speer, then recorded in writing and made the "leader's decisions" the basis of his own orders and decrees. 167 If he presented decrees to Hitler for his signature, he usually signed them without making any fuss.168 The large arms monopolies that supported the Minister of Ammunition found an extremely effective form in the Führer's meetings, Hitler's political authority

directly and intimately linked to their own economic power.
The effectiveness of the state monopoly group that was formed in this way remained unsurpassed until the final period of the war.
The arms monopolies took advantage of the opportunity, through Hitler and Speer, to find an even more comprehensive "connection to the political power network of the nation," 169 as Zangen put it, that is, to the power apparatus of the fascist party. The new ammunition minister enjoyed the active Support for Bormann, who, for example, on February 15 , 1942 , issued the order to the party to respect the absolute priority of the minister in the questions of "performance improvement".170 On February 18, Speer sent a letter drafted by Todt to the Gauleiter.171 It stopped on February 24th

In Munich he gave them a speech and explained to them his program of “arms management and industrial responsibility.”172 Several weeks later he spoke in detail about the same topic to the district economic advisors, the district department heads for technology and the district representatives of the DAF. 173 The ammunition minister's regular exchange of ideas with the Gauleiters continued in the coming weeks and months.
nates away.

165 TO WiRüAmt v. 2'1. 3. ex. Ilespr. on March 23, 1942 (PS-1452); zi tb *Janssen,* p. 49.
166 *Speer,* Memories, p. 245f.
167 Speer's 91 minutes of the "Führer meetings" with a total of almost 1000 sheets (completely contained in ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 1740 and Film 3399) are an important source for the history of the Second World War (quoted here as: FB). Your publication by Boelcke *(Germany's Armament in the Second World War.* Hitler's Conferences with Albert Speer 1942-191, 5. Edited and submitted by Willi A. Iloelcke, Frankfurt a. M. 1969), "condensed" to the point of falsification, is for irrelevant to the researcher. See my review in *Z(G,* 8/1970, p. 1082 ff.
168 An example of this is in *Speer,* Memories, p. 222.
169 *Radandt,* A speech by Wilhelm Zangen, p. 205.
170 See p. 61. - At the end of 1942, Ilormann called on the Gauleiters to support Speer's concentration and rationalization measures and to no longer resist the closure of companies. "The war situation requires a change in the attitude of the Gauleiter." (ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 8630, letter from Bormann to the Gauleiter, May 29, 1942).
171 Ibid., Film 2312, Rs. Speers to the Gauleiter on February 18, 1942.
172 *Nachrichten_di!s RMfßuJ[,* No. 1, March 31, 19!i2, supplement, Speer's speech at the. Gauleiter conference on February 24, 1942.
173 Speech in: BA Koblenz, R 3/1547.

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In the form of the Gauleiter, who had an economic and political influence in the districts that should not be underestimated, one of the regime's most important domestic political pillars became more closely linked to the armaments organization of the Ministry of Munitions. The arms monopolies attached even greater importance to this, as the regional war economy organization of armaments inspections and armaments commands interpreted at the beginning of May 1942. the hands of the OKW passed into the sphere of power of the Ministry of Munitions and thus came under their direct influence. Attempts by the regional celebrities of the fascist party. However, they were usually successful in preventing them from interfering in war economic issues that directly affected the interests of the arms companies and from undermining the powers of their "self-responsibility" organization. A particularly vivid example of this was the tug of war over the formation of the regional economic chambers. 174 Since March 1, 1942, when GB Rüst had control over the workforce and the raw materials for armaments, the Minister of Ammunition now tried to solve two fundamental economic problems that had long been hotly disputed by competing groups within the ruling class It was about the dictatorial regulatory power over all workers in the fascist sphere of power and about the central state monopolistic planning of the national economy in favor of the imperialist predatory war. In March and April 1942, they were created according to the suggestions of the ammunition minister and with the support of Hitler two. new institutions: the "General Plenipotentiary for Labor Deployment" and the "Central Planning", both central state organs that were supposed to solve those problems in the spirit of the war economy concept represented by the Minister of Ammunition.

b) Fritz Sauckel's appointment as "general representative for labor deployment"

On March 21, 1942, Hitler appointed the Nazi gauleiter and Reich Governor of Thuringia, Fritz Sauckcl, as "General Plenipotentiary for Labor Deployment" (GBA).175 From then on, Sauckel's name was used for the mass deportations of foreign citizens from the fascist-occupied areas and their forced labor in the German one Closely connected to the war economy. The initiators of this appointment included primarily the OKW, the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition - already under Todt the organization of the four-year plan and the Reich Ministry of Labor. In the form of the Reich Industry Group, the Reich Coal Association and the GB Chemistry In the background, the most powerful monopoly organizations and arms companies were pulling the strings. In the end, the Minister of Ammunition, supported by the leading arms monopolies, largely implemented his concept in labor policy in connection with the extensive concentration of state monopoly regulatory power in his !Vlinisterium.

Under the pressure of the Soviet offensive in front of Moscow, the manpower situation for the German imperialists had become extremely dire.176 At the end of December 1941, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, head of the OKW, took part

the Reich Labor Minister made an approach to Göring and suggested that he appoint a "General-

174 See p. 98ff.

175 *RGBl.* 1942 1, p. 179, "Decree of the Führer regarding a general representative for labor deployment" from March 21, 1942.

176 See p. 193 ff.

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"authorized for the deployment of human beings" 177. By decree of January 10, 1942 , Göring appointed Werner Mansfeld, ministerial director in the Reich Ministry of Labor - and deputy head of the labor deployment business group in the four-year plan - -organization with “unrestricted authority to direct the entire work environment” "deployment and for the distribution of the manpower available after the military compensation demands have been met".178 However, he avoided expressly and personally appointing Mansfeld as his general representative and accordingly giving him an express right to give instructions.

The Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition, Todt, who was involved in the preliminary discussions for the appointment of a "human dictator" or "human commissioner,"179 had already, by mid-December at the latest, contacted one of his old confidants, Gene <Director Paul Budin, CEO of the ammunition company Hugo Schneider AG (Hasag) and head of a special ammunition committee since spring 1940, appointed special representative for the acquisition and distribution of Soviet prisoners of war and civilian citizens as forced laborers in the German armaments industry.180 The

The appointment of Mansfeld, a veteran fascist bureaucrat, must also be seen as a defense against the "total leadership claim(s)" of the Ministry of Munitions "in the entire labor deployment issue" 181, which the armaments departments of the Vehrmacht had been registering with suspicion for a long time and which in the choice of an industrialist from the inner circle of the arms companies gathered around the ministry as head of the "Special Mission for Russian Operations" 182.

As it soon became clear, Mansfeld's powers were limited. His competencies vis-à-vis the OKW and the Ministry of Ammunition remained unclear. Hitler :hesitant to make a clear decision in favor of a “human dictator”. Far-reaching changes in labor and social policy affected a key problem of warfare and the war economy and at the same time intervened in highly political areas.

Not only did they have to violate various interests within the fascist leadership clique and curtail competencies, but they also had to cause serious political problems for the German imperialists. However short the period of time in which Mansfeld held his powers was - his last report to Göring on the "use of Soviet Russians" dated March 23, 1942 18 :J was already during Sauckel's term of office - his activity was already leading one significant tightening of the forced labor regime of German imperialism.

Albert Speer, the new Minister of Ammunition, and the armaments monopolies supporting him sought to consequently extend their concept of rationalizing war production and centralizing the state monopoly's regulatory power to the area of regulating the workforce. On February 19 , 1942

177 EichJwltz, Prehistory of the GBA, p. 375f., Doc. 3, Keitel to RArbM, December 22, 1941.
178 Ibid., p. 379f., Doc. 6, Göring's decree v. January 10, 1942.
179 For more information on this see Eichlwltz, History of the GBA, p. 348ff.
180 Ibid., p. 353. - Göring had already given the labor deployment business group of the four-year plan (Syrup/Mansfeld) a "special order" for the "Russian deployment" on November 14, 1941 (BA Koblenz R 41/281, report Mansfeld v. December 13, 1941).
181 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 2328, statement from WiRüAmt (v. Meendsen-Bohlken) on one Todt's draft for a decree on "labour deployment issues", dated February 8, 1941.
182 See ibid., film 8630, Rs. Budins to the military district representatives of the RMfBuM, December 18, 1941.
1.83 BA Koblenz, R 41/281.

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Speer had a detailed discussion with Hitler - the first of his so-called Führer meetings. The central topic of this meeting was the workforce situation. On the same day, Hitler's "Decree on Key Forces" was issued.184 The long-term ideas and demands of the Minister of Ammunition and the armaments monopolies were set out in a "Memorandum on the Deployment of Labor" that Speer had brought with him, but only later, after further revision, Hitler wanted to hand over: "Memorandum on the work deployment not yet submitted to the Führer. - Add new figures for the next leader's lecture." 18.5 This memorandum - unknown to researchers - undoubtedly contained, above all, the demand for comprehensive powers and for the concentration of state onopolistic power in the area of regulating the workforce potential under the leadership and control of the Ministry of Ammunition. Janssen does not consider it unlikely that "Speer thought of taking the labor deployment into his own hands in February 1942."186 The Minister of Ammunition first suggested the Nazi gauleiter of Breslau, who he knew well, as the general plenipotentiary for labor deployment (GBA). (Gau who Lower Silesia), Karl 187 According to his statements, it was Bormann appeared two days later as Kandi-Hanke. data Sauckel suggested; Speer "agreed with his choice." 188 As early as March 9, he declared to General Thomas according to his file note: "Gauleiter Sauckel should become labor commissioner instead of Mansfeld[189], but outside of Speer's staff."

On March 19th, Speer brought the draft of the decree appointing the GBA to the "leader's meeting". For the last time he discussed with Hitler the objections and claims of other authorities, which were then finally put on file: "The Leader with the points of the decree criticized by State Secretary Neumann a GbA. agree on all points. I presented Neumann's objections to him, all of which he rejected. He intended to sign the decree immediately. The guide again at the request of Pg. Dr. Ley, to lead the labor effort, and at the same time pointed out to him that it would be a bad design if the same organization that has to represent the interests of the worker also represents the often conflicting interests of the state. The Führer fully agrees with this opinion and finally decided that Gauleiter Sauckel of the GbA. should be." 190 Hitler thus gave the Minister of Ammunition the necessary support against the objections of Robert Ley and the four-year plan headquarters, which Erich Neumann represented Göring and Körner. Neumann's objection was directed against comprehensive authority for

184 See p. 196 f.

185 FB, February 19, 1942, point 20 (my numbering, as none in the source).

186 *Janssen,* p. 60; On the other hand , *Homze, Edward L.,* Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, Prince-ton 1967, pp. 105f., emphasizes that Speer had suggested a Gauleiter as G BA from the outset as a "strong political personality" and as a support within the party for his war economy concept .

187 /*MG,* Vol. 16, p. 526, Speer's interrogation, June 20, 1946.

188 Ibid.

189 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1758, AN WiRüAmt via. Discussion between Speer and Thomas v. March 9, 1942. - Sauckel's appointment was by no means a "complete surprise" for Speer (see *Homze,* p. 107; also *Carroll,* p. 241).

190 FB, March 19, 1942, points 11 and 12.

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the GBA, 19 1 which had to remove it from the control of the four-year plan organization, and against its extensive direct subordination to the requirements of the armaments monopolies and their state executive, the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition.

Hitler's and Speer's arguments against Ley's ambitions were irrespective of their abysmal mendacity - a fascist organization like the DAF represented workers' interests! - revealing about the intentions and fears of the fascists. The establishment of a GBA was recognized as a political issue of high importance. In addition to the forced recruitment of foreign workers, its task should also consist of the increased exploitation of German workers and their even deeper enslavement by the arms monopolies. It should also include "the question of women's work (ie the forced obligation of women to work in the armaments - DE), the rationalization of work, etc." 192 . But it was precisely at the time of their first serious military defeat that the fascists showed themselves to be particularly sensitive and concerned about the mood and war morale of the people. Even if they did not want to directly burden the DAF and especially Ley, as itinerant preacher of "German socialism", with the odium of the planned coercive measures, they still considered it necessary to solve the political problem how fascist unscrupulousness and cruelty should be combined with social and chauvinistic demagogy and, if possible, disguised by them. This may also have been one of the reasons why one of the Gauleiters, who was experienced as a demagogue, was appointed to the post of the GBA and not immediately int The solution of appointing a Gauleiter also fit the armament powerhouse's concept, which consisted of enforcing the new state monopolistic course, particularly at the regional level, with the support of the fascist party. The more powers the GBA had, the better. It could not have been difficult for Speer to make it clear to Hitler that the task of the general plenipotentiary to be appointed was of incomparably greater importance and importance in economic and, above all, social policy terms than that of other general plenipotentiaries and that he, Hitler, would therefore have to sign the decree himself.

With Sauckel, one of the ambitious fascists of the second set was chosen, a bull-necked upstart and demagogue full of brutality. As the "foundation leader" of the "Aryanized" Gustloff armaments group - which, on a much smaller scale, roughly corresponded to Göring's position in the Reichswerke group - and with good connections, particularly to the Dresdner Bank, Sauckel also had certain industrial-monopolistic experience. Close business relationships and intimate personal acquaintances connected him with Walther Schieber, head of the Ministry of Munitions, and with Carl Goetz, chairman of the supervisory board of Dresdner Bank. As a "close friend of Bormann" 193 , he owed his nomination prima However, the decree on the GBA, signed by Hitler on March 21, 1942, was only published a month later, together with Göring's executive order of March 27, 194 . A compromise solution was thus found. Göring, who as

191 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 376, AN BfV (Görnnert) ex. Discussion with Sts. Neumann, n.d. (mid-March 1942).

192 Ibid., Film 10 804, TB Goebbels, entry from. March 13, 1942.

193 ***Homze,*** p. 106; see ***Carroll,*** p. 241.

194 ***RGBl.*** 1942 I, p. 180, AO Görings v. March 27, 1942.

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The fact that the representative for the Four-Year Plan de jure had supreme decision-making power in all economic policy issues since 1936 was not completely ignored by Hitler's decree, and his business group on labor deployment was not tacitly pushed aside.

The GBA was at least formally subordinate to him. Göring transferred to him all the powers that the Labor Deployment Business Group of the Four-Year Plan, which was thereby dissolved, had previously had, and gave him the full right to give instructions, especially for his area of responsibility, the "procurement and distribution of workers (and) regulation of working conditions". "to the supreme Reich authorities, their subordinate departments, as well as to the departments of the party and its branches and affiliated associations, to the Reich Protector, the Governor General, the military commanders and heads of the civil administration" _195 Before the order was signed and together with Hitler According to a decree published in the Reich

Law Gazette of April 21 , 1942 , **the Minister of Ammunition had obtained additional, extraordinarily far-reaching authority from Hitler for the GBA "so that it could also carry out personnel-related changes in the Reich Ministry of Labor and in the subordinate offices."196 Speer himself considered "large-scale personnel changes" necessary.197 After the signing, but before (!) the publication of both decrees, the :t'lfonitionsminister made a declaration in the first number of his ministerial gazette on Sauckel's appointment, which had the**

character of an additional implementing order for the GBA: "At the request of the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition, the Reich Governor and Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel was appointed "General Plenipotentiary for Labor Deployment" within the four-year plan. He has extensive powers and authority to issue instructions for this activity. In particular, he has been given the task of supplying the armaments industry with those workers who are a) necessary to replace the forces lost through conscription over the next few months and b) to fully staff the second shift in the priority programs ." 198 The extensive subordination of the GBA to the Ministry of Ammunition and the armaments monopolies and its dependence on their labor requirements arose from the nature of the matter and always remained the basis for their mutual relationships. They were also expressly formulated from the outset and by Hitler sanctioned it; Sauckel remembered it clearly years later: "Speer once sang to me in the presence of the Führer that I was there

to work for Speer and that I was mainly his fan; he mentioned this very often. .. "199 In principle, Göring's authority for the GB Rüst of March 1 , 1942 had already **established the facts of this subordination.199& In contrast, the legend that Sauckel was Speer's adversary, which is repeatedly used by bourgeois authors, is untenable Subordination to the Ministry of Mu-nition b:;.w. under the central planning had never succeeded, his incompetence**

195 Ibid.

196 *Eichlw/ Jz,* Prehistory of the GBA, p. 382, Doc. 8, Speer to Lammers, March 23, 1942.
i97 Ibid.

198 *messages from the RM{BuM,* No. 1, March 31, 1942.

199 *IMG,* Vol. 3, p. 543, presentation of evidence by the American. Prosecutor,13. 12.1945 (Exhibit US-230); ibid., vol. 32, p. 514, PS-3721, interrogation of Sauckel v. September 22, 1945 (English). 199a See p. 64.

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and "cruelty" 200, his "independence" and "self-reliance" 2 01 towards these institutions made a forced labor policy that was effective for German imperialism and smooth, effective cooperation impossible. What is left out is that Sauckel acted as an exponent and tool of a shameful system of state-monopolistic regulatory power, which served the purpose of subjugating Europe's sources of life to German imperialism and making them subservient to the German war economy. Last but not least, it also worked with the help of the general representative for labor deployment. The attempts to construct contradictions within this system, especially between Speer and Sauckel, or to overestimate actual conflicts, which only later acquired a certain importance under the pressure of the crisis of German imperialism after Stalingrad and Kursk, obscure its true character.

c) The constitution of "Central Planning"

The culmination of the efforts of the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition and the monopoly circles supporting him to regulate the entire war economy centrally and from their own power was the founding of the "Central Planning" in April 1942. The establishment of a central planning body was not an idea born of Speer, the new minister, 20 2 and did not come as a surprise to those closely involved.203 Todt had already planned for such an organ in the form of a five-man committee at the end of 1941/ beginning of 1942 in view of the collapse of the blitzkrieg strategy.2< K Walter Rohland later confirmed this and further preparations

200 *Carroll,* p. 241.

201 *Janssen,* p. 62f.; *Carroll,* p. 132 p. and 244; *Milward,* War Economy, p. 75f. u. p. 87 f.; further *Irving,* The Tragedy of the German Air Force, p. 224 and passim.

202 This is seriously claimed by Boelcke *(Germany's Armament in the Second World War,* p. 93), who thus adopts Janssen's assessment *(Janssen,* p. 56).

203 The history of central planning goes back to the first days of the war. When the war broke out, the OKW's Defense Economics and Armaments Office (at that time: Defense Economics Staff) was developing a project for a central planning office; However, the WiRüAmt's "proposal, presented at the beginning of September 1939, to form a planning committee for the defense of the Reich , which should carry out coordination between the armament projects of the Wehrmacht and the other projects for the defense of the Reich" (ZStA Potsdam, FS , Film 5465, memorandum WiRüAmt (v. Wolzogen) about "The activity of the WiRü Office in ensuring the supply of ammunition to the Wehrmacht parts from 1938 until the armistice with France", concluded at the beginning of June 1940) failed due to the resistance of the commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht parts and Todts in its capacity as GB Bau (Thomas, p. 170f.). At this time, the office was also dealing with even more far-reaching plans for the creation of an "Armaments Ministry" (ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 5465, KTB WiRüAmt/Stab, entry dated May 9, 1940 about discussions with v . Hanneken and Posse on September 17/18, 1939), whose management was apparently supposed to be officially taken over by Göring, but in fact by Thomas (see *Thomas,* p. 508ff., notes from Thomas and Obst. Jansen from March 29, 1940) .

204 Just a few weeks after his appointment as Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition, Todt intended to "convene all departments involved in production and manufacturing that are important to the war effort to form a planning group. It is the task of this planning group

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to the "creation of a kind of war (economic) ministry" under Todt's leadership.205 At the end of 1941, the armaments
chiefs of the three branches of the Wehrmacht also began to strive for "joint control of armaments orders".206 The initiative lay with Milch, the newly appointed General Aircraft Master, who also took over the chairmanship of this "three-member committee".207 The committee apparently convened the decisive meeting on February 13, 1942, at which the new ammunition minister countered the Wehrmacht's aspirations and pushed through the decision to implement the "overall planning". under him, Speer, to summarize.208 On March 2nd, Speer sketched before Thomas the picture of a central planning organization, like

what he had in mind: “Foundation of a small planning committee under the Reich Marshal, who takes over the entire central planning for the conduct of war. As a representative of the Wehrmacht, Chief WiRüAmt together with the most important state secretaries are involved in food planning, transport planning, coal and energy planning, construction planning, etc and managed centrally. Merger in the economy is similar to that in the armaments industry

> to determine which programs are available, what quantities of raw materials, what industrial capacities and what workforce the individual programs require.
> (ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1783, RMfßuM to WiRüAmt, April 19, 1940). The planning group should further investigate "whether the planning that has been initiated so far in the expansion of industry through construction and manufacturing facilities is absolutely necessary and whether there is certainty that all of these preparations that are already underway will also be of use for the conduct of the war" (ibid). Drafts for the organizational structure of this planning body were already available. There should be a "working staff of the planning group" and five working groups. The working staff or planning "chief committee" (not unlike the general council of the four-year plan and apparently in competition with it) actually existed for a while (see ibid., Author Chief WiRüAmt, April 30, 1940), but failed, according to Ludwig, the impossibility of armaments planning under blitzkrieg conditions" ***(Ludwig,*** Technik, p. 359f.). “
>
> The idea of setting up a planning body based on five working groups finally came to an end In 1941 in the above-mentioned five-man committee again. Signaled on November 22, 1941 The Defense Economics and Armaments Office has a threatening development for its own position: "He (Todt - DE) intends to convene a committee of five representatives from the Wehrmacht's tank, air force, ammunition, chemical and submarine programs should take a decisive stance on all questions in the area of raw materials, the means of production, the distribution of labor, etc. From Mr. Sauer’s remarks
>
> (di Karl-Otto Saur - DE) it could be seen that the entire planning
> the defense industry should be controlled from this point. It seems necessary at least to ensure that this committee, which includes Messrs. Roland
> (instead of: Rohland - DE), Werner, Burger, Blohm and a representative of the chemical industry the WiRüAmt will also be involved. The first meeting of the committee should take place next week. The first task is expected to be:
> Committee will identify the bottlenecks and look for a new form of urgency determination."
> (ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 2325, AN WiRüAmt dated November 22, 1941; the name Burger may have arisen from Purucker due to hearing errors (Georg Purucker, director of the Flick Group; ammunition expert).

205 ***Milward,*** War Economy, p. 66.

206 ***Janssen,*** p. 38. - Janssen's presentation should, however, be followed with reservations, as he is based on largely based only on personal "communications" from Milch.

207 Ibid. 208 See p. 60 f.

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economy is already being handled, to committees in which the management of the main economic areas takes place, such as the transport committee, the food committee; Planning for the individual areas should also take place **in** these committees, which will then be put together and discussed in the central planning committee. The Defense Economics and Armaments Office would of course have to play a leading role in armaments
planning." 209 This organization with an official headquarters, set up on the model of the economic management staff or the general council of the four-year plan **2** 10 and with a number of committees from the economy itself, The management of which would normally have been in the hands of leading monopoly representatives turned out to be as comprehensive as it was cumbersome and traditionally bureaucratic.

The next day, March 3rd, the Minister of Ammunition is said to have confronted Göring with the complete fact that Hitler had commissioned him to set up a central planning office; He is said to have been accompanied by milk, pushers and smoke. 2 11 This would be an important indication that Krauch was significantly involved in the creation of central planning.

The negotiations about central planning only reached their decisive stage in March and early April. The key question for the ammunition minister and the arms monopolies was whether. Central planning would gain sufficient regulatory power over the most important production conditions for the armaments industry and for the entire rest of the economy, namely over the distribution of labor and over the management of raw materials, primarily coal and iron or steel. The newly appointed GBA offered them the guarantee that he would meet the defense companies' demands for workers without scruples and would closely adhere to the central planning guidelines for their procurement and distribution. The management of coal and iron was formally in the hands of the Reich Ministry of Economics. However, the coal magnates had been in control of the fate of their industry in the Imperial Coal Association for a year. The fact that it took almost two months before the Central Planning Board met for its first meeting was not least due to the difficulties it had in resisting one to eliminate central, comprehensive regulation of iron and steel production. This resistance came from the Reich Ministry of Economics and various representatives of the steel companies. Only when the circles around the Minister of Finance managed to adapt the "management" basis for iron and steel to their purposes and, in the form of the Reich Iron Association, to create a new institutional form of regulation by the large monopolies themselves, was central planning able to deal with this "Key raw material" iron directly controls the production of all branches of the armaments and production equipment industry.

On April **2nd ,** Speer and Milch, in the presence of Krauch, Pleiger and Schieber, obtained Göring's final approval for their now heavily revised concept for central planning.212 The "Central Planning Office for the Four-Year Plan" will, so

209 ***Thomas,*** p. 536, AN Thomas' v. March 3, 1942 Discussion with Speer on March 2, 1942.

210 On the economic management staff. ***Volume I,*** p. 234 ff.; on the General Council of the V. s. ***Petzina,*** Autarkie-politik, p. 58f. u. p. 134ff.; ***Eichholtz,*** On the share of the IG Farben Group..., p. 89f.

211 ***Janssen,*** p. 57. - Source (“communication” from Milch to J.) and representation are not unconditional reliable.

212 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 8398, AN RMfBuM ex. Discussion b. Göring on April 2, 1942, v. April 9, 1942.

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Both stated that "the necessary clarification of the demands with the actual possibilities must be carried out in a summary for the entire economy", for this purpose "also the planning and allocation of raw materials as a whole... and in particular for iron and metals... Too The tasks of central planning include, above all, the balancing of interests in new planning between armaments, chemistry and transport." Göring declared that he "fully agreed" and commissioned Speer, Milch and State Secretary Körner - as representative and liaison for Göring himself - with the management of the central planning.213 On April 3, Göring gave
Hitler a lecture and requested that the central planning "the the entire distribution of raw materials with the exception of a) coal, b) fuel, c) Buna"2t. He obviously hoped to be able to exercise control over central planning through milk and grains and at the same time limit its overall economic influence, above all by removing the division of GB Chemistry.

The most important preliminary decisions were made on April 4th. In response to the Minister of Ammunition's ideas, Hitler declared that he "agreed with the establishment of a Central Planning Office and also that, alongside me (di Speer - DE), this Central Planning Office would be co-directed by Field Marshal Milch." 215 Speer also pointed out to Hitler that immediately points out one of the main prerequisites for the work of the Central Planning Office, namely that the allocation of raw materials is carried out by this Central Planning Office, since the Minister of Economic Affairs is too concerned about his own interests and less about those of the war economy, while now through In order to increase ammunition and weapons production, a significant shift must be made in favor of the arms industry. - The Führer is of the same
opinion." 216 With what skillful tactics the Minister of Ammunition approached this critical point, which is of decisive importance for the entire reorganization of the state monopoly regulatory mechanism was in the war economy, was also evident towards the end of the "leader's meeting". Speer drew Hitler's attention to the issue of iron quotas and, on this occasion, persuaded him to expressly promise "that this distribution (of iron - DE) will be carried out by the central planning office in the four-year plan."217 On April 22, 1942 Göring
signed the "Decree of the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich on the establishment of a 'central planning' in the four-year plan" drafted by Speer,218 after the ammunition minister had successfully fended off the attempts of the OKW and the OKM to gain a say and membership in the new institution . The decree assigned the central planning:

"a) the decision on the need to carry out new planning or
Continuation of existing plans,

213 Ibid. Differently see *Janssen,* p. 57.

214 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 376, AN f. Göring z. Lecture b. Hitler, v. April 3, 1942.

215 FB, April 4, 1942, point 44.

216 Ibid.

217 Ibid., point 56.

218 *News from the RM(BuM,* No. 2, April 25, 1942. - Hitler already mentioned the central planning as existing in his decree of April 14, 1942 on the infantry and locomotive programs: the allocation of iron, etc. for these programs successes, it said, "by the 'Central Planning' department in the four-year plan" (ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 4788).

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b) the decision to create new or expand existing raw material production facilities. c) the distribution of
existing raw materials, in particular iron and metals, to all those who need them,

d) the use of coal and energy in production, e) the coordination
of the demands of the economy as a whole on the transport system."219

The three members - Speer, Milch and Grains - made their decisions together.
The Minister of Ordnance always had the decisive voice and the leadership, although not explicitly fixed, was clearly in his hands. Körner hardly played a role in the deliberations. However, he maintained the formal connection with Göring, who was no longer involved in the work of central planning, and took it upon himself to inform the GB Chemistry on various issues. High officials and experts from the Reich Ministry of Armament and Ammunition, the Reich Ministry of Economics and the Four-Year Plan Organization regularly took part in the meetings, as well as guests, depending on the topic, the heads and key employees of the RVE and RVK as well as the main committees and rings, other leading monopoly representatives, Representatives of the Wehrmacht, GB Chemie and GBA with their senior employees.
The deliberations were usually lengthy and the discussions heated, as it concerned the raw material quotas and the allocation of workers for the various branches and areas of the economy.
Speer himself described the "leadership of central planning" as "the most important war-economic task of all."220 Under the name of the GB Rüst and central planning, all the essential powers in the field of armaments, which had previously been given to Göring as representative, were now held for the four-year plan passed to Speer.221 The first meeting of the
Central Planning took place on April 27 , 1942, the last (62nd) meeting on December 5 , 1944.
The main points of discussion at the meetings were

the management of iron and steel -	to around 30 meetings,
the management of Fe alloys and non-ferrous metals -	to 10 meetings,
coal management -	to 11 meetings,
the procurement and distribution of labor -	to 8 meetings.

On a number of occasions, Central Planning dealt specifically with issues relating to fuel, nitrogen, rubber and machinery production, energy supply, nutrition, construction, transport and forestry. The close interconnectedness of the fundamental economic problems over which central planning “a-

219 Ibid. *(news from the RMf BuM);* incorrectly quoted in *Janssen,* p. 58.
220 BA Koblenz, R 3/1547, Speer's speech to the district economic advisors, district managers for Technology and district leaders of the DAF, April 18, 1942.
221 The original four-year plan organization, whose highest representative - after Göring - Körner had previously served, was finally buried with the formation of the Central Planning. The main participants, Göring and Körner, registered this themselves a few months later: “1. Question of representation of the four-year plan representative; not a representative, but the central planning is the representation. 2. Detach four-year planned service posit Ministry of State. They are subordinate departments of the central planning." (ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 376, AN f. Göring's discussion with Körner, July 30, 1942).

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"clear decisions" were 222 , it also meant that, for example, at every coal and iron meeting taken on the issues of labor, transport, the supply of machinery, energy, etc., as well as the consequences of quota changes to other armaments programs and production areas played an important role.

"Reorganization of iron management"

The key authority of Central Planning lay in the distribution of iron and steel, which was transferred to it from the GB for iron and steel management. At Speer's instigation, on April 22, 1942, at the same time as Göring's decree on central planning, Funk commissioned the "general advisor" of his ministry, Hans Kehrl, "with the central elaboration of the reorganization of the entire raw material quota and management system" .223 Kehrl In the following weeks, a comprehensive inventory of the existing or
distributed quota quantities was made and suggested that all previously running quotas be canceled. Depending on the decision on the allocation of quotas by Central Planning, which in the future should discuss and control the planning and production data with the Reich Iron Association, but should also thoroughly examine the raw material requests of the Wehrmacht and the other quota holders and decide on them with its own authority, The Reich Office for Iron and Steel had to issue so-called iron certificates, transferable iron checks and iron stamps.

The new system was introduced in mid-June, immediately after the RVE was founded. 224 It gave the iron processing companies, primarily the armaments companies, “greater freedom of planning ,”225 as the iron quotas were valid without restrictions and could be passed on to sub-suppliers at their own discretion.
However, Speer had early on obtained Hitler's decree 226 , which threatened the harshest punishments for those entrepreneurs who gave false information about their material requirements and hoarded materials. Furthermore, the system could only work if Central Planning actually stopped issuing more authorization certificates than iron and steel were being produced.

Behind this radical reorganization was the concentrated power of the German arms companies, whose support Speer had secured. A “Committee for Quota Issues and Exploitation” that he had convened had been working since March 1942

222 Ibid., Case XI, No. 411, Doc. R-124, minutes of results of the 1st meeting of the Central Planning of April 27, 1942. The following is the file number indicated. the existing complete inventory of the result protocols is cited as ZP-E, that of the stenographic protocols (ibid., Nos. 412 and 413) as ZP-P; Of the latter, a few selected but important parts are printed in /MG, Vol. 38.

223 AO Funks, quoted from /*(ehrl,* p. 254.

224 See *news from the* RMfBuM, No. 6, June 25, 1942, decrees of the RMfßuM and RWiM v. June 11, 1942; *DRA,* No. 136, June 13, 1942, AO I of the Reich Office for Iron and Steel (reorganization of iron management) and other AO, all from June 13, 1942.

225 *Janssen,* p. 71.

226 RGBl. 1942 1, p. 165, "Ordinance of the Führer for the Protection of the Armaments Industry" v. March 21, 1942.

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of inventories" under Albert Vögler, which included Hellmuth Roehnert (Rheinmetall-Borsig/ Reichswerke Group), Arthur Tix, Karl M. Hettlage and Alfred Stellwaag.227 According to Kehrl's testimony, a thorough reorganization was carried out in view of the chaotic conditions in the raw materials sector, especially the inflationary development of the iron contingents, also demanded in a memorandum that was written by gentlemen from the Siemens company with the collaboration of several other companies and that was presented directly to Hitler in March 1942, bypassing the course of business. 228 The steel industry finally examined the new regulations, and Vögler personally approved them to Kehrl and Speer. 229 The Vereinigte Stahlwerke, Siemens and other companies provided Kehrl with experts, such as Willy H. Schlieker, 230 who later remained active in central planning.

The monopolies enforced a similar distribution regulation for non-ferrous metals.231

Ultimately, central planning only took over the regulation of the distribution of some raw materials and general production conditions (transport, energy, labor), not the production itself. Nor did it immediately have the opportunity to use the levers of financing and credit to financially secure and stimulate its regulatory interventions and planning measures.

Nevertheless, with the "distribution of sources of power"232 by the central planning, a new level of state monopolistic regulation and planning was reached. The measures and guidelines of the new regulatory body directly affected only individual branches of industry, especially in the raw materials industry The production of iron and steel and the control over the use of this "key" or "lead raw material" had regulatory effects on the entire national economy. Since the direct influence of the Minister of Munitions, who effectively headed the central planning, was also exerted through the system of committees and rings at that time already extended to a significant and still growing area of industrial production, one could now speak of an extensive system of state-monopolistic planning with macroeconomic standards and effects.

What was characteristic of this planning was its pronounced imperialist class function. The ruling circles in fascist Germany, especially the arms magnates and financial oligarchs, hard hit by the defeat before Moscow, created their new system of planning and regulation - with Lenin - to the exclusion of not only the working people, but also the majority of the bourgeoisie to speak - 'last word' of modern large capitalist technology and planned

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227 *News from the RMfBuM,* No. 1, March 31, 1942, announcement undated.

228 *Kehrl,* p. 253.

229 Ibid., p. 254 ff.

230 Ibid., p. 255. - An expert sent by the Siemens Group, Karl Müller-Zimmer-mann, became the (temporary) head of the "Reich Offices for Iron and Steel and for Metals" formed on July 27, 1942 by merging the Reich Offices for Iron and Steel and for Metals. "Reich Office for Iron and Metals" (ibid., p. 257 and p. 457).

231 *Tlwmas,* p. 366f.; *Kehrl,* p. 258.

232 BA Koblenz, R 3/1547, Speer's speech to the district economic advisors, district officials for Technology and district leaders of the DAF, April 18, 1942.

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Organization".233 It served their exclusive purpose of multiplying war production, continuing their barbaric war, destroying the socialist Soviet Union and achieving their goals of global conquest and expansion.

d) The formation of the Imperial Iron Association

The Reich Iron Association, **founded on the model of the Reich Coal Association 234 ,** was constituted on May 29, 1942, over a month later than the Central Planning Department. **However, the formation of the RVE was one of the most important prerequisites that the Central Planning needed for its functioning. It also did not come about without the supporting pressure of the Central Planning Department, at whose first meeting on April 27th it was decided: "The iron producing industry will be brought together in a Reich Iron Association. It should be formed as soon as possible and become operational as quickly as possible. The establishment of an interim interim body (iron planning group) is therefore waived." 235**

The RVE's history dates back to 1941. At that time, it was undoubtedly obvious that it would be founded in parallel to the RVK.236 But while the Ruhr companies, which were firmly organized in the Rhine-Westphalia coal syndicate, were able to do so in view of their dominant position and the preponderance of their coal syndicate While it was relatively easy for the German coal industry to dominate the other coal producers and force them to merge under their leadership into the RVK, the situation in the iron and steel industry was more complicated. The production structure and competitive conditions had given rise to much more complex cartel relationships and the industry was split not only into two, like the coal industry, but into several areas, each of which was looked after by a district group of the iron-making industry economic group. The North West district group, which united the Ruhr companies, was absolutely dominant. In addition, the Oberhütten-Ballestrem and Berghütte corporations ruled in the Upper Silesia district group, Flick in the Central Germany district group and Hermann Röchling in the Southwest district group. The very different, often com

233 *Lenin,* W. *1.,* On "left" childishness and on petty bourgeoisie (1918), in *derselhe,* Works, Vol. 27, Berlin 1960, p. 332. - The superiority of the socialist planned economy even in war, which is under the most difficult conditions Circumstances that had already proven itself in 1941/42 did not have any effect on the fascist planners. At the end of 1942, Kehrl's office, apparently on behalf of Central Planning, prepared a list of questions for the Reich Research Council, which stated: "4th organization of the "Soviet defense industry. How is the relatively large production output of the Soviet defense industry explained? What methods of organization, production planning and relocation are used?" (BA Koblenz, R 3/1943, AN regarding "Topics to be mentioned in the letter to the Reich Research Council", November 25, 1942).

234 See *Volume 1,* p. 132ff.

235 ZP-E, April 27, 1942, 1st meeting. - This decision actually fell within the sole competence of the Reich Minister of Economics; The fact that Central Planning caught him was a sign of how strongly the balance of power in the war economy had shifted in favor of Central Planning and thus the Minister of Munitions.

236 Kehrl's claim that such a foundation, operated by Röchling, Funk and others, had already "made great progress" before Speer's appointment as minister, is, however, completely unbelievable *(Kehrl,* p. 263).

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existing interests of the steel companies in the annexed and occupied territories - one essential reason, for example, for the special position of the Reichswerke group - were also not conducive to a merger.

Until now, the "Small Circle" of the Ruhr mining companies, also known as the "Circle of Seven", had served as the "Council of the Gods" of iron and steel and as the unofficial presidium of the econor The iron-making industry group controlled the fortunes of the industry.237 In this circle, the United Steel Works dominated through its chairman Ernst Poensgen, the head of the economic group and spokesman for the district. The Hermann Göring Group, Upper Silesian and Saar Metallurgy were not represented in the small circle. It seemed to Ruhr magnates like Poensgen that the tight, compulsory regulation of production and distribution by an imperial association threatened the cohesion of the Ruhr companies and gave rise to fears that the influence of competitors, especially the Reichswerke "Hermann Göring", would get out of hand. This meant that the undisputed The dominance of the Ruhr companies under the leadership of the United Steelworks was in danger.

In the second half of April 1942, the circles behind the Minister of Munitions decided to form a Reich Association. On the 19th/20th On April 1, Speer proposed to Hitler "a commission within the four-year plan to increase iron production", similar to that previously held by von Hanneken, but under the aegis of central planning; an "economic expert" should be appointed for this purpose. "He considers," Speer noted after the interview with Hitler, "my suggestion Vögkr acceptable, but believes that Röchling would carry out the task even better. Leaves the decision to us."238 With Vögler, Speer defeated the undisputed leader and spokesman of the German of finance capital - evidence of the importance that the ruling circles attached to the issue.

Shortly afterwards, Speer, Vögler, Röchling and Funk apparently decided to found a Reich association modeled on the RVK within the supervision of the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs, i.e. while formally preserving Funk's competencies. A few days later, Poensgen received from v. Hanneken drafts of a founding decree and statutes for the RVE, dated April 24th.239 On April 27th, the central planning department called for accelerated action and proposed Röchling as chairman of the RVE.240 The reference to the fact that it was intended The creation of an official "iron planning group" gave their demand the necessary emphasis.241 On April 30, Röchling submitted a memorandum to the minister of ammunition on the situation in the iron and steel industry and in particular on the "possibility of increasing iron production by 5 percent compared to the previous one without additional coal and without additional means of transport".242 A week later the die was cast. On May 6th/7th the Minister of Ammunition reported to Hitler "briefly about the planned 'Reich Association of Iron and Steel'" and left

237 *Volume I,* p. 52.

238 FB, 19.-20. 4. 1942, point 14.

239 BA Koblenz, R 13 XX/162, v. Hanneken to Poensgen, April 25, 1942.

240 ZP-E, April 27, 1942, 1st meeting. - By choosing Röchling instead of Vögler, the predominance of the Ruhr companies was avoided from becoming too visually apparent; Possibly the aim was to prevent Vögler's reputation from being damaged in this difficult role.

241 Ibid.

242 FB, 6.-7. 5. 1942, point 4.

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confirm the "proposal" that Röchling should take over the chairmanship.243 But it took another few weeks before the RVE organization was operational. Contributing to this delay was the opposition to the founding of the RVE that prevailed in the management of the iron-making industry group, especially Ernst Poensgen, who had to be aware that when he was hired - he was also a vocal advocate of the Ruhr interests - was out of the question if "a single person was to finally make the big decisions in the RVE".244 Certain resistance from this side had a particular impact on the staffing of the RVE's proposed presidium.

On May 18, 1942, Hermann Röchling was given more detailed instructions by Speer and officially introduced to Hitler as head of the RVE.245 He took part in both Speer's "leader meeting" and Hitler's luncheon. Hitler presented the renowned guest and old acquaintance to his round table from the "fighting period" as "an industrial personality who was particularly impressive in his reserve and calmness . " to "formulate the statutes more sharply and precisely" and initially also obtained a promise that Röchling would be entrusted with the "management of iron production" not only through Göring, Funk and Speer themselves, but also "through a special decree from the Führer." should be.248 On May 27, Funk officially appointed Röchling as chairman, Walter Rohland and Alfried Krupp von Bohlen and Haibach as equal deputy chairmen.249 Two
days later, the "Order on the Reichsvereinigung Eisen" and the statutes of the RVE were issued. Both came into force with their publication on June 1st.250 On May 30th, Poensgen was removed as head of the iron producing industry economic group.251 Röchling replaced Poensgen in this post and also took over management of the main iron production group at the Ministry of Munitions.

The controller of the Röchling Group, one of the worst chauvinists and anti-communists, an old party member and supporter of the fascists, embodied in his

243 Ibid.

244 *Case 5.* Prosecution plea, selected documents, verdict of the Flick trial. Edited by Karl-Heinz Thieleke and others v. Klaus Drobisch, Berlin 1965, p. 151, Doc. NI-2558, protocol d. Wigru Esl (Reichert) ex. Discussion in the RWiM v. May 1, 1942. See also *Weyres-P. Levetzow,* p. 17f.; *Hallgarten/ Radkau,* p. 423f.

245 *Chronicle of the RMf BuM,* 1942, Bl. 42, May 18, 1942.

246 *Ficker, Henry,* Hitler's table conversations in the Führer's headquarters 1941-1942. Edited by P.E Schramm in additional work. with Andreas Hillgruber and Martin Vogt, 2nd edition, Stuttgart 1965, p. 353 (May 18, 1942).

247 FB, May 18, 1942, point 5.

248 Ibid. A total of six draft statutes were drawn up (BA Koblenz, R 13 1/596, Röchling's speech to the Southwest District Group of the Wigru Esl on June 10, 1942).

249 BA Koblenz, R 13 XX/162, letter of appeal from May 27, 1942. - As the eldest son of the senile Gustav Krupp, Alfried Krupp was de facto head of the Krupp Group since 1941. Hans Malzacher (Mountain Hut Group) was later appointed as Röchling's further deputy.

250 *Case 5,* p. 161 ff., Doc. Nl-1967, case Wigru Esl v. June 1, 1942; Founding AO and statutes of the RVE v. May 29, 1942.

251 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 9081, Bl. 114 R and Bl. 115, Funk to Poensgen (draft), May 30. 1942.

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new positions a compromise between the interests of the Ruhr companies, especially the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, the Reichswerke and the other steel companies. The key state monopoly group around the Ministry of Ammunition considered this compromise to be necessary for the war effort. Extraordinary powers were concentrated in the hands of the chairman of the RVE. But it was ensured that he could not use it against the interests of the most powerful, especially the Ruhr companies. His deputies Rohland and Alfried Krupp - who was also deputy head of the iron-making industry group - were supported by representatives of the two leading Ruhr companies. Rohland, Vögier's right-hand man and one of the ammunition minister's closest confidants, de facto headed the main iron ring and , due to his position on the Ruhr, and was in fact the most influential personality in RVE production. 254 Rohland Alfried Krupp also took over the positions of head and deputy head of the North West district group of the iron-making industry economic group from Poensgen and Zangen over the course of the summer.255 The "Three Wise Men" or "Three Kings", as the heads of the RVE internally called, began their work at the beginning of June with "absolutely dictatorial powers"256. 2 57 However, it took a longer time before the composition of the Presidium, Administrative Board and administration of the RVE was clarified. On August 21st the Presidium met for the first time.258 It was only at this point that it was officially announced that in addition to Röchling, Rohland and Alfried Krupp, the presidium included seven other members, namely Flick, Poensgen, Zangen, Pleiger, Alfred Pott (Oberhütten-Ballestrem-Konzem) and one representative each the “Ostmark” and Saxony. 2 59 Flick and Alfried Krupp were members of both the RVE and RVK presidiums. Paul Goerens (Krupp) as chairman of the Association of German Ironworkers and Wilhelm Jäzosch as representative of the DAF were considered permanent guests at the presidential meetings.

The board of directors of the RVE, including those mentioned, comprised 33 members - all of them large entrepreneurs. 260 Hans-Günther Sohl (United Steelworks) - later a member of the executive committee in Poensgen's place - and Eugen Langen (Röchling Group) were appointed managing directors.

252 Ibid., Bl. 3, TO RWiM, October 3, 1942.

253 *Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernherg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No.10,* 15 vols. (hereinafter: *Trials),* vol. 6, p. 799 (Case V), Vemehmg. v. Albert Speer on October 9, 1947.

254 He was expressly referred to by Röchling as "the leader in the Ruhr area" (BA Koblenz, R 13 1/596, Röchling's speech to the Southwest district group of the Wigru Esl on June 10, 1942). On the board of the steel trust he was deputy to chairman Poensgen , himself chairman of the board from October 1943.

255 BA Koblenz, R 13 1/628, Rs. Wigru Esl v. July 1 and August 31, 1942.

256 Ibid., R 13 1/596, speech Röchling v. June 10, 1942.

257 *Chronicle of the RMfBuM,* Bl. 50, June 5, 1942.

258 *Case 5,* p. 167ff., Doc. NI-4508 (F), Protocol. d. (1.) Presidium meeting of the RVE v. August 21, 1942; see ibid., p. 173, Doc. NI-2522, RVE report for July 1942, v. August 15, 1942.

259 BA Koblenz, R 13 XX/162, Case Wigru Mining v. August 25, 1942. - As chairman of the RVK, Pleiger took part in the presidium meetings of the RVE as a "permanent guest" *(case* 5, p. 167, document NI-4508 (F), minutes of the presidium meeting of August 21, 1942 The disproportionately weak position that the Reichswerke "Hermann Göring" group held in the management bodies of the RVE is very remarkable.

260 BA Koblenz, R 13 XX/162, Rs. Wigru Mining v. August 25, 1942.

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A wealth of powers and functions were transferred to the RVE: those of the GB for iron and steel management, the Reich Office or the Reich Commissioner for Iron and Steel, the Reich Office for Economic Development (Department II), the Reich Commissioner for Price Formation (for the “internal” prices), as well as the iron-making industry business group.261 The apparatus of the RVE consisted of main departments and central committees. “The department heads of the RVE were, so to speak, the managing directors of the committees and at the same time had the decisions of the committees in Berlin to represent." 262 Seven main departments of the RVE were formed: raw materials and transport (with 6 departments), technology, sales and prices, trade, social affairs, statistics and administration. A "Central Committee for Raw Materials and Transport" was directly subordinate to Alfried Krupp.

The "market-regulating" monopoly associations of the iron and steel industry came under the leadership of the RVE; this formed a new umbrella cartel, the Iron and Steel Association (Esge) under Zangen's leadership, "to deal with all association and price questions."263 Röchling, already Since the summer of 1940, Göring's or Funk's "general representative for the works of the iron industry in Lorraine and Meurthe et Moselle-Süd" was now appointed "Reich representative for iron and steel in the occupied territories".26'

It was the monopoly powers themselves who dominated and directly managed the newly created state monopoly structure. They concentrated within themselves the necessary powers to govern the entire branch of industry, including the cartels and syndicates and the companies in the iron and steel trade, "on their own initiative and responsibility" 265. All companies and monopolies had joined the RVE, like a coercive cartel. stic associations of companies "that mine iron ore, produce and roll iron and steel, sell and trade iron ore, other iron-containing raw materials, scrap, ferro-alloys, iron and steel". Their measures and orders were binding for all members.

But the RVE was much more than just a coercive cartel. Their “most importanttask” was “increasing performance and rationalizing production and sales”.

The RVE regulated the entire "iron industry of Greater Germany and its areas of influence", drew up comprehensive production plans, raw material supply and transport plans, ensured the general introduction of technical and other rationalization processes and measures, regulated sales and prices and concluded monopolistic agreements on these . She had the right to shut down companies or change their production program.

However, the relationship of the RVE to central planning and its position in the overall system of war economic regulation was clearly defined from the outset: "The task of the Reich Association ends with iron production and before the use of iron (distribution)." 266

261 ZStA Potsdam, Case V (Flick Trial), Film 405, Doc. NI-870, Report from JW Reichert ex. "The development of the organizations of the German iron industry during the time of the National Socialist regime", undated.

262 Ibid., Case X (Krupp trial), Film 425, Doc. NI-5548, Eidl. Explain by Walter Rohland v. March 14, 1947.

263 Case 5, p. 171, Doc. NI-4511, Protocol d. 2nd meeting of the 4th Presidium of the RVE v. October 30, 1942.

264 BA Koblenz, R 3/1596, decree of Göring v. June 18, 1942.

265 Case 5, p. 162, Doc. NI-1967, Articles of Association of the RVE v. May 29, 1942.

266 ZP-E, April 27, 1942, 1st session.

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On June 20, 1942, Röchling described the new, far-reaching command of the RVE before the members of the Association of German Ironworkers as a “upheaval ... which was ultimately due to the enormous expansion of the German area of influence. We will," he promised his fellow entrepreneurs, "neither in war nor in the coming victorious peace will we have to worry about sales shortages in the iron-producing industry. The vast European area requires the provision of the necessary amount of iron to a very large extent." 267 As he defined the dual function of the RVE a few months later in front of the RVE's administrative board and the advisory board of the economic group, "it is as much about dominating mainland Europe as it is about achieving the highest possible increases in iron and steel performance, in order to spare the blood of the German people."268 After all, this "sparing" obviously couldn't go that far: "The increase in German troop power at the same time imperatively demands the most economical use of labor in the economy"; this was particularly important to take care of “making use of the many foreign workers, especially the Russian ones”.269

The German monopolies therefore created an instrument of state-monopoly regulatory power in the RVE, with the help of which they wanted to fully exploit the enormously increased profit opportunities in the dominated part of Europe and at the same time meet the requirements of their imperialist war through increased production.

First, the RVE quickly worked out a "proposal for an increase in crude steel production in the Greater German Reich and its areas of influence", which Röchling presented to the Minister of Munitions on June 8th.270 The Central Planning decided on the final plan of July 15th on June 22nd July: "The plan drawn up by the Reich Association must be carried out."271 On August 10, Hitler had the leaders of the RVE promise him the fulfillment of their program after extensive consultation.272 The monopoly masters took advantage of the opportunity In return, they negotiated with Hitler a price increase for coal, pig iron, semi-finished products and scrap, which was to come into force on January 1, 1943. 273 Zangen took charge of the preparations for the increase in iron and steel prices on behalf of the RVE.274 With RVE and RVK, two powerful state monopoly institutions - each a kind of middle ground between the specialist ministry and the super trust - now controlled and directed the most important ones Basic industries. The extensive state powers to regulate production with which they were endowed were entirely in the hands of a small group of large corporations. The Reich Economics Minister's supervision of RVE and RVK had become purely formal. Rather, they acted in

267 BA Koblenz, R 13 1/634, Röchling's speech at the working conference of the German Ironworks People's Association on June 20, 1942.

268 Case 5, p. 149, Doc. NI-6198, Speech Röchling v. October 30, 1942.

269 Ibid.

270 BA Koblenz, R 13 1/674. In more detail about d. RVE production planning and its results nisse see p. 363 f.

271 ZP-E, July 22, 1942, 11th session.

272 FB, 10.-12. 8. 1942, points 39-47. Dating (August 10) according to ZStA Potsdam, case XI, no. 724, Bl. 126, Doc. Pleiger-411, Affid. Milk, April 29, 1948.

273 Ibid., points 45 and 46.

274 Case 5, p. 168, Doc. NI-4508 (F), Protocol. ex. d. Presidium meeting of the RVE v. August 21, 1942.

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general framework and mandate of central planning; the ministerial executive on which they relied was the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition and its Armaments Supply Office. **275** Röchling said frankly, with a swipe at the Reich Ministry of Economics, that as head of the main iron production ring, he was subordinate to the Minister of Ammunition: "This supervision takes precedence over any other." **276**

3. The expansion of the state monopoly position of the Reich Ministry for Armament and ammunition. Armaments commissions and regional economic chambers

According to Minister Speer at the beginning of June 1942, “it must be assumed that the war can last for many more years.” **277** The forces of monopoly capital grouped around the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition were accordingly anxious to maintain the state monopoly position of the ministry and to expand its regulatory powers. They systematically continued the reorganization process that had begun at the turn of the year 1941/42 in the summer and autumn of 1942. It reached its climax and provisional conclusion in the formation of the armaments commissions, which represented the keystone in the regional system of armaments regulation .

Other important elements of the process mentioned were the geographical expansion of the Ministry of Munitions' sphere of power to the occupied territories and the expansion of the economic regulatory function of the Central Planning Department.
It turned out to be by no means an easy project for the Minister of Ammunition to extend his powers to the areas occupied by German fascism. The competencies here were diversely distributed and complex. Nevertheless, as early as June 1942, Speer largely implemented his intentions on the territory of the USSR and in France.

For the ambitious goals of the planned fascist summer offensive of 1942 in the East, advanced armament centers in the Ukraine, in the Dnepr-Donec region, were supposed to deliver supplies, especially ammunition. 278 Hitler took this plan, which he had been harboring since April 1942, as an opportunity to grant Speer, by decree of June 9, 1942, extensive powers for the "use of technology", ie for armaments construction, energy supply, and road and waterway construction in the occupied Soviet territories. 279 As a result The technical department in the Rosenberg Ministry lost its raison d'être.

275 Radkau makes a knowledgeable comment about the two chairmen: "Pleiger and Röchling, whose extra tours and leadership attitudes had become particularly annoying to the other large industrialists, neutralized each other as opponents at the top of the Speer organization." (llallgartenl *Radkau,* p. 298).

276 BA Koblenz, R 13 1/596, speech Röchling v. June 10, 1942. - According to Röchling, "the RVE staff also worked for the main iron production ring, so that the main iron production ring had no permanent staff of its own" *(llallgarten/ Radkau,* p. 425 (=Doc. Nl-5549, statement by Röchling v March 17, 1947)).

277 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 11246, Speer to Pleiger, June 5, 1942.
278 See p. 464f.

279 *Janssen,* p. 54; see FB, June 4, 1942, point 35. - Speer's demand, "that more direct paths must be taken not only for road construction, but also for the restart of industry (direct involvement of industry with its best forces)" , played a constant role in his discussions with Hitler since March (FB, March 16, 1942, point 18; see also FB, April 14/15, 1942, point 17; FB, May 6, 17, 1942, point 21).

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It was more difficult to wrest Göring's supreme authority over the exploitation of the occupied territories. The Minister of Ammunition was only able to do this indirectly, through the chairmen of the RVK and the RVE, Pleiger and Röchling, who worked closely with him and the Central Planning Department, and were appointed by Göring on January 10th (Pleiger) and on June 18th , 1942 (Röchling) were appointed Reich Commissioner for Coal and Iron and Steel in the occupied territories.

At the end of June 1942, the French military economics and armaments staff was divided into a military economics staff and an armaments staff. The French Armaments Staff was subordinated to the Armaments Office of the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition, while the French Military Economic Staff remained subordinate to the OKW. The previous three arms inspections in the lower, regional instance became three defense industry inspections. The Ministry of Munitions created its own central armaments inspectorate in France, based in Paris, to which various armaments commands were subordinate. It also formed a "German Procurement Office in France," which was intended to "summarize the previously highly decentralized procurement in France and ensure better utilization of operations."280 This "complete reorganization in the field of armaments"281 came after decrees of the OKW and the Minister of Ammunition of June 26th came into force on July 20th , 1942 , "centralized the occupiers' power of disposal over the French economic potential and concentrated it largely in the hands of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition and the armaments companies behind it".28 2 In order to At the same time, Hitler agreed to make Speer responsible as GB Construction in the occupied territories.283 Göring, who was ignored as the representative for the four-year plan, had no choice but to subsequently "extend the powers of GB Construction as secured by the Führer's decree." to greet". 284 Göring declared a special decree from Hitler for the Protectorate, suggested by Speer as a precautionary measure, to be "superfluous, since the Protectorate had already been included in the Four-Year Plan through a Führer decree and Reich Minister Speer therefore readily granted his powers within the Four-Year Plan to the Protectorate as well could apply".28.5 Nevertheless, the Minister of Ammunition also prevailed in this case. A decree signed by Hitler on August 18 expressly extended the powers of the GB Bau to the Protectorate and to all annexed and Finally , through a decree issued by Hitler on October 13 , 1942, the Reich Ministry for Armament and Ammunition in the General Government received the same powers for "technical administration" as in the occupied Soviet territories 28 7 - a formula-

280 *Thomas,* p. 319. Relevant decree (regarding the procurement office) of July 25, 1942 in ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 8630. In *Thomas* and in *DZW,* vol. 2, p. 457, erroneously: procurement staff.

281 *Thomas,* p. 319.

282 *DZW.* Vol. 2, p. 457.

283 FB, June 23, 1942, point 6.

284 FB (Reference Speer-Goering), June 29, 1942, point 7.

285 Ibid.

286 *Ludwig,* Technik, p. 435 ("Decree of the Führer on the powers of the general representative for the regulation of the construction industry in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the areas attached to the Greater German Reich and the occupied areas").

287 *Germany's armament in the Second World War,* p. 98.

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ment that was supposed to leave the economic policy prerogatives of Governor General Hans Frank nominally untouched, similar to those of Göring and Rosenberg on occupied Soviet territory.

In October the internal organization of the central planning was perfected. Rules of procedure and an office were created, each consisting of a representative of the three members of Central Planning, which had to prepare the meetings and ensure that all crucial military tasks were carried out quickly, unbureaucratically and ruthlessly in mutual coordination of all factors "and "that all work that is obviously of no importance for the war decision" is omitted."288

a) Expansion of the "middle instance" of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition

When the armaments inspections and armaments commands were incorporated into the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition in May 1942, this was one of the most important steps towards the displacement of the military from the armaments organization. But it was only one of many steps, and as far as the so-called middle instance was concerned, that is, the regulation of arms production at the regional level, on the spot, so to speak, it was only a beginning laden with compromises. For example, the armaments inspectors and their officers and men were only subordinate to the Minister of Ammunition for the duration of the war; They remained military, retained their rank (general's rank), uniform and pension entitlements.

Speer was skeptical about this situation.289 From the outset he had a much more far-reaching concept for the middle authority of his armaments organization. Already in the first drafts of the Ministry of Munitions from spring 1942 for the new middle authority, so-called war economy staffs appeared, which were supposed to bring together those responsible for armaments in the military districts.290 But it was not until autumn 1942, in view of the failure of the Wehrmacht's offensive plans before Stalingrad and in the Caucasus, this idea gained its final form in the armaments commissions of the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition. On September 17, Göring ordered "the immediate establishment of armaments commissions" in the areas of activity of the armaments inspections.

288 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 8814, Bl. 176 and 176 R, Rules of Procedure of Central Planning, v. October 20, 1942.

289 In his internal notes about the quality of the inspectors (e.g. "good, perhaps even very good" regarding General Franz Barckhausen/Paris: "adequate, but no more" regarding General Stieler v. Heydekampf/Wehrkreis III= Berlin -Brandenburg), Speer assessed, for example, Major General Kurt Erdmann, armaments inspector of the - most important - Military District VI (Rhineland-Westphalia) was described as "energetic and active"; however, Erdmann, he wrote, took too much sides with his officers. "Needs to be brought into line" was the minister's final verdict (ZStA Potsdam, RMfBuK, No 63, Bl. 6f., HS. List, undated, undated).

290 So ibid, FS, Film 5381, 5. Draft of a decree by the Reich Minister f. B. u. M. and GB Rüst i. Four-year plan on the interaction of the departments in the middle instance with each other and with the self-responsibility organizations of the industry", dated April 17, 1942.

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of the Reich Defense Commissioners. 29 1 Their tasks were to "uniformly control the instructions of all departments concerned with armaments management tasks" and "to promote the efforts of the self-responsible bodies in the armaments industry with regard to the exchange of experience between individual companies by all means and to eliminate any difficulties that arise in this regard ". They also took over the function of the previous examination commissions of the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition for the "combing out" and implementation of workers and had the authority to negotiate directly with the military replacement departments about the recruitment or replacement of workers.

According to Speer's executive order of October 10, 292 , 26 armaments commissions were formed, whose management had their headquarters at the respective armaments inspection. Each armaments commission included: the armaments inspector, the military district representative and the armaments chairman of the Ministry of Ammunition, the heads of the responsible state economic and state employment offices, the district economic advisors and the presidents of the district economic chambers - which were yet to be formed.

Walther Schieber, head of the Armaments Supply Office, appointed the armaments chairmen in coordination with Wilhelm Zangen, head of the RGI. An agreement should be reached about the appointments with the Gauleiters concerned. The armaments chairman represented the demands and measures of the ministry's committees and rings in the area of the armaments inspection in question. “As a representative of the self-responsibility organization, the armaments chairman supports the armaments inspector and the military district representative in order to ensure that the entire armaments production process runs smoothly. The district chairmen (for the area of the Reich Defense Commissioners -
DE) are bound to his instructions. He is authorized to manage his business
to make use of the facilities of the regional chamber of commerce." The post of armaments chairman was everywhere in the hands of specially selected, high-ranking representatives of leading armaments monopolies.

The military district representative of the Ministry of Munitions was responsible to the “ver-
Technical Office for the use of technology in the area of armaments inspection - in ministerial parlance - for armaments construction projects and for rationalization of transport and energy supply technology in the service of the large armaments manufacturers. They were responsible for these tasks the district offices for technology, the engineers of the NSBDT registered there and the district representatives of the committees and rings who were united under the district chairman were available. In addition, the military district representative took over important functions of the previous examination commissions; he had the companies "on a rational use of work, in particular the correct use of the specialists." The "worker" inspection therefore had the authority to prepare "combing out" notices and to force workers to work in other companies for the purpose of more intensive and extensive exploitation. The military district representatives were all at the same time district department heads for technology or their close employees, so they worked directly with them the district leadership of the NSDAP and especially with the district economic advisors; From a technical and organizational point of view, they were subordinate to the Nazi Party's Main Office for Technology, of which Speer was the head.

291 *News from the RMfBuM,* No. 13, October 22, 1942, “Decree on. d. Summary of the departments and self-responsible bodies of the armaments industry in the middle instance", September 17, 1942. Hereafter also the following.

292 Ibid., Appendix 1, 1st Conduct AO, October 10, 1942. Hereafter also the following.

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The chairs of the armaments commissions were appointed by the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition. They had decision-making power in all matters dealt with by the commissions; The instructions of the Armaments Commission were, in turn, binding for all institutions involved. It is not difficult to see from this that the chairmen - albeit in "permanently close contact" with the Reich Defense Commission-293 - concentrated ren enormous power within themselves and, in fact, the entire economy controlled in their area.

Speer, "contrary to the armaments office's proposal" to appoint the armaments inspectors as chairmen of the armaments commissions, largely enforced his demand that "only an exponent of the armaments industry could be considered as chairman"293a, and reserved the appointment for himself. This meant that the military were generally relegated to the deputy chairmanship.2114 The chairman, the armaments inspector, the military district commissioner and the armaments chairman were each direct organs of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition. The heads of the state employment offices as "branch offices of the GBA" 295 Sauckel were required to were from give priority to meeting the requirements of armaments; in addition, essential functions of the previous examination commissions were taken over by the military district representative, so that there was a mutual dependency between the two. Finally, the presidents should of the regional economic chambers - incidentally also predominantly large and armaments industrialists - only become members of the armaments commission in the event that the regional economic chamber is not already represented in the armaments commission by a member of its presidium in his capacity as armaments chairman of the committees and rings.296 Everything In any case, there was a clear preponderance of representatives from the Ministry of Ammunition in the Armaments Commission, the majority of whom were usually direct representatives of the armaments industry. The power she embodied was great and - on a smaller, regional scale - distantly similar to that of the Minister of Ammunition.

But in contrast to this, the concentration of power in both armaments commissions was not the expression of real centralization of power; because all of the war economy institutions that it "supervised," working side by side and often against each other, continued to act as independent departments. The Armaments Commission had a far-reaching control function, but no comprehensive regulatory function; because it was limited - apart from the above-average activity and penetration by virtue of one or other chairman --: on commission work, ie on periodic

293 According to H üttenberger, by setting up the new "middle authority", Speer also sought "to mobilize the help of the Gauleiter" *(Hüttenberger, Peter,* Die Gauleiter. Study on the change in the power structure in the NSDAP, Stuttgart 1969, p. 182). 293a ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 5675, AN WiAmt/VO Wagner, October 7, 1942.

294 As of October 1, 1944, the military district commissioners had ten heads of armaments commissions, and the armaments chairmen and armaments inspectors each had five heads of armaments commissions (ibid., film 3381, list of addresses). Armaments inspectors were appointed chairmen of the armaments commissions, particularly in the occupied territories (see also *Thomas,* p. 315). Furthermore, the management of the commissions lay with the armaments inspections or commands (ibid.).

295 As note 292.

296 Ibid.

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Meetings at which problems and "difficulties" were usually discussed afterwards or proposals and measures to overcome them were decided. The Augsburg Armaments Command, for example, stated in a critical statement that the Armaments Commission departments would have been better brought together "under uniform, responsible leadership." The "principle of shared responsibility" represented in Speer's order, it went on to say, "does not correspond to any of them In accordance with the principle that was otherwise common in the Third Reich, that one person leads responsibly."297 After all, for the first time in the war history of German imperialism, all the important departments, commissions and committees of the war economy down to the last district, down to every armaments command, were united in one a close-meshed network, the threads of which were pulled from a central office. The Wehrmacht - not only the OKW, but also the three branches of the Wehrmacht - was completely pushed out of its leading position. All the threads came together in the Reich Ministry for Armament and Ammunition. 298 each The more the power to regulate the war economy was concentrated in this ministry in the coming months and years, the more densely meshed this network became, and the more effectively the new "middle authority" worked.

In the domestic political area, towards the end of 1942, against the background of the impending military crisis, a process of concentration of power also took place, which was reflected both in the further fusion of state and party functions and in a complicated interweaving of domestic political and economic policy functions, both of which above all Gau plain, expressed. This process found its organizational form mainly in the "Ordinance on the Reich Defense Commissioners and the Unification of Economic Administration" of November 16, 299 and in the formation of the regional economic chambers. As early as September 1942, the territorial boundaries of the regional armaments industry organization of the Ministry of Munitions (Rü-Armaments inspections and commands) were adapted to the district boundaries; that is, the boundaries of a number of armaments commands were changed or their headquarters were relocated, so that the boundaries of the armaments inspections now corresponded exactly with the boundaries of the districts (one or more districts per armaments inspection).300 In Ordinance on the Reich Defense Commissioners 30i, the institution of the Reich Defense Commissioners, which had already been created on September 1, 1939, was reorganized. While there were previously 18 Reich Defense Commissioners, one in each military district command, each of the 42 Gauleiters in his district now exercised this function . As organs of the Council of Ministers for Reich Defense in the "middle stage", the Reich Defense Commissioners were appointed by Göring as its chairman. Their special organs were so-called defense committees and war economic staffs. The latter included the members of the armaments commissions and "the heads of the other "authorities concerned with war economic tasks". The war economics staff, as the ordinance stated, "provides advice to the Reich Defense Commissioner for his district and meets under his chairmanship" (§ 14).

As Reich Defense Commissioners, the Gauleiters were "political commissars who...

297 ***We y res-v. Levetzow,*** p. 34, "Comments on the implementing regulation of the RMfBuM from 10.10.1942" V. 17.10.1942.

298 Cf. the haunting presentation in ***Thomas,*** p. 312ff.

299 On this ***DZW,*** Vol. 3, p. 174ff. u. p. 232.

300 ***Thomas,*** p. 317f.

301 ***RGBl.*** 1942 I, p. 649ff.

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"old administrative authorities"302 and which were supposed to coordinate the activities of the military, political and economic departments. Through this unification of party and state power, all political power was centralized with the Gauleiters, whose position was thereby significantly strengthened. The de facto weakness of the The Council of Ministers for Reich Defense favored an arbitrary policy by the Reich Defense Commissioners, regardless of the fact that, according to the regulation, the supreme Reich authorities could "repeal the instructions of the Reich Defense Commissioners for their area of responsibility" (§ **5).**
In the area of war economics, however, the Reich Defense Commissioners remained "without any significant direct influence" compared to the weight and importance of the organs of the Reich Minister for Armament and Ammunition.303 However, the close interconnection of the political and economic power apparatus became clear in view of the growing contradictions between domestic political and war economics as well as between regional and central interests and claims to power increasingly ambivalent, ie both promoting and inhibiting effects on armaments organization and armaments industry;

b) Delayed formation of regional economic chambers

Plans to create regional economic chambers had been in place since 1941. Corresponding regulations only appeared in the spring of 1942. Another year passed before the planned 42 regional chambers of commerce and 17 chambers of commerce were formed, in which the previously existing 106 chambers of industry and commerce, 71 chambers of crafts and 27 **chambers of commerce were merged. In the meantime, the military and foreign policy situation as well as the state monopolistic power constellation at home had changed fundamentally. The original intentions of the initiators of the campaign had almost nothing in common with its result. Changes had taken place in the state monopoly mechanism that counteracted the "decentralization" intended by the creators of the regional economic chambers and largely paralyzed it or even turned it into its opposite.**

A rough analysis of the processes reveals three stages in the planning and formation of regional economic chambers (GWK).
Soon after the start of the war, with the protection of the Reich Ministry of Economics and the Reich Chamber of Commerce, there was a certain reformation of regional economic interests, represented by the Chambers of Industry and Commerce and their "working group" under the leadership of banker Friedrich Reinhart (Commerzbank), the president the IHK Berlin, took place.304 The power of the imperial groups,

302 ***Neumann,*** page
561. 303 *nzw ,* vol There
was a connection with the failure of the "corporate" efforts, see ***Hüttenberger, Peter,*** Representation of interests and lobbying in the Third Reich, in ***The Führer State: Myth and Reality.*** Studies on the structure and politics of the Third Reich.

Edited by Gerhard Hirschfeld and Lothar Kettenacker with an introduction by. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Stuttgart 1981, p. 44 7 ff.

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The RGI in particular, which had been working closely with the Reich Ministry for Armament and Ammunition and its "self-responsibility" organization since the spring of 1940, obviously encountered growing criticism from the IHR areas and from the districts.

The Reich Ministry of Economics (Funk, Landfried, Kehrl), which, although officially the supervisory authority of the RGI and the other groups, was, according to the judgment of its own speakers, "completely outside the G,-- uppen organization"305 and also had control over the Reich Chamber of Commerce, whose " Member" of the Reich groups, could no longer exert any influence on them, articulated these interests early on. In a meeting on September 2, 1940, the ministry's chambers advisor, Ministerialrat Haßmann, obviously a confidant of the party chancellery, expressed thoughts about revitalizing and "land consolidation" of the IHK, whose areas would have to be aligned with state or political borders. and about a "synthesis between chambers and groups"; There was talk of the "need to de-bureaucratize the chamber system and to establish close contact with the NSDAP."306 In May 1941, Minister Funk himself announced within his own circle his intention to "bring business even closer to the party than before, and although also because of this,

that the district economic advisors become presidents of the chambers of industry and commerce should". 307 Soon afterwards he announced in a speech at the Gauleiter conference in Berlin that his "ultimate goal was the establishment of 'Gau economic chambers'", although this goal could "only be realized gradually".308 Regarding the for this plan The group that entered, which was encouraged by the party chancellery and at least tolerated by Göring, also included Franz Hayler, head of the Reich Trade Group, and its general manager Otto Ohlendorf, two high-ranking SS leaders and members of the "Friends of the Reichsführer-SS" at this time. who in no way could have committed themselves to this without Himmler's approval.309 The group of advocates of the GWK in 1941 therefore comprised not insignificant but heterogeneous forces: namely important circles of the middle bourgeoisie, which was often influential at the regional level, especially from the consumer goods industry and trade, apparently supported by the mass of smaller entrepreneurs and craftsmen and led by representatives of influential banks, SS economic and "estate" ideologists who liked to pose as protectors of the "commercial middle class", and leading circles from the Reich Ministry of Economics and, last but not least, the party chancellery and the Gauleiter and Gau economic advisors of the fascist party.

After the failure of the Blitzkrieg strategy on the battlefields of the East and after Speer's appointment as Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition and GB Rüst, a new phase of development began. Funk issued it in sudden haste "with the consent of the Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan, the General Plenipotentiary for the

305 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 8937, Bl. 128, AN RWiM v. June 24, 1942.

306 Ibid., No. 9310, Bl. 263 and 263 R, AN RWiM above. meeting about. Chamber tasks on September 2, 1940, v. December 16, 1940.

307 ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, Film 19 425, AN Rkzl. ex. Meeting over the radio on May 23, 1941, v. May 28, 1941.

308 Ibid., RWiM, No. 9330, Bl. 34 and 34 R, back cover (draft) Funks to Gauleiter, April 18, 1942.

309 Ibid., No. 8953, Bl. 80ff., AN ex. Discussion between Pietzsch, Erdmann (both RWK), Hayler and Ohlendorf on May 28, 1941 "ex. the question of the organization of the commercial economy", June 10, 1941.

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Reich Administration and the High Command of the Wehrmacht" 3 10 the so-called basic or "enabling" ordinance of April 20th 3 11, the 1st and 2nd implementing ordinance of the same date 3 12 and the 3rd implementing ordinance, the so-called Gau Chamber of Commerce Development Ordinance (GWKA V), dated May 30, 1942. 3 13 This happened so hastily that even the head of the party chancellery, Martin Bormann, no longer had the opportunity to comment on the 1st and 2nd implementing regulations beforehand.3 14 “The "The organization department of the Reich Ministry of Economics," the speaker in question noted, "was surprised by the development and would not have known anything eight days before." 3 15 The ammunition minister and the RGI, and even the Reich Chamber of Commerce, were also passed over.

The GWK represented a regional coercive organization for the "commercial economy", i.e. for industry, trade, crafts and utilities, whose management was to be closely linked to the political violence in the respective NSDAP district. The GWK, especially for its president, The powers envisaged, concerning both the regulation of production and distribution as well as the appointment of regional economic and political positions, inevitably had to collide with those of the central arms management bodies, which were currently in the process of accelerated development under the new ammunition minister.

Two days before the first regulations were issued, Funk had once again stated in a circular to the Gauleiters that his goal was to “simplify the economic organization and bring it into as close contact with the party as possible,” which was in line “with wishes expressed by the party have already been brought to my attention several times."3 16 He explained his action differently to Hans-Heinrich Lammers, the head of the Reich Chancellery: "The consolidation of the economic organization in the middle instance had proven necessary in order to concentrate the economy here *too* for the purpose of increasing performance in armaments tasks." 3 17 There was internal talk in the Reich Ministry of Economics that "serious political necessities had prompted rapid action by the RWM."3 18 The entire circumstances indicate that this was the case In this phase it was a hasty reaction to the consistent course taken by the Minister of Ammunition and GB Rüst, who had been in the process of creating their own, extensive "middle authority" since March. Göring, Funk, Bormann, circles from the OKW, the mainly regionally organized consumer goods industry and well-known bank representatives (Reinhart, Carl Lüer, Kurt v. Schröder)3i9 310 *RGBl.* 1942 I, p. 189, “Ordinance on the simplification and standardization of organizational

sation of the commercial economy", April 20, 1942.

311 Ibid.

312 Ibid., p. 189 (1st DVO, the actual Gau Chamber of Commerce Ordinance (GWKVO)) etc. P. 190 (2nd DVO).

313 Ibid., p. 371ff.

314 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 9330, Bl. 189, Bormann to Funk, May 1, 1942.

315 Ibid., Bl. 103 R, AN RWiM, May 12, 1942.

316 Ibid., Bl. 34, Rs. (Draft) Funks to the Gauleiter, April 18, 1942.

317 Ibid, Bl. 185, radio to Lammers, June 12, 1942.

318 Ibid., Bl. 103 R, AN RWiM, May 12, 1942.

319 See ibid., No. 9311, Bl. 203, invitation Reinharts as head of the IHK working group in the RWK (strictly trust!) to 17 !HK presidents f. Discussion on April 22nd, v. April 9, 1942.

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counteract this with the formation of regional economic chambers. Of course, the general tendency, which has increased since the defeat before Moscow, to concentrate the state's monopoly regulatory power, to intensify war economic efforts and to more strongly merge the economic and political potencies of the regime became noticeable in their action, but in one way , which was typical of the competition and anarchy of the capitalist mode of production.

The final phase - the founding of the regional economic chambers themselves - was delayed for many months, until 1943 , due to lengthy negotiations about the detailed implementation regulations and the "model statutes" . The order on the establishment of the regional economic chambers and economic chambers of December 16, 1942 appeared on December 23 , at the same time as the model statutes.320 In the course of the first quarter of 1943, most of the new chambers were constituted.

In the meantime, the war situation had changed fundamentally, and the ammunition ministry's dominant position in the war economy was now unshakable in the regional area. After the armaments commissions of the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition were formed, the institution of the GWK was organizationally linked to them and was clearly subordinate to them in its function. The originally planned reorganization process of the chambers was riddled with very important exceptions and the management functions were completely tailored to the needs of the arms monopolies grouped around the Ministry of Munitions and the RGI.

The debate over the final form of the reorganization was primarily carried out by the RGI on the part of its critics. Minister Speer, who had now finalized his district organization, stayed in the background, probably for tactical reasons, especially since he himself tried to involve the party, especially the Gauleiter, in his armaments concept. In response to a request from Albert Pietzsch, the President of the Reich Chamber of Commerce, on May 4 , 1942, that he should use his influence to ensure that "the technical structure should not be disturbed with the reorganization" so that time could be "gained", "To consider the measures that, despite the reorganization, ensure that the functioning of the professional organization remains undisturbed"321, he remarked in passing: "Landfried: ... I'm not interested" and left the letter with this note the State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Economics.322 After all, the appointment of his responsible head of office, Schieber, as second deputy head of the RGI on June 23 , 1942323 probably also played a role in this context. In addition, Speer's intervention with Hitler may have contributed to Bormann issuing an express ban324 against making district economic advisors presidents of the district economic chambers.

320 Ibid., No. 9818, Bl. 98ff. Model statutes of the GWK, undated; *DRA,* December 23, 1942, p. Hf.
321 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 9330, Bl. 177.
322 Ibid., hs. Marg. Speers and Schulze-Fielitz', undated.
323 *News from the RM{BuM,* No. 7, July 20, 1942, published. ex. "Cooperation between the Armaments Supply Office and the Reich Industry Group", undated - dating (June 23) according to ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 9074, Bl. 216, AN RWiM, July 18, 1942.
324 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 9330, Bl. 192, FS Bormanns to radio, May 27, 1942; ibid, Bl. 193, letter from Bormann to the Gauleiter, undated (this letter appears only on August 7, 1942 as and the available party chancellery circular, separation in the management of offices of the party States"; ibid., FS, Film 381).

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On June 11, Zangen intervened on behalf of the RGI's Advisory Board against the "new development in the organization of the commercial economy"; The Advisory Board, he telegraphed to Funk, was "unanimously of the opinion that the measures introduced do not correspond to the importance and needs of the industry and endanger the implementation of the tasks assigned to it, especially at the present time."325 He wanted one Discussion on the implementation of the regulations issued, in particular on the expected model statutes, the first draft of which was already available.

Detailed discussions then took place between Landfried and Zangen, after which it was noted in Zangen's aforementioned telegram: "The wishes of the Reich Industry Group have been largely fulfilled in the statutes (this word was subsequently deleted - DE). Mr. Zangen has not raised any objections to the statutes in their current form." 326 The second draft of the model statutes from July 1st 327 was already "the end result of the discussions with the RGI and the Minister of Ammunition."328 The main points of contention, What was at issue was the subordination of the district economic groups to the

district economic chambers - such district groups existed in the mining, iron-making industry, construction industry and others economic groups - and the staffing of the leading positions in the district economic chambers.329 In both The RGI largely prevailed on points.

An important role here was played by the fact that the change in the war situation helped the apparatus of the Reich Ministry of Armaments and Ammunition to gain a dominant position in the war economy and made many of the original intentions of the regional economic chambers obsolete.

The presidential and vice-president positions of the 42 regional economic chambers and the 17 economic chambers - according to Funk, "leading economic personalities supported by the party's trust" 330 - were ultimately filled by direct representatives of the monopolies to around 80 percent. Very often the president of a previous IHK had become president of the regional economic chamber The heads of the industrial departments, about the same percentage of monopoly representatives, especially from arms companies, were also vice presidents of the district economic chambers.

After a long period of back and forth, those economic groups that had a special district structure were completely or partially exempt from the regulations of paragraphs 2, paragraph 2 of the GWKVO and paragraphs 6, 7, paragraphs 1 and 2, and 14 of the GWKAV. were adopted, according to which such district divisions, for example the district groups of the mining and iron-making industry economic groups, were to be integrated into the GWK or chambers of commerce, their district boundaries were to be brought into line with the Gau borders, their leaders and managing directors were to be appointed by the President of the GWK appoint and have their budgets approved by him. Such “exception” regulations particularly affected the mining industry group and the iron-making industry group, but also the construction industry group.

325 RWiM, No. 9074, Bl. 214f. (Original).
326 Ibid., No. 9330, Bl. 230, hs. Marg. (RWiM), June 30, 1942.
327 Ibid., Bl. 235 ff.
328 Ibid., Bl. 239, TO RWiM, July 1, 1942.
329 See the summary of these points ibid, No. 9074, Bl. 252, 252 R, Rs. Zangens, September 9, 1942.
330 Funk's speech on May 15, 1943, quoted from *DZW,* vol. 3, p. 233 f., see also *Neumann,* p. 450 ff. and p. 626.

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Table 12

Presunten of the regional economic chambers and economic chambers (as of 1943; selection)

Surname	company or Group affiliation	1. Gau Chamber of Commerce 2. Chamber of Commerce
		1.
Eugene Vögler	Hochtief AG	Eat
Moritz Klönne	August Klönne, Dortmund	South Westphalia
Successor (1944): Otto Make	Bochum club (United Steel Mills)	
Otto Berve	Schaffgotsch	Upper Silesia
Philipp v. Schoeller	Schoeller & Bleckmann Stahlwerke AG (United Steel Mills)	Vienna
Carl Luer	Dresdner Bank/Opel	Rhine-Main
Kurt v. Schröder*	Bankhaus 1. H. Stein & Co.	Cologne-Aachen
Ewald Hecker	Ilseder Hut	Hanover - Braunschweig
Herbert Sedlaczek	Otto Wolff/Oberhütten	Magdeburg- Anhalt
Albert Pietzsch		Munich/Upper Bavaria (commissioner)
Wilhelm Wohlfahrt	Zeiss Ikon AG	Saxony
Erich Faust	Flick Group	Moselle country
Reinhold Thiel	Gehr. Thiel GmbH, Ruhla	Thuringia
Wilhelm Zschintzsch		Mark Brandenburg
Jens Juhl Strube	United Luster Factories AG	Main Franconia
Robert Eisenmeier	JP Bemberg AG, Augsburg	Swabia
Heinrich Hunke	Deutsche Bank; previously G WB Berlin	Berlin
Anton Kiesewetter	Credit institution of the Germans, Reichenberg	Sudetenland
		2.
Johann W. Welker	Haniel Group	Duisburg
successor (1944): Heinrich Kost	United Steelworks GH &	
Hans Croon	J. Croon Oetker	Aachen
Theodor Kaselowski	Group	Bielefeld
Carl Wurster	IG Colors	Ludwigshafen
Werner Stöhr	Leipziger Wollkammerei AG	Leipzig
Alois Meyer	Arbed Group	Luxembourg
Hermann Röchling	Röchling's iron and Stahlwerke GmbH	Metz

*** "on vacation" as a regional economic advisor**

Source: **ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 9827, Bl. 16f., "Economic Special Service", No. 2, v. January 7, 1943; National newspaper, Essen, March 31, 1913; ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 9818, Bl. 116ff. Installation undated (194l\).**

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industry, stone and earth, ceramic industry, clothing industry and sugar industry.331 Finally, the GWK model statutes stipulated for all district divisions that only their managing directors, but not their heads, were to be hired and dismissed by the president of the GWK.332 That The result of the formation of regional economic chambers, which had been given great advance praise in the regime's propaganda with slogans such as "Closer to the party!" and "Tightened organization of the commercial economy", remained poor overall. The powers of the central arms authorities were not restricted in any way. The Gauleiter's power was strengthened by combining the regional economic interests of their area; However, this increase in power did not really come to fruition because of the increasing structural and institutional weakness of those interests and because of the de facto exclusion of the party authorities from the leadership of the regional economic chambers. On the contrary, it appears that the institution of the GWK, as it had now taken shape, rather contributed to strengthening the middle authority of the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition, who had already firmly anchored it there - within the framework of the armaments commissions.

On September 22 , 1942 , Haßmann complained bitterly to the party chancellery that "the weeks of uncertainty and indecision were used by many opponents of the new order inside and outside the economic organization to increase the existing natural difficulties and the regional economic chambers with them from the outset to burden tensions that make their establishment and their further work more difficult."333 He noted with regret that "the simple and clear idea of the regional economic chamber that we presented is gradually being undermined by the intervention of one-sided interest groups and is therefore always further away from our original conception."334 In relation to the enormous armaments organization of the Ministry of Munitions at the central and regional levels, the Gauleiter's influence had undoubtedly decreased rather than increased. But with the appointment of all Gauleiters as Reich Defense Commissioners in November 1942 , their position in economic policy had at least been consolidated; So in the following period of "total war" they had to be taken into account by monopolies and central arms authorities as a generally inhibiting factor for the intensification and further centralization of armaments and war production.

4. Changes in function and structure the regulatory mechanism in the war economy

"The winter campaign opened our eyes," wrote "The German Economist" on January 30 , 1942, "that ... the utmost military and economic efforts are required." 335 The realization that the blitzkrieg strategy had failed was,

331 See the relevant events in ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 9080, 9081, 9106, 9115, 9119, 9159, 9168.
332 Ibid., No. 9818, p. 98ff. (§ 22).
333 Ibid., No. 9821, page 342, Haßmann (RWiM) at noon (Pkzl.), September 22, 1942.
334 Ibid., page 343.
335 The German Economist, Vol. 16 (1941/42), No. 18, January 30, 1942.

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As described, triggered fundamental changes in the concept of the war economy and in the state-monopolistic organization of the war economy.

As early as December 1941, under the aegis of the armed forces themselves, they launched an attack taken, the most significant changes in the state-monopoly mechanism of the war economy were concentrated in a relatively short period of time - from February to April/May 1942 - and created its basic pattern, which, mechanism, which creates a new constellation of forces in this although expanded in many ways in the following period, continued to exist until towards the end of the war.

The level achieved in the development of state-monopoly capitalism far exceeded that of the First World War. The Reich Ministry for Armament and Ammunition under Todt, as an independent, "civilian" ministry in the centralized fascist state, far exceeded the Prussian Arms and Ammunition Procurement Office in its very beginnings, both in its state-monopolistic structure and in its effectiveness Ministry of War (Wumba). From the beginning, the path that was followed in the First World War with the war (raw materials) was avoided.

companies (war stock corporations and war companies mbH). The outrageous profit and corruption practices of these companies probably played a role here, with which they had greatly discredited themselves in the public eye at the time.

In 1942, a new, largely self-contained form of organization <l.eii state-monopoly capitalism prevailed, which differed fundamentally from the state-monopolistic structures from the time of the First World War (War Office; Wumba; War Raw Materials Department and War Companies)336. The main distinguishing features 337 were

---, the extensive displacement of the Wehrmacht leadership from procurement and the transfer of full, undisputed regulatory power to the “civilian” ammunition ministry,

- the central regulation and planned management of the production of weapons, ammunition and military equipment (initially for the army) in the committees and rings by the leading producers (arms monopolies) themselves, on behalf and with the authority of this ministry, the central regulation
-, of a mass supply of forced laborers from the fascist-occupied areas of Europe for the German war economy,
- the binding distribution of the total supply of the "lead raw material" iron and other raw materials by the Central Planning, which was controlled by the Ministry of Munitions and whose organs de facto were the RVK and the RVE as well as the GBA.

At the end of 1942, the new organizational system largely included the countries and areas occupied by German imperialism.

336 On this *Germany in the First World War.* By a collective of authors led by Fritz Klein, 3 vols., Berlin 1968, 1969; *Schröter, Alfred,* War - State - Monopoly 1914-1918. The connections between the imperialist war economy, militarization of the national economy and state-monopoly capitalism in Germany during the First World War, Berlin 1965; *Feldman, Gerald D.,* Army, industry, and labor in Germany, 1914-1918, Princeton 1966.

337 See also *Khmelnizkaja, JL,* The development of state-monopoly capitalism in Germany during the Second World War, in *German Capitalism and the Second World War,* Vol. 3, Berlin 1962, p. 205f.

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Ultimately, this comprehensive state-monopoly war capitalism was based on completely different domestic political conditions than during the First World War.
He relied entirely on martial law, on barbaric terror against the people and on fascist mass manipulation.
The core of the reorganization of the war economy apparatus was twofold: Firstly, the long-demanded priority for armaments production was enforced, and the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition was accordingly expanded into the central armaments industry executive and at the expense of other war economy institutions with extraordinary, priority regulatory power fitted.
Secondly, the system of committees and rings in armaments production was transformed into a decisive instrument that was effective in regulating production right down to the last armaments factory, which was directly controlled and controlled by hundreds of prominent representatives and experts from the leading armaments companies.
Strengthening the ministerial executive to the extent achieved was unthinkable without Hitler's direct support and decision. Speer's support for Hitler was so unshakable and his ties to him were closer than that of any other minister. But what Hitler decided on - he also depended to an exceptionally high degree on the ideas, suggestions and submissions of the Minister of Ammunition. He, in turn, acted entirely according to the concept of the cream of German finance capital, which supported and advised him.

Speer could only realize his concept if he managed to disempower the two most influential institutions in war economic policy, namely Göring as the representative for the four-year plan and the Wehrmacht leadership, and to combine their powers. This was successful with massive help from Hitler, although not completely (weapons offices of the Wehrmacht units; GB Chemistry) and not without compromises (GBA; occupied territories). The Minister of Ammunition also brought important positions in the previous areas of the Reich Minister of Economics and the Reich Minister of Transport under his control Control.

This centralization process was an expression of the fact that the military defeat of the winter of 1941/42 and the threatening war of attrition weakened rather than intensified the traditional antagonisms between the monopoly groups and corresponding political antagonisms within the ruling class in this phase of the war.
What seemed to predominate during the period in question was the leveling out of opposites and a broad agreement in tactical and strategic positions. Behind the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition, which had now become a central part of the military-industrial complex and the most important state command point of German finance capital, were all the major arms companies, led by the mining companies - of which, first and foremost, the United Steel Works - and the electrical companies. Closely linked to him, but in a relatively independent position, the IG Farben group was also one of the forces grouped around the ministry.

The above-mentioned leading circles of monopoly capital no longer remained in the background, but instead took up all the relevant positions in the system of committees and rings. The committees and rings called themselves "self-responsibility" bodies of the armaments industry, but they explicitly operated as departments of the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition and exercised official authority. Behind this terminological contradiction lay a novelty in the development of the state mono-

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politic capitalism: It was not just a particularly intensive form of fusion of monopoly and state power, but rather a state production dictatorship of industrialists over large areas of industry; because the heads of the committees and rings had the authority to make independent, sole decisions in all questions in the area under their authority.338 This was precisely what seemed to contemporaries to be "almost tantamount to a revolution"339. Zumpe states: "The most important thing of this new structure was that the limits of capital ownership were effectively abolished."340 It should of course be added that this form of state monopolistic regulation, just as little as its different and much more limited forms in the First World War, led to a change in the fundamental pro- production and ownership relationships, but on the contrary was intended to serve to consolidate and expand them.

A tailor-made legal basis for this dictatorship of the arms power was available in the form of the "Fuhrer's Ordinance for the Protection of the Armaments Industry" of March 21, 1942, drafted by Speer himself.341 It threatened all violations by companies and departments, including military ones, against those liable for armaments management Ordinances and regulations, especially false information about labor requirements and hoarding of raw materials, with criminal proceedings before the People's Court c Characteristic of the regulation was the exclusive authorization of the Minister of Ammunition to request such procedures: "Prosecution only occurs at the request of the Reich Minister for Armament and Ammunition, who at the same time acts as the general representative for armaments tasks in the four-year plan."342 To make matters worse, Speer ordered a letter from Hitler on the same date to the "managers" of the armaments industry, in which the "leader" assured the entrepreneurs he "trusted" that they would protect the interests of the war economy "even without constant supervision." of the empire as their own.343 As if to excuse himself

338 The thesis of **Mottek!Becker!Schröter (Mottek, Hans/Becker, Waüer!Schröter, Alfred,** Wirtschaftsgeschichte Deutschlands. Ein Grundriß, Vol. 3, Berlin 1974), p. 338: "This type of Direct management of the armaments industry was basically just a continuation of the method that had already been practiced before the war in the so-called economic groups with their specialist groups."

339 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 5675, ed. by Chief Rü (WewiAmt), Colonel Neef, ex. ,,Out of-shots and rings", October 26, 1942.

340 **Zumpe, Lotte,** Economy and State in Germany 1933 to 1945. With a chapter by Berthold Puchert **(=Economy and State in Germany.** An economic history of state-monopoly capitalism in Germany from the end of the 19th century to 1945 in three volumes. Edited by Helga Nussbaum and Lotte Zumpe, Vol. 3), Berlin 1980, p. 429.
It must be said that the abolition of the limits of capital ownership was of course not absolute, but rather applied to important areas of capital disposal (allocation of orders, supply of raw materials and workers, rationalization, conversion of production, investments).

341 **RGBl.** 1942 I, p. 165 (only published on April 9th and in force since April 11th).

342 Ibid (III, 2).

343 ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, Film 19467, Rs. RMfBuM v. March 25, 1942 (contains letter from Hitler to the "armaments managers" dated March 21, 1942); printed in **causes and consequences.** From the German collapse in 1918 and 1945 to the state reorganization of Germany today. A collection of certificates and documents on contemporary history. Ed. and
Arranged by Herbert Michaelis/Ernst Schraepler with collaboration. v. Günter Scheel, Vol. 19, p. 15 ff.

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Hitler used this to justify the above-mentioned regulation, which served to subordinate any potentially different individual interests of companies to the overall interest of German monopoly capital, as presented to its leading representatives.
The production dictatorship of the arms companies had nothing to do with the legend - strained by reactionary apologetics - of the dictatorship of the party or the fascist state over industry or over the "economy" .344 **In reality, the concept for "self-responsibility" came from " of the industry by the powerful monopolists themselves and has been set new standards since the turn of 1941/42 by the same circles of monopoly capital - personalities such as Vögler,-Zangen, Bücher and Rohland who launched it in 1940 expanded to a new level of effectiveness. The "Chronicle," which was kept in the Speer Ministry, showed the minister's weekly, even daily, contacts with the leading representatives of monopoly capital.:¾5 After the war, Speer described his method: As a "layman," he sought "good Experts looked around" and "those who were described to me as the best were brought out of the industry and given dictatorial powers over their production circle" _3-1.6**

In this context, the claim made by Todt and Speer themselves and circulated in bourgeois historiography that "engineers" and "technicians" were the main pillars of the system of "self-responsibility" has a strong apologetic impact.347 This is where the crucial point comes from Role of the top representatives of the defense companies -: supervisory board and board chairmen and members or general directors and directors - as heads of the main committees

344 Extreme apologies on this question, which is crucial for historical-political knowledge, are carried out, for example, by the incorrigible Treue (Treue, *Wilhelm,* Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Neuzeit, Vol. 2: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1973) and Kannapin in his work, which is already programmatic in the title *(Kannapin, Hans-Eckart,* Economy under duress, Cologne 1966). But Milward, who should know better, also holds similarly questionable views: "The NSDAP clearly occupied a position of power above that of the business and industrial associations, and despite its often close ties to them, it was able to help them in cases of conflict to impose their will and did so." *(Milward, Alan S.,* The Second World War.
War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, Munich 1977, p. 370f.). See also recently Milward's thesis regarding "the party control exercised over the business world" and its "loss of the capacity to make independent decisions" *(the same,* Towards a Political Economy of Fascism, in *Who Were the Fascists.* Social Roots of European Fascism. Edited by Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet and Jan Petter Myklebust, Bergen/Oslo/Troms0 1980, p. 59).
Overall, the statements of bourgeois authors on this question have become more reserved and differentiated since the 1950s and 1960s in view of the analyzes and documents presented by Marxists (see, for example, the literature report by *Saage, Richard,* On the Relationship between National Socialism and Industry, in *Aus Politics and contemporary history,* B 9/1975, p. 17ff.; with a theoretical approach worthy of discussion and remarkable political insights, recently *Volkmann, Hans-Erich,* On the relationship between large business and the Nazi regime in the Second World War, in *World War II and social change.*
Axis powers and occupied countries. Edited by Waclaw Dlugoborski, Göttingen 1981, p. 87 ff. (93 ff.)).

345 The "Chronicle of the Offices of the Reich Minister Albert Speer" (previously: "the General Building Inspector for the Reich Capital") consists of several typewritten (half-) Annual volumes (on microfilm in ZStA Potsdam, FS, Fihn 42948).

346 Ibid., film 3568, consultation. Speers ("Meeting on May 17, 1945").

347 So (at least misleadingly) *Janssen,* p. 46.

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and special committees or rings are easily out of sight. The unreal construction of a property- and therefore class-neutral technical intelligentsia, which would have brought its professional and class experiences (working groups, committees, etc.) into the fascist armaments organization partly voluntarily and partly on orders, was championed most penetratingly by Karl-Heinz Ludwig. According to him, in 1940 Hitler "left the further organization of armaments to the engineers".348 This thesis is expanded: Unter Todt
During the war, "the engineers simply resorted to certain forms of 'technical collaborative work' with the committee system... which is part of the essence of ideal engineering activity."3 49 His technocentric conception of the omnipotent but politically inexperienced or misguided technical intelligence Ludwig serves for multi-layered apologetics.

In contrast to the thesis of the "leadership" of the armaments organization by "technicians" and "engineers", Weyres referred to the sources; these "completely refute the thesis of the purely technical orientation of Speer's organs" 350 Neumann had already made similar claims in 1944 Wilhelm Zangen himself drew attention to the study, according to which "the 143 board members of 35 industrial companies in the Ruhr area were composed as follows: 85 technicians, 47 business people and 11 lawyers. This shows that engineers still predominate on the boards of German industrial companies, because the first generation of capitalists is always more concerned about giving their sons a technical rather than a commercial education. Many of these men now sit in the committees and rings."351 "Engineers" or "technicians" - these were of course Albert Vögler, probably the most influential among the creators of "self-responsibility" -

Systems, Rohland, Lüschen and Krauch as well as any subordinate rationalization expert in any special committee!
The facts also fly in the face of all attempts by right-wing and "left-wing" bourgeois interpreters of history to portray the economy under fascism and especially the war economy as something non-capitalist and even anti-capitalist, as a "political economy of fascism" 352 or something similar. In reality, it was nothing other than a vulgar, but particularly radical and brutal, monopoly rule based on the fascist apparatus of violence. The new quality of its state-monopoly organization and structure testified to a particularly high degree of unity and determination of the core of the ruling class, behind which the specter of an impending military and political catastrophe had loomed since the defeat at Moscow.

When the war situation forced the regime to take war-economic measures of extreme consequence, it was precisely the leading representatives of finance capital, especially the arms companies, who initiated such measures. It was clear that rigorous intervention in the reproductive process was required in order to thoroughly adapt the national economy to a long and difficult war. As always, comprehensive state monopoly regulation had to be comprehensive this time too.

348 *Ludwig,* Technology, p. 350.
349 Ibid., p. 352, p. 360.
350 *We yres-11. Le11etww,* p. 212f. The same applies to Todt's term of office (see *Volume I,* p. 113ff.).
351 *Neumann,* p. 620 f.
352 So - already in the title - in *Milward,* Towards a Political Economy of Fascism (p. 56).

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bring with it excessive profit regulation and thus affect the individual and group interests of broad circles of the bourgeoisie.
The public regulation of the reproductive process is therefore by no means the ideal of the capitalist class. In principle, what Lenin wrote still applies: “All the habits and traditions of the bourgeoisie in general and of the petty bourgeoisie in particular are ... against state control, for the inviolability of 'sacred private property', of 'sacred' private enterprise." 353 This also applies to the monopoly bourgeoisie. "History shows," writes Helga Nussbaum, "that monopoly capital repeatedly attempts to regulate the reproduction process by the state - to this day - resistance." 354 The tendency to distrust state paternalism and restrictions on the private ownership of the means of production is inherent in capital even in developed state-monopoly capitalism - of course in small and medium-sized capital more and with greater justification than that large.355 The radical reorganization of the state monopoly mechanism of the German war economy, the climax and
turning point of which was the year 1942,356 only prevailed and proved to be comparatively effective because it was controlled by the arms monopolies themselves was carried out. They only got involved under the premise and condition that they carried out the state monopoly interventions on their own and kept their scope under control. Minister Speer later, in his programmatic speech on June 9, 1944, gave a kind of theoretical "justification" for the regulatory system in the war economy that was created under his leadership: "The implementation of comprehensive industrial tasks can only be directed by men who come from industry themselves emerged." And even more clearly: "Sharp instructions in industryare only intolerable if they are initiated by bodies outside the industry." 357 Despite all the armament successes of 1942 and the following period, which the initiators of the reorganization extensively boasted about, this remained However, for the time being and for a long time to come,
it was largely piecemeal and functioned imperfectly enough despite great bureaucratic effort. The complete subordination of individual and group economic interests to the overall imperialist interest was just as unsuccessful

353 *Lenin, W. [.,* The next tasks of the Soviet power (1918), in *the same,* works, vol. 27, Berlin 1960, p. 244.

354 *Baudis, Dieter/ Nussbaum, Helga,* economy and state in Germany at the end of the 19th century. Century to 1918/19 *(= Economy and State in Germany,* 3 volumes. Edited by Helga Nussbaum and Lotte Zumpe, Vol. 1), Berlin 1978, p. 118.

355 The leading representatives of monopoly capital also attached great importance to continually being assured of the regime's loyalty to the private and monopoly economy. Hitler in particular repeatedly made such assurances.

356 However, there was no sudden upheaval in the development of the war economy. Radkau rightly asserts that the "totalization" of the war economy under Speer was "by no means diametrically opposed to the economy of the Blitzkrieg" *(Jlall-gartenl Radkau,* p. 423); The "enforcement of the centrally managed war economy" was a demand of "large industry" from the beginning of the war (ibid., p. 422). The four-year plan (Reich Office for Economic Expansion), the Ministry of Ammunition (under Todt), the Reich Coal Association, etc. were various approaches and fields of experimentation for this.

357 *Anatomy of War,* p. 449 and p. 451, Doc. 250, Speer's speech to industrialists (Essen), June 9, 1944.

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could be determined exactly and unanimously. The macroeconomic prerequisites and consequences of the regulatory interventions in the reproductive process that came from the armaments sector - quite apart from the political ones - could only rarely be overlooked by their authors, let alone planned. The production and market laws of capitalism, curtailed and restricted in their effectiveness in one place, asserted themselves again behind the backs of the organizers and planners; Even the threat of fascist terror fundamentally changed nothing.

Even later, in times of greatest concentration of state-monopolistic regulatory power, significant difficulties remained (and arose again) in increasing war economic effectiveness, which arose from the internal contradictions of the imperialist-fascist order.

a) State, monopolistic concentration of power and fascist party

If the circles around the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition wanted to wrest the decisive regulatory powers in armaments production from the cumbersome and, in their opinion, incompetent hands of the Wehrmacht, then the powerful and tightly knit organization of the fascist party must have seemed most welcome to them as an ally. One of Speer's essential functions as minister was precisely to bring about such an alliance. "The facts are in contrast to the assertion of bourgeois historians that Speer carried out the reorganization of the armaments industry "by largely eliminating the party authorities and, so to speak, against their will."358 The regime's economic and political power organs and institutions grew in the face of the In what was now obviously a
longer-lasting war that was probably exhausting and burdensome for the mass of the people, they worked much more closely together and coordinated their efforts to rationalize production, intensify exploitation and suppress the working people. This was a tendency that corresponded to the objective situation of German imperialism, but which in its enforcement and impact was not insignificantly weakened by the various disputes over jurisdiction and internal power struggles through which it asserted itself.

Since the spring of 1942 , the "only viable path" taken by German imperialism in view of the war situation was "to entrust the management of the economy to the most powerful monopolists, to strengthen their power and to divide all industrial activity into monopolistic and authoritarian organizations (like the Reich Associations - DE)" 359, this very development, as Neumann (1943/44) correctly recognized, had to create "new serious social problems": "Small and medium-sized businesses must suffer even more . The workers must be terrorized even more so that even higher performance can be achieved." 360 The increasingly close cooperation between the ammunition ministry and the Gau leaders as an important
domestic political pillar of the regime objectively corresponded to the increasing 358 *Pätzold, Kurt!Weißbecker, Manfred,* Swastika and Totenkopf. The party of crime,

Berlin 1981, p. 417, note 27 (quoted by WJ Mommsen).
359 *Neumann,* p. 660.
360 Ibid.

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the importance of domestic political factors, which in turn had a causal connection with the military crisis and with the desire of the ruling circles to plunder and bleed their own people more comprehensively and "totally" for the war. Neumann defined the relationship between Politics and economics in this process in a revealing way: "The rise of the practitioners of violence (ie the upper party hierarchy including the Gauleiter - DE) is based on the most monstrous monopolization that a modern society has ever experienced." 361 Speer's conception, which is based on approaches and Todt's plans, it was from the beginning - as Thomas expressed it approvingly - "to now influence the broadest mass of the German people through the party authorities about the need for drastic measures in the sense of making full use of all real human and material reserves of strength".362 This was primarily what the Minister of Ammunition was concerned with , to enforce the primacy of armaments with the help of the entire political authority of the regime.

His concept of rationalization and "increase in performance" not only touched on actual arms production, but at least in its effects also affected the construction industry, the energy industry and the consumer goods industry, both large and small, local companies. A variety of conflicting interests had to be subordinated to this concept, far-reaching social and political impacts are kept under control.

In the war years that followed, the process of unifying the power of the arms monopolies with the power of the fascist party, pushed forward by Speer, progressed at all levels, although not without fluctuations and setbacks.363 There were arguments and battles of interest, especially with various Gauleiters and with the partners from the upper party hierarchy; Here, depending on the political constellation, the power position of the Nazi greats and the prospects of success, the allies of the ammunition minister (Bormann, Goebbels, Himmler) changed, while Hitler himself, clearly recognizing what a functioning war economy meant for the conduct of the war, largely stuck to his line decided to equip the minister - according to his suggestions - with increasingly comprehensive economic and political powers and to support him in all internal disputes.

What is missing is the assertion, often found in bourgeois publications and carefully nurtured in Speer's own post-war publications, 364 of a deep antagonism or of irreconcilable conflicts of interests between the armaments organization of the Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions and the fascist party or,

361 Ibid., p. 660f.

362 *Janssen,* p. 354, note 124, AN Thomas' v. May 9, 1942.

363 In principle, Neumann observes correctly, even if he overshoots the mark with regard to the control of the means of production: “A small group of powerful industrial, financial and agricultural monopolists are merging more and more with a group of party hierarchs to form a single bloc "who has the means of production as well as the means of violence." *(Neumann,* p. 661). Against the thesis that the leading fascist politicians themselves became monopoly capitalists through the ownership or disposal of capital, see *Eichholtz, Dietrich,* Fascism and economics: On problems of the development of production relations under the fascist dictatorship, in *fascism research.* Positions,
Problems, polemics, ed. Dietrich Eichholtz and Kurt Gossweiler, Berlin 1980, p. 67 f.

364 See especially his memoirs *(Speer,* Memoirs) and his last book *(Speer,* Der slave state).

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

Central regulatory bodies in the war economy, end of April 1942

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is covered up, to be dissolved."367 Its members should immediately become members of the Reich associations. "As this brings about a clear allocation of tasks, but also a separation of the overall industrial context, so that a uniform leadership in general industrial matters is no longer possible In order to restore a uniformly coherent industry, I consider membership of the Reich Associations in the Reich Industry Group to be an imperative requirement." He sent Landfried the text of the relevant provisions 368 , which he demanded to be included in the statutes of the Reich Associations.

Hans Kehrl, general advisor in the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs, rejected Zangen's proposals.369 From the text of the statutes drafted by Zangen, only the provision was found according to which the Reich group vis-à-vis the Reich associations "in general industrial matters has the right to give instructions and in technical matters ... the right to information and information "The right of veto" should have as soon as they have more far-reaching effects370 , in accordance with their intention to be included in the final statutes of the RVE - but without its most important component, namely the right of veto.371 Kehrl opposed membership of the Reich Associations in the Reich Industrial Group with the Justification: The Reich Associations represent "structures of their own kind as a result of the strong transfer of state sovereignty tasks in the area of raw material management." "When such extensive sovereignty is transferred, as happened with the Reich Associations, the direct and immediate relationship of the Reich Ministry of Economics must be acknowledged the imperial associations." 372 The general problem raised by Zangen was not without an objective basis. Due to the strong expansion of the system of monopolistic "self-responsibility" in the armaments industry and its extremely close integration with the official organs of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition and Central Planning, a new type of state-monopolistic force grouping emerged.

The management of Reich Industrial Group 373 had established close ties with the Reich Ministry of Armaments and Ammunition under Todt. But this connection, despite all its intensity, remained partial and primarily involved the regulation of armaments production in a number of particularly important industrial sectors.
Until the end of 1941, it was not even the absolutely dominant connection between the leading industrial association and the state apparatus. The management of the Reich Group was also closely intertwined and linked through corresponding derived state powers with the Reich Ministry of Economics, with the military armaments departments and with

367 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 8955, Bl. 4, pliers to Landfried, May 1, 1942.
368 Ibid., Bl. 5, "Provisions for the statutes of the Reich associations and professional associations" (appendix to Zangen's letter).
369 Ibid., No. 8955, Bl. 6, AN Kehrls v. May 6, 1942.
370 As note 368.
371 *Case 5,* p. 162, Doc. Nl-1967, statutes of the RVE v. May 29, 19t,2 (§ 1 Paragraph 2).
372 As note 369.
373 The leadership of the Reich Industry Group is understood here as a group of at most 20 to 30 monopoly capitalists who represented approximately the same number of large corporations. These include the head of the RGI (Zangen) and his deputy (Rudolf Stahl), the RGI's narrow advisory board and the heads of the most important business groups (if not already represented on the narrow advisory board). In 1941 the narrow advisory board (without pliers) counted 17 members (see *Zumpe,* p. 47/df.).

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the four-year plan organization. It was only in the spring of 1942 that the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition, with significant support from the leadership of the RGI, became by far the strongest crystallization nucleus of state-monopoly capitalism.
Typical of the changes that occurred was the qualitatively and quantitatively new level of merging of monopoly and state power. The new bearers of state-monopolistic regulatory functions - the committees, rings and imperial associations -
The monopolistic and state elements were no longer distinguishable, either functionally or in terms of personnel. The circle of corporate representatives, which now numbered dozens, even hundreds, and ruled over the system of committees, rings and imperial associations, was at the same time integrated into the apparatus of the ministerial executive.
This greatly strengthened and expanded the actual power of the monopoly bourgeoisie. It no longer exercised its control over the war economy primarily indirectly, from a distance, so to speak, but directly and comprehensively.
The representation of general interests of monopoly capital by the Reich Industrial Group became a less acute problem. However, in this case the leading corporations would have reactivated and used the Reich Group as an institution - this hypothesis appears to be justified - as a primary means of economic and political power if the Minister of Ammunition had not taken on these interests in such a natural and goal-oriented manner and not so comprehensively would have enforced.

A very broad and closed state monopoly grouping emerged around the Reich Ministry of Armaments and Ammunition. Already at the end of the spring of 1942 it clearly had a dominant influence on the fortunes of the war economy. It consolidated itself and expanded its sphere of power in the following period.
Of course, the core of this group still consisted of the monopolies that also set the tone in the RGI. This was expressed in the personal activity of such RGI representatives such as Zangen and Keßler. To the outside world, the connection between the RGI and the Ministry of Munitions even appeared to be strengthened and deepened by such an unusual measure as the appointment of the head of the department, Walther Schieber, at the end of June 1942 "as further (ie second - DE) deputy head" of the RGJ.374 War, however The
RGI, not only in the form of its management, but also as an organization, was still the main and direct support of the Ministry of Munitions during Todt's time - as was the case at the end of 1941/beginning of 1942 with the formation of the main committees and especially the main committee "General Wehrmacht Equipment" -, The shifts within the state monopoly regulatory mechanism since the spring of 1942, including the strong expansion and rejuvenation of its personnel base, gradually moved the RGI as an organization away from the center of this mechanism.375

One of the indications for this can be seen in the transformation of the Armaments Advisory Council, which was formed under Todt, into the Armaments Council under Speer. The Armaments Advisory Board, which included Zangen and Keßler, the head of the RGI, and one of the most prominent members of its Closer Advisory Board as chairman (Keßler) and as a member (Zangen),

374 *News from the RMfBuM,* No. 7, July 20, 1942, published. ex. "Cooperation between the Armaments Supply Office and the Reich Industry Group", undated - dating (June 23) according to ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 9074, p. 216, AN RWiM, July 18, 1942.

375 Accordingly, I consider it necessary to modify my own previous statements *(DZW,* Vol. 2, p. 291 ff.) .

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intended as a working and decision-making body. The "Sense Advisory Board" of the Minister of Munitions, appointed by Todt in December 1941 and already a hybrid structure at the time, no longer took up its function at all. Speer's Armaments Council apparently only had an ornamental function.

After all, the composition of the Armaments Council showed - and should also show officially - that the top representatives of German finance capital now supported the course of the new minister personally and on a much broader front than ever before. In addition to Zangen and Keßler, there were corporate rulers such as Vögler, Bücher, Röchling, Pleiger, Krupp and Werner, who had never themselves served on the RGI committees. In summary, it can be stated that the serious changes that have taken place in the regulatory mechanism of the war economy since February 1942 - in their beginnings since the end of 1941 - were an expression of a regular process of concentration and centralization of state-monopolistic regulatory power, which prevailed as a result of the changes in war events , under the sword of Damocles of the menacing dangers that the failure of the Blitzkrieg strategy posed to the ruling class and its fascist regime.

The reorganization progressed under the conditions of the capitalist-imperialist exploitative order - that is, in an anarchic manner, with a huge expansion of the bureaucratic apparatus, combined with considerable friction within the ruling class. This explains the inconsistency and imperfection that clung to it. It ultimately took place on the backs of the working people, who felt the brunt of its effects; Their main, dual goal was to intensify exploitation and release millions of soldiers as victims on the battlefield of the imperialist war.

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The turning point of the war and the war economy concept of German imperialism

1. Effects of the defeats of the winter of 1942/43

a) Frontier losses and armament programs

The Battle of Stalingrad marked the turning point of the Second World War. With the historic victories on the Volga and the Caucasus, the Red Army wrested the strategic initiative from the aggressor and thus initiated a fundamental change in the course of the war. The balance of power between the two fighting power groups had fundamentally changed.

The dreams of the rapid conquest of the Caucasian oil, on which those responsible for the German war economy had already speculated in 1941 , **and of advancing to the oil sources in the Persian Gulf were dashed; The hopes that the occupiers had pinned on possession of the most fertile areas of the RSFSR on the Don, the Volga and the Kuban also evaporated. This meant that essential items in their war economy calculations had not worked out.**

While the Wehrmacht's summer offensive in 1942, **although less extensive than the previous year's, was even more costly in terms of losses, the fascist invaders suffered a loss of personnel** in the Stalingrad cauldron and during the Red Army's winter offensive in 1942/43 **material equipment, which was far from the result of the battle in front of Moscow the previous winter.**

Of the Wehrmacht's total losses of officers and men from May 1942 **to April** 1943 **amounting to** 1.54 **million men ,** 1.37 **million, or around** 90 **percent, fell on the army on the German-Soviet front.1 Of** 260 **divisions, that stood there** in the fall of 1942 , 113 were **destroyed** in the winter of 1942/43 . **2 sions were completely destroyed,** 22 of them **in Stalingrad alone.3** 91,000 **men were taken ,** 30 **German divisions prisoner there, and the Red Army recovered** 147,200 **dead Germans from** the battlefield after the surrender.4

Since August 1942, **the army's loss of dead, missing and wounded had significantly exceeded the replacement personnel - by October** 1942 **by** 300,000 men, so that at the end of the winter the replacement coverage was 850,000 **men short of the losses.5** **-, like that**

1 ***DZW,*** Vol. 3, p. 93.
2 Ibid., p. 92.
3 ***Grigoleit,*** p. 146 f.
4 ***DZW,*** Vol. 3, p. 60.
5 "Overview of the departures and additions of personnel to the army on the German-Soviet front (December 1 , 1941 **to May** 1 , 1944"), **quoted from *Grigoleit,*** p. 135 **and .S.U1 ,. _ _**

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Table 13

Personnel departures and additions to the army on the German-Soviet front August 1942 to February 1943

Month	Departures	Accesses	difference
August 1942	256100	89750	-166350
September 1942	185000	83750	-101250
October 1942	130100	97200	- 32900
November 1942	128900	61200	- 67700
December 1942	200690	62000	-138690
January 1943 •	152465	109500	- 43965
February 1943	390657 • •	91900	-298757
Total•	1443912	595300	-849612

• Error in summation

* * With the losses in Stalingrad

Source: "Titanic Overview of the army's personnel departures and additions to the German-Soviet Front (December 1, 1941 to May 1, 1944)", quoted from *Grigoleit,* p. 135 and p. 144.

According to General Thomas, the equipment of 45 divisions of all types was lost in Stalingrad, while the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front had lost 50 divisions by then.6 The Battle of Stalingrad (November 1942-February 1943) cost the fascists 3,600 tank vehicles 7 - that was 150 percent of the new armored vehicles produced at the same time.8 On January 23, 1943, the diary keeper of the OKW (Wehrmacht command staff) noted that there were only 495 operational tanks left on the entire Eastern Front: 34 in Army Group A, 291 in Army Group A the Don and B Army Groups, 167 in the Center Army Group and 3 (!) in the North Army Group.9 Huge losses of artillery were recorded. Franz Halder's successor as Chief of the Army General Staff, General Kurt Zeitzier, complained about the "huge amount of army artillery" lying in Stalingrad.10 The Wehrmacht also lost large amounts of material in the subsequent retreats that winter. Goebbels compared the retreat route from Rostov to Taganrog with the sight of Dunkirk and noted it as a dismal experience "that in such retreats an enormous amount of material, especially heavy mater

6 *The Effects,* p. 167.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., p.278, table 104.

9 *KTB of the OKW,* vol. 3/1, p. 66, paper. Greiners v. 1/23 191.3. - The numbers probably only refer to armored fighting vehicles and are explained not only by combat losses, but also by high repair rates due to the effects of the weather, etc.

10 *Hitler's briefings.* The fragments of the minutes of his military conferences 1942-191.5. Edited by Helmut Heiber, Stuttgart 1962, p. 84, December 12, 1942. - According to Hubatsch, it was even "the mass of the army artillery", ie the artillery reserves that the O KH had at its disposal, which "remained in Stalingrad" *(KTB des OKW,* Vol. 3/2, p. 1602). There were mainly around 400 heavy guns *(DZW,* vol. 3, p. 93).

11 *Goebbels,* Diaries, p. 282, March 19, 1943.

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For units on the German-Soviet front, the figures for the 16th Army (Army Group North) as of January 1943 can **be viewed: carbines** 25 **percent, machine guns** 18 **percent, light grenade launchers** 24 **percent, heavy infantry guns** 33 **percent, heavy field howitzers** 26 **percent .12**

Table 14

Army losses May 1, 1942 to April 30, 1943 **Tanks and**

assault guns Other armored	**5500**	
vehicles Motor vehicles	**2500**	
including trucks and	**230000**	
tractors Cars Motorcycles		**110000**
		60000
		60000
Guns (without anti-tank guns)	**ti500**	
Pak	**2500**	
Grenade launcher	**8500**	
carbine	**420000**	

Source: DZW, **Vol. 3, p. 94.**

The Army's average monthly ammunition consumption increased in the period from May 1942 to **April** 1943 **compared to the previous period since June** 22 , 1941

Infantry cartridges	**- by 75 percent,**
Hand grenades	**- by 35 percent, - by**
2 cm anti-aircraft	**83 percent, - by 300**
grenades 8.8 cm anti-aircraft grenades	**percent, - by 900**
Anti-tank grenades (3.5 cm to 8.8 cm)	**percent.1211**

From May 1942 **to April** 1943, **the Luftwaffe lost a total of** 20,000 **aircraft 1 3** 8810 **in the period , of that from December 1,** 1942 **to April** 30 , 1943.14 **"The greatest losses were suffered by the air force, two thirds of which were on the German-Soviet front." 15 The total losses The fascist air transport fleet alone during the Battle of Stalingrad numbered almost** 800 **aircraft.16 The fascist leadership** " was **unable to see the defeat at Stalingrad as the beginning**

to recognize a qualitative change in the course of the war".17 However, it found itself forced to plan future operations from a defensive standpoint in order to give the Wehrmacht and the war economy the breathing space necessary to regain the hoped-for return of the strategic initiative. Considerations and explorations for a separate peace with the Western powers increased in leading circles of the regime.18 At the same time, the alternative was discussed

12 KTB of the OKW, **vol. 3/2, p. 1576. 12a**
Calculated according to DZW, **vol. 3, p. 94.**
13 DZW, **Vol. 3, p. 94.**
14 Groehler, **History of the Air War, p. 353.**
15 Ibid., p. 354.
16 Ibid., p. 353.
17 DZW, **Vol. 3, p. 517f.**
18 Ibid., p. 405ff.

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To temporarily end hostilities in the East with or without an armistice.19 To this end, Minister Speer had been urging Hitler since the beginning of February 1943 to "immediately begin preparing a line of fortifications in the East."20 This proposal, an "Ostwall"21, Similar to the Atlantic Wall, the underlying idea at that time was that behind it one could prepare - initially limited - offensive attacks and air force raids, but above all gain time to expand the war potential of the fascist-dominated "Fortress Europe", to make it fully usable for new wars of aggression.

The fascists saw the key problem in all of these plans and considerations as being to weaken the USSR so that it would no longer be capable of attacking on a large scale.22 So they ultimately concentrated their forces on a limited offensive in the central section of the German-Soviet front (Kursk), from which they had high hopes and which was intended to at least make the Red Army incapable of major offensive operations in the long term.

The plan to regain access to Caucasian oil from the Kuban bridgehead in the south as soon as possible was by no means abandoned.
Under these circumstances, the conception on which the armament programs of late 1942/early 1943 were based was as disjointed and unreal as the strategic conception of warfare. There was neither a full concentration on the army's armament and the needs of the German-Soviet front nor a clear decision between offensive and defensive armament.

The focus of armaments planning was tank armor. The "Adolf Hitler tank program" of January 22, 1943, calculated over a period of two years, contained the requirement to increase the production of tanks (tanks, assault guns and self-propelled guns) by around four times.

Hitler's demand for a longer-term tank program with ambitious goals dated from September 1942, a point in time when the fascists had to reckon that the war in the East would last at least through 1943. According to suggestions from those responsible at the Reich Ministry for Armament and Ammunition, this program envisaged an increase in production to 800 new-type tanks, 300 assault guns and 300 self-propelled guns per month by the spring of 1944, i.e. , in purely numerical terms, an increase of two and a half to three times the current production of armored vehicles.24 On December 2, 1942, Speer, Rohland and others told Hitler that this program - now already as

19 Ibid., p. 408; see memorandum by Richard Riedl about "The Russian Question", partly published in *Eichholtz, Dietrich, "* Paths to de-Bolshevization and de-Russification of the Eastern region". Recommendations of the IG Farben group for Hitler in the spring of 1943, in 1970, T. 2, p. 18ff. (hereinafter: "Ways to de-Bolshevization"); Mussolini's letter to Hitler v. March 9, 1943, reproduced. in *KTB of the OKW,* vol. 3/1, p. 213 (March 14, 1943); *DZW,* Vol. 3, p. 423.

20 FB, 6.-7. 2. 1943, point 46.

21 For the planned course of the "Ostwall" see *DZW,* vol. 4, p. 28ff.; ibid., vol. 3, map p. 576.

22 *Martin, Bernd,* Germany and Japan in the Second World War. From the attack on Pearl Harbor to the German surrender, Göttingen 1969, p. 275, Doc. 21, remarks by General Alfred Jodl to Japanese officers, April 18, 1943.

23 FB, 7.-9. 9. 1942, point 7.

24 monthly average III/1942 = 520 pieces; *The Effects,* p. 278, table 104. To the following Negotiations can be found there, p. 167f.

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"Adolf Hitler's tank program" was prominent in the draft - it required complex investment buildings, additional machines and large quantities of iron and other metals. Hitler pointed out to those present that "we must, under all circumstances, use these figures listed in the program “Tanks have to reach”. 26 “Tanks must be made,” he exclaimed, “at all costs!” 27 In mid-January 1943, when the catastrophe on the Volga became obvious, Hitler demanded "an improvement over the Adolf Hitler program" within just a few months and agreed to give Speer the necessary authority for "the immediate, comprehensive introduction of all "those measures" that "lead to an immediate increase in the output of armored fighting vehicles".28 The heads of tank production in the Armored Car Main Committee and in the companies considered the promise that Speer and Saur gave Hitler to be premature and frivolous.29 It took a few more days of apparently heated discussions before Hitler signed "the tank authorization for the increased Adolf Hitler program" 30, which had been agreed with all those involved in the meantime.

This "probe order" from Hitler of January 22, 1943 3 1 clearly bore the signature of Speer and Walter Rohland and represented a unique special authority for the Minister of Ammunition to date. The measures for the "immediate increase in tank production" - figures were not mentioned here - are "of such decisive importance for the outcome of the war that all civil and military departments must, in accordance with the instructions of the Reich Minister for Armament and Ammunition, strongly support this production with all available forces." The program was to be immediately " to supply an "abundant and generous" supply of workers, raw materials, machines and energy, "even if this temporarily impairs other, important production in the defense industry." Workers from tank production should no longer be conscripted, confiscations that have already taken place since December 18, 1942 should be reversed. Anyone who neglects the order

or neglected to comply, Hitler threatened persecution by the "People's Court".
The final figures for the “Adolf Hitler tank program” were as follows: At least 1,500 armored vehicles 32 were to be produced per month by late autumn 1943, and 2,100 33 by the end of 1944 .

These numbers were still significantly lower in the fall of 1943 and also at the end
not reached in 1944; but tank production was the deciding factor in 1943
Center of gravity of the armour. Huge new tank factories were built and put into operation

25 In addition to Speer and Rohland, Erich Müller (Krupp), Ferdinand Porsche (Volkswagenwerk) and presumably Karl-Otto Saur (Technical Office) were present.
26 FB, 1st-3rd 12. 191.2, point 13.
27 Ibid.
28 FB, January 18, 1943, point 1. According to Saur's notes, this "tank meeting" with Hitler took place on January 17, and not on January 18, 1943 (Saur, keywords, January 17, 1943).
29 Saur, keywords, January 17 and 18, 1943.
30 Ibid., January 22, 191i3.
31 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 4181i; hereafter also the following; said ibid, RVfg. RMfBuM, February 4, 1943.
32 ZP-P, January 26, 1943, 30th session.
33 The Effects, p. 168. Later (191.4) increased to 2800 (ibid., p. 169). - "End of 1944" probably means December; the monthly average for IV/1944 was 1955 units (FB, April 10, 19t,:J, point 11). Erroneous figures (3250 units for December 1944!) at We y res-1-'. l.el-'etzow, p. 78; inaccurate also DZW, vol. 3, p. 227.

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taken. Production almost doubled in terms of number of units and almost tripled in terms of tonnage compared to the previous year.34

The order of January 22 , 1943 drastically expanded the powers of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Munitions and its industrial organization by giving them the opportunity to intervene at any time in the other areas of armaments and the war economy as a whole and in the competencies of any civil and military departments.35 In doing so, he already foreshadowed future developments.

On the Wehrmacht side, since the appointment of an "Inspector General of the Armored Forces" (Colonel General Heinz Guderian) on February 28 , 194336 , the powers have also been concentrated in one place. By virtue of his function, Guderian largely eliminated the confusion of authority between the Army Weapons Office, the Army General Staff and OKW in the area of procurement, testing and deployment of the tanks and cooperated closely with the Minister of Ammunition and the leading tank producers. The production of tanks was not the only sector of army armament in which stocks were to be replenished through forced programs and “special actions” by the summer of 1943 at the latest. The “artillery program”37 and the “Aktion” were also considered extremely urgent Infantry ammunition."38 From mid-January onwards, a "violent action to rearm the eastern units"39, proposed by the army leadership and confirmed by Hitler, began, with the help of which the front of Army Group South was primarily intended to be stabilized: "The entire New production of armaments for army weapons and the entire production of motor vehicles until March 15th are available to the Eastern Army, insofar as they can be used at all." 40 For example, the entire German production of trucks with a payload of over 1 t went to the German-Soviet one Front.41

At the beginning of 1943, the air force and navy also urgently demanded new equipment and the restoration of their severely damaged combat effectiveness. The newly appointed commander-in-chief of the fascist navy, Admiral Karl Dönitz, implemented a “fundamental reconceptualization of the fleet construction program” 42 and demanded that Hitler and Speer “accelerate” a new fleet of submarines and light naval forces for submarine warfare to create which had to tie up enormous armaments potential.43

Terms like "violent action" and "special action" now appeared more frequently - a clear sign that despite increasing armament numbers, the losses in material

34 *The Effects,* p. 278, table 104; p. 279, table 105.

35 As far as the party departments were concerned, the head of the party chancellery was obliged, according to the decree, "in agreement with the Reich Minister for Armament and Ammunition" to ensure that they "provide the program with the fullest support in every respect" (see note 31).

36 *KTB of the OKW,* vol. 3/2, p. 1577.

37 FB, 13.-15. 5. 1943, point 29.

38 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 5382, ,,Overview of the development of the armaments industry in the area of the Armaments Inspection XII" (Wiesbaden) for IV1943.

39 *KTB of the OKW,* vol. 3/1, p. 39, January 14, 1943 and p. 204, March 11, 1943.

40 *DZW,* Vol. 3, p. 82; see ibid., p. 80ff.

41 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 1445813, Bl. 4, Decree RWiM, February 25, 1943.

42 *DZW,* Vol. 3, p. 140.

43 Ibid., p. 140ff.

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were larger or almost as large as production, so that in this respect the Wehrmacht lived from hand to mouth and had stable stocks or even larger ones
Stocks of weapons and equipment, as in the times of the “Blitzkrieg”, are no longer available were.

Later, in the final phase of the war, such "violent actions" and the corresponding "special representatives" and economy determined; “ Commissioners" the image of the German armaments in 1943 they were still the exception. However, the crisis on the Volga already gave rise to the prototype of such an action, namely the "Rapid Action Supply Drop Containers" - canister bombs of 1000 kg and 250 kg gross weight 44, intended to supply the troops encircled in Stalingrad. The action ordered by Hitler According to the Minister of Ammunition's decree of January 24, "until March 15, it had priority over all levels of urgency1 keywords and special actions of all parts of the Wehrmacht, including the tank program"45 and was personally headed by the Chief of Air Armaments, Field Marshal Milch. Speer appointed Philipp Keßler (AEG Group), one of his trusted employees and the most renowned organizer, as his special representative and placed him alongside Milch. The project, which was only put into motion in mid-January,46 when the situation in Stalingrad was already hopeless for the aggressors, probably served its organizers more as a fig leaf and was a testament to

their inability to face the inevitable catastrophe.

b) The war economy concept
in the “ Totakn war"

In view of the catastrophe that befell the 6th Army on the Volga, the regime's ruling circles were forced to mobilize new forces on a large scale to wage the war. At the end of December 1942, a narrower circle around Hitler, who was responsible for the "initially reduced pace"47 of this mobilization, switched to the course of "total war", which was largely advocated by Goebbels, Speer, Milch and others.48 They had during the The Battle of Stalingrad became convinced that the regime's victory was no longer certain unless a significantly increased effort was made in economic and military terms, as well as in domestic and foreign policy.

concept of - long practiced “Totalen war"49 The who have been invaded

1.4 FB, January 18, 1943, point 11.

45 BA Koblenz, R 41/140, decree of. January 24, 1943. - According to a decree from the RMfBuM the day before, the tank program was still "with the same urgency" (ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 4184).

46 *Speer,* Memories, p. 264.

47 DZW, Vol. 3, p. 179.

48 Ibid., p. 179 ff.; see *Speer,* Memories, p. 267 ff.

49 The fascist military theorists (1939) defined the characteristics of "total war" as follows: "totality of the participation of all layers of the population in the war, totality of the coverage of all the basis of a people's existence and totality of leadership and the use of all means of war" (quoted in *Förster,* Total War and Blitzkrieg, p. 76; see also there, p. 67 ff.; also *Bleyer, Wolfgang,* State and Monopolies in Total War. The state monopoly power apparatus and the "total mobilization" in the first half of 1943, Berlin 1970 (in follow-den: Total War), p. 9ff.

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and subjugated peoples - should be applied to one's own people as a whole. It amounted to a thorough strengthening of the military and war economy potential, especially the human and labor potential, and to the intensification of the terror against expressions of growing discontent and against any oppositional movement. It also included a wave of propaganda, combined with demagogically exploited restrictions on public life, and, last but not least, a more intensive, systematic exploitation of the occupied territories; However, the regime's actions suffered from contradictory objectives and the varying consistency with which its leading representatives initiated and carried them out. The management of the "total" mobilization was also inconsistent and without clear authority. The military crisis and the
personnel and material losses that had occurred highlighted the dependence of the conduct of the war on the functioning of the war economy. At the same time, given the superiority of the anti-Hitler coalition, the The limitations of Hitler's Germany's war economic possibilities became clearer than ever.

The fulfillment of the new armaments programs depended on three material factors: on the industrial capacities, on the raw materials and on the labor available for them. A fourth factor of great importance for the procurement or better use of the three mentioned was the penetration and effectiveness of the state monopoly organization of the war economy, which again depended significantly on the degree of concentration of regulatory power.
The crucial problems lay in the growing shortage of workers, especially skilled workers in armaments, and in the limited capacity for the production of certain raw materials, especially iron and steel. The "Special Collection" (SE)
The action of January 1943 **broke the protective clauses of the "key workers" decrees of** February 19 **and October** 3 , 1942; **among the** 800,000 **new draftees who had to be recruited by the end of March** 1943 , **there were** 200,000 **skilled and key workers from the**
armaments industry. 51 Under these circumstances, no radical change could be expected without far-reaching political decisions. With the participation of Bormann, Keitel, Speer, Goebbels, Sauckel and others, after a violent tug of war, especially between the military and the representatives of the armaments sector, which jeopardized their need for skilled workers saw the unpublished Hitler decree of January 13 , 1943 **come into being.52 He called for the mobilization of all men and women "whose labor power is not or not fully utilized for these purposes (the defense of the Reich - DE)." for the Wehrmacht and the armaments industry, wit**
The "retraining and training of replacement workers" for the defense industry should be "carried out as a precautionary measure in the long term and on an ongoing, generous basis." The general representative

50 See **DZW,** Vol. 3, Chapter. 3 (see pp. 206ff.). - Thomas complained in his report (1944) that the measures to carry out total war in 1943 had been "taken drop by drop" (Thomas, p. 159).

51 Ibid., p. 188, p. 212. For the key worker decrees, see p. 196 ff.

52 Ibid., p. 185 ff.; **The second World War.** Documents, Doc. 42, p. 186 ff., "Decree of the Führer on the comprehensive use of men and women for tasks of Reich defense" dated January 13, 1943 (hereinafter also the following). Detailed documentation of the creation of the decree in ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, film 19481.

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The Reich Economics Minister was supposed to ensure that companies were closed down in favor of the war economy. The decree initiated the first major wave of the measures of the fascist power apparatus, which, accompanied by strong propaganda pressure to mobilize the German population "totally" for the war. 53 **On January 26, 1943, the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition opened the 30th meeting of Central**

Planning with the declaration that the "situation in the East" was "on

Armaments production in the Reich has had extremely serious consequences East in planes, tanks, guns, etc., in some way; if we had done this a year ago, we would now have the plus to increase our striking power. Now we need the plus to maintain our defensive capability.

Unfortunately that is a big difference. You can't make up for what you missed. But the fact is that now the last moment has come when it even makes sense to do that."

The "most pressing question at the moment" is "the activation of the entire economy in favor of the arms industry"; this was the essence of his analysis. "There is no doubt that in order to be able to continue the war with Russia successfully, we need to intensify our entire arms industry. This requires us to send soldiers outside. This requires us to bring new German workers, including unskilled workers, into the companies; because I cannot replace all the soldiers we have to give away with foreigners. The German ceiling is simply becoming too low. We're already having one failure after another in the production of grenades and we don't know where it's coming from. Cases of sabotage can occur. The measures that must be taken to transfer at least a million Germans into the armaments industry are extremely harsh and, in my opinion, will practically depress the entire standard of living of the upper class."

However, as it soon became clear, the "upper class" in fascist Germany did not allow their standard of living to be affected. Above all, however, it was general domestic political reasons that gave rise to the "efforts to initiate "total war" in Germany in the following months encountered considerable resistance and revealed clear limits to the fascist "mobilization" of the people.55 Although the Minister of Ammunition had no direct influence on the forced mobilization of German workers, he and the circles of monopoly capital grouped around his ministry strived for a foresighted one Conception represents the most radical possible realization of the maxim of "total war," which Speer had apostrophized as "activation of the entire economy in favor of the armaments industry." The defeats of the winter of 1942/43 also provided the decisive impetus for far-reaching changes in the state-monopoly power structure Mechanism of the German war economy that those forces implemented over the course of 1943 and which culminated in the autumn of that year.

53 For details on workforce policy and situation, see p. 226 ff.
54 ZP-P, January 26, 1943, 30th session; hereafter also the following.
55 *Bleyer,* Total War, passim (bsd. Chapter 3); *Speer,* Memories, p. 267 ff.

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Although the above-mentioned concept only came into full effect after the final fiasco of the German offensive strategy in the summer of 1943, the following basic features of it had already been clearly evident since the beginning of the year, when those circles began to expect "that the Russian war will continue for a considerably longer period of time than we imagined"56: 1) "Intensification of our entire arms industry"57 through profound rationalization; 2) Further concentration of regulatory power in the war economy; Consolidation of the ministerial apparatus and the "self-responsibility" organization of the armaments industry as the bearer of this regulatory power; 3) Summary of the "European" armaments potential under the leadership of the central war economy bodies me

Capitalist rationalization

The ideas of the ammunition minister and the armaments monopolies of a „profound rationalization of war production corresponding to "total war" consisted of a) concentrating production much more than before in the so-called best companies, b) suitable workers for armaments from the closure of large ones parts of the consumer goods industry and ineffective companies in other areas of the commercial economy and trade and o) to improve the technological level of production, especially by simplifying and standardizing products and processes.

for these demands in the „"Total war" was just as patriotic as it was profitable arms monopoly. Of course, they are directed exclusively against weaker, especially small and medium-sized companies and, once put into practice, had to be recognized in the affected social strata of the bourgeoisie (small and medium-sized capitalist companies) and the commercial middle class (crafts, trade) caused increasing dissatisfaction to arise; but economically and militarily, the ruling class saw its implementation as indispensable for regaining the initiative on the German-Soviet front and ending the war victoriously . Production should now be concentrated in the best companies with greater consistency than in 1942. While in 1942 the best companies were expected above all to set an example - although the decrees of the Ministry of Munitions always mentioned the closure of less effective companies in their favor - and from the committees and rings, the production experiences and methods to disseminate and generalize the best companies, the emphasis now shifted significantly. "Through specialization alone," Speer urged the heads of the committees and rings on January 15, 1943, "and an even stronger transition to large-scale production, concentrated in as few companies as possible, the loss of skilled workers who were previously considered indispensable can be compensated for ... It will therefore not be possible to avoid ordering the closure of smaller and inefficient companies and to direct the released workers to specialized, best-in-class companies." 58

56 ZP-P, February 12, 1943, 32nd session (Speer's statement).

57 ZP-P, January 26, 1943, 30th session.

58 *News from the RMfBuM,* No. 19, February 8, 1943, RErl. Regarding "Intensification of committee and ring activities", January 15, 1943.

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There had been closures of companies in the war economy since the outbreak of the war , especially when the employees of such companies were drafted into the Wehrmacht - as was the case with smaller trading and craft companies - or when raw materials and...

Raw materials for production were largely reduced, for example in the spirits industry.59 But now, with the “total war,” large-scale shutdowns became an essential part of the war economy strategy and an indispensable vehicle for rationalization.

At a time when, on the one hand, 200,000 workers previously employed by the U.K. were drafted from the armaments industry, but on the other hand, the fascist leadership expected significant increases in production, the problem of supplying the armaments factories with workers, especially skilled workers, became acute Stage.
Radical solutions were obvious. For example, representatives of the Ministry of Ammunition and its main committees argued before the Bavarian Chamber of Commerce on February 16, 1943, "the second and third shifts in the best companies must be fully utilized"; for this purpose, "the unsuitable or uneconomical shifts must be used." "Companies are relocated to the best companies". The existing situation must be changed, whereby, depending on the size of the company, "for every 200 people there are five toolmakers and for five people there is one toolmaker." Other options mentioned were: " taking away machines, merging them into larger companies." 60 The regulations of the "Three Men's College" of January
29th, of the Reich Economics Minister of January 30th and March 16th and the circulars of the Minister of Ammunition of January 15th and February 23rd, 194361 formed the legal basis for the still -laying action in the first half of 1943, which was carried out with great effort - including propaganda -. Nevertheless, its overall result remained below the expectations of its initiators.62 In industry, both the Reich Minister of Economics took part in the Reich offices as well as the Reich Minister for Armament
and ammunition via the committees and rings. The Reich offices, in coordination with the economic and specialist groups, issued bans on the manufacture of a large number of goods or on the use of certain raw materials and named those companies that should be closed.

The state economic offices issued the closure instructions. Originally, the closure of the Reich offices was supposed to be completed by mid-April 1943.63 The committees and rings, on the other hand, had their closure proposals coordinated by the district chairmen (arms supply office) with the district economic advisors; The companies received the closure notice from the Reich Defense Commissioner. If differences arose with the Gauleiter/Reich Defense Commissioner, the Armaments Commission of the Minister of Ammunition decided.

The coordination of the operation was extremely poor. The committees and rings work.

59 See the information in *Faingar, _[. M.,* The development of German monopoly capital Floor plan, Berlin 1959, p. 31.

60 BA Koblenz, R 41/234, Prot. (February 18) d. Meeting of the district representatives of the RMfBuM at the industrial department. the Bavarian Chamber of Commerce on February 16, 1943.

61 *RGBl.* 1943 1, p. 75f., "Ordinance on the release of workers for missions essential to the war effort" dated January 29, 1943 (Lammers/Bormann/Keitel); ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 9014 (RWiM decree); BA Koblenz, R 3 /1846 (decree RMfBuM).

62 For an analysis of the results of the campaign, see p. 230 ff.

63 *Bl,eyer,* Total War, p. 106.

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"very quickly", while at most Reich offices "the matter was in flux" and only "on average (to) 50 percent completed" by the middle of the year.6' Here too, similar to the application of the the reporting and work obligation - the domestic political concerns of leading circles of regime and the resistance was considerable, which was provided primarily by departments of the fascist party and regional authorities, but also by key representatives of the propaganda and interior ministries. The ammunition ministry with its "self-responsibility -"Or lays the most rigorous emphasis on consistent enforcement of the G anen urged in view of the arms decommissioning regulations.
At the same time, by withdrawing orders and material quotas, the committees and rings had the most effective means of creating a fait accompli on the basis of the regulations and the closure instructions based on the "hard war necessities"65.

On June 21, 1943, in a speech to the Gauleiters, Speer reprimanded them for their resistance to the decommissioning, which he also justified to them by saying that the armaments had to be relocated from air-threatened areas, especially from the Ruhr area. "The Gauleiter and the authorities of the Gauleitung were consulted before the decommissioning, but from now on the decision will be made here at the headquarters."66 If necessary, he threatened, this decision would be enforced with comprehensive quota blocks for material. 67 The "Decree on the Closing of Unrationally Operating Arms
Industry Plants" which was prepared by the Minister of Ammunition with regard to this situation and presented to Hitler for signature on June 28, 1943, used radical language. This - in clear reference to Speer's call for the "intensification of committee and ring activity" of January 15th - not only ordered the closure of companies "that do not fully or predominantly fulfill the tasks of the war economy", but it also said, "that even non-rationally operating companies in the armaments industry ... should be shut down if necessary in order to be able to direct the freed up workforce to specialized, best-industry companies."68 At the end of July, Speer promised Hitler that by shutting down larger companies in the consumer goods industry or through their Transformation into armaments
factories, 500,000 men with production experience - as well as factory space, machines and managerial staff - were to be recruited for armaments 69 ; the prerequisite for this, however, was that the relevant powers were transferred from the Reich Economics Minister's area to his ministry.

The technical and technological problems of rationalization 70 concerned such important questions as type limitation, series size, standardization and so-called refinement. Since the time of Fritz Todt, the Ministry of Munitions and its industrial "self-responsibility" organization have made concerted efforts to solve these problems.

New fields of activity opened up for the defense companies' rationalization specialists

64 BA Koblenz, R 7/2218, AN RWiM, 2L 6. 1943.
65 *B/,eyer,* Total War, p. 107.
66 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1740.
67 Ibid.
68 ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, Film 19481, Hitler Erl. v, June 28, 1943. See also BA Koblenz, R 3/1846, AN RMfRuK (Scheid) v. June 12, 1944.
69 *Speer,* Memories, p. 287 (July 26, 1943).
70 See p. 302 ff.

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the formation of further development commissions at the Ministry of Ammunition. A motor vehicle commission began its work on December 1, 1942 and was established on June 10
a radio measurement commission and a shipbuilding commission were formed on July 22, 1943. The
Motor Vehicle Commission under the acting leadership of Colonel Holzhäuer,
a technical military, close cooperation with the main
Committee for Armored and Traction Vehicles and with the Tank Commission. The
At the same time, the main committees for tanks and motor vehicles became functional through joint quota offices and "planning communities" for engines, transmissions, etc
and intertwined in terms of personnel. At the same time as the founding of the motor vehicle

Table 15

Development Commissions of the Reich Minister for Armament and Ammunition (or for Armaments and War Production)

Commission	Director	Founding date
Tank Commission	Ferdinand Porsche (Volkswagen factory) since December 1943: Gerd Stieler v. Heydekampf (Henschel)	June 21, 1941
Weapons Commission (also: gun commission)	Erich Müller (croup)	April 2, 1942
Ammunition Commission	Albert Wolff (DWM)	April 2, 1942 July
Powder and Explosives Commission	Paul Müller (Dy n ami t Nobel)	1, 1942
News Media Commission	Karl Küpfmüller (Siemens & Halske)	August 21, 1942
Motor Vehicle Commission	Obstlt. Holzhäuer	November 19, 1942 (as of December 1st)
Commission for Observation and Fire Control Equipment	Waldemar Petersen (AEG)	December 18, 1942
Development Commission Long distance shooting	Waldemar Petersen (AEG)	March 1943
Commission for radio measurement technology	Karl Küpfmüller (Siemens & Halske)	(10th) June 1943
Shipbuilding Commission (with sub-commission for merchant shipbuilding)	Vice Admiral Topp	July 22, 1943
Main Commission for Electrical Engineering (as a committee of several commissions)	Friedrich Lüschen (Siemens & Halske) Deputy: Hans Heyne (AEG)	(Jan.?) March 1944
Main Development Commission Airplanes	Roluf Lucht (Messerschmitt) Deputy: Karl Fr y dag (HenscheVHeinkel)	September 15, 1944
Main Development Commission machinery	Oskar Stamm (Schwarzkopff) (Deputy Karl Lange)	January 6, 1945

Source: Dating according to various sources (News ***from the RMf BuM; Chronicle of the RMf BuM,*** etc.).

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Commission, an "Advisory Board for Motorization at GB-Rüst" was formed.71 The radio measurement commission headed by Karl Küpfmüller (board member of Siemens & Halske AG) was given a different, much narrower task: by combining the research and development capacities to introduce radio measurement technology into the German air defense system in the quickest and most rational way, and thus an important means, especially for defending against the Allied bomber fleets.72 Through an order from the head of the RGI on "Technical Committees for the Economic Groups" dated March 1 , 1943, the economic groups, "if they do not exist, technical committees have been set up for all production operations that are still in operation that are not currently being looked after in committees or circles of the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition",73 the technical instructions on Zangen's behalf from the Niche department "Reichsgruppe Industrie" should receive. This meant that the organizational form of the „tech rationalization work in the entire industry that was not part of the defense sector was aligned with that in the defense industry. Weyres greatly exaggerates and judges one-sidedly when he sees Zangen's order as "a last attempt" to "shield the economic groups from further proliferation of committees and rings."74 The RGI, which has been closely linked to the apparatus of the Ministry of Ammunition and without whose conceptual and personnel support the organization of "self-responsibility" in the armaments industry was not at all conceivable, it rather prepared the further concentration of power at the Ministry of Ammunition - albeit at the expense of its own supervisory authority, namely the Reich Ministry of Economics .

Further concentration of regulatory power

The Wehrmacht's attack plans for the summer of 1943 were closely linked to the fulfillment of the army's armament programs, especially the tank program.
In the form of the extraordinarily far-reaching authority that was linked to the “Adolf Hitler tank program,” the Minister of Ammunition had a means of pressure in his hands, which he used without inhibitions to prevent his ideas of “total war” from the further concentration of the G" and To realize regulatory power in the war economy.

He initially made significant new incursions into the Wehrmacht's sphere of influence. On January 18 , 1943 , he persuaded Hitler that selected officers who were reliable in the interests of the ministry would remain in office during the planned major reduction in the number of personnel in the Army Weapons Office.75 Speer's policy will have contributed to the relationship between the HWA and its ministry soon "satisfactorily clarified" 76.

71 *News from the RilffBuM,* No. 16, December 16, 1942, issue RMfBuM v. November 19, 1942.
72 According to *Ludwig,* Technik, p. 247, the radio measurement commission, similar to other development commissions, did not succeed in "coordinating its work results with those of the research groups that were working for the Navy, the Air Force or the SS at the same time." .
73 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 9086, p. 372f., "Basic arrangement" Zangens, March 1, 1943.
74 So *Weyres-P. Le11etzow,* p. 99. For the relationship between RGI and RMfBuM, see also p. 113 ff.
75 FB, January 18, 1943, point 22.
76 FB, April 10, 1943, point 1.

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The Minister of Ammunition **used the final resignation of General Thomas as head of the Armaments Office on November 17,** 1942 **77 and the reduction of the OKW's Military Economics Office to a "military economics staff" on February** 28 , 1943 **78 under a new boss - to give his ministry numerous areas of responsibility and work areas of the previous military economics office or the military economics staff.**

His first demand was the most serious. It touched the nervus rerum of the Wehrmacht's armor. At the end of January 1943, **Karl Maria Hettlage, who, as general advisor for economics and finance, was equal to the head of the ministry, urged the OKW to "hand over the price inspection system from the OKW/Wi Office to the Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions or to the Wehrmacht parts" _79 Keitel quickly resigned: "Now that developments have gone this way, I no longer cling to the price review, even though my responsibility to the finance minister required my membership in OKW. For my sake, this organization may also fall apart! I am no longer interested!" 80 But it still took almost a quarter of a year before he signed a decree according to which the contract and price review department in the military economic staff was transferred to the Ministry of Munitions with effect from May 1st.81 This was a success of fundamental importance for the armaments monopolies . From now on, the ministerial apparatus they controlled and thus - in a much more direct sense than before - they themselves were responsible for monitoring and checking their price calculations and for controlling their profits.**

The minister had less success with a frontal attack on the Wehrmacht's procurement offices. On **March** 6 , 1943, **Hitler signed a decree that was intended to implement a "combined uniform procurement for the three branches of the Wehrmacht"82, and on June 26 he once again expressed his approval of the "proposal"83 for uniform procurement. But it was not possible to bring together the procurement offices of the Wehrmacht parts under the leadership of the ministry; Only the area of work "Procurement of commercially available equipment for the troops" was transferred from the military economics staff to the ministry.!¼ In addition, over the course of the months, it or its middle authority incorporated numerous other areas and departments from the domestic department of the military economics staff, including protection of companies including factory security and factory air protection, draft protection, defense issues, patent and licensing issues, raw material management, relocation of arms orders to neutral countries.85**

77 ***Thomas,*** p. 315.

78 **Ibid., p.** 369 **(with effect from** March 1). **For the history of the formation of the military economic staff (since** January 15, 1943) **see ZStA Potsdam, FS, film** 1828 **and film** 1784.

79 **ZStA Potsdam, FS, film** 1784, **lecture notes WWiAmt f. Keitel,** February 5, 1943.

80 **Ibid., Marginale Keitel,** February 6, 1943 **(hs.).**

81 **Ibid., film** 1828, **decree of Keitel v.** April 30, 1943; **see ibid., Joint decree by Speer and Keitel, regarding "Reorganization of pricing for armaments contracts",** April 10, 1943; ***Thomas,*** p. 371.

82 **FB,** March 6, 1943, **point** 22.

83 **FB,** June 26, 1943, **point** 4.

84 ***Thomas,*** p. 368; ***Germany's armament in the Second World War,*** p. 237.

85 ***Thomas,*** **p.** 368; **ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film** 5381, **OKW decrees from.** July 7 **and** 21, 1943.

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A fundamental change in the balance of power in favor of the group around the Ministry of Munitions took place in the area of naval armaments. On January 30, 1943, Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz took over command of the Navy. From the beginning he sought closer cooperation with the Minister of Munitions in order to remedy the plight of the naval armament, whose iron quota had been significantly reduced in December 1942 86 and which was suffering from a shortage of supplied parts. In the spring of 1943 there were agreements between Speer and Dönitz in which the transfer of command over naval armaments to the Ministry of Munitions was discussed.87 In March Hitler gave his fundamental consent to this.SB But the resistance of the Admiralty delayed the further course of events well into July, when the catastrophic submarine losses and the general military and armament situation finally left the naval chiefs no other choice.

First, on May 4th, Dönitz spoke as a guest of the Central Planning Department about the bleak prospects for naval warfare, especially submarine warfare, in view of the now overwhelming Allied defense forces and demanded "the naval contingent of iron that was in the last quarter of the year 180,000 t should be increased to 230,000 t",89 If - he explained - the submarine construction program is not "increased under all circumstances with the greatest possible speed", then one day this submarine weapon will have to be used
will be crushed by the defense". Furthermore: "... if we don't suddenly pull out our large escort vehicle plan of minesweepers, barrier breakers and speedboats with the greatest speed, then in six months at the latest we will experience the greatest catastrophe there is".

The catastrophe came faster than expected. The "troubles" in Tunis, largely caused by the "missing sea connection between Tunis and Italy"90, ended on May 12 , 1943 with the surrender of almost 240,000 German and Italian troops.91 On May 24 , the naval command was suspended because of the Due to the sharply increased own losses, all group attacks by submarines on Allied convoys had to be canceled and the North Atlantic and the Allied convoy routes had to be evacuated.92 “The large-scale attempt to successfully wage the oceanic supply war against Great Britain and the USA with the help of submarines had failed ."93 In May the number of casualties shot up to almost 20 percent of the total number of front-line submarines, thereby documenting "the crisis into which submarine warfare has fallen."94

86 *Janssen,* p. 110; *DZW,* Vol. 3, p. 140.

87 *DZW,* vol. 3, p. 237ff.; *Janssen,* p. 111 (without citing the source): "That's why Dönitz approached Speer in March with the request to take responsibility for the naval armament." In fact, a circular from Speer dated March 10th, describing "disruptions" to the U-boat -Production was to be switched off and contained the significant note: "In addition, it is to be expected that advance deliveries, sub-deliveries and sub-deliveries for submarine production will shortly increase by at least 30 percent." (ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 1828). On the other hand, see *Speer,* Erinne-rungen, p. 285 (gives approximately April/May as the date of such agreements).

88 *Janssen,* p. 111.

89 ZP-P, May 4, 1943, 40th session; hereafter also the following.

90 Ibid.

91 *DZW,* Vol. 3, p. 132.

92 Ibid., p. 149!.

93 *Förster, Gerhard/ Helmert, Heinz/ Schnitter, Helmut,* The Second World War. Military history Abriß, 2nd edition, Berlin 1974, p. 243.

94 *KTB desOKW,* Vol. 312, p. 1439, Doc. 17, excerpt from the KTB of the Naval War Command, June 8, 1943.

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Table 16

Submarine losses of the Kriegsmarine January to August 1943

Period	Number of boats	Period	Number of boats
January	6	May	41
February	19	June	17
March	15	July	37
April	15	August	25

Source: DZW, Vol. 3, p. 150 (graphic).

Now the conferences chased each other.95 In the "leader's meeting" on June 26, Speer informed Hitler about Dönitz and his plan to take over the naval armament in his ministry. "The Führer would welcome it," he noted afterwards, "if the naval program were taken over by us." 96 Three days later, he and Dönitz transferred the naval armament program - the so-called impotence program 97 - to the Main Committee for Shipbuilding, for which Speer appointed a new head in the form of Otto Merker, board member of Klöckner-Humboldt-Deutz AG (Klöckner Group). , had ordered.98 After the conference with the Admiralty on July 5th that sealed this "Dönitz-Speer Pact"99, at which Merker already presented his concept for a new series construction system and impressive production figures for the future 10 0 was also " The most sensitive point among the minister's demands for the main committee was implemented: "the sole management of the shipyards and the provision for repairs". 101 On July 22, 1943, Dönitz and Speer fixed their agreements in a "joint decree". 102 Afterwards, in addition to the main shipbuilding committee, a development commission for shipbuilding (shipbuilding commission) was formed, which, in addition to the head, who was to be named by the commander-in-chief of the navy, ten experts from the ammunition minister's area, including Merker, and six representatives of the navy should belong. From now on, a number of departments in the Main Office of Warship Construction in the OKM were technically subordinate to the Minister of Ammunition. The main shipbuilding committee received

95 *Chronicle of the RMfBuM,* 1943 I, p. 73f. and 109H. (May; June/July 1943).

96 FB, 6/26 191.3, point 27.

97 *Chronicle of the RMfBuM,* 1943 I, page 122.

98 Ibid., p. 109f., June 29, 1943. - Merker was chairman of the board of Magirus-Werke AG, another company in the Klöckner Group. He soon also took over management of the shipbuilding business group (from Rudolf Blohm). In the “self-responsibility” apparatus of the armaments industry, he was previously head of the fire-fighting equipment working committee in the main mechanical engineering committee.

99 *Chronicle of the RMfRuK,* 1944 I, page 85 (May 1944).

100 Speer, Memories, p. 286.

101 *Chronicle of the RMfBuM,* 1943 I, page 115, July 5, 1943.

102 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 418, "Joint decree of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine and the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition", regarding "Implementation of the fleet construction program 1943", July 22, 1943. Hereafter also the following. -.Speer, Memories, p. 287, incorrectly states July 23rd as the signing date.

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express authority for the “control of the entire production”. “Navy departments no longer have the right to intervene in production.”

The ambitions of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition, however, went much further in line with the concept of "activating the entire economy for the benefit of the armaments industry." The more "totally" the entire economy was made subservient to armaments, the more separate administration appeared to the circles around the Minister of Ammunition and regulation of the area of so-called civil production by the Reich Ministry of Economics as an inhibiting circumstance. The tendency to maintain civilian production, it seemed to those responsible at the ministry, could not be prevented effectively enough, civilian production capacities and industrial raw materials could not be used consistently enough for armaments, and sufficient workers could not be gained through rigorous shutdowns, as long as this separation of the Economy, at least the industrial or commercial economy, in the civil and defense sectors remained.

As early as the first half of June 1943, discussions about this took place between leading representatives of the Ministry of Munitions and Hans Kehr! instead of 103, the most influential man in the Reich Ministry of Economics at the time, who, as Speer put it immediately after the war, "was practically my man in the Ministry of Economics" 104. The discussions were certainly conducted confidentially at first, but they soon progressed to the point where that on June 26th between Speer and Hitler - according to Speer's transcript - "the question of taking over the entire production from the Ministry of Economic Affairs to us was discussed for information purposes." “The Führer,” Speer continued, “would agree to such a measure.” 105

A month later, the Minister of Ammunition announced to his heads of office in the presence of Kehrl that on July 26th he had received Hitler's final approval for the integration of civilian production from the Reich Economics Ministry into the Ministry of Ammunition: "The Führer has agreed that the entire production will be carried out by the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition and the civilian production that has so far been maintained is being ruthlessly restricted and throttled, with the exception of the products that are absolutely essential for the war effort and other essential supplies... A concentration of everyone that the Minister has long considered necessary Forces should now be carried out by combining all departments and institutions concerned with production and the entire war economy." 106

This euphoric interpretation of the "leader's decision" took hold of the matter far ahead of events; Hitler also issued a decree that the Reichswirt had previously

103 *Chronicle of the RM(BuM,* 1943 I, p. 89f. - These early discussions remain unmentioned in *Kehrl,* p. 298 (ff.), who deliberately tone down his activity in this regard; see also there, p. 310ff.

104 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 3568, Speer's interrogation, May 17, 1945: "Unofficially, Kehrl also belonged to the ministry, who was practically my husband in the Ministry of Economic Affairs."

105 FB, June 26, 1943, point 28.

106 *Chronil, of the RIvl(BuM,* 1943 I, pages 123 and 125, July 27, 1943. - Colonel Dornberger, head of the A 4 project, claims to have observed during his visit to the Führer's headquarters at the beginning of July 1943, "How here, in this alcohol-filled atmosphere, a power struggle that had been raging for months between the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Ammunition was decided in favor of Speer" *(Dornberger, Walter,* V 2 - The shot into space, Eßlingen (1958), p. 117.)

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The production areas regulated by the Minister of Finance were not handed over to the Minister of Ammunition until September 2, 1943. He initiated a comprehensive reorganization of the state-monopolistic regulatory apparatus in the war economy, but did not fulfill the high hopes of the Speer Ministry that had obviously been harbored in June/July.

Efforts to combine "European economic and armaments capacity"

The occupied countries were also included in the war economy concept of "total mobilization". From the beginning, the occupied territories had functioned as a reservoir of forced labor and were subject to methods of maximum, short-term economic plunder, especially of their raw materials (in the form of loot and through overexploitation), particularly important machines and mechanical equipment. The German orders to the industry of Western European and some other occupied countries, on the other hand, were overall disproportionate to their potential economic performance. The German arms companies and major banks pursued their policy undeterred economic "penetration" and financial-capitalist subjugation of the countries within its sphere of influence, especially in southeastern Europe; The desolate economic situation in the occupied countries made this plan easier for them.

Under the impression of the crisis on the German-Soviet front, key representatives of the ruling class in Germany became increasingly dissatisfied with the economic results of the occupation policy to date. At the turn of the year 1942/43, there was a growing concern, particularly in circles in the Wehrmacht and the armaments industry, that they might be tied down by a strong enemy in the East for years to come. The head of the Army Weapons Office, General Emil Leeb, feared that in the long term German industry would not be able to compete in the "race between the armament of the enemy states and ours" with the existing means and would "fall dangerously behind". 10 7 During this time, a series of often far-reaching demands emerged for a uniform "European" economic planning, a "European armaments program" and an effective mobilization of the "European" economic reserves by extending rationalization to the "European economic and armaments capacity" .108

The ruling circles were increasingly looking for practical political solutions.

Developing new foreign policy ideas and making certain changes in the occupation policy now seemed to many to be unavoidable, both in order to "make the European economy crisis and blockade-proof in the future" i09 , as Reich Economics Minister Funk demanded, and, above all, in order to increase the willingness to collaborate. to strengthen society in the occupied countries, to politically disorient the opposition forces and to weaken the anti-fascist resistance movement.

Characteristic of the "Europe plans" that emerged in this phase were the

107 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 2324, Leeb's "Memorandum on 'European Armaments Concentration'" dated December 1, 1942; partly printed in Anatomy of War, p. 412 ff., Doc. 218.

108 Ibid.

109 articles by Walther Funk in the DAZ v. November 29, 1942, quoted there.

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The Foreign Office's work on a "European Confederation of States".110 Ribbentrop's ideas amounted to the German side "creating the European Confederation of States in a very concrete form as soon as possible, namely as soon as we have recorded a significant military success) proclaim" 111, which should initially include Germany, Italy, France, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, Greece and Spain as members. The political and economic objectives of the project were spoken of without further ado: "There will be a strong calming and tensioning of the forces for our war in these countries." Especially in the occupied countries, the project should serve to increase their war economic effectiveness increase; it would "work both in France and elsewhere in the occupied territories in the direction that these countries would undoubtedly contribute to the war effort in a completely different way in terms of personnel and material than before."112 The circles made more direct and determined efforts to the Reich Ministry for Armament and Ammunition to solve the problem of exploiting the productive potential of the occupied territories more completely, rationally and permanently.

The minister focused his energy on getting the crucial powers into his hands. In the summer/ autumn of 1942, he was able to build up the core of his own ministerial armaments organization in France from the inheritance that the armaments office brought into the ministry. He took over armaments inspections in the Protectorate and the General Government as his area of responsibility and carried them out here and in the occupied ones Soviet areas, so to speak, undermined the economic policy positions of Göring and the respective occupation authorities.113 Now, during the Stalingrad crisis, he pushed for a consistent and comprehensive solution to the problem. At the beginning of January 1943, he had Hitler promise him "that all questions relating to the use of France's industrial strength for armaments would be controlled directly by the Ministry of Armaments and Ammunition."114 With this bargaining chip he managed to get Göring to give him a few days later, on January 10th, transferred his powers to utilize the armaments capacities of all occupied territories: "The General Plenipotentiary for Armaments (GB-Rüst) and Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition has the use of all possibilities to increase the German armaments potential in the occupied areas to carry out everything to the last by every means." 115 For this purpose, the GB Rüst was given express authority to issue instructions to the military commanders and Reich Commissioners.

With effect from February 1, 1943, as before in France, the Protectorate and the General Government, also in Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark, the armaments organization of the OKW was transferred to the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition.116 The Armaments Staff (France; Denmark), armaments commissions

110 See also *DZW,* Vol. 3, p. 409ff.

111 AN Ribbentrops v. March 21, 1943, quoted from the *concept for the "reorganization" of the world,* p. 103.

112 Ibid., p. 103 f.

113 See p. 92ff.

114 FB, 3rd/4th/5th 1. 1943, point 55.

115 BA Koblenz, R 3/1988, Göring's "Order on increasing the armament potential in the occupied territories" dated January 10, 1943.

116 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1828, OKW decrees from 30. 1. (Belgium, Nieder!.) and v. February 3, 1943 (Denmark); Decree RMfBu.M v. February 12, 1943 (Denmark).

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(General Government; Protectorate), armaments inspections, armaments commands and field offices in the occupied countries were now linked into a solid network for the exploitation of the resources of these countries.

On March 1, 1943, the armaments organization in the Netherlands was reorganized and merged into an "Armaments and Procurement Commission."117 On March 15, the Minister of Ammunition also formed an Armaments and Procurement Commission in France, with a managing armaments and procurement staff; In this context, the Armaments Staff and the Armaments Inspection in France as well as the German Procurement Office in France were dissolved.118 The new, tightly centralized institutions were primarily intended to establish the German committee and ring organizations as steering, control and rationalization bodies in the economy of the countries concerned establish,119 Corresponding orders were issued for France on January 1st.

June,120 for the Netherlands on July 5th and 12th, 1943. 121

Walther Schieber explained the "new regulations in France" to the heads of the committees and rings on June 5th. 122 As the "most important prerequisite" for the integration of the German and the French armaments potential, "a personal union was established between the head of the 'Procurement' department (of the armaments and procurement staff - DE) and the armaments chairman" in the form of Major Graf, who, as required for this position, "on the one hand is a staff officer , on the other hand, was an "industrialist of special stature". The committees and rings are now called upon to create a system of "godfathers" and "lead companies" for French companies. "Use the French armaments potential," Schieber appealed to his audience, "as if it were part of our German potential, then the self-responsibility of German industry will also fulfill this major, war-important task!"

However, the Ministry of Munitions encountered a variety of obstacles that ultimately made it impossible to initiate coordinated and effective "European" arms production. The omnipresent resistance of the affected peoples, which took on new dimensions everywhere after Stalingrad, was the most important factor with which the fascist planners had to reckon with

the forced labor policy of the German imperialists represented the concept of a uniform

117 *messages from the RMfBuM,* No. 22, 10th t,. 1943, Announcement regarding "Formation of Armaments and Procurement Commissions for France and for the Occupied Dutch Territories", n.d.

118 Ibid.; also *chronicle of the RMfBuM,* 1943 I, p. 43, April 1, 1943. Inaccurate *DZW,* Vol. 3, p. 390.

119 See *Milward, Alan S.,* The New Order and tlie French Economy, Oxford 1970, pp. 139ff.

120 BA Koblenz, R 4/20, Decree RMfBuM regarding "Involvement of committees and rings in the military utilization of France" (together with the MBfh France), dated June 1, 1943; also fd Netherlands (together with the Reich Commissioner fd. Netherlands), v. July 5, 1943.

121 BA Koblenz, R 3/100, (both) decrees for the Netherlands.

122 Ibid., R *t,/ 20,* AN G IWE via. Schieber's speech, June 10, 1943. Hereafter also the following. - The officer named by Schieber, "the board member of one of our largest German industrial companies for 19 years" (ibid.), was in all probability Julius Graf, board member of Christian Dierig AG, on the supervisory board of about a dozen other companies or group companies Dierig Group is represented and plays a leading role in numerous sub-organizations of the textile industry economic group and in the Reich offices for cotton and for cotton yarns and fabrics.

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managed and productive "European" war economy; it was precisely in the first half of 1943 that a new wave of forced conscription affected the occupied countries, this time also on a large scale in Western Europe.123 Finally, the fascist satraps fought fierce battles among themselves over their competencies and prerogatives.124 The main thing In the first half of 1943, the attention of the circles around the Ministry of Munitions was obviously still focused on the occupied areas in the east, especially on the industrial capacities of the General Government and on the Dnepr-Donec industrial area. The Donec basin remained after the abandonment of the Soviet offensive in February/ March 1943, except for its eastern part, remained under fascist rule. During this time, the heads of the German war economy had great hopes of reaping the reward of their previous year's efforts in rebuilding the district's capacities in the form of steel and ammunition. Their illusions were dashed However, they soon suffered the blows of the Red Army's summer offensive.125 Only under the impact of this offensive did the focus of their interest finally shift from the east to a - more intensive and modified - exploitation of the economic power of Western Europe.

2. Concentration of regulatory power in the summer/autumn of 1943

a) War economic consequences of the collapse of the defensive strategy of German imperialism

All hopes that the regime had placed on the summer offensive in the Kursk Salient were shattered when the “Citadel” operation collapsed with heavy losses within a fortnight. “All expectations that offensive strikes would sustainably increase the offensive power of the Soviet armed forces in the long term disappeared weaken".126 In the second half of August, the Red Army's counteroffensive transitioned into a general offensive in the central and southern sector of the German-Soviet front. By the end of September, the Soviet troops had driven the Wehrmacht back 200 to 300 km and reached the so-called Ostwall, on which the occupiers based their future strategy.127 In October and November the battle broke out for this fortification line, which the Red Army finally broke up a width of over 1200 km.

In doing so, she liberated Kiev, the capital of Soviet Ukraine (November 6). According to the strategic concept of the fascist conquerors pursued with the Kursk operation, the new "variant of a targeted transition to strategic defense" 128 also failed.

During the Soviet offensive, the German imperialists took control of the Donec Basin

123 *DZW,* Vol. 3, p. 348ff. and passim.
124 In his last book, however, Speer vastly overestimated these disputes, especially for the Protectorate, in order to burden the SS and the occupation authorities in his own favor *(Speer,* The Slave State, p. 137 ff.).
125 For more details see p. 470 ff.
126 *DZW,* Vol. 4, p. 52.
127 With the route N arva - Pskov - Gomel - Dnieper line from Kiev to Zaporoze - Strait from Kert. For the significance of the eastern wall, see ibid., p. 28ff.
128 Ibid., p. 53.

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and lost the industrial cities on the Dnepr, which had been an important supply and repair base for them and which had played a major role in their long-term war economic plans just a few months earlier. In total, almost half of Ukraine was liberated by the end of 1943. With the expulsion of the German troops from the Taman Peninsula, the "gate to the Caucasus (ie to oil - DE) was finally closed for the aggressors".129 The Wehrmacht's successive loss-making defeats and retreats on the German side since mid-1943 -Soviet front, the war-economic balance of the German imperialists worsened dramatically. The Battle of
Kursk alone cost huge amounts of men and material. In July and August 1943, the Eastern Army lost almost half a million soldiers, of which 172,000 in the Battle of Kursk alone.130 During the Operation "Citadel" resulted in the loss of almost 1,500 German tanks; that was 54 percent of the tanks deployed for this purpose or 40 percent of the total tanks on the German-Soviet front at the beginning of July, including entire units of the new tank types "Tiger", "Panther" and of the assault gun “Ferdi-nand”.131 From July to November, the Eastern Army lost a total of over 1.2 million men dead, missing and wounded.132 Weapons losses were higher during this time than in all previous phases of the war.

Table 17
Average monthly losses of the army in weapons 1941-1943 (in pieces.)

	June 22, 1941 to April 30, 1942 (10.3 months)	May 1, 1942 to April 30, 1943 (12 months)	May 1, 1943 to November 30, 1943 (7 months)
carbine	9257	35200	41448
MP	2847	3442	4396
MG	4308	3953	7034
Pack (5 and 8 cm)	67	207	482
Grenade launcher	768	707	1161
Artillery pieces	481	453	463
Armored vehicles	434	677	860

Source: DZW, Vol. 4, p. 84.

The consumption of ammunition rose sharply. From May to November 1943, more than double the amount of artillery ammunition and hand grenades was used per month compared to the previous twelve months.133 On the loss side of the war economy balance sheet,
there were also the enormous losses in submarines since the spring of 1943 the loss of all material from Army Group Africa, which surrendered in Tunisia on May 12, 1943.

129 *Gretschko, AA,* The Battle of the Caucasus, Berlin 1971, p. 491 (daily order of the commander-in-chief of the Soviet North Caucasus Front, General IE Petrov, dated October 9, 1943).
130 *DZW,* Vol. 3, p. 588.
131 Ibid. Other loss calculations in *KTB of the OKW,* vol. 3/2, p. 1578 and p. 1621.
132 *DZW,* Vol. 4, p. 86.
133 Ibid., p. 84.

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The events in Africa in particular made it possible to foresee that far-reaching political changes would soon take place on the Apennine Peninsula - which began soon after the Anglo-Americans landed in Sicily (July 9th/10th). 135 On July 25, Mussolini was overthrown. At the beginning of September, the Badoglio government concluded a ceasefire with the Allies, signed unconditional surrender, and thereby dissolved the war pact with Hitler's Germany.

German troops and authorities then established a complete occupation regime in Italy. The German military command centers were happy about this, especially the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition (since September 2nd: for armaments and war production) and the OKW. They seized an extensive loot of Italian equipment, weapons and military equipment and the resources of the previously Italian-occupied areas of southeastern and western Europe, hoped for hundreds of thousands of Italian workers for German armaments and immediately made plans to use everything available to incorporate Italian economic potential into the German war economy.

But quite apart from the blatant political and military defeat that Italy's secession meant for the German ally, the economic advantages that the German occupiers had hoped for could only be realized in the short term.
The military situation following the simultaneous landing of Anglo-American troops on the Italian mainland gradually made it impossible for them to systematically organize and exploit the Italian economy, and the resistance of the Italian people, especially the working class, did not allow their trees to grow to the sky: nevertheless, they strengthened The potential of the Italian armaments industry, concentrated in northern Italian cities such as Turin and Milan, will continue to dominate the German war machine for some time.
In Casablanca (January 1943) , Roosevelt and Churchill decided to press ahead with the air offensive against targets in Germany according to a common plan. Their directive included among the primary goals of this offensive the destruction of the economic basis for German warfare, especially the armaments industry. In 1943 , however, this point remained largely on paper. The percentage of bomb loads dropped on military facilities - especially submarine shipyards and increasingly aircraft industry plants, oil refineries and transport facilities - increased only slowly. (Table 18)

However, attacks of unprecedented strength hit, for example, the Essen works of the Krupp Group (the first on March 5, 1943) i36, the dams on the tributaries of the Ruhr (May), the Zeiss works in Jena (May 27), the Buna factory in Hüls (June 22), several aircraft factories (end of July), the research institute (development and test series factory) for V-weapons in Peenemünde (August 17/18) and the ball bearing factories in Schweinfurt (17 August and October 14).137

134 See *Hitler's briefings,* p. 231, Hitler's discussion with SS-Sonderführer v. Neurath, May 20, 1943.

135 *DZW,* Vol. 3, p. 610ff.

136 After the first five major attacks in spring/summer 1943, the Krupp Group reported property damage worth 485 million RM and usage damage worth 70 million RM for compensation from state funds (ZStA Potsdam, Reich Ministry of Finance, No. B 7188/1, Bl. 287 and 289 R, AN RMdF v. May 24, 1944).

137 For more information on this see *DZW,* Vol. 3, p. 158 ff.; Vol. 4, p. 121ff. - To remedy the slump in production of ball bearings, the Ministry of Armaments took action in October

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Table 18
Proportion of bomb loads dropped on military targets in fascist-occupied Europe 1942-1943

Period	Weight total (in t)	of which on military economic objectives (including submarine bases) (in t)	in percent
1942 {quarterly average) 1/1943	11443	446	3.9
	27920	1818	6.5
11/1943	46377	4796	10.3
III/1943	60018	5133	8.6
IV/1943	52734	10130	19.2

Source: The effects, p. 2f., tab. 1 and 2.

Estimates of losses in defense production due to air raids during 1943 vary between three to five percent (USSBS) and ten percent (Speer). 138 In his speech to the Gauleiters on June 21, 1943 in Berlin, the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition summarized the result of the "Battle of the Ruhr" 139: "All the air raids in the Ruhr area have so far caused damage: to the drop forges 15 percent, but for crankshafts for the air force 18 percent (due to special cases that occurred at Krupp), for tank cars two percent. When it comes to coal, we have a loss of 25 percent in the Ruhr area, across the entire Reich related to 12 percent; a loss of iron in the Ruhr area of 24 percent, for the entire Reich area (related) of 11.9 percent; the loss of 13 percent for locomotives can be completely made up for by other workshops." 140 It was the bombing raids in the spring/ summer of 1943 on the Ruhr area, the most important armaments center of German imperialism, that motivated the armaments powers to take extraordinary measures. Speer even came up with the plan, "as part of the evacuation of the non-working population, the men and women remaining in the work process of the Rhine-Ruhr economy would be brought together in community camps, looked after them there and, as a consequence, 'OT-like' them. ", that is, to be captured and led as a 'Wehrmacht's entourage'" 141. Finally, the choice was made "purely

"Violent action", called "Aktion Keßler" after its leader, which, like that of January 1943 (supply of Stalingrad), "was given priority until further notice over all levels of urgency, keyword programs and special actions of all three branches of the Wehrmacht" (BA Koblenz, R 13 V /100, decree RMfRuK of October 20, 1943 regarding special powers for Philipp Keßler). 138 p. 107.
The effects, p. 11; We yres-11. Le11etzow,

139 Walter Rohland later spoke at the end of 1944/beginning of 1945 of the "second battle for the Ruhr," which "had to be won in exactly the same way" as the first in 1943 (BA Koblenz, R 7/2252, Protocol of the Eisen- and steel meeting in the RMfRuK, January 18, 1945).

140 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 1740. Significantly lower figures on p. 780 (Speer's KTB des OKW, **Vol. 3/1, information for June, regarding coal, iron and steel).**

141 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 5884, Ley an Speer, June 17, 1944. - In his speech to the Gauleiters on June 21, 1943, Speer had announced that he would turn the workers on the Ruhr into uniformed "front workers" (ibid., film 1740).

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"The formation of the Ruhrstab Speer", as Robert Ley later wrote, "and the DAF operation in the Rhine-Ruhr prevented ... what would otherwise appear to be a forced killing off of every operational, both social and also economic self-responsibility." 142 The formation of the Ruhrstab (also: Ruhrstab Speer) in August 1943 seemed to fit in with the forced direction of concentrating state monopolistic regulatory power in the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition. But at the same time there were already signs of shock, if not the dissolution of the organization of the German war economy.

As early as the second half of June, the Ministry of Ammunition made the "first major decisions" about the "Ruhr Area Action". 14 3 The decisive preliminary meeting took place in the ministry on July 10 or 11, 1943. In addition to Speer, Albert Vögler, Alfried Krupp, Walter Rohland, Moritz Klönne, Nagel (Rheinmetall), Paul Pleiger, Rüdiger Schmidt (RWKS) and the heads of the Armaments Inspection VI (Münster), the Organization Todt and the GB Construction Authority were gathered the Ruhr area.144 The Ruhrstab, essentially a "loose summary of the individual departments of the (Armaments) Ministry working in the Ruhr area"145, was constituted in August 1943 in Kettwig/Ruhr. Speer retained top management for himself, had himself but represented by the Chief of Staff, Major General Kurt Erdmann, armaments inspector in Münster.

The dominant personality in the Ruhrstab was Albert Vögler, chairman of the supervisory board of Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG. He had the interests of the Ruhr monopolies primarily handled by Walter Rohland. Rohland brought together a "larger group of employees" and "the castles of Landsberg and Hugenpoet near Kettwig were made available to him for accommodation". 146 The Ruhrstab, which included representatives of large corporations, experts from the Ministry of Armaments and other state and party departments as well as high-ranking officers, was given comprehensive powers to regulate all war economic issues in the entire Ruhr area, the largest and most important weapons factory of German imperialism, especially in the event of damage air raids and other obstacles and difficulties.

***Members of the Ruhrstab* Speer 147**

Albert Speer	
Kurt Erdmann	as Chief of Staff
Adam	as OT task force leader, responsible
Ernst Buskuhl (Flick)	for coal mining, president of the Westphalia State Labor
Friedrich Gärtner	Office, representative for the "Ruhr" of GB Construction
Gunschemann	

142 Ibid., film 5884, Ley to Speer, June 17, 1944.

143 ***Chronicle of the RMfBuM,*** 1943 I, p. 105f., 20./22. 6. 1943.

144 Ibid., 10/11. 7. 1943.

145 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 1734, Speer's travel report from his Rhine-Ruhr trip, November 1944 (in December 1944 the Ruhrstab was reorganized as a largely autonomous economic body under Albert Vögler).

146 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 9081, Bl. 191, 191 R, Northwest District Group of Wigru Esl to RWiM, July 31, 1944.

147 According to ***Janssen,*** p. 147 and p. 376, note 38.

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horns	as military district representative VI and chairman of the Armaments
Huts	Commission VI as representative of the armaments
Theodor Hupfauer	inspection (air protection) as head of the DAF
Fritz Imhoff	Rhine-Ruhr operations staff as water load distributor
Moritz Klönne	as Armaments Chairman VI a (at the same time: President of the G WK Westphalia-
Coal	South) as representative of the Reich Ministry of
Kretschmer (RWE)	Transport as load
Maximilian Lamertz	distributor of electricity as President of the Reich Railway Directorate
Müller	as representative of the Reich Ministry of
Hans Reuter (Demag)	Transport as Armaments
Walter Rohland (VStW)	Chairman VI b as responsible for the iron industry
(with his own staff under Hans-Günther Sohl)	
Rüdiger Schmidt (RWKS)	as general director of the Rhenish-Westphalian coal industry
	syndicate
Albert Vögler (VStW)	
Wish	as a gas load distributor

The devastating air raids on residential areas of German cities, on which the vast majority of the bombs dropped until the end of 1943 still fell, also had an immediate effect on the war economy (loss of hours worked by the workforce; decline in work morale), which initially remained small. Since the annihilation attacks by the Anglo-American bomber fleets on Hamburg at the end of July/beginning of August began to grow.148 Their indirect consequences were more significant. In favor of the production of air defense weapons, industrial capacity was withdrawn from other armaments sectors. "In 1943, 10,000 were heavy anti-aircraft guns," Albert Speer remembered regretfully, "pointed at the sky in the Reich or in Western theaters of war; they could have been used in Russia against tanks and other terrestrial targets." 149 The air force command, which no longer had a uniform concept for conducting the air war, saw itself forced to push its fighter program, which also affected other sectors, such as army armament. In a decree from the Minister of Ammunition dated August 27 , 1943 , it was stated: “The current situation forces us to place the fighter program at the very top of all armaments production; this fighter program includes the production of on-board weapons. This must be increased to an unheard-of extent." l50 Furthermore, the production of everyday goods - dishes, linen, window glass, cardboard and others - was increased because tens and hundreds of thousands of "bomb victims" and "bombed out" people are provided with these in a makeshift manner had to.

The German big bourgeoisie reacted extremely to the increasing aerial bombardments

148 *Weyres v. Levetzow,* p. 107. - In his speech in Posen on October 6, 1943, Speer cited the example of the "company loyalty level" "which is often still 20 or 30 percent of the target level eight days after the attack" (ZStA Potsdam , FS, film 3570).

149 *Speer,* Memories, p. 291.

150 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 1730, RErl. RMfBuM, August 27, 1943; see *Chronicle of RM{BuM.* 1943 II, Bl. 9 f., August 25, 1943.

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sensitive. This meant that they directly saw their ownership of factories and other material assets (means of production) - thus the basis of their power and their profits. and even put their lives at risk of destruction. For some of their representatives, the impotence of the German air defense was a clearer sign of the seriousness of the situation than the decisive defeats on the still distant German-Soviet front. In earlier years, her own air supremacy had already appeared to her to be the first prerequisite for economic perseverance, even in a long war.151 Now air supremacy over Germany and all of Europe, as Goebbels put it quite realistically internally in March 1943 , was "through "lost the war in essential parts" 152, and for some representatives of the master in the East...

Not least for this reason, the ruling class came to the realization that the war could not be won for them. At this time, the SD received reports on the mood in which the opinions of industrialists were circulated; Among them there is “no one who still believes in victory.”153 However, according to the undercover agent, an IG Farben director explicitly stated that “the British bombers were destroying the factories of the large industrial corporations (1. G. Farben, "Rheinstahl, etc.) and only destroy the factories that do not belong to large corporations."154 The solution was to relocate the production facilities on a large scale either to eastern German areas, to Austria and to the Polish area or even to continue them underground, was the solution for the monopoly power had previously been undesirable because of the difficulties and costs associated with it, as well as the many types of losses in production and profits,155 but in the second half of 1943 it gradu

Just as seriously as the search for an effective defense against the air threat, leading circles in the regime took the development of so-called retaliatory weapons (V-weapons) with the most deterrent effect possible. The design and production of such weapons received decisive impetus.

Attempts to prepare offensive actions again, if no longer on land, then at least in the air, also occupied the air force leadership. All relevant circles of the regime that considered this direction met with the intention of initiating a change through their own long-distance air war 156, in particular "carrying out destructive attacks against the Russian arms industry" 157 and thus the same concept against the USSR - just more consistent and more effective - to apply, according to which the Western Allies acted over Germany. 158 At the end of June 1943, the Minister of Ammunition formed a small committee of leading armaments industrialists and key heads of the war economic apparatus

151 See, for example, the memorandum from GB Chemistry “On the development of the raw material situation in the long term Duration of the War" from January 28, 1941 (ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1726).

152 Ibid., Film 10806, Goebbels-TB, entry from. March 6, 1943.

153 BA Koblenz, R 58/1114, report by the informant Dr. H. Thost v. September 7, 1943.

154 Ibid.

155 reservations existed, especially against underground relocation; “The industry had no desire to go underground,” said Speer about that time (around the end of 1943) (ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 3568, interrogation from May 18, 1945).

156 *Groehler,* History of the Air War, p. 389 ff.

157 Göring's decree of November 26, 1943, quoted there, p. 395.

158 *KT B* cles *OKW,* vol. 3/2, p. 1597 f.; *DZW,* Vol. 4, p. 134 ff.

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declared the large Soviet power plants - as far as they were within reach - to be the most urgent and worthwhile target of a long-range bomber offensive.159

These plans entered an acute stage in the fall of 1943 and even led to a new production program by the Luftwaffe leadership in December, according to which the production of fighter aircraft was to be cut by almost 30 percent in favor of an enormous long-range bomber program (He 177). 160 Although they ended miserably, the composition of the above-mentioned ministerial commission clearly showed that the German monopoly bourgeoisie still saw the USSR as its main enemy, whose weakening and defeat should give it the key to new war successes.

b) Reorganization of the state monopoly apparatus in the war economy (third phase)

"Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production"

Since June 1943, the circles around the Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions had made efforts to finally break up the ministerial apparatus of the Reich Ministry of Economics, which had already been undermined in many ways, and to transfer the remaining competencies and spheres of influence to the Ministry of Munitions.

Of course, these skills were still important. The Reich Ministry of Economics was the head of an extensive state monopoly regulatory mechanism. It was the supervisory authority for the entire so-called organization of the commercial economy, that is, for the Reich Chamber of Commerce, the Reich Groups and Economic Groups, the Gau Chamber of Commerce; The so-called control areas and management bodies such as imperial offices and imperial associations were subordinate to him.

After all, it had the economically and politically important large regional apparatus of economic offices at the Gau (state) and district level.

The production of consumer goods, which the Reich Ministry of Economics regulated through the Reich offices, Reich associations and economic groups by means of manufacturing bans and orders, raw material quotas and export promotion as well as through the rationing of products (purchase voucher system), was estimated to have made an estimated 1% in 1943 (23.5 percent). of total industrial production 1 6 2. Officially, basic materials production (a further 23.5 percent) also belonged to the ministry's area, as did mechanical engineering, insofar as it did not directly produce war material, and other capital goods industries. All in all, apart from the increasing overlap with various main committees of the Ministry of Munitions

159 The members of the commission known to date are Carl Krauch and Albert Vögler (Groeh"ler, History of the Air War, p. 394), Walter Rohland, Paul Pleiger, Walther Schieber and managing director Rudolf Carl (FB, June 28, 1943, point 6) and Kurt Waeger (Chronicle of the *liMf BuM,* 1943 I, BI. 108, June 23, 1943). See also *Janssen,* p. 184f.

160 Groeh"ler, History of the Air War, p. 394.

161 While the basic industry, especially coal, iron and steel, was already largely de facto part of the regulatory area of the Ministry of Munitions through the Reich Associations, the Central Planning and the Armaments Supply Office, the capacities of the investment and consumer goods industries were also increasingly controlled by this ministry -says. See also *Janssen,* p. 133f.

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(mechanical engineering, rail vehicles, etc.), well over 50 percent of industrial production falls within the regulatory area of the Reich Ministry of Economics. The decisive position in this ministry was now held by the textile industrialist, district economic advisor (Gau Kurmark) and SS brigade leader Hans Kehr} as "General Officer for Special Tasks" and, since the end of October 1942, as head of Main Department II (Industry). He had been the four-year plan officer for textiles during the war and had made Minister Funk indispensable through his years of work in converting the ministry to wartime conditions - not least in the plundering of the occupied areas. Since the summer of 1942 he was the permanent representative of the Reich Minister for Economic Affairs of the most influential employees in central planning and was increasingly involved in the work of the Ministry of Munitions through Speer and his (Kehrls) first-name friend Schieber.

On August 9, 1943, Funk and Speer presented the head of the Reich Chancellery, Hans-Heinrich Lammers, with a draft of a law according to which the decisive powers of the Reich Ministry of Economics were to be transferred to the Reich Ministry of Armament and Ammunition . The authors of the draft were Kehr! and Schieber.163 The intensive, accelerated interministerial negotiations on the law lasted almost four weeks. Several departments and departments raised objections, so that on August 18th Speer turned sharply to Bormann, who was considered one of the initiators of the delaying tactics: "The demand(s) for the fastest expansion of armaments are currently being dictated to us by the enemy. "164 On September 2, 1943,

Hitler finally signed the "Decree of the Führer on the concentration of the war economy" 165, according to the title a formulation that was repeated in earlier and later decrees, but in fact the prelude to the most profound restructuring of the fascist state apparatus and to the greatest extent Concentration of state monopolistic regulatory power in the economy, which had taken place since the beginning of the Four Year Plan. From now on, the "responsibilities of the Reich Minister of Economics in the area of raw materials and production went to industry

and crafts", i.e. the ministerial regulation of the entire so-called civil production outside of agriculture, "transferred to the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition" (§ 2). The Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition was given the name "Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production" "in view of its expanded scope of tasks".

In connection with Hitler's decree, Göring, as representative for the four-year plan, saw himself obliged to expand the powers of GB Rüst "to all questions of production", "unless I have appointed other general representatives for this purpose".166

The Reich Economics Minister remained, as Hitler's decree euphemistically stated, "responsible for the fundamental economic policy questions of the German economy" (§ 1), which of course was in view of the situation and the true balance of power in the war.

162 *Wagenühr,* p. 191. The calculation was based on estimated net production values. taken.

163 ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, Film 19 468, draft law and AN for Lammers dated August 9, 1943. See also *Bleyer,* Total War, p. 165 f.; *Janssen,* p. 134 f.

164 ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, Film 19 468, FS. Speer to Bormann, August 18, 1943.

165 *RGBl.* 1943 I, p. 529f. Hereafter also the following.

166 BA Koblenz, R 7/590, Göring's decree of September 4, 1943.

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economic power apparatus was illusory. He also remained responsible "for the supply of consumer goods to the civilian population and the regulation of their distribution", for foreign trade and for "the financing issues of the German economy" and retained overall supervision of the credit institutions (§§ 3, 4) - mostly competencies of a secondary nature or those that had already largely been emptied of th After the war economic powers of the Wehrmacht (apart from the Air Force) were replaced and the powers of GB Rüst were taken over from the four-year plan general power, a further step, perhaps the most important, had now been taken. A new level of concentration of state monopolistic regulatory power in the war economy had been reached. In the other warring capitalist states there was no similar example of such an essentially completely uncontrolled concentration of power 167; no example of the de facto dissolution of an important, traditional ministerial apparatus in favor of another created solely for the purpose of war 168; no counterpart to the autocratic regime that promotes "self-responsibility" Organization of the arms monopolies, headed by leading monopoly magnates and corporate representatives, now exercised 169, supported by the fascist terror apparatus and completely exempt from any public criticism.

The planning office

The unification of the regulatory powers in armaments and civilian production at the Armaments Ministry was the most important prerequisite that the leading circles around the Armaments Ministry created for the planned expansion and strict centralization of the entire planning activities of this state-monopoly command center. Already at the meeting of the Central Planning on July 29, 1943, **in which leading representatives of the most important main committees of the Ministry of Munitions and the Industrial Council of the Air Force such as Geilenberg, Merker, Wilhelm Schaaf (BMW) and William Werner took part, it was clear that according to Speers Words, "roughly agreed ... that we are setting up a planning office, which we are already in the process of setting up, in which the entire future development of the programs will be brought together."170 A few days after Hitler's decree of September 2nd, Göring said in his As the representative for the four-year plan, the new planning office (at GB Rüst) was launched as the organizational and accounting central authority of the Ministry of Armaments.171 Formally, this office was directly referred to as the office of the four-year plan. Kehrl became hea**

167 See ***Milward,*** The Second World War, p. 358ff. (i.e. the British Lord President's Committee or its subcommittees and the US Office of War Mobilization); ***Martin, Bernd,*** Japan's war economy 1941-1945, in ***war economy and armaments 1939-1945.*** Edited by Friedrich Forst-meier/Hans-Erich Volkmann, Düsseldorf 1977, p. 269 and p. 276f. (about the Japanese Ministry of Ammunition).

168 See ***Milward,*** The Second World War, p. 349 and p. 358f. (via the British Treasury).

169 See ibid., p. 359f. (War Production Board/USA); ***Martin,*** Japan's war economy, P. 256ff., passim (about the rule of the Zaibatsu).

170 ZP-P, July 29, 1943, 44th session. Similar things happened in the head of office meeting (with Kehrl) on July 27, 1943 ***(Chronihdes füWfBuM,*** 1943 I, pp. 123 and 125).

171 As note 166.

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An illustrious company of corporate representatives gathered in the new office

experienced managers of state-monopoly capitalism, such as Hans Fischböck 172 as Kehrl's deputy, Friedrich Dorn 173 as "general advisor for special tasks", Ernst Vits 174 and Fritz Rudorf 175 as Dorn's employees, Fritz v. Engelberg 176 as deputy head of the most important main department (technical Planning), which Kehr! himself headed, Karl Müller-Zimmermann 177, Willy Schlieker 17B, Ernst Rudolf Fischer 179, August Kolb 180 and Gerhard Saager 18 1 as senior employees (heads of branch groups) of this main department. A large number of experienced statisticians were in a main department for planning statistics; the instruments of the German Institute for Economic Research (formerly: for economic research) were available to it.

18 2 The planning office was supposed to prepare the decisions of the central planning and control the implementation of its decisions. For this purpose it was based on the planning offices of the committees and rings and summarized the results of their work at ministerial level. His functional area of responsibility was broad. With the help of "detailed production and consumption statistics" and by means of requirements planning "for the entire German sphere of influence," it had to "set up production and distribution plans for the entire war economy," correspondingly the distribution of raw materials and basic materials and "all workers in the greater German sphere of influence "to be proposed to Central Planning for a decision. 183 It had the right to use the Reich offices and Reich associations for its purposes, to approve all major investments and capacity expansions and to monitor all "fundamental urgency classifications and reclassifications within the commercial war economy". Ultimately, it was its task, Danger moments that could disrupt the course of the general German war economy must be brought to the attention of the central planning department at an early stage. 184 Although the planning office set itself such ambitious tasks, a central production plan was not created either for industry or even for the armaments industry and under the prevailing circumstances - this is primarily due to the lack of

central power of disposal and comprehensive control over all important means of production, as well as the generally critical situation of the German war economists.

172 V AR Creditanstalt-Bankverein, Vienna; General Commissioner for Economics and Finance at the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands; Reich Commissioner for Price Formation (since 1942).

173 **Feldmühle Group; Reich Commissioner for Pulp and Paper; Chief Executive Officer of Ost Fiber GmbH.**

174 **VV United Glanzstoff-Fabriken AG.**

175 **VV Bank of German Aviation.**

176 **VV Dyckerhoff-Zementwerke AG; General advisor to the Reich Commissioner for Price Formation.**

177 Siemens Group; Reich Commissioner for Iron and Metals.

178 **Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG; at the same time head of department in the arms supply office.**

179 **IG colors; at the same time head of the department in the raw materials office.**

180 **Degussa Group; at the same time head of the department in the raw materials office.**

181 **Previously head of special department N. 0. (reorganization) in the RWiM.**

182 ***Kehrl,*** p. 320 **and** p. li98ff.

183 ***News from the RMf RuK,*** **No.** 30, October 20, 1943, " **Decree of the General Plenipotentiary for Armaments in the Four-Year Plan and the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production on the task of the planning office" of September 16,** 1943.

184 **Ibid.**

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society and in particular the uncontrolled abundance of "programs" chasing each other - did not come about either. Kehrl later testified that "the task of bringing the desirable with the possible" was "given the countless problems that are to be solved immediately had to be", "the main content of the work of the planning office in general".185 However, according to the intentions of its creators, the
character of the planning office should remain that of a "fundamental office"186. To deal with the practical problems of raw material distribution, a raw materials office was created in the armaments ministry For the sake of coordination, it was also under the direction of Kehrl.187 While iron and steel production remained under the administration of the Armaments Supply Office, the regulatory powers of the Raw Materials Office extended to the remaining metal production, including alloy metals, to mining, including coal the areas of chemistry, mineral oil, rubber and industrial fats, wood, textile raw materials, pulp and paper. Under these circumstances, overlaps with the competences of the Armaments Supply Office could not be avoided; the conflicts dragged on for months.188 The third newly formed office was the Production Office for Consumer Goods, also known as the Production Office for short. It was created to
regulate the area of "civilian production" taken over by the Reich Ministry of Economics, and was headed by Georg Seebauer, a member of the board and supervisory board of about a dozen large power plants in southwest and western Germany, and a senior employee of the NSBDT and the office until 1935 for technology of the Nazi Party, then deputy head of the Reich Energy Industry Group, at the same time head of the Reich Board of Trustees for Economic Efficiency and the Reich Committee for Performance Improvement. In this office, which was internally referred to as the “Office for Plundering” (of the consumer goods industry - DE) 189, they functioned Economic groups in the form of main committees.

The “general representative for operational implementation”

Only now, armed with the powers of the Reich Economics Minister, did the Armaments Minister have the real opportunity to enforce his concept of "total war" in the entire industry. Aware of the critical situation for German imperialism, the circles around the ministry pushed for a decidedly more "total" one.
Course in the war economy.
A central concern that the minister and the arms monopolies pursued immediately and with particular intensity, especially since the resistance within the ruling class itself was considerable, was the closure of large areas of consumer goods production.

185 Kehrl, p. 325. - Another contemporary observer later judged: “The only task of the committee was and remained to eliminate the competition of the demand parties from planning period to planning period and to balance it out between the parties by means of a quantity compromise and to coordinate them with one another. " (Geer, p. 121).

186 ZP-P, November 22, 1943, 50th session.

187 Kehrl, p. 464, note 7. - The previous heads of the corresponding departments from the Reich Ministry of Economics were appointed as department heads of this office (ibid., p. 319).

188 Janssen, p. 137f.

189 Chronicle of the RMfRuK, 1943 II, BI. 25, September 8, 1943.

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production in favor of armaments production or in the reallocation of workers (skilled workers) and capacities of the consumer goods industry to the armaments sector. The Minister of Armaments had already told Hitler at the end of July that as soon as he was authorized for "civilian" production, he would "convert large consumer goods industry companies into armaments companies ... not only 500,000 German workers, but also their management staff and the Factory facilities as units for "urgent programs". 190 Even in this form, however, his conception was hardly suitable for weakening the resistance of the bourgeoisie circles affected by the production shutdowns and for making the Gauleiters and other regional opponents of the shutdowns more inclined. However, it was gradually implemented from September 1943 onwards.

As early as September 1st, Speer appointed a "general representative for operational implementation" (GfB), who reported directly to him. 191 The GfB had "special representatives for the individual branches of production". His area of responsibility extended to industrial companies with 100 men and to craft companies with a workforce of 50 or more; The workforce of the factories that had been closed down or were used for armaments production had to be transferred "completely" to the armaments industry. Proposals for such "conversion of entire civilian companies into armaments production" should come from the armaments companies themselves and be decided personally by the armaments minister. 19 2 Director Walter Jander, board member of the Junkers Group and regional economic advisor for the Saxony-Anhalt district, was initially designated as GIB; After just a few days, Ministerial Councilor Wissmann finally took over the position. 193 The Minister of Armaments had the core ideas of his economic from the „policy concept "Total War", which he and the relevant circles of monopoly capital he represented had developed since the summer of 1943, expressly confirmed again by Hitler on September 11th: "The Führer is agreed with the basic manufacturing policy that I presented to him based on my speech notes for Rechlin." 194

In the following period he presented this concept in speeches to various leadership bodies of the regime, especially on October *6 ,* 1943 in Posen to the assembled Gauleiters of the NSDAP. Above all, he said, it was necessary to "carry out a wave of decommissioning on a large scale " . Speer criticized the previous shutdown policy - especially the Reich Ministry of Economics, which had favored large companies in the consumer goods industry at the expense of medium-sized and small businesses. "To make matters worse, these medium-sized and small businesses that are already working with short-time work have been shut down. This wave of shutdowns has had almost no success for us at all.

190 ***Speer,*** Memories, p. 287 (July 26, 1943).

191 ***News from the RMf RuK,*** No. 29, September 15, 1943. Hereafter also the following.

192 BA Koblenz, R 13 I/592, protocol d. Meeting of the Advisory Board of the Northern District Group west of the Wigru Esl, September 10, 1943.

193 ***Chronicle of R Mf RuK,*** 1943 II, BI. 18, 21 and 23, beginning of September 1943.

194 FB, 11./12. 9. 1943, point 7. - A month later, Speer presented Hitler with an "initial overview "on operational conversions" (FB, October 14/15, 1943, point 21).

195 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 3570, Speer's speech by. October 6, 1943 (Posen). Hereafter also the following ender.

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Because the employable people in medium-sized and small towns (i.e. companies; DE) are an extraordinarily small percentage of the total workforce available in the company."

In the armaments industry, on the other hand, the full concentration on the "best company", which "in armaments... of course, just like with consumer goods, is almost always a large company", is correct, given and necessary by the structure of this sector, "since I in armaments can only produce cannons or machine guns or ammunition in large series.

The minister explained the new line of decommissioning policy, which was the opposite of the previous one: the larger companies in the consumer goods industry - "those with over 100 men" - would be captured and would have to hand over their workforce to armaments companies; in particular, "the textile companies that... Paper production companies, printing companies and others. This is the only way to free up one to one and a half million of the six million workers employed in the consumer goods industry for armaments. Any materials that may be released will be sent to the middle and Steering small businesses that should be brought to full performance and that have considerable reserves.

Using examples of recently initiated shutdowns in production, Speer made his audience emphatically aware of "how serious the situation is in the field of armaments": "We have ... completely shut down the household gas meters, the household electricity meters and the household water meters and have thus approximately 4,000 of the highest quality workers, and only German workers, can be made available for the production of the headlights and the devices for the night guidance procedures... We continue to manufacture around 12,000 Leica and Kontax devices per year, All of which are commissioned by the Wehrmacht, and have made the freed-up workers, high-quality lens grinders and mechanics, also available for the night guidance process... We have taken over the production of the eye optics, for example. T. reduced and thus gained 5000 workers who are now at work making the latest type of image converters for night hunting, working for the A-4 program, for submarine periscopes and for the tank and anti-tank systems. Programs to ensure the necessary panoramic telescopes, which could no longer be produced in sufficient quantities. We shut down the Stöhr worsted spinning mill in Leipzig and made the workforce available to an adjacent aircraft factory for hunters... Unfortunately, we were forced to completely shut down the culturally and historically valuable Breitkopf & Härtel music printing plant in Leipzig... We have them Wanderer office and typewriter factory, Chemnitz, completely shut down. They are now making aircraft communication devices, aircraft mother compasses and aircraft weapons." They were even forced to "close two factories from locomotive production, which we had with great difficulty and difficulty brought to a total of 530 locomotives... one in Munich to manufacture the BMW aircraft engines with 3,000 men and to transfer the other one in Berlin to Alkett for the production of assault guns."

One of the core ideas of the new decommissioning concept was that the occupied countries, especially France, should produce consumer goods for Germany on a large scale, "because we still have a significant unused reserve in the consumer goods industry in the occupied areas... These reserves are... a displacement of the material, a displacement of the rayon e.g. B. on the French textile companies.

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The Gauleiter Reich Defense Commissioners, to whom Bormann had already announced in mid-September that the armaments minister would convert entire companies into armaments factories "down to the last man" and shut down all production that was not necessarily important for war, 196, however, remained skeptical of the new initiative. They were often incited by companies in the consumer goods industry in their region to resist closure proposals and decisions, especially since they feared that the supply of consumer goods to the population would deteriorate and that the implementation would cause social problems for the workers and employees affected have political implications.

In its two variants - the so-called duty-compulsory implementation (of the entire workforce in a defense company) and the so-called self-responsible implementation (ie the acceptance of defense subcontracts and supplies for a defense company) - the company implementation posed a danger for the affected company to be absorbed by the arms company through long-term business leasing agreements, through agreements on a right of first refusal or through direct expropriation. 197 There were internal disputes about this, which delayed the announcement of guidelines for implementation for over half a year.198

The "Wissmann Action" was intended to provide armaments with significant industrial capacity and, above all, manpower, primarily the skilled workers in the consumer goods industry. This also happened, especially in 1944, 199, but would probably have happened on a much larger scale if this action had taken place would not have been increasingly intertwined with the relocation of the armaments industry from areas at risk of air warfare and would not have been increasingly subordinated to it.

With the threat to the armaments factories from the air, the companies' efforts to relocate their production facilities, which were most at risk from bombing, grew, or at least to "loosen up" the highly centralized production and set up sub-operations for particularly important products in the east, southeast and south of Germany The first decree of the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production, which was intended to regulate the relocation of "unique" production in the armaments industry, e.g. ball bearings, and "bottlenecks", came from - at the time intended to be more preventative -

from December 1942. 200 From the end of June 1943, when Hitler gave the minister all

196 BA Koblenz, R 3/1846, Rs. Bormanns an d. Gauleiter, September 14, 1943.

197 "We y res-v. Levetzow, p. 111 and p. 93f. (quote: draft of a “decree on the implementation of companies and parts of companies" dated November 11, 1943).

198 The final “Decree on the Implementation of Companies and Parts of Companies (Implementation Principles)” of April 20, 1944 (News from the RM{RuK, No. 38, June 9, 1944, Appendix 1) finally prohibited the takeover of implemented ones Operated using the methods listed.
For the discussion see WeiJres-v. LePetzow, p. 111f. See also BA Koblenz, R 3/1877, Rs. RMfRuK an d. Chairman d. Armaments commissions etc. (with internal guidelines), December 15, 1943.

199 See the numbers from d. Wissmann's report v. 12th G. 1944 (as of May 31, 191i4): Transfers of 108,966 workers from 1,696 companies with a total of 221,835 employees (WeiJres-v. LePetzow, p. 112 f.).

200 ZStA Potsdam, RMfRuK, No. 77, p. 34, RMfRuK decree on the “Prevention of production losses due to air raids”, December 19, 1942. - Basic information on the above-ground and underground relocations at Demps, expansion, p. 73 ff.

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the necessary powers201, the regulations and rules for the relocations (overground) were gradually developed.202 The wave of relocations that began around the turn of 1943/44 mainly affected the large armaments companies and at the same time often provided them with tangible capacity - and operational expansions.203 Nevertheless, the arms powerhouses viewed the relocations as a necessary, costly evil that ate up a not insignificant part of the rationalization effect of the last few years. However, the immediate burdens and difficulties of the relocation campaign were borne mainly by the conscripted workers and employees, while the armaments companies were largely covered by the costs and risks by the fascist state.

Start of underground storage (A 4)

Since the spring of 1943, Hitler has been pushing "that in the long term the aim must be to ensure that the most sensitive production such as crankshafts, bevel gears, electrical equipment, etc. are carried out in factories that are fully protected by concrete."204 He opposed "the relocations to the East of the Empire as only "of limited value" 205 and was so impressed by the underground laying and concrete encasing of the armaments production that Speer had to teach him about the limits of this method. Above all, he made it clear to him that "the Ruhr area represents a base for our industry that cannot be relocated." On July 10, he applied to the OKW to release the partly empty bunkers on the Maginot Line for inspection.207 The earliest project to relocate underground was started at the end of August/beginning of September 1943.208 It was the large-scale production of the Rocket A 4 (Aggregat 4), also called V 2 (Retribution Weapon 2), an automatically controlled rocket that could transport around 1 t of explosives a maximum of 370 km.

This project took shape after the former Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition gradually wrested management of the development and production of the A 4 from the Army Weapons Office, which had had the weapon developed over many years. On January 15, 1943, a special committee A 4 (SA 4) was formed under Demag director Gerhard De $_{G}$enkolb, the previous head of the main committee Railway Vehicles, and in March a long-distance shooting development commission was formed under Waldemar Petersen (AEG). 209 “The A 4 special committee was responsible both for the final production of the rocket and for the extremely extensive system of

201 *Demps,* Expansion, p. 77; *DZW,* Vol. 4, p. 127; *Janssen,* p. 149 (Hitler's decree of June 28, 1943).
202 ZB *News from the RM{RuK,* No. 28, September 6, 1943, joint decree RMfBuM and GBA regarding "Relocation of workers during company relocations", August 23, 1943.
203 *Weyres-1.1. Le1,1etzow,* p.
10L 204 FB, April 11, 1943, point left.
205 Ibid.
206 FB, May 30, 191i3, point 16; see *Speer,* The Slave State, p. 308 f.
207 *KTB of the OKW,* vol. 3/2, p. 769, entry from July 10, 1943.
208 *Demps,* Expansion, p. 81.
209 *Dornberger,* p. 82 ff., p. 90 ff.; *Janssen,* p. 189 ff.

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"Supplier companies responsible" 210 and thus combined committee and ring functions. The representatives of the military research institute were in the majority seated by production specialists from the major companies involved (Siemens, AEG, Askania, Lorenz, Demag, Henschel, Flick).211 About the strategic value and effectiveness of the A 4, a “pronounced terror zone”. "weapon" 212, however, it seems that opinions differed even in the Armaments Ministry.213 But Speer had the rocket demonstrated in the film Hitler on July 7, 1943 and it was a resounding success.214 Hitler seemed to hope that the device would be piled up. "To solve the problems of warfare and, above all, to free him from the nightmare of aerial bombardments. We now need such a "war-decisive weapon," he exclaimed. "With it we will bring England to its knees" 215; "How will the homeland be relieved" - was his main argument - "if we attack the English with it!" 216 Speer noted Hitler's comprehensive authority for the tank program was simply "to be changed accordingly and presented again as a Führer decree for the A IV production".217 On July 25th Hitler signed this decree.218 In the meantime "the A 4 program had been doubled" and "the date for the production of the The device was brought forward by two months", i.e. set for November 1, 1943.219 The program requirements and ideas fluctuated overall between 900 (order from the OKH on October 17, 1943), 950 (Degenkolb program from spring 1943) and 3,000 or even 5,000 rockets per month within a "short period of time" (Hitler's demands from March 1942 and August 1943).220

210 *Dieckmann, Götz,* conditions of existence and resistance in the Dora-Mittel-bau concentration camp under the aspect of the functional inclusion of the SS in the system of the fascist war economy, phil. Diss. Berlin 1968 (hereinafter: Conditions of Existence), p. 44.

211 See ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 10799, v. Braun to SA 4, June 10, 1943, including pieces.; sat *Demps,* Expansion, p. 117 below; 369f.

212 *Bartel, Walter,* report on the role and significance of the Dora-Mittelbau concentration camp and the function of the SS in A 4 production (= series of publications by the VVN Presidium, Frankfurt a. M., 13/1970), p. 4 .

213 Schieber (or Speer) received an extremely skeptical, essentially negative report on the A 4 from Krauch at the end of June 1943. As an offensive weapon of “counter-terror,” it would remain a “wishful idea” as long as there was no fundamental redesign of German air defense , among other things, by surface-to-air missiles of the “waterfall” type (ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 3315, AN Krauch f. meeting with Schieber, June 29, 1943; see also *Speer,* memories, p. 572, note 7) After the war, those responsible declared, according to Speer in 1981, that it was "quite simply the explosive devices" - that is, the nuclear warheads - missing., "where it would have been worth it to take such effort to carry them to the target area" *(Speer,* The Slave State, p. 285 and p. 307; see also *Dornberger,* p. 108ff.).

214 *Speer,* Memories, p. 377; *Dornberger,* p. 108; sat FB, 17/18. 7. 1943, point 19. - *Janssen,* p. 194, sets the date of the film screening or the introduction of Dornberger and Wernher v. Braun's date to Hitler probably mistakenly dated July 8th; also *Speer,* The Slave State, p. 288.

215 *Speer,* The Slave State, p. 296.

216 *Speer,* Memories, p. 377.

217 FB, July 8, 1943, point 19. Different representation in *Speer,* Memories, p. 377 f. 218 */r!Jing, DaPid,,* The Secret Weapons of the Third Reich, Gütersloh 1965 (hereinafter: Secret weapons), p. 105 (retranslated there from English).

219 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 3384, AN RMfBuM(RLA) ex. Discuss regarding “Ensuring the Fuel for device A 4", July 23, 1943.

220 *Speer,* The Slave State, p. 295ff.

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When the heavy air raid on 17/18. When the production of the A 4 threatened to be delayed by many months on Peenemünde in August 1943, those responsible immediately began preparing huge underground production facilities as an alternative solution, "making as much use as possible of caves and other suitable bunker positions." 221 Speer pre- visited Peenemünde the day after the attack and from there immediately flew to Hitler to report to him. Both then conferred with Himmler, who had given Hitler the labor of the concentration camp prisoners and the SS economic apparatus for the relocation and security of A 4 production a few hours earlier - , "the largest and most important armaments task that the Führer could assign" 222 - had offered.223 Since then, the two most influential power apparatuses of the fascist empire have governed the production of rockets in close cooperation, but dominated by fierce state-monopolistic competition.224 The Special Committee A 4 and In this way,

the arms monopolies represented therein secured the help of the SS in the ruthless "intervention" of many thousands of concentration camp prisoners: "On the basis of a suggestion (Himmler - DE), the Führer orders that all measures be taken to work together with "The Reichsführer SS, with the strong involvement of his forces from the concentration camps, is once again pushing forward the construction of the corresponding production facilities and the production of the A 4." 225 representatives of the SA 4 identified the tunnels previously used by Wifo under the Kohn-stein massif north of Nocdhausen as a suitable relocation site for the assembly of the A 4.226 At the end of August, the first transports of concentration camp prisoners arrived from Buchenwald. The “Dora” concentration camp subcamp was founded. In November 1943, when the expansion of the underground production facilities had long been underway, Mittelwerk GmbH was created as a subsidiary of Waffenkontor GmbH and the company was thus legally founded. The Mittelwerk was founded solely by the Special Committee A 4" 227 and was under the protectorate of the Ministry of Armaments. The plant was initially managed by Degenkolb and later by Georg Rickhey.

The underground expansion and later the rocket assembly were carried out under inhumane living conditions by concentration camp prisoners, whose procurement and guarding was the responsibility of the SS. Himmler entrusted the overall management of the cave construction to SS brigade leader Hans Kammler, a "ruthless but capable robot" 228 who was the armamer

221 FB, 19./22. 8. 1943, point 24.

222 So Himmler according to *Speer,* The Slave State, p. 290. - Himmler convinced the "Führer" with his offer, especially because he insisted on absolute secrecy of the A-4 production and therefore originally "only Germans" were used for it wanted to leave (FB, July 8, 1943, point 20).

223 *Speer,* The Slave State, p. 289; sa *Irl'ing,* Secret Weapons, p. 144 and p. 244; *Demps,* Aus- construction, p. 1211.; *DZW,* Vol. 4, p. 412.

224 About Himmler's ambitions and the disadvantages of the cooperation between the SS and the Ministry of Armaments are reported, albeit with apologetic exaggeration, *Speer,* The Slave State, p. 285 ff.

225 FB, 19./22. 8. 1943, point 24.

226 *Demps,* Expansion, p. 123.

227 *Dieckmann,* Conditions of Existence, p. 48.

228 So *Speer* in his last book (The Slave State, p. 332). - Kammler, as construction director in the RLM with Speer, probably already known from the first years of the war, was made head of the entire SS construction department by Himmler in the fall of 1941. As such

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Minister enthusiastically praised him in mid-December for his truly unique act, "transforming the underground facilities in Niedersachswerfen from a raw state in an almost impossibly short time of two months into a factory that has no comparable example in Europe (she! - DE) and, moreover, stands unsurpassed even by American standards" 229 - unconcerned by the indescribable, inhumane conditions in which he himself had seen the prisoners working in the caves a week before.230

The Mittelwerk, pioneer of the underground relocation in the last period of the war, represented, regardless of the ambitions of the SS, a specific "state monopolistic enterprise of the Speer Ministry"231 in which the German monopolies used the SS as a direct accomplice of arms production and profit-making. They thus renounced any concealment of the relationship of exploitation, which was caused by the dominant role of extra-economic coercion - of sheer t
was deformed into something similar to slavery.232

Occupied territories

Hitler's decree of September 2 , 1943 applied "to the area of the Greater German Reich including the incorporated eastern territories and the protectorate." 233 An "order from the Führer on the decree on the concentration of the war economy" of September 5, 234, which was not published, declared it valid "also for Alsace, for Lorraine and Luxembourg, Lower Styria, the occupied areas of Carinthia and Carniola, for the Bialystok district and for the General Government". As far as the other occupied areas were concerned, a formulation was made elected, which took into account the ambitions of the Foreign Office, but de facto regulated things similarly: “For the occupied territories that are not mentioned in paragraph 1, the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production can take responsibility for all measures in the area of raw materials and give instructions on production to the Reich Commissioners, the military commanders and the other German administrative bodies"; If necessary, the consent of the
Speer finally secured himself on September 12 , 1943, the day after the Wehrmacht seized Italian territory, including Rome, that was under German control

In addition to concentration camp buildings, he also designed the "Peace (construction) program of the Reichsführer-SS", ie a 13 billion RM post-war plan for SS and police buildings and bases throughout Europe, including the "new Eastern region". (ibid., p. 406ff.).

229 BA Koblenz, R 3/1585, Speer to Kammler, December 17, 1943.

230 *Chronicle of the RMf RuK,* 1943 II, Bl. 88, December 10, 1943; *Speer,* Memories, p. 380; *Speer,* The Slave State, p. 300 ff.

231 *Dieckmann, Götz,* On the relationship between monopolies and the SS in the fascist war economy, examined using the example of the Dora concentration camp, in: *Deutsch/,and in the debate between socialism and imperialism.* Contributions to the latest German history. Festschrift for Walter Bartei (WZ d. Humboldt University Berlin, Ges.- u. Linguistics R., XIX (1970)12), p. 157.

232 For more detailed information about the Mittelwerk and “Dora,” see the cited works by *Bartel, Dieckman* and *Demps;* see *DZW,* Vol. 4, p. 411f.

233 *RGBl.* 1943 I, p. 530 (§ 6).

234 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 8440, Bl. 49. Hereafter also the following.

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war zone under German military administration, "with rapid access ... the sole authority to exploit the Italian armament capacity".235 A corresponding decree from Hitler, signed that day, was given to Hitler again the next day, September 13th Signature presented, " in order to emphasize that this power of attorney remains valid even after the Duce's liberation ." Minister of Armaments - D. E.) can transfer machine tools and other equipment from air-threatened areas in particular to other companies, including those of the Reich, for the duration of the war." 237 Within a few weeks, the Armaments Ministry set up its "Italian Staff", a special organization for Italy, whose competencies overlapped heavily with others in the hopeless administrative confusion that soon spread there, but
which nevertheless played a decisive role the country's economic plunder. 238 The head of the organization was Major General Hans Leyers, previously an armaments inspector, an "extraordinarily energetic gentleman who tried to take charge of everything that somehow even marginally touched on armaments issues" .239 Leyers described his function itself: "My task here in Italy is primarily to keep the industries in northern Italy operational and to use them in the service of German armaments and war production." 240 He also strives to "in the central Italian area (which was threatened by the Allied offensive - D. E.) to dismantle production facilities and relocate them to the north or to Germany, as well as to deliver important raw materials and products necessary in Germany to Germany."241 Leyers began his work by transferring the industrial facilities from Rome remove and reinstall it in Northern Italy.242

The organization's experts also included Major General Ernst Becht, formerly head of the raw materials department in the Defense Economics and Armaments Office of the OKW, "who had resurfaced from obscurity because of his great knowledge" 243, and Willy Schlieker, who had been working for some time Vögler and Rohland were an iron and steel expert from the United Steel Works who were seconded to the Ministry of Armaments.244 Speer consolidated the position of the Ministry of Armaments in Italy thanks to his close relationships with Ambassador Rudolf Rahn, the “plenipotentiary of the Greater German Empire in Italy” and “un-crowned King of Italy " 245, ar

235 *Chronicle of the RM{RuK,* 1943 II, BI. 26, 11/13. 9. 1943.
236 Ibid. - Mussolini was attacked by an SS commando unit from the Ge in the course of September 12th.
captivity (see *DZW,* Vol. 3, p. 645).
237 BA Koblenz, R 3/1988, Hitler decree v. September 13, 1943.
238 A closer examination of the German occupation and occupation administration in Italy remains a research desideratum for the time being.
239 ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, film 19 491; Sts. a. D. Mussehl to Kab.-rat Killy (Reich Chancellery lei), April 27, 1944.
240 Leyers to Reichsstelle Steine und Erden, November 19, 1943, quoted from *DZW,* vol. 3, p. 651.
241 Ibid.
242 As note 239.
243 *Chronicle of the RM{RuK,* 1943 II, BI. 33, September 27, 1943.
244 *Janssen,* p. 251.
245 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 10 738, letter from. Gen.-Maj. v. Tempelhoff (unnamed

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German military administration and former State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Economics.

"The rapid evaluation of the Italian capacities for the German armaments potential," emphasized the Armaments Minister, "is of absolutely crucial importance." 246 Like vultures, the German arms monopolies and the departments involved also pounced on raw materials and machines "for particularly important production" 247 and had them transported to Germany. As early as mid-September, for example, everything was in place to "clear out Alfa Romeo's machine tools , Fiat etc. to Germany" 2 8 met. From September 15th to October 31st , 1943 alone , they deported 4,800 t of production facilities and 68,200 t of raw materials and other materials from Italy.249 This operation was led by the head of the department, Walther Schieber.250 At Speer's suggestion, Hitler also approved the significant German exports to Italy, which, as the armaments minister calculated, would bring "significant relief for our entire armaments industry"; deliveries should "only be made for our armaments interests." 251 In the ambiguous attitude of the German imperialists towards the Italian economy - productive exploitation their capacities on the one hand, robbery and plunder on the other - what had happened in the rest of occupied Europe was only repeated in an accelerated sequence. A similar procedure was followed with the Italian workers, some of whom were held in "arms protection factories" 252 , some of whom were transported to Germany as civilian workers and there "exclusively supplied to the commercial war economy" 253.

In the situation of the summer/autumn of 1943, when resistance to occupation, terror and plunder spread to ever wider sections of the population in all occupied countries and the influx of forced laborers driven to Germany dried up, those responsible for the German war economy made a new attempt to to put the European economic potential within its jurisdiction into its service as completely and concentratedly as possible. After Hitler's decrees of September 1943 , a centralization of the economic power of fascist-controlled Europe, for which diverse and confusing administrative structures and areas of competence had previously represented an almost insurmountable obstacle, became within reach.

The circles around the Armaments Ministry had a variant at the end of the summer

General) January 26, 1944. - Rahn was promoted by Hitler from envoy to ambassador on November 22, 1943 *(KTB of the OKW,* vol. 3/2, p. 1298, November 22, 1943).

246 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 19622, Speer to Karl Hermann Frank, September 23, 1943.

247 *Janssen,* p. 251.

248 BA Koblenz, R 3/1565, spear in d. Meeting with the General Aircraft Master („St/GL-BuM-meeting") dated September 15, 1943.

249 *Germany's armament in the Second World War,* p. 308. - Figures apparently too low in *Groehler, Olaf! Schumann, Wolfgang,* On the alliance relationships of fascist Germany in the Second World War, in *Z(G,* 7/1980, p. 639.

250 *Janssen,* p. 251.

251 FB, 11./12. 9. 1943, point 20.

252 Ibid., point 5.

253 ZStA Potsdam, Siemens AG, No. 5624, p. 133, decree RMfRuK regarding "Deployment of the Italians" v. September 18, 1943.

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"European" economic policy was drawn up that best met their production and profit needs and, according to their calculations, promised the greatest possible success with the least possible effort. 2M The principle was to use the resources of operational space and mechanical equipment that still existed in Germany To make raw materials and labor available as completely as possible for the production of war equipment by largely shutting down the consumer goods industry, i.e. to make them available to the arms monopolies. A considerable part of the demand for consumer goods should come from the production of the occupied countries, especially the industrially developed countries. covered, consumer goods production there is expanded for this purpose and significant orders are relocated there.

This concept, which was primarily tailored to Western Europe, primarily France, also represented a very far-reaching variant of the "total war " in Germany.“Its realization had to de facto result in the liquidation of the German consumer goods industry and the planned post-war expansion this industry, which realized a large part of German exports. But the acute overall interest of the ruling class in maintaining and increasing war production - which coincided with the profit interests of the large arms companies - now outweighed partial and future interests.

The Armaments Minister laid Hitler to rest on 11/12. September detailed the plan to consolidate and increase the potential of the occupied territories under his aegis. Hitler “in principle” declared that he “agreed to carry out European production planning - possibly through the creation of a production office.

At the same time, he agrees that France must also be represented on an equal footing with the other nations in this production planning. He takes it for granted that Germany, as the leading power in Europe, also retains clear leadership in production planning."255 Three weeks later, Speer had Hitler expressly confirm once again that he was "along with the course "agreed" to establish consumer goods production in the occupied territories and especially in France.256 The spectacular start of the new "European" course

was the official invitation from the Vichy government's minister for industrial production and trade, Jean Bichelonne, in mid-September 1943 to Berlin. Bichelonne was received as a state guest and was very courteous. Speer conferred with him for several days.257 He obliged the collaboration minister to provide him with expanded deliveries of consumer goods such as clothing, shoes, textiles, and furniture - of course primarily for the Wehrmacht In return, we must concede that no more workers would be deliveriesdeported to Germany from the French companies that work for these (including basic and raw material production, transport, food).

254 See *Chronicle of the RMfBuM,* 1943 II, BI. Hf., August 27, 1943. The problems in this regard were immediately dealt with in a summarized manner after the planning office was formed (see *Schumann, Wolfgang,* The economic-political survival strategy of German imperialism in the final phase of the Second World War (hereinafter: survival strategy), in *ZfG,* 6/1979, p. 500f.)

255 FB, 11./12. 9. 1943, point 14.

256 FB, September 30th/1st 10. 1943, point 22.

257 Bichelonne probably stayed in Berlin from September 16th to September 19th, 1943; Different information in *Speer,* Memories, p. 323, *Janssen,* p. 126 and *Kehrl,* p. 316.

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On October 5th, the Minister of Armaments signed a decree on such "barrier" or "protection companies" (S-companies).258 The system of such companies later expanded to 10,000 companies.259It was also expanded to Holland, Belgium and Italy. It was not difficult to see that this system was just another, albeit more hidden, form of exploitation of the countries concerned, which at least offered the collaborating circles of the local bourgeoisie the opportunity to pocket a larger share of the profits themselves, and which supplemented or replaced the deportation of workers to Germany with another, modified type of forced labor for German imperialism. This also contained the political meaning of an illusory and demagogic formulation such as the "equal rights" of occupied countries - absurdly used in the same breath as the demand for "clear leadership" by Germany.

The core and final piece of the organizational and regulatory work on the relocation abroad, which was drawn up in the following weeks, was the extensive double decree of the Minister of Armaments of December 3, 1943.260 Decree I stipulated the new tasks, the transfer of executive powers to the "steering offices" of the Ministry of Armaments and the principles and methods , according to which they had to proceed. It was the “duty of German industry, part of its self-responsibility and task of state production control,” it said, to force the relocation of orders in order to “increase the industrial capacity of the occupied western territories (meaning France , Belgium and the Netherlands - DE) of the war economy to the greatest possible extent. This must be done "fortai, according to plan according to war economy necessities". "The Reich's interest requires, above all, the increased relocation of general consumer goods, since their production in the Reich is restricted in favor of armaments production, but supplies must be maintained."

He would ensure, the minister assured, "that the workers necessary for military production are left in the occupied western territories in order to work in their country for the Reich and thus for the defense of Europe."
He hereby transferred full responsibility for the utilization of the industrial capacity of the occupied Western European countries "to the bodies responsible for production control (main committees, main rings, economic groups and specialist groups) for their respective production areas". "Relocation associations" of German companies to impose corresponding "relocation requirements" and to promote and monitor the implementation of these requirements with the help of their branch offices in the occupied countries, the so-called state representatives. This means that "as a principle, the state-controlled, ie "Relocation" planned, prescribed and monitored by the control centers of the Reich and "appropriate to the wartime needs of the Reich, the raw material supply situation and the performance of the economy of the western regions".

According to Decree II, from January 15, 1944, orders that the Wehrmacht and the occupying authorities were to send to companies in the "hundreds of local procurement points".

258 *Chronicle of the RM{RuK,* 1943 II, page 38, October 5, 1943; *Kehrl,* p. 317 and p. 345. - The scope of the decree was the occupied Western European countries and Norway.

259 *Speer,* Memories, p. 324.

260 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 20308, p. 152ff., “Decree (1 and II) on the relocation of orders in the occupied western territories" dated December 3, 1943. Hereafter also the following.

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occupied Western European countries may no longer be awarded, otherwise "a planned, centrally controlled and monitored relocation of German orders in the areas in question would be unfeasible". From now on, the “procurement projects” of these bodies can only be implemented via the main committees, main rings, economic and specialist groups as the only central “steering bodies”.

However, it still took quite some time for the decrees to be implemented. Significant resistance also had to be overcome, which came primarily from the Wehrmacht offices and the GBA.261 Before the new system of exploitation could finally bear its full fruit for the German war economy, it had to be weakened by the stubborn resistance of the affected peoples in the course of the Liberation of Western Europe collapses. But for a good six months it represented the most developed form of state monopolistic control and exploitation of the economic resources of the occupied Western European countries that had emerged in the course of the war.

The “ Tapeworms/,ate”

The significant changes in the regulatory system of the war economy in favor of the power of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production made it seem necessary to the Minister of Armaments to reorganize and standardize his power apparatus and to legally fix his area of competence. His "Decree on the distribution of tasks in the war economy" of October 29, 1943 26 2, also known as the tapeworm decree because of its length, marked the end of a phase of concentration of power and organizational restructuring in the state-monopoly system of the war economy against the background of the military defeats Kursk to Charkov to Kiev, in Africa and Italy, which shook the fascist regime to its foundations.

The decree fixed the complicated structure of the ministry from top to bottom, supplemented by new organs such as the planning office, the raw materials office and the production office for consumer goods, and specified in detail the expanded tasks and powers of the committees and rings.

Leading monopoly representatives welcomed the decree as an "almost revolutionary development in the management of German arms production." They praised it in particular as a "novel, exemplary masterstroke of organizational design" because the committees and rings as a "fundamental basic mandate ... according to the new All other departments, including those of the Wehrmacht, were given full and exclusive responsibility for 1. the planning of occupancy [and] 2. the implementation of production" in a clear and consistent formulation.263

261 It was only on April 13, 1944 that Colonel General Fromm, as head of HRüst/BdE, ordered the transfer of contract awarding in the occupied Western European countries and in Italy to the organs of the RMfRuK for his area (BA Koblenz, R 13 V/102, decree dated April 13, 1944).

262 *News from the RMfRuK,* No. 31, October 26, 1943 (as an independent supplement). Hereafter also the following. The decree was apparently drafted by Kehrl *(Kehrl,* p. 312).

263 VEB Carl Zeiss Jena company archive, No. 22 700, presentation by. Heinrich Küppenbender, managing director of the Zeiss Group and head of the HA precision mechanics and optics of the RMfRuK, on “Leadership and management work in the organization of precision mechanical and optical war production” from January 12, 1944. Hereafter also the following.

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For this purpose, the main committees and main rings were given the legislative powers, including penal powers, which resulted from the goods traffic regulations and were previously reserved for the Reich Minister of Economics and his organs (Reich offices); That is, they had the right to order manufacturing and construction bans, for typing, for company occupancy and manufacturing instructiőns. The far-reaching independence" and the implementation of "military leadership ideas" in Jena), "self-responsibilityªthe anization are, as Heinrich Küppenbender (Carl Zeiss or head of the Main Committee for Precision Mechanics and Optics, approvingly explained, "a considerable recognition of the work successes achieved so far of the committees". The economic and specialist groups of the ᴳ"anization of the commercial economy" "Or have now been fully integrated into the system of "self-responsibility" of the armaments industry. This means that "the Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production is now largely responsible for the involvement of their capabilities and apparatus." Küppenbender rightly concluded: "The position and tasks of their central organization, the Reich Industry Group, are naturally strongly affected by the fundamental change in the tasks of the economic groups."
In the field of armaments production, the economic groups became executive bodies, "working staffs" of the committees and rings that ruled here. In the management of the groups and the committees or rings, personal union was established everywhere - in the given case and if this had not happened before. 264 In the area of consumer goods production, the economic groups "now essentially assumed the function of a main committee."265 This was related to the fact that the bloated "General Equipment" main committee was dissolved and its special and working committees were partly transferred to the Armaments Supply Office, partly were transferred to the production office.266 The wave of reorganization had immediate personnel consequences for the main shipbuilding committee. Even before the tapeworm decree was published, Speer took the opportunity to appoint Rudolf Blohm (Blohm & Voss), whom he had appointed as head of the shipbuilding department in July The main committee had also had Otto Merker replac

264 Fundamental agreements about this probably dated back to the spring of 1942, at least long before the time of the "Führer decree" of September 2, 1943 and the tapeworm decree: "It was agreed *at the time* between Mr. Reichsminister Speer and Mr. Zangen that at the "In terms of staffing the committees and rings, staff union should be created, if possible, with the offices of the organization of the commercial economy (ie the economic and specialist groups - DE)." (ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 8956, Bl. 7, HA Bau an RWi f, December 22, 1943; my emphasis). According to a file note dated November 3, 1944, at that point in time, a year later, there was a personal union between main committees and economic groups everywhere except in four cases (ibid., Bl. 21).

265 Ibid., Bl. 5, Rs. HA General Device (Gocrz), November 3, 1943 (cited decree RM.fRnK of October 25. 1943).

266 Ibid.

267 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 9085, Bl. 50. Order of !Icrkers by RWiM, September 27, 1943. - Biohm resigned on September 11 (ibid., Bl. 45, Biohm to RWiM, September 11, 1943). He was accused, among other things, of carrying out a large part of the group work "under the label of the main committee, which is at Blohm & Voss (in Hamburg-DE) and not at Economic group (in Berlin - DE) was settled" (ibid., Bl. 48, AN Kehrl for Sts. Landfried, September 3, 1943).

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industrial capacities "exclusively on the submarines" 268 , while the rest of the Navy's production program continued to vegetate under the telling name "powerlessness program" 269.
Finally, in November 1943, a new main committee for electrical engineering was formed under Friedrich Lüschen as a combination of the various committees and rings in the electrical industry, including the main group for electrical engineering products.270 The Minister of Armaments also used the opportunity of the reorganization to head his ministerial apparatus to consolidate and merge even more closely with the mechanism of "self-responsibility" of the arms monopolies. In mid-October he asked his heads of office to name one or more leading representatives of the economy as their "representatives" or "successors", "on the one hand, in order to have a trained replacement in the event of a failure, and on the other hand, in order to incorporate the industry's experience into the decisions in all important decisions" _271 After his suggestion, men like Walter Rohland, Hans Malzacher (mountain hut group), Wilhelm Schaaf came (BMW) and Walter Rafelsberger (district economic advisor for the Ostmark district) in question.272 At the head of office meeting on November 3 , 1943, a "distribution" was already made: Rohland was appointed as deputy to Lieutenant General Kurt Waeger (Armaments Office), Schaaf and Malzacher as deputy confirmed by Schieber (Armaments Supply Office) and Rafelsberger as representatives of Seebauer (Production Office).273 Saur (Technical Office) only received a deputy (Dietrich Stahl) later, in 1944 .
The reorganization at the top ministerial level was completed by the minister expanding the central office at the turn of the year 1943/44 in order to keep the entire, greatly expanded apparatus, but especially personnel policy, better under control. The position of the head of the office, Willy Liebe!, was strengthened; Karl Maria Hettlage acted as his representative, who also remained head of the General Department for Economics and Finance, which was now included in the Central Office: “The head of the Central Office, Mayor Liebe!, representative Prof. Hettlage, represents the minister in all political matters and is in charge of all overarching matters of the ministry in dealings with the highest Reich authorities and party offices as well as in the processing of laws, regulations and decrees."274

Reorganization of the Reich Ministry of Economics

In contrast, the position and competencies of most of the institutions previously managed or supervised by the Reich Ministry of Economics, both central and regional, deteriorated significantly. The Tapeworm Decree took away from the Reich authorities the “responsibility for the implementation of production” and the “control of the

268 ZP-P, September 15, 1943, 47th session.
269 Ibid.
270 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 3384, back cover of HA Elektrotechnik (Lüschen) from November 22, 1943.
271 *Chronicle Ms RMfRuK,* 1943 II, Bl. 54, October 13, 1943.
272 Ibid.
273 Ibid., Bl. 65, November 3, 1943.
274 House communication RMfRuK, quoted in *chronicle* MS *RMfRuK,* 1944 1, Bl. 10, mid-January 1944; sa ibid, 1943 II, Bl. 94 ff., December 21, 1943.

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economic offices in the area of occupancy planning and production" and transferred them to the committees and rings.275 They were left with "essentially only statistical tasks - in cooperation with the planning office - and distribution functions".276 The role of the Reich Chamber of Commerce has always been the case - and especially during the war years - anything but big, shrank to insignificance. The economic groups of the Reich Industry Group, one of the most important pillars of the state-monopolistic position of the Reich Ministry of Economics, were integrated into the industrial "self-responsibility" apparatus of the Ministry of Armaments. Finally, the remaining functions of the regional chambers of commerce in the area of order control were transferred to the area of responsibility of the Ministry of Armaments. 277 The Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs renewed its leadership after the amputation of its most important members and functions in November 1943. SS brigade leader (afterwards: SS group leader) Franz Hayler became the new state secretary, main department head (II) and permanent representative of the SS state secretary -Brigade leader Otto Ohlendorf was appointed.278 Both high-ranking SS leaders were personally well acquainted with Himmler and were members of his “circle of friends”.279 Both had held leading positions in the “Organization of the Commercial Economy” since the 1930s: Hayler was head of the Reich Trade Group, Ohlendorf its general manager. From these positions, her advancement into the ministry, which was now largely limited to the distribution of consumer goods, seemed plausible. Nevertheless, the process was unusual: "It caused quite a stir," said an IG Farben director after the war

State Secretary Landfried had to leave the Ministry of Economics and an SS man

Hayler, together with Ohlendorf, who had an even higher SS rank than Hayler (apparently this refers to his function in the RSHA _:_ DE), became his successor." The IG Farben group assessed the situation as "that "The SS (Himmler?) was of the opinion that the Ministry of Armaments had too much power, which they tried to prevent." 280

The actual key figure of the SS leadership in this revival was not the insignificant Hayler, but Ohlendorf, a still young, ambitious fascist with university education in economics and law, who had been one of them since 1936

275 See note 262.

276 Weyres-11. Le11etzow, p. 100; see AO Funks and Speers in the tapeworm decree (note 262).

277 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 8956, pp. 18 and 18 R, Rs. RMfRuK, March 8, 1944.

278 *DZW,* Vol. 4, p. 446f. On November 16, 1943, both were “entrusted with the management of the business,” and on January 30, 1944, they were both fully entrusted with their functions and appointed State Secretary respectively. Ministerial director appointed (ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, film 19619, personnel files d. RWiM). Incorrect dating in Speer, The Slave State, p. 114. - The previous State Secretary in the R WiM, Friedrich Walter Landfried, went to Italy as head of the German military administration and special representative of the RMfRuK. The management of Main Department III Foreign Trade was entrusted to an experienced foreign trade (export) expert of Monopoly Capital, board member and director of Ferrostaal AG Franz Kirchfeld, whose company belonged to the Gutehoffnungshütte group (Haniel Group).

279 See Vogelsang, Reinhard, The Himmler Circle of Friends, Göttingen/Zurich/Frankfurt a. M. 1972, p. 157, p. 162 and p. 164.

280 ZStA Potsdam, Case VI (IG Farben trial), Film 413, Doc. NI-1294, Statement by. Günther Frank-Fahle v. July 7, 1945, ex. “IG personnel who took positions in the government”. From this and other documents it also emerges that the IG Farben group was sympathetic to the new line in the RWiM and supported it.

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had a distinguished career in the Reich Security Main Office, as commander of the SS "Einsatzgruppe D" in the USSR in 1941/42, responsible for the murder of at least 90,000 Soviet citizens 28 1 and now the powerful head of the SS's domestic German intelligence service (Amtschef III: SO Ohlendorf apparently served Himmler as a direct informant, especially on economic and social policy issues, and was to be groomed as the next man in the Reich Ministry of Econo The background to the appointment of the two SS leaders and police generals, who since then led the ministry largely independently with Funk's tacit consent, has not yet been fully clarified.282 What is certain is that they took office on Himmler's instructions and in consultation with Bormann The task was to "Weaken Speer's position"283 and were intended to create a counterweight against the overwhelming state-monopolistic concentration of power in the Ministry of Armaments, which, according to Schumann's assumption284, was also in line with *the* Reich Industry Group. Ohlendorf, praised by Speer as "one of the most brilliant thinkers of National Socialism" apostrophized285, as SD boss and SS ideologue, he had deep suspicions about the “self-responsibility of industry” from the start. He considered the rule to be detrimental to the mass support of the fascists, especially in the middle classes, and therefore politically dangerous to expose the monopolies in the war economy too openly and to let the other bourgeois classes feel them too blatantly. He was an opponent of the preference for the "optimal companies", ie *the* "best companies", and the "mammoth production" that "massified" people.286 The SS had already made moves in the autumn of 1942, with Ohlendorf's active help to infiltrate Minister Funks into a key position in the Reich Ministry of Economics and to transfer to hi

281 According to Ohlendorf's own statement in the Einsatzgruppen trial (Case IX).

282 More recently, in more detail on this , *Herbst, Ludolf,* The Total War and the Order of the Economy. The war economy in the area of tension between politics, ideology and propaganda 1939 to 1945, Stuttgart 1982, p. 255ff.

283 BA Koblenz, R 581377, AN SD-Leitabteilung Berlin (f. Ohlendorf), October 12, 1944.

284 *Schumann,* Survival Strategy, p. 507.

285 *Speer,* The Slave State, p. 123.

286 See BA Koblenz, R 712016, R 712017 etc., speeches and speech drafts by Ohlendorf, especially from May to December 1944; *Speer,* The Slave State, p. 124 ff. and passim; *Schumann,* Survival Strategy, p. 506. - As early as August 26, 1942, Ohlendorf had written a report for Himmler in which he opposed "the intertwining of state authority and private-sector interests by the same people" *(Speer,* The Slave State , p. 106); "the fact that economic leaders now took the place of the state and took over the authority of the state," he explained his view after the war, was for him "one of the most essential basic prerequisites for the economic loss of our war." (ibid., p. 107).

287 Ibid., p. 108. At that point in time, Himmler, apparently at a hint from the "Führer's headquarters", felt compelled to reject the plan. Ohlendorf would only "use himself up" "like everyone else" in a few months; because " During wartime, a fundamental change in our total capitalist economy is not possible" (AN Himmlers dated October 21, 1942, quoted there, p. 111). However, Himmler's "anti-capitalism" could not be taken literally in view of the great influence that the industrialists and bankers, for example in the "Circle of Friends", had on his opinion formation in economic policy

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On the 20th/21st In August 1943, immediately after his appointment as Minister of the Interior, Himmler finally negotiated with Funk that his informants Hayler and Ohlendorf would move into the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs with the rank of State Secretary and Ministerial Director . All of these negotiations remained hidden from Speer.
It also seems reasonable to conclude that Himmler wanted to use the Reich Ministry of Economics to establish important economic and social policy positions at home and abroad, which, according to the SS, would pay off in full after the end of the war. The point in time from which effective post-war planning was actually carried out from here and Ohlendorf in his new position became, as Schumann claims 289, **"the decisive 'key figure' in fascist post-war planning" should certainly not be set before the spring of 1944. In particular, Ohlendorf and Hayler's own contribution to substantial economic and economic-political preparation for the post-war period should not be overestimated: on the one hand because of the catastrophic lack of insight into military and political reality, from which Ohlendorf was by no means free, and on the other hand because of the utopian character of the "anti-monopoly" vehemently pursued by Hayler and Ohlendorf**
Middle-class propaganda, which, presented in the spirit of an atavistic and racist small-owner ideology, had its very real basis in the fear of the crumbling of the fascist mass base.

For the German big bourgeoisie, however, it was important that the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs from then on direct its main focus in the domestic political area on carefully observing the social effects of the "total war" and preparing for the reorganization of the economic and social structure after the end of the war. Another important one Function of the Reich Ministry of Economics and especially the two new ones SS greats at its head was to politically empower the centers of post-war economic planning - committees such as the "European Circle", the working group for foreign trade issues and the "Small Working Group" of the RGI, which were mainly supported by industrial and banking circles legitimize and secure.
It would also be necessary to examine in more detail whether the ministry's new and old foreign trade experts (Franz Kirchfeld, Gustav Schlotterer, Karl Lindemann 290) developed a noteworthy, independent post-war foreign economic strategy

questions and probably also about his decisions in the summer/autumn of 1943.
Funk, on the other hand, pursued a simpler purpose with the project, namely his ministry to protect against further loss of position.

288 Funk did not get through with the request to appoint Ohlendorf with the rank of undersecretary (ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, film 1961!), personnel files R\Vi J, Funk to Lammers, January 15, 1944).

289 ***Schumann, Wolfgang,*** Political aspects of the post-war planning of fascist German imperialism in the final phase of the second war (hereinafter: post-war planning), in: *Z{G,* 5/1979, p. 398.

290 Lindemann, owner d. Bremen export company C. Melchers & Co., VAR of the North German Lloyd, member of the circle of friends 1-Iimmlcr, quickly made a career in 1‼44/4.5; In July/August 1944 he replaced Albert Pietzsch as head of the Reich Chamber of Commerce (ZStA Potsdam, RWii\I, No. 9063, BI. 107, radio to Lindemann, July 31st (August 3rd) 19!, 4.). Lindemann was appointed by RWiM as an official negotiator in foreign trade issues, e.g. ß. sent to Switzerland (ZStA Potsdam, case VI (IG Farben trial), film 413, doc. NI-1294, statement by Günther Frank-Fahle dated July 7, 1945 about "IG personnel", that positions in the government").

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and policy was developed, to what extent they were involved in the parallel planning of the Reich Industrial Group and other institutions 291 and what role their activities played in the concept of Ohlendorf and the SS.

3. The perfection of power of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production and their limits

„We must expect that the Russian war will last considerably longer than we expect 292 This fear, expressed by Minister Speer at the Central Planning meeting on February 12 , 1943, ten days after the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, reflected the awareness of the critical situation that the leaders had circles of monopoly capital had won in the face of the terrible defeat.
Unrest and uncertainty spread among them. Alleged and actual failures in the war economy were remembered. The arms monopolies and the fascist leadership basically agreed that the critical situation had to be used as an opportunity for a comprehensive reconstruction of the state monopoly mechanism in the war economy, which would enable the war to be continued with increased force.

The aim of the monopolies was twofold. The subjugation of their own and the peoples of the occupied and subjugated countries to the laws of war production and thus to their dictates should be as total as possible. At the same time, they sought more emphatically than ever to concentrate all regulatory power in the war economy. This strategy corresponded to objective tendencies of the imperialist war economy, of which they had been more or less clearly aware for a long time, but which the radically changed war situation now forced upon them unavoidably.
However, the strict pursuit of such a course of "total mobilization" and the expansion of the arms monopolies' regulatory power to the entire war economy also implied political consequences.
The Armaments Minister therefore tried to persuade the regime's top political representatives - especially in the area of domestic policy and propaganda - to cooperate more intensively with his ministry and to use their political weight for his purposes. From the end of 1942 he focused on maintaining close contact with Goebbels, who was considered the leading political and propagandistic representative of the “total war”. Funk and Ley also belonged to the circle. Göring was to be brought in and take over his role as chairman of the Council of Ministers The Reich's defense could be used to shake the position of the "three-man college" (Keitel, Lammers, Bormann)293 appointed by Hitler's decree of January 13 , 1943 , whose activities became bogged down in "insignificant details" and by which , according to Speer,

291 For this, see the first investigations by *Schumann,* post-war planning, p. 368 ff.; *same,* over-life strategy, p. 500ff. (507).
292 ZP-P, February 12, 1943, 32nd session.
293 *The Second World War.* Documents, p. 186 ff., Doc. 42, "Decree of the Führer on the comprehensive deployment of men and women for tasks of Reich defense" dated January 13, 1943, paragraph IV; see also *DZW,* vol. 3, p 202 and pp. 206ff.

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no "activation of our armament" was to be expected. 29 But Göring's star, namely his reputation with Hitler, had been on the decline for a long time, especially since Stalingrad. Furthermore, due to his moral depravity, he was no longer capable of any energy output Himmler took the second position within the Hitler clique, a circumstance that led the Minister of Armaments to form an alliance of interests with him in the summer/autumn of 1943 .

Speer's conception included, above all, extracting the utmost in terms of power, stability and political prestige from the precarious military and armament situation for the mechanism of "self-responsibility" of the armaments industry that he organized. The extraordinary powers that Hitler gave him at the beginning of 1943 -Decree on the "Adolf Hitler Tank Program" was an essential step on this path. On May 13 , 1943, he had leading monopoly representatives and other representatives of the armaments industry invited to him by Hitler, who, according to Goebbels, Testimony, "discussed the measures to be taken now with the armament captains all day long". 295 Speer used his close relationship with Goebbels for a massive propaganda campaign for "total war". His speech on June 5 , 1943 in the Berlin Sportpalast 296 was a highlight of this propaganda, through which he specifically drew general attention to the state monopoly armaments mechanism he represented. By manipulating public opinion in his favor, he hoped to increase the reputation and influence of this mechanism vis-à-vis the state and party authorities, especially at the district level.

Here, for the first time, Speer publicly named a number of the "leading minds" of the war economy and announced their decoration with the Knight's Cross for the War Merit Cross and other high orders: Pleiger, Krauch, Röchling, Rohland, William Werner, Fr dag and Heyne , Geilenberg, Tix, Degenkolb, Porsche, Erich Müller and Albert Wolff, as well as Saur and Schieber, "who also emerged from the industry." 297 On June 7th he presented himself to Hitler again with the monopoly representatives, who personally presented them with their medals.29B The high endowments that were distributed at the same time remained unknown to the public.299

a) "Central control" of the war economy

The successes weighed more heavily than medals and endowments in the further concentration of state monopoly regulatory power that the ministry claimed for itself. The climax of the concentration movement of 1943, which had already begun with the takeover of naval armaments, was the events of autumn 1943 , starting with Hitler's decrees of September 2nd and 5th . The turning point had already taken place

29'i Speer, Memories, p. 269.

295 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 10807, Goebbels-TB, entry from. May 15, 1943; spear, memories, see 278f.

296 Excerpts in Anatomy of War, p. 424 f., Doc. 228.

297 Ibid.

298 Bleyer, Total War, p. 170. - The wave of awards had been coming from Speer for several years Prepared for weeks (FB, May 1, 1943, point 11).

299 FB, June 28, 1943, point 13: Here we are talking about an "endowment list" in which "an endowment of RM 250,000 is to be provided for Degenkolb at a later date by order of the Führer."

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During the war on the Volga, all those problems were put on the agenda that were connected with the "total mobilization" and with the reorganization of the state monopoly mechanism in the war economy; but the devastating defeats and losses of the summer and autumn in the German-Soviet economy Front, combined with the retreats in Italy and the Allied air raids on Germany, accelerated the course of events significantly; the concentration of state monopolistic regulatory power in the German war economy reached a new level.

Speer was already able to claim in his appeal to the armaments industrialists of September 15th, if not without exaggeration, at least with a certain justification: "The entire productive power of the Greater German Reich will now be deployed and directed by a single central office."300 With this However, "central office" did not mean a single office or just the ministry as such. Rather, it was a conglomerate of ministerial authorities, interministerial bodies and industry "self-responsibility" institutions, all of which had in common the leadership of the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production or his representatives: above all the ministry itself and in particular its new planning office, the central planning and the now completed system of industrial “self-responsibility”, ie the committees, rings, business groups, imperial associations and development commissions.

The planning office was the authority that actually aimed for a kind of overall economic planning. With the Planning Office, the Ministry of Armaments announced its claim to take the fundamental questions of economic planning into its own hands and to record and "steer" the prospective development of its own economy and that of the affected areas, at least in statistical and balance terms.

However, the activity of the office within the framework of the "Greater German Reich" remained relatively limited. In the "European" framework, however, it extended to attempts to organize a "practical European economic planning" 301 and, a little later, increasingly to the preparation of a "European "Post-war economy under German leadership, an activity in which leading representatives of finance capital took a significant part.302 As much as the war events and the
acute requirements of the imperialist war economy determined and limited the planning office's radius of action, it still represented According to his claim, the “central office” that the armaments minister spoke of was most clearly visible.

The actual regulatory power in production, on the other hand, was most clearly embodied by the committees, rings and imperial associations. In particular, those three main committees (ammunition, armored cars, weapons), which existed since 1!)40, combined the full

300 *Anatomy of War,* p. 436, Doc. 237. - Around this time, the Air Force also found itself forced to fit in or subordinate itself more and more to the RMfRuK's regulatory apparatus. Speer expressed it this way in his Posen speech to the Gauleiters: "We have recently been giving all the help we can to air armament, which is still the responsibility of the Luftwaffe and the Reich Marshal." (ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 3570, speech from October 6, 1943).

301 *Schumann,* Survival Strategy, p. 501 (quote "Memorandum concerning European Economic Planning" from the Planning Office dated September 13, 1943).

302 *Schumann,* post-war planning, p. 398ff.

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Table 19

Regulatory area of the main committees for ammunition, armored cars and weapons (as of October! November 1943)

	Number of staff served	
	establishments	supervised companies
HA ammunition	4000·	450000
HA armored car	150**	160000
HA weapons	approx. 10,000 • • •	210000

• Companies are often also occupied with other production
** Of these, 90 are for the production of track chains
*** With subcontractors

Source: BA Koblenz, R 3/163, file notes from the planning office v. October 7th, October 28th and November 12th, 1943.

made and functions of a ministry of industry with those of an oversized trust.

At the end of 1943, the overall mechanism headed by the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production largely represented what the large monopolies had had in mind since the beginning of the war: a largely complete, self-contained system of economic regulation in the interests of the conduct of the war and the war goals of German imperialism and at the same time in the direct profit interests of the leading groups of German finance capital.

Leading representatives, directors and general managers of large corporations sat at the command posts of this system. One to two dozen giant corporations controlled the entire mechanism. Even what was not directly integrated into the sphere of authority of the Armaments Ministry (Air Force armament, SS operations, GB Chemistry, GBA, Agriculture) was largely dependent on the decisions of the central ministerial executive of the German arms monopolies and central planning.

The supporting and driving forces, the true rulers of the powerful regulatory and repressive apparatus in the war economy, were the large arms monopolies.
The spokesmen of bourgeois historiography deny precisely this fact.
By misunderstanding and perverting the facts, they portray the “self-responsibility of industry” as the work of the “arms dictator” Speer; it was its "carrot" for industry, insofar as it offered the industry the last refuge of "a certain freedom of movement in the totalitarian state."303 The enormous concentration of state-monopolistic regulatory power in the committees, rings and commissions of the Ministry of Armaments is reinterpreted as: a "decentralization of limited decision-making functions" to "subordinate authorities of the Speer Ministry".304 The leading positions in the system were not filled with harmless, diligent "technicians" and "experienced administrative specialists", as was already widely spread by fascist propaganda at the time , but by selected, authoritative representatives of the large corporations who, with all the means offered by the apparatus they themselves built and controlled, sought to multiply production and profits,

303 *Janssen,* p. 166.
304 *Germany's armament in the Second World War,* p. 9.

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sought to increase and prolong the genocide in order to ultimately achieve their war goals. Speer himself described Walter Rohland (deputy chairman, chairman of the board of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG since October 1943) as his "closest colleague"305, and Friedrich Lüschen (deputy chairman of the board of Siemens & Halske AG) as his "fatherly advisor"306 , Philipp Keßler (Chairman of the Board of Directors of Berg-mann-Elektricitäts-Werke AG307, which is controlled by the Siemens Group) as one of his "most energetic employees".308 These names already represented two of the most important sources of the strength and power of the Ministry of Armaments and its state-monopoly regulatory mechanism marked: the United Steelworks Group and the Siemens Group.

The United Steelworks Group undoubtedly occupied a particularly dominant position here. Rohland was head of the Main Committee on Armored Cars, and at the same time, as Speer put it, "the most prominent representative" of the Reichsvereinigung Eisen as well as executive chairman of the Industrial Council of the OKH. With Arthur Tix (Bochum Association/ijanomag), the group appointed another head of one of the most important main committees (weapons). Vögler, the chairman of the supervisory board of the group, and Ernst Poensgen were also members of the Armaments Council, Vögler and Tix were also members of the Industrial Council of the OKH. Vögler also sat on the Air Force's Industrial Council and was ultimately the dominant figure in the Ruhrstab Speer. He was significantly involved in all military-economic decisions and decisions of far-reaching importance that were made in the Armaments Ministry. Without his suggestion or his decisive advice, the Armaments Minister

made no decisions on basic economic and political questions. The same was true - in gradations - for the head of the Reich Industry Group, Wilhelm Zangen, chairman of the board of Mannesmannrohren-Werke AG and general director of the Mannesmann Group controlled by Deutsche Bank, at the same time a member of the Armaments Council and the Industrial Council of the OKH and head of the main committee "V

The apparatus of "self-responsibility" of industry, which numbered thousands of part-time employees and which itself had direct executive power and function on the scale of industrial sectors, now formed the broad monopoly-capitalist platform of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production. The representatives were decisive in this apparatus of a few dozen corporations and other large companies. The actual support and supporting force of the entire regulatory mechanism, the head of which was the Ministry of Armaments, was and remained a not very large, gradually expanding but essentially constant circle of powerful arms companies.

In addition to those already mentioned, this circle included the Reichswerke "Hermann Göring", the AEG group, the Krupp, Flick and Röchling group, the Zeiss group,

305 *Speer,* Memories, p. 350.

306 Ibid., p. 487; see ibid., p. 436.

307 Since the "demarcation of interests" or "compensation" between the two large electrical companies in the fall of 1940, Bergmann has been under the sole influence of Siemens *(Koebel-Tusk, Eberhard,* AEG. Energy - Profit - Crime. Edited by Peter Heß, Berlin 1958, p. 141).

308 *Speer,* Memories, p. 298.

309 ZP-P, November 3, 1942, 23rd session.

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Demag and others. The IG Farben Group controlled all the important regulatory centers in the chemical industry through the central positions it occupied (GB Chemistry, Reich Office for Economic Development, Economic Group Chemical Industry) and was - above all thanks to Krauch's close cooperation with the Central Planning and the Armaments Supply Office (Slide) - firmly integrated into the overall system.
At the end of 1943, **under the leadership of the Ministry of Armaments, the German monopoly economy had** merged with the fascist state into a largely unified mechanism. **This "central office" was equipped to make the German war economy as well as the entire continent, as far as it was within German control, serve the war needs of German imperialism.**

b) The "Iron Pact". Appearance in Poznan

After Himmler's appointment as Reich Minister of the Interior in August and after the concentration decrees of September 1943 , **the political constellation at the top of the regime took on a new look through Speer's alliance with Himmler. Himmler seemed to German finance capital to be the safest guarantor against the "communist danger"310; it enthusiastically welcomed his appointment as Interior Minister: "With sincere joy," wrote banker Kurt v. Schröder on behalf of the corporate owners and bankers of Himmler's "circle of friends" to him, "I welcomed your appointment as Reich Minister of the Interior... A strong hand is now certainly very necessary for the leadership of this ministry, and it is therefore on all sides, "But especially your friends feel grateful that the Führer has given you this task." 311 The Armaments Minister had previously suggested the**
"transfer of responsibility for plant security to the Reichsführer SS" and confirmed this in an agreement with Himmler on July 26, 1943.312 **At the end of August he had reached extensive agreements with Himmler regarding the forced labor of concentration camp prisoners in the underground V-weapons production.**

On October 5th, both concluded an agreement on cooperation between the

Ministry of Armaments and the SD.313 This agreement officially granted the SD extraordinary rights in the offices of the ministry, the organs of "self-administration" of industry and in all armaments factories. There was a fundamental obligation to provide information, including in secret matters, to the SD introduced: "On request

310 "Himmler's organization is the best element available for maintaining internal order and resisting communism," a representative of Allan W. Dulles cabled from Switzerland to the State Department on April 7, 1943 as the result of a conversation with Prince Maxiinilian Egon zu Hohenlohe-Langenburg, an agent and undercover agent of the RSHA with connections "to leading personalities"

***(Hass, Gerhart,* documents on the attitude of Hitler's Germany and the USA towards the Soviet Union in 1943, in *JfG,* 5/1971, p. 472f., Doc. 7).**

311 *History of the German workers' movement,* Vol. 5, Berlin 1966, p. 581, Doc. 100, v. Schröder to Himmler, August 27, 1943.

312 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 10801, Rs. RMfRuK from September 15th and Rs. Chef Sipo and SD from September 12th, 1943 (the occupied countries of Western Europe were excluded from the regulation).

313 Ibid., Film 4649, decree RMfRuK v. October 5, 1943. Hereafter also the following.

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The security service must therefore provide information to the same extent as when it comes to inquiries from its own departments... This obligation to provide information also applies to the production companies supervised by the departments of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production." The SD offered certain considerations in return However, the following obligation must be made in writing in the same way: "The departments of the head of the security police and the SD are also instructed to provide information to the departments of the RMfRuK." The head of the Sipo and the SD undertook to deliver "reports on the effects of events and measures on the situation of armaments and war production, in particular on phenomena that can disrupt production."

On October 5 , 1943, **Speer signed the decree cited; S D representatives were present, but their signature was not required. The ministerial chronicle reported: "The involvement of the SD's economic advisors was perfect. The decree on cooperation was issued by the minister on** October 5th **in the presence of brigade leader Ohlendorf (as head of the SD-Inland of the RSHA - D.E.) and Gauleiter Hanke (then temporarily head of the central office of the ministry - D.E.) signed. In front of a meeting of around 100 SD speakers, the minister gave an introductory speech about the cooperation expected from him." 314 The decree sealed the so-called Iron Pact between the Armaments Minister and the SS; since then, people have been talking about this everywhere in the leading institutions of the regime pact and of the new "Speer-Himmler axis".315 The day after the decree was signed, Speer appeared with a number of leading armaments industrialists and experts at the already mentioned Reich and Gauleiter conference in Posen with speeches about armaments and the "total War".316 Speeches and appearances were carefully planned.317 The intention was to demonstrate that from now on the inexorable law of "total war" prevailed and that at the same time the necessary power - including terror - was behind the armaments minister as the one for one responsible for such a consistent course in order to act in accordance The Minister of Armaments first heard from the previous speakers - Rohland (on army armament), Schlieker (iron and steel), Frydag (air force armament), Merker (naval armament).**

314 *Chronicle of the RMfRuK,* **1943 II, l. 38, October 5, 1943.**

315 *Janssen,* **p. 103, p. 123 and p. 166; also p. 197 f. - J anssen leaves the substance of this pact in the dark, conspicuously minimizes its meaning and dates it about a year later (ibid., p. 103); at least a sign that it lasted until "towards the end of the war" (ibid.). The agreement is not mentioned in Speer's memoirs.**

316 The various surviving versions of Speer's speech (speech ms.; stenographic minutes; version subsequently sent to the Gauleiter) show only minor stylistic differences in a few places (ZStA Potsdam, FS, films 1735, 3570, 42213; *Chronilc of the RMfRuK).* **The following after FS, film 3570.**

317 Before the Posen conference, Speer had a preliminary discussion with Walter Rohland *(Janssen,* **p. 157). On October 6th, Rohland pointed out the imperfection of the "total mobilization" of the** *German* **workforce much more sharply than the other speakers and called for the utmost consistency, especially on this delicate point. He had a memorandum written in this spirit in his pocket He presented it to Hitler the next day in the presence of Speer and Pleiger in Rastenburg in order to "express in general the view of the industry at headquarters." (ZStA Potsdam, Case , Affidavit of Ohland, April 16, 1948). See p. 236 f.**

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armament) - "the seriousness and concern that weighs on us" in impressively documented reports. In these, the main concern of those responsible for armaments about "human deployment and leadership" (Rohland) constantly recurred. The tenor of the speeches was that large-scale shutdowns in the non-armament industry and corresponding "relocations" of manpower were necessary as quickly as possible in order to provide armaments with the necessary German "leaders" and skilled workers, especially the "sergeant staff" in view of the current and future drafts into the Wehrmach Masters and foremen, without whom the foreign forced laborers could not be used and monitored effectively. The speakers made it clear to the Gau leaders that if there was a risk of losing the arms race, they would have their "special requests" (Rohland) and "regional concerns" (Schlieker). "We have to achieve a total commitment of the people," Rohland demanded most urgently, "and we have to be careful that only one optic emerges from this totality. " Frydag concluded his lecture with an appeal to "immediately" initiate the planned shutdowns and transfers of entire workforces to the aircraft industry "as the only means ... to perhaps still secure production in aircraft construction."
He spoke quite openly about the alternative: “If the implementation does not take place or not to a sufficient extent or too late, then the hunter program falls.
Then not only will there be no increase, but then the current program can no longer be maintained, and if the fighter program is not fulfilled, the pre-industry and the rest of the industry will inevitably fall victim to the British bombs.

Speer, who then summarized the problems of armament in detail, attacked the Gauleiter in his first sentences. The main purpose of the event, he said, was "to take away from you in the future any excuse for not knowing what this was about... that only the strictest measures are still able to to make the situation favorable for us". He categorically asked them to stop obstructing his policy of "total war" in the economy, especially against the shutdowns.

At the climax of his speech he invoked his alliance with Himmler, which he intended to use to enforce his course. With the help of the SD, he declared war on the unauthorized production of consumer goods such as radios, refrigerators, typewriters, etc. in defense factories - usually carried out for the purpose of corruption: "I asked Reichsführer-SS Himmler to help me to make the SD available to locate such production facilities, and we have reached an agreement with the SD that they have access to all armaments factories and that they can make the necessary determinations there. At the same time, the SD has the task of helping me to identify all the production (of consumer goods - D.E.) that still exists in the armaments cities ... according to a special list and to help me (for decommissioning or, "Implementation" - D. E.) to suggest." He bluntly threatened the Gauleiters that he would “declare the closures himself if the districts do not comply with my request for closure within 14 days.
I can assure you that I am willing to assert the authority of the Reich here, whatever the cost. I have spoken to Reichsführer-SS Himmler and I will treat those districts that do not implement these measures accordingly."

This speech, the transcript of which Speer gave to the Reich and Gauleiters in November,

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sent 3 18 , violent complaints from those attacked to Bormann and Hitler followed. At times, the always latent contradiction between the "totalization" of the war, especially in the economic and social areas, and the regime's efforts to achieve the greatest possible domestic political stability broke open.

This conflict, whose causes were of an objective nature, was of course not consistently fought and resolved. After attempts to support the Armaments Minister's course against the Gauleiter, Himmler seems to have been dissuaded from doing so by objections from Bormann and Hitler 3 19; As Minister of the Interior and responsible for the security of the regime, he eo ipso had to play an ambiguous role in the conflict mentioned from the beginning. Speer's course could obviously not be implemented at the desired pace using such violent methods. In the following months, up to April 1944, the Armaments Minister himself entered a politically critical phase in which Hitler, certainly not without Bormann's input, became more distant from him.320 But Speer's own political ambitions also contributed to this.

The contradictions between war economic and political requirements, as they forced themselves on the ruling class, temporarily became apparent as institutional and personal differences before they completely faded into the background as the war progressed compared to other, overarching problems. The simmering and variously erupting differences between the Gauleiter-Reichsverver-

The defense commissioners or Bormann and the apparatus of the Armaments Ministry or the minister himself are, however, largely overestimated and misinterpreted in bourgeois history and memoir literature. This apologetic exaggeration serves either to place Speer and the monopoly circles that support him in a "positive" political opposition to Bormann and the "party clique" or to absolve the former from the odium of a lost war.3 21 The real point of contention lay neither in - non-existent - fundamental political differences of opinion, nor in the concentration of power with the armaments minister and his "self-responsibility" apparatus. Rather, it was mainly about the conception and methods of "total war", about differences that were objective and now rapidly increasing contradictions between the requirements of the imperialist war economy and the political needs of a regime that sought to keep its supporters and broader masses of the people happy and feared nothing more than revolutionary unrest, a "second 1918".

c) Political ambitions

With the rise of the Armaments Minister, especially with the ministry's enormous increase in power after Hitler's decree of September 2 , 1943, his and those around him's political ambitions also increased. In those months of bad news, leading circles from business, the armed forces and politics looked for the

318 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 42213.

319 ***Speer,*** Memories, p. 326f.

320 Ibid., p. 326ff. - The Poznaÿ speech and the Gauleiter's complaints were still the subject of discussion between Speer and Hitler more than six months later, but Hitler described the matter as "settled" (FB, May 22/23, 1944, point 1).

321 See ***Janssen,*** p. 123f. u. p. 164ff.; ***Speer,*** Memories, p. 325f.; ***Hüttenberger,*** p. 183f.

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Front in the East and from Italy an alternative to the existing political leadership, whose structure seemed to them to be insufficiently elastic and effective. In contrast to the upper bourgeois opposition around Goerdeler and Beck, they did not consider Hitler's regime to be run down and discredited, but only considered changing Hitler's immediate surroundings and replacing some of his paladins with more agile, dynamic people who would support the "total war". lead with greater consistency and be more skilful in foreign policy - possibly also through a special peace should negotiate. 3 22 In particular, the problem of the "second man in the state" was discussed in view of Göring's political and military failures, but also a revolution at the top of the Foreign Office.3 23

The "Speer-Himmler coalition" 3 24 reflected the trend of the of the stronger convergence of economic and domestic policy in the "total war " . primarily Himmler and Speer as "second men" and thus possibly as Hitler's designated successors. This problem was apparently widely discussed. Speer's later statement that it was not wrongly assumed at the time that he was striving to succeed Hitler with the support of his "environment" 3 26 need not be doubted. The monopoly capital was largely united behind him and his ministry. "My successful industrial apparatus" , he expressed it after the war was over and would therefore have endangered the conduct of the war."327 It is very telling in this context that even after July 20 , 1944 , he expressly expressed Albert Vögler's "desire for change in of the government" and added: e from, "was so closely connected to me that my fall "That changes in the government by replacing the older members with younger ones would be advantageous is a generally widespread view." 3 28 In the leadership of the Wehrmacht, many of the highest military figures were "friends" and "closely connected" with him. , especially Mileh, Zeitzier, Guderian, Fromm and Dönitz. This fact was, without a doubt, largely connected with the consistent support and clear position of monopoly capital for the armaments minister. According to Speer, it was certainly clear in the highest circles of the regime, "that the army's leadership was considering (they! - DE) as one of many options to take my side if Hitler were to suddenly leave one way or another " .

...

Hitler's own behavior and statements fueled the rumors about Speer's position as the "second man in the state."330

322 *Kehrl,* p. 302f. u. p. 332ff. On the negotiations for a special peace , *DZW* said: Vol. 4, p. 303ff.

323 *Kehrl,* p. 303ff. According to Kehrl, the candidates for Ribbentrop's successor were Seyß-Inquart and Neubacher in conversation (ibid., p. 304).

324 *Speer,* Memories, p. 326. 325

On the problem of the increasingly close connection between economic and domestic policy, see *Demps,* Expansion, p. 94 f.

326 *Speer,* Memories, p. 289; *Speer,* The Slave State, p. 316, see also *Kehrl,* p. 334 f. Recently see *Schmidt,* p. 91 ff. 327 *Speer,* Memories, p. 290.

328 *Am:aomie des Kriegs,* p. 458, Doc. 257, statement by. Spear for Fegelein, August 20, 1944.

329 *Speer,* The Slave State, p. 317.

330 *Speer,* Memories, p. 289 and p. 280 (chapter heading).

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However, given the situation, it was not to be expected that the question would actually be decided. In addition to the military developments, which kept everyone on tenterhooks, the group and clique struggle at the top of the regime played an important role, which intensified in connection with this development and which Hitler himself apparently exploited to avoid making a decision. Under these circumstances, the established power structure still proved to be relatively stable, especially with regard to the traditional structure of the party hierarchy. The fascist party's strong own weight and perseverance were particularly evident in the behavior of the Gauleiter Reich Defense Commissioners towards the Armaments Minister. A political career in the desired direction ultimately proved to be impossible for the Minister of Armaments without the disempowerment of his opponents and competitors, including Himmler, which under the given circumstances could only have been accomplished by Hitler or through external force, such as a putsch . However, the circles surrounding the Armaments Minister were not willing or prepared to use force. After all, the atmosphere in the inner circle of the fascist leadership in the catastrophic situation at the end of 1943/beginning of 1944 - even if one takes into account the self-congratulation and apologetics in later publications33 1 - was extremely tense. This must be assumed to be one of the reasons that led to a serious physical collapse of the Armaments Minister at the beginning of 1944, which prevented him from fully exercising his official duties for almost four months.332 Speer later even claimed that Himmler had been mistreated by the SS during this time. Doctors carried out an assassination attempt on him.333 The political scene at the top of the regime remained unchanged despite major shifts in the internal power structure. The political alternatives that circles around the Armaments Ministry had in mind remained untested. This began a period in which disruptions and contradictions between economics and politics, between the interests of finance capital and the politics of the ruling fascist clique became noticeable; Contradictions in the state monopoly system of rule, which, promoted by external events, quickly accumulated and came to a

331 What is particularly relevant here are the relevant passages in Speer's memoirs *(Speer,* Memoirs, p. 325ff.; especially p. 333ff., 342f.); see *Kehrl,* p. 332ff.

332 .Janssen, p. 158ff.; *Speer,* memories p. 336 (ff.).

333 *Speer,* Memories, p. 342; *The same,* The Slave State, p. 316 ff. - *Schmidt,* p. 107 ff., describes this, probably rightly, as a "chimera" brought into the world by Speer after the war with apologetic intent.

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CHAPTER IV

The workforce situation. On the situation of German working people and foreign forced laborers

1. Labor problems in 1941/42. The “general representative for labor deployment”

a) Labor policy in the summer/ autumn of 1941

When General Thomas reported on the success of the armament preparations for the attack on June 22, 1941, he emphasized the "tremendous increase in the material equipment of the Wehrmacht" that had been achieved; The first and foremost disruptive influence on the "smooth running of the production programs" was the "difficult labor situation."1 At the beginning of the reporting period (September 1940), 5.3 million German workers worked in industry directly and indirectly for the Wehrmacht; that were 55.2 percent of all industrial employees.2 There were also around 300,000 prisoners of war and civilian foreign forced laborers - at the end of May 1941 there were already around a million - and 150,000 skilled workers "on leave" from the Wehrmacht, who were already returning from February 1941 were withdrawn to the troops.3 According to Thomas, the results achieved would not have been possible without the foreign workers and without the "Rü-
Vacationers 40".4 After April 1941, the Wehrmacht's armaments departments had plans for future one
There are hardly any clear ideas and planning figures for armament programs and the workforce requirements in the coming period. Everything depended on the success or course of the planned "blitzkrieg" against the USSR - the need for manpower, for example, on "the possible replacement needs for the summer campaign, about the amount of which there are still very different opinions (between 5,000 and 200000 per month)"; So it simply became “the date for an extension of the protection of the most important produ
(before enlistments - DE) set for August 1, 1941" .5 In the absence of any "extraordinary measures" on the labor market, Kuczynski rightly sees a "also "For monopoly capitalist conditions and narrowness of mind, extraordinary madness in assessing the importance of a campaign against the Soviet Union".6

1 *Barbarossa case,* p. 222f., Doc. 63, report WiRüAmt v. July 10, 1941.
2 Ibid., p. 216, Doc. 62, ed. WiRüAmt v. December 6, 1940; see *The Effects,* p. 213, table 11, where only those directly employed by the Wehrmacht are recorded (50.2 percent).
3 *Case Barbarossa,* p. 217, Doc. 62, ed. WiRüAmt from December 6, 1941 (different *Thomas,* p. 240); *Wagenühr,* p. 154 (1 million).
4 *Barbarossa case,* p. 223, Doc. 63, report WiRüAmt v. July 10, 1941.
5 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 2313, AN WiRüAmt v. May 21, 1941.
6 *Kuczynslci,* Situation of the Workers, Vol. 6, p. 257 f.

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Although there were no binding orders or resolutions before June 1941 about a new "re-equipment" after "Barbarossa" in favor of the air force and navy, the army's armament should, if possible, be transferred to those workers who were made available "by restricting the army's ammunition production" 7 . The OKH refused to do this and claimed that there were only a "relatively small number" of such workers, which, however, was "not nearly" sufficient to "fulfill the tasks that were given priority to the army - the tank program, armor-piercing monkeys , Army flak - to be fulfilled. A transfer of manpower from the army sector is therefore not to be expected. "8 It was only in connection with the Göring program that central manpower "planning" came into flow again.

The instruments of labor recruitment in 1941

Already at the beginning of 1941, an important change had occurred in the system of official "manpower control". By Göring's decree of February 18, 19419, "examination commissions of the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition", the so-called bottleneck or Todt commissions, were set up in the military districts , which had the task of inspecting companies in the entire private economy with the help of sub-commissions with the aim of transferring workers from "limitable production" of a civil and military type to "bottleneck production of crucial importance for the war (special levels SS and S) of the Wehrmacht". "The leadership of the commissions is determined by the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition, the work is led by the armaments inspection."

The Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition had a strong position in the system of regulating the industrial labor market since the beginning of 1941.

The examination commissions, which were to include representatives of the armaments inspection, the state labor office and the district economic office under the leadership of a representative of the ammunition ministry, had to "determine and uniformly control the measures necessary to cover the demand for workers for the bottleneck production in the district." and in particular to propose the district decisions "a) on the production target in the civilian sector (production restrictions, bans, decommissioning), b) on the level and type of Wehrmacht production (determination of the order level), c) on the implementation of the workforce".

The decree, which came about after several drafts by Todt and the Defense Economics and Armaments Office, was the fruit of a compromise between both sides, which was also expressed, for example, in the fact that the respective armaments inspectors were appointed by Todt to chair most of the examination commissions - 19 of 26. 1° "The Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition's claim to leadership of the examination commissions," the OKW nevertheless suspected, "allows conclusions to be drawn about his claim to total leadership in the entire labor deployment issue." 11 In any case, they failed

7 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 2313, OKH/Chief HRüst to WiRüAmt, April 10, 1941.
8 Ibid.
9 BA Koblenz, R 41/138; hereafter also the following.
10 Ibid., R 41/139, RMfBuM decree to the chairmen of the examination commissions v. 5/14 1941ff.
11 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 2328, Statement by WiRüAmt (v. Meendsen-Bohlken) on the decree draft RMfBuM ex. “Labor deployment questions”, February 8, 1941.

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continued attempts by the OKW to "reconcentrate the control of labor deployment with employment offices and armaments departments".12 The continued coexistence of four authorities or state apparatuses that were responsible for the procurement and distribution of industrial workers, Of course, this did not
improve the situation in any way.13 On June 20, 1941, Göring significantly expanded the pow They now had the right, "in addition to all commercial enterprises, to have all economic enterprises of the Reich, the states and the municipalities (municipal associations) and other self-governing bodies examined with regard to the supply of workers (employees and workers) for the armaments industry." 14 This decree came into being on the same day as the Göring program; the direct connection between the two was revealed by a decree from Todt on the following day, which set the most urgent task for the examination commissions to be the procurement of 100,000 workers for the
armament of the Luftwaffe.15 The Minister of Ammunition planned to transfer a total of 473,000 workers into the armaments industry with the help of the commissions by the end of 1941.16 From autumn 1941 onwards, the examination commissions reported "decreasing success figures"17; After all, the minister certified to the chairman of the commission that the “overall

success of the combing out campaign” had “increased to 358,000 workers transferred” up to and including October Examination commissions of the Minister of Ammunition and
their sub-commissions in the military districts - especially the employment offices with so-called E-lists (lists of dispensable products) 19, with special "combating commissions" and
with special requirements for first-rate important armaments programs, - facilities for " "retra
- the recruitment of voluntary workers, especially non-working women, which was supported by the press and other means of propaganda,
- the “Rü-Urlauber 40” campaign and the dismissal of older skilled workers from the Wehrmacht (born 1896 and older),

12 Ibid., Film 2313, Thomas' "Notes for Lecture at the Reichsmarschall" dated November 9, 1941.

13 In addition to the RArbM, the OKW/WiRüAmt and the RMfBuM, the Four-Year Plan Organization, the Reich Labor Leader, the DAF and other bodies also dealt with "work assignment" - questions.

14 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 2312, decree of Göring (BfV) regarding “procurement of the necessary forces for Wehrmacht and armaments industry" from June 20, 1941.

15 BA Koblenz, R 41/281, decree RMfBuM regarding "expansion of the scope of work of the examination commissions" dated June 21, 1941.

16 Ibid., R 41/139, RMfBuM to OKW, February 28, 1941.

17 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 8651, "Experience report on the development in the field of personnel management in the period from the beginning of the winter of 1941/42 to the beginning of the winter of 1942/43" (WWiAmt: Betz) January 1943 (hereinafter: “experience report”).

18 Ibid., Film 8630, RDecree RMfBuM to the chairmen of the examination commissions, December 5, 1941. For November 1941, the commissions reported a further 28,400 "combed out" people (ibid., R-Decree RMfBuM to the chairmen, January 2, 1942).

19 BA Koblenz, R 41/251 and R 41/252, various pieces, including “Guidelines on the restriction of "ability of civil production" from May 191.1 (RWiM).

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- the "recruitment" of foreign workers, which was carried out both by organs of the Reich Ministry of Labor and directly by a number of arms companies.

While the "working vacationers" from the Wehrmacht were called back again in the spring of 1941, the success of the volunteer recruitment among non-working women, which had been pushed since March, remained low .
Large armaments companies were also contractually obliged to provide retraining places and to train skilled workers. The OKM, for example, reported 3,941 such places in 36 shipyards and W-companies, of which around 60 percent were occupied at the end of June 1941 and only 52 percent at the end of July; the downward trend continued. At full occupancy, over 20 percent of the reported manpower requirements for naval armaments could have been covered.21 The Navy appeared to be particularly active in this area and also tapped into sources outside the economy. In collaboration "with the large naval shipyards" 22 it took over the management of SA vocational schools, some of which had existed long before the war, expanded them on a large scale and turned SA men and other workers there into "skilled workers for Ship and mechanical engineering" 23 .
The employment offices generally proved unable to meet the defense industry's growing demands for workers, especially skilled workers, especially since the technical and geographical focus of the demand sometimes changed abruptly in the course of the "reversal" of armaments. First and foremost, they tried To meet the manpower requirements of some programs that had been declared urgent, some of which were extraordinarily high. This particularly affected the manpower required by Göring as the representative for the four-year plan and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and by the Chemical Division From February 1st to December 15th, 1941, 77,339 construction and 36,808 company workers, a total of 114,147 workers, were added solely for the purpose of "ensuring the workforce requirements for mineral oil and buna companies in the chemical production plan". 24 From February to August 1941, the employment offices of the defense industry placed a total of 105,000 workers on average per month, of which around 20,000 were prisoners of war and civilian foreign forced laborers ,25

Chaotic workforce “planning” after June 22nd

The Göring program, an extreme expression of German imperialism's economic blitzkrieg and world domination strategy, not only set clear priorities, but also new standards in the regime's labor policy. If the air armament is increased from 1.3 to 4.8 million workers 26, the army

20 See ibid., R 41/281, REDecree RArbM to the presidents of the LAÄ regarding "Increasing the use of women" dated March 18, 1941; ibid., AO of the NSDAP (party office) regarding "German women help win" v . March 16, 1941.
21 Ibid., R 41/227, OKM statement, undated.
22 Ibid., R 13 XX/299, case RGI v. September 11, 1941.
23 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Fibn 1748, OKM to Rüln XX (Danzig), December 19, 1941.
24 BA Koblenz, R 41/177 to R 41/187, monthly reports of the RArbM for BfV, June 23, 1941 ff.
25 *Müller,* Wehrmacht and Occupation, p. 175 (RArbM report dated October 24, 1941).
26 Thomas, p. 449, Prot. d. Discussed at Milch on June 26, 1941.

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On the other hand, even according to the most far-reaching demobilization plans, a maximum of one million soldiers were to be given over as labor force for the war economy 27, it was clear that this amounted to an adventurous, completely unreal imperialist strategy based on war economy fantasy ideas and demands. In the area of labor policy, the summer and autumn months of 1941 offered the grotesque spectacle of the "fight of all against all" (Thomas). Despite a clear orientation towards air armament, arms companies, army and OKW departments and the districts made contributions around the Reich Ministry for Armament and Ammunition, there was increasingly stubborn resistance to the radical "re-equipment" tha This resistance initially grew to a considerable extent from the insistence on the established and, apart from a relatively small proportion, not revoked army armament programs; then the rapidly increasing material losses on the German-Soviet front played an increasingly important and ultimately dominant role; and finally, especially from September 1941 onwards, extensive conscriptions to the front aggravated the situation. The numbers that the Wehrmacht units and the OKW stated in these months as "immediate requirements", "minimum requirements", etc. for labor must be assessed against the background of this increasingly bitter battle and the growing uncertainty about the further course of the war in the East -be shared.

Already in the first two months of the war against the USSR, the "labor situation," as General Field Marshal Keitel explained, proved to be "the biggest bottleneck in the defense industry." 28 At the beginning of July, the Wehrmacht calculated an armaments requirement of 1.5 million men for the current year.29 In September/October the difficulties increased noticeably. On October 1st, those born in 1922 were called up to the Wehrmacht and many UK positions of other workers or skilled workers were terminated.30 In the war economic situation report of the Defense Economics and Armaments Office for September it was stated in this context: “Either the troops' human needs or the human needs of armaments are met. This decision can no longer be avoided."31 The reports of the armaments inspections reflected the same problem. All other difficulties, however, fade into the background, it said in the monthly report of the Armaments Inspection V (Stuttgart): "This is the fight for *people* "It's become a problem!"32 Only a small proportion of the foreign forced laborers who were promised to important companies such as Bosch and Daimler-Benz arrive. “If the production programs are to be carried out to the extent that the Führer has broadly defined them, then not only can not a single man be withdrawn from production for the Wehrmacht, but on the contrary, considerable forces must be used of the Wehrmacht flow back into industry." 33 In November, "numerous

27 Ibid., p. 465, Prot. d. Discuss d. Chiefs OKW with d. WT on August 16, 1941, v. August 18, 1941.

28 Ibid., p. 463.

29 Reinhardt, p. 39 (AHA lecture notes from July 8, 1941).

30 Ibid., p. 102.

31 Ibid., p. 103.

32 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 5382, situation report of Rüln V (Stuttgart) on September 15, 1941, v. September 13, 1941.

33 Ibid.

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Armaments factories ... experienced significant labor shortages due to Jewish evacuations."34 In contrast, the most important sources from which the labor requirements for the planned "re-equipment" were to be met were no longer available. These were primarily the many hundreds of thousands that had been expected from the dissolution of the 49 army divisions and from the reduction in army armament; Secondly, foreign workers should be brought to Germany, especially Polish and French forced laborers and prisoners of war, who should relieve the labor situation in agriculture and industry.

At this time, the German imperialists' ideas about the future supply of the war economy with German workers were still officially based on Hitler's

„ Guidelines for personnel and material armament" of July 14 , 1941, which stated grandly: "The military domination of the European area after the overthrow of Russia will soon allow the size of the army to be significantly reduced." 35 In August, Keitel assured the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition and the heads of the military armaments organization that Hitler's order to disband army formations "after the conclusion of the eastern operations" had already been given.36 Colonel-General Fromm, head of army armaments and commander of the reserve army, gave figures: "After the end of the eastern operations , 50 divisions should be disbanded. The skilled workers should first be removed from these and transferred to the armaments industry. The remaining people should be the skilled workers of the remaining divisions, as long as they are not weapons specialists. We can expect a total of 300,000 workers for the armaments industry. In addition, those born during the World War (around 200,000 men) are also to be replaced."37 On this basis, over the course of the following two months, in cooperation between the Wehrmacht command staff, the military economics and armaments office The OKW and the Reich Ministry of Armaments and Ammunition finalized the OKW guidelines “on personnel measures in the Wehrmacht for the conversion of armaments in the winter of 1941/42” dated October 23 , 194138 . However, the drafts for this document already demonstrate the growing doubts of their authors about the possibility of carrying out the planned reduction in army strength. After all, the guidelines said: “1. The purpose and meaning of the transfer of forces and the use of forces is a) to strengthen the armaments industry by bringing in manpower largely from the army, and to a limited extent from the navy and air force, b) to restructure the army by increasing the number of rapid units and equipping them with the best possible equipment , c) Improvement of the personnel situation in the air force and navy. 2. The forces for this will essentially be gained from the dissolution of army divisions and expendable army troops." The first "instalment" of 50,000 skilled workers was promised for December 15th . From this date at the latest, all coal miners should be released from the Wehrmacht.

The so-called reversal of armaments from 194039 was repeated at a higher level ; The same was expected especially with regard to the workforce

34 *Reinhardt,* p. 188 (War economic situation report WiRüAmt for November 1941).
35 *Thomas,* p. 452, Hitler's decree v. July 14, 1941.
36 Ibid., p. 463, Prot. d. Discussion with Keitel on August 16, 1941, v. August 18, 1941.
37 Ibid., p. 467. 38 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 2325; hereafter also the following.
39 See *Volume I,* p. 212ff.

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Possibility, as it was then, of "freeing up" soldiers on a large scale for work in the war economy during a sufficient breathing space - after the overthrow of the USSR.

But the guidelines cited already contained reservations that meant significant reductions in the planned reduction in the size of the army. Of the 49 divisions to be disbanded, "the bloody losses in the army that were uncovered at the end of the operations ... probably around 200,000 men" should be accounted for. Furthermore, "in the main"
Divisions with low manpower are disbanded. "New orders will be given," it was finally said, "if, given the war situation, the changeover in the army's armament is delayed and the number of units released should be significantly reduced." The letter accompanying the guidelines, dated six days later, contained a clear reference to their anachronism, which the stalling of the fascist October offensive before Moscow clearly demonstrates: "Attention is drawn to the uncertain nature of these guidelines. Their implementation depends on the preliminary conclusion of the operations in the east and the resulting overall situation." 40 In the second half of November, when the last attempt by German offensive units to take Moscow was stuck in the fire of the defenders, the Wehrmacht leadership finally had to show its colors . The

"Implementing Regulations No. 1"41, which the OKW issued on November 28, 1941 in addition to the guidelines of October 23, quietly repealed them in their main point, the dissolution of 49 army divisions in favor of the war economy .42 The more sparse the traditional sources of labor became, the higher the German imperialists raised their hopes for foreign forced laborers. Until now, the heads of the defense industry have had certain limits here too. The labor pool of French prisoners of war was running low. The majority of the transports with J)Olnian
forced laborers still ended up in agriculture. The approach of the fascist state and occupation organs in recruiting forced laborers and distributing them in the war economy was by no means satisfactory to those in arms.43 Since June/July, large numbers of French prisoners of war were to be withdrawn from other sectors of the economy for the Göring program. But when the air force leadership tried to withdraw French forced laborers from army and naval armament construction sites, they encountered strong resistance from the Minister of Ammunition.44 Also the plan to replace 500,000 French prisoners of war from German agriculture with Soviet prisoners of war and send them to air armament , failed, this time due to Hitler and Himmler's initial refusal to employ Soviet prisoners
of war and civilian Soviet forced laborers in Germany.45

40 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 2325, OKW to RArbM and RWiM, October 29, 1941.
41 Ibid.
42 See also p. 44.
43 *Seeber, Em,* forced laborers in the fascist war economy. The deportation and exploitation of Polish citizens with special consideration of the situation of the workers from the so-called General Government (1939-1945), Berlin 1964, p. 47ff. u. p. 127; see *Volume I,* p. 101r.

44 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 4566, RMfBuM to RArbM, October 1, 1941.
45 Hitler admitted to Göring that he had replaced 100,000 French troops with 120,000 Soviet ones.

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b) The establishment of the forced labor regime for workers from the USSR

The initiative of the arms monopolies

From the very beginning, the arms monopolies pushed for the mass forced labor of Soviet prisoners of war and civilian Soviet workers in the German war economy.46 Their demands were strongly supported by the Ministry of Munitions, the OKW, the Reich Ministry of Labor and the Four-Year Plan Organization.
Paul Pleiger, chairman of the Reich Coal Association, called on the OKW on June 30 , 1941, **eight days after the start of the aggression, under the threat of "serious shocks" in the coal supply situation, to "distribute the Russian prisoners of war into... First and foremost, he wanted to take the coal sector into account." He immediately needed** 83,000 **men. "If there is to be any chance of success," he told General Thomas, "in my opinion, when allocating Russian prisoners of war, one should not only include miners, but should From the outset, all workers who are used to heavy physical work (road workers, quarry workers, construction workers, etc.) are taken on." 47 On July 9th, representatives of the Flick Group declared their consent and interest in "that we... "All requested workers are to be assigned to Russian prisoners of war, and we would like to request that the matter be dealt with more quickly."48 In the same month, Preußag and Wintershall Group plants submitted applications to the employment offices for the accelerated allocation of Soviet prisoners of war.49 However, the ban initially applied the employment of Soviet**
prisoners of war in Germany, which began with Hitler. It arose from the fascists' deep-rooted fear of the resistance of the Soviet soldiers and officers who had been raised by the Bolshevik Party and of the possible effect of anti-fascist ideas on their own people.50 Furthermore, the German rulers assumed that the war in the East was in would be finished in a few weeks or at most months.

tic prisoners of war (see *IMG,* vol. 31, p. 474H., Doc. PS-3005, Rs. RArbM to the President of the LAÄ, August 26, 1941).

46 Streit denies this fact in his otherwise well-founded work; He does not know the following facts and only mentions the RVK with a request for Soviet prisoners of war as recently as August 15, 1941 *(Streit,* p. 198ff., p. 215).

47 Pleiger to Gen. Reinecke, June 30, 1941, quoted by b. *Kuczynski,* Situation of the Workers, Vol. 6, p. 260. The same demand was later submitted as an application to the RArbM and - for information - to Göring (BA Koblenz, R 10 VIII/19, RVK to BfV, August 15, 1941).

48 *Anatomy of War,* p. 341, Doc. 168, Sulzbach-Rosenberg-Hütte at the Amberg employment office, July 9, 1941.

49 BA Koblenz, R 13 XX/410, Saline Bad Dürrenberg (Preußag) to the Halle employment office, July 21, 1941; ibid, Wintershall AG, Kaiseroda plant, to the Eisenach employment office, July 23, 1941; ibid, Saline Artern (Preußag) to A beitsamt Sangerhausen, July 22, 1941; see ibid., back cover of the Wigru mining company from July 16, 1941.

50 Detailed evidence regarding the mentioned ban in *Streit,* p. 192 ff. - Even before the war, fascist politicians expressed their opposition to the possibility of employing Soviet prisoners of war in Germany, such as Agriculture Minister Richard Walther Darre: “Prisoners of war (as forced laborers (DE) are probably only an option in a war that has nothing directly or indirectly to do with Soviet Russia, under no circumstances

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At the beginning of July there was at least talk of a "certain relaxation", especially because of the large demand for labor in agriculture for maintenance and harvesting work.51 The Inspector General for German Roads - identical to the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition - then planned to "prisoners of war". "To employ Russians under particularly strict surveillance and isolation in large-scale construction projects in a closed operation in order to free French and Serb prisoners of war who are suitable for individual deployment1; for agriculture."52 On the same day, July 4th, the Military Economics and Armaments Office of the OKW a conference1; on the "use and labor deployment of the Russian prisoners of war" in which it was stated that "from all departments involved (the representative for the four-year plan and the Reich Ministry of Labor were promine DE) the demand that prisoners of war should also be used for work in the Reich must be represented and supported without fail."53 The "need" for prisoners was put at 500,000 (of which 400,000 were needed for agriculture). The representative of the OKW prisoner-of-war system announced that it was to be expected that the existing ban would be "at least relaxed," but "it would be necessary for work deployment It is essential that only Russian-speaking prisoners are allowed to be used - because of possible Bolshevik propaganda. Only a closed work operation in columns (Todt Organization, construction battalions) should take place under guard." For the a In the industry, those involved did not count on prisoners of war from Soviet labor "given the prerequisites that had to be met" or "at most in exchange". The great confusion that prevailed at that time in all questions relating to the employment of Soviet forced laborers and the lack of clarity about the final solution to these questions could also be seen in the statement by the OKW representative that -The use of "certain ethnic groups (Belarusians, Ukrainians, Latvians, Estonians, Finns, etc.) must be excluded".

Göring in particular carried out an exchange of the type mentioned in the following period, to whom Hitler finally approved the transfer of 100,000 French prisoners of war from agriculture to the aviation industry and to provide agriculture with 120,000 Soviet prisoners of war The contingent of Soviet prisoners who were to be brought to Germany for forced labor had been exhausted; According to the basic OKW decree of August *2nd ,* **"no more than around 120,000 prisoners of war would be brought into the Reich on the orders of the Führer**

It will be tolerated that the prisoners of war become sources of decomposition for the Soviet Russians become propaganda. Since e.g. Since a war is currently hardly conceivable that is not also directed against Soviet Russia, I believe that taking prisoners of war into account is wrong." (ZStA Potsdam, Case XI, No. 454, Bl. 13, Doc. NID-14941, hs. Marginal note Darres v. February 18, 1939 to report RMEL v. February 12, 1939).

51 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 4566, Rs. GI fd German Roads, July 4, 1941.

52 Ibid.

53 *IMG,* **Vol. 27, p. 63 f., Doc. PS-1199, AN WiRüAmt, July 4, 1941. Hereafter also the following. See also *Pfahlmann,* p. 92 (OKW to BfV, July 5, 1941).**

.54 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1788, OKW-Erl. v. August 25, 1941. - Despite Göring's constant urging for the "greatest acceleration" of this exchange, which was "of crucial, war-decisive importance" and, as he ultimately demanded, should be completed by October 1, 1941 (ibid.), The action ultimately proved to be "unfeasible" {ibid., OKW decree of October 14, 1941).

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transferred."55 The decree stipulated: "The use of Soviet prisoners of war within the borders of the Reich is a necessary evil and should therefore be kept to a minimum. In principle, they may only be employed in those workplaces where they work in closed columns in complete isolation can." 56 In September, after the Red Army's defensive operation near Smolensk had halted the German advance towards Moscow for over two months and the war was expected to be extended beyond the winter, the monopolies and war economic regulatory bodies increased their pressure on the fascist leadership. State Secretary Paul Körner (Four-Year Plan) wrote to State Secretary Friedrich Syrup (Reich Ministry of Labor) on September 2nd: "The Reich Marshal (Göring - D.E.) will probably ask the Führer again whether the number of Russian prisoners of war to be taken into Germany should be included Taking into account the situation of the labor market, it could be increased." 57 In mid-September, the Reich Coal Association demanded another 8,000 to 10,000 Soviet workers (prisoners of war) to unload coal trains in Germany, as well as an unlimited number of Ukrainian miners for the Ruhr coal mining. Pleiger emphasized in his negotiations with the OKW, he said he wanted to "deport the Italians in particular, who are doing absolutely nothing in the coal mining industry."58 As head of the Reichswerke "Hermann Göring" mining company, he also announced his claim to Soviet workers for this company Group.59 Here, in the meetings between the RVK and the OKW, the transport of civilian workers from the USSR to Germany was on the agenda for the first time. As Pleiger explained, he wanted to "advertise his own jobs in the Ukraine in order to avoid the wage-gouging that has hitherto been common in other occupied territories."60 What this "advertising" should look like was clear from Pleiger's "position"
communicated by telephone two days later. emphasizes, "You shouldn't recruit people, but rather detach them and, in addition to food, give pocket money and support to the family (who are left behind - DE)."61 A few days later, on September 24th, a meeting of those involved took place in the Reich Ministry of Labor Departments are discussing this new question, which everyone has agreed to. urgency, there was still great uncertainty. "The Reich Marshal has," it was said, "already given a certain commitment to the recruitment of metal workers from the Baltics for the Luftwaffe's armament." 62 According to the guidelines of the Commissioner

55 Ibid., FS, film 1811, OKW-Erl. Regarding "Employment of Soviet prisoners of war" August 2, 1941.

56 Ibid. - This explains the fact that on August 22nd, at a large meeting at the RFSS "about police measures when using foreign workers", forced laborers from the USSR were not mentioned at all (ibid., FS, film 8288, weeks -Report WiRüAmt fd August 18-24, 1941).

57 Ibid., Case XI, No. 419, Bl. 24, Doc. NI-3746, Grains to Syrup, September 2, 1941.

58 Ibid., Case XI, No. 415, Bl. 20f., Doc. PS-1456, AN about Thomas' discussion with Pleiger and Gen. Reinecke v. September 17, 1941; see Czollek, Fascism and Occupation, p. 150f.; fernel' *Anatomy of War,* p. 359f. u. p. 364f., Doc. 181 and 184; *Seeber,* p. 72f.

59 Ibid (PS-1456).

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid., Case XI, No. 396, Bl. 118f., Doc. EC-75, AN WiRüAmt v. September 20, 1941 via telephone with Pleiger on September 19, 1941.

62 Ibid., Bl. 121, Doc. NI-460, transcript. RArbM ex. d. Discussion v. September 24, 1941.

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According to the four-year plan, civilian Soviet workers were only to be brought from the Baltics, and those of Polish nationality were to be brought to Germany. Further "advertising" should "in principle initially be limited to the Ukraine" and exclude "old Russians".63 In a promemoria from the OKW on October 4th, however, under the impression of the demands of the industry, the concerns of the Abwehr and the SS categorically called for the "inclusion of Russian prisoners of war" and "Ukrainian civilian workers" in the German war economy -
primarily for the armaments industry and mining.64 Like the chairman of the RVK, the GB Chemie, IG-farben-Auf, also took part - Chairman of the Supervisory Board, Carl Krauch, played a key role in the discussion about the forced recruitment of Soviet workers. In October, even while he was on sick leave, he insisted on telling General Thomas through his manpower representative that he had "a train of thought about the use of Russian prisoners of war in war armament, for the further pursuit and in particular implementation of which he (Krauch - D. E.) **considers you, dear General, to be called upon".**

Krauch expressly wanted his written suggestions to be viewed as a "suggestion from GB Chemie".65 After the war, an authoritative and well-informed representative of the IG Farben Group, August v. Knieriem, a member of the board of directors and general counsel at the time, shamelessly falsified the facts of the case Corporation. In an extensive work full of evil demagoguery, he laid down a kind of general line for future bourgeois historiography and jurisprudence, according to which monopoly capital and generalization were to be whitewashed. If war were to happen, he argued, no state could be denied it. resent the fact that he can be "reliant on foreign work

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid., FS, film 1737, "Lecture note for head of office" from October 4th, 1941; printed in **Eichlwltz,** Prehistory of the GBA, p. 371. - On September 30th, 1941 it was noted in the KTB of the WiRüAmt/Staff: "Reichsführer SS [is] against recruiting workers in the Old Russian region. Pleiger, who wanted to recruit 12,000 men, wants to go to the Reich Marshal with Syrup about it." (Ibid., film 8273, KTB WiRüAmt/Stab, entry dated September 30, 1941). Hitler and Göring approved Pleiger's plan three weeks later (ibid., entry dated October 22, 1941). But it turned out in November that "due to the difficult transport situation in the east, neither the 5,000-6,000 miners from Krivoy Rog who had already been recruited nor the majority of the prisoners of war themselves could be transported to Germany" **(Reinhardt,** p. 185; quoted Kriegswirtsch . Management report WiRüAmt v. November 1941).

65 **Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No.10** (hereinafter: **Trials),** Vol. 8 (Case VI, Vol. 2), Washington 1952, p. 397f., Doc. EC-489, Fruit e.g. V. Kirschner to Thomas, October 20, 1941; see facsimile in appendix d. Vol. - Krauch's "suggestions" have not yet been found. Some conclusions can be drawn from later KTB entries from the WiRüAmt: "GB Chemie wants to fire Italians and bring in Russians in return." (ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 8273, KTB WiRüAmt, entry dated October 28th 1941). "Krauch's demands" (for the expansion of the hydrogenation works - DE): "4, or better 8 construction battalions, reinforced by four times the number of French or Russians, 20 or 40,000 men, should be deployed." (Ibid., entry dated December 5, 1941).

66 P. **Knieriem, August,** Nuremberg. Legal and human problems, Stuttgart 1953, 511 .

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"But the German industrialists had nothing to do with this entire [forced labor] program as such (elaboration, implementation, implementation)."67 The arms monopolies' desire for the mass use of Soviet prisoners of war and civilian forced laborers caused a stir in the ruling circles of the regime informative disputes of a fundamental nature. A contradiction inherent in the fascist regime and its imperialist world domination program became clear. According to the basic political ideas of the fascists, the employment of Soviet workers within Germany was prohibited in principle, whose Bolshevik influence and socialist convictions they viewed as safely assume and which they had to fear that they would not allow themselves to be intimidated and that they would foment resistance, sabotage production, come into contact with German resistance fighters and provide reconnaissance services for their home country.68 They only kept exceptions under extensive security measures, above all, isolation and the heaviest security possible.

On the other hand, the needs of the war economy required that the more obviously the blitzkrieg strategy failed due to the resistance of the Red Army, the more inevitable a generous mobilization of the "captured" workforce potential.69 The profit interests of the defense companies, which were inextricably linked to these needs, made them the fiercest advocates of such a strategy
Mobilization. 70 The military events on the German-Soviet front and the increasing deterioration of the labor situation forced those in power to gradually change their position.

The Hitler decree on October 31st and Göring's guidelines on November 7th , 1941

In the second half of October, things developed rapidly in view of the failure of the major German offensive against Moscow. An OKW decree of 14.
October already saw, as the Ruhr companies noted with satisfaction, a "tremendous relaxation of the Russian deployment" (the prisoner of war columns could now also work in "protected factories", "interspersed with German foremen" and without

67 Ibid., p. 513. Examples of more recent apologetic treatment of the topic are provided by Pfahlmann (1968) and Kannapin, Hans-Eckhardt, Wirtschaft unter Zwang, Cologne 1966.

68 The final consequence of such fears about the security of the conquered and to-be-conquered territories in the East were the monstrous extermination intentions of the “General Plan East” (see p. 430ff.).

69 From the Ruhr area, summarized demands for the "use of Russian prisoners of war on a larger scale than before" were justified with the "good experiences" that "were made with Russian prisoners of war in the previous war" (ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1781, situation report of the Rüln VI (Münster) from October 14, 1941).

70 Streit denies this, but can only cite a single source, which he interprets one-sidedly (Streit, p. 198ff.), according to which the Ruhr companies were skeptical about employing Soviet prisoners of war in mid-November 1941 (!) - but not like him I mean, for reasons of principle, but obviously because of the various official prohibitions and requirements and because of the expected catastrophic physical condition of your prisoners.

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On October 20, Hitler , Göring and Pleiger decided on the future status of civilian Soviet forced laborers in Germany.72 The model for their treatment was used as a model for their treatment 10,000 to 12,000 Ukrainian miners were given work - like prisoners of war - "only in closed columns", food was "below the German standard" and payment was "only pocket money".73 The final turning point in the attitude of the fascists The last days of October brought leadership. On October 30 , Keitel ordered production of ultra-
accelerating anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns to be doubled. The negligently edited final passage of the decree testified to how urgent the need for these weapons had become: “The shortage of workers is being met with the greatest possible use of Russian prisoners of war under German guidance - as already ordered for mining.

74 This meant that the forced employment of Soviet prisoners of war was expressly and officially permitted in the production of weapons and military equipment, i.e. in the core operations of the armaments industry.
Hitler's decisive order was dated October 31 , 1941: "The Führer has now given instructions that the three million Russians are to be used in the economy and fed properly." 75 With this, the OKW at the same time admitted between the lines the deliberate murder of many hundreds of thousands Prisoners of war in the Wehrmacht camps through starvation. "In addition," it said in the text of Hitler's decree, "very low remuneration is to be provided for a modest supply of some of the luxury items of daily life, and if necessary, performance bonuses are to be provided for." - “Major deployment for the needs of the war economy” is limited only by “1. Ensuring security to prevent dangers to the German people, 2. Accommodation in closed camps, 3. Ensuring adequate nutrition".

While the mass forced labor of foreign workers had previously been an important, but not indispensable, accessory for German imperialism's war economy, now, in view of the increasingly obvious collapse of the Blitzkrieg strategy, the conviction had become established in the leading circles of the regime that it was a necessary condition for the continued functioning of the war economy mechanism and thus for the continued conduct of the war.

On November 7 , 1941, on Hitler's behalf, Göring ordered the "maximum utilization of Russian manpower" in front of an audience of heads of state, business, the Wehrmacht and the Nazi Party and made it clear that Hitler's attitude to this question had "fundamentally changed." 76 Soviet prisoners of war would be used as workers in the greatest possible number within Germany, especially in the coal mining industry, where - under German overseers - "if necessary

71 BA Koblenz, R 13 1/373, protocol. d. meeting d. Advisory board of the Wigru Northwest District Group Esl v. November 19, 1941.

72 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 5682, AN WiRüAmt v. October 21, 1941.

73 Ibid., film 11246, Göring to Pleiger, October 24, 1941.

74 Ibid., film 8322, Keitel's order v. October 30, 1941.

75 Ibid., Film 8273, KTB WiRüAmt, entry from. October 31, 1941. The Hitler decree itself was issued in the form of an order from Keitel (ibid., Case hereafter also the following.

76 *IMG,* Vol. 27, p. 69 and p. 65, Doc. PS-1206, AN WiRüAmt about d. Meeting on November 7, 1941, v. 11/11/1941.

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“Entire factories should be occupied by Russians”.77 From now on, “free Russian workers” should also be brought to Germany in order, as Göring justified it, to save German women from having to work and “do little work and eat a lot” forced laborers of other nationalities “from the Reich At this conference, Göring laid down principles and "guidelines" for the treatment of Soviet forced labor in the German war economy, which obviously incorporated the demands and "suggestions" of the monopolies as well as the reservations of the fascist security authorities. At the forefront, he mentioned “security, security and defense aspects” and explained: “Officers should be excluded from deployment as far as possible, and commissars (usually already murdered by the Wehrmacht or SS anyway - DE) should be fundamentally excluded from deployment... For security measures, the fastest and "The strictest effectiveness is decisive. The scale of punishment generally has no further levels between dietary restrictions and summary execution." 79 With regard to food, Göring spoke about the "frugality" of the Soviet people and announced: "Nutrition [is] a matter for the four-year plan. Creating our own food (cats, horses, etc.)."80 About the "free Russian workers "The guidelines contained a serious fundamental provision: "In practice, deployment and treatment will not be handled differently than with Russian prisoners of war." 8t According to Göring's guidelines, the Soviet workers were to be accommodated in heavily guarded camps, were only to work in columns and were to be strictly isolated from other foreign and German workers - all regulations that could not generally be implemented in either industry or agriculture. Worst starvation rations of food and the most miserable clothing were planned. It went on to say that the Soviet worker was not allowed to receive more than The German imperialists were particularly concerned about their interests on the issue of pay: “Every financial measure in this area must assume that the lowest wages in the East - according to an explicit instruction from the Führer - are a prerequisite for the equalization of war costs and the settlement of the Reich's war debts the war is over. Violations are subject to the most severe punishment. This applies analogously to any promotion of 'social aspirations' in the Russian colonial territory." 82 Finally, the Soviet forced laborers were supposed to wear a discriminatory label, similar to that prescribed for the Polish workers. The guidelines of November 7th laid down the basic principles of the treatment of Soviet forced labor in Germany. The most important additional labor supply for German imperialism was now the population at its mercy in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union, including prisoners of war. The particularly barbaric, sophisticated hunger and terror regime that the Soviets

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid., Vol. 39, p. 498f., Doc. USSR-386, Göring's "Guidelines" on the "Use of Soviet Russians", presented at the meeting on November 7, 1941. The latter intention corresponded exactly to that by Krauch and Pleiger (see p. 188{.).

79 Ibid., p. 499f., Doc. USSR-386.

80 Ibid., Vol. 27, p. 67, Doc. PS-1206.

81 Ibid., Vol. 39, p. 500, Doc. USSR-386.

82 Ibid., p. 500f.

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forced laborers were subjected to in the Reich became the core of the entire forced labor system. The increase in barbarism and the brutalization of forced labor policies within and outside the empire that began with it left their mark on this system.

c) The Crisis (December 1941-February/March 1942)

The Di/,e,mma of fascist labor policy

The defeat before Moscow led fascist labor policy into an acute crisis. Previously a relatively functioning part of the economic blitzkrieg concept, it had now obviously failed. Its fundamental dilemma became starkly apparent, and it would continue to plague it until the final phase of the war, namely the problem of the alternative between "vice" and "rifle", that is, between exploitation and being squeezed out of armaments and being called up to kill and be killed at the frontline. This problem, discussed again and again before and after, now threatened to become insoluble. Given the limited German manpower potential - regardless of any remaining reserves - the point at which a long-lasting, grueling material war with heavy losses would have to reach the limits of this potential could be measured.

At the end of December 1941, a new, imploring tone could now be heard even in official decrees. "The current situation of total war," for example, began Hitler's decree "on the further simplification of administration" of January 25, 1942, "in which the German people are waging a battle for existence or non-existence, now urgently demands in the first place Deployment of all available forces for the Wehrmacht and the armaments industry." 83 The military leadership ordered
comprehensive new conscriptions. At the same time, armaments were to be increased to the highest possible level and the entire war economy was to be converted to a longer war. The German leadership saw these as the basic prerequisites to be in favor of "restoring the army's full effectiveness by spring 1942"84 and of renewing their offensive on the German-Soviet front by the summer at the latest.

For the period from December 1941 to April 1942, the Wehrmacht required a total of over a million men for replacement and new formations, around half of them from the armaments industry. A total of 700,000 industrial men had to be called up by the spring of 1942.85 (Table 20)
On December 24th, the armaments inspectors received an urgent order from the OKW to carry out comprehensive confiscations from those born between 1919 and 1922 "with the greatest possible speed", which would have a severe impact on the number of skilled workers in the armaments factories.86

83 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 8906, Bl. 84 (not published).
84 *Thomas,* p. 470, ed. WiRüAmt regarding “The demands on armaments taking into account Survey of the situation in December 1941" dated December 23, 1941.
85 BA Koblenz, R 13 1/654, speech by Todt before d. Large advisory board of the RGI on January 13, 1942.
86 Ibid., RVfg. WiRüAmt at Rüln, December 24, 1941.

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Table 20

Force requirements of the Wehrmacht
December 1941 to April 1942

December 1941	151000
January 1942	325000
February 1942	236000
March 1942	265000
April 1942	33000
In total	1010000

Source: ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 8651, "Experience report on the development in the field of personnel management in the period from the beginning of the winter of 1941/42 to the beginning of the winter of 1942/43" (WWiAmt), January 1943.

The impact was chaotic. "The Christmas season of 1941," as it was said in a report by the Armaments Inspectorate Demand for a blood-letting of armaments workers, who in and of themselves are hardly able to meet the increased needs of the troops. Never since the military organization was founded has such an onslaught of telegrams fallen on it, instructions which, since they come from different central offices, sometimes contradicted each other, canceled each other out, demanded determinations that could hardly or not be fulfilled, demanded exceptions." 87

In the iron and steel industry, companies faced considerable difficulties in switching from three-shift to two-shift operation. "For a few weeks now, Dortmund-Hörde has abolished three-shift operation first in the Martinwerk, and later also in the Thomaswerk. In January, the Gutehoffnungshütte followed, and this week the Niederrheinische Hütte, the Vulkan smelter for the blast furnace."88 The

Managing Director of the North West District Group of the Iron Making Business Group Industry considered it “absolutely necessary that, taking into account the large ones impending confiscations, the issue is addressed immediately so that the Orders can be made calmly now and not in a hurry later must meet".89

The situation in mining, which had been critical for some time, became noticeably worse. Still On December 20th, the OKW ordered radical “Hi!l measures for mining”; All miners from the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS should be fired “immediately”. and "until further notice".90 A few days later it was said that the measure applied "with the exception of the Eastern Army" and the Afrika Korps.91 In However, it was known to initiated circles that the action had barely been ordered was completely canceled again: “Due to the current military situation, they can

87 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1782, situation report by. January 13, 1942.
88 Ibid., Case V, Film 420, Doc. NI-6200, AN Flick about. d. Meeting of the northwest district group of the Wigru Esl on February 10, 1942, v. February 12, 1942.
89 Ibid.
90 BA Koblenz, R 7/112, OKW decree v. December 20, 1941.
91 Ibid., OKW decree v. December 31, 1941.

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Measures already planned to support mining are not being implemented at the moment. The decision has been postponed."92 Those involved became relatively clear about the inconsistency of their objectives.93 The "new demands in the field of army armament" resulted in "a completely new situation for all parts of the Wehrmacht when it came to work."94 People believed the philosopher's stone in the mass forced recruitment and exploitation of Soviet workers, to which Hitler once again officially acknowledged in Directive No. 39 of December 8, 1941: “Young British workers are to a large extent used by prisoners and Russians to gradually free up civilian workers who are deployed in groups." 95 In contrast, in its detailed memorandum of December 23, "taking into account the situation in December 1941," the Military Economics and Armaments Office made a calculation that was certainly pessimistic, but overall somewhat realistic on: “In October 1941, the manpower requirements of the armaments industry, including the Reichsbahn, mining and construction industries, which had to be covered as soon as possible and by June 1942 at the latest, were calculated to be around 1,100,000 workers. In order to cover this need for the implementation of the ordered programs, the following were expected at that time: a) the release of 500,000 men from the front after the eastern operations had been completed, b) the recruitment of another 100,000 people through further combing was not possible.

urgently important companies,

c) with a further 100,000 foreigners through continued recruitment of foreigners,

d) with 300,000 men through increased use of Russian prisoners of war and civilian worker.

In contrast, it can now be noted that a) there are no layoffs from the Wehrmacht, b) skilled workers are no longer being recruited from the civilian sector to any significant extent can be,

c) there is hardly any effective gain in the area of the use of foreigners, since the recruitment of 100,000 new foreigners is offset by a significant decrease due to return migration, d) due to the expanded release of Russian prisoners of war for work in Germany in the next few months as a result of the outbreak Due to epidemics and as a result of their malnutrition, the total deployment of the Russians by the spring of 1942 can be estimated at a maximum of 300,000 men.

In addition, given the Wehrmacht's current replacement requirement of 625,000 men, it must be expected that the armaments industry will be at least <At least 200,000 well-trained and efficient workers will be withdrawn. A calculation of this comparison results in an unmet need for the armaments industry of at least 800,000 people by the early summer of 1942."96 In order to get the situation under control, the regime's top representatives took two decisions

92 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 8630, AN WiRüAmt, December 1941.

93 All relevant documents from the discussion at the end of 1941/beginning of 1942 about future labor policy were based on the dilemma described; see Eichho1.tz, history of the G BA, below the document section.

94 *Thomas,* p. 475 (as note 84).

95 *Hitler's instructions for the victory 1939-1945,* p. 174.

96 *Thomas,* p. 475 (as note 84).

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Interlinked measures are envisaged as a fundamental, long-term solution, namely the large-scale "implementation process" announced in Directive 39 , **which was to place Soviet forced laborers in place of the armaments workers to be drafted, and the appointment of a general plenipotentiary who would, if possible, take over the entire "distribution" of the Workers in the war economy should be regulated dictatorially, but in particular the above-mentioned action should be led centrally.**

The "Key Forces" decree of February 19, 1942

The arms companies' primary concern was the deprivation of skilled workers, "since the competition between the defense industry and the Wehrmacht for skilled workers was now inevitably intensifying."97 The call-ups of skilled workers soon reached alarming levels for the companies and led to "loud cries for help from industry "98 and called the Reich Minister for Armament and Ammunition into action. Todt declared on January 13th **before the Grand Advisory Council of the Reich Industry Group that nothing could be done about the convocations and that cries for help and telegrams were of no use; A bloodletting of ten percent of armaments workers is to be expected, which must be overcome.99 But at least it was under his influence that the OKW decree of** 28.

January 1942 **came about, according to which** 50,000 **reservists born in** 1908 **and younger "were to be provided immediately 'until further notice' in the UK as key armament forces" (so-c Armamentsmen). In January and February, through various instructions from the OKW, the following were also "excluded from all call-ups": the mineral oil program, mining, the production of tanks, machine tools and tires as well as the powder and explosives program.101 After Albert Speer's appointment as minister, one The first measures he implemented were to protect "key workers". In the first of his "leader's meetings" on February** 19 , 1942, **he, who had prepared a more detailed "memorial on the labor deployment" 1°2, presented this point to Hitler as the most acute.103 On the same day he received Hitler's Signature on a "key forces" decree104: "From the armaments industry, the companies producing raw materials, the Reichsbahn program, the fuel, powder and explosives production and the rest of the chemical production plan, the energy industry and the associated industries of the preliminary and semi-finished industries -products, 'key workers' will no longer be drafted in."** (§ 1) **Defining the term key forces and limiting and determining their number "to the bare minimum" was reserved for the Minister of Ammunition "in conjunction with the head of the OKW"** (§§ **2 and** 3).

97 *Petzina, Dietmar,* The mobilization of German workers before and during the Second World War World War, in 18/1968, p. 453.

98 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 8651, "Experience Report".

99 As note 85.

100 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 5682, OKW decree regarding "armament call-ups and Armament soldiers", January 28, 1942.

101 Ibid., film 8651, "experience report".

102 See p. 75 f.

103 FB, February 19, 1942, point 14/15.

104 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 5682, decree of Hitler v. February 19, 1942; hereafter also the following.

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According to Section **3, Paragraph 3, the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition was also authorized to "have abuses tried by a special court at the People's Court".**
The basis for the entire procedure was the definition of what should be considered a key worker according to the decree. Speer gave this definition together with General Thomas in a special decree.iOä According to this, key workers were "absolutely irreplaceable"; they were "as a rule technical employees and administrative staff as well as specialists", for example "high-quality" designers, controllers, foremen, setters and skilled workers special shortage occupations. In contrast, such selected "skilled workers" who were only protected temporarily were "almost irreplaceable"; they could and should be replaced within eight weeks by workers who had to be "relocated" from other areas and given additional training accordingly .

At the end of the selection procedure carried out jointly by the OKW, the Minister of Ammunition and the arms companies there was:

"Recognized key workers,	**647000**
recognized skilled	**708000**
workers, unprotected people	**202000"106**

born between 08 and 22. In fact, only 244,000 **defense workers were called up** in the first quarter of 1942.107 By the end of 1942 , **the number of recognized key workers rose to over a million.108**

With the key forces decree, the Wehrmacht's exclusive competence in all questions of conscription ended, as it still appeared to be irrefutable in the OKW's January decree. In **this extremely important nerve point in the entire conduct of the war, decisive rights to have a say were transferred to the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition, who was able to make far-reaching decisions in consultation with Hitler. "With the order for 'key workers and skilled workers', the time for improvised emergency measures is over." The call-ups in the following months could "still weaken the war economy, but no longer destroy its structure."109 However, the arms companies and state monopolies had Command posts of the war economy in the regional area, within the framework of the decree, still have a lot of fights with the Wehrmacht offices to fight out the key forces.HO**

In April, the OKW reduced the number of enlistments for the army (born 1908-22) **for May and June combined from** 200,000 **to** 176,000, **including those from the commercial sector from** 90,000 **to** 60,000, **with the proviso that "the priority programs Skilled workers are retained in their entirety, and the unprotected forces are retained to the extent necessary."111 However, this only meant the key workers, since, as it was said in the "experience report" from the Military Economic Office already quoted, "with the June**

105 Ibid., Joint Decree OKW and RMfBuM regarding "Definition for "key workers" and "skilled workers"' , February 19, 1942. Hereafter also the following. See also ibid., Decree OKW (Keitel) of February 19, 1942.
106 Ibid., film 8651, "experience report".
107 Weyres P. LePetzow, p. 33.
108 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 8651, "Experience Report".
109 Ibid.
110 See e.g. BA Koblenz, R 13 1/373, Prot. d. Advisory board meeting d. North West District Group the Wigru Esl v. March 31, 1942.
111 Ibid., R 7/112, OKW/WiRüAmt decree, April 23, 1942.

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"The last 'skilled worker' capable of field service has been withdrawn from the companies" .U2 In July, Hitler again "acknowledged from Minister Speer that the planned draft of 100,000 **men per month from the armaments industry is not possible."113 He ordered key workers "in Summer** 1942" . **At Speer's request, he also refrained from "renewing stricter scrutiny of the key workers", at least "until further notice, in order to avoid alarming the industry".114 But as early as autumn, the situation on the German Soviet front, the fascists began to prepare new large-scale conscriptions.115 In September, Hitler pushed for the unemployed key workers to be given military training "in installments of** 50,000." **116 Once again, the Minister of Ammunition succeeded in keeping the key workers in the armaments factories. He secured renewed strong protection for key personnel 117 and convinced Hitler that the intended conscription "for short-term training" in the army in industry "would have led to a percentage deduction that was unsustainable" .118 The defeat However, the Volga radically changed the situation and made the key forces decrees invalid.**

The history of the GBA

Although the top bodies of the regime at the turn of 1941/42 **unanimously expressed the view that the situation required a "human dictator,"119 for a long time there was no clarity about who would hold this office, what extent his powers would have to be and who he would have to deal with directly should be responsible.**
Time was of the essence, but given the highly political nature of the matter and the uncertainty of the extremely critical situation at the front at the time, it was not surprising that a period of months still passed before Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel was appointed "General Plenipotentiary for Labor Deployment". (GBA) was appointed. As early as November 14 , 1941, **following the conference on November 7, at which Göring laid down the basic principles for the barbaric discrimination and brutal exploitation of Soviet forced labor in Germany, 120, State Secretary. Paul**

112 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 8651, “Experience Report”.

113 FB, 23.-25. 7. 1942, point 40. - It was apparently Speer's argument that - under the auspices of the initially successful new fascist offensive - was reflected in Hitler's idea that "dying (at the front - DE) is a matter of a few minutes, while a skilled worker can work 360 days a year on building the most perfect weapons of his time and thereby save hundreds of soldiers from the sacrifice of blood."

(Picher, p. 488, table conversation from July 28, 1942).

114 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 8651, “Experience Report”.

115 ***DZW,*** Vol. 3, p. 171.

116 FB, 7.-9. 9. 1942, point 29.

117 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1783, decree RMfBuM v. October 3, 1942.

118 Ibid.

119 Ibid., Film 8630, OKW draft for a memorandum "Overview of the armament measures" for Hitler, version from the end of December 1941, postdated to January 1, 1942. -
In detail on the subject of **EichhoUz,** the history of the GBA; also p. 74f.

120 **IMG,** Vol. 39, p. 497ff., Doc. USSR-386, Göring's “Guidelines” regarding the “Use of Soviet Russians” by November 7, 1941; ibid., vol. 27, p. 65ff., Doc. PS-1206, TO WiRüAmt üb. d. Meeting on November 7, 1941, v. 11/11/1941.

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Körner announced an order from the representative for the four-year plan: "The Reich Marshal has now ordered ... that the non-Wehrmacht deployment of Russians (prisoners of war and free workers) in the Reich, including the Protectorate and the General Government as well as in the Reich Commissariats, will be centrally managed by his Labor Deployment business group To carry it out, it uses the general labor deployment administration and, in the occupied East, the organization that is available to the East Economic Staff or the Reich Commissioners, General Commissioners, etc. for the labor deployment. The Reich Marshal has the labor deployment business group for a quick and expedient solution for all questions in the civilian sector related to the Russian deployment." 121 The express authorization of the Labor Deployment Business Group towards the Reich Ministry of Labor was new here. However, the transfer of extensive powers from the Reich Labor Minister to
the head of the labor deployment business group, ie to Ministerial Director Werner Mansfeld, on behalf of the ill head of the business group, State Secretary Friedrich Syrup, initially extended exclusively to the "Russian deployment".122 In December - The OKW's drafts for Hitler's "Armament 1942" decree of January 10, 1942123, the demands for the mass use of Soviet forced labor and for the consolidation of all powers in the overall area of labor regulation played an outstanding role. There was a lecture note for Keitel on the draft of the
Wehrmacht command staff dated December 13, 1941124, in which the "special measures for human recruitment" called for by Hitler in Directive 39 were explained in more detail: "Removal of UK recruits from the war economy in exchange with Russian prisoners of war. To the extent envisaged here by the leader, a completely new moment in the distribution of people has occurred. Exploiting the idea through a generous implementation process secures the power of the young fighter...

The prisoners of war must be made available as quickly as possible. The top management of this very extensive shift of power is best left in the hands of the Reich Labor Minister, who must obtain powers that extend to dictatorial power. It is good for this that the representative of the Reich Marshal, Ministerial Director Mansfeld, belongs to the Reich Ministry of Labor. At the same time the first step towards normalizing the distribution of people; now too many positions!" 125 With this in mind, on the same day in a meeting of state secretaries, Keitel informed the highest fascist authorities about the situation in the Wehrmacht and armaments and about the plans of the OKW.

On December 22nd, Keitcl wrote again to the Reich Labor Minister 126 and urged the minister to provide himself with "significantly increased powers."

121 Ibid., Vol. 27, p. 59f., Dole PS-1193, Körner's cover letter to the V. November 7, 1941, " Göring's guidelines V. November 14, 1941.

122 See ***CzoUek, Roswitha/ EichhoU:;, Dietrich,*** On the economic policy conception of German imperialism during the attack on the Soviet Union, in: ***JfW,*** 1968, T. 1, p. 141 ff. (hereinafter: conception).

123 See p. 45.

124 ***Eichho/ t:;,*** Prehistory of the GBA, p. 372 ff., Dole 2.

125 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1775, lecture note WFSt regarding "Personal and material armament" (new version) v. December 13, 1941.

126 ***EichhoUz,*** Prehistory of the GBA, p. 375 f., Doc. 3.

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allow. 127 He suggested that Hitler or Göring appoint a “plenipotentiary for the use of human resources” in his ministry and assured him of his support for this purpose. 128 At the same time he had his proposal submitted through State Secretary Körner Göring 129, by virtue of which With his authority as representative for the four-year plan, all previously appointed general plenipotentiaries for various areas of the war economy (chemicals, iron and steel supply, construction, motor transport) were given their far-reaching powe Körner commented immediately. He declared "that he recognized the need for a 'human commissioner' with special powers" and agreed to present sent Keitel's support on Göring's demand 130 The Reich Labor Minister December 24th referred to the OKW's request and requested that the powers for the proposed general representative be transferred to Ministerial Director Werner Mansfeld, representative of Syrup. In the draft "overview version of the OKW „ of the armament measures" from the final memorandum in December it was said again on the same topic: "All orders have been given or requested by the military for the deployment of labor (deployment of Russians, human dictator), these measures must have an effect." 13 2 In the next and final version of the memorandum of January 3, 1942 133 The same passage read: "When deploying labor, the remaining needs must be met through strict management (Gen. Bev. for the deployment of people), and the withdrawal by the new drafts for the " v ehrmacht" must be counteracted through the deployment of Russians." 134 Göring's decree of January 10, 1942, the same day on which Hitler signed his decree on "armament in 1942," gave Mansfeld "unrestricted authority to direct the entire labor effort." 135 The two decrees did not complement each other by chance, but were coordinated with one another. In his decree, Göring expressly commissioned Mansfeld to take care of the "use of prisoners of war, especially from Soviet Russia." 136 Mansfeld's first official act was his appearance on January 13, 1942 before the Grand Advisory Council of the Reich Industry Group. At this meeting, Todt and pliers the mobilization of domestic and foreign workforce potential for the the labor German armaments industry. Mansfeld saw itself and deployment business group as the executive bureaucratic body of the armaments companies and the ammunition ministries - "unrestricted authority" already in a joint V ersterium. Since he had de facto transferred his orders fro

127 Ibid.

128 Ibid.

129 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 2325, Reitel to Körner, December 22, 1941.

130 ***Eichholtz,*** Prehistory of the GBA, p. 377, Doc. 4, AN WiRüAmt v. December 23, 1941.

131 Ibid., p. 378f., Doc. 5.

132 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 8630 (as note 119).

133 ***Thomas,*** p. 478ff.

134 Ibid., p. 481.

135 ***Eichholtz,*** Prehistory of the GBA, p. 379, Doc. 6, Göring's decree of January 10, 1942.

136 Ibid.

137 Ibid., p. 380ff., Doc. 7, order of January 13, 1942.

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objective subject area, namely wage policy issues. From this point of view he finally shed light on the “problem of foreign workers ... in its detrimental effects”: lower benefits, higher wages. More incidentally, he “mentioned” that “he is entrusted with the management of the use of Russian workers". [138]
However, Mansfeld's most urgent and special task was precisely "the supply of all suitable Russian prisoners of war for the armaments industry ... in cooperation with the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition and the OKW." 139 At the meeting of armaments inspectors on January 21 , 1942, at the When Mansfeld was introduced as the “Reich Commissioner for Labor Deployment,” the representative of GB Chemistry expressed impatience: “The labor deployment issue has still not been resolved... Labor deployment is above all... Foreigners and prisoners of war are particularly important . GB -Chem is
waiting for Russian prisoners of war . had to show for the German war economy. In mid-February 1942 he had to confess his failure in a lecture at the Reich Chamber of Commerce and admit that mass shootings, hunger, cold and epidemics in the Wehrmacht's prison camps had caused such mass deaths among Soviet prisoners of war that the number of those already employed in Germany Prisoners, as he put it, "could hardly allow themselves to be increased".1"2 He outlined his plan to focus his work on the deportation and forced labor of civilian Soviet citizens. But he did not want to arouse too high expectations and therefore let it be known that the precarious situation for German imperialism during the Soviet offensive, in particular the chaotic conditions in the transport system, constituted a decisive obstacle to this. He also criticized the previous, from his point of view, ineffective methods of the fascist human drivers: "It makes no sense to transport these workers in open or unheated closed freight wagons in order to unload corpses at the point of arrival." 143

Finally, on February 24 , 1942 , when his recall had already been decided by Hitler and the new Minister of Ammunition, Albert Speer, Mansfeld requested 627,000 second-class Soviet workers from the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.144

The office of “human dictator” provisionally administered by Mandeld was inseparable

138 VEB Carl Zeiss Jena company archive, No. 9725, “Some notes from the presentation by Ministerial Director Dr. Mansfeld from RAM at the meeting of the Reichsgruppe Industrie on January 13, 1942 in Berlin" (notes from Karl Albrecht, general manager of Wigru precision mechanics and optics).

139 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1741, lecture by Colonel Neef (WiRüAmt) at the inspectors' meeting on January 21, 1942.

140 Ibid., lecture by Dr. Ritter at the inspectors' meeting on January 21, 1942.

141 Ibid., film 1737, AN WiRüAmt v. March 10, 1942.

142 Ibid., Case XII (OKW process), No. 109, p. d.
Lecture by Mansfeld on February 19, 1942, v. February 20, 1942.

143 Ibid.

144 *JMG,* Vol. 26, p. 162, Doc. PS-580, RVfg. RMfdbO to the Reich Commissioners for Ostland and Ukraine, March 6, 191.2.

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linked to the entire war economy and tailored in particular to the needs of armaments production; However, it was also a political issue of the first order - He was responsible for dealing with such explosive questions as the German "work deployment", including service obligations and possible forced employment for non-working women, the forced labor policy within Germany and in all occupied territories, the working and living conditions of German and foreign workers, especially the so-called increase in performance, but also the general wage policy, rationing, etc. It was a central position of the state-monopolistic overall system of the fascist dictatorship.

In the struggle for the occupation or control of this institution, whoever held the dominant position in the war and in the political influence of the people had the probability of success. As far as the economy and armaments production were concerned, this was the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition - especially since the change of ministers in February 1942. As far as the political aspect of the labor question was concerned, the Nazi Party maintained its primacy here. Bormann, Ley, Goebbels and Hitler himself were involved in the disputes over the "Human Commissioner" in their capacity as representatives of the Portei.

As with the decision on the entire armaments organization, the Wehrmacht leadership and the representative for the four-year plan entered the race without any prospects in this question. Werner Mansfeld's positional weakness was essentially

This was a reflection of Göring's weakened political position, but was also due to the unfavorable circumstances for Mansfeld's mission that prevailed at the front and in the rear during the Soviet offensive and the extensive retreat movements of the Wehrmacht.

The change in the post of Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition on February 8, 1942 not only made it easier to equip the ministry with expanded and new powers, but also accelerated decisions of far-reaching importance in the area of labor policy. Speer's authorization in this matter came on Hitler's instructions, but formally through an additional order from Göring to his decree of March 1st, in which he appointed the new minister as "General Plenipotentiary for Armaments Tasks in the Four-Year Plan" (GB Rüst).

In the order, Göring declared Speer "entitled to take the lead ... in questions of labor deployment, etc. for the armaments and their sub-companies and to issue instructions here too."145 This confirmed the actual role that the Minister of Ammunition played in the establishment of the GBA. At the same time, this passage already announced the dependence in which the GBA later found itself vis-à-vis the Ministry of Ammunition and the armaments organization of the monopolies that were inextricably linked to it.

For political reasons, Hitler and Speer ultimately chose a Gauleiter.

Seen from this point of view, Sauckel's appointment 146 represented a compromise between the economic

145 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 8442, Bl. 18 R, Göring to Speer and Körner, March 1, 1942 (see p. 64).

146 To the extent that Hitler and Bormann were involved in the selection, they probably voted for Sauckel because they wanted to offer this upstart, who often boasted of his proletarian origins, an equivalent to the fact that they had rejected the proposal a year earlier to make him one of the future ones to make Reich Commissioners on Soviet soil; At the end of May 1941, S. was still considered a candidate for Ukraine, albeit an “uncertain” one

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borrowed and the political aspects that the ruling class had to take into account. The last word was reserved for Hitler, who decided that the GBA could turn to him directly on all important political questions, while otherwise taking it for granted that, as Sauckel remembered years later, "I'm here for that was to work for Speer and that I was mainly his (Speer - DE) man".147

d) Program and policy of the GBA 1942

The establishment of the GBA and its close functional ties to the GB Rüst or the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition and to Central Planning gave the German armament powers the means to have a fairly coherent concept for solving the labor problem in the war economy develop and enforce. In the spring of 1942, this concept emerged, on the one hand, against the background of the devastating defeat near Moscow, and, on the other hand, on the basis of - albeit not unclouded - military optimism, in the light of which the prospects of a renewed German offensive in the East looked rosy; Furthermore, it was based on the premise, considered politically important, that the German people - especially the petty-bourgeois masses and the propertied classes -, in order to strengthen their support for the war and loyalty to the regime, should, if possible, protect themselves from radical interventions in their living conditions and from an all too obvious deterioration in their working conditions. and living conditions must be preserved.

Under these circumstances there could only be one solution: the Wehrmacht's inevitable claims for compensation had to be satisfied; The stock of German skilled workers had to be largely secured; The war economy's general labor replacement and expansion needs were to be ensured by the massive recruitment of foreign, primarily Soviet, forced laborers. The latter task became the GBA's main field of activity. • In the meantime, the Defense Economics and Armaments Office of the OKW had calculated that
the "requirements of the armaments programs", as far as they had been drawn up for 1942, required an additional 1.4 million workers for the armaments industry, of which the office only considered 500,000 to be securely procurable (half each were civilian and half Soviet forced laborers were prisoners of war). Forced recovery and exploitation of foreign workers on a massive scale

“

(ibid., FS, Film 5474, AN (Großkopf, AA) about meeting in the Foreign Policy Office of the NSDAP on May 29, 1941, v. May 30, 1941).

147 IMG, Vol. 3, p. 543, Doc. PS-3721, interrogation of Sauckel v. September 22, 1945; see ibid., vol. 32, p. 514 (English). - If the Speer Ministry had already had the power as one and a half Years later, a different organizational structure would certainly have been chosen for the GBA and this institution would have been more clearly subordinate to the minister.

H8 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1784, ed. WiRüAmt v. March 26, 1942 (deadline: March 1, 1942). It was at least admitted that 0.2 million should be viewed as double counting. f/.9 Homze, p. 107.

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centralized organization operated. Without this mass forced labor, "German imperialism would not have been able to continue its war long after its blitzkrieg strategy suffered a fiasco. By this crime, it prolonged the genocide and its own existence." 150 The GBA replaced the previous, now dissolved, labor deployment business group of the four-year plan organization and relied on the central and regional authorities of the Reich Ministry of Labor, whose main departments III (wage policy) and V (labor deployment) were made directly available to it. Speer had obtained the authority for him from Hitler to "make changes in personnel terms in the Reich Ministry of Labor and in the subordinate offices." 151 This happened in many cases; especially from Main Department VI (European Office for In the districts, he appointed the Gauleiters as his representatives, thereby securing additional control over the state labor offices and labor trustees subject to his instructions and gaining influence over the activities of the other regional authorities. 152 The right to give instructions on manpower issues to the military commanders and occupation administrations was already transferred to him on March 27th by a decree from Göring.153 After the first six months of his activity, Sauckel - and with him Speer - pushed for "an appropriately strict order from the Führer." , the draft of which was immediately drawn up after a joint discussion with Hitler.154 This resulted in Hitler's decree of September 30th, which expressly authorized the GBA, "at its discretion in the Greater German Reich including the Protectorate as well as in the General

"To take all measures in the government and in the occupied areas to ensure the orderly deployment of work for the German war economy under all circumstances" and to "appoint representatives in the offices of the military and civil administration" in the occupied countries ", who were directly subordinate to him.155 Sauckel's representatives in the occupied countries l56 were the same as the department or group heads of the German occupation administrations responsible for "labor deployment"; regional labor departments worked under them, for example in France and Belgium at the field and senior field commanders in the provinces or

Departments.

150 Drobischl Eichholtz, p. 638.

151 Eichholtz, Prehistory of the GBA, p. 382, Doc. 8, Speer to Lammers, '.l3. 3. 1942. To See also Seeber, p. 65ff.

152 /MG, Vol. 32, p. 200ff., Doc. PS-3352, "Order No. 1 on the appointment of the Gauleiters as authorized representatives for work in the Gauen", April 6, 1942.

153 *RGBl.* 1942 I, p. 180, "AO of the BfV on the implementation of the Führer's decree on a GBA", March 27, 1942.

154 FB, 20.-22. 9. 1942, point 39.

155 *J* MG, Vol. 29, p. 94, Doc. PS-1903, "Decree of the Führer to implement the decree on a GBA", September 30, 1942.

156 Ibid., Vol. 41, p. 216f., Doc. Sauckel-13, “Decree of the GBA on the position of the responsible wore", October 25, 1942.

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"Exploitation of the labor power of the East"

Sauckel's main task was to "bring in as many people from the East as is possible."157 According to Hitler and Göring, the "most important solution," as Sauckel announced, "was to exploit the labor power of the East. One Millions of Russians would have to be brought into the Reich as quickly as possible, so quickly that the achievements of some of these Russians could be brought to bear before the offensive." 158 In addition, he was commissioned to transport 400,000 to 500,000 "Russians" to Germany, who were to work as domestic helpers "after satisfying the needs of the industry."159 Organizational measures for forced recruitment in the occupied Soviet territories had already been taken Mansfeld was hit. Sauckel often followed on from this, primarily using the
"labour deployment" departments of the Eastern Economic Staff and the Reich Ministry **for** the occupied Eastern territories or the Reich Commissioners. However, Sauckel's forced labor program differed significantly from this in its enormous dimensions and forced pace preceded. The organizational apparatus also took on new dimensions. The GBA's first measures included the aforementioned increase in the recruitment program from 627,000 (Mansfeld) to 1.4 to 1.5 million Soviet forced laborers (with "domestic helpers"), the doubling of the " "Recruitment commissions" in the occupied Soviet territory, the advancement of the focus of the planned deportation operation from the second half of the year to May/June 1942 and a corresponding tripling of the existing transport program in April.160 It was clear to those involved that under such auspices, the handling of forced recruitment would also show a new level of brutality and naked violence would reign. Sauckel based his executive apparatus on this from the beginning. On March 31, ten days after his appointment, the GBA sent a letter to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories and the Eastern Economic Staff in which he called for “all options to be completely exhausted in order to provide civil protection as quickly as
possible and to the greatest extent possible to bring workers from the newly occupied eastern territories into the Reich."161 He announced the doubling and reinforcement of the personnel of the 24 "recruitment commissions" that had been set up since November/December 1941 and were now subordinate to him. For this purpose, 200 civil servants were recruited from German employment centers, in “Sonderführer”-

uniforms and set off to the east.162 The Wehrmacht actively
participated in the fulfillment of the “Sauckel program” in the areas it occupied. At the beginning of May, the OKH ordered “minimum requirements” for

157 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 10804, TB Goebbels, entry from. April 1, 1942.

158 IMG, Vol. 36, p. 312, Doc. EC-318, Protocol. d. Presidential meeting (LAÄ) at the GBA, April 15, 1942.

159 Ibid., p. 314.

160 Müller, Wehrmacht and Occupation, p. 178; IMG, Vol. 25, p. 62f., Doc. PS-016, "Program" of the GBA v. April 20, 1942.

161 IMG, Vol. 39, p. 495, Doc. USSR-382.

162 Ibid., p. 496; Müller, Wehrmacht and Occupation, p. 179 f.; Czollek, Fascism and Occupation, p. 153; Pfahlmann, p. 46. In July 1942, the recruiting commissions were "around 700 men" strong (IMG, vol. 27, p. 119, Doc. PS-1296, GBA report of July 27, 1942 on "Ein-satz foreign workers in Germany. As of July 27, 1942").

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to fix all rural communities; Special measures from the military authorities are necessary because the apparatus of the GBA's labor deployment departments operating in the cities is not sufficient. 163 From the first days, the manhunters of the GBA used violent methods of extraordinary brutality against the Soviet civilian population that clearly qualified as crimes against humanity. 164 If a source expert like Homze has the nerve to claim "that until the summer of 1942 the Russian workers were volunteers" and that "the partisans were also responsible for some of the terror associated with the recruitment," 16 5 This shows anti-communist stubbornness that is inexcusable.

At the end of May, a few weeks before the start of the German summer offensive in the southern part of the Eastern Front, Sauckel traveled to Ukraine. He reported optimistically about the labor resources there and about the "extraordinarily satisfactory" state of health of the rural population, but complained about the "shortage of means of transport", about the lack of sufficient human drivers and about the self-interest of military authorities in employing local people Manpower - while, as must be expressly noted, Field Marshal Bock (Fedor v. Bock, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group South - D.E.) has promised his unconditional support and has instructed the subordinate departments accordingly However, he also had to call forced recruitment the "influence of Soviet propaganda" and partisan activity.

The skilled workers and the other workers who remained behind, mainly women, have either already been transported away from the cities, are employed in the army or have disappeared. Nevertheless, the fulfillment of the GBA program for German agriculture and industry “can be ensured in the required number of people”, although predominantly in the form of female workers. “In the main, however, only agricultural workers can be transported to Germany in large numbers "Wireii . . . It is the task of the German armaments industry to create the conditions for this (training opportunities, retraining, etc. - D.E.) immediately and with the greatest energy."

In contrast to Mansfeld, Sauckel was able to boast of successes after just a few months. Under his leadership, the forced labor system was quickly brought to a "previously unknown level of open mass slavery" **i67** and operated with ever more ruthless and brutal methods. But it would be completely wrong to do so

163 ***Guidelines for the management of the economy in the newly occupied eastern areas (Green Map),*** **T.** 2, **p.** 143, **Guidelines OKH/GenSDH,** May 10, 1942; ***Müller,*** **Wehrmacht and Occupation,** p. 183.

164 **On** April 16, 1942 **or earlier, the Kiev Defense branch radioed the Defense Group South (Wiln South): “The forced recruitment of local workers for use in Germany, which has been going on for four days, appears to be confirmation of Soviet propaganda. Effect: Multiple camouflage of the affected circles by taking shelter in other people's apartments. Many men„ estimated at 5,000, fled to the countryside. There is probably an influx of partisans there... (BA Koblenz, R** 41/137, **Wiln Süd to WiStab Ost,** April 16, 1942).

165 ***Homze,*** p. 167.

166 **ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film** 57586, **“Report of Gauleiter Sauckel about. his trip to Soviet Ukraine in his capacity as GBA",** May 26-31, 1942. **Hereafter also the following.** i(i7 ***Müller,*** **Wehrmacht and Occupation, p.** 175.

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to see a break in the fascist forced labor policy, as the authors of most bourgeois accounts do, who thus place all responsibility solely on Sauckel and his executive organs, while leaving his clients and backers unscathed. To construct a fundamental difference between a period of "voluntary" foreign labor until 1942 and a period of forced labor since 1942 is not only to falsify the facts, but also to distort the fascist-imperialist character of the German war aims and the German war economy -veil.

At the end of July, Sauckel boasted that he had completed the task assigned to him for 1942 in just four months.168 He had sent 1,640,000 foreign workers to German-speaking countries.

country, of which 1,301,000 were Soviet citizens, ie a total of 410,000 per month and around 94,000 people per week.

Table 21

Foreign forced laborers transported to Germany in 1942 (in 1000)

	deportees including them		
	ones	Soviet	Soviet foreign
	Forced laborers, forced laborers, prisoners of war		
January-March 1942	400	64*	138
April	286	174	43
May	447	344	54
June	437	371	38
July	469	412	86
In total (April-July)	1639	1301	221

• Soviet civilian labor only: 1941 to March 1942

Source: Calculated according to: *IMG,* Vol. 27, p. 116, Doc. PS-1296, Report d. GBA v. July 27, 1942; ibid., p. 581f., Doc. PS-1739, GBA "Report on the work deployment in 1942" by. December 23, 1942.

Over the course of these oppressive months, the Soviet population overcame the initial shock of the human hunts and mass deportations and defended itself increasingly effectively; Sauckel's complaints about the "obstacles that arose from passive and open resistance, from the mistrust of the population infected by Bolshevism and from the systematically carried out counter-propaganda" testified to this. The difficulties were particularly exacerbated by the increasingly widespread partisan activity."

The GBA's optimism had waned significantly in its reports of December 1 and 23, 1942 (as of November 30 and the end of December, respectively).169 It no longer provided detailed figures broken down by month and nationality and therefore counted the "difficulties" of the forced enlistments in even greater detail

168 *IMG,* Vol. 27, p. 115ff., Doc. PS-1296, report d. GBA v. July 27, 1942. Hereafter also the following. - The RMfBuM confirmed this: "In terms of numbers, the gap created by call-ups in the first half of the year has been closed." (BA Koblenz, R 41/141, Statist.
elaboration RMfBuM (RüAmt), September 19, 1942).

169 *IMG,* Vol. 27, p. 573ff. u. p. 578ff. Doc. PS-1739, hereafter also the following.

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on. The reason was the drastic decline in "successes" in his main field of activity, namely in the occupied Soviet territories. The overall result for the five months from August to December had fallen to 77 percent compared to the previous four months, and he also had this result could only be achieved through additional deportations from other countries; the result on occupied Soviet territory had fallen to 44 percent (for civilian workers to 31 percent)!

Table 22

Soviet forced laborers deported to Germany in 1941/1942 (in 1000)

	Civilian forced laborers	Soviet Soviet Prisoners of war
Until March 31, 1942	64	138 *
April 1st-31st July	1080	221
August 1st-31st December	336	235

* January to March 1942 only

Source: see Table 21

The downward trend was obvious. Since the end of 1942, this prompted the GBA to increasingly push for "a careful treatment of foreign workers, including (! - DE) Soviet Russian workers," which "above all, cold reason compels."170 This is the only way they can achieve this "the German war economy has the greatest benefit" and could be "maintained at such a level of performance over the long term."171 The larger the employment of forced laborers, especially Soviet ones, the more brutal and degrading the regime treated them. The new dimensions of the forced labor regime made the methods of exploitation and discrimination a major domestic political problem for the fascists. The German population, especially the working people in industry and agriculture, were supposed to work with the foreigners, but at the same time feel and act as members of the victorious people and the "master race". The forced laborers were assigned the status of labor slaves and "subhumans"; As a result, the work itself, at least the hard, dirty, monotonous work, was in danger of being seen as a flaw for a German - an effect unintended by the exploiters.

The real contradictions that lay in this situation were ultimately insoluble for German imperialism, especially since for it the "foreign workers" were not only a necessary accessory to its war economy, but their exploitation was an inseparable part of its main war aim represented: to subjugate the peoples of Europe and the USSR and to integrate them into his system of world domination.

170 Ibid., p. 588, Doc. PS-1739, Speech d. GBA on d. Reich and Gauleiter conference in Posen on the 5th/6th 2. 1943.

171 Ibid., p. 577, Doc. PS-1739, report d. GBA v. December 1, 1942.

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Therefore, German forced labor policy in the occupied territories as well as within Germany was in a constant dilemma. It fluctuated between the - largely carried out - intention to reduce the life of the forced laborers to a prison and starvation existence under the pressure of omnipresent terror and full of degrading discrimination, and attempts to increase their performance and willingness to perform by increasing starvation rations and by foregoing various discrimination measures and through differentiated benefits of different types.

The GBA's policy was characterized by these contradictions from the beginning. However, in 1942, terror and discrimination prevailed with great exclusivity, which, thanks to the "final victory" and inexhaustible manpower resources, especially in the USSR, people believed they could handle without regard to losses.
In 1942, the number of foreign forced laborers transported to the Reich amounted to a total of 3.3 million - a number that was never reached in any other year of the war. Over 60 percent of them were citizens of the Soviet Union.

Table 23
11 foreign forced laborers were sent to Germany in 1942 (in 1000)

	Deported altogether	of that Soviet forced laborers	in percent
January-March	400	approx. 180	approx.45
April-July	1640	1301	79
August-December	1260	571	45
In total	3300	ca.2050	approx. 62

Source: see Table 21; *IMG,* Vol. 27, p. 598, speech by the GBA on June 5th. 2. 1943. - Some incorrect numbers and dates in *Homze,* p. 144 and p. 152; *DZW,* Vol. 2, p. 315.

At the end of 1942, over 5.7 million civilian foreign forced laborers and prisoners of war were working in
Germany.172 Under Sauckel, the armaments powers finally ensured that foreign forced laborers were primarily sent to the armaments industry. According to GBA decrees of May 18 and 23, 1942, at least 75 percent, and according to later decrees and programs, at times even all Soviet forced laborers were to be put into armaments.173 The number of foreign forced laborers newly employed in Germany from April to December was approximately 80 percent in industry (arms production, mining, construction).174 If the forced
labor regime took on new dimensions under the GBA, this was due to its significant powers, the political and military conditions that were more favorable for German imperialism in the short term, its close functional interdependence. communication with the Ministry of Munitions and the Central Planning and its political

172 *IMG,* Vol. 27, p. 595, Doc. PS-1739, Speech d. GBA on 5.16. 2. 1943.
173 *Pfahlmann,* p. 130.
174 *IMG,* Vol. 27, p. 574 and p. 577, Doc. PS-1739, report from GBA v. December 1, 1942.

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Penetration power. Sauckel also benefited significantly from the fact that the Soviet winter offensive ended in March/April, that the front and transport situation temporarily stabilized and that the Wehrmacht occupied the rest of Ukraine since the end of June, in the course of its summer offensive and advanced further to the Don, the Volga and the Caucasus.

Mobilization of women and young people

Unlike in the area of forced labor policy, nothing significant changed on the German labor market with the introduction of the GBA. The greater mobilization of the non-working German population, especially women, progressed only hesitantly under Sauckel, although the Wehrmacht and important business circles pushed for it. The responsible authorities continued to pursue a cautious course.175 Although direct coercive measures against non-working women were avoided, several hundred thousand women took up work in the course of 1941 and 1942, partly due to the repeated appeals of the NSDAP, the NS-Frauenschaft, the OKW and other fascist institutions and press organs. The potential of German women who volunteered to work in the war economy voluntarily or under moral and political pressure was obviously essentially exhausted.

Table 24
Female German workers 1939-1943 (each May 31, pre-war Germany; in 1000)

1939	14626
1940	14386
1941	14167
1942	14437
1943	14806

Source: The Effects, p. 205, table 4.

In total, for April to December 1942, the GBA estimated 1.125 million German workers that it had "made available" to the war economy.176 Many tens of thousands of female and male workers had been employed in agriculture for years

175 After the first Marxist study of women's work during the war in ***Volume** 1,* pp. 79ff., a series of further and more comprehensive works appeared, so that
A detailed treatment of the topic in this volume can be dispensed with.
See especially (with further references) ***Arendt, Hans-Jürgen,*** On women's politics of fascist German imperialism in the Second World War, in: ***JfG,*** 1982, vol. 26, p. 299ff. (305ff.) (hereinafter: On women's policy); ***ibid.,*** Basic features of the women's policy of fascist German imperialism 1933-1939, ibid., vol. 24, p. 313ff. See also *DZW,* Vol. 2, p. 313ff.

176 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 3386, GBA-, "Overview of the new labor force made available to the German war economy in the period from March 31, 1942 to September 30, 1944", September 30, 1944.

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male Reich labor service subjects, "compulsory year girls", those subject to country year service and members of the Hitler Youth's rural service and students were deployed to work for a longer or shorter term and without a fixed employment contract.177 In the spring of 1942, the authorities and the Nazi party introduced a system into the agricultural work of the rural population and school youth who were not permanently employed. Here they saw an opportunity to relieve the labor balance in favor of the defense industry. On March 7, 1942, the "Ordinance on the use of additional workers for the food security of the German people" 178, called the Göring Ordinance, appeared, which already provided for a kind of "total" mobilization of German workers for agriculture. Its authors hoped to "mobilize all the reserves of people skilled in agricultural work and capable of working on land that still existed in the villages and country towns" _179 According to the Göring Ordinance, men and women, young people and old people from rural towns and rural communities - people he himself suggested "in agreement with the mayor and the local group leader of the party" are forced to do any agricultural work by the employment offices "for a limited time." "The respective job is determined by the local farmer leader." During the 1942 harvest, several hundred thousand such-pre-

namely female - forced conscripts in the countryside.180 On April 11th, the GBA issued an "Order on the War Deployment of Youth"181, according to which "external and long-term, local deployment" in agriculture for students in grades 5 and 6 and female students The Gauleiter decided on the duration of the deployment or the closure of the school classes "temporarily or continuously depending on the agricultural needs" in the period from April 15th to November 15th "Short-term local deployment, .. at their place of residence or in neighboring places" could be used by all students from the age of 10 up to the 6th or 7th grade.

e) Living and working conditions of Soviet forced laborers

The character of the war against the USSR as a class war was clearly demonstrated by the classification of Soviet forced laborers on the scale of forced labor and by the regulations governing their working and living conditions. Their treatment was fundamentally oriented towards the grim image of the enemy of the "Bolshevik subhumans" and the "dehumanized Asian hordes"182, which is always

177 *Lehmann, Joachim,* On the mobilization of German workers for agriculture in the years 1942-1945 (hereinafter: mobilization), in: *WZ University of Rostock,* Ges.- u. Sprach-wiss. Series, H. 9/1974, p. 557ff. - In the summer of 1942 alone, 160,000 "compulsory year girls" were employed in agriculture (ibid., p. 558).

178 *RGBl.* 1942 I, p. 105 f.; hereafter also the following.

179 *National Socialist Country Post,* March 20, 1942; quoted from *Lehmann,* Mobilization, p. 552.

180 The uncertain Zalile information is analyzed by *Lehmann,* Mobilization, p. 553f.

181 *IMG,* vol. 41, p. 223f., Doc. Sauckel-67a.

182 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 10869, announcement by the manager of the Messerschmitt Group (and VAR of Messerschmitt AG), Theo Croneiß, in the company newspaper on March 9, 1942.

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nent component of the fascist ideology and was systematically and comprehensively disseminated by officials since June 22nd. The barbaric terror and inhumane discrimination against the Soviet forced laborers, which soon became part of everyday working life in the German war economy, were in this way ideologically and propagandistically supported to the public.

In view of the discussions and orders of the fascist power organs regarding the accommodation, guarding and other treatment of the Soviet forced laborers, the fascist racial ideology clearly showed itself to be what it was in its essence: a weapon of the most reactionary and aggressive elements of the German imperialist bourgeoisie in their struggle against Labor movement, democracy and socialism, for the unhindered exploitation and oppression of the world. The ideology and practice reflected the fascists' inextinguishable fear of their most indomitable opponent, a fear that was similarly manifested, albeit on a different scale, in the treatment of political prisoners in the concentration camps.

At the same time, it revealed capital's unbridled greed for profit, which, according to the German imperialists' intentions, should not be diminished by any significant remuneration, food, clothing, etc. Ultimately, as Heydrich put it, “it was in the interests of the Reich if ... the workers of the allied and friendly nations slowly returned to their homeland and for this there was an increased deployment of Russian workers. There should be no political consideration whatsoever regarding the treatment of the Russian workers." !83

Isolation and political quarantine

The "conditions of use" of Soviet prisoners of war had already been the subject of discussions and decisions in the summer of 1941. They were summarized again in Göring's guidelines of November 7th
the political isolation of the prisoners: "No contact with the German population, especially no 'solidarity'. German workers are fundamentally the superiors of the Russians."11¼

While the Wehrmacht was primarily responsible for the treatment of prisoners of war, the fate of the civilian Soviet workforce in Germany was controlled by the fascist police from the beginning. “The Russian workers,” said Heydrich
as Himmler's deputy and head of the Reich Security Main Office at a departmental meeting of the central authorities at the beginning of December 1941
The line that is generally followed by the security authorities, is that they are kept in the Reich as civilian prisoners under guard in camps. They are also not recruited in Russia, but are forcibly transferred to the Reich." 185 On February
20, 1942, Himmler, Reichsführer-SS and chief, issued a decree the German police, the notorious “General Provisions on the Recruitment and Use of Workers”

183 Ibid., Case XI, No. 373, BI. 53, Doc. NG-3347, AN Ausw. Office ex. a "meeting of all departments involved" under Heydrich on December 3, 1941, from December 4, 1941.
184 !MG, Vol. 27, p. 67, Doc. PS-1206.
185 As note 183.

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forces from the East". These regulations and the associated circular186 codified the slave-like existence of the Soviet forced laborers and justified them in fascist jargon: "The decisive factor for the entire treatment of these workers is that they have lived for decades under Bolshevik rule and were systematically raised to be enemies of National Socialist Germany and European culture." In the "reception camps" for the transport of forced laborers from the Soviet Union, just as in the prisoner of war camps, SS special commandos raged "with the aim of eliminating those who appeared to be particularly dangerous elements from working in the Reich." Those separated in this way, if not immediately executed, were sent to concentration camps for "special treatment" as certain death candidates.

The remaining workers were placed in mass camps "with appropriate fencing, preferably with barbed wire." From then on, they lived "permanently under surveillance." People were only allowed to leave the camp for work. "Accordingly, all free time takes place in the camp." Outside the camp, the forced laborers were only allowed to move "in closed columns" and, according to the regulations, "were to be strictly separated from the German population, foreign civilian workers and all prisoners of war ". (General provisions) This also applied in principle to the time at work. "It is important to prevent good communist ideas from penetrating the German population by preventing any contact that is not directly related to work and, if possible, any solidarity "To avoid violence between German people and workers from the old Soviet Russian area." (circular)

During the work, however, it was often impossible to prevent German and Soviet workers from working together. In the decree, Himmler therefore described it as urgently necessary to "emphasize the German worker's position in such a way that, despite his cooperation, he appears as a superior and supervisor and, if possible, a feeling of solidarity with these workers cannot arise in him."
The fascists feared nothing more than class solidarity between German workers and Soviet forced laborers. In this context, it was said, the companies would have to be "instructed about the necessity and the various possibilities of highlighting the German people." At the workplace, "German foremen, foremen, and workers should be brought in to guard the workplace, with supervisory functions." ... and to be identified in this capacity by an armband to be provided by the company with the inscription 'Werkschutz'". (General provisions)

The fascist police worked hard to create a dense network of informants; It is "important to establish a particularly intensive executive intelligence service within this workforce," the decree said, "with particular attention to the spread of communist ideas and the risk of acts of sabotage."

Any resistance from Soviet workers could be broken by means of "special treatment".

186 The "General Provisions... " (ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 1737; brief excerpts in *1 MG,* **vol. 41, p. 214 ff., Doc. Sauckel-6) were the appendix to Himmler's circular of the same date regarding "use of workers from the East"** *([MG,* **vol. 31, p. 500ff., Doc. PS-3040; printed here without an appendix). Citations below after both documents.**

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"The special treatment is carried out by hanging." As a deterrent, it had to be attended by "a certain number of workers from the old Soviet Russian area" (Circular).187 This fundamental document of
fascist barbarism and the most shameless exploitation was not the product of SS ideology alone, not a product of one inexplicable racial madness. It is clear from our analysis that this is the result of months of discussions in circles of the monopolies, the Wehrmacht, the ministries and leading state monopoly institutions, the security authorities and the institutions of the fascist party.

In principle, the political line of the document and the framework regulations it contains for the treatment of civilian Soviet forced laborers 188 remained in force until towards the end of the war, although the requirements of effective production and the rapidly increasing resistance to forced recruitment soon required certain modifications -let it kick.189

Nutrition

Soon after Göring had called for the Soviet people to “create their own food (cats, horses)”190 in his guidelines of November 7, 1941 under the pretext of “frugality,” the Reich Food Minister worked together with representatives of the Soviet people OKW, the Reich Ministry of Labor and others in detail with their diet. 191 The negotiations in this committee gave the impression that they wanted to exploit the Soviet forced laborers without food if possible. State Secretary Backe explained that the food situation actually did not allow any employment of Soviet workers at all, and thus "justified" his demand that they only receive horse and free bank meat and, instead of bread, so-called Russian bread - made from 50 percent rye meal, 20 percent sugar beet pulp, 20 percent "Cell meal" (sawdust) and 10 percent straw meal or leaves - to spend; He thought to them "in advance ... seven days of flour soup."

In accordance with the decisions of this consultation, the ration rates for Soviet prisoners of war were set in the following weeks, as were also for Soviet civilians

187 Himmler's circular contained the infamous passage about the death penalty for sexual intercourse with Germans: "For every sexual intercourse with German comrades, special treatment must be applied for for male workers from the old Soviet Russian territory, and admission to a concentration camp for female workers."

188 Further elaborated in the “Sample of a service regulation on the treatment of Eastern workers housed in camps” (draft) dated July 18, 1942 (ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1737).
On the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war, fundamental *dispute,* p. 249ff. and passim.

189 According to the (first) addendum to Himmler's “General Provisions ... ", the Barbed wire was dispensed with, provided that the camp fence was high enough to prevent attempts to escape and contact with the population; the regulations regarding the deployment of convoys were relaxed; Forced labor families should no longer be torn apart in the camps (ibid., addendum dated April 9, 1942).

190 /MG, Vol. 27, p. 67, Doc. PS-1206.

191 Ibid., Vol. 39, p. 446ff., Doc. USSR-177, AN BfV v. 11/29 ex. Meeting in the RMEL on November 24, 1941. Hereafter also the following.

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Forced labor should apply. It was agreed on weekly rations of 2600 g bread (made from 72 percent rye meal and 28 percent sugar beet pulp), 250 g horse or free bank meat, 130 g fat, 150 g nutrients, 70 g sugar, 3000 g potatoes, 21/3 l skimmed milk and , as the main food, 16.5 kg of turnips (which were generally not rationed at all). In addition to 155 g of sugar, hard workers only received 21 kg of turnips as an allowance.192 A French prisoner of war, in contrast, received 1,550 g of bread, 427 g of meat and 213 g of fat *more* per week as a hard worker (after the general ration reduction of April 6 , 1942, only 800 g bread, 350 g meat and 176 g more fat).193 According to the fascists' own calculations, the weekly ration for Soviet workers contained just under 60 g protein and 25 g pure fat.194 The effects of this diet, with which the fascists aimed for their destruction openly announced to the Soviet people were devastating. A flood of urgent complaints came from the arms inspections and employment offices. Armaments Finns like Krupp complained when hunger had left large numbers of sought-after Soviet skilled workers unable to work within a few weeks. “From our Russian prisoners of war,” reported the Fried. Krupp AG at the beginning of April, “are already over 30 percent. H. was unable to work due to inadequate nutrition and 12 died in the camp. ... Among the civilian Russian workers who - with a few exceptions - arrived here in an excellent state of health, the typical hunger edema is already becoming noticeable." 195 We have cases almost every day," reported a Hildesheim armaments factory "That Ukrainians who are definitely willing to work collapse powerless at the machine." 196 The Ruhr companies agreed that "satisfactory work performance is not possible with the current ration rates. ... It is to be hoped that the Berlin authorities will change their mind of the unsustainability of the situation. Under today's circumstances there is little point in bringing the Russians to the West." 197 Numerous armaments companies expressly defended themselves against the possible accusation of “sentimentality”; they made their proposals to improve the rations “solely for the purpose ... of getting the highest possible performance out of the undoubtedly capable and useful Ukrainian workforce” 198 The Reich Industry Group presented the concerns to the entire industry on March 5th. The under-nutrition of the Soviet workforce may, she admitted, be "desirable for political reasons"; but from the "point of view of labor input," "which in our opinion should not be given less consideration given the current conditions," the design appears to be the same the provision of food is not appropriate, because instead of an increase in performance, a reduction in performance is achieved, which is not in view of the end goal

192 Ibid., p. 448 (table sets in force from December 4, 1941); BA Koblenz, R 13 XX/40, H. 1, Rs. RMEL v. December 10, 1941.

193 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1737, AN WiRüAmt v. March 10, 1942; ibid, head of OKW at GBA, March 25, 1942.

194 IMG, Vol. 39, p. 448, Doc. USSR-177.

195 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 1737, Fried. Krupp AG to Rüln VI (Münster), April 2, 1942.

196 Ibid., Elfi (Elektro- und Feinmechanische Industrie GmbH), Hildesheim, to RArbl\l, April 22, 1942.

197 BA Koblenz, R 13 1/373, protocol. d. Seating d. Advisory board of the Wigru Northwest District Group Esl v. March 31, 1942.

198 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1737, Elfi, Hildesheim, to RArbM, April 22, 1942.

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is justifiable."199 The OKW then threw its weight into the balance and used massive arguments to demand nutritional allowances for Soviet heavy workers: "The terms 'work', 'heavy work' and 'heavy work' must be viewed objectively, independent of ethnic affiliation as the conversion of calories into muscle strength.
It is a fallacy that one can accomplish the same work with 200 inadequately nourished people as with 100 fully nourished ones. On the contrary: the 100 fully nourished people achieve far more and their use is much more rational. On the other hand, _the minimum rations issued for the mere maintenance of life, since they are not matched by any equivalent value in terms of work performance, are to be booked as a pure loss in economic and military terms, which is increased by the transport and administrative resources used." 200

On April 17, 1942, the Reich Food Ministry set new rations for all Soviet forced laborers outside of agriculture. The rates for heavy workers, heavy workers and miners were increased for bread, meat and fat (for example, for heavy workers to double the previous rates), those for "normal workers" remained almost unchanged. The allocation of skimmed milk was generally "discontinued". "; All high-quality foods (milk, eggs, cheese, butter) were legally withheld from Soviet forced laborers. “Special rations” (coffee, tea, poultry, game, etc.) were out of the question for them.201 This new regulation remained final. The increased rations were also completely
inadequate.
In many cases, the food authorities cut the rates significantly under the pretext of supply difficulties.202 Fascists, large and small, enriched themselves by stealing and undermining the food intended for the forced laborers.
The Soviet workers could not supplement their food budget, like large parts of the German population, through "relations" and on the black market or, like other forced laborers, through food parcels from their relatives from the occupied countries.

So their food situation remained catastrophic. The armaments factories still had to realize that - as was the case at Krupp in October/November 1942 - "the nutrition of the Russian prisoners of war, who are employed exclusively as hard laborers in our company, is completely inadequate" and "that the People on this diet always collapse after a short time at work and sometimes die . " They received “almost always either boiled water beet or the boiled water beet leaves as warm food.

In addition to the work to be done, the Russians employed in this plant (Eibia GmbH, Liebenau - DE) have to walk 18 km from the camp to the plant every day... "204 The unchanged rations for "normal
workers" particularly endangered the "replacement -

199 Ibid., RG I to RMEL, March 5, 1942.
200 Ibid., Chief O KW to G BA, March 25, 1942; sa ibid, AN WiRüAmt, March 10, 1942.
201 Ibid., Decree RMEL v. April 17, 1942.
202 See ibid., RMfBuM to RMEL, July 30, 1942.
203 AN Fried. Krupp AG (Apparate Construction II for Labor Dept.), November 19, 1942; quote b. *Kuczynski,* Situation of the workers, vol. 6, p. 311ff.
204 BA Koblenz, R 41/269, OKH/Chief HRüst/BdE to RMfBuM, August 7, 1942.

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"training campaigns" of the GBA, in which Soviet forced laborers were to be trained for the armaments industry. There were increasing reports about the rapid loss of strength of those being trained.205

Weaning

The remuneration of civilian Soviet forced laborers, a question to which the fascist regime attached particular importance, was regulated by the "Ordinance on the Taxation and Labor Law Treatment of Workers from the Occupied Eastern Territories (StVA Ost)" of January 20, published in the Reich Law Gazette Established in 1942. 206 While an additional, tributary tax of 15 percent, the so-called wage equalization levy, was imposed on citizens of the Baltic Soviet republics, similar to Polish workers, the fascists imposed a flat-rate tax on all other Soviet forced laborers, the "Eastern tax." . She recorded all earnings that exceeded 17 RM per week. The forced laborers had 1.50 RM per day deducted from their wages, which according to the tax table attached to this regulation could only range between 10 and 17 RM per week , for accommodation and food - so that in the best case scenario 6.50 RM paid out, but in the worst case - the actual

•It was not uncommon for debts of 207 - 0.50 RM to be incurred, and even more per day if I was ill 1.50 RM debt was written down. Work clothes were not delivered.

:Supplements for overtime work, etc., as well as all other social benefits and concessions were eliminated. Soviet workers were exempt from traditional labor regulations regarding working hours, occupational safety, vacation, sickness, etc. · excepted.

This was nothing other than an attempt to exploit millions, and in the future tens of millions of Soviet people, effectively without pay, the variable capital,

-that is, to reduce the expenses for wages to a minimum value and thus increase the rate of surplus value or profit many times over. The "Eastern tax" was also an item that had already been included by the fascist state in order to strengthen its balance Wehrmacht accommodation of its war debts .As far as not the

and food, the armaments companies only spent a minimum on this. The equivalent to be paid for the work performed was calculated in fractions of the

:205 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 1737, Danziger Werft AG at Rüln XX (Danzig), July 17, 1942: "What is the point of all the retraining if it is already clear from the outset that the retraining students will be like this until the end of the retraining period of strength that a later use in production seems extremely questionable, apart from the high costs, effort and loss of time that we incur as a result of the retraining."

206 *RGBl.* 1942 I, p. 41, hereafter also the following.

207 See *Kuczynslci,* Situation of the Workers, Vol. 6, p. 307 f.

208 The Göring guidelines of November 7, 1941 stated with regard to the payment of wages to civilian Soviet forced laborers: "Every financial measure in this area must assume that the lowest wages in the East - according to an express instruction from the Führer - are a prerequisite for the compensation of war costs and the settlement of war debts of the Reich after the end of the war." *(IMG,* Vol. 39, p. 501, Doc. USSR-386).

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Collective wages of German workers. According to calculations by the GBA, the Ruhr mining industry paid 102.80 RM **per prisoner per month to the tax authorities, whereas the prisoner of war paid the company** around 152 **RM plus** 22 RM when crediting only 60 **percent of the performance or earnings of a German smuggler RM brought in saved social security contributions. That meant an extra profit of over** 71 **RM - i.e.** 70 **percent - per man per month! 209 A similar calculation for the Mansfeld copper-slate mine construction showed monthly "costs" ("wages", flat rate tax, accommodation and food) per prisoner of only** 96 **RM.210 In the discussion surrounding the wage regulation of January** 20th **relaxed, it was about its serious economic and political consequences, which immediately became apparent. The offices of the Eastern Economic Staff and the Reich Ministry for**

The occupied eastern territories, whose demagogic promises regarding labor "recruitment" the regulation publicly and obviously belied, feared above all the fiasco of this "recruitment" and the increased resistance of the Soviet population. It was also rightly suspected that the publication in the Reichsgesetzblatt would expose German imperialism abroad too much and that the Soviet government authorities in particular would take up this exemplary case and exploit it for propaganda purposes at home and abroad, "because this table appears to the outside world "must give rise to the impression of an almost monstrous exploitation of the workforce."211 But the most important arguments came directly from the arms companies and their state-monopoly institutions. These were stronger than those involved in the "Eastern tax". which did not flow to the monopolies themselves but to the state, was interested in an intensification of exploitation, which had to immediately increase its profits. "Under these circumstances, there is no incentive to increase performance"212, the OKW summarized the numerous submissions from the defense industry on the wage regulation and called for the "relaxation of the Russian tax in order to achieve a real incentive to increase performance."213 The Reichsgruppe Industrie once again emphatically expressed the view of the leading armaments monopolies: "The fact that, according to tax and labor law regulations, differentiation based on performance is virtually impossible has a particular impact on performance." 2!4 The "Ordinance on the conditions of employment of Eastern workers" dated June 30 , 1942215-

then contained new wage and tax rates. Instead of the "Eastern tax", a progressively graduated "Eastern workers tax" was now introduced, which also went to the state. For example, with gross earnings of 35 **to** 36.40 **RM per week calculated according to the tariffs for German workers, almost half of this amount** (15.75 **RM). Of the rest,** 10.50 **RM had to be paid for accommodation and food, as before. The Soviet worker was paid** the remaining 9.10 RM according to the table rate. **The minimum wage per week was** 0.70 **RM. There was no de jure upper limit;** However, with a weekly wage of 70 **RM (according to the tariff for German workers), which was unattainable even for Soviet special workers, this was** over 40 **RM**

209 BA Koblenz, R 2/5359, case G BA, February 17, 1943); see *Streit,* p.
210 Ibid., Wi G 280 ff. ru Mining at GBA (?), July 22, 1943.
211 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1737, RMfdbO to BfV, March 9, 1942.
212 Ibid., AN WiRüAmt, March 11, 1942.
213 Ibid., Chief OKW to GBA, March 25, 1942.
214 Ibid., RGI to RMEL, April 9, 1942.
215 *RGBl.* 1942 I, p. 419.

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to be paid solely as a tax for Eastern workers; The forced laborers were only left with 16.45 RM. The Soviet forced laborers were excluded from social benefits and wage supplements (for overtime, night work, Sunday and public holiday work). Giving them pay slips was forbidden.

Although it was now possible, as demanded by the arms monopolies, to differentiate wages based on performance, albeit modestly,216 the Soviet forced laborers were generally left with nothing more than "pocket money", as was the case with Pleiger, Todt and other Nazi and corporate giants had demanded. But, as even a White Guard informant of the fascists reported after research in forced labor camps, it was usual from the outset, "that even this small amount was never paid out."217 According to this report, the Soviet Workers “simply explained that the 'remaining amount' would be kept in the bank for them, since they could not buy anything in Germany, and that when they returned home, these funds would be paid out to them. However, one avoids telling the worker the amount of his 'savings'. So the Eastern worker never knows how much he earns." 218 The "Eastern worker savings" exploited for propaganda purposes did not simply have the character of forced savings, but was de facto a forced loan to finance the hated Hitler state and its war; a forced loan, the repayment of which was entirely at the discretion of this state. At the same time, the fascists managed to ensure that the complete lack of money tied the forced laborers to the camp - in addition to the police regulations.

The cruel regime of the fascists towards the Soviet forced laborers in Germany, whose closer analysis would have to include numerous other living conditions and working conditions (such as accommodation, clothing, sick care, severity and length of work, penal regime), led to indescribable physical deficiencies severe psychological damage, terrible illnesses and epidemics and the deaths of hundreds of thousands.

Within a few months a situation had been reached that began to worry those responsible for the war economy. What moved them was not the catastrophic and degrading condition into which their policies had placed the Soviet forced laborers, but rather the resulting loss of productivity and the deteriorating relationship between expenditure and profit. Of all people, Fritz Sauckel, the unscrupulous human trafficker, felt compelled to wage a - ultimately hopeless - fight against the overexploitation of the labor power of the Soviet citizens who had been deported to Germany with so much effort and difficulty. In a circular to the Gauleiters as his "representatives for labor deployment" dated September 24, 1942, he formulated for the first time with sharpness what he never tired of repeating from then on: "Beaten, half-starved and dead Russians do not mine coal for us , are completely useless for the production of steel and iron, produce neither weapons nor other equipment and ultimately represent an enormous burden on our national life and a scandal before the world." 219

216 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 1737, RVfg. RMffiuM, July 8, 1942: "This will essentially resolve the difficulties that have been repeatedly complained about, particularly from the private sector."

217 Ibid., film 10975, report above. "Eastern workers - decisive factor in the final victory", undated, undated (summer 1943). 218 Ibid.

219 Ibid., Film 1737, Rs. GBA to the Gauleiter, September 24, 1942. See also Pfahlmann, p. 211 f.

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This was what the monopolies, authorities, parties and police, with the thousands of creatures serving them in the guards, warehouse administration, factory security, etc., produced every day, but which gradually turned out to be a cancer for the war economy: " Beaten, malnourished, half-desperate Eastern workers ... "220; "malnourished, wasting away, unwilling, desperate and hate-filled slaves On January 9, 1943, the GBA ordered a comprehensive "ongoing ... "221 inspection of the Eastern worker deployment."222 With this inspection, over on official forms regularly. It was reported that special "processors for Eastern worker issues" were commissioned in the companies and special "clerks for the inspection of the deployment of Eastern workers" were commissioned in the labor and state employment offices. The work and reports of these clerks were brought together at the GBA, whose “Inspection of the Eastern Workers Deployment” (Department VA 1) was supposed to lead and coordinate the entire inspection activity.

f) "Destruction through work"

After the Battle of Moscow, the fascist rulers recognized the concentration camps as a hitherto little-used source of cheap labor that could be used without any consideration for the health and lives of the prisoners affected. Since around mid-1942, prisoners have been increasingly exploited in armaments production.223 This marked the beginning of the darkest chapter of fascist labor policy.

Since the beginning of 1941, the IG Farben group and the SS had been looking for a concept for the mass industrial exploitation of the labor of concentration camp prisoners in "blessed"224 cooperation in Auschwitz. Since the winter of 1940/41, the IG had been planning in the vicinity of the Concentration camp camp planned to build a large Buna factory and soon expanded this project into a huge industrial complex. Citing the representative for the four-year plan (Göring) and the Reich Office for Economic Development (Krauch), the company demanded and received from the SS a sufficient number of prisoners capable of working Number. For this reason, the SS carried out the infamous "selections" on the railway ramp at Auschwitz-Birkenau. The prisoner's alternative was to work for IG Farben or be murdered in the gas chamber. The Monowitz concentration camp, built in the spring of 1942 as an "offshoot" of Auschwitz at the request of the IG directly on the large construction site, became the model for the later countless satellite camps and external commands of the large concentration camps inside and outside Germany.

220 *IMG,* Vol. 27, p. 577, Doc. PS-1739, GBA report as of November 30, 1942, v. December 1, 1942.

221 Ibid., p. 588 f., Speech d. G BA in front of the Reichs• and Gauleiters in Posen on the 5th/6th. 2. 1943.

222 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 1737, RErl. GBA, January 9, 1943.

223 The material in this section comes primarily from the following more detailed presentations: *DZW,* vol. 2, p. 406ff.; *IG Farben, Auschwitz, mass murder.* About the bloodguilt of the IG Farben. Documentation on the Auschwitz trial, (Berlin 1964); *Dieckmann,* Conditions of Existence; *SS in action.* A documentation about the crimes of the SS, Berlin 1957, p. 405 ff.; *Brenner, Hans,* On the role of the external commandos of the Flossenbürg concentration camp in the system of the state-monopoly arms industry of fascist German imperialism and in the anti-fascist resistance struggle 1942-1945, phil. Diss. (A), Dresden 1982.

224 *IG-farben, Auschwitz, J,.,fassmord,* p. 14 (Faks. ibid., p. 19), Ambros an ter Meer and Struss, April 12, 1941 (,,... our new friendship has an impact the SS very blessed").

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“Those who were immediately selected,” said a witness involved after the war, “had a short, terrible period of suffering. For those who were assigned to work, it also ended in death, but with terrible torment. It is difficult to say who did that had a 'better' lot... "225 Inmates who were exhausted by the hard work, hunger and beatings and were unfit for work were regularly separated out by the IG and "deported", that is, handed over to certain death when they were returned to the main camp. So had It confirmed its accuracy with the statement confirmed by another witness: "Where the SS was, there were dead people. But apparently there were even more dead where the IG was." 226 The IG Farben concept of the exploitation of concentration camp prisoner labor, gradually developed between 1941 and 1943, was an "attempt to resolve the irreconcilable contradiction between modern production and forced labor."227 It essentially consisted of one Modification of terror and a certain material stimulation ("premium system"; "primitive chord system"). The company representatives negotiated this with the heads of the SS Economic and Administrative Office and instructed the camp management in how to use their model. Finally, the main office took the IG's suggestions and demands as a model for measures in all camps. "The SS literally apprenticed with the IG." 228 Other arms companies obtained information from the Farben Group about its experiences with forced labor for prisoners in Auschwitz. Krupp concluded a corresponding contract with the SS in December 1942.229 It began in the spring of 1942 the SS began converting the concentration camp system generally to forced labor for the armaments industry, thereby combining "the brutality and goals of the slave labor program with those of the concentration camp." 230 Himmler had already been considering mass use since December 1941/January

225 ***Auschwitz Trial, Frankfurt am Main.*** **Final lecture and reply by Prof. Dr. Fried-rich Karl Kaul, legal representative of the co-plaintiffs based in the German Democratic Republic in the criminal proceedings against Mulka, among others, before the jury at the regional court in Frankfurt am Main, (Berlin 1965), p. 45 (quoted from the hearing of the witness Dr. Wolken on February 27th . 1964).**

226 ***Guilty within the meaning of law and international law.*** **Excerpts from the minutes of the trial against the concentration camp doctor Fischer before the Supreme Court of the GDR, (Berlin 1966), p. 71, interrogation of the witness FJ Amann, March 15, 1966.**

227 ***Dieckmann,*** **Conditions of Existence, p. 116.**

228 Ibid., p. 128.

229 ***DZW,*** **Vol. 3, p. 247f.**

230 ***IMG,*** **Vol. 3, p. 515, presentation of evidence d. U.S. Attorney General (Dodd), Dec. 12 1945.**

231 SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff, chief of personal staff and Himmler's confidante, claimed after the war in Nuremberg that the procurement of concentration camp prisoners as labor for the armaments monopolies was linked to the affiliation of corresponding company representatives (in this case Heinrich Bütefisch) to the " circle of friends" or had "nothing to do" with their SS rank ***(SS in action,*** **p. 452 and p. 450). In the case of Büte-fisch in particular, Streit testifies that it was "no coincidence" that Bütefisch, who was not technically competent (ie for Buna-Auschwitz - DE), represented the IGF[arben], because he was the representative of the IGF in the Himmler's industrial circle of friends, which meant he was already acquainted with Wolff and Pohl."** ***(Dispute,*** **p. 218). Vogelsang, on the other hand, deliberately spreads a cloak of silence about the concentration camp prisoner work and denies the influence of membership in the Himmler Circle of Friends**

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The idea was to "use this huge source of work not only for reconstruction after the war".232 On January 26th, six days after

the infamous Wannsee Conference, at which the "Final Solution to the Jewish Question" was decided, Himmler informed the head of the inspection of his concentration camp camps, SS brigade leader Richard Glücks: “Since Russian prisoners of war are not expected in the near future, I will be very impressed by the Jews who are emigrating from Germany (! - DE). Send numbers to the warehouse.

Prepare to admit 100,000 male Jews and up to 50,000 Jewish women into the camp in the next four weeks. Major economic tasks and orders will be presented to the concentration camps in the next few weeks. SS-gruppenführer Pohl will inform you in detail." 233 On February 1, 1942, the SS Economic Administration Main Office (WVHA) was formed under

Oswald Pohl. The actual decisions were made at the beginning of March, apparently not uninfluenced by the resolute measures of the new Reich Minister for armament

nation and ammunition and of the imminent appointment of a GBA. On March 3, 1942, after consultation with Hitler, Himmler commissioned the head of the WVHA, Pohl, to convert the concentration camp system to mass forced labor in armaments production and authorized him to take all measures necessary for this and to centrally manage the entire forced use of prisoners . Himmler supplemented this order, which itself has not yet been found,234 on March 4th with a telephone conversation with Pohl in which he told him that the concentration camp camps - previously known as the "Inspection KL" of the SS Main Office - were placed under the WVHA promised: "Pohl concentration camp."235 On March 16, the "KL Inspection" was incorporated into the WVHA as department group D.

On April 30, Pohl reported on the state of affairs and summarized the new concept of forced labor in concentration camps: “The war brought about a visible structural change in the concentration camps and fundamentally changed their tasks with regard to the use of prisoners. The focus is no longer on holding prisoners solely for security, educational or preventative reasons. The emphasis has shifted to the economic side. The mobilization of all prison labor, initially for war tasks (increasing armaments) and later for peacebuilding tasks236, is becoming more and more important." Therefore, "a gradual transfer of the concentration camps from their previous one-sided political form into an organization appropriate to the economic tasks" is necessary.237 “business” affairs of the monopolies in general *(Vogelsang,* p. 106; see also

p. 135!.). On Bingel see affidavit. Pohl (note 253a). See also *Brenner,* p. 99ff.

232 Nuremberg Doc. NO-2570, statement by Oswald Pohl; quote b. *Dieckmann,* conditions of existence ments, p. 82.

233 Nuremberg Doc. NO-500, Himmler to Glücks, January 26, 1942 (Faks. in *Kühnrich, Heinz,* The Concentration Camp State. The Fascist Concentration Camps 1933 to 1945, Berlin 1980, p. 108).

234 The order, which may have only been given orally, is known from Pohl's report to Himmler v. April 30, 1942 (*I MG,* vol. 38, p. 364 f., Doc. R-129), which refers to him at the beginning, as well as through minutes from the Pohl trial (see *Drobisch, Klaus,* resistance in Buchen•wald, Berlin 1977, p. 58).

235 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 2297, handwritten entry by Himmler in his calendar, March 4th. 1942.

236 Incorrectly stated in other sources: peace tasks.

237 *IMG,* Vol. 38, p. 364f., Doc. R-129. Partially printed in *Anatomy of War,* p. 391, Doc. 206.

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Of course, this program reflected a large portion of wishful thinking. The ideas of Pohl and his newly created SS economic headquarters came into constant contradiction in the practice of the concentration camps and prisoner work with the main political function of the camps and the SS as a whole - to secure the the RSHA. regime through Vemich - which was represented most clearly by The function of tungsten terror ---,, terror and the deterrence through terror was in turn a basic condition for the maintenance of the entire system of forced labor for foreign workers and also of the work regime for the German working people; The concentration camp system was the "means of extra-economic coercion par excellence."238 The conception of this system as a machine for the destruction and deterrence of all actual and potential opponents of the regime therefore remained fundamentally unchanged. The course of the war and in particular the swelling resistance of all the oppressed peoples of Europe allowed the fa Terror, the main method of securing fascist rule, also remained the main purpose of the concentration camp system. All attempts by responsible SS representatives and the monopolies to economize it ran up against this barrier. The infamous formula of "extermination through work" expressed the dilemma and the internal contradiction of forced labor for concentration camp prisoners and at the same time articulated the attempt to solve the problem by means of a compromise, so to speak. 239 Furthermore, the German imperialists moved with the forced labor of concentration camp prisoners. Prisoners in a tangle of contradictions that stemmed from "the nature of a system" in which productive work had been reduced to one of the most cruel punishments.2 0 Thus the low work productivity and intensity of the prisoners and that The SS henchmen's beating and starvation regime was sometimes criticized by monopoly representatives as inhibiting production, a faulty cycle fro In the end, the SS and German finance capital were faced with an insurmountable problem. "The modification of terror in favor of the profit of the monopolies was an extraordinarily complicated and ultimately insoluble task."241

In the first months of 1942, "megalomania"242 was still rampant among those responsible for the SS in economic projects initiated by bourgeois Authors usually interpret it as a fundamentally anti-capitalist, anti-monopolistic line.243 It expressed itself primarily in the plan to exploit prisoner labor in large-scale armaments factories owned by the SS, which were set up ***within*** **the concentration camps and**

238 ***Dieckmann,*** Conditions of Existence, p. 83.

239 Apparently this formula was used for the first time in mid-September 1942 - right away- early on by Himmler, Goebbels and Justice Minister Thierack - related (see the sources in ***Brenner,*** p. 115f.). Pohl's order of April 30, 1942 for the entire concentration camp area regarding the prisoners' production use already pointed in this direction; It said that the effort had to be "exhaustive in the true sense of the word in order to achieve the highest level of performance"; the working hours were "bound to no limits" (/ ***MG,*** vol. 38, p. 366, doc. R-129).

240 ***Dieckmann,*** Conditions of Existence, p. 122.

241 Ibid., p. 137.

242 Ibid., p. 91.

243 From this apologetically distorted view, see ***Speer,*** The Slave State, p. 31ff. and passim.

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Minister, skilled workers and machinery should be procured from the defense industry - a plan that was at least not uninfluenced by internal security considerations.244 The Ministry of Munitions only gradually pushed through this, from September 1942 onwards.

The plan failed not so much because of the SS's inability to do business, but primarily because of the resistance of the Ministry of Munitions and the arms companies, who were able to rely on simple economic circumstances. Any withdrawal of skilled workers and machines from the productive armaments factories of the corporations to set up and operate concentration camp companies that worked with the lowest productivity would have meant both a loss of profits and, above all, long-term production losses that the regime could not afford. The German monopolies, especially the arms companies, certainly had an interest in having workers procured and guarded by the SS; But at the same time , " German industry ensured that the SS did not exceed the limits set for it and become a competitor."245 Therefore, the SS's continued attempts to assert itself through the monopoly of prisoner labor - a right up to the end in terms of number and productivity - failed relatively insignificant monopoly - to build its own economic empire. "The SS was unable to underpin its political and military positions through appropriate economic independence and in this way to escape its clear dependence on the German arms industry and the state controlled by it -national institutions. The SS remained a part of the state apparatus with a clearly defined area of responsibility and did not become the dominant institution of the German fascist system of rule." 246 The reorganization of the concentration camp system occupied the SS until the end of the war. In the course of this, concentration camp prisoners were used in all branches of the armaments industry, predominantly in the large armaments companies or in their concentration camp branches.

"The maximum number of concentration camp prisoners employed in a company was between 40,000

244 The SS had similar concerns about the internal security of the regime in 1941/42, when the arms monopolies pushed for the employment of Soviet prisoners of war and civilian Soviet forced laborers. However, the reasons for the SS's attitude towards concentration camp prisoner work were more complex and complicated. The SS's struggle for its own "economic empire" (based on prisoner labor), which was widely cited by bourgeois authors and was always overrated in terms of significance and results, was originally, before 1942, aimed at the SS's own construction sovereignty and at the disposal of large construction capacities - and building materials industry. After the war, they were intended to be used to build bases, barracks, etc. for the police and Waffen-SS throughout occupied Europe, for which a "peace program" worth 13 billion RM was drawn up in the fall of 1941 (see . *Speer,* The Slave State, p. 406ff.). The purpose of the planning was therefore not an economic one, but a purely political one: the SS wanted to be prepared for the subjugation and terrorization of the peoples of Europe, for the "securing" of the "Greater Germanic Empire" that was to be created (see p. 430ff.). . In view of the defeat before Moscow, they were modified for the duration of the war and tailored to the new conditions of the more "total" war. The associated economic policy ideals soon failed due to reality.

245 *Bartel, Walter,* military economic leader, secret weapons, concentration camp. Report on the role and significance of the Dora-Mittelbau concentration camp and the function of the SS in A4 production, Frankfurt a. M. 1970, p. 16.

246 Ibid., p. 17. Basically on this problem, see *Karny, Miroslm,,* Koncentral\ni tabory, SS a nemecke monopoly, in *CeskosloPensky casopis historicky,* 5/1978. p. 676ff.

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and 50,000. In total, around 500,000 concentration camp inmates were employed in the entire German industry at the height of the operation." 247 Even before the SS set up the concentration camps for their new function, leading arms companies such as Heinkel and Messerschmitt (end of 1941)248 and like the Volkswagen factory (end of 1941/ beginning of 1942)249 with success in that, like the IG Farben group, they placed prisoners to work. "The intertwining of the KL with the German economy," Kogon states, " , arose not just from the SS's desire for power, but also from corresponding requests from industry, which suffered from a shortage of workers and often no longer shied away from any means to gain a decisive advantage over the competition, namely to have sufficient numbers of workers available; Only in this way could it fulfill its 'patriotic duty': to make the maximum contribution to the war economy." 250 According to Rudolf Höß, former SS-Sturmbannführer and commandant of the Auschwitz concentration camp, the concentration camps "never have any workers offered to industry" .251 The employment of concentration camp prisoners was not a lucrative business for the concentration camps, but for the industry; It resulted in unprecedented profits for the defense companies. “At the beginning of the war, the companies paid little for these workers, around Mk. 1,-[to]Mk. 1.20 Armament companies approached my office to obtain workers from the concentration camps, and those who already employed such workers have, in most cases, constantly requested an increase in the number of prisoners they employ."253a After the reorganization of the concentration camp system Dozens of other companies and hundreds of defense companies followed suit, led by leading monopolies such as Siemens, Krupp, Hermann-Göring-Werke, Vereinigte Stahlwerke, Flick, AEG, Demag, Brabag, Gustloff, Hasag, Junkers, Daimler-Benz and BMW. 254 Pohl himself named IG Farben and Hermann-Göring-Werke, Hasag, Heinkel and Messerschmitt, Brabag and Krupp, as well as the Auer-gesellschaft (Degussa Group), the Mauserwerke and eight of the "largest employers of concentration camp prisoners". largest German construction companies, including Dyckerhoff & Widmann, Hochtief, Philipp Holzmann, Wayss & Frey• day.255 He explicitly named people who had helped him from negotiations about the handover

247 Anatomy of War, p. 472, Doc. 268, Explanation. under oath by Karl Sommer before d. Nuremberg Military Tribunal (1947).

248 DZW, Vol. 2, p. 406.

249 Brenner, p. 87 and p. 112 (difference! dating).

250 Kogon, Eugen, The SS State. The system of German concentration camps, Munich 1974, p. 270.

251 Anatomy of War, p. 478, Doc. 269, Explanation. under oath v. Rudolf Höß, 1946/47 (March 12, 1947).

252 Ibid.

253 Dieckmann, Götz, On the relationship between monopolies and the SS in the fascist war economy, examined using the example of the Dora concentration camp, in WZ d. Humboldt University11. Berlin, Ges. and Linguistics. Series, 2/1970 (Festschrift Walter Bartel), p. 150.

253a ZStA Potsdam, Case VI, Film 419, Doc. NI-382, Explanation. under oath v. Oswald Pohl, August 5, 1946.

254 See Anatomy of War, p. 472ff., Doc. 268, Explanation. under oath v. Karl Sommer before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal (1947).

255 ZStA Potsdam, Case VI, Film 419, Doc. NI-382 (as note 253a) and Film 420, Doc. NI-399, Addendum to this v. August 6, 1946.

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of concentration camp workers, Rudolf Binge] (Siemens), Otto Ambros and Fritz ter Meer (IG Farben), Lindner (Messerschmitt), Paul Pleiger and Wilhelm Meinberg (Reichswerke Group), Fritz Kranefuß (Brabag), Paul Budin (Hasag), Ferdinand Porsche (Volkswagenwerk), as well as Xaver Dorsch and the heads of the Ministry of Armaments.'-56

2. "Total War" - partial mobilization (1943)

a) Mandatory reporting and decommissioning action

As early as the fall of 1942 , **the OKW and other leading circles of the regime had made various attempts to implement levies and mobilizations on a larger scale.257 With the encirclement of the 6th Army in Stalingrad, the critical point had been reached, which meant that the regime was unable to protect its armaments industry until now gave up. In his order of December** 19 , 1942258 , Hitler **ignored his "key forces" decree of February of the same year. The armaments industry (the "commercial war economy" including transport) was given** 50,000 people born in 1908 **who could be used in the war in two installments** by **February** 20 , 1942 **until** 1922 **"including key workers and skilled workers" without replacement and until March 31st a further** 150,000 **(excluding underground miners) were withdrawn from troops stationed in Germany or in the occupied territories "in exchange" for soldiers who could not be deployed at the front.**

"The Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition will designate those to be drafted," it was said; the exchange described ("Rü 43 **exchange") was even supposed to take place after "name suggestions" from the Ammunition Minister.259 After the German relief advance on Stalingrad in the After the last decade of December failed and the loss of the encircled army became obvious, the Wehrmacht's demands for strength rose rapidly. On January** 8 , 1943 , **after consultation with Speer, Hitler made a final decision on the so-called SE Action (Special Conscription Action), which required a further** 200,000 **UK-provided workers - predominantly skilled and key workers - were withdrawn from the armaments industry.260 Central Planning261 initially broke this number down into** 10,500 **workers from the Chemicals GB, "whereby mineral oil remains almost completely protected" and petroleum extraction "requires total protection". should enjoy;** 27,000 **from mining, "primarily from surface work"262;** 7,000 **from the Todt organization;** 2,500 **from the energy industry and** 50,000 **from "other commercial**

256 As note 253 a.
257 *DZW,* Vol. 3, p. 171 and p. 181ff.
258 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 1818. Hereafter also the following.
259 The Rü-43 exchange operation "encountered great difficulties and was therefore only partially carried out." (ibid., film 3353, activity report of the GBA for the period from January 1 to June 30, 1943).
260 IIA Koblenz, R 41/141, Hitler decree of January 8, 1943.
261 ZP-E and ZP-P, January 29, 1943, 31st meeting. Hereafter also the following.
262 This number differed from Hitler's demand on January 8th for 30,000 miners and even more so from the OKW's increased demand for 118,000 miners from the Kv years 1906-1922 (BA Koblenz, R 7/113, v. Unruh to RWiM , February 6, 1943). General Walter V. Unruh himself wrote: "I have convinced myself that only around 45,000 people can now be handed over." (ibid.).

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War economy". The other half (103,000) should be allocated to the companies in the middle instance and deducted from the armaments commands, amounting to an average of 30 percent of the previously employed UK workers born between 1906 and 1922. Only 10 to 15 percent should be which provide precision mechanics and optics and “certain electrical devices”; "The most important tool factories receive total protection." The arms commissions primarily decided on exceptions.

However, the demands of the Wehrmacht went far beyond the confiscations of the SE campaign. In mid-January, the OKW estimated the "immediate need" for soldiers for the first half of 1943, taking into account the 400,000 men already mobilized by the orders of December 19, 1942 and January 8, 1943, to 800,000.263. The armament industry demanded around one and a half for the same period Millions of workers.™ In this

situation, in which negotiations were taking place at the same time about the new major armaments programs of 1943, especially the "Adolf Hitler tank program",265 the leading circles of the regime continued their long-held plans for a broader mobilization of German workers through.266 On January 13, 1943, Hitler signed the unpublished “Decree of the Führer on the Comprehensive Use of Men and Women for Reich Defense Tasks ,”267 Goebbels, Bormann, Sauckel, Lammers, Keitel and others were involved in its preparation Speer had been involved. In it he described the main goal of all the measures to be taken as "freeing up able-bodied men for deployment at the front". For the first time, the fascist leadership felt compelled to decree that for this purpose "all men *and women"* who were not yet or not fully active in the war effort should be "recorded and deployed according to their capabilities." Keitel, Lammers and Bormann were entrusted with the general direction and control of the operation.

As things stood, the new soldiers for the Wehrmacht had to come mainly from the pool of 5.3 million British soldiers - including 2.7 million in industry and transport (Reichsbahn) and 0.9 million in agriculture and forestry 268 - recruit.269 Although not expressly mentioned, this fact was clearly reflected in the decree, in which it was ordered in the first place to "re-examine all U.K. positions as strictly as possible and to abolish them in all cases" in which it was "without endangering others tasks important to the war effort. The counterpart to this requirement was the obligation to register for all non-working German men (from 16 to 65 years old) and women (from 17 to 50 years old). The GBA was responsible for this, and at the same time was given powers to transfer male and female workers from trade, crafts, commerce and the liberal professions "if they do not already carry out an activity that is predominantly important to the war effort." Finally, the Reichswirtsc hafts -minister commissioned to "initiate the closure of companies and companies"

263 *K TB of the OKW,* vol. 311, p. 46, entry by. January 18, 1943.

264 *Bleyer,* Total War, p. 79.

265 See p. 121 ff.

266 On the overall problem of “total” mobilization see *Bleyer,* Totaler Krieg; recently *Autumn,* p. 207 ff.

267 *The Second World War.* Documents, p. 186 ff., Doc. 42; hereafter also the following. To prepare Preparation of the decree see *Bleyer,* Total War, p. 57 ff.

268 *DZW,* Vol. 3, p. 186 (concerning men born between 1897 and 1925; as of the end of November 1942).

269 *Grigoleit,* p. 155.

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"that do not wholly or predominantly fulfill the tasks of the war economy or the securing of vital needs".

On January 27, 1943, Fritz Sauckel had an "Ordinance on the registration of men and women for tasks of the Reich defense" published in the Reich Law Gazette in accordance with Hitler's decree of January 13. **270** The individual categories of those required to register had been called upon by the employment offices to to fill out registration forms over the next few weeks and submit them there. Although the GBA regulation lowered the registration age for women from 50 to 45 years compared to Hitler's decree, it still affected three million women and half a million men. According to a circular from Sauckel to his offices on February 6th, "a significant number of forces were to be mobilized as quickly as possible." The entire reporting campaign was to be completed by March 31st.271

After almost three and a half years of war, this was now the legal requirement The basis for the general work obligation ----, a characteristic feature of the state-monopoly war economy - was created. The template was apparently a draft law passed by the Hitler cabinet on May 21, 1935, which in turn was based on the “Law on the Patriotic Relief Service " of December 5, 1916 **272 ,** but contained stricter provisions, **273** which had now been watered down again.

Those in power, especially Hitler, had extremely conflicted feelings about the forced enlistment of women. For years, even after the collapse of the Blitzkrieg strategy in 1941 and in the critical Moscow winter of 1941/42, Hitler was unwilling to do so, despite the urging of the Ministry of Munitions and the OKW, the GBA, Goeb·bels and others. The exceptions to the obligation to register and work remained numerous for women.274 As before, it was not permissible to restrict those receiving family support, as has often been suggested, "by the threat of complete or partial withdrawal of family support "to be brought to work" if they were not required to register or be deployed anyway. 2 75 In Sauckel's instructions on the employment of women who were required to register - who predominantly belong to the middle and wealthy classes - there was still talk of "necessity". the preservation of its (the German people - DE) biological health"; It must be “prevented under all circumstances that the German woman or girl could suffer damage to their physical and mental health even if they are deployed again” **.276**

270 RGBl. 1943 1, p. 67 f.; For the following see Bleyer, Total War, p. 93 ff.

271 ZStA Potsdam, Reich Ministry for Science, Education and Public Education, No. 147, Bl. 24 R, Bl. 25.

272 Germany in the First World War, Vol. 2, p. 470ff.

273 ZStA Potsdam, Case VI, Film 416, Doc. EC-258, Report RWiM/GB fd Kriegswirtschaft (Wohlthat) about. "The preparation of the GB's economic mobilization for the war economy", as of the end of December 1937. Here - as the basis for the "war labor deployment" - the unpublished law is listed with its core provision: "Compulsory national service for all Reich members from the age of 15 to 65, unless they are soldiers or expressly exempt." See also Thomas, p. 100f.

274 Arendt, On Women's Politics, p. 310f.

275 ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, film 19486, AN (Lammers) “The Führer's Order from. Jan 13 1943", undated (mid-July 1944).

276 IMG, Vol. 27, p. 611, Doc. PS-1739, Speech d. GBA in front of the Reich and Gauleiters in Posen on 5.16. 2. 1943.

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However, compulsory work was nothing new for the millions of workers who had been exploited for many years in industrial companies and in other areas of the German war economy. But in its general form, now legally fixed, it gained considerable importance for the labor situation in the war economy over the next few months and also in later phases of the war. After all, he intervened so radically in the personal and family lives of millions of people. So far only men have been called up to the Wehrmacht.

“The compulsory registration regulation,” summarizes Arendt, “was the result of a contradictory policy characterized by sharp class differences. The fascist state wanted to solve the problem of the war economy's growing labor needs without compromising women's privileges within the scope of women's service obligations of the ruling circles without jeopardizing the population policy goals and without subjecting the mood of working women to more stress than is absolutely necessary. "277 The decommissioning operation under the leadership of the Reich Minister of Economics was enacted by the "Regulation on the Freeing up of Workers for War-Essential Use" of 29 January 278 and several ministerial decrees of January 30 , 1943.279 It was explicitly related to the compulsory registration campaign . The closures were primarily intended to attract skilled workers; in the opinion of Minister Speer, this was particularly urgent, " because the soldiers who now have to leave industry must be replaced at an early stage. If they are replaced too late, there will be a lack of skilled workers and key workers who are able to introduce the new people in any way." But here, in particular, he suspected that "the gentlemen in the Ministry of Economic Affairs are definitely soft and cautious"; On the other hand, the matter “could not be carried out radically enough.”280 In fact, it took until mid-March before the Reich Economics Minister's decree came out, which concerned the “closures and mergers of industrial operations”2 8 1; The Reich offices were commissioned to carry it out.

The wave of closures, as it was handled, affected only a few larger companies, but primarily liquidated countless small businesses, especially in trade and crafts. In the food supply sector alone, in mid-June 1943 , the closure of 21,000 (estimated at 27,000 by July 31) businesses - butcher shops, bakeries, etc. - and the "freeing up" of 33,500 (42,200) workers were reported2 82 ; that was less than 1 .6 workers per company. This type of closure created unrest among the population and caused the regime, as Sauckel put it at a staff meeting, problems of a "difficult nature": "That is, when companies and businesses are closed down, it does happen It will mean that some of these people cannot be accommodated, and no one can expect us from the work force to blame the dissatisfaction and mood of these people on the work force. The Ministry of Economic Affairs will then have to take responsibility for this

277 Arendl, On women's policy, p. 309.
278 *RGBl.* 1943 I, p. 75f. (signed by Lammers, Keitel and Bormann).
279 ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, Film 19485. - This was about one decree each Trade, crafts and the restaurant and accommodation industry.
280 ZP-P, January 26, 1943, 30th session.
281 ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, film 19485, decree RWiM v. March 16, 1943.
282 Ibid., AN Reich Chancellery, June 23, 1943.

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... and this must also be reflected in the press accordingly. Because the closure of these businesses is not due to the need for labor, but rather out of the need to save energy and obtain additional rooms... I believe that every Gauleiter will control the closures in his own interest in such a way that he does not become the curse of his fellow citizens 283 As early as June 21st, the Reich Economics Minister ordered the end of the shutdown in trade, crafts, restaurants and accommodation industries.284 Meanwhile, Goebbels drafted announcements to calm the disturbed commercial middle classes,7.85 so that they could escape the gaping discrepancy Between their economic elimination and the unheard-of economic situation and capital concentration in the armaments factories, no conclusions were drawn about the character of the regime. The shutdowns in the industry were canceled according to the decree of August 13th, 286; the completion and reporting date was supposed to be September 30th This marked the end of the entire decommissioning operation "because of the resulting alarm among the population" in 1937.

In the middle of the year, the GBA reported on the results of the mandatory reporting campaign, which was "substantially completed at the end of June."288 They were - despite a tidal wave of propaganda for "total war" - significantly below the expectations of the relevant authorities. They testified to a "broad passive resistance" in 1939 among the non-working population, especially the female population, as well as to the orientation of state organs to behave relatively leniently in the face of this resistance for political reasons.

Table 25

Result of the mandatory reporting campaign (as of the end of June 1943)

	In total	Women	Men
Reported people	3592000	3048000	544000
Can be used in the work process	1578000	1462000	116000
Used in the work process below:	1361000	1260000	101000
for less than 48 hours per week (ie usually half-day)	701000	684000	17000
Used in the -			
defense industry -	567000	537000	30000
agriculture	287000	262000	25000
- the rest of the economy	507000	461000	46000

Source: DZW, **Vol. 3, p. 217. - In a final statement published a year later (mid-July 1944; see note 275) at the end of 1943, 1,626,000 workers gained from the compulsory registration campaign were stated as "usable", i.e. only one slightly increased number.**

283 BA Koblenz, R 41/25a, GBA staff meeting, February 10, 1943.

284 ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, Film 19485, Decree RWiM, June 21, 1943. - Finally, the action should be completed by July 31 at the latest (ibid., Decree RWiM, July 12, 1943).

285 Ibid., draft of a statement, mid-July 1943.

286 BA Koblenz, R 7/2220, Decree RWiM regarding " End of the decommissioning campaign in the industrial strie", August 13, 1943.

287 As note 275.

288 Ibid., film 19482, AN Reich Chancellery (f. Lammers), August 12, 1943.

289 *DZW,* Vol. 3, p. 216.

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After converting the part-time workforce - over 50 percent of women - into full-time employees, there was only an increase of around 912,000 workers instead of 1,361,000.290 Speer and Kehrl saw this as the hope they had harbored since the beginning of the ca

Table 26

Result of the decommissioning campaign in 1943 (as of the end of June 1943)

	In total	Women	Men
Laid-off workers	161000	102000	59000
Relocated workers	114000 *	73000	40000
Implemented in the			
- Armaments industry	49000	31000	18000
- Agriculture	3000	2000	1000
- rest of the economy	61000	40000	21000

• Addition errors due to rounding up

Source: DZW, Vol. 3, p. 221 (corrected according to ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, Film.19482, GBA report from July 28, 1943).

Table 27

Results of the decommissioning sale ("commercial") April to September 1943

Reich office	Number of decommissioned establishments	Number of released Workforce
Money	—	—
Iron and metals	—	—
stones and earth	734	2376
Precious metals	approx. 1200	approx. 2000
mechanical engineering	—	—
Chemistry•	434	
Precision mechanics and optics	64	? '.!50
Technical products	164	
textiles	95	? ?
Clothing and related areas • •	—	—
Paper processing	498	2884
leather	9	?
Community shoes	11	150

• Mainly producers of perfumery and cosmetic products

* * Almost no shutdowns; "No significant workers of any kind" released (report dated October 14, 1943; without numerical information)

Source: According to the final reports of the Reich offices to the RWiM, October 1943 (BA Koblenz, R 7/2221; incomplete). - Overall (trade, crafts, trade), the result of the Reich Economics Minister's action with 150,000 "relocated" workers remained 50 percent below expectations (300,000); the latter number according to *Bleyer,* Totaler Krieg, p. 105.

290 *Autumn,* p. 211.

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thoroughly deceived, putting a total of two million women into work and "transferring at least a million Germans into armaments factories."
291 At the same time, Sauckel calculated the preliminary results of the decommissioning campaign. Of the 161,000 "released" workers , 114,000 were "reassigned" to jobs important to the war effort.292 Started and carried out half-heartedly, the campaign ultimately produced only the meager result of a total of around 150,000 workers "released for more important tasks" by the fall of 1943.293 Comparatively special The result in the commercial sector, ie in industry, was pitiful. (Tables 26 and
After just one month of decommissioning practice, the Reich Economics Minister complained that "the decommissioning proposals from the Reich offices to the state economic offices often only concern small businesses," so that "the impression arose that large businesses were being spared,"294 but things changed Judging from the figures given in the final reports of the Reich offices, there is obviously nothing wrong wi

b) The mobilization concept of the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition

In the course of 1943, 830,000 men were called up to the Wehrmacht in addition to the drafts from the reserve army through the abolition of their UK position.295 From November 1942 , the number of those enlisted in the UK decreased from 5,277,000 to 4,118,000 by August 1943 , i.e. by 1,159,000 or 22 percent. 296 The labor situation in the war economy was and remained critical. In addition, the organizational mechanism of the "total" mobilization and the demarcation of competences between the bodies concerned with it were confused. As part of the mobilization actions, the procurement of manpower was not in the hands of the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition, which was stated in the Hitler decree of January 13 , 1943 was not even mentioned, but in those of the GBA, the Reich Economics Minister and - as far as the general direction and control of the actions were concerned - the "three-man college" (Keitel, Lammers, Bormann).

The dissatisfaction of the circles around the Minister of Ammunition with the concept and pace of the “total” mobilization was all the greater given the scaled-up armaments programs, especially the “Adolf Hitler tank program,” but also the great “Iron Plan” of the Reich Unification Eisen,297 collided more and more violently with the withdrawal of skilled workers to the Wehrmacht.

Under these circumstances, internal disputes could not be avoided. In mid-May, Speer complained to Hitler about the GBA because of "differences" with him that "the inspection of armaments, supply companies including the chemical, mining and iron-making industries as well as the construction industry and the OT by the labor

291 ZP-P, January 26, 1943, 30th session.
292 ***DZW,*** Vol. 3, p. 221.
293 As note, 275. Presumably this number corresponded to the one at the top of table 26 (161,000); Accordingly, the shutdown would have been reversed for around 10,000 workers, which is not at all unlikely.
294 BA Koblenz, R 7/2218, RWiM decree, April 30, 1943.
295 As note 275.
296 ***Grigoleit,*** p. 181 f.
297 See p. 363f.

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operational authorities". He reached a "determination" that if he was prepared to "entrust" the authorities of the GBA with operational inspections, "the decision on the results of these inspections rests exclusively with my (Speers - DE) organs ".298 In May 1943 **the ammunition minister had to take part in a second special confiscation operation (SE-11-Action). It affected a further** 150,000 **skilled and key workers born between** 1901 and 1922, **who were to be called up in four installments from June to October.299 According to Speer, replacement will generally only be made in purely numerical terms by the Labor** GB.300 **In order to counter the effects of this new loss and at the same time the decline in the transport of forced labor on armaments, the ammunition minister appointed so-called labor engineers (AEI) in all larger armaments plants, ie in those with more than** 300 **employees.301 They were appointed Appointed by the chairmen of the armaments commissions at the suggestion of the respective "operations manager" and acting according to their instructions. The AEI's list of tasks spoke volumes about the central role that they played in operational "increasing performance", ie in intensifying and perfecting the exploitation and the The aim was to maximize production and profit from each individual worker: "Testing and ensuring the most rational and economical use of workers in the company"; "Retraining and training of the assigned unskilled domestic and foreign workers"; "Preparation and promotion of the use of workers from the compulsory registration campaign, in particular of half-day workers", as well as of war disabled people; support of the Armaments Commission in the implementation and "in the fulfillment of the special operations in terms of work deployment". For the AEI and for all other "measures that increase production through better use of work," the minister set up a "work order" department under the previous DAF official as a central coordination office a quarter of a year later and member of the Ruhrstab Speer, Theodor Hupfauer, in the Ministry of Armaments.302**

When German submarine warfare experienced its disaster towards the end of the spring, the German Afrika Korps capitulated, a little later Allied air raids hit the Ruhr area, other industrial facilities and numerous large cities hard and finally in the summer the core of the German offensive planning for 1943, **the Kursk operation failed, it was clear to those circles that only radical solutions could help them get the manpower they needed. This argument - especially Speer's insistence on transferring hundreds of thousands of skilled workers from the consumer goods industry to the armaments industry - obviously played an important role at the end of July when the minister negotiated with Hitler about transferring the powers of the Reich Economics Ministry to his ministry.303 After Speer succeeded in taking over the powers of the Reich Economics Minister**

298 **FB,** 13.-15. 5. 1943, **point** 9.

299 **ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film** 1727, **RE-Decree RMfBuM v.** May 21, 1943. - **According to *Bleyer,* Total War, p.** 73, **the SE-1 action de facto yielded** 183,000 **men for the Wehrmacht** and **the SE-II action** 78,000 men.

300 **Ibid (film** 1727).

301 ***News from the RMfBuM,* No.** 26, July 8, 1943. **Hereafter also the following.**

302 **ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, film** 19622, **decree RMfRuK about. Image the official group "Work Regulations",** September 25, 1943.

303 ***Speer,* Memories, p.** _287.

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Apparently, his intentions were largely realized, especially through closures and "combing out" in the consumer goods industry.aM An overview of the overall result of the mobilization of German workers in 1943 showed 1,626,000 " usable" workers as a result of the compulsory registration. action, around 150,000 workers as a result of the closure campaign and around 400,000 workers as a result of the "combing out campaign".305 The last-mentioned number is remarkable: the "combing out campaign"306 only began in August, after the closure campaign had been completed, and was particularly effective in September and October out; at that time, when the consumer goods industry was already under the regulatory authority of the Ministry of Ammunition and Armaments.307 This last item actually seems to have been the most significant benefit for the armaments industry, both quantitatively and qualitatively, that the German labor force balance of 1943 had. When Sauckel reported to Hitler in mid-November, however, he had to significantly reduce the results of the mandatory reporting campaign: " 3.6 million women were examined, of which 1.6 million were fit for action . Of these, only 0.7 million were employed part-time. During the course of the year, 0.5 million of the women who had been hired at the beginning had to be laid off again on the basis of a medical certific "combing out" measures that the Armaments Minister himself initiated immediately after taking over the powers of the Reich Economics Minister ("General Representative for Operational Implementation"); However, the new, much stricter policy towards the consumer goods industry only had a more significant impac An overall balance, which can only be drawn up every year from May to May,309 shows an entry of 370,000 female German workers and two million foreign forced laborers from 1942 to 1943 , which was offset by an exit of 1.4 million male German workers.310 This positive balance, with around one million workers, turned into the opposite the following year. Female German workers continued to be mobilized after May 1943 ; However, about the same number dropped out with a medical certificate and for other reasons. Their overall numbers stagnated; m

304 For the concept of “total war” in the RMfRuK, see Chapter 3.

305 As note 275.

306 It was the "combing out action of the civil sector" (AZS action 1943) that was initiated in mid-August but did not begin until September and was led by the GBA (see *Demps, Laurenz,* figures on the use of foreign forced laborers in Germany in 1943). 1943 (hereinafter: *Demps,* forced laborers), in *ZfG,* 7/1973, p. 837f. and p. 840 (Doc. 1: GBA report from October 5, 1943 on the “work deployment in the third quarter 1943").

307 The number given in *Bleyer,* Totaler Krieg, p. 110, as 400,000 to 500,000 {also *DZW,* vol. 3, p. 221: 500,000) seems to be dated in error with spring 1943 and is not included in the source given.

308 ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, Film 19482, TO Party Chancellery about. Lecture d. GBA with Hitler on November 18, 1943, v. November 21, 1943.

309 According to official statistics (Statist. Reichsamt). The following figures refer to Germany within the borders of v. August 31, 1939 (without “Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia”; see Table 28).

310 The departure and addition figures are netted, i.e. opposing movements are also included. offset against each other.

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In industry it even fell by 150,000. This was countered by a certain increase in home workers - which were not yet statistically reported in 1943. In the central planning department, Field Marshal Milch characterized the overall result as "a complete failure of the mobilization of German women."311 The intake of foreign forced laborers was halved compared to the previous year. This resulted in a loss of 1.3 million male German workers Total employment of only 870,000 workers. If it had not been for the - albeit poor - result of the "total" mobilization in the first half of the year, the deficit would have been even higher. Of the total labor force growth from May 1942 to May 1944, only eleven percent was due to the mobilization of German workers and 89 percent to that of foreign forced laborers.

Table 28

Workers employed in Germany 1939-1944 (Pre-war Grenun, May 31st; in 1,000)

Year	workforce of it total	Foreign Germans Workers workers female		including: German Workforce	in percent
1939	39416	301	39114	14626	37
1940	35983	1154	34829	14386	41
1941	36177	3033	33144	14167	43
1942	35525	4224	31301	14437	46
1943	36527	6260	30269	14806	49
1944	36110	7126	28984	14808	51

Source: The Eff ects, p. 204 ff., Tables 3-5. Minor addition errors in the sources.

Thus, in the course of 1943, the difficulties in recruiting workers again reached a critical level and acquired a new quality, which was caused by the severe shortage of skilled workers, by the failure of the "total" mobilization of non-working German women and by the sharp decline in the number of skilled workers Forced labor transports were marked.

The most disturbing effect of the confiscations in 1943 for the German imperialists was that the number of skilled and specialized workers (especially toolmakers and setters), foremen and foremen was now declining more rapidly than ever before. However, they were absolutely necessary for maintaining a certain level of labor productivity and intensity and especially for the training and supervision of the forced laborers and the newly assigned German workers. While the core of such “leaders” had already been outdated for some time, the “SE actions” from the beginning of 1943 were draining their resources to keep them going

the irreplaceable layer of armaments production, which is running at full speed. In the first half of 1943, 261,000 skilled and key workers were drafted, and in the second half of the year another 172,000,312 The “best personnel we had,” emphasized Milch at the beginning of 1944, “is the most heavily drafted into the Wehrmacht. As a result, it is not possible at all

311 ZP-P, February 16, 1944, 53rd meeting.
312 BA Koblenz, R 3/1615, AN RMfRuK, October 13, 1944,

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to make full use of every foreigner, unless the piecework forces it and that we have the opportunity to take action against foreigners who don't do their stuff." 31.3 As far as the mobilization of female German workers was concerned, it was for the ruling circles not only a political problem, but also caused them economic difficulties. For the arms monopolies, the employment of German women in industry did not offer any undiminished advantages. On the contrary, it brought with it a number of side effects that were detrimental to profits. The companies could According to the legal regulations, German women could not be exploited as uninhibitedly and ruthlessly as foreign forced laborers and in most cases they could not have them do the heavy and dirty work. The length of the working day was, if not shortened working hours (half-day work) at all, also an option such as driving in the workplace, there are stricter limits. The cost of social services grew even faster than when male German workers were hired.

Most of the newly hired women first had to be trained and a relatively long start-up period was required before they could be fully integrated into the production process. The large and rapidly increasing shortage of skilled workers, foremen and masters, who had already been absorbed by the supervision of foreign forced laborers, had to complicate and delay the training of the new female German workers. The demand for the conversion of certain areas of production, for example the electrical industry, to home work, which was raised by the G BA and the Ministry of Armaments, also meant complicated economic changes for the defense companies and cost-increasing precautions such as the construction of interim storage facilities and changes in the production organization and were not met with great willingness among them.

Although the German imperialists generally viewed the "total" mobilization of female German workers for the war economy as "important" and necessary for the war effort, on the one hand there was a lack of certain prerequisites (trained workers) for their rapid and effective use; On the other hand, their massive use both in the company and in home work, especially in the increasingly critical overall situation, meant an economic and social experiment on a large scale, which the armaments leaders were reluctant to undertake because of the associated reduction in profits.

The Minister of Armaments and his monopoly capitalist supporters and confidants, especially Walter Rohland, had expressed their deep dissatisfaction with the previous results of the “total” mobilization on October 6, 1943 at the Gauleiter meeting in Posen and assured that from then on a different, much sharper course would be taken 314 The basic line for this course was laid down by Rohland in his memorandum for Hitler from the autumn of 1943315 and Speer in his memorandums ("Führer templates") from January 25, 1944316.

313 ZP-P, February 16, 1944, 53rd meeting.

314 See p. 174f. - Speer already raised the demand for such a course in his speech at the Gauleiter meeting on June 21, 1943 (ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1740).

315 ZStA Potsdam, Case XI, No. 724, Bl. 144ff., Doc. Pleiger-416, Affid. Rohland v. April 22, 1948, with attachment (affidavit of April 16, 1948); ibid, Bl. 152 f., Doc. Pleiger-416 a, consultation. Rohlands, August 28, 1947 (Case V). Hereafter also the following. - The attachment cited contains Rohland's subsequent summary of the contents of the memorandum, which itself is not available.

316 Ibid, FS, Film 3385.

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The basic ideas from Rohland's memorandum, which he brought to Hitler in Rastenburg together with Speer and Pleiger on October 7th 3 17, had been the subject of discussion for a long time in the management bodies of the "self-responsibility" apparatus of the armaments industry, especially in the Ruhr area (Ruhrstab). , and the Ministry of Armaments. Rohland undertook his action, which, according to his own statement, he had "discussed with a number of my acquaintances and colleagues before and after", undoubtedly on behalf of Vögler; "it was about," he expressly emphasized, "in general terms the... to express the opinion of the industry at headquarters."

According to Rohland's rendition of the tenor of the memorandum, one must come to terms with the fact that no more civilian foreign workers will come to Germany "voluntarily". However, their forced employment brings with it, the longer, the more security risks in return for low performance. Therefore "The conclusion is that we must strive for the total commitment of German people by all means." "Only the optics" should not remain "Total of the "war". The memorandum called for "the total commitment of German people, similar to that in England and Russia."

The proposed radical mobilization, combined with a "compulsory military service" for all those released and those not employed, should primarily extend to the entire apparatus of the Wehrmacht departments and to the "official apparatus of the state and party", "with simultaneous recourse to greater use of women".

Rohland also included in the memorandum the demand for restrictions on private consumption and for the "relocation of the still necessary civil [production] sector to the occupied territories," which the Ministry of Armaments had already begun.

Finally, "in order to achieve a general increase in performance", he pushed for stricter measures against fluctuation and lost hours, for the general introduction of the rolling work week with Sunday work and for meal allowances for heavy workers of all categories.

In fact, all of this, taken together, was the concept of a qualitatively new, consistent mobilization of the entire German population for the war of German finance capital. Speer's later, repeated memoranda on "Total War" were based in principle and on their main practical demands from Rohland's memorandum.

According to Rohland, Hitler was initially convinced of this concept on October 7th; The next day, however, he was changed by the Gauleiters who had traveled there and by Bormann, who undoubtedly accused him of the feared domestic political consequences for the regime.

c) Stagnant flow of foreign forced laborers

In 1943, the influx of foreign forced laborers to Germany steadily declined compared to the previous year, despite the fascists' best efforts to increase it, and fell sharply, especially in the second half of the year. The decisive reason for this was the victories and advances of the Soviet army as well as the rapidly growing popular resistance in those subjugated by the fascists
countries.

317 For the dating of the handover to Hitler, see *Schmidt,* p. 233.

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The German imperialists saw the **Soviet Union and Poland as the most important sources of forced labor. It was precisely these sources that were becoming more and more blocked by the offensives of the Soviet Army and the enormously growing, increasingly organized resistance of the population, especially the Soviet partisans.**
The advance of the Soviet Army also saved significant parts of the Soviet civilian population from the attack of the occupiers in good time.
Already in the first months of 1943 , **the GBA experienced irreparable declines in its "programs." In January and February, as Sauckel reported to Hitler, the transports from the East were "almost completely" canceled, of course not only because of the "difficulties the winter months",3 18 but above all because of the battles raging between the Don, Donec and Dnepr for the Donec basin and eastern Ukraine. Larger transports only started again in March. However, in the past,** 10,000 **to** 12,000 **Soviet citizens were deported as forced laborers every day, complained the representative of the GBA on April** 22 , 1943 **at the meeting of the central planning, "in the last three months** in **total only** 60,000".319 **The fascist forced labor commissions and commissioners had already concentrated on areas since autumn** 1942 **(Kuban region, Stalingrad region, Caucasus), which "have now become operational areas or are no longer in our hands."320 The GBA, as the OKW liaison officer reported, rightly stated: "All plans for the supply of Russians have been carried out "The strategic situation has been destroyed." Large numbers of**
321 Soviet prisoners of war, which the German imperialists had definitely counted on, failed to materialize. Those who took prisoners in large numbers in the battles in the East were no longer the fascist occupiers, but the superiorly led and heroically fighting Soviet troops. When the urgently requested prisoners of war did not materialize, the German monopoly masters began to lament previous "mistakes" and "regret ... that the Russian prisoners, with whom they are extremely satisfied today, were so poorly fed and accommodated in the winter of 1941/42 **"That they starved to death in their hundreds of thousands. Today we miss them urgently." 322 The German imperialists tried to**
keep themselves harmless in Western Europe. With the help of the French collaboration government, through coercive laws and terror, as well as propaganda phrases about "saving Europe from Bolshevism," over 450,000 **French workers were deported to Germany** in 1943 , **despite growing resistance from the population** ,323 **almost** 90 **percent more than in** 1942. **This number went entirely** mainly due to the first half of the year, in which a total of 480,000 **forced laborers (out of** 990,000) came **from occupied Western Europe . 324 From around the end of March/**
beginning of April, the occupiers felt the omnipresent

318 *IMG,* Vol. 26, p. 3, Doc. PS-407 (II), FS GBA to Hitler, March 10, 1943.

319 ZP-P, April 22, 1943, 36th session.

320 ZP-P, February 16, 1943, 33rd meeting.

321 MA GDR, W 61.50/109, report on d. GBA staff meeting on March 23, 1943.

322 *Anatomy of War,* p. 441f., Doc. 242, AN ex. Discussion in the Upper Silesian Institute f. Economic research on November 9, 1943.

323 *Homze,* p. 193f.; *Milward* (The New Order and the French Economy, p. 124, table 13) only gives around 420,000. The numbers in the literature and also in the various GBA reports and other sources differ, for example: T. strong.

324 *Demps,* forced laborers, p. 834, Doc. 1, GBA report regarding III. Quarter 1943, v. October 5, 1943.

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Table 29

Foreign forced laborers transported to Germany January to March 1943

Area of origin	January	February	March	In total
USSR	12081	17317	33921	63319
General Government	8465	22049	31231	61745
Warthegau	526	649	4763	5938
protectorate	9266	6164	9497	24927
France	36981	43950	98440	179371
Belgium	25062	20463	35008	80533
Netherlands	9220	10073	15681	34974
Rest of Europe	5905	7019	14646	27570
Prisoners of war	12579	10670	14195	37444
In total	120085	138354	257382	515821

Source: ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, film 19482, report d. GBA v. April 28, 1943 (f. Lammers).

Effect of the defeat at Stalingrad on the stiffening resistance to the forced deportations. At the Central Planning meeting on April 22nd, the representative of the GBA stated that "in all areas around Germany in the last few weeks there has been extraordinary resistance on the part of those recruited... that the arrival of the forces is more or less a has become a police question."325 From April/May onwards, this resistance had a striking so numerical impact - for example in France326, in the Generalgouvernement327 and in Belgium 3 2 8. The total number of foreign forced laborers newly employed in the German war economy rose to 160,535 in April and 170155 in May.329 (Table 30)

The human trafficking fiasco began in the second half of 1943. In its report for the 3rd quarter, the GBA spoke of a "tension in labor deployment of an extremely severe nature": while in the East the labor reserves were becoming increasingly scarce, and military measures such as blocking larger economic sectors made it more difficult to mobilize and transfer the remaining workforce "In the occupied western territories, which in themselves would have been capable of making larger contributions, an increasingly stubborn rigidity in mood occurred, which ... has not yet been overcome to this day." 330 The conflicting interests within the state monopoly mechanism of the occupiers clashed violently in the occupied territories of the USSR. In the summer of 1943, under the immediate impression of the failure of the offensive at

Kursk, Army Group South alone under Field Marshal Erich v. Manstein 500,000 Soviet workers for fortification work.331 The Reich Coal Association, known as 325 ZP-P, April 22, 1943, 36th meeting.

326 *DZW,* vol. 3, p. 389; *Homze,* p. 188f.; *Milward,* The New Order and the French Economy, p. 124, table 13 (different numbers).

327 *DZW,* Vol. 3, p. 372.

328 Ibid., p. 395.

329 *IMG,* Vol. 26, p. 13, Doc. PS-407 (IX), GBA to Hitler, June 3, 1943.

330 *Demps,* forced laborers, p. 832, Doc. 1, GBA report by October 5, 1943.

331 See ZStA Potsdam, Case XI, No. 331, Bl. 88ff., Doc. NO-1831, minutes of the meeting in RMfbO on "labour deployment issues" on July 13, 1943, from July 20, 1943.

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Table 30

Foreign forced laborers transported to Germany in the 1st - 1st quarter of 1943

Area of origin	I. Quarter	II quarter	III. quarter
USSR	63319	227700	154000
General Government	61745	40300	30600
Western	294878	185100	85200
Europe Rest of Europe	58435	58600	28000
Prisoners of war	37,444	27600	46000
In total	515821	539300	343800

Qllßlle: Demps, forced laborers, p. 834; ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, film 19482, GBA report from. April 28, 1943 (f. Lammers: "Status of work deployment on April 15, 1943").

by the end of August, 200,000 "Soviet prisoners of war from the rear army areas who were suitable for mining" had registered their most urgent need,3 32 in view of this, with the help of Speer, they felt compelled to obtain a "Führer's order" according to which they were to receive this workforce and to provide them with "a new occurrence of "Soviet prisoners of war" were granted "unrestricted priority" and the "immediate right of selection ."333 The number of

deported Soviet citizens shrank to a few tens of thousands after the start of the Soviet autumn offensive In the operational areas, people were forcibly "repatriated" to the West and deported to Germany, mostly women, and to a large extent also children and old people.3M However, the chaotic conditions during hasty retreats and the bitter resistance of those affected often prevented the occupiers from

carrying out their plans.

When the Upper Silesian corporate magnates complained in November 1943 that "a serious mistake had been made by the SS in repatriating Russian workers from the Ukraine,"335 these were undoubtedly the circumstances mentioned and not those alleged by the SS. "political reasons" are to blame. “In the Donets region,” the armaments leaders argued, “around 500,000 workers were said to have been ready for transport, divided into workforces with their masters, foremen, etc. The usual way of transporting these workers to Germany was in closed trains It would have been possible to equip entire steelworks here with the local workforce. However, the SS prevented this previously usual type of return transport as being impossible for political reasons; why is incomprehensible. The Ukrainian workers were ordered to go to western Ukraine in small groups The result of this is that they crumbled and now none of these people are tangible anymore." 336 332 *Case 5,* p. 185, Doc. NI-2840, Rs. RVK to district groups, June 29, 1943.

333 *IMG,* Vol. 26, p. 285, Doc. PS-744, decree of Chief OKW v. July 8, 1943.

334 Sauckel reported that since the first half of 1943 the "eastern" forced labor transports "consisted largely of women and young people" who were not suitable for mining (ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 3353; activity report of the GBA for the Period from January 1 to June 30, 1943).

335 WAP Katowice, Upper Silesian Institute for Economic Research, No. 2, BL 26. AN ex. Discuss with Mencke (head of the Upper Silesia district group of Wi gru Esl) v. 9th U. 1943.

336 Ibid.

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In the second half of the year, the resistance of the French people reached a level that posed the greatest danger to the domestic political position of the collaborationist regime. Since August, the flow of French workers has almost completely dried up. While 30,000 had been brought to Germany in July, there were only 10,000 in August and 5,000 in September.337 In December, the GBA reported that since then "France had practically disappeared as a catchment area for German armaments deployment."338 It was a situation that was rapidly deepening Gap between the increasing demand of the defense companies, the Wehrmacht and the other "requirers"

for forced laborers and the shrinking possibilities of forced recruitment, which provided the breeding ground for increasing internal struggles over the forced laborers and violent disputes about the methods of their "procurement" and treatment The blocking operations in France, which the Armaments Minister set up together with the French collaboration government,339 became the subject of ongoing disputes between the GBA and the ammunition and ammunition departments from the end of 1943 until the summer of the following year.

Ministry of Armaments.

The creation of protection companies was in view of the resistance to forced recruitment, which, as it was formulated in the central planning department in the summer of 1943, “was in harmony with the military development in Russia and the resulting feelings for the development of the war among the Western peoples "340 grew rapidly, a tactical measure by the German imperialists. Not only the ammunition minister, but also the GBA and, above all, the corporate owners and heads of the armaments industry were trying hard to solve the problem of "relocating" industrial production at this time to France on a large scale and discussed it together. In a meeting on July 30, in which Speer, Sauckel and 13 heads of main committees of the Ministry of Munitions took part, the course of deliberations on these and other central questions of fascist labor policy revealed “a broad agreement between the views of the GBA and the organizations of the Minister of Munitions " .341 The forced deportation of foreign workers to Germany and their - at least indirect - compulsory obligation to work for German imperialism in their own country were two variants of fascist forced labor policy that, according to the wishes of their authors, should complement each other as much as possible. They had to but necessarily collide and ultimately had both, given
the military and political situation,

337 *Milward,* The New Order and the French Economy, p. 124, table 13. - Sauckel's final accounting for 1943 (ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, Film 19481, GBA report for Hitler from December 20, 1943) contains the following figures for Western European countries: January to July: France 391,000, Belgium 117,000, Netherlands 138,000; August to December: France 26000, Belgium 13000, Netherlands 20800. See also *Demps,* forced laborers, p. 834, Doc. 1, GBA report by. October 5, 1943.

338 ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, film 19481, GBA report for Hitler v. December 20, 1943: “That The same applies to Belgium."

339 See p. 160 f.

340 ZP-P, March 1, 1944, 54th meeting (Kehrl).

341 *Bleyer, Wolfgang!Drobisch, Klaus,* documents on the exploitation of foreign forced laborers by German monopoly capital in the Second World War, in *Bulletin of the working group "Second Well War",* 3/1970, p. 70, AN Küppenbender (Carl Zeiss Jena) from July 30th .1943.

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Given the deep crisis of fascist rule over occupied Europe, there is no prospect of lasting success.
The disputes over these variants within the ruling circles of Hitler's Germany, in particular between the Armaments Ministry and Central Planning on the one hand and the GBA on the other, were not about the alternative of a peaceful and humane alternative that, in contrast to the GBA's policy, served the interests of the French people politics, but simply about the direction that one wanted to take tactically in forced labor policy and thus in collaboration policy in general. Attempts by bourgeois historians to contrast Sauckel and Speer as fundamental opponents and to see the latter as a moderate -

therefore more successful --- to pose as representatives of the regime fail due to the facts.
The given situation forced the German imperialists **to** make a virtue of necessity and to choose an option with the protection companies, which promised them the greatest war economy benefits that could still be achieved, but which inevitably had to reduce the volume of deportations to Germany even further.
The difficulties into which the fascist forced labor policy got into in the second half of the year could not be illuminated more clearly than by the fact that, after Italy's defection from the fascist alliance in September 1943, leading representatives of the regime positively rejoiced that they too Italian workers were forcibly transported en masse to Germany.
Goebbels confided in his diary that the Italian debacle had turned out to be "good business" for Hitler's Germany, both in terms of the spoils of arms and, above all, of the spoils of manpower.3 **2** The new source was immediately tapped, but only had an impact in the The following year, the Italian forced laborers were predominantly former soldiers of the Italian army who were interned by the German fascists and served as...

"Prisoners of war" were deported to Germany to work.

Over the course of 1943, the German imperialists resorted to extreme, increasingly **brutal** measures to reduce the labor deficit. In his already mentioned order of July 7th, Hitler had demanded that all men between the ages of 16 and 55 years of age captured in the fights with the partisans of the Soviet Union, Poland and the countries of southeastern Europe should be treated as prisoners of war and sent to Germany for forced labor bring.3 Himmler immediately extended this demand to all able-bodied female "prisoners" from such fights.344
The fascists' forced labor system experienced its most rapid expansion in 1943. Of the 600,000 to 750,000 concentration camp prisoners, It is estimated that all of them performed forced labor in the German war economy,345 the majority were driven from Germany and occupied Europe into the camps and work detachments this year.

342 Goebbels diary, quoted from Homze, p. 202 (without date).
343 IMG, Vol. 26, p. 285, Doc. PS-744, decree of Chief OKW v. July 8, 1943. 3t,4 Ibid., p. 287, Himmler's decree v. August 5, 1943; see *DZW,* Vol. 4, p. 171.
3',5 Wormser-Migot, Olga, Le systeme concentrationnaire Nazi (1933-1945), Paris 1968, p. 399 E.

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d) Record of abduction and exploitation

The reported figures about the foreign forced laborers employed in the German war economy contain major inaccuracies and contradictions. At the end of 1943, the planning office of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production found that the definitions and figures for labor statistics at the Reich Statistical Office, at the GBA, at the Armaments Ministry, etc. "did not agree in any way", which resulted in "numerous misunderstandings, differences of opinion, double counting and wrong decisions".346 The following compilation and analysis is based on See-ber's 3 47 critical and balanced comments **on the extent of the deportations and the number of them foreign forced laborers actually employed in Germany.**

In the Reich Ministry of Labor, the employment office's figures for the foreign forced laborers placed in the "requirements" (companies, construction sites, etc.) were compiled. Apart from the prisoners of war, who were counted separately, the statistics that resulted were missing , important positions, especially the Czechoslovakian forced laborers in Germany (320,000) who were not counted as foreigners until 1941 and many thousands of (skilled) workers who the armaments companies, the GB Chemie, the Reich Coal and Iron Associations through their own advertising offices and agents " within the framework set aside by the GBA for the initiative of the individual consumer" 348 and through all sorts of other "wild" advertising to Germany.

Table 31

Zi11il.e foreign forced laborers in Germany 1941-1943 (borders August 11, 31, 1939; in 1000)

January 31, 1941	1307	February 15, 1943	4121
4/25	1508	3/31	4416
	2140		4718
9/25/1/20, 1942	2138		4950
5/20	2606	5/15/6/30/8/15	5264
10. 7.	3159		5345
20. 8.	3413	9/30/11/15	5412
10.10	3579	12/31	5438
November 20th	3785		
12/31	3984		

Source: Seeber, p. 297, list based on ***the labor deployment in the Great German Reich,*** born 1941 to 1944.

However, it included workers from neutral, allied and satellite states, whose share was just under 13 percent in October 1941, but two years later (November 1943) it was only around half as much.
The number of prisoners of war who had to work in the German war economy was determined relatively precisely by the employment offices since autumn 1940.

346 ***Kehrl,*** p. 468, note 7.
347 ***Seeber,*** p. 89ff.
348 Ibid., p. 282f., document appendix: Krauch to Kehr), January 13, 1944.

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Table 32

Nationality of the civilian foreign forced laborers 1941-1943 (borders August 11, 31, 1939; in 1000)

Country of origin	4/25 1941	September 25, 1941	January 20, 1942	May 20, 1942	10. 7. end 42/ 30. 6. 1942 beginning	43 1943		11/15 1943
Poland (GG and annexed territories)	873	1008	1032	1195	1279	1397	1515	1611
France Belgium	25	49	63	75	77	135	401	665
	86	122	131	135	134	131	258	221
Netherlands	90	93	96	105	127	154	240	265
USSR	10.	25	**	283	727	1380	1671	1811
protectorate	—	140	141	159	169	193	224	285
Yugoslavia (including Croatia)	47	109	134		128	118	127	115
Italy	132	272	188	128,200	212	200	210	120
Hungary		35		30	30		32	27
Other	21 224	287	31 322	296	276	31 275	326	292
In total	1508 2140		2138 2606		3159 4014		5004	5412

• Employees on a contractual basis

•• Not listed separately; included in “Other”, excluding Galicia (Western Ukraine)

Source: BA Koblenz, R 41/166, ed. WiRüAmt regarding "Use of foreign civilian workers and prisoners of war in the war economy", July 21, 1941 (as of April 25, 1941); ibid., R 41/141, statistical elaboration RMfBuM (RüAmt), 10 9. 1941 (January 20th, May 20th and July 10th, 1942); ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 5442, AN WiRüAmt, December 9th, 1941 (September 25th, 1941); *IMG,* vol. 27, p 601, Doc. PS-1739, Speech of the GBA at the Reich and Gauleiter Conference in Posen, 5.16.2.1943 (end of 1942); ***Homze,*** p. 148 (15.11.1943); BA Koblenz, R 41/29, half-year report of the GBA for the period from January 1 to June 30, 1943 (June 30, 1943). - The information in the penultimate and third-to-last columns comes from GBA reports and differs from those of RArbM (Table 31).

Table 33

Prisoners of war working in Germany 1940-1943 (in 1000)

5/31/1940	350
January 1941	1202
5/31/1941	1270
10/1/1941	1368
12/31/1941	1406
2/28/1942	1370
5/31/1942	1454
7/31/1942	1507
9/30/1942	1629
5/31/1943 9/30	1620
.1943	1465

Source: The Effects, p. 34, table 11; BA Koblenz, R 41/166 (see Table 32); ibid., RU/173, ed. RMfBuM (RüAmt) about. work effort d. War and civilian prisoners v. January-July 1942, September 29, 1942; ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 5442, AN WiRüAmt, December 9, 1941; ***Homze,*** p.195; ***Pfahlmann,*** p. 137.

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Table 34

.Nationality of prisoners of war working in Germany 1940-1943 (in 1,000)

Country of origin	April 25, 1941	February 1942	July 1942	September 1942	end of December.	Autumn 1942 1943
France	1192	971	946	935	932	739
USSR	—	154	318	455	488	496
.Yugoslavia		105	103	100	101	94
Belgium	2 65	58	56	56	55	53
Poland	49	31	35	34	33	29
-Great Britain	23	41	45	44	4!}	54
Other	15	10	5	4		
In total	1349•	1370	1507	1628	1658	1465

• Sum error in the source

·*Source:* Same as Table 33; *IMG,* Vol. 27, p. 601 (see Table 32).

. held. However, even later, the employment offices had neither control over the disposal nor a numerical overview of the prisoners who worked directly for Wehrmacht purposes (construction and labor battalions, etc.).349 Since the number of prisoners of war working in Germany fluctuated greatly from country to country because they, like 300,000 Poles were transferred to ·civilian status (1940) or, like approximately the same number of French people, were exchanged for civilian forced laborers (1942/43), the statistics, taken on their own, are often contradictory and misleading.

The statistical sources examined show that the share of Soviet forced laborers in all foreign forced laborers (civilians and prisoners of war) in September/

Table35

Foreign forced laborers in Germany by economic sector 1940-1944
,(each May 31st; in 1000)

.Year	In total	including: Agriculture	Industry	Crafts	transport
·1940	1154	681	256	108	35
·1941	3033	1459	965	310	97
·1942	4224	1978	1401	296	171
·1943	6260	2293	2829	430	289
1944	7126	2478	3163	537	407
- As a percentage of all employees -					
·1940	6.4 1941 13.6	17.6 20.3 22.1	2.6	2.6	1.8
	8.4		9.5	7.7	4.5
1942	11.9		14.3	8.5	7.7
1943	17.1		25.7	12.7	12.6
1944	19.7		29.3	16.4	17.4

Source: The Effects, p. 206, Table 5. Minor deviation for the industry. in the RGI statistics: ibid., p. 212, table 10. - From 1943 onwards, the total numbers listed increasingly lagged behind the RArbM information (cf. the previous tables).

349 *Pfahlmann,* p. 106ff.

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October 1941 was less than one percent, in January/February 1942 an estimated six to eight percent, in July 1942 around 22 percent and since the end of 1942 it has been relatively constant at around 35 percent.

The Reich Statistical Office recorded summary figures on foreign forced laborers - including civilian workers, prisoners of war and Jewish people of all nationalities - in the "Balance of War Economic Forces" (Table 35).

All of this information fell significantly short of the success figures calculated by the GBA. Sauckel summed up the figures reported to him by his offices about the forced laborers who had been transported to Germany and some of whom were still on the transport; The employment offices, on the other hand, based on the number of people who were actually in work or who had been found a job. Finally, after the transport, a certain number of forced laborers were placed in temporary employment center camps before they were assigned to companies to work.

Here Jag is the cause of the differences of hundreds of thousands, even millions, who died during the transport due to hunger, cold and epidemics, fled or were shot or killed while trying to escape; who turned out to be unfit for work at the place of unloading or, being forced to work, died sooner or later from weakness, overwork or illness; who fled Germany and who were imprisoned, killed or sent to concentration camps because of resistance. No small role was played by the fluctuation of workers who, especially from satellite and allied countries, returned home after their contracts had expired, who used the right to vacation to escape, who "breached their employment contract" in other ways or who were considered sick or . were deported to their homeland unable to work.

Sauckel himself apparently considered his statistics to be by no means complete. In the hearings before the Nuremberg Tribunal, he suggested that a total of around 12 million foreign workers could have been brought to Germany, although at most 8.1 million were employed in the war economy at the same time (1944).350 Since Sauckel was in this Statement apparently the prisoners of war and working people

Table 36

Foreign forced laborers transported to Germany 1941-1943 (in 1000)

Until the end of March 1942	3 484 •
Until (27) July 1942	5124
Until November 30, 1942	6234
Until December 31, 1942	6381
Until June 30, 1943	7,437
Until the end of December 1943	8349
Until September 30, 1944	9335

• This information is undoubtedly significantly too low, as it covers the forced laborers who were working at the end of March, but not all of the forced laborers transported to Germany by then (see *Seeber,* p. 92). After the war in Nuremberg, Sauckel admitted that possibly 5 million forced laborers had been taken to Germany before his term in office *(Homze,* p. 153).

Source: The GBA reports already cited.

350 *Homze,* p. 153 (consultation with Sauckel from October 5, 1945). See also *Seeber,* p. 89; *Drobisch, Klaus/ Eichholtz, Dietrich,* The forced labor of foreign workers in Germany during the Second World War, in *ZfG,* 5/1970, p. 637; *Kuczynski,* Situation of the Workers, Vol. 6, p. 278.

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Neglected concentration camp prisoners, Kuczynski's estimate is fully justified, as he considers it to be "by no means an exaggeration" that the fascists drove a total of "around 14 million foreign workers and prisoners of war" into Germany.351 From the point of view of war economics, all of these calculations were missing the many millions of workers who produced in the occupied and other countries for fascist Germany or for the occupying power. According to the GBA's rough calculations, this amounted to almost 14 million 3 52 in mid-1943 - in armaments factories alone, in other companies involved in "commercial production" (especially raw and basic material production), in the OT and in Wehrmacht services - at the end of 1942 (June)

12.3 million locals 353 . In agriculturealone, in the area of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories in mid-1943, a further 8.1 million worked under the command and on behalf of the occupiers.354 Since 1942, the foreign forced laborers assigned to German industry were increasingly exclusively employed in armaments factories. Their share of the total workforce of these companies doubled in the course of 1942.

Table 37

Employment of foreign forced laborers in "A-companies" (industrial companies with direct Wehrmachtsau/ sluggish), in the IG- Farben and Reichswerke-Kom.em 1941-1943 (in 1000)

	"A companies"		IG Colors		Reichswerke "Hermann Göring"	
	Busy. forced laborers	(in percent)	Busy. forced labor	(employed (in percent) forced percent)	workers	
(End of) June 1941	620	13.7	—	—	—	—
(End of) December 1941	797	17.0	10	8.8	130	42.4
(End of) June 1942	1201	24.5	22	16.9	142	44.7
(End of) December 1942	1763	33.1	—	—	—	—
(End of) June 1943	1631	30.3 *	68	39.7	190	51.0
(End of) December 1943	1885	33.7 *	—	—	—	—

• Apparently too low values due to the change in the statistics of A companies, in which, unlike before, "the workforce employed in the production of semi-finished products have recently been counted outside of the listed recipients" (BA Koblenz, R 41/29, half-year report of the GBA fd period from January 1st to June 30th, 1943).

Quelk: The Effects, p. 214, table 12; *Hom* , P. 239 (f. IG Farben and Reichswerke)

This influx of foreign workers was one of the main reasons for the rapid increase in defense production.

A handful of giant corporations, each employing tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands, secured the lion's share of the number of newly brought in forced laborers. In the summer of 1943, the IG Farben team alone employed

351 *Kuczynski,* Situation of the Workers, Vol. 6, p. 278.
352 *IMG,* Vol. 27, p. 598ff., Doc. PS-1739, Speech d. GBA v. 5.16. 2. 1943 (Posen).
353 BA Koblenz, R 41/29, half-year report d. GBA fd time v. January 1 to June 30, 1943.
354 Ibid.

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Group and the Reichswerke “Hermann Göring” group had 44,000 and 48,000 foreign forced laborers, respectively, more than a year earlier.355 At the end of 1943, the Flick and Krupp groups, like the IG Farben group, each had around 40 percent of the workforce foreign forced laborers, in the Reichswerke group over 50 percent, in various newly built group plants in the aircraft industry even 80 to 90 percent and above.356

3. Problems with the working and living conditions of German workers

Since the attack on the Soviet Union, the German workers, employees, farmers and other working people have been in the predicament that, through their hands, they have helped their mortal enemy, fascism, to wage the war of annihilation against the bastion of socialism and thus, according to its plan contributed to the destruction of their own revolutionary future. In no other phase of German history did the law of the capitalist mode of production discovered by Marx have a more catastrophic effect, according to which "as capital accumulates, the situation of the worker, whatever his payment, high or low, must worsen."357 With The fate of the Blitzkrieg strategy was predetermined after the adventurous attack on the USSR and the defeat of German
imperialism was decided. However, since the forces of the heroically fighting German anti-fascists were not sufficient to overthrow the hated regime, there were both terrible blood sacrifices at the front and a rapid and Absolute deterioration of the situation of the working population in Germany, the decline and collapse of the German economy is inevitable.

The sociological structure of the German working class was subject to a politically and ideologically momentous process of change that has yet to be examined in detail. Since 1933, the fascist terror had driven their revolutionary vanguard into illegality and decimated their class-conscious cadres. The armaments industry had replenished the stock, which had been reduced by millions during the global economic crisis, and the drafts at the start of the war had reduced it again. The wave of drafts into the Wehrmacht and "mobilization" campaigns after the failure of the Blitzkrieg strategy initiated a new phase of accelerated, far-reaching sociological shifts that lasted until the end of the war. It was characterized above all by the fact that the male core workforce was becoming significantly older , the proportion of women increased significantly and other parts of the lower middle class were proletarianized.

So June 22, 1941 did indeed bring about “a radical change in the situation of the German worker”358.

355 Homze, p. 239.

356 See d. Milch's remarks at the 53rd meeting of the Central Planning (ZP-P, February 16, 1944).

357 Marx, Karl, Capital. Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, in Marx, Karl/Engels, Friedrich, Works, Vol. 23, Berlin 1962, p. 675.

358 Kuczynski, Situation of the Workers, Vol. 6, p. 274.

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a) Terror, corruption and manipulation359

Not only the coercive regime against foreign workers, but also the exploitation regime to which the German workers were subjected, was based on the functioning of fascist terror and its apparatus, whose individual structures and branches spread into every house and into every family reached every company and every workplace. From the beginning of the war, the workers were confronted with the system of fascist terror and martial law, the pillars of which in the company were the "defense officer", the factory security officer under his command and the dense network of police and corporate spies.

Since the beginning of 1941, more and more large companies began to set up their own so-called labor training camps in order to provide "the moment of deterrence" in the event of deliberate and malicious indiscipline on the part of the workers360 without delay, that is, without the detour through the police and judiciary and without to take advantage of the loss of the affected workforce. The previous - and also the usual - practice was that the companies submitted applications for "protective custody", for sending to a concentration camp and for legal prosecution. The new, additional facility, at the insistence of Himmler's monopolies with a decree of 28. made legally binding in May 1941,3 6 1 enjoyed great popularity among the exploiters. From the companies in the Westphalia-Lower Rhine economic area alone, the Reich Trustee of Work from January to September 1941 submitted applications for "protective custody"1438, for labor training camps in 1193, and for concentration camps 38 and placed under prosecution by the public prosecutor's office 1193. 3 6 2 In the labor training camps that were set up at numerous companies such as IG Farben,
Krupp, Siemens, AEG and Hochtief AG, supervised by the Gestapo and assigned to the con-

.were subject to factory protection, “loiterers” and others “unwilling to work”.

359 Pii.tzold has recently given an overview of the research problems on this topic. He suggests defining terror, ideology and corruption as an interconnected system of "fascist manipulation" *(Pätzold, Kurt,* The fascist manipulation of the German people. On a research problem. In *Social foundations and power mechanisms of German fascism. The anti-fascist struggle,* part 1, edited by Werner Kowalski (= Scientific Contributions 1980/42 (C 16) of the Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg), Halle (Saale) 1980, p. 48ff.).

360 *DZW,* Vol. 2, p. 92 (cited SD report “Messages from the Reich” dated April 22, 1941); see also *Dro-bisch, Klaus,* documents on direct cooperation between the Flick Group and the Gestapo at the Suppression of the workers, in: *J(W,* 1963, T. 3, (hereinafter: documents) p. 217f.; *the same,* On terror and its institutions in Nazi Germany, in: *Fascism research.* Positions - problems - polemics. Edited by Dietrich Eichholtz and Kurt Goss-weiler, Berlin 1980, p. 169, note 41.

361 *DZW,* vol. 2, p. 91f.; *Drobisch,* Documents, p. 217. The decree in /*MG,* Vol. 42, p. 302f., Doc. Gestapo-57. Labor education detention and labor education camps were prepared or introduced as “educational measures” even before the war on the basis of the protective custody decree. January 25, 1938 *(Adamska, Jolanta,* labor education camp - extermination camp for Polish forced laborers, MS-print of a contribution to the international scientific session on the topic “Nazi crimes against humanity in Poland and Europe 1939-1945”, Warsaw, 14 .-April 17, 1983, p. 2).

362 *Anatomy of War,* p. 360, Doc. 181, "Social-political information" of the RVK from November 1st. 1941. - In addition, 18,689 “warnings” were issued (ibid.).

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Elements" and "troublemakers" were detained for a period of up to 56 days with twelve hours of work, minimal food, etc. In mid-1942, for example, the Leunawerke of the IG Farben Group set up a labor training camp for around 160 workers, "in which from the entire Merseburg administrative district and beyond from the entire military district IV, elements from the various companies important to the war effort that are unwilling to work should be taken in and trained to work."363 In Essen and Magdeburg, Krupp, in collaboration with the Gestapo, set up three such camps for the main Krupp plants. Corporation built.aM The treatment that the inmates of the labor education camps received was largely similar to that in the concentration camps. "This miniature concentration camp," a Dutch worker later testified about a labor training camp run by the Krupp company, "did not differ in any way from the notorious large camps in terms of prison treatment." 365 On August 22, 1941, Göring, in his capacity as representative for the four-year plan, issued an order against "staggering",366 which, taking
into account the facts that had since emerged, was intended to provide legal means for the stricter actions of the monopolies in their companies. Göring's decree stipulated three levels of punishment: "If the person was absent from work for the first time without a reason," a "reprimand" was to be issued. "In the event of a repeat offense," an entry had to be made in the work book.

"If the warning is unsuccessful," it was finally said, "the guilty parties can be grouped into special work squads after gross dereliction of duty."
The decree was followed by implementing regulations from the Reich Labor Minister dated October 4, 367 and November 22, 1941. The circular of November 22, 1941 on the “combat of indiscipline in the companies”368 encouraged the companies and labor trustees to: "That indiscipline in companies, especially in the armaments industry, must be countered with all energy and by speeding up the process as much as possible in individual cases". The first step should be to issue warnings and, above all, fines and administrative penalties (up to 100 RM); In the case of more serious "offenses" and especially in the case of recidivism, the decree stated that those concerned should be "immediately sent to a labor training camp with the help of the police." The basic provision on the scope of this punitive measure was: "This procedure is to be applied not only to the armaments industry, but to all branches of the private economy and the public service, both for nationals and foreigners as well as for workers and employees." The Opportunity, workers

363 Ibid., p. 403, Doc. 210, Ammoniakwerk Merseburg GmbH (Leunawerke) to Filmfabrik Wollen, June 29, 1942. See d. Announcement of this "concentration camp" construction in an instruction from the social department of the Leunawerk dated March 4, 1942 *(Fighting Leuna (1916 to 1945).* The history of the struggle of the Leuna workers, T. I, 2nd Hbbd. (1933-1945), Berlin 1961, p. 794 f.).

364 *Drobisch, Klaus,* The factory security - corporate terror organ in fascist Germany, in: *JfW,* 1965, T. 4, p. 236 (ff.).

365 Case _

366 *DZW,* Vol. 2, p. 107 (Facs.).

367 BA Koblenz, R 13 XX/39, H. 2, RErl. RArbM v. 10/4/19h.

368 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 10298, Bl. 11 f., RErl. RArbM (Mansfeld) v. November 22, 1941. Hereafter also the following.

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According to the decree, the companies were expressly free to prosecute employees or have them deported to a concentration camp; But - and this made an important motive of the arms monopolies and legislators clear - such "measures through which a member of the following who is capable of working is removed from the work process for a long time should be avoided if possible and only taken in serious cases".

An instruction from the social department of Leuna werke gave examples of other important powers and means of punishment for management: “Withdrawal of personal performance bonuses, exclusion from company bonuses for up to four weeks. Transfer to a lower-paid job, withdrawal of the allowance or additional card if only 36 hours of work per week are worked without excuse."369 This meant that by the end of 1941/beginning of 1942 there was already a comprehensive, very effective terror instrument in the hands of the entrepreneurs subjected the workers to extreme labor and made them lawless and defenseless.

The "domestic policy change" 370 to even more draconian means of maintaining domestic stability in the second half of 1943 had less of an effect in the production sphere in the form of new, stricter orders against "lack of discipline", "breach of employment contracts", ", insubordination" and the like, as issued primarily by the GBA,371 but rather through the more brutal handling of the existing terrorist instruments and through the ruthless expansion of reprisals against the working people.372 According to an agreement between the RSHA and the Ministry of Munitions, on 9 August 1943, the network of "defense officers" was expanded to include the companies and facilities in the transport and energy industries in order to "prevent" all attempts at espionage, treason, sabotage and the formation of resistance movements among the followers in a timely manner. recognize and fight back."373 Speer and Himmler reached a further agreement with the DAF: "I am grateful for this," Speer explained to the Reich and Gauleiters at the Posen conference on October 6, 1943, "that at the request On the labor front, a few thousand loiterers are being arrested from the factories right now and transferred to a concentration camp." 374 In connection with the described increase in sickness and accident sickness in the factories, the arms companies and armaments departments employed an increasing number of people the question of how they could use coercion and terror to reduce the resulting loss of production and profits. At the end of March 1942, the Reich Industry Group demanded that care be taken to "reduce the number of sick people" because "at present an increased strain of all forces must be demanded."375 The President of the Reichsknappschaft, Jakob, devoted particular attention to this task

369 dated March 4, 1942; Fighting Leuna, p. 794f.
370 *DZW,* Vol. 4, p. 351.
371 In particular "Order against breach of employment contract and poaching as well as the demand for disproportionately high wages in the private sector" dated July 20, 1942 *(DRA* v. July 28, 1942); "Order No. 13 to ensure order in the companies" dated November 1, 1943 *(RABl.* 1943 I, p. 543).
372 See *DZW,* Vol. 4, p. 358f.
373 Ibid., p. 359f.
374 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 3570, Speer's speech, October 6, 1943.
375 BA Koblenz, R 13 .XX/85, case concerning "Reducing sick leave", March 26, 1942.

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Zeal. In the DAF he was looking for an ally for his plan to put pressure on the doctors, who "in case of doubt ... would not have to certify the inability to work, but rather the ability to work."376 On July 21st he officially instructed the miners' association directors The aim is to enforce the "requirement" of doctors to "certify fitness for work in cases of doubt" _377 At the meeting of the central planning on October 23 , 1942 , Pleiger referred to the sickness rate in the Ruhr area: "We have a workforce of 350,000 people Up to 60 percent had celebratory shifts, and we had medical examiners carry out checks on a wide variety of mines, which had the result that 30 to 40 percent had to go back in after the medical examination. If there was the possibility, perhaps various medical examiners from the military side "Getting us out of the military again would take a lot of pressure off of us. The application is ongoing." Minister Speer summed up cynically: "So a doctor brings you a few thousand men a day." 37s Before the same committee he explained a week later, citing information from Robert Ley, "that where there are company doctors and the people from be examined by the company doctors, the sickness rate immediately drops to a quarter to a fifth." 379 He demanded: "The SS and the police could get tough here and put the people who are known as loiterers in concentration camps. There is no other way. This only needs to happen a few times, word gets around." 380 In the minutes of the meeting's resolution it was summed up in this sense: "In general, in order to reduce fluctuation, the loitering system must be addressed sharply, in particular by increasing the number of medical examiners and through access by the police (the loiterers were obliged to do hard labor and were sent to concentration camps)." 38!

Under the leadership of the Minister of Ammunition, a whole system of control measures was introduced in the armaments industry, which was based on the experience of large companies. First of all, the "operators" themselves should use their coercive measures against "loiterers" who are partying while sick. Furthermore, the minister, together with the GBA, called for "a stricter orientation of the health insurance doctors." Armament and Ammunition and the Reich Labor Minister have therefore agreed that the subordinate offices of the Reich Minister for Armament and Ammunition in the military districts (military district commissioners) will work closely with the state medical officers of the responsible state insurance institutions.

The offices of the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition will inform the state medical examiners of the companies in which a special deployment of the medical examiner's office appears to be particularly urgent." 383 The most unscrupulous representatives of this profession were soon popularly known as " shock troop doctors."
At the same time, the "police attack" against "shoppers" became so brutal

376 Ibid., President Jakob to DAF/Mining Department, June 23, 1942.
377 Ibid., Rs. v. July 21, 1942.
378 ZP-P, 16th session.
379 ZP-P, October 30, 1942, 21st session.
380 Ibid.
381 ZP-E, October 30, 1942, 21st session.
382 BA Koblenz, R 41/228, GBA to Milch, January 30, 1943.
383 Ibid.

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In such a way that even the DAF considered this to be inappropriate and ineffective. At a meeting with all the relevant authorities in the regime (party office, RSHA, DAF, Reich Ministry of Arms and Ammunition, Reich Ministry of Labor, Reich Ministry of Economics), she called for more careful investigation of the cases. For example, it was not acceptable, their representative argued, "when 5,000 young people in Berlin alone had been sentenced to 1-6 months in prison for work spree." 38 Reports on the success of the terrorist measures were already availal

According to the Siemens Group, the situation with regard to lost hours has improved, especially "as a result of the drastic measures taken by the health insurance companies to reduce the number of hours lost sick leave"368.

Speer's project from May/June 1943 provided an insight into the deep-rooted wishes of monopoly capital to uniform millions of German workers - in this case initially the workers of the Rhine-Ruhr area - and force them into community camps and at the same time carry out the "evacuation of the non-working population".386 This "Aktion Ruhrgebiet"387 was intended to maintain production in the industrial area despite targeted and more massed air raids than before. Similar ideas also appeared later, especially since, in view of the increasingly devastating bombing raids on German cities, the concern and urgent demand of the corporations was "that the leadership of people is not lost, that there is no emigration, that we keep our hand over these people, so that "We can use them again at short notice."388 When the "half-day women" in the production area of electrical aircraft equipment stopped coming to work after an attack at the large aircraft factory in Wiener-Neustadt, "because they are desperately afraid of another one Bomb damage happens," Milch took the position that the bombed-out workers should be barracked like in Hamburg, etc.... The workers should be kept like soldiers by cooking for them, caring for them, etc. Then that comes into play Order." 389 After all, the fascists had to take into account that terror could not be a sufficient or infallible means of "increasing performance". Especially during war, they did not forego the worst mass demagoguery and methods of materially corrupting the working people. They considered such methods to be particularly necessary and useful in the areas of nutrition and wage policy.

Nutrition, as a direct prerequisite for maintaining the working capacity of the working people, had become more patchy since the beginning of the war, particularly poor in protein and vitamins, and continued to deteriorate in quality.390 The population therefore reacted sensitively to deteriorations in the allocation of food, especially since at the same time the masses other consumer goods are increasingly com

384 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 10492, Bl. 3R, AN RWiM v. 2nd 7th ex. d. Meeting regarding "Be- "Fighting work-strolling in companies" dated June 29, 1943.

385 Ibid., Deutsche Bank, No. 18861, Bl. 18 R, Bl. 19 and Bl. 25, management reports (Siemens & Halske) to the Supervisory Board, July 22 and December 30, 1943.

386 Ibid., FS, film 5884, Ley to Speer, June 17, 1944; see p. 142f.

387 *Chronicle of the RMfBuM,* 1943 I, Bl. 105, June 20, 1943.

388 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 3570, Rohland's speech at the Reich and Gauleiter conference in Posen on October 6, 1943.

389 BA Koblenz, R 3/1565, St/GL-BuM meeting, September 15, 1943.

390 *Kuczynski,* Situation of the Workers, Vol. 6, p. 271ff. u. p. 292.

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disappeared. Nevertheless, Kuczynski is generally right in saying that, even if there were fluctuations and differentiations, at the end of 1943 the German workers " were generally no worse fed than in the first year of the war ."391 Greta Kuckhoff testifies from her own experience that The dissatisfaction and "complaining" of broad circles about the food situation during the war was directed less at the level of food rations, which were by no means "hunger rations", although illegal anti-fascist propaganda sometimes used this term. "The dissatisfaction, however, mainly arose from the disappointment that the already occupied countries did not deliver more of what one felt was right to expect: in addition to the silk linen, the ankle boots and furs, also early tomatoes, oranges and asparagus, butter and meat, etc In summer, but above all, enough fresh vegetables."392 Nutrition was nevertheless one of the fascists' main political concerns.

They feared widespread discontent from a reduction in rations, which they believed they could no longer avoid at the end of the winter of 1941/42 . But it also had to impair the physical performance of the working people. Nazi leaders like Goebbels considered this measure, even if it was necessary, to be very questionable and spent months beforehand preparing the people for it through demagoguery and diversionary tactics. Goebbels did think that "there is no need to shed tears when the burdens of the war now become more noticeable on the shoulders of our people" and that "increasing food supply" will "not have any particular effect if the reduction in food rations is now announced".394 He complained about Ley, who ,In 393 he prophesied that the “swords of the people” was carrying out “performance-enhancing propaganda,” “which is extremely inappropriate, especially now at a time when food rations are being cut.” 395 Hitler also spoke before Speer against “too extensive exploitation of the human labor, especially with the now reduced diet.396 The ration reduction took place on April 6 , 1942.397 The weekly rations for the German "normal consumer" were reduced from 400 to 300 g for meat, from 270 to 206 g for fat and from 2250 to 2000 g. For meat and fat, these were
the first cuts since the beginning of the war, and for bread for almost two years. The rations of the other consumer categories were also reduced by 250 g for bread , and by approximately the same proportion for meat and fat; only hard workers received relatively higher meat rations.398

The fascists calculated that the cuts would be a temporary necessity.
When in the summer of 1942 the entire Ukraine and the Kuban region and with it new large, fertile agricultural areas temporarily fell into their hands, they believed that they could increase the rations for bread and meat again. This happened on October 19 , 1942 (for bread to 2,250 g, for meat to 350 g) - just a month before the start of the Soviet Union

391 Ibid., p. 292; see ibid., p. 130 and p. 271 ff.
392 *Kuckhoff, Greta,* From the Rosary to the Red Chapel. A life report, 3rd edition Berlin 1974, p. 340.
393 *Goebbels,* Diaries, p. 68 (February 1, 1942).
394 Ibid., p. 124 (March 19, 1942).
395 Ibid., p. 131 (March 20, 1942).
396 FB, April 4, 1942, point 30.
397 See also *DZW,* Vol. 2, p. 395ff.
398 *Kuczynski,* Situation of the Workers, Vol. 6, p. 130 and p. 291f. Hereafter also the following.

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Offensive at Stalingrad. When the meat ration was again significantly reduced the next spring, attempts were made to alleviate the negative impression of the measures by increasing the bread rations (in the spring and autumn of 1943).399 Goebbels used the opportunity of increasing the rations again in October 1942 to to hype up chauvinism and expansionist greed in a radio speech: “This time it's not about pale ideals... We as a people finally want to put ourselves at the mercy of the world.... This time it's about more important things, namely things that concerns us all, about coal, iron, oil and, above all, wheat, so that we have our daily bread on the table." 400 Paul Pleiger, supported by Sauckel and Speer, had already expressly urged Hitler in August 1942 to reduce the cost of
rations of the occupied territories should be increased again as soon as possible.40l This initiative by the leading representatives of the war economy was symptomatic and showed their primary interest in maintaining the productivity of the German working people.

It has also been their aim for months to increase people's willingness to work with the help of so-called special allocations of food, tobacco and liquor. "Called" from time to time, seemingly at random, and issued at one time to broader sections of the population, at another time only to certain categories of workers, the special allotments constituted a system of stimulants of a corrupting character.
In mining, especially in the Ruhr, such methods were apparently most common and most developed. Since 1941, as an incentive for Sunday shifts, the companies have, where possible, obtained tobacco products, drinking spirits, canned fish, wine, coffee, and sweets for non-smokers and women through the RVK or the economic offices, for payment, but without coupons or food stamps were issued to incoming miners.402 On November 1, 1943, "Guidelines for the Granting of Special Allocations in Ruhr Mining",403 which the RVK issued in agreement with the Ruhrstab Speer and which were supplemented and revised several times, brought a system into this practice.

The ruling circles of the regime consciously used such stimulants - admittedly within the limits of their possibilities - as a means of political stabilization internally and to morally encourage their supporters and followers, but since 1942 increasingly primarily for the purpose of "increasing performance". Sauckel invited a fundamental discussion “in a small circle” about “increasing performance” and its stimulation

399 See *DZW,* Vol. 4, p. 351 f.

400 *Anatomy of War,* p. 407f., Doc. 214, radio speech by Goebbels v. October 18, 1942; see.
11. *Hassell,* p. 247 (11/2/1942). - Goebbels used exactly the same argument on May 31, 1942 in “The Reich” to counteract the deterioration in mood after the ration cuts (see *DZW,* Vol. 2, p. 396); here he perhaps emphasized it even more strongly that the war is waged “for a fully laid breakfast, lunch and dinner table”.

401 FB, 10.-12. 8. 1942, point 47. Göring's categorical demand at the same time to the heads of the fascist occupation authorities that they had to "get the most out of the occupied countries" had exactly the same meaning: "If there is hunger, then hunger not the German, but others when there is a need to starve."
(/ MG, vol. 39, p. 385f., Doc. USSR-170, minutes of the meeting on August 6, 1942). See *DZW,* Vol. 2, p. 397 and p. 430; also *Kuczynski,* Situation of the Workers, Vol. 6, p. 292 (Goering's speech on the “Thanksgiving Festival” on October 5, 1942).

402 BA Koblenz, R 13 XX/79, various correspondence.

403 Ibid.

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In mid-October 1942, **the responsible ministers. Above all, advice should be given on "whether and in what form it is possible to link the ration cards and the clothing card with the work performance of the individual followers." 404 The G BA was concerned with the "striking increase in sick leave in the last few months" and the "increase in strollers, etc." which reduced real working hours, in selected companies even to** 85 **percent of the prescribed working hours for men and to** 75 **percent for women. According to Sauckel, it was suggested that if the required work performance was fully fulfilled, "special material advantages" would be offered in the form of "shortage goods", food, clothing and tobacco products.**

These suggestions apparently came from the business side, especially since they were exclusively demands on the state with no negative consequences for profits.
The GBA was aware that any more comprehensive regulation of this kind would be rejected for economic and political reasons. He therefore explained the subject of the negotiations from the outset from the opposite perspective: "It is certainly true that full work performance would be ensured if those who do the work, for example. T. would stay away, get less food or even have to accept cuts on their clothing card or smoking card. The only thing that seems doubtful is whether such a path is actually feasible." 405 A generally applicable regulation did not come about.
But the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition and the GBA took up the issue at the beginning of 1943 **in connection with the Adolf Hitler tank program and the others Ambitious armaments programs for 1943** from **the wage side. Speer, for example, presented a draft of "Principles on the recognition and reward of special achievements in the armaments industry".406 According to this, five percent of the company's wage total was to be paid out Retained funds are paid cash bonuses "to recognize special achievements and significant suggestions for improvement".**

Judging by their production propaganda and political content , **such decrees, subsequently issued in various forms,4 07 were primarily aimed at engineers and technicians, managers of larger and smaller production units, masters, work planners and setters, but less so to broader strata of workers.**

This is how the German armament powers implemented the old exploitative recipe "Carrot" and "stick" under the general terror regime with the help of corruption ("special allocations", bonuses, awards of various kinds), which had the additional side effect of having a negative impact on the solidarity behavior of the working people Blows to the stomach with a cane, in the form of ration cuts (although these were probably only used against foreign forced laborers)

404 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 10413, BI. 50f., GBA to RWiM, October 13, 1942.

405 In principle, this method has of course been applied to collective leave for years and days, with RMEL allowances for heavy and heavy-duty workers being granted for leave only for "transitional periods" (BA Koblenz, R 13 XX/38, H. 2, Rs . Wi a week of mining from September 26, 1941). g ru

406 ZStA Potsdam, RWillf, No. 10413, BI. 57 ff., draft by January 15, 1943.

407 Ibid., BI. 60, Decree of the GBA regarding "Bonuses for suggestions for improvements in the company" from July 31, 1942, new version from January 30, 1943 (only the older version is in the file).

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and of fines, mostly in the form of wage deductions - a means that appeared to be extremely widespread and applied more and more systematically.408 The longer the war lasted, the narrower the fascists' scope for maneuver became. On the one hand, their efforts to stimulate the work performance of German workers grew, especially as performance and willingness to perform decreased; On the other hand, the supply of goods and the amount of additional food and luxury goods that could be procured shrank as the war progressed and the withdrawal from the occupied areas, which at the same time further reduced the incentive through cash bonuses and wage supplements - as did the importance of wage levels in general.

The importance of wages as one of the most important factors in the situation of workers and employees declined so much during the war that Rudolf Stahl, deputy head of the Reich Industry Group and head of the Salzdetfurth/Mansfeld Group, wrote in 1943 : "Earnings have just lost their appeal."409 There was hardly any more to buy than the food allotted to you; rather, you could exchange money for "black". By 1942 , long-lasting consumer goods had already largely disappeared from the market, or their quality had deteriorated significantly. Nevertheless, the ruling circles of the regime did not give up attempts to attract German workers through manipulation with wages and piecework and through limited wage increases to encourage greater expenditure of labor. Since the end of 1941 , monopolies (Reich Industrial Group), DAF and the Reich Ministry of Labor or GBA even decided to introduce a comprehensive system of so-called wage regulation measures, which was intended to completely undermine the existing collective wage system cm. The RGI's original plan to carry out a radical "reorganization" of job evaluations was abandoned as it was too time-consuming during the war. "In the meantime, the general situation had also changed," said the minutes of a meeting chaired by top representatives of the Ruhr companies by Ernst Poensgcn on March 31 , 1942, "very significantly changed. The war situation is forcing us to further increase performance in the armaments industry as quickly as possible." 410 What remained was the plan to implement "a performance-enhancing wage system at the level of the wage level now achieved," which expressly "does not have a comprehensive impact on the wage level as a whole should and may have". This "extensive change and reorganization of the previous wage system" involved the dissolution of the previous three collectively agreed wage groups (skilled, semi-skilled, unskilled). eight wage groups, which, distributed across nine local classes, multiplied the differentiation of wages. The top wage groups for particularly qualified skilled workers were 10 to 33 percent higher than before; However, the overall wage level should under no circumstances rise significantly.

As late as 1942, certain purposeful shifts between industries were taking place; For example, in December, miners' wages were increased, while in other industries, such as the aircraft and metal industries, wage cuts were widespread - mainly through. At the same time, the fascists made high promises to the public and

408 See e.g. B. ibid., FS, film 3966, minutes of the trust board meetings at the Lützken plant Village of the Wintershall Group, bsd. 1942-1944.

409 Quote from *Jonas,* p. 392.

410 minutes d. meeting d. District group northwest of the Wigru Esl on March 31, 1942, quoted from *Kuczynski,* Situation of the Workers, Vol. 6, p. 298, hereafter (p. 298ff.) also the following.

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Holy that the newly established chord sets would be retained without “chord scissors”.

The material stimulus for qualified skilled workers should increase the work performance of these key workers in the defense industry. This seemed all the more important to the German imperialists because they increasingly used the armaments workers as foremen for foreign forced laborers and thus also used them for political and police supervisory functions. However, the actual effect of the stimulation was reduced by the fact that, on the one hand, skilled workers in particular had been at a severe tax disadvantage since the beginning of the war (KWVO), but on the other hand, their actual wages were generally already significantly higher than the basic wage.
But the monopolies certainly achieved one goal by fragmenting the previous wage structure: competition among workers increased. This not only constantly provoked an overspending of labor, but also consolidated the political control and rule of finance capital. The "reorganization" of wages opened up increased opportunities for those in power to directly corrupt individual workers and groups of workers, which only intensified this effect. The purpose of the "wage-regulating measures" was ultimately supported by demagogic propaganda.

The "wage regulation measures" were first tested on selected industries and companies "in which there is apparently a performance reserve", especially on "companies with excessive piece-rate earnings" and in particular on "companies described as low-performing)". On September 20, 1942, the GBA launched the general action; His “Guidelines for wage policy measures to restore wage and piecework equity” were issued to the Reich Trustees of Labor and the DAF.

411

The "wage regulation measures" were started, albeit without much acceleration. In the iron metallurgy sector, such measures had been taken in 7,000 companies in March 1944.412 The action finally dragged on until the approaching defeat of Hitler's Germany took hold came to an end without delivering any decisive results.

This "purposeful and war-related emergency measure" 413 was understandably received with skepticism and mistrust by the workers. The monopolies and fascist labor authorities only pursued their plan half-heartedly because it would jeopardize the wage freeze and thereby affect profits was suitable and because such a major, drastic change in the wage area seemed to them to be too complex and risky under the increasingly difficult conditions and in view of the increasingly threatening war situation and, in their eyes, was increasingly losing its importance.

Since the failure of the Blitzkrieg strategy, the fascists generally imposed increasing restrictions on their social demagogy. Already in January 1942
Hitler told Robert Ley "that he would not be able to accept a lecture during the war in the foreseeable future"414 when Ley wanted to present to him his plans for a "social work", which Hitler had been involved in conceiving, which had previously been a big propaganda issue

411 Handbook of the GBA, p. 59f.
412 *DZW,* Vol. 4, p. 358.
413 As note 410 (p. 300).
414 BA Koblenz, R 41/28, Lammers an Ley, Jan. 1942.

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He himself had actively participated in 1940/41.415 This "social work", especially the associated "social housing program", the "old-age pension scheme" and the "healthcare work", which were also designed by Ley, were, he replied, in everything "still completely open and not yet determinable".416 The ratio of means to "increase performance" shifted more and more in favor of the "whip". The change in the course of the war also represented a drastic turning point in this respect. The fascists concealed themselves ideologically the increase in exploitation and the social burden on the working people with phrases about the "hardness of war" and the "necessity of the German people's total effort," phrases that also served to calm them down.

It is difficult to analyze exactly what part terror and corruption played in the "increase in performance", especially since the additional effect of ideology and propaganda must be taken into account. The "moral degradation"17 that the workers and other working people suffered so comprehensively during the war were exposed to like never before, produced their worst results where the fascists succeeded in burying class solidarity towards foreign forced laborers, especially the Soviet ones, and implanting the inhumane fascist ideology of racial madness and the "master race" into people's minds ; where German workers felt superior to foreign workers and treated them accordingly, "instead of seeing from their fate how deeply they themselves had degenerated" .418

b) Working conditions and labor productivity during war

The number of employees in the German war economy as well as in industry as a whole remained relatively constant during the war years. In industry and the overall economy, however, the number of *German* workers fell sharply (by 30 and 26 percent respectively); Within the number of German workers, the number of ***male*** workers fell significantly (by 39 and 42 percent, respectively).

Table

38 Workers employed in Germany 1939-1944 (pre-war borders, May 31st; in 1000)

Year	total workforce	German total workforce	below in the Industry	of which male	female
1939	39416	39114	10836	8071	2765
1940	35983	34829	9551	6936	2615
1941	36177	33144	9200	6534	2665
1942	35525	31301	8369	5790	2579
1943	36527	30269	8170	5350	2820
1944	36110	28984	7640	4923	2717

Source: The Effects, p. 204, table 3; p. 205, table 4; P. 206, Table 5. Not very significant deviations in *Wagenühr,* p. 139ff.

415 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 3854, Hitler decree v. September 15, 1940 (regarding the housing construction program).
416 BA Koblenz, R 41/28, Lammers an Ley, Jan. 1942.
417 *Marx,* p. 675.
418 *Kuczynsld,* Situation of the Workers, Vol. 6, p. 320.

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The question of the development of labor productivity was all the more important for the German imperialists. The volume of production as a whole and especially armaments production as well as the degree of exploitation and the level of profits largely depended on it. When analyzing this problem, a variety of factors, both negative and positive, must be taken into account. The most striking characteristic of the labor situation was the influx of foreign forced laborers and - overall roughly proportionately - the loss of male German workers. The employment of foreign forced laborers - including prisoners of war and concentration camp inmates - was the factor that reduced labor productivity in industry the most; The majority of them were unskilled or unprofessional workers who, because they were mostly malnourished and treated like cattle, often held back from work and also offered resistance in other forms. Furthermore, the

Labor productivity of individual categories of workers, individual companies and branches of production can be distinguished; it often differed from that on an economic scale, about which general statements can only be made approximately.

The working and living conditions of German workers and employees deteriorated after June 22, 1941 and especially after the turn of the war, even if not uniformly in all areas and not uniformly in all phases of the war and for all categories of employees, at least continuously and full. Characteristically, the structure of factors that had a decisive influence on those conditions shifted significantly. While wages played a far less important role than ever before and real wage calculations provide increasingly inaccurate and uncertain statements due to the influence of extra-economic factors (such as bomb damage),119 working hours and work rush, the level of food rations, the shift regime, and segregation of those subject to conscription came into play from the family, in the case of those who have been bombed out, the housing question and other livelihood concerns come to the fore.

As early as mid-1941, the armaments departments noted a widespread "decrease in the performance of the followers as a result of long working hours, insufficient nutrition, night alarms and increased use of foreigners"; in individual plants "a drop in performance of up to 50 percent or more was noted in the tenth hour of work "420 With the beginning of winter 1941, the work performance of German workers declined "increasingly as a result of worries about the procurement of food, coal, clothing and other everyday items."421 The letter from one throws light on the fate of women who were bombed out and forced to serve Dreherin gave a highlight to the Augsburg Armaments Command: "Five people live in two rooms, each room measuring 3 by 3 meters. I'm so ruined by the cramped conditions and arguments with the landlords that I get very excited about every little thing all day long On the night shift, I work from half past six in the evening to six in the morning, and at the slightest noise I make when I come home in the morning, an argument with Ms. Loh-meyer starts." 422

419 See ***Kuc:;ynshi,*** Situation of the Workers, ßd. 6, p. 303 f.

420 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 1752, "War Economic Situation Report No. 23, July 1941" (OKW/WiRüAmt).

421 “War Economic Situation Report No. 28, December 1941” (WiRüAmt), quoted by **Reinhardt,** P. 278, note 79.

422 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 4826, Christine Bauer to Rükdo Augsburg, 1.12. 1942.

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The constant deterioration in the qualification structure of employees had the same effect on reducing productivity. The number of skilled workers shrank from year to year. The proportion of short-term semi-skilled and unskilled workers increased rapidly.
The most noticeable impact was the influx of foreign forced laborers and, to a much lesser extent, of German women - predominantly unskilled and sometimes unaccustomed to work.

Mining offers striking examples of productivity losses both as a result of exhaustion of strength and a decline in qualification levels, especially in areas with a high proportion of foreign forced laborers.

Table 39

Shift production volumes in the Ruhr coal mining and in the Mansfeld copper slate mining 1939-1944

Year	Dysentery (kg of coal per capita underground workforce)	Mansfeld (kg miners per capita total workforce)
1939	2064	771
1940	2013	774
1941	1959	787
1942	1848	713
1943	1656	677
1944	1617 *	645

* 1st half of the year

Source: Kuczynski, Situation of the Workers, Vol. 6, p. 287; Jonas, p. 397 (ff.) (calculating 310 shifts per year). See also *DZW,* Vol. 4, p. 461.i

In iron metallurgy, too, the armaments leaders complained about a “decrease in performance” that resulted from the progressive physical exhaustion of the workers. Rohland explained in October 1943 that this could not be compensated for by rationalization, “since in some cases the physical strength was no longer sufficient "To work at the ovens for up to 12 hours straight during the warm summer months."423 In the armaments industry (in the narrower sense), however, counteracting factors more than compensated for the drop in productivity in the later years of the war - which was already expected in 1940/41. The most important was rationalization, i.e. primarily series production in the given period, the "new concentration of industrial production on particularly efficient companies ,"424 the introduction of new production processes and technologies and the "implementation" of workers from "civilian" industries into war-important industries , which had been increasing in size since 1941. The annual production per capita of an employee in the textile industry, for example, which the German Institute for Economic Research calculated in terms of sales value at 7,000 RM (for 1936), increased to 11,000 after the person in question was "implemented" in vehicle construction , into the iron

423 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 3570, Rohland's speech at the Reich and Gauleiter conference in Posen on October 6, 1943.

424 Ibid., film 1777, study d. German Institute for Economic Research. "German industrial production during the war and its measurement", 1942. On rationalization. P. 295ff.

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manufacturing industry to 12,000, in the chemical industry to 15,000, in the non-ferrous metal industry to 23,000 and in the fuel industry to 25,000 RM.4 25 In addition to factors that increased labor productivity and the degree of exploitation through greater intensity of the While work generally increased even further, it was the general tightening of the exploitation regime with the help of fascist terror and martial law that counteracted the consequences of the drop in productivity. In his "groundbreaking" speeches on February 4th and 5th, 1942, Minister Todt had expressly called for, in addition to rationalization, to develop that "further reserve" that "still lies in the work performance of the worker" who achieved more in the First World War have.4 2 1 Monopolies and state bodies also pursued "performance improvements" by increasing working hours, refusing or "compensating" vacation,4 27 introducing regular Sunday shifts and having additional "special shifts" run. If the hourly work output fell, such coercive measures could be used to maintain or increase the daily or annual output of the workers. In the long run, however, these means had to lose more and more effectiveness - due to the deterioration in nutrition and increasing physical exhaustion, air raids and bombing raids with their psychological and material consequences, as well as the growing apathy and demoralization in the face of military events.

In their hunger for extra work, the arms monopolies, with the help of the state organs, finally broke through the previously applicable legal barriers to working hours after the start of the war. Weekly working hours fluctuated far more within the industry than the overall figures 4 28 indicate; The industrial average of 48 to 49 hours was largely fictitious because of the extremes that lay behind it - excessively long working hours in the defense factories and part-time employment of hundreds of thousands of women. As early as the fall of 1940, "the vast majority of armaments companies had now introduced the 60-hour week."4 29 After the working time extensions in mid-June 1941, "the majority" of people worked in the Ludwigshafen factories of the IG Farben Group Workforce 55 hours or more per week; 24 percent worked 60 hours.430

In tank production for the "Adolf Hitler tank program", the 72-hour week was temporarily and operationally practiced on a larger scale for the first time, as it would become typical for entire areas of armaments production a year later. Also for other programs The 60-hour week was far exceeded in the spring of 1943. The Röchling-Buderus AG steelworks in Wetzlar relied on a demand from the armaments departments and had "Aktion 88" (air force program)

425 Ibid. - A certain distortion of relations with the textile industry as a result of the price and profit policy of the monopolies in the heavy and chemical industries must be taken into account.

426 BA Koblenz, R 13 1/1011, "summarized statements by Reich Minister Dr. Dead on the armaments program... (Attachment to Rs. RMfBuM dated March 2, 1942).

Since mid-1941, 427 guidelines of the RArbM have been based on "alternately granting vacation compensation for one year and vacation in nature for the next year": "In principle, the followers should receive vacation once every two years." (BA VEB Porcelain Factory Kahla, Hescho holdings, No. 221/2, Bl. 50, RTA Thuringia to manager d. Hescho, July 18, 1941).

428 See *DZW,* Vol. 4, p. 357.

429 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 10356, Bl. 11, excerpt from a management report (untitled) by September 24, 1940.

430 Ibid., Case VI, Film 420, Doc. NI-6287, Directorate Office. Ludwigshafen, August 21, 1941.

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Working 66 hours a week and eight hours on two Sundays per month.431 During the course of 1943, Sunday

shifts were generally introduced in the armaments industry, usually one per month or up to twelve per year. However, this facility existed in isolated cases much earlier, in some cases even before the war.432 The mining companies ensured a not insignificant increase in production through Sunday shifts in the coal mining industry as early as 1941/42. Anyone who did not report for the compulsory Sunday shift had one weekday of their collective holiday deducted.433

Table 40

Compulsory Sunday shifts in German coal mining in 1941/1942

	Number of procedures layers	Coal mined per shift worked (t)
November 1941	537209	1.58
March 1942	420496	1.49
October 1942	973451	1.52

Source: BA Koblenz, R 13 XX/109, RVK statistics, undated.

In the spring of 1943, the fascists specifically changed the youth protection legislation so that 16 and 17 year olds could also take part in compulsory Sunday shifts.434 In favor of the "Adolf Hitler tank program", the working people were induced to do so-called tank shifts with great propaganda hype; these were additional, unpaid shifts Sunday shifts, the proceeds of which, ie the wages, went to the state.435 In increasing exploitation in such an extensive manner, the fascist regime was also subject to certain limits - limits, however, with regard to foreign forced laborers, especially Soviet ones, and with regard to who disregarded the concentration camp prisoners with literally murderous intent. "Up to a certain point," Marx wrote, "the greater wear and tear on labor power, which is inseparable from an extension of the working day, can be compensated for by greater replacement. Beyond this point, wear and tear increases in geometric progression and at the same time all normal conditions of reproduction and activity of labor power are destroyed." 436 For the German working people, exploitation as a result of the extension of working hours, inadequate nutrition, etc. gradually reached the point at which the According to Marx, the price of labor falls below its value, "although it remains nominally unchanged or rises itself."437 Towards the end of

1943, those responsible gave themselves up

431 BA Koblenz, R 41/229, Report of the President d. LAA Hessen to GBA, March 1, 1943.

432 See *Jonas,* p. 388.

433 ZStA Potsdam, Case X, Film 427, Doc. Nl-4113 (F), “Social Policy. Information" of the RVK, No. 11-12/1942.

434 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 10350, Bl. 23f., case RWiM v. March 20, 1943 with draft decree regarding. "Employment of 16- and 17-year-old young people in mining companies".

435 See BA Koblenz, R 13 XX/46, H. 1.

436 *Marx,* p. 549.

437 Ibid. Real wage calculations can therefore be made in cases of extreme exploitation, labor and Living conditions lose their significance.

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stated that the “increase in performance” in armaments goes “up to the limits of human performance”; As Rohland admitted at the Reich and Gauleiter meeting on October 6th, it had "exhausted the last reserves that were available in our companies." 43!1 The ruling class suffered many consequences from its policy of overexploitation of the labor power of the German workers Difficulties of an economic, political and ideological nature. Economic problems arose to the extent that increasing physical and psychological exhaustion reduced the level of intensity of work. The excessive length of the working day came at the expense of its "degree of compression"«O; What capital gained there was lost here. In industry, this had a negative impact on the degree of utilization of the machinery and thus on labor productivity. The “head of the war effort vaccination of the German industrial companies,” Theodor Hupfauer,441 had to realize for himself “that an extension of working hours... proved to be unprofitable in the long run, as the weaker followers became weak and sick , less and incorrectly produced and so the end result did not exceed that of an eight to nine hour work". **442** The workers' increasing dissatisfaction with their situation, which expressed itself primarily in passive resistance to excessive exploitation, worried the fascists politically. The German working people defended themselves against the overexploitation of labor and health with various means, although mostly without any class consciousness.

In June 1942, the President of the Reichsknappschaft drew attention to cases “in which miners, especially younger ones, intentionally caused injuries to themselves using the potassium hydroxide solution contained in the team lamps, which were of a very long-term nature and led to sick leave periods of up to nine months. After reporting to the Secret State Police, Maid. J. Eleven men were taken into custody."443 Military and civilian authorities had plans to tighten the penal provisions against "schemes to temporarily suspend the ability of workers in the defense industry to work" - such as feigning illness and self-mutilation.444 However, the OKW military economics office advised that the situation should remain the same as before, with an admission to a labor training camp/.45 because the worker in question disappeared from the direct control of the armaments monopolies during a prison sentence or concentration camp imprisonment.

Illness and accident rates rose to previously unknown heights - an obvious result of rationalization, labor shortages, inadequate nutrition and...

438 BA Koblenz, R 3/1594, report d. RWK ex. d. Economic situation at the end of 1943.
439 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 3570, Rohland's speech, October 6, 1943 (Posen).
440 1Uarx, p. 432.
441 Hupfauer, "senior service manager" in the DAF, later moved to the NS Main Office for Technology and the RMfRuK (1943) and became head of the Central Office of the RMfRuK in 1944.
4!,2 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 10707, prepared by Carlo v. Kügelgen ex. “The performance principle in German industry", undated (1943/44).
443 BA Koblenz, R 13 XX/85, Pres. Jakob an d. Head of the DAF Mining Department, June 23, 1942.
444 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1791, AN OKW/WiAmt for OKW/WR, September 16, 1942.
445 Ibid.

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Loss of night rest due to the increasing number of air alarms.446 In 1942, the Ruhr mining industry recorded the loss of "about 1,000 German men every month due to accidents, deaths, etc."447 The "physical strain on the miners, which practically two every month "Driving shifts on Sundays," Pleiger described the situation, "is such that they cannot continue to do so for another six months."448 Sickness rates in particular rose sharply during 1942.449 In the aircraft industry, it was previously average at two to three percent per year, in June 1942 10.1 percent for wage earners and 6.5 percent for salary earners and rose to 1 year or 9 percent in September.450 "In a certain respect," argued the head of the aviation industry business group, Rudolf Lahs, "the whole process can be equated in its effects with a kind of strike by other means and in other ways."51 To a certain extent, the frequency of sickness and accidents was actually a fine barometer for the political mood and attitude of the workers.452

The general direction in which labor productivity in German industry developed during the war can only be roughly estimated. You ask

Table 41

Production, number of employees and labor productivity in German industry 1939-1944 (1939=100)

Year	Basic industry production index	Employee index	Index of labor productivity
1939	100	100	100
1940	101	97	104.1
1941	118	103	114.6
1942	118	104	113.5
1943	125	115	108.7
1944	106	121	87.6

Year	Arms production		
	Production index	Employment index	Labor productivity index
	Armament device	Defense industry••	
1939	100	100	100
1940	176	201	87.6
1941	176 •	232	75.9·
1942	256	257	99.6
1943	400	304	131.6
1944	500	approx. 310 at least 160	

446 See Jollfls, p. 410 and p. 431 (for the Mansfeld Group).
447 ZP-P, October 28, 1942, 17th session.
448 ZP-P, 11/3/19li2, 23rd session.
449 BA Koblenz, R 41/228, GBA to Milch, January 30, 1943.
450 Ibid., Lahs in milk, November 20, 1943.
451 Ibid.
452 See Jonas, p. 411.

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Year	*Consumer goods industry* production	Employment index ("Other manufacturing index")	Labor productivity index
1939	100	100	100
1940	95	82	115.9
1941	96	79	133.3
1942	86	71	121.1
1943	91	73	124.7
1944	86	65	132.3

Year	*Overall industry* Production index	Employment index	Labor productivity index
1939	100	100	100
1940	97	91	106.6
1941	99	95	104.2
1942	100	91	109.9
1943	112	97	115.5
1944	110	99	111

• Unlikely or uncertain value

** Index of employees "for the Wehrmacht" excluding the basic materials, construction and building materials industries

Source: Production indices (P) according to *Wagenühr,* p. 191 (weighting: industrial production in-- total= 100; Basic materials = 23.5; Armor equipment= 31.1; Buildings = 6.4; consumer goods = 23.5); Employment indices (B) according to ibid., p. 125, p. 140 ff. and p. 159 and *The Effects,* p. 213, table U

(as of May 31 this year); Labor productivity indices calculated from -X 100. p b

If you compare the index numbers of the German Institute for Economic Research for industrial production - as a whole and in its main areas - and the index numbers of the corresponding number of employees and then calculate an index of labor productivity year by year, a colorful picture emerges. (Table 41) The following trends can be assumed to be real: 1. Labor productivity in the production of military equipment rose - after an initial decline as a result of extensive production expansion - in 1942, 1943 and with certainty

also significant in 1944.

2. Labor productivity in primary industries began to decline (most sharply) in 1942 in mining) and fell sharply in 1943 and especially 1944.

3. Labor productivity in the consumer goods industry rose after the start of the war, but then remained at about the same level.

4. Labor productivity in the industry as a whole fluctuated between increases and decreases, but generally showed an increase compared to 1939; apparently it was in Year 1943, the year of the greatest increase in armaments - the absolute highest value reached.

Any attempt to make more precise statements encounters insurmountable difficulties

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{Change in the production or armament range, "refinement" and other reductions in quality, further problems in calculating the production index, etc.). After all, most authors 453 take the view that labor productivity in industry {Homze), or at least in the armaments industry (Weyres), increased throughout the war (USSBS) or since 1942 (Wagenühr, Weyres). The present calculation for the "arms final production" by Wagenühr (1941-1944) ™ is slightly higher due to the labor force increase being underestimated, the values calculated by Bassett (USSBS) for the entire industry 4.55 are also higher than those calculated in our Behind the numbers lie the most shocking conditions of unrestrained exploitation of foreign forced laborers, but also of German working people. If, despite the above-mentioned below-average labor productivity of most of the forced laborers and despite the reduction in the qualifications of the German workforce, labor productivity as a whole and especially in armaments production increased significantly, it can be concluded from this that the masses are subject to the enormous pressure to rationalize, intensified by fascist terror the German working people were exposed to almost no possibility of resistance, and to the additional brutality of the fascist driver system against the foreign forced laborers.

4. The forced labor regime 1943456

In the course of 1943, the working and living conditions of the foreign workers began to reach the standard that the German imperialists intended for the forced laborers in the long term. The arms industry

453 *Wagenühr,* p. 125; *Weyres-11. Le11etzow,* p. 45ff., p. 202f.; *Homze,* p. 260ff. (cites calculations by USSBS, Overall Economic Effects Division); Petzina, on the other hand, is of the opinion that "productivity in the armaments industry probably fell sharply in 1942." *(Petzina,* The mobilization of German workers before and during the Second World War, p. 453).

454 *Wagenühr,* p. 125; see *DZW,* Vol. 4, p. 357, where the talk of “war production” is inaccurate is.

455 See *Homze,* p. 261.

<.56 A detailed analysis of the fascist forced labor policy and the conditions of existence of the forced laborers cannot be given here. Let's look at Seeber's individual representations ; *Drobisch (Drobisch, Klaus,* The exploitation of foreign workers in the F1ick group during the Second World War, Phil. Diss. Berlin 1964 (hereinafter: exploitation); *Schmelzer (Schmelzer, Janis,* The Hitler-fascist forced labor system and the anti-fascist resistance struggle of foreign prisoners of war and deportees (1939-1945), shown with particular attention to the IG Farben companies in the Halle - Merseburg area, Phil. Diss. Halle 1963); *dispute; Dörr (Dörr, Hubert,* On the actions of the fascist management of the former Lauchhammerwerk Gröditz in Flick Group towards workers and other working people as well as forcibly deported foreign workers, prisoners of war and concentration camp inmates during the Second World War, Phil. Diss. PH Dresden 1978, etc. Basic information on the analysis in *Kuczynski,* Situation of the Workers, Vol. 6 etc . Vol. 16; *Volume I,* p. 88ff.; valuable material also hei *Jonas; Fighting Leuna* and other work on company history. See also *Homze* and Pf ahlmann from the civil side .

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was firmly geared towards the mass employment of foreign workers. The three large fascist procurement centers (GBA, OKW, WVHA) still provided it with a "supply" of forced laborers. The most powerful corporations also still had their own "advertising offices" and agents in most of the occupied countries, especially in Western Europe. The core and numerically largest group of forced laborers were the abducted Soviet citizens.

The huge state monopoly mechanism with its institutional instruments and legal regulations, which had been created and set in motion for the oppression, discrimination and manipulation of forced laborers, had also become well established. The ruling circles, especially monopoly capital, endeavored to squeeze the last possible amount of work out of them with minimal accommodation, wages and food. In doing so, they differentiated not insignificantly between the individual categories of workers and nationalities. In close cooperation with the armaments factories and companies, the Wehrmacht, police and SS ensured the utmost restriction of all personal freedoms, especially the suppression of political activity, and the immediate use of repressive terror at the slightest sign of defiance and resistance. The propaganda machine of the Nazi Empire also did its utmost to incite the German working people against the "inferior" foreign workers and to play the forced laborers off against each other using anti-communism, racism and chauvinism.

a) Exploitation and terror

Until well into 1943 , the ruling circles harbored illusions about the influx of foreign workers. This strengthened them in their ruthlessness towards the health and lives of the forced laborers. Several times the permitted occupancy number was crammed into the barracks camps built by the corporations, usually without any facilities other than beds with straw sacks, hardly heatable and without adequate facilities with the most necessary sanitary facilities. Dirt and vermin soon took over. The inmates were at the mercy of the unrestricted arbitrariness of the camp management and the guards, mostly company employees and "proven" fascists, who established a barracks regime with brutal punishments as a deterrent, with informants, etc. "For example, this is the picture of desolation and impoverishment could never be wiped out in the camp of the Bochum Association," even stated an investigative commission of fascist authorities.457 The Gestapo's so-called counterintelligence officer, usually a senior employee of the company, was responsible for special political surveillance.

There were no clothing cards for the forced laborers. The clothing brought to Germany had to be worn day and night until it literally fell apart. Soap or washing powder were hardly given to clean the things. When necessary, the fascists handed out used clothing from textile and rag collections.

Underwear, bed linen, leather shoes and warm winter clothing were for forced

457 *Case 5,* p. 200, Doc. NI-3013, Report of a Commission from d. RMfbO and WiStab Ost via d. Inspection of Eastern workers camps in the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial area, November 24th to December 5th, 1942.

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workers not provided. In the winter of 1942/43, under the direction of Hans Kehr! (Reich Ministry of Economics) through the Reich Office for Textiles, the Clothing Industry Economic Group and the Shoes Community "developed special types of clothing for Eastern workers." 458 **The footwear, for example, that was produced in this "Special Program A" consisted mainly of "full wooden shoes ".**

While the wages had a questionable value in view of the rationing and the minimal supply of non-rationed food and consumer goods even for the better-off forced laborers from the countries occupied in the west and north, nutrition, ie the food allocation, played and had to play a much more important, vital role have a significant impact on their productivity.

The fascist system of food rations for forced laborers was even more complicated and far more graduated than the wage system. Here, however, this differentiation had the direct result that the large majority of foreign workers suffered chronically from severe hunger.

The differentiation in the rations for heavy workers, hard workers and so-called normal consumers was supplemented by the differences between the allocations to non-Soviet foreign civilian workers, which in terms of quantity equaled the rations for Germans, to non-Soviet prisoners of war and to Soviet prisoners of war and "Eastern workers".

Table 42

Food rations for forced laborers (hard workers) at the beginning of 1944 (Rations of the first group = 100)

	bread and Flour	meat	fat	sugar and Jam	nutritional medium	Pod fruits	cheese and Quark	Eggs
Non-Soviet foreign ones								
Civilian worker	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Non-Soviet Prisoners of war	90	79	92	88	48	—	100	—
Soviet prisoners of war and "Eastern Workers"	92	66	66	27	48	—	—	—

Source: According to ***Jonas,*** p. 457.

At a meeting of the directors of the Mansfeld Group it was determined that from mid-November 1942 to mid-May 1943 the foreigner camps were to be allocated 70 kg of potatoes "per fully fed person", but only 40 kg could actually be counted on, while the average consumption for this time 1 kg per day should be set at 180 kg. "The DAF's instructions that Eastern workers and prisoners of war should only be supplied with white turnips for the period from November 15, 1942 to May 15, 1943 are of particular concern

458 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 1737, RErl. RWiM, December 18, 1943.

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may be used as long as other vegetables are not available in abundance. This means that from mid-December, the workers coming from the Soviet area can only be fed with white turnips." 459 The report from a Flick Group mine about the weight loss among its 300 Italian and 500 Soviet prisoners of war is shocking: " The Italians who were interned by the military at the end of October showed a weight loss on November 26th, 1943 of 1,194 kg, 2nd January 1944, of 1,500 kg, 2nd February, 1944, of 1,300 kg, 27th February, 1944, of 0,416 kg, a total of 4,410 kg.

For the Russian prisoners of war deployed at the end of 1942 , we achieved a weight gain of 7,960 kg or around 1 kg per month in eight months up to October 3 , 1943 , while in only two months of this time a weight loss of 1,050 kg per month or a total of 2,100 kg was determined, so that a weight increase of 5,860 kg remained. After this time, a continued weight loss was noted, namely on October 31, 1943 from 1,400 kg November 20, 1943 from 0.700 kg January 2, 1944 from 1,100 kg February 2, 1944 from 1,100 kg February 27, 1944 from 0.329 kg a total of 4,629 kg, so that these Russians up to 1,231 kg have regained the initial weight that they had in the completely dilapidated condition in which they arrived with us at the time (from the camps of the Wehrmacht-DE)."460 If there were no better nutrition for the prisoners of war, then it would have to happen The report stated that “a sharp increase in illnesses and a significant decline in performance” are to be expected.461

Food guidelines issued by the DAF at the beginning of 1943 with their "Eastern workers" “suggestions regarding the species' own diet” 462 involuntarily revealed the barbaric hunger regime in the forced labor camps and in the armaments factories.

They contained detailed instructions for processing vegetable waste, turnips and turnips (runkels) into “shchi”, “borscht”, etc. Bones, if available, should be boiled three to four times for three hours each; As a rule, they were the only addition to the water soups.

In the summer of 1943, a report from a Fascist shop steward sent to the “Eastern Workers” camp stated that because of malnutrition, “women have no longer had mensis for over a year and a half... A general phenomenon is the weakening of the bladder muscles as a result of vitamin deficiency and Water soups." 463 Ek-

459 *Jonas,* p. 462f.

460 *Case 5,* p. 207f., Doc. NI-3420, report from the “Monopol” colliery to W. Tengelmann, March 9, 1944.

461 Ibid (p. 208).

462 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 10710, Cover letter (Rs.) d. GBA v. January 16, 1943 on the instructions of the DAF/Office for Labor Deployment regarding “The feeding of the Eastern workers”, undated; after this also the following.

463 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 10975, report from a White Guard representative

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Zeme and furunculosis, especially since no soap was given out anywhere. Due to a lack of food and especially a lack of digestible potassium salts and phosphorus compounds in their food, “the majority of Eastern workers are on the verge of a nervous disease, a disruption of the entire nervous system. The biggest scourge of the camps, however, is tuberculosis, which is also spreading very rapidly among minors." 4M Theft and corruption flourished among the German "carers". As a rule, it remained undetected or unpunished when camp leaders and kitchen administrators - often with the acquiescence and approval of the management of the company in question - "exploited" tens of thousands of H. eichsmarks and enormous amounts of food, i.e. cheated the forced laborers out of it. 465 What elsё? a daily departure through death, the removal of completely emaciated death candidates who have already been deployed for months?", the Ruhr district group of the mining economic group had to ask its member organizations in a circular dated January 29, 1943 466, which dealt with such conditions. The personal well-being of broader circles of the Nazi bureaucracy and corporate administration, even high-ranking officials, was partly based on such direct fraud against the forced laborers. The Reich Commissioner for the Collection of Waste Materials and area manager of the NSDAP, Hans Heck, his deputy and several other officials and party leaders were involved in one of these affairs. A certain Rudolf Bulauka, district representative for waste material collection in Hanover, supplied them with free food packages from 1942 to the end of 1943. Even after the corruption ring was exposed, it was only secretly known that "the food came from allocations that were intended for foreigners in the shared waste material warehouse in Hanover, which was under the jurisdiction of the district commissioner Bulauka."46 7 was in operation forced labor is characterized by forcing and naked violence.

Punishments such as deprivation of food, "fines" amounting to daily wages and arrest were imposed as punishment for insignificant actions, for example in the Krupp works in special detention cells (standing bunkers) under cruel conditions. The company's "justice" also included induction in penalty columns and. in “labor education camps”. At the beginning of 1943, the management of the Eisenwerk-Gesellschaft Maximilianshütte, the main company of the Flick Group, angrily asked the factory departments why they had received so “extraordinarily few applications for issuing warnings, imposing fines or reporting them at the state police control centers" and demanded: "The opportunities available to increase the performance of foreigners and to prevent non-duty absence from work, non-duty refusal to work and

Fascists (OKH/GenStb (Department of Foreign Armies East?)) and T. "Eastern workers - decisive factor in the final victory", undated (summer 1943).

464 Ibid.

465 Cf. above. d. Flick Group *Drobisch,* Exploitation, p. 123ff.; *Dörr,* p. 160ff. - In the Ruhr area, the armaments companies leased out the kitchen facilities of the forced labor camps on various occasions, "which leads to extremely unhealthy war profits". *(Case 5,* p. 199, Doc. NI-3013 (see note 457)).

466 *Bleyer!Drobisch,* p. 63, Rs. d. Ruhr hard coal mining district group of Wigru Mining V. January 29, 1943.

467 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 8569, Bl. 14 and page 14 R, AN RWiM, February 14, 1945. - The Supreme Party Court of the NSDAP spread a cloak of silence over the matter and left it with "warnings" and ridiculous fines for the guilty.

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"The barbaric practice of beatings that prevailed everywhere was repeatedly sanctioned by authorities of the fascist leadership such as Göring, Keitel, Speer and Milch. General Immediately after Italy's secession, Field Marshal Milch even formulated the right to beat the former allies as an order: "I gave the order that they may be beaten if they do not work." 469 In the Ruhr, the heads of the mining companies were of the opinion that "beatings in mining are inevitably part of it."470 A director of the Fieseler aircraft company cynically boasted to a committee of aviation industrialists that the "improvement" had been achieved by "unruly Dutchmen". to have "after a shorter or longer stay in a closed room with some solid German followers". 471 In this respect, too, the Nazi ideology of the "sub-human" with the "East" badge, of the "swamp people" imported from the East 472 had the most devastating effect on the situation of the Soviet forced laborers. "For example, women beaten in the face with nailed boards. Pregnant women are kicked in the stomach. Men and women are locked in cold concrete dungeons after removing their outer clothing in winter for the slightest offense and left without food. For 'hygienic' reasons, they become Eastern workers in winter Cold water was poured on the 473 from hoses. Hungry Eastern workers in the camp yard are executed in the most inhumane way in front of the assembled camp inmates because of a few stolen the potatoes." "Systematic beatings" took place in the Wildau camp at Schwartzkopff machine factory, "which led to the beaten being completely unable to work." A particularly heinous crime was reported from Spandauer Stahlindustrie GmbH (Flick Group): "The child Serbin, 13-14 years old, was regularly beaten in the factory, which resulted in internal bleeding." The BMW headquarters in Munich demanded exemplary shootings "in front of the assembled team" if they showed restraint in their work.474 The company owners worked very closely with the police and Gestapo. As soon as the company's terror system was no longer sufficient to counter the forced laborers' resistance to their exploiters, the factory and company management handed them over to the state terror organs. In many cases they demanded that they be sent immediately to a concentration camp. "If there are misconducts," the RVE expressly instructed its factories in October 1943 , "they must *immediately* be consistently pursued and severely punished, if necessary up to a concentration camp. The companies must recognize serious and repeated misconduct by foreigners, in particular their disappearance, always immediately

468 *Case 5,* p. 194, Doc. NI-3150, Rs. to operating departments v. January 26, 1943.

469 ZStA Potsdam, Case XII, No. 111, Bl. 116, Doc. NOKW-180, Prot. d. Discussion Göring with air force generals and representatives of the aircraft industry in the Messerschmitt works (Regensburg) on November 2, 1943.

470 *Case 5,* p. 199, Doc. NI-3013 (see note 457); see ibid., p. 200ff. (Examples from the Hoesch Group, the United Steelworks and the Flick Group).

471 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 4184, lecture by. Dir. Freyer in the Junkers engine plant in Kassel-Bettenhausen on June 22, 1943.

472 Quote ibid., Film 10975 (as note 463). Hereafter also the following.

473 What was meant here was the warehouse of the Auer Society, Oranienburg (Degussa Group).

474 *Streit,* p. 259.

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Report to the Gestapo. The Reichsvereinigung Eisen asked the Gestapo (main security office) and the Reich Ministry of Labor (Reich Trustee of Labor) to ensure rapid prosecution and severe punishment in such cases, which was also promised within the scope of the given possibilities." 475 The majority of forced laborers were underqualified to do heavy work.

The German imperialists admittedly wanted to use foreign forced laborers to do the difficult, dangerous and dirty work for the German workers, whose performance was constantly declining as a result of the rush to work, the length of the working hours, the increasing night-time air alarms and the insufficient nutrition to assume "unskilled workers". At the end of 1943, 77 percent of the foreign workers worked underground in the Mansfeld copper slate mining industry . Only those forced laborers who were “unsuitable” for underground operations were used above ground. Of the total workforce working underground, 26.4 percent were foreign workers, while only 13.9 percent of the surface workers were foreign workers. Underground, the foreign workers were primarily used as tractors and conveyors on the wings. In these categories they made up 85 and 52 percent of all workers, respectively, while only 12 percent of the workers in front of the longwall and 6 percent of those on the main conveyor lines.476 As far as the Soviet forced laborers were concerned, the authorities even stipulated that they should only be given heavier and heavier jobs Heaviest work.477 A related review of the Ludwigshafen operations of the IG Farben group showed that 85 percent were employed as heavy and heavy-duty workers and as alternating shift workers, the rest were either employed in specialized work due to their existing previous training or are used in particularly annoying acid and dirty operations" .478 For such difficult and health-damaging work, which was forbidden by law for German women and young people, the companies also used female forced laborers, especially Soviet and Polish women, without any scruples. In mechanical engineering -industry, predominantly Soviet workers worked the late and night shifts; The first shift was reserved for German women. The hardest physical labor was also imposed on the Soviet workers there. "At Boehringer, the difficult work of sawing off and centering material was previously carried out by 4 men, today by 4 Russian women, with each person turning over up to 3 tons of material per person." 479 German workers who worked with Soviet forced laborers during the war years , later reported unanimously, "that after a short time, especially among women, their youthful age was no longer recognizable due to the inhumane working and living conditions."480 One of the darkest chapters was the forced labor of children and young people.

Although hardly researched yet, there are documents about this particularly barbaric crime of German imperialism, such as the diagnosis made by a camp doctor in August 1943 about a ten-year-old Polish child who was in a German-run factory.

475 *Case 5,* p. 195f., Doc. NI-3178, Rs. d. Chairman of the RVK v. October 4, 1943.
476 *Jonas,* p. 450 and p. 406.
In any case, 477 female "Eastern workers" were employed in men's work (ZStA Potsdam, Case VI, Film 420, Doc. NI-2829, Höchst management meeting, February 22, 1943).
478 Ibid., Doc. NI-6315, Ludwigshafen management meeting, April 19, 1943.
479 Ibid., FS, Film 4742, "Use of Eastern workers in the German machine industry" (printed confidential publication, edited by HA Maschinen at RMfBuM), May 1943.
480 *Dörr,* p. 104.

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See Bank had to work to death in the closely linked Glanzstoff Group: “The child Agathe Nowacke, contr. no. 832, employed in the cone factory, ... suffers from physical weakness and malnutrition and will no longer be able to work in the future." According to the entry in the medical register, "further deployment of this ten-year-old meant child murder".481 In the Carl Flohr company AG, similar conditions prevailed which can only be described as the deliberate murder of Soviet and Polish children: “Extremely difficult nutritional conditions, in which a number of children under 14 years of age do difficult work for ten or more hours a day for a weekly wage of 2 RM must." 482 According to the same eyewitness report, "children between the ages of 4 and 15 were used as workers" in various places.483 In the fall and winter of 1943, when hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens who had been forcibly evacuated by the Wehrmacht on their retreat were deported to Germany, the arms companies complained to the armaments minister, that “a high percentage” of the forced laborers provided to them in this way “were unfit for work due to old age, underage or illness. A transport of Eastern workers sent to the Mannesmann tube works in Düsseldorf consisted of 29 percent children under the age of 14, and there were also blind, old-age, sick and wounded people in this transport who were not fit for action. A transport assigned to the August Thyssen hut contained 161 of 509 Eastern workers aged between 1 month and 14 years, 49 unfit men and 69 unfit women." 484 Working hours and vacation, like all other conditions of exploitation, were subject to the general law of the Capital, according to which it "is ruthless towards the health and lifespan of the worker where it is not forced to be considerate by society." 485 Legal provisions were made that "there are no restrictions on working hours for foreigners, including women." 486 The corporations Therefore, they did not in the least care about the officially prescribed (minimum) guidelines of 56 to 60 hours; they worked predominantly 72 hours per week, including the mostly obligatory Sunday shifts, i.e. 84 hours.487 When the question became acute in mid- 1943 How to deal with the "Eastern workers" who had originally been promised a vacation trip home after two years of work in Germany, the monopoly rulers and heads of arms production categorically rejected such a vacation from the outset and expressed "grave concerns" about it, "because this would knock down the only remaining solid pillar of the labor deployment building."488 An order had already been issued for Polish forced laborers on March 31, 1941, according to which all their vacation entitlements were "temporarily" suspended.489 In the summer of 1943, as Frenchmen,

4.81 *Anatomy of War,* p. 432, Doc. 235, AN from d. Elsterberg artificial silk factory of the Vereinigte Glanzstoff-Fabriken AG, August 31, 1943.
482 As note 463.
4.83 Ibid.
484 BA Koblenz, R 3/1597, RMfRuK to GBA, January 25,
1944. t,85 *Marx,*
p. 285. t,86 Lecture on d. Meeting of the Krupp Group's work engineers on January 12, 1944 (Doc. NIK-10213), cited b. *Drobisch,* Exploitation, p. 107.
487 Ibid., p. 106ff.
488 *Bleyer!Drobisch,* p. 70, Doc. 32, AN v. Heinrich Küppenbender (Carl Zeiss Jena), July 30, 194.3.
489 *Seeber,* p. 186.

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As increasing numbers of Belgians and Dutch people used their vacation to escape and no longer returned to Germany, the heads of the armaments organization of the Ministry of Munitions complained about this to the GBA and pushed for redress. On July 30 , 1943, in the presence of the minister, the heads of the main committees demanded from Sauckel "clearly ... that the manager must be given the right to block the legally provided vacation if there is a danger that the workers will no longer return." .490 The GBA reassured them by pointing out that a corresponding order would be finalized. But the main committee leaders did not give up, but "explicitly asked Sauckel again... whether this also gave the manager the right to ignore the contract with the French workers, who rely on the company regulations . Sauckel clearly stated that this was easily possible on the
vacation issue based on his new decision." 491 The GBA's order also met the requirements of the armaments power down to the last detail. According to the armaments minister's order of September 20 , 1943 , it amounted to this that the armaments companies were able to "apply to the Reich Labor Trustees for the imposition of a general vacation ban for foreign worke

b) "Careful management and conservation of human labor"

At the end of the autumn of 1942, when the transport of forced labor from the occupied territories of the USSR fell sharply, the discussions and disputes within the ruling circles about forced labor policy began to increase in scope and severity. State authorities, especially the GBA, pushed for a "more careful" handling of the labor force of the forced laborers, who were no longer available indefinitely, as previously assumed. The OKW's military economics office also admitted to "mistakes": "The treatment of the Russians (prisoners of war and
civilian workers) ... has proven to be a serious mistake." 493 Essential elements of the dispute became visible in a dispute between Himmler and Gauleiter August Eigruber. Eigruber had made this clear on November 25 , 1942 in a speech in Linz before the All the prominent people in the Upper Danube region called for "decidedly more freedom" for foreign forced laborers. "One could," said Himmler's party in his speech, "not only treat foreign labor deployment from the police and racial side, but rather from the care and educational side." 494 Himmler complained to Bormann: "Not a single Gauleiter takes responsibility from me for the danger that, out of the 5 mil

490 *Bl.eyer/ Drobisch,* p. 69 (as note 488).
491 Ibid., p. 69f.
492 Quote b. *Seeber,* p. 186, note 181.
493 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 8651, "Experience report on developments in the field of personnel management in the period from the beginning of winter 1942/43 to the beginning of winter 1942/43" (WiAmt), January 1943.
494 BA Koblenz, NS 6/160, AN boss Sipo and SD for Himmler, December 31, 1943.

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agile, a huge sabotage organization can grow up that one day could work suddenly." 495 One should "not want to play the honest man" in order to "make oneself popular with the foreigners."496 After the surrender of the 6th Army in At Stalingrad, attempts at a tactical reorientation in forced labor policy, especially towards Soviet forced laborers, took shape, which resulted in a withdrawal of extreme measures of terror, exploitation and degradation and a significantly increased differentiation based on work performance. The Reich Industrial Group gave two options At meetings with the industrial departments of the regional economic chambers at the end of February 1943, the new line was announced, which had been agreed upon with the GBA in "full agreement" in a joint "Committee for Eastern Workers' Affairs": "The work input that had hitherto been allocated primarily to quantitative solutions , must now and in the future be increasingly focused on the qualitative side." 497 The main concern of the arms monopolies was clearly formulated: "On our part, we must ensure that development is directed along a path that serves to increase the performance of the companies."498

Little happened in practice. A new wage regulation for "Eastern workers" from April 5, 193 reduced the special tax ("Eastern workers' levy") by a few percent, gave companies the opportunity to pay a surcharge from the "Ostarbeiterslev" for "particularly high-quality services" and wrote the written statement of wages.499

The attempt to eliminate the extreme excesses of "subhuman" barbarism was staged with greater aplomb. In April, the Ministry of Propaganda, together with the Reich Security Main Office, issued a "leaflet on the general principles for the treatment of foreign workers working in the Reich" 500 out of here. These "principles" were closely related to the Rosenberg Goebbels propaganda guidelines of February 15th.501 The Nazi leadership suddenly came out against its own theses of the "subhuman" and, among other things, banned corporal punishment.502 About the Foreign Languages Publishing Company, the Ministry of Propaganda forced the publication of counter-revolutionary, anti-Soviet weekly newspapers, magazines, brochures and other printed matter for the forced laborers. The total circulation of foreign-language weekly newspapers in the fall of 1943 was already 750,000,503. This campaign by Goebbels and Rosenberg hardly had any other practical effects. Himmler flatly rejected the repeated "suggestion" of the GBA, the DAF and Rosenberg that the labeling requirement for the "Eastern Workers"

495 Ibid., Himmler to Bormann, January 14, 1943.

496 Ibid. - Bormann apparently refrained from answering.

497 Ibid., R 13 XX/299, Rs. RGI to the regional departments of the GWK and WK and to the Wigru , March 6, 1943.

498 Ibid.

499 Ibid., R 7/3092, Elaboration RWiM regarding "special regulations" for Polish and Soviet forced laborers, undated (1945); see also Drobisch, Exploitation, p. 155; Homze, p. 171 .

500 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 381, v. April 15, 1943.

501 Anatomy of Aggression, p. 179ff., Doc. 37; see DZW, Vol. 3, p. 340f.

502 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 381, "Information sheet ... v. April 15, 1943.

503 Homze, p. 288; see Dörr, p. 143.

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to change - a proposal that had been discussed since the beginning of the year. Sauckel only ensured that the "Ostarbeiter" patch ("OST") could be worn on the left sleeve instead of on the right chest when there was a special "distinction".505

What the arms monopolies understood by the new orientation was demonstrated at an early stage the IG Farben, the Flick Group, Krupp and other mining companies. Streit states that "beginnings of a regular system in which the rations granted were made dependent on the work performance of the individual prisoner" had been evident since October 1942 were.506 In Auschwitz, as early as mid-October, the IG Farben Group was already practicing a three-tier system of "performance nutrition" towards the civilian Soviet forced laborers. Apparently it was the Krupp Group and, above all, the Fürstlich Plessische Bergwerks, which was operated by IG Farben AG (Kattowitz), through which the coal mining industry adopted this system "on a broad front".

A particularly bad role was played by the chairman of the board and general director of the Pleß'sche Werke, Günther Falkenhahn, who propagated and enforced the barbaric system in his capacity as head of the Upper Silesia hard coal mining district group of the RVK in Upper Silesia.

A detailed version of the relevant regulations has been handed down from the Flick Group. In March 1943, the "clerk for Eastern worker issues" at the Lauchhammerwerk in Gröditz developed guidelines for care work and cooperation with the camp ,5 07 whose main concern was to evaluate the performance of the forced laborers according to performance groups and then distribute the starvation rations of food. There were three so-called quality groups of "Eastern workers" in Gröditz: good (100 percent or 90 percent performance), medium or unsatisfactory (70 percent) and bad (50 percent, 24 percent). The system of punches in the stomach was according to The "Guidelines" are handled as follows: "Application in the B
business: Based on the
ration card that has to be shown, the supervisor in the company gives the bad person ½ a shot, the good person the more that is taken away from the bad person, and the middle person a short amount of soup.
In the
camp: soup allocation as before. At lunch the bad guy always gets a small allotment, maybe only the good guy can get the rest...
Voluntary contributions from the plant, on the other hand, can be reduced in full or distributed accordingly. The principle always remains that what is taken away from the bad, the good gets more. That's why every company has to make sure that it has to put together as much good as bad." (!)

The Soviet forced laborers' ration cards were provided with appropriate Russian texts; The Group III cards said: "Your performance is bad! That's why you are not entitled to full meals, soups, smokes and clothing! Work better, be clean and punctual! Only then will you receive full rations!" The murderous procedure, as Dörr states, "not only concerned the rations of the Soviet citizens, but also extended to the working

504 BA Koblenz, R 41/290, case GBA v. September 25, 1943; see ibid., R 41/25a, prot. of the staff discuss at the G BA on February 10, 1943.

505 ***Pfahlmann,*** p. 206f. (Erl. GBA dated July 14, 1943).

506 ***Streit,*** p. 268ff. Hereafter also the following.

507 dated March 22, 1943; quoted in ***Dörr,*** p. 142ff. u. p. 254f. Hereafter also the following.

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and living conditions of the Soviet forced laborers as a whole. For example, it was stipulated that 'of course only Eastern workers with the quality mark -Good- could receive the exit' or 'the bad ones could always be excluded', 'but always before others for house cleaning and Sunday work, e.g. B. for unloading and loading wagons etc. "There was work to be done."

In a very short time, this sophisticated system spread throughout the entire defense industry. A very similar "division into groups based on the Silesian model" was propagated by the Weimar Armaments Command in August 1943 as exemplary.508 Belonging to performance groups I (over 80 percent of normal performance), II (60 to 80 percent) or III (below 60 percent) should be taken into account when it comes to food, accommodation, clothing and footwear, canteen goods, possibly when going out and when spending your free time. Group I should be assigned “good jobs” and exempt from “collective punishments”. Group III, on the other hand, should be assigned overtime (on Sundays, after work), cleaning and tidying work in the warehouse and “particularly dirty work”.

At the end of 1943, this system was recommended for use by all German companies at the highest level in order to "increase performance". On December 23rd, the Minister of Armaments informed all "German company managers" of the "success" of such "experiments" through the distribution of two types of food "to educate or punish the part of the prisoners of war who work worse . " as a means of internal terror.510 The forced laborers thus found themselves caught in a cruel pincer between terror and hunger, a barbaric and undoubtedly not ineffective weapon of the fascist German monopoly bourgeoisie in the class struggle.

Around the middle of the year, the crisis of the forced labor regime entered an acute stage because the resistance of the oppressed peoples dried up the usual sources of forced labor supplies, and deepened over the course of the summer and autumn as the Red Army expanded after the Battle of Kursk Liberated areas of the USSR. The tendency of certain circles of the ruling class to turn forced laborers into more enduring and productive labor slaves through better nutrition, somewhat more liberal treatment, through targeted material incentives and through increased political demagogy and manipulation gained even more ground.

After a trip to the occupied Soviet territories in June 1943, Sauckel made an urgent appeal directly to Hitler that “after the strong mobilization of the European workforce for the entire German war economy, the time has now come... from which the human "The workforce of all of Europe must be carefully managed and maintained"; only if "the people available are used really sensibly and therefore sparingly" can they still be

508 BA VEB Porcelain Factory Kahla, Hescho, No. 221/1, sheets 22 and 22 R, Rs. RüKdo Weimar, August 23, 1943. Hereafter also the following.

509 BA Koblenz, R 3/1818, Rs. RMfRuK “To the German operators!” (confidential), December 23, 1943; see *Streit,* p. 265.

510 *Dörr,* p. 149. Glossing over the practice described, adopting the fascist one Vocabulary, *Pfahlmann,* p. 148.

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existing "enormous performance reserves" can be mobilized.51 1 Immediately, in June, the GBA - as an extension of its "Eastern Workers' Inspection" - together with the DAF (Ley) set up a "Central Inspection for the Care of Foreign Workers", whose work also included representatives of the Propaganda Ministry, the East Ministry and the head of the Sipo and the SD took part.5 12 The Central Inspectorate had the power to issue orders and its commissions could intervene to make changes on the spot in the factories.

The fascist authorities made a few further, minor concessions. According to a regulation by the Reich Finance Minister, Soviet forced laborers after one, two and three years of work in Germany were to receive a "premium" surcharge - which could be revoked at any time - amounting to 20, 30 or 50 percent of the wages to be paid to them 5 13 : Pfennig amounts per week, a few marks per month.
Furthermore, they were hypocritically promised a week of vacation in Germany after two years of employment and two weeks of vacation at home after three years. 5 14 A change in pay "in the interest of improving performance" also occurred for all prisoners of war.5 15 In a series of internal or
secret reports and memoranda, corporations, business groups, main committees of the Ministry of Armaments and "scientific"
Institutions, including the DAF's Labor Studies Institute, with questions of forced labor and its effectiveness for the war economy, especially with the "use of Eastern workers".
5 16 Albert Vögler, in his capacity as President of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, initiated extensive investigations into the relationship between nutrition and work performance among forced laborers towards the end of 1943, which were started in the Institute for Work Physiology of the said society.5 17 Even the German Psychological Society convened a conference specifically to "discuss questions of ethnic and work psychology in the Eastern region".518 Increased political-ideological pressure was intended to encourage foreign
workers, especially non-Soviet workers, to perform at high levels of work. Fascist propaganda implored in the blackest colors the “danger of Bolshevism for Europe”.

The forced laborers should be given the impression that, for better or for worse, they are linked to fascist Germany as the bulwark of anti-communism.

The subjugation of half of Europe and the deportation of many millions of people

511 ZStA Potsdam, Case XI, No. 365, Bl. 117f., Doc. NG-3396, report d. GBA to Hitler, June 13, 1943.

512 *RABl.* 1943 I, p. 588; hereafter also the following. See also *Homze,* p. 269; *pile man,* see 213f.

513 BA Koblenz, R 7/3092, ed. RWiM regarding "special regulations" (VO of July 23, 1943). "Surcharges" from the "Eastern workers' levy" for additional services were in principle possible since the GBA's AO of April 5, 1943 (see note. 499).

514 Ibid.

515 According to decree d. GBA v. September 8, 1943; see ibid., R 3/1818, Rs. RMfRuK “To the German managers!”, December 23, 1943; see also *DZW,* vol. 4, p. 495; *Pfahlmann,* p. 182.

516 See *Homze,* p.174f.

517 AGK Warsaw, Case V, VDB Weiß-II, Doc. Weiß-1030, Explanation under oath v. Prof. Heinrich Kraut, June 7, 1947.

518 BA Koblenz, R 58/1005, report d. SD control section Prague to RSHA. d. meeting on 25/26 10. 1943, v. 11/1/1943.

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However, manpower to Germany was a situation that could only be created by force and maintained only by force. Since the resistance in the occupied countries against forced recruitment and the resistance of the forced laborers in Germany grew impressively in the course of 1943, the fascists increased the terror and perfected their apparatus of violence both in the occupied territories 519 **and in Germany 520.**

Based on racial ideology, the terror against forced laborers and their discrimination also had a domestic political function. The better and higher position of the German workers and other working people compared to the foreign workers was a policy with the express aim of breeding chauvinism and a racist feeling of superiority and of destroying or downing any sense of solidarity and solidary behavior, but above all the developed proletarian class consciousness. to keep. The security and existence of the fascist system of rule as a whole depended significantly on the success of this policy.
However, the lack of supplies of forced labor since the spring of 1943 and the low productivity level of forced labor also strengthened those circles of the rulers who considered a kind of "carrot" useful in addition to the "stick". They were more than willing to accept the increasingly critical situation for them so far with that "second method" of imperialist rule, which complements the method of violence: with the "method of 'liberalism', the steps towards the development of political rights, towards reforms; concessions, etc." 521 - however limited and crippled the most extensive "concessions" intended for the forced laborers were, which mainly consisted of various variants of "deception, flattery, platitudes, promises a million times over"522.

But for the fascist regime there was no alternative. In view of the insurmountable, explosive class contradiction between the forced laborers and their tormentors, which deepened with every day of the advance of the Red Army and its allies, the fascists did not change the forced labor regime in any essential point and maintained the regime of terror and degrading Discrimination fully functional. This made the lying fascist "humanization"
aspirations, their performance incentives and above all their propaganda from the outset and totally unbelievable. The forced laborers rightly associated them with the course of the war and recognized them as a sign of the regime's increasing weakness and vulnerability to crises. Therefore, the fiasco of the measures described was inevitable.
The arms monopolies assessed every change in the working and living conditions of the forced laborers primarily from the perspective of work performance and their profits. An evaluation of letters from foreign workers in Germany

519 **DZW,** vol. 3, p. 348ff.; Vol. 4, p. 171ff.

520 See e.g. B. the regulations regarding the auxiliary guards for the working war prisoners who had to be taken out of the companies and their use of weapons (BA.Koblenz, R 3/1818, Rs. RMfRuK "To the German company managers!", December 23, 1943).

521 ***Lenin, W. /.,*** The differences in the European workers' movement (1910), in ***Lenin,*** works, Vol. 16, Berlin 1962, p. 356.

522 ***The same,*** The tasks of the proletariat in our revolution (1917), in: ibid., vol. 24, Berlin 1959, p. 48.

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from April 1943 showed that "most of the complaints come from large companies."523 The monopolies opposed any real improvement and additional social expenditure. A typical example of their reaction was the argument of the management of the Mansfeld Group: ... in our opinion, we have to cut back a little on these things during wartime".524 The Minister of Armaments encouraged them in this attitude by, for example, gave his comment to a new "information sheet" from the GBA on the "attitude towards prisoners of war from the Eastern peoples": "The highest principle remains to get as much work performance out of the prisoners of war from the Eastern peoples as is possible." 525

c) The ideal of imperialist exploitation

To the German imperialists, fascism and war seemed to have removed all barriers to the expression of surplus value from the available and sub-human labor power. After impose -, the attack on the Soviet Union, they believed that they no longer had to any restrictions on themselves in their greed for super-profits and extra work for their war.

Exactly two years had passed since the attack on the USSR when the senior employees of Junkerswerke, the largest German aircraft company, gathered in Kassel. They had a certain Freyer, director of the Fieselerwerke, a smaller but also important German air armament company in *which* "thousands of foreigners"526 worked, tell them about their experiences with the exploitation of foreign forced laborers in the armaments industry.

The speaker shared his “wealth of experience” in front of an expert audience. He discussed in detail the advantages of forced labor for the German armaments monopolies: “The greatest advantage of employing foreigners compared to the previous situation of employing only German workers is that we only need to give orders, there is no contradiction, no negotiation necessary and an enormous amount of time is gained for productive work by the subordinate commanders. The foreigner is available immediately when he is needed for overtime and Sunday work. There are forces available to unload and load wagons even outside of working hours, and what more are such advantages. With the deployment of foreigners, the NCO, who previously spent a large part of his time on personnel matters, suddenly had time again for technical and organizational problems and work.

Disputes between foreigners over the allocation of work never arise because the work must be carried out without contradiction. A lot of unnecessary chatting time has been eliminated, and the foreigner's presence at the workplace is almost 100%.

523 BA Koblenz, R 41/268, "Sentiment report (April) from letters from foreign workers" dated May 5, 1943 (based on the reports of the foreign letter checking offices of the OKW's counterintelligence department).

524 *Jonas,* p. 472, undated (approx. July 1943?).

525 messages from the RMfBuM, No. 25, June 24, 1943.

526 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 4184, lecture by Freyer in the Junkers engine plant in Kassel-Bettenhausen on June 22, 1943. Hereafter also the following.

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the case. Even the ten-minute toilet time is controlled, monitored and punished if it is violated. The start of work is on time, as most of the foreigners are picked up... The proportion of working time is generally greater than that of German followers. The relief of German men in places that are harmful to their health such as spray painting, sandblasting, anodizing baths, annealing baths and others has occurred and is of considerable value."

The speaker enthusiastically emphasized how “practical” it was that forced labor could be “militarized” in everything. Language skills are not necessary in themselves because with the foreign workers, who only exist as numbers, “communication in German command form” is completely sufficient.

It is hardly conceivable that the monopolies could provide clearer self-testimony to the fact that fascism, war and slave labor represented for them excellent, particularly suitable means to the end goal of satisfying their hunger for extra work.

In his conclusions, Frcyer pointed out the continuation of the forced labor system after the war: "The German," he said, "has, with the deployment of foreigners, for the first time, on a huge scale, appropriated and taken advantage of the activities of auxiliary peoples made and learned great lessons and gained experiences from them. It will be good to gain this entire wealth of experience in a professional position during, and at the latest after, the war."

However, the time of fascist "lightning victories" was long over; six months earlier, the Battle of Stalingrad had ended in a catastrophic defeat for the German imperialists and increased the resistance of the oppressed peoples of Europe.

This was probably the deeper reason why the speaker recognized more clearly a basic prerequisite of the forced labor system he so praised: "Only power holds everything together, and woe betide us if it were otherwise."

A particular problem for the corporations was the "limits to the use" of forced labor in modern mechanical production. They considered relatively simple, consistent mass or series production to be the best option, in which "the individual steps can be carried out foolproof and safely ".527 Again, according to an experience report from Fritz Werner AG, "there would be no point in pushing automation to such an extent that unskilled labor would be further saved, but the need for high-quality facilities would be increased." This was clearly evident Contradiction between the development of the productive forces, especially modern technology, and the effort of capital to push workers under the thumb of terror and hunger en masse to the social level of the cheapest industrial pariahs. The way out here seemed to be “rationalization”. - to the extent that this meant the reduction of mechanical production to simple steps combined with assembly work.

,,"Technically speaking," said the aforementioned Fieseler-Director, "the disadvantage of employing foreigners is that plants or departments that have not yet been rationalized have considerable difficulties. The use of foreigners only has the highest degree of effectiveness where the individual work tasks have been specialized to the greatest extent. Intensive use of foreigners creates a rational flow of work as a condition in general."528 In the Dornier works, people looked deeper and saw the same problem as a political one: "In other respects

527 As note 479. Hereafter also the following.
528 As note 526.

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"The use of human beings in such a highly sensitive production process as aircraft construction can never be accomplished with mere police force." 529 The dilemma of the German imperialists lay in the fact that they exploited millions of foreign forced laborers against the resistance of the people predominantly using non-economic means coercion, barbaric terror, which meant a return to historically long-outlived forms of exploitation of a slave-like nature. However, such forms contradicted the character of the modern productive forces and, if expanded accordingly, sooner or later were bound to come into contradiction with the needs of capitalist production Above all, the overall system of forced labor organized in this way only worked if there was sufficient supply of "human material" and if it was possible to permanently suppress the resistance of the exploited. After the Battle of Stalingrad at the latest, both of the above-mentioned conditions proved to be questionable and invalid.

The explosive contradictions and deadly instability of such a system did not go completely unnoticed by various representatives of the regime and formed the background for many fundamental discussions of the forced labor question.
The topic had been with the German ruling class for decades.530 Leading representatives of German finance capital - for example Vögler, Poensgen, Röchling and Krupp - had already gained practical experience with foreign forced laborers during the First World War. The ideas of the Pan-German Association about the "classification of helots" of "Poles, Czechs, Jews, Italians, etc." in Germany {1905), who had to do the "menial manual labor" for the "master race" (1895), the dream of large German industry to develop the East as "a large worker recruiting area for Germany" (1915) - such war goals also harbored the current rulers.531 Hitler and Himmler had already learned their pan-German lesson in their early years.532 The racist-colonialist component of the fascist
ideology was tailor-made for the exploitation of "auxiliary peoples" by the German "master people".

529 Ibid., film 1737, Dornier-Werke GmbH, Munich-Neuaubing, at the Munich police control center, April 9, 1942.

530 Compilation of sources since 1895 in Drobisch, Exploitation, S. Ilff. Hereafter also the following. See also the contributions by Willibald Gutsehe and Lothar Elsner in Politics in the War 1914-1918. Studies on the politics of the German ruling classes in the First World War, Berlin 1964, p. 82ff. u. p. 167ff.

531 Göring made a drastic statement about this on November 7, 1941: "The dirty work should now and in the future be done by our 'work slaves'." (Report by Gen.-major v. Schell to the advisory board of the Wigru vehicle industry about Göring's speech , November 18, 1941; quoted in Schmelzer, p. 64).

532 See Petzold, Joachim, Conservative Theorists of German Fascism, Berlin 1978, p. 18 ff.; the same, The emergence of Nazi ideology, in Fascism Research, p. 261 ff.;
Gossweiler, Kurt, Capital, Reichswehr and NSDAP 1919-1924, Berlin 1982, p. 90f. and passim. Typical fascist documents of a pan-German variety towards Poland were, for example: B. Hitler's programmatic statements on October 2, 1940 (IMG, vol. 39, p. 426ff., Doc. USSR-172, Bormann note) and Himmler's memorandum for Hitler v. May 15, 1940 regarding "Some Thoughts on the Treatment of Foreign Nationals in the East" (VfZ, 2/1957, p. 196ff. (here undated); Poland, Germany and the Oder-Neisse border. Published by the German Institute for Contemporary History in conjunction. with the German-Polish Historian Commission under d. responsible Editing by Rudi Goguel, Berlin 1959, p. 142f.).

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or by justifying it through the “Germanic race”. In this way, the German working class was to be integrated into the imperialist system as a privileged, corrupted “master race” proletariat. Hitler calculated in advance how significantly the standard of living of the German people would be affected by the numerous foreign workers.

forces ... would be raised", although he had primarily in mind business profits and state profits; "the involvement of 20 million cheap foreign workers in the German economic process" would bring, he calculated, "a profit that would be greater than that caused by the war by far exceeded the amount of national debt incurred.
One only has to calculate how much would be gained if the foreign worker only earned RM 1,000 a year instead of - let's say - RM 2,000 like the domestic worker."533

For German finance capital, the "international worker exchange" (Syrup) in the European "major economic area" was part of the "reorganization of Europe" and of the system of world domination, ie the exploitation of the world, that they were striving for. While the German worker in the future will be the foreman of Europe should function,534 the German economy would “continue to be forced to use foreign workers on a large scale”.535 The arms companies were particularly counting on the mass forced labor of Soviet people; they “in general” viewed the Soviet forced laborers “as easy to come from the vast Eastern region means of production to be supplemented" .536

At the end of 1943, the GBA, Gauleiter Sauckcl, summarized the long-term objective of German finance capital in a speech to armaments industrialists and other business leaders: “to create a working capacity of German workers and foreign workers, which will give us absolute predominance over all for the coming century peoples of the world not only militarily, but also economically and in terms of work." Form a basic principle of monopoly capitalist class politics. It is about the general
tendency of monopoly capital to single out privileged layers of workers and other working people, to divide the masses through differentiated economic and political treatment and to play different groups and classes off against each other for the sake of their own people and other peoples to enslave them even more deeply and depress them in their level of life.

During the Second World War, this principle was realized insofar as the German imperialists moved from German heavy and skilled workers, foremen and masters to the "contractually" exploited "foreign workers" from the allied and satellite countries, to the civilian forced laborers from the occupied western, Northern and southeastern European countries and the forced laborers from Poland and the USSR to the concentration camp prisoners and Soviet prisoners of war - a truly devilishly conceived, multi-leveled one

533 **Picker,** p. 312, table conversation. v. May 4, 1942.

534 **Zechen-Magazin** (Gelsenkirchner Bergwerks AG), October 10, 1942.

535 **EichhoUz,** "Paths to de-Bolshevization", p. 43, memorandum by Richard Riedl on "The Russian Question", March 1943.

536 **Case 5,** p. 198, Doc. NI-3013 (see note 457).

537 Speech at the 1st war conference of the Thuringian armaments industry on December 4, 1943; quote at **Schmelzer,** p. 39.

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scale of working and living conditions, terror and discrimination.538 Building such a pyramid of imperialist exploitation on a European and possibly world scale was one of the most important war and class goals of German fascism and imperialism.5 9 But times had changed fundamentally since the
First World War. The era of transition from capitalism to socialism began with the October Revolution. Communism had become a world movement, Leninism had become the theory and worldview of the international revolutionary workers' movement. Huge political changes took place throughout eastern and southeastern Europe after the end of the war and in the course of the revolutionary post-war crisis. After June 22, 1941, the Second World War had become a global military conflict between socialism and capitalism, a battle to the death, not comparable to all previous wars.

The German conquerors and world domination strategists had to reckon with these changes, and they also reckoned with them in their own way. MO They reacted to this with a special political sensitivity and caution towards the dangers that this would pose to them and with extreme defensive and preventative measures.
Set out to destroy Marxism and the first socialist state, they also showed a special ruthlessness and radicalism in defense and "security". But a "security" concept, according to which ultimately only a dead opponent can no longer offer any resistance a dead communist would no longer pose a threat to them, contradicted the planned mass and liberal exploitation of foreign workers, especially Soviet forced laborers. If, as we have seen, this contradiction was already noticeable in the war, under martial law and martial law - how much it must only bother the fascists in "peaceful" times, in a "Siegfrieden"! On August 31, 1941, Mt Himmler mentioned in a memorandum on a "uniform
regulation of the legal status of foreign nationals of non-German citizenship in the Reich", which he sent to the head of the NSDAP party chancellery, Bormann, 542

538 Himmler, for example, only issued a decree about civilian foreign workers v. December 7, 1942 into four “Volkstum” groups (Pfahlmann, p. 208f.).

539 See Volume I, p. 91.

540 For this problem see p. 4.4.8 ff.

541 As early as 1940, concerns had been raised in important circles of the regime against the too cavalier adoption of the “idea” of “not using ethnic German workers for the multitude of simple, subordinate and seemingly primitive jobs; rather, such work should only be carried out by relatives so-called auxiliary peoples (mainly Slavs, etc.) are carried out". (Schumann, New documents of the Reichsgruppe Industrie on the "reorganization" of Europe, p. 416, Doc. 8, memorandum of the RGI dated August 1, 1940; partly printed in Anatomy of War, p. 272ff., Doc. 126) At the time, the RGI quoted a newspaper article by Alfred Rosenberg, which argued against the danger of class struggle: “This point of view, which can be explained for Africa and from tropical conditions, would be intolerable for the German nation because it would in principle restore the possibility of a class struggle would appear on the horizon." (Schumann); inaccurate interpretation in the introductory page 384). See also Homze, p. 291 (quoted in the same sense by Seldte and Syrup).

542 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 4667, Himmler (RKF) to Bormann, August 31, 1941. Hereafter also this The following.

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Although things were not called by their real name, but rather in racial ideological terms, the fascist dilemma was made sufficiently clear. The forced laborer
"Deployment" "in its current form" - so far, it should be noted, there has been no general mention of Soviet forced laborers, apart from a few thousand prisoners of war - "is an emergency measure during the war and, if necessary, **during** a few transitional years after the end of the war". In the long term, the gap in the labor market should be closed "as largely as possible by workers from the Germanic peoples as well as from the ranks of Poles, Czechs, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, etc. who are capable of Germanization and whose selection my departments are already carrying out." "Other foreign workers," he wrote, "should then only be used in closed work operations and in camp accommodation as well as with the strictest possible police surveillance, for which the Russians and Poles will be the suitable material."

Himmler considered any "tendencies" of the "vvirtschaft", ie monopolies, which resulted in a "long-term commitment of these workers" to be harmful. Even earlier in the Ruhr area, an "irreparable damage" had been done to the "Westphalian people" by "foreign peoples". "damage" has been caused.

A representative of monopoly capital who was particularly close to the Nazi leadership, such as the Göring and Himmler friend Wilhelm Tengelmann, chairman of the board of the mining company Hibernia AG, took the same point of view, also veiled with phrases about the "biological dangers" for the German people. He wrote in a comprehensive -memorial in mid-1943, at a time when over two million Soviet people were doing forced labor in Germany, "that if, unfortunately, after the war it were necessary to settle a larger number of foreign workers, their accommodation would only be in closed, remote settlement communities can be provided for in such a way that their lives can develop there in accordance with their peculiarities, their mentality and their national character."543 Behind the racist formulas and clauses lay the most barbaric class struggle against forced laborers and the destruction of entire peoples , which the fascists also prepared within Germany under the forced labor regime. According to a decree of the GBA of August 12, 1942 on "social benefits" for forced laborers, for example, such benefits "that have population policy aspects as their subject matter", such as family allowances and child allowances, were only granted "if the German upbringing of the children or . of the expected offspring is secured", which meant: hardly ever paid.544 Soviet forced laborers had to fear childbirth "more than death".545 There were homes for the children of "Eastern workers" in which the infants and Children were systematically starved to death. After visiting such a home, SS group leader Hilgenfeldt criticized these methods to Himmler with self-revealing arguments: "In my opinion, dealing with the question right now is impossible. There is only an either-or here. Either you want not that the children stay alive - then you shouldn't let them slowly starve and use this method to remove many more liters of milk from the general diet; there is then

543 Ibid., Case XI, No. 727, BI. 109f., Doc. Pleiger-465, memorandum. Tengelmanns v. May 1, 1943 "Experiences from the employment of foreign peoples in Ruhr mining, taking into account the conditions at the mining company Hibernia AG, Herne".

544 BA Koblenz, R 13 V628, decree GBA v. August 12, 1942.

545 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 10975, Memorandum. regarding "Eastern Workers - Decisive Factor of the Final Victory", undated, undated (approx. mid-1943).

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Ways to do this without torture and painlessly. Or one intends to raise the children so that they can later be used as workers. But then you have to feed them in such a way that they are fully capable of being put to work once." 546 For the time after the war, this was not an alternative for Himmler, although in October 1943, looking back on 1941/42, he regretted it the mass murder of Soviet prisoners of war and their mass deaths from starvation: Back then, we didn't value the mass of people the way we value them today as raw materials, as labor power. Which ultimately, if I think in terms of generations, isn't a shame, but it is today , because of the loss of manpower, is unfortunate." **M7** The longer the war lasted, the more doubts the German imperialists apparently had about the possibility of realizing their "workhouse" ideal of forced labor to the extent planned.

But what remained was the reality: the forced labor regime for millions of workers, their starvation and misery and their inhumane exploitation. This regime, which became one of the greatest sources of profit for the fascist state and for the monopolies, showed where imperialist profiteering inevitably leads when fascist terror suffocates every sign of resistance in the blood. It was adequate to the German monopolies' unbridled expansionism and fully met their insatiable need for profit. It represented a step towards their goal of creating the conditions and atmosphere of a workhouse throughout Europe and other parts of the world. Contrary to all later claims by the monopoly masters about the compulsion to employ foreign labor to which they were subjected, this regime was their own creation and in many respects the realization of the imperialist ideal of the profitable, risk-free exploitation of foreign auxiliary peoples of colonial status. They made use of fascism and needed the war to come close to this ideal, the realization of which was and is not only criminal, but anachronistic and, in view of the advance of socialism in the world, deeply illusory.

All attempts to resolve the contradictions of imperialist exploitation through forced labor in a fascist manner inevitably failed. Historically, every system and every form of imperialist forced labor is destined to collapse.
But when fascism was defeated, the shocking result of forced labor remained millions of dead, starving, sick people and people who had been deprived of their education and the best years of their lives by German imperialism. In this area too, the experience and knowledge that fascism is the product of a declining social order and an instrument of the imperialist big bourgeoisie with which it **wants to maintain its parasitic exploitative rule with bestial aggression was paid dearly.**

546 Ibid., Case XI, No. 336, pages 85ff., Doc. N0-4665, Hilgenfeldt to Himmler, August 11, 1943.
547 !*MG,* **Vol. 29, p. 112, Doc. PS-1919, Himmler's speech in Posen to SS leaders, October 4, 1943.**

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Excursus: Comments on the history of the forced laborers' resistance

The foreign forced laborers in Germany resisted their exploiters and oppressors despite the enormous pressure of the fascist terror machine.
The history of this resistance has not yet been written.548 In
view of the special situation of forced laborers, the term resistance must be understood as a multitude of conscious and spontaneous actions that are against both the political system of German imperialism and its economic potential also simply directed against the system of terror, hunger and the constant threat of death to which the forced laborers were exposed. The main forms of their resistance include: the fight for survival, reluctance and refusal to work, escape, sabotage and scouting. The forced laborers who actively resisted joined the front of the anti-Hitler coalition and fought for their own freedom as well as for the liberation of their and the German people from the fascist yoke.

The most original form of resistance under the given conditions was the fight for survival, primarily the fight against hunger organized by the fascists. The sources bear witness to this, for example, in the countless reports about "thefts" of potatoes, beets, fruit, etc. and about the barbaric punishments that were pronounced and carried out for this. But this is also evidenced by the diverse evidence of the solidarity of German working people, who provided food for forced laborers, which was punished no less cruelly.
The b1 was probably of large size and considerable economic importance ;-
knew work restraint. As a permanent, long-term form of resistance, it was more effective than the relatively rare cases of open work stoppages or refusal to work (strikes). The sources of this form of resistance are not nearly as sparse as might be assumed. The figures on the low labor productivity of the forced laborers (of various nationalities), often calculated by the fascists - which contradict one another - are of course not very meaningful in this regard, especially because not only the resistance, but also the hunger and weakness of the people Putting limits on exploitation. But the defense companies' complaints and complaints about "work diversion", "passive resistance" and "negligence" were extremely numerous, even if the management was not always clear about the actual intention of the forced laborers; the Flick Group complained that that the foreign workers carried out the smelter work "sometimes with incredible negligence, sometimes with clumsiness."549 Reluctance to work and refusal to work were also carried out in various indirect and covert forms - such as concealing professional knowledge, simulating for the purpose of taking sick leave, self-infection (e.g. causing suppurations, eczema, etc.) and even self-mutilation.

But a number of strikes and strike-like incidents are also known from the sources, for example, at the beginning of July 1941, "sedition and passive resistance" by 23 "Belarusians" (Soviet prisoners of war) in a quarry, which was then followed by

548 Important material for this can be found, among others, in *Brodski, JA,* In the fight against fascism. Soviet resistance fighters in Hitler's Germany 1941-1945, Berlin 1975; *Seeber; Drobish,* exploitation; *Dieckmann,* Conditions of Existence; *Smelter; DZW,* Vol. iff.
549 *Case 5,* p. 127, Doc. NI-3471, Mittelstahl/Flick KG to RüKdo Potsdam, November 16, 1943.

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were “transferred to a concentration camp” by the Gestapo; 550 first strikes by “Eastern workers” at Mannesmann in March 1942; 551 In April/May a strike by 59 Soviet forced laborers who had just arrived in a "Sudeten German" armaments factory, nine of whom fled.552 Sometimes the reluctance and refusal to work of prisoners of war
were tolerated and covered up by soldiers and officers of the guards from the prisoner of war camps who did not identify with the brutal driving, beating and hunger regime of the arms companies.553 An important and widespread form of resistance among the forced laborers was escape.SM It was particularly feared by those in power as a factor of
domestic political uncertainty and unrest.555 The number of fugitive forced laborers reached a peak in the summer of 1942. The documents from the fascist security authorities show that during the second half of 1941, an average of around 7,500 forced laborers were reported to have been recaptured every month, while from May to August 1942 alone more were reported every month when 6,500 fugitive Poles were arrested.556 The numbers of fugitive “Eastern workers” and prisoners of war were the highest.

On July 30, 1942, 104 of 380 “Eastern workers” had already fled from a single company in the Flick Group and only 34 of them had been arrested again.557 By

Table 43

Escape of civilian Soviet forced laborers April to August 1942

Month	number of“ East- workers" as a whole	of which fugitives again	Arrested people
April	174000	2059	1800
May	447000	5052	over 3474
June	771000	around 13,000	10259
July	979000	22603	18924
August (Estimate)		around 30,000	

Source: **BA Koblenz, R 58/1030, AN RSHA via. d. Meeting of the "Working Group in the RSHA" on September 17, 1942. Furthermore, 9,000 Poles were reported as absconders. The numbers (of arrested "Eastern workers") are considerably higher than those cited by *Seeber* (p. 223) according to the "Reports from the Reich". , unless, which is unlikely, the figures are not cumulative but monthly.**

550 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1781, situation report d. Rüin XIII (Nuremberg) v. July 12, 1941.

551 Ibid., film 1737, Mannesmannrohren-Werke AG to Rüln VI (Münster), March 24, 1942.

552 Ibid., Grelit synthetic resin pressing plant at Rüin IV (Dresden), May 4, 1942.

553 See the complaints from the Ruhr, Saar, Upper Silesian, potash and brown coal mining in BA Koblenz, R 3/1810, collective report (f. RMfRuK) v. December 7, 1943.

554 *Seeber* (p. 222) describes escape as “the most common weapon” of the Polish people forced laborers.

555 In the RSHA, the head of the Gestapo, SS group leader Heinrich Müller, personally took charge of dealing with the question of "work flight" (see BA Koblenz, R 58/1030, AN RSHA about the meeting of the "working group in the RSHA " on September 17, 1942).

556 *Seeber,* p. 223.

557 *Drobisch,* Exploitation, p. 95f. (regarding Maxhütte Unterwellenhorn). 20•

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14,583 prisoners of war in the OKW area escaped in August alone, including 5,395 Soviet prisoners; 9,814 were recaptured within four weeks, including 2,374 Soviet; Of the 285 Soviet officers who escaped, only 38 were captured again.558 In 1943, the defense companies' complaints about escapes among "their" forced laborers
increased. The leading state-monopoly institutions in the defense industry requested stricter state measures, such as special identification of everyone Forced labor and expanded use of “labor education”

measures.559 Above all, they objected to the fact that French and other forced laborers had to be granted vacation, of which "only a very small percentage" returned.560 "For example," the RGI complained in January 1944, "of "In the last French transports, only four to six percent returned."

,, Recently," the Minister of Justice told the OKW in July 1942, for example, "cases have been increasing in which Russian or Polish prisoners of war escaped from the population in the (German annexed - DE) eastern territories through grants supported by accommodation and food." **562**

It was precisely the escape movement among forced laborers that forced the fascists to maintain an increasingly large surveillance and terror apparatus in Germany. In the spring of 1943 they felt compelled to undertake several large-scale manhunts and large-scale raids for fugitive forced laborers, involving hundreds of thousands of people, including tens of thousands of armed personnel.563 The organization of these manhunts was already outlined in the Reich Security Main Office in the fall of 1942: “Under the pressure of the growing number of work fugitives, the police can no longer maintain the current search system (for) named individuals and are looking to introduce a new procedure. The following plan is in mind: The party and its branches give the police auxiliary staff **to** set up a wide-meshed search network. This should consist of:

1. in increased train control,
2. increased traffic control on the roads, motor vehicles, etc.,
3. increased border controls,
4. patrol service,
5. Creation of so-called barricade controls (e.g. on larger rivers)." 5M forms of resistance of a highly developed character such as the sabotage of war production,
the scouting activities and the secret arming of the forced laborers

558 BA Koblenz, R 41/173, OKW decree ("Regarding escape decree") of September 22, 1942.
559 So the RVK (ZStA Potsdam, Case XI, No. 455, BI. 66f., Doc. NG-5701, Pleiger to GBA, August 5, 1943).
560 BA Koblenz, R 12 1/228, AN RGI v. January 26, 1944.
561 Ibid.
562 Ibid., R 22/951, RMdJ to OKW, July 21, 1942.
563 ***Seeber,*** p. 225.
564 BA Koblenz, R 58/1030, AN RSHA via. d. Meeting of the “Working Group in the RSHA” on September 17, 1942.

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The purpose of rising up against the oppressors required great boldness and a clear consciousness. For understandable reasons, resistance in these forms took place in the utmost secrecy. Sabotage was punishable by torture and the death penalty; So the error built into the weapon or the damage to the machine tool should, if possible, not be recognizable as a case of sabotage and could be explained as a material defect. Nevertheless, one can draw conclusions about the spread of sabotage and its diverse manifestations from the cases of sabotage that are more or less clearly recognized in the sources of fascist provenance, for example in the RSHA's "Reports of Important State Police Events". even the names and origins of the resistance heroes. In a single number of the "reports" mentioned, the 17-year-old Soviet forced laborer Zajcev from Gobolinka (?) **reported that he had damaged an agitator at Ruhrchemie AG, Oberhausen, by throwing a paving stone into it threw the batter; from Sachova, also 17, from Staravovka (?), who placed a ten-gram screw in the closed weight box of an ammunition scale; by Bir(n)jukov from Saratov, who cut oxygen lines on He 111 fighter aircraft at the Heinkel aircraft factory in Rostock.565**

The decisive historical turning point in the resistance struggle of the forced laborers was the transport of hundreds of thousands of Soviet forced laborers in 1942. The mass deportation of members of the socialist workers' and peasants' state relocated part of the violent class conflict between capitalism and socialism to Germany itself.566 The resistance continued in all its forms

a new dimension. Class-conscious and combat-determined Soviet forced laborers played an outstanding role in this. It was they, above all, who created illegal organizations and used every opportunity to harm the fascist enemy, especially its arms production. In 1943, the illegal network of the most important of these organizations, the "Brotherly Cooperation of Prisoners of War" (BSW), which worked closely with the anti-fascist German organization "Anti-Nazi German Popular Front", extended from southern Germany across large parts of DC Germany aus.567 The resistance of the forced

laborers gained general momentum after the end of the war. "In general, it can be observed," the foreign letter examiners568 stated in a "mood report" from April 5, 1943, "that the tone of the letters (from forced laborers or their relatives - DE) has changed in the last few weeks. Some people boldly and openly express their opinions, which they would never have dared to do before." 569 The forced laborers began to "talk about the German defeat ... and about the fact that in some places they had a numerical preponderance over the German population

565 **Ibid., R** 58/212, **"Reporting important state police events", No.** 3, 12/17/19!,3.
For information about acts of sabotage see also *Seeber,* p . 227ff. **u. p.** 233ff.

566 **See *Dörr,* p. 111.**

567 ***Brodsld,*** p. 369 **ff.,** p. t, 33 **ff.**

568 **The foreign letter checking centers were facilities of the OKW's counterintelligence department, which worked together with various other state departments. Your evaluation and mood reports are a valuable source (from Nov.** 19!,f **to Sept.** 19!,3 **numerous in BA Koblenz, R** l,1/261,-268).

569 **BA Koblenz, R** t,1/268, **mood report for March,** 5th **t,.** 19!,3.

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570 A month later it was said: "Cases of sabotage are increasing."571 It often happens that a forced laborer "intentionally breaks a machine and then boasts about it." 572 **In** the summer and autumn of 1943, countless letters were published "a wild joy" about the events on the German-Soviet front and in Italy. 573 The

development of the resistance of the forced laborers, its successes, its difficulties and its limitations cannot of course be explained by themselves alone, but were in inseparable connection with the overall events in Germany, in the occupied territories and on the fronts. They cannot be understood and presented in isolation, especially not without analyzing the terrifying fascist terror machine and its perfection, but also not without taking it into account the assistance of German people and the incessant efforts of the best forces of the German working class to "establish fraternal solidarity with the foreign workers deported to Germany and to include them in the common struggle".574

570 Ibid.

571 Ibid., mood report for April, May 5, 1943.

572 Ibid.

573 Ibid., "Special mood report" about the Dutch and Belgian postal service. Forced laborers, each f. d. time v. July 1 to August 31, 1943.

574 *Ulbricht, Walter,* **The increasing exhaustion of Germany and the "new phase" of the German economy (1942), in** *the same,* **On the history of the German workers' movement, Vol. 2, Berlin 1953, p. 279.**

rationalization and war production

1. rationalization in the Industry

When the German aggressors' blitzkrieg strategy finally failed in the fall of 1941, they realized the responsible persons the German War economy very fast, that had occurred, which some from them since long feared had: that namely also their economic Blitzkrieg concept in shards lay. The Recipe, after dem she from so to the production in the Defense industry on a longer War with big Wear and tear weapons and To set up military equipment were determined, that was Rationalization or r - as synonym in the back then Usage of language - ,,Performance increase".

The Big bourgeoisie understands under Rationalization, How Varga noticed, ,,all methods, the to increase of Profits one corporate lead".1 Im In a narrower sense, capitalist rationalization is a specific phenomenon of the monopoly-capitalist economy of the age of imperialism and the General crisis of capitalism. This rationalization, "a system of organizational and technical measures that had to be taken at a certain stage of capitalist development in order to be achieved through the "Changing the organization and management structure of the production process as well as the concrete forms of exploitation (utilization of working time) of the workforce in order to increase profits" , [2] arises under the pressure of national and international competition from big capital and has its "actual and deepest driving forces" [3] in the greatly accelerated development of technology and its scientific foundations since the second half of the 19th century and in the simultaneous transition to capitalist Large company and for the Monopoly.

Dem Obligation, the existing enormous production apparatus to develop further and more effective to exploit, this followed capital on different, with each other combined paths: the Application of the results of scientific and technical progress Elimination few more effective production capacities, the increase the Intensity of exploitation and, at times, extension of working hours. Straight in the years of the second World War were the German Imperialists "even ready, at least short-

1 *Varga, E.*, **Business and Economic policy. Quarterly reports 1922-1939. Ed. v. Jörg Goldberg, Vol. 3, S. 1677, Inprecorr No. 102 v. 10. 8th. 1926 (Reprint).**

2 *Kubitschek, Helmut*, **To capitalist rationalization and her impact on the Qualification fication structure the Working class in Germany (from the crossing for the imperialism until in the 20s Years of 20. century), Economics Hab. script, Berlin 1965, S. 15f.**

3 *Nussbaum, Manfred*, **Business and Country in Germany while the Weimar Republic, Berlin 1978 *(=Economy and Country in Germany*, Vol. 2), S. 168 f.**

in a timely manner first, the physical Boundaries of working day for the German workers to exceed and then long term the Working class subjugated to sacrifice countries".4 The "negative" variant the capitalist Rationalization, [5] "a special characteristic the rationalization in the period of decline of Capitalism", [6] closes the Decommissioning fixer Capital parts a, e.g. b. the closure whole Corporate complexes and factories with lower profitability and the "Healthy shrinkage" whole Industry- branches, without consideration on the Fate the workers and employees. So far however the Production Fund modernized become and the concentration the production in huge Operating units progresses, becomes the rationalization to one Main method of enforcement of technical progress and with it the Development the Productive- forces. Varga has in the view on the exploitation the working people four Basic components the capitalist rationalization worked out: increase the productivity the Work; Methods to production from relative added value (below leads Varga the Standardization, standardization and Typing on); enlargement of absolute added value through increased exploitation the Worker (below become except the "simple Ver- lengthening the Working hours" the assembly line and the Lowering the Chord times called); the tightening the exploitation through simple Wage reduction.7 Kuczynski provides - undoubtedly also for the from us examined Time - with Right firmly, that until now still not certainly become can, „how much from this rising Work performance dem science- light-technical progress, how much of closure more outdated companies, how much the work rush attributable is".8th

The concept of rationalization developed here does not include explicit ones Revolutions of the productive forces, the emergence of new industries, revolutionary technical Innovations. This lead far above the Frame the rationalization beyond, pose the problem though again after a certain time new, on higher level ladder. The Rationalization in another sense again - as the most important method the capitalist Company, the Production costs to Reduce and her Rate of profit by saving living labor (variable capital) and production costs average (especially of circulating constant capital) per unit of product increase - is a more uninterrupted process and goes through the entire story of Capitalism. What we have defined as rationalization in the narrower sense is characteristic On the other hand, certain historical phases of capitalist development are characterized by a particularly large extent, through particular depth, through a particularly accelerated tempo this process and not last through his comprehensive state monopoly Financial support characterized are.

The state monopoly regulation the rationalization in Germany, one fruit of the First World War and even then on the standardization of weapons and weapon parts directed, [9] was since the 20s years a for the monopoly capital indispensable tool for the purpose of entire industries and also such frames men's conditions the capitalist production How the Transport- and news network

4 *Kuczynski*, Everyday, Vol. 5, S. 153.
5 *Mottek/Becker/Schröter*, S. 263.
6 How Note 1 (p. 1679).
7 How Note 1 (p. 1678).
8 *Kuczynski*, Everyday, Vol. 5, S. 165.
9 *Walnut, Manfred*, S. 168.

sen and the electrification the rationalization to subdue. She became through semi-official Institutions How the Reich Board of Trustees for economics carried and should the "Increase the productivity the German Business with everyone means" [10] serve, around the German imperialism again competition- and expandable close .

For tempo and depth the rationalization were, How already Varga stated, „also not pure economic moments from Importance", [11] particularly political points of view of class struggle and of international competition the imperialist powers. The War threw all this Questions with extreme Sharpness on. After dem Fail the blitzkrieg strategy decided itself the ruling class too one wave of rationalization new Dimensions.

a) The Rationalization program the Arms monopolies and his requirements

The Rationalization in the German one War economy since 1941/42 showed significant differences to usual shape and method the rationalization on. If the rationalization in the Frame whole Industries "without consideration on competition questions" [12] aimed for became, so were the "in the Weimar republic unthinkable" [13] been . It was in first line dem Pressure the Conditions to attribute under dem the ruling Circles given of their defeat before Moscow stood. It be, so formulated _ Hermann J. Abs, board member and speaker of the Germans Bank, "not very important" What out of the individual Operated would, important be alone the extraction of the war" ,14 Always a element of capitalist competition, through forced this and him constant reproducing, should the rationalization so on more comprehensive step ladder, quickly, organized and coordinated take place. rationalization in this extent meant one under dem Obligation special Circumstances took place temporary solution specific Contradictions of Capitalism. She had to with the Effects the Competition laws in contradiction devices and sat one thoroughgoing state monopolistic regulation ahead, powerful enough, around these effects to encounter. One tight organized state monopoly executive was to create, behind if necessary the entire Fascist coercive machinery state stood. This requirement for the rationalization was at the same time Condition for the increased exploitation and Plunder the working people as well as for the deterioration the Location of many weaker entrepreneur, particularly out of the "civilian" manufacturing sectors; quite to be silent from the Hundreds and thousands from disused Operated.

The economic basis for the regulation the mentioned Effects, d. H. for your temporary repeal, formed the ample Blessing of profits out of the treasury, the under circumstances generous and for all involved Defense contractors lucrative

10 *Publications of Reich Association of the Germans Industry*, H. 8th, October 1919, S. 28, quote at *Walnut, Manfred*, S. 171.

11 How Note 1 (p. 1679).

12 ZStA Potsdam, German Bank, No. 21 078, Bl. 153; protocol the meeting of Rhenish Westphalian advisory board the Germans Bank at the April 15, 1942 (Speech from Hermann J. Section).

13 *Neumann*, p. 634.

14 How Note 12.

settlement of countless disputes and complaints. The transfer of certain production orders, for example, caused a variety of disputes and problems or Supplies from one Defense company at one other which involve patent issues, production secrets and special procedures .

The significant increase in production and labor productivity associated with rationalization tied together was, brought the German working people, Ahead the working class, overwork and increased workload and cost them - since it was a production for the prolongation of the war - Rivers of blood and tears. German workers and foreign forced laborers experienced the deadly curse an organized, broad one created capitalist Rationalization, the exclusively the continuation of the imperialist war served. The millions workers and employees, the the Rationalization would have turned them into unemployed people under "normal" capitalist conditions were "released" for the imperialist war and marched into the trenches and Mass graves. In total stayed the Labor force balance of German Imperialism given the extremes War economy and the Mass convocations to Front negative and was only achieved through the forced deployment of millions of foreign workers balanced.

Finally stayed the progress in the Development the productive forces, otherwise an essential one moment the capitalist Rationalization, apart from the production from \Vaffcn and Equipment of war, then of destructive forces, [15] small amount and was disproportionate to the overall economic loss caused by the slowdown or brought about a standstill in the development of the productive forces in large parts of the economy.16

The initiative to pervasive rationalization the Defense industry went in the Late autumn 1941 in first line from minister Fritz Dead and the around the Reich group Industry grouped leading Arms monopolies out of, the be Ministry supported and the system of committees and working groups from the beginning.17 The experiences from their "experiments in the ammunition industry" [18] were already in 1940/41 in limited Scope also at the production from tanks, artillery and

15 *Mottek!Becker!Schröter*, S. 46ff.

16 A more precise {comparative) Analysis of the effects of armaments and war on development winding the productive forces stands still out of.

17 Please refer *tape I*, S. 121ff. - *Neumann* (p. 301f.) noticed with Right, that the "General representative
"powerful" of the four-year plan already in the pre-war years important rationalization functions in the view on the coming War had. End 1938 developed the VDI
„Thoughts about appropriate measures for "rationalization" and corresponding organizational satory suggestions that already the idea of death and spear in war came to life called committees and rings contained (ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 375, Memo from December 6, 1938). Ludwig knows This memorandum obviously does not, but it makes oracles while rejecting an exact one classes analysis about it, that in the ministry Todt and "im entire committee system …
noticed a strong dependence on this 'technical joint work' right from the start. bar (made), the for the beings more ideal typical Engineering activity heard". *(Ludwig*, Technology, S. 360 u. ff.).

18 *Milward*, war economy, p. 58. - Milward heaps praise and "recognition" on the fascist Todt, who, as a "very capable and capable minister," led Germany's transition to a war economy shaft caused have (ibid., p. 55), and leaves the crucial role the Armaments monopolies completely in Dark.

Handguns were used. During 1941 there was V request the imitation also in others sectors the Armor. Of that stimulated were surely also the "Thoughts of the Führer," which Hitler wrote immediately before the attack on the USSR about "preferring primitive mass production over high-performance ones Machines" and expressed that the construction of weapons and equipment "too complicated and overbred" be.19

The formation of a tank commission Reich Minister for Armament and ammunition (June 21 , 1941), the appointment of an industrial council for air armaments (May 14, 1941) . Industrial rings (August 1941), the reorganization the Department of general aircraft masters ('1 October 1D41) and the structure a state monopoly organization also with the " General Plenipotentiary for the N achrichtenwcsen", General Erich Fellgiebel, with wrestling, presentations and one industrial Advisory Board (November December 1941)

were - not coordinated for the time being - Steps towards solving the problems of rationality nalization in a more comprehensive manner and in the closest interconnection between arms mono- Poland and State apparatus or. Wehrmacht leadership to solve.20

Triggering moment for a comprehensive A rationalization campaign was the order Hitler from December 3 , 1941 about the "simplification and improvement of our performance Armaments Production", which was co-designed by the Minister of Ammunition.21 Hitler demanded in dem from Urgency dictated Decree one general " Conversion on mass production", through which alone the "rationalization of our production methods" would be attainable; this allows you to " raw materials, learned powers and T o s a v e time ". To For this purpose, the constructions of monkeys and equipment should be "down to the last detail". simplifies and the Acceptance conditions "particularly in Tolerances in parts from weapons and devices". "Basically, the practicality, the lightness Her- availability as well as dem Save on at material the priority to give".

Seen in light, the decree contained a message addressed to the armaments departments of the Wehrmacht. parts directed Catalog of demands from the arms monopolies that eliminates all of this see wanted to, What one effective and profitable Mass production in the ways was standing. The industry, whose experts, according to the decree, "during the development of the weapons and equipment" were to be involved in a comprehensive manner on proposals for "product Improvements" are requested, which require the fixing of "obviously technical ones defects and Weaknesses" which concerned weapon designs ; quite in the sense of armaments

19 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 2313, AT OKW/WFStb/Dept. L v. 21. 5. and Lecture notes v. May 29, 1942.

20 Please refer S. 12f., S. 32 u. S. 52f.; further *tape I,* S. 128f.

21 At the 14. 11. 1941 (or earlier) demanded Hitler from Keitel the Template one draft for a "The Führer's order" about mass production, simplification of arms production, savings from skilled workers etc. (ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 1742, Keitel at Thomas, 14. 11. 1941) on Reason the "daily haunting Discussions on the armaments area" (ibid., Keitel to Thomas, 17. 11. 1941). Todt played a key role (see e.g ibid, "Old woman from Dr. Dead unrecognized Version", o. D.). Keitel was ready to accept responsibility and authority dem Decree largely Dead to leave to: „I want me only on the Appraise and demand ments of Reichsmin. f. b. u. M. support and his Suggestions in Commands (at the WT/weapon offices - EN) implement". (Ibid., hs. AT Keitel f. Thomas, n.d.). Todt apostrophized the Decree later before dem Huge Advisory Board the RGI that is as "brilliant Command" Hitler, „the he himself designed and multiple redictated has" (BA Koblenz, R 13 I/654, speech at the 13. 1. 1942), let but straight through this formulation none Doubt at his own Participation. Please refer also p. 35 f.

The aim of the corporation was to "simplify the individual construction elements as much as possible in favor of an easy processing method suitable for mass production, and to the utmost extent the standardization all Individual parts" and the Waiver the Wehrmacht positions on
"exaggerated demands" and "excessive manufacturing requirements and acceptance conditions" were demanded. The decree fundamentally sanctioned "the allocation and concentration of the Orders to the each for for the given purpose and on most economical workers Companies".
From greater scope was finally the - deep in the Competencies particularly of Reich Minister of Economics intervening - Instruction, the Rationalization work of Ministry of Ammunition via working groups "on the entire other Equipment of war - especially on the general Wehrmacht equipment, the until now still outside one such a review - to expand". So was the l\eichsminister for Armament and ammunition, the next to dem boss of OKW for the execution of decree was responsible , a "carte blanche for the thorough rationalization of the industry" [22] has been issued. Now was the moment came, the Rationalization concept the behind dem Ministry of Ammunition standing leading Circles of monopoly capital to realize.
The Reich Minister for Armament and ammunition and the Reich Industry Group left immediately to it, the Decree Hitler's to Strengthening of their own to exploit state monopolistic positions. Which Power this grouping embodied, showed itself not least in that she her Ideas of of rationalization within shortest Deadline enforced, also against the resistance, which came primarily from relevant circles of the Wehrmacht, the fascist party and special the DAF accomplished was.23
With his decree of December 22, 1941 on the "self-responsibility of the armaments industry," Todt began the "adaptation" of the state monopoly organization in the armaments industry to the "need for significantly greater rationalization. " .24 At the next day gave the minister already precise "Implementing provisions for Leader's order from the 12/3/1941" out.25 After that they had Armament committees and special committees "Best work plans taking into account the different manufacturing facilities the Industry for all Devices to work out" and dem minister
"constantly to be submitted". Dead shouted the Committees in addition on, the production the to "combine" individual weapons and devices, i.e. H. to concentrate in the "best companies" and the Type program the Defense companies generally to clean up.
Above all, the suggestions mentioned should be for "production improvement" and design simplification from the defense companies ·demanded and from the special committees pretested become. To this one Purpose had the Special Committees Work offices
"from some for particularly qualified manufacturing specialists in the relevant field and "industry designers"; technicians the Wehrmacht departments were only "from case to case at the Examination papers to participate". The like that checked Suggestions went at the Minister, the she one from each Main committee agrees creating central Work office supplied. In this one central Work offices were
„the best professionals the relevant Production branches united".26 The main output

22 *Zumpe*, S. 339.
23 See. - also for the The following - S. 48 ff.
24 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 2312, REl. RMffiuM v. December 22, 1941.
25 Ibid, REl. RMfBuM v. December 23, 1941.
26 *anatomy of war*, S. 379, Doc. 194, report OKW/WiRüAmt v. February 9, 1942 ex. d. meeting of the Main committees v. 6. 2. 1942.

shots had finally "those instructions to work out, the to Implementation of these measures necessary" were. She became from the OKW in the military area and from the Minister of Ammunition in the Area the production in Power set.

At the 29. December urged Dead still once on it, „with all Acceleration" to proceed.[27] Next to dem Army Weapons Office in the Donut Jebensstrasse originated specially for the work offices the Main committees a more provisional barracks complex, in whose Hall intended for demonstrations and exhibitions the suggestions of the work offices or the instructions the Main committees "in more personal Pronunciation between the representatives of Army Weapons Office and the Industry" possible one immediate agreement can be reached should.[28]

The Main committees started without Default with the Work and started February Already in 1942 conceptions for one rationalization of their production areas. In the Course of three make Reporting and advice "were given to the minister (Todt - DE) based on from numerous samples and extensive Elaborations as well as gra- phical comparison suggestions and Suggestions made, the both on that area of manufacturing as also the construction significant Savings at material and bring working crows and thus a considerable increase in performance will contribute".[29] Dead made at this conference (4th/5th February) "trend-setting" [30] Explanations about the Location. To Wehrmacht would one million soldiers moved in, underneath around eight percent the Defense workers. At the same time must the Army armor "again on large quantities brought become". The "Heavyweight the Solution" of problem lie "in of rationalization the Production. In the Industry lay still huge reserves, the through internal rationalization mobilized can be. If all Workforce and machines the Best performance brought are, then is one More production reached, the above that demanded program out still a Excess creates. This Excess must intended _ become. The front can still further Substitute at People necessary have

..... the m

Measure, the for the Goal lead becomes, is the Elimination the most expensive companies, i.e. the establishments with dem highest Expense at Hours for one particular Work

..... Th e

differences in the Price for a Device are large. The !(easy) Gr(anat)W(erfer) becomes to a Price from 300,- RM until 600,- RM manufactured. The production must on the Companies that only 300,- RM need, concentrated become. In the Exchange of experiences must the expensive operation improved become. Can he it not create, so must him Workforce and machines withdrawn become and dem approve Operation transferred become. It comes one mutilation the German Worker even, if man one 100 percent Worker _ through inadequate Operating facility and deficient Operational management go ahead one 50 percent Performance brings. The powerful workers must out of here out of the unhealthy company."

Wilhelm Pliers wore few Hours later the same Thoughts dem Advisory Board the RGI and emphasized, „that the entire Industry as Defense industry to apply have".[31]

27 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 2312, Dead at pliers, 29. 12. 1941.

28 Ibid, "Summarized "versions" Todts in the meetings with d. Main- committees and dem HWA at the 4. u. 5. 2. 1942.

29 How Note 26.

30 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 2312, Write to of HA "Wehrmacht device" from the March 2, 1942 to the "summarized "versions" Todts at the 4. u. 5. 2. 1942 (see Note 28); in the following

become the Explanations Todts quoted.

31 *anatomy* de, *war*, S. 377, Doc. 193, AT ex. d. meeting of advisory board the RGI at the 5. 2. 1942.

He fordcrtc,the rationalization everywhere as quickly as possible and "also against enormous Resistance energetic to carry out. It must be radically rationalized towards the best companies ... Pliers urges extreme speed and opposes bureaucratic methods. Dead demand most ruthless Goal fulfillment, for what he every Power of attorney want to give ." [32]

In the Karl Lange, Managing Director, formulated the discussion the Mechanical engineering business group and Director of Main Committee Machinery, in brevity, what about it went:

"First stage: type restriction. Second stage: Cleaning up the production program the individual company and Vote on the other companies. Third Stage: Complete Conversion the production or decommissioning." [33]

In his essential Basics was with it the program the rationalization the industry from Reich Minister for armament and ammunition and dem apparatus of "Self- responsibility" the defense industry, essential supports from the Line the RGI, signed. The most important methods and measures of rationalization on a scale of entire branches of industry were determined and tried; the cornerstone of the state monopoly regulatory apparatus were in shape the Main committees created; the Fixed price system [34] stimulated immediately and effective every Rationalization success.

Dead had even at the days after the the mentioned "Rationalization Show" final detailed discussion with the main committees on 6. February Hitler above The previous Results of rationalization reported, probably presented him with his overall concept and demanded further powers. After his accidental death, the competing forces and factions of the ruling class under the leadership of Göring smelled the opportunity to give the Ministry of Munitions its leadership role to dispute and the concentration the Regulatory power at him to impede. The new But ministers seconded from Birder and pliers, sat itself through and received those extensive powers from Hitler, which Todt had apparently already demanded. The Wehrmacht leadership, especially the three branches of the Wehrmacht, and the Reich Ministry of Economics recognized the decision-making authority of the Minister of Ammunition and his "self-responsibility " organization of the agreement from 18. February in principle at; Goering did the & on 1. March, by he spear for the GB Arm appointed.

Dem followed a faster expansion of state monopoly regulatory apparatus. Out of-shots and everyone received rings necessary powers, rationalization on their own initiative to carry out. On 20. February laid the Minister of Ammunition to a decree The heads of the main committees explicitly stated as a directive: "The implementation of the company comparison studies and the preparation of the best work plans is of the utmost importance."35 The decree assigned the heads of the main committees the purpose and acceleration the necessary negotiations ever a Representative of the Ministry and the Army Weapons Office.

In the decree above the area of responsibility and the Rules of Procedure of the "Self-responsible bodies (committees and rings) in the Armaments Industry" from April 20, 1942 commissioned the Minister of Ammunition the Committees and rings, "at those associated with them Companies and Operated or. Operations departments the most expedient Under-

32 Ibid, S. 378.
33 Ibid.
34 Please refer S. 514 ff.
35 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 2312, REl. v. 20. 2. 1942.

Placement and execution of orders in the most efficient way with the least amount of effort of raw materials and workers and with the best utilization of capacities. They have the Manufacturing through technical and organizational "To simplify means and achieve the highest possible performance." [36] You had to concentrate the production in the “Best operated”. care for, at Company comparisons
and exchange of experiences to put aside “all petty considerations of private secrecy” [37], to implement modern series production and in its entire Area of responsibility “Top performance from Person and Machine" [38]
to strive for. The Head of committees and Rings became expressly reliant, “In the future, don't try to achieve your goal with companies solely through your power of persuasion "to achieve" but "through clear instructions and orders to the industry".39 The uniform state monopoly regulation of rationalization process was in essential in the first months of 1942 and was through the comprehensive ones Powers of Reich Ministry for Armament and Ammunition guaranteed under spear. She developed itself after Proviso the progressive Centralization the Regulatory power in this Ministry in the years 1942 to 1944 to one always more complete system.

The progress of rationalization itself depended both on this centralization process and directly on military-political events and developments. After the defeat at Stalingrad, a new wave of rationalization began, with the Minister of Ammunition focusing on a much sharper one Concentration of arms production on the “best companies”, extensive closures of companies in order to attract (skilled) workers and the further simplification and standardization of construction and technology with the help of the development commissions. [40] In the autumn of 1943, after the transfer of competencies from the Reich's Ministry of Economics to the Ministry of Armaments, the entire consumer goods industry was finally included in the forced rationalization process. Significant for the importance that the Minister of Armaments and those who set the tone Monopole's contribution to this was the appointment of Georg Seebauer, President of the Reich Board of Trustees for economic efficiency, to the leader of the production office for consumer goods in the Ministry of Armaments and at the same time head of the Reich Committee for performance improvement.

In terms of conception and the extent achieved, the rationalization in German industry from 1942 to 1944 something unique in the history of the German Imperialism. Albeit with different levels of realization - depending on the wartime importance of the production sector and the degree of monopolization of the industry -, so continued in the German War economy under the pressure of the War situation, which contained the decision about the existence or non-existence of German fascism and imperialism, but the new one Quality one regulated by a state monopoly Rationalization on an entire industrial scale.

36 *News of RMfBuM,* No. 3, May 6, 1942, Anl. 1, 1.. DVO for the Decree RMfBuM "At the leadership of the committees and Rings" (May 6, 1942).
37 B.A Koblenz, R 13 I/1012, REl. RMfBuM re: Exchange of experiences v. 23. 3. 1942.
38 How Note 12.
39 *Messages of RMfBuM,* No. 3, May 6, 1942, Decree RMfBuM "To the guide the committees and Ring l" from May 6, 1942.
40 See., also for the The following, S. 124ff. u. S. 146H.

b) Metlwden the rationalization

The stated purpose of the Rationalization meant increasing war production as quickly as possible while reducing the number of workers. With this primarily military-political motivated The main goal was onto closest the goal the Securing profits and -maximization, in first line for the Large- and Arms capital, linked.

The variety of methods and forms of rationalization becomes concrete to be shown. The transition to larger series and, in this context, proved to be particularly effective in increasing arms production. many times to flow production, flanked and secured by the ammunition minister's decision-making authority in design matters, the transfer of order distribution to the committees and rings, the concentration the production on the "Best companies" and the

"Exchange of experiences"; furthermore, in the area of the entire industry, type restrictions41 and material savings.

On the other hand, standardization (standardization and typing) played a less important role; in this area gave it apparently no particularly quick and spectacular successes. Standardization should not be confused with type reduction in the sense predominantly practiced during the war, although there was no absolute dividing line between them. Standardization primarily includes the unification and thus interchangeability of basic components and accessories in production within an industry, where the variety of product range of the end products of the industry concerned can definitely be maintained. In highly developed and highly monopolized industries such as the electrical industry, the leading monopolies and the technical associations they dominated had already imposed a high degree of standardization over many years. This level was much lower and the resistance arising from competition was greater, for example in the vehicle industry.

The most important Financial support the military at the standardization was nice in the first world war been, the "Quick Substitution more similar Spare parts and accessories>hearing parts"42 of

weapons and military equipment through standardization of parts and dimensions, about it Repairs to accelerate and material losses avoid. In Hitler's decree of 3. December 1941 The "extreme extent of the standardization of all individual parts" was called for.43 However, the designers of weapons and military equipment seemed to have difficulties in quickly adapting to the solution to the task at hand; Difficulties, which were probably largely due to the previously usual procurement and ordering system. The apparatus of the Ministry of Munitions also apparently did not focus much attention on meeting this demand.

It was not until June 8 , 1943 that Speer commissioned Hanns Benkert, a board member of Siemens Schuckertwerke AG and director of club German Engineers in the NSBDT, him

41 The type reduction was in 1942 and 1943 although with the cessation of production in the relevant companies and parts of companies, mostly but not yet with their decommissioning tied together; it was usually another production, e.g from weapons and Equipment of war or from supplies for other companies.

42 *The technology in the world war.* Ed. by Max Schwarte, Berlin 192C, p. 243; quoted in *Nussbaum, Manfred,* p. 168.

43 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 2312, Decree Hitler's above "Simplification and performance increase
ours arms production" v. 3. 12. 1941.

"in collaboration with the German Standards Committee, the Reich Board of Trustees for Economic Efficiency, the Reich Committee for Delivery Conditions, the economic groups, the general representatives, to submit a plan within three months to the committees, committees and commissions of the Reich Minister for Armament and Ammunition and the other departments and committees involved in standardization and typing, which under his (Benkerts - D E.) Measures to be summarized in leadership are necessary in order to achieve a uniform design in the field of "To ensure German standardization and typing." The order referred to the entire German industry and apparently aimed at a fundamental and far-reaching solution. A month later, Benkert was mentioned in the Ministerial Gazette of the Ministry of Munitions as being responsible for the "unified leadership in the field of "Standardization and Typification".45 As head of the main office for technology of the fascist party, Speer also gave him the post of Todt Death of the vacant presidential position of the VDI. Benkert eventually also replaced the president of the German Standards Committee in its function.46

He referred to himself henceforth as "Reich representative for standardization and typing" and began working on the "reorganization of German standardization" under "large-scale guiding principles". a “uniform Germans "Work of Standards", that with one tighter state monopoly regulation as until now tied together be should; in Future would have to “Declarations of commitment and official emphasis ... voluntary compliance with the standards where it is necessary."4 [7] The planning in this difficult and certainly not uncontroversial area, long-term and generous, did not, as far as is known, show any significant results during the war. At least was the Order at Benkert characteristic for the comprehensive rationalization concept Circles around the Reich Ministry for Armament and Ammunition.

The German imperialists were willing to simplify and conserve raw materials for the sake of increasing production and profits In addition to "refinement" and "refinement", they also had to accept serious losses in quality, and even consciously set course for such deteriorations. This was less of a problem on the Weapons and ordnance of the Weir closes, but still captures a wide area Circle of “war-important” products. Already on the 20th. June In 1941, for example, Göring called for his decree on the “restriction of "Bauwillens", 48 everywhere to “Makeshift construction” to pass over, also at Armaments buildings. It had to be built “in the simplest form”; “beauty of work” and the like had to be omitted. "Buildings that only... As a rule, the reduction in the construction iron quota is a "changeover" to the "primitive construction method", explained Todt in the most primitive way Version in one only a "durable design" for a few years is required.49

Hitler, the itself also already before "Barbarossa" with Thoughts above the “Favor

44 Ibid, Reich Chancellery, Movie 19429, Rs. RMffiuM v. 8th. 6. 1943.

45 *News of RMfBuM,* No. 26, 8th. 7. 1943, call RMffiuM "At the Operations manager the German arms industry", v. 24. 6. 1943.

46 *Ludwig,* Technology, S. 217f.

47 B.A Koblenz, R 13 V/102, Prot. d. meeting at the 18. 1. 1944 in the Siemens house, Berlin, regarding "Reorganization of the Germans Standardization".

48 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie *1,566.* Hereafter also the The following.

49 Ibid, REl. GB Building v. October 25, 1941.

primitive mass production against "high-performance machines",5() represented the same view a year later before Speer and Ganzenmüller - so but under the pressure of defeats and losses of Winters 1941/42: „We have to build more rolling stock quickly, and in a primitive form. If a locomotive or a wagon five years hold, it is completely sufficient if only the material is provided task suffice can." 51

The rationalization was a planned raid on labor and organized using scientific methods health of the German workers. By law and Through arbitrary special regulations regarding temporary extensions of working hours, Sunday shifts for certain branches of industry, etc., the working day was rigorously extended been. Rationalization additionally increased the workload **for hundreds of thousands** sity and work rush. Measures as the introduction Series production, piecework and assembly line work, production stops and shutdowns and the associated relocations and service obligations of working people were enforced with the greatest ruthlessness; behind the rationalizers and profiteers stood the fascist one Terror apparatus, the every Resistance brutally suppressed.

What the "Suggestions for improvement" concerned, to those Hitler in his Decree from the

3. December 1941 had called, like that acted it are by no means suggestions from the workforce, let alone from the workforce. However, such proposals from the working people - under the conditions of exploitation of free production relations a crucial source of rationalization - hoped the armed forces since 1942 also in size rem Dimensions of the War economy usable make. About designs for a The “law on the inventions of followers” was already being negotiated before the war.5 [2] In the spring/summer of 1941 , a draft from the Reich Ministry of Labor failed due to objections the Reich Industry Group. [53] am 12. July 1942 Suddenly an “Ordinance on the Treatment of Inventions by Followers” appeared in the Reich Law Gazette von Göring as representative for the four-year plan and to be carried out by Reich Minister for Armament and Ammunition. [54] Instead of the one in previous ones Drafts still included two Possibilities for the inventor (Crossing the invention on the entrepreneur; free Disposal of the inventor above his invention proposal) there was so only still the Duty, any Inventions "dem Entrepreneur to "to be made available", although, as it was vaguely stated, in return for "an appropriate remuneration".55 Speer centralized at the same time the invention and Proposal review system at the NSDAP Main Office for Technology, which he headed. “The review and possible follow-up of invention proposals in the field of armaments and weapons is carried out in the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Munitions by the same employees who work in the office for technical sciences employed are." [56]

50 How Note 19.

51 FB, May 24, 1942, Explanations Hitler's for the "Transportation problem" (23. 5.).

52 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 10301, BI. 12ff. (1939).

53 Ibid, No. 10302, BI. 82, RGI at RArbM, 3. 5. 1941.

54 *RGBl.* 1942 I, S. 466 f.

55 Ibid(§ 2). Please refer also *News of RM{BuM,* No. 22, April 10, 1943.

56 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 10302, BI. 123, Rs. Speers (as Director of main office for Technology) from 18. 8th. 1942. - The Office for Technical Sciences in the central office of the DAF was just the main office for technology of the NSDAP and with it in the area of the ammunition minister transferred been (ibid., BI. 111 and 111 R, Rs. RWiM v. 30. 5. 1942).

The Monopolies served itself the new legal Handle uninhibited and dined
Members of "followers" who made rationalization suggestions were given pennies. Apparently, dissatisfaction with this became widespread, so that warnings from representatives of the DAF even found space in a magazine published by the Ministry of Armaments go not on, so explained the leader of the DAF Office for Performance Training, Vocational Training and Business Management on the occasion of the opening of the "Reich Exhibition". "Operational matters suggestion system" at the 7. September 1943 in one Donut large company,
"that you deal with amounts of 5 RM up to 100 RM or a maximum of 200 RM the proposer compensates" .57
was the relationship between rationalization and exploitation methods the German monopoly capital since 1942 in it, with the ceiling rapidly thinning German skilled workers, many hundreds of thousands, even millions of foreign forced laborers without size Loss of time in the Rationalization process to classify. They did this in the manner of imperialist slave owners and Colonial rulers used naked methods of violence, primarily against the Soviet forced laborers deported to Germany, without regard for the health and lives of these people.58 The fascist ideology provided the political-ideological one Motivation **for** such a criminal act. The time pressure that rationalization was under and the greed for rationalization profits provided the economic background for it. But the extent and pace of rationalization were certainly a factor the barbaric forms of exploitation Soviet forced laborers co-determined, this barbarism in turn influenced forms and methods of rationalization; for example, it undoubtedly pushed down its technical and technological level and made the shortage of skilled workers even more noticeable.
In 1943/44 additional problems came to the fore out of the influx of unskilled and inexperienced in production German Workforce out of the Mobilization actions of
"Total war" resulted. A rationalized, extensive one In contrast to the foreign forced laborers, the intensive exploitation of these forces, which was not limited by scruples, was counteracted by the political considerations of the fascist regime. At least since spring 1943 they tried central Organs of the Reich Ministry **of** Armament and ammunition the solution of the problem. At the arms supply office was within the office group responsible for the fundamental questions of rationalization " Industrial Self-Responsibility" a special department "Operational Order" with the subject areas "Regulatory measures to protect the armaments industry and Increasing performance through social policy measures; wage questions" and
"Consultants for health care issues, medical examiners, etc." created; for Director this Department ordered spear the DAF official Theodore Hupfauer. 5 9 According to a decree by the Minister of Ammunition dated July 8, 1943, so-called labor engineers were employed in the armaments factories, giving them new state monopoly powers Rationalization of the labor and exploitation process received. The Department "Operational Order" became according to Ministerial decree from the 25. Sep-

57 *The exchange of experiences,* October 1943, speech of DAF office manager Stone Wart v. 7. 9. 1943; quote at *Weyres-1>. Le1>etzow,* S. 124.

58 Please refer S. 193 ff.

59 ZStA Potsdam, RMfRuK, No. 63, p. 68 u. 68 R, "Preliminary Business distribution plan of the Reich Ministry for Armament and ammunition (Was standing 1. 4. 1943)"; **s. a.** *Thomas,* S. 372/373 (structural diagram).

In December 1943, it was expanded and reorganized into the “Work Regulations” department and the Armaments Office affiliated.6° This office group Under Hupfauer was throughout, now dem Minister of Armaments subordinate Area the War economy responsible for

"all Measures, which the production through better increase work effort", including for "performance improvement" and "performance recognition", for employment relationships and working conditions, for the Labor deployment engineers and the Use of forced labor (in collaboration with GBA and DAF), for which foreign Companies in the occupied territories and for special measures or allocations.

In the following will be on concrete examples of measures and effects of rationalization in a number of the most important areas of the war economy. Sectors of the industry analyzed.

Kohl.s

For Since February 1942, the Reich Coal Association and the Mining Economic Group, Hermann Winkhaus (Mannesmann), who headed the RVK's Committee for Performance Improvement, developed a "proposal for the rationalization of the production of mining supplies, especially mining machines."61 Winkhaus reported in October before the Central planning: “We have the prerequisites for a significant increase in production the feeder industry, those in individual products to 150 percent of their current (must mean: last year or previous - EN) Performance stands, created by the fact that at the beginning of this year we had a very strong rationalization of our devices have. We have e.g 120 existing Drill mining hammer types on 12 Types cut down and about 80 Rotary hammer types to 8, and we have banned any company from building more than 2 of these types. We then have the plan at that time, 16,000 up to 17,000 workers in the feeder industry insert to must, ... reduced to 7,800 men." 62

In the June 1942 ordered Paul Pleiger, chairman of the RVK, an increased " supply exchange in coke"63: The Rhenish-Westphalian coal syndicate transferred its deliveries to Pomerania to the Upper Silesian hard coal syndicate (except foundry coke and coke for the Hydrogenation plants Pölitz); for that stepped the Lower Silesian Hard coal syndicate to the H.\VKS the same amount of deliveries after his western Sales areas and

part of the deliveries to Bavaria; the Upper Silesian Coal Syndicate, in turn, held the Lower Silesian by assigning the same amount his deliveries to Saxony. The purpose of this exchange was to noticeably shorten the transport routes for coal. Against further “transport unbundling” measures of Reich Ministry of Economics opposed Corporations and Syndicates but with success.M

As End 1942/beginning 1943 Reich Ministry of Economics, RGI and The Ministry of Ammunition called for the abolition of all cartel and syndicate quotas because of delivery rights and market shares “none Security claim more" had, ,,because she outdated and through product

GO ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, Movie 19622, Decree RMfRuK v. September 25, 1943. See. also S. 233.

61 B.A Koblenz, R 13 XX/40, H. 2, Rs. Wigru Mining, 2/25 1942.

62 ZP-P, 28. 10. 1942, 17. Meeting.

63 B.A Koblenz, R7I/1, RVfg. Pleigers v. June 18, 1942; hereafter also the The following.

64 Please refer *Weyres P. LePetzow,* S. 65.

tional and Delivery obligations replaced are"65 and because production and Sales quotas the
Pleiger protested against all "interventions" in the coal syndicates because the coal syndicates... Their merger into the Reich Coal Association under my leadership corresponds to the requirements of today's economic concept and the requirements of the war economy places are".00

iron and steel

As early as February 14, 1942, 14 days after a corresponding instruction from the Iron Making Industry Economic Group, the economic group's first rationalization report was available.6 7 The large associations (pig iron, steelworks, pipe, large pipe, stainless steel association , Forging Association, etc.) had formed rationalization commissions. “For semi-finished products, the question of a relocation from S(iemens-) M(artin)- on Thomas steel for Bullet stick and superstructure ... checked", reported the steelworks association. The dimensions of shaped and bar steel should be further standardized. The stainless steel association also dealt with the determination of types and also had those works checked that were less than 1000 t in the year to make a decision about the Maintenance this Companies". The Orders should go through the association rationally distributed and the sales apparatus standardized.
One leading and coordinating function on the Area the rationalization took place after its founding on May 27th In 1942 the Reich Iron Association came into being.
In an overall assessment of rationalization, the iron-making business group led the way Industry has a number of noteworthy ones Positions on:
"a) The processing from Iron ore through Break, Seven, sintering, Wash, Roasting, A glomerizing, briquetting, etc. has Large amounts of fuel can be saved in the blast furnace and at the same time the furnace performance in pig iron extraction increased.
b) Certain blast furnaces have been set up to produce certain types of pig iron. That’s how it is to win phosphorus-containing pig iron is cleaned up been.
c) The development of new steels has made encouraging progress thanks to the exchange of experience between the plants involved. By replacing the previously high-alloy steels with low-alloy replacement steels that serve the same purpose you get large quantities knew how to save on alloying agents.
d) New production processes have been developed. This purpose was also served by the purchase of patents by the Reichsvereinigung Eisen and their transfer to the member factories. To a large extent, for example b. Thomas steel, ie commercial grade steel, has been developed into a high-quality steel that is not inferior to Siemens-Martin quality .

65 BA Koblenz, R 13 XX/165, Case RGI/RMffiuM (pliers/sliders) “To the economic groups, committees and rings” dated 28. 1. 1943. - The first relevant decrees from the Reich Economics Minister dated from October 1942.
66 Ibid, Draft f. Writing Pleigers (to RWiM?), undated (9. 12. 1942); said there, Wigru Mining at RG I, November 29, 1943.
67 Ibid, R13 1/1011, 1st rationalization report of Wigru Esl v. February 14, 1942; hereafter also the following.

e) Through expansion the Electrical steel industry is the share of Electrical carbon steels and alloys Carbon steels compared to the previous one grown significantly over time.

f) It is the arrangement met, that particular groups from Stainless steel works **only** order certain steels (correctly: manufacture - DE), for example one group only structural steels, the other group only tool steels. This measure has to be certain cost reductions and others advantages guided.

g) The number of steels permitted for production has been reduced to an extraordinary extent. According to the new war list, only around 260 types of stainless steel are allowed to be manufactured, whereas previously many thousands of different types were allowed to be manufactured sorts brought on the market have been.

h) In terms of shaping, the previously very large number of rolling mill profiles is also complete considerably restricted been. The applies just as much **for** the ordinary Commercial steels, as **for** the in the War list summarizes stainless steels and special steels.

i) There is also one in the approved dimensions of the finished rolling mill products far-reaching restriction occurred. Certain factories may only particular Produce profiles and only certain dimensions. In short, this division of the rolling programs has contributed to a significant increase in rationalization in the rolling mills.

k) The production of carbide blades for high-speed tools has also been greatly reduced by significantly reducing the permitted number of blades."[68]

The rationalization be but, so restricted the Economic group your success report, before everything "through this impaired been, that our Key- and Skilled workers were predominantly called up for military service and that the replacement forces, like Women, further free and captured foreigners, at not by far the Performance as much as the drafted followers. If we were able to observe an increasing output per capita and year during peace, this can generally be the case during war no Proof provided become."[69]

The Speer Ministry's ministerial newspaper was published in the area of the main forgings ring the Example one company at, the his production at forgings in the The period from April 1, 1943 to April 1, 1944 increased by 85 percent compared to the previous year without any major increase in the workforce, and coal consumption per ton of forging material increased by 41 percent and energy consumption by 40 percent percent reduced.[70]

weapons and Equipment of war

It can be assumed that the degree of rationalization of the production of tanks, weapons and Ammunition start 1942 already relatively high was.7[1] One rapid, essential reduction the Types let itself on this one sector not realize. But the

68 *Schumann, Wolfgang,* Post-war planning the Reich group Industry in the Autumn 1944, in *JfW,* 1972, T 3, S. 288f., Dole 4 (Wigru Esl at RGI, 10. 1. 1945).

69 Ibid, S. 288.

70 *News <ks RM{RuK,* No. 28, 9. 6. 1944.

71 That's what it said, for example in secret Part of the annual report Rheimnetall-Borsig AG door the fiscal year 1941: “While the number of workers compared to the previous year 8.1 percent

Minister of Ammunition guaranteed an essential prerequisite **for** the continuous flow of rationalized large-scale production by depriving the Army Weapons Office and other military departments of the opportunity to constantly come up with new type requests and a variety of them Change requests in the production to talk into it. New constructions and Design changes of weapons and equipment including The required number of units required agreement between the Wehrmacht and the Ministry of Munitions since 1942, i.e. des consent of Minister of Ammunition. Spear, supported on his immediate Contact with Hitler, ultimately largely exempted the Army Weapons Office from making decisions on design issues via the development commissions the hand.

He also advocated to the Army General Staff for a "flawless and calm continuation" of the "initiated series production" [72] . He protected the industry - however not always successful [73] - against an erratic order policy of the Wehrmacht and thus the time-consuming and energy-consuming start-up and adjustment difficulties with design changes and small batch sizes. In a letter from 12. February 1943, he informed General Kurt Zeitzier, he had the head of the Army Weapons Office once again pointed out that from his, Speer, Powers of attorney Demand results in “all to him " I will only submit any new program requirements to the industry once I have given my express approval." [74]

Things were different in the Air Force, over which the Minister of Munitions had no influence in this regard before 1944; of which they put there only slowly rising or fluctuating Production figures are eloquent testimony.

Her significant Rationalization successes achieved the Main- and Special committees mainly through concentration the production and corresponding series production in the “best companies”. the “exchange of experience”, i.e. by communicating production experiences and Technologies, procurement from licenses etc. to less effectively producing companies; through specialization and cooperation, especially by concentrating the leading companies on the main ones Work processes and by awarding numerous subcontractors and underdeliveries to other, often medium-sized and smaller companies; through “definement”; through Material saving.

The sources about concrete Rationalization steps and successes are relatively very sparse, especially in the so-called final armaments production. [75] Speer gave a summary number in November 1942: “Many working committees are through operational Performance comparisons Performance improvements from 50 percent and more

increased, sales increased by 34.5 percent and production by 38 percent." (ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 1735).

72 Ibid, Movie 1732, spear at Zeitzler, 2/26 1943.

73 Please refer *Weyres P. LePetww,* S. 122.

74 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 1732, spear at Zeitzler, February 26, 1943; s. a. ibid, spear at Leeb,
12.2. 1943: “The Leader At the time, he clearly ordered that the program requirements he had set would not be accepted by either the Army General Staff or the Army Weapons Office without my express consent may be changed with consent."

75 Related documents the main committees, special committees, working committees, etc. have not yet been found. In contrast, examples of rationalization from other industries were even publicly propagated (see *Weyres P. LePetzow,* p. 46, p. 50: Article from “Frankfurter Zeitung”).

achieved ...been." [76] In March In 1943 he spoke of “extraordinary successes” in 1942 at the reduction of Raw material-, particularly of Iron- and Steel consumption:
“We have been able to and have tripled in the area of weapons For this...only 30 percent more iron was needed." [77]
In increasing extent the rationalization experts turned the monopolies are particularly keen on material consumption standards. The head of the Main Ammunition Committee, Edmund Geilenberg, declared at the beginning of 1943: "We have many kg (steel - EN) a save can ... We become in the reduction some calibers see every gram of steel, because the enormous number of pieces produced has an impact on the ammunition every gram clear out of We have further Try run, around the reduce operating weights
set. But there are economic limits, ie the wear on the tools is so great that it is not possible profitable to go further down." [78]
More detailed Data lay above the production of Supplier parts before. The Daimler-Benz Group concentrated beginning 1943 the production of Speedboat engines (20-cylinder diesel engines), previously manufactured in Untertürkheim and Berlin-Marienfelde, in the Untertürkheim factory. Production there was so thoroughly rationalized that both companies ran more engines than before with fewer workers and fewer machines together generated became. From the 1. March 1943 at was the Donut plant for the
"Panther" production cleared:
„1) One Manufacturing area from 10000 sqm was for Pz production released.
2) 243 machine tools were handed over to the Pz production (only 59 machines were for taken away from naval production).
3) An additional 420 workers were deployed for Pz production, while 100 workers after Untertürkheim transferred became.
4) The entire relocation took place without any loss of production for the navy. It was in the Consequence not only in each single month of year 1943 same number of engines delivered as before, but the Untertürkheim plant also produced a total of 231 20-cylinder diesel engines in 1943, 21 engines = a full month more production than in 1942 from the Untertürkheim works and Marienfelde were delivered together." [79]
In the Munich headquarters of the BMW Group, production of the Type 801 aircraft engine (for fighter aircraft) increased within a year, from December 1941 to December 1942, from 160 per month on 360 Piece. The rationalization documentation for pointed to this engine countless construction and process improvements and the introduction of flow production all important parts. Each engine was from 1940 to 1944 - with an enormous increase in the number of units and a significant improvement in construction and engine performance - the total material requirement increased by 49 percent and the number of working hours increased by 60 percent lowered.SO (Tabel 44)
In the Annual report for the Year 1943 presented the Arado Aircraft factories GmbH firmly, that

76 *News of the RM{BuM,* No. 15, November 30, 1942, Rs. RMfBuM "At the leaders of the committees and Rings" from November 16, 1942.
77 ZP-P, March 2, 1943, 35. Meeting.
78 Ibid.
79 B.A Koblenz, R 3/1576, Daimler Benz AG (Reel) at RMfRuK, February 2, 1944.
80 Ibid, R 3/1752, Group report O. D. (approx Beginning 1945): “BMW. expansion the Plant facilities and start-up of deliveries".

in 1943 the number produced Aircraft numbers have increased by a third compared to the previous year with approximately the same workforce. St
However, the "Reich Marshal's Industrial Council for the Production of Air Force Equipment" stated at the beginning of 1943 generally a backlog of rationalization the airplane or air defense industry; above the intercompany Performance comparison give it
“So far, relatively little Success reports".82 The At the same time, the Industrial Council announced that it was “in accordance with the demands (! - DE) of the Reich Minister **for** Armament and Ammunition agreed with the Reich Aviation Ministry that in the future inter-company Performance comparisons are carried out by the committees and rings under the leadership of the Industrial Council become".83
A However, the success of such and similar measures had to remain limited as long as the number of produced Aircraft types still increased.
In the Naval armament set a comprehensive and coordinated Rationalization immediately after the takeover of this armaments sector by the Ministry of Munitions in the second half of July 1943 and after the reorganization of the Main Shipbuilding Committee under Otto Merker (Klöckner Group).! [14] In the armaments program of the Navy the Number of types radical shortened, the Shipyard capacity largely on concentrated on submarine construction. The construction of submarines was completely new because of the great vulnerability of the usual types of boats to the modern defense equipment of the Allies Types should be changed has now been thoroughly rationalized. end of July already could the minister on the meeting the Headquarters planning with results attend:
“In the Navy, we whittled down the future types, no fewer than 11 future types, down to two in a single session. We have brought together the designers of all shipbuilding companies and the navy in one warehouse (i.e. H. in Blankenburg/Harz - D.E.), where she so this two Types draw and edit." [85] The construction drawings for the new 1600 tU-Boat XXI for example created in the summer/autumn of 1943 this one Design office. In the In November/December 1943 the boat went “from the design drawing to series production”.86 This process boasted Spear, that instead of the two until three Years, the normally up to Ready for series production necessary were, now about one and a half years less were needed,8 [7] although at strong increased Risk to fitness of the series product.
The submarine was also produced in a new way, using sectional construction. The individual ship sections were built inland and assembled in the shipyards. In this way, the transport routes and the delivery system multiplied became more complicated; But series construction and flow production significantly increased labor productivity and the speed of completion. In addition, the risk decreased significantly which would otherwise be under construction in the shipyards for months Losing boats to air raids.
The precision mechanical-optical industry rationalized under the leadership of the Zeiss Group dominated Special Committee Optical and precision engineering Armament device

81 Ibid, R 2/5723, report d. Managing directors the Arado Aircraft factories GmbH f. 1943.
82 Ibid, R 3/3117, Rs. of Industrial Council the air force v. February 15, 1943.
83 Ibid.
84 Please refer S. 134f. u. S. 163f,
85 ZP-P, 29. 7. 1943, 44. Meeting.
86 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 1732, speech Speers in Krampnitz before Command. generals and corps chiefs on January 13, 1945.

Table 44
Expense at material and Worker for a Airplane engine (BMW 801) 1940 and 1944

	Total material requirements (kg)	of that (kg) steel	Light metal	Heavy metal	alloy steels (kg)	of that (kg) chromium	manganese	nickel	molybdenum	vanadium	work expense (Hours.)
1940	5445	4100	1185	160	2800	62.0	16.0	7.5	3.0	0.2	3150
1944	2790	2100	670	20	1863	33.3	18.0	3.5	0	0.77	1250
1944 in percent from 1940	51.2	51.2	56.5	12.5	66.5	53.7	112.5	46.7		385	39.7

Source: BA Koblenz, R 3/1752, Group report or D (approximately Early 1945): "BMW. expansion the Plants and Start-up of deliveries". - The finished one engine weighed, depending on the type, 1200 to 1800 kg.

Table 45
Airplane pattern and variants 1939-1944 _

	Number the pattern	Number of the variants
1939	17	3
1940	14	6
1941	16	7
1942	22	6
1943	23	10
1944	27	11

Source: Groehler, Story of Air war, p. 407.

Table 46
reduction Pon *Types and production stables in the precision mechanical-optical Industry (as of August 1944)*

Product	type number before	, afterwards	Manufacturing locations before	and after
Command device 40			334	64
Prism lenses	300	14	23	17
Lenses (for Wehrmacht and civilian purposes)	3000	180	35	6

Source: Weyres P. [.epetzow, S. 119f.

(later: Main Committee for Precision Mechanics and Optics) their production was primarily intended for the Wehrmacht on very extensive way. (Tabel 46)

The “exchange of experience” in the production of gyroscopic devices for the Air Force - an example **of** that detailed rationalization work - was organized in such a way that the management of the special committee for optical and precision mechanical armament equipment took over the main factory of Zeisslkon AG in Dresden with the supervision of two other plants (Anschütz & Co. GmbH and Feinmechanische Werke Neumühlen GmbH, both in Kiel). The Zeiss lkon AG demanded already in your first suggestions from the February 1942, the entire production management, particularly but the Work preparation (Tool construction and

-production, piece time determination, work planning) of both plants to be thoroughly turned inside out and standardized, all tools, to teach and resources to “normalize” and material purchasing, -management and -centralize storage.88 “Both works need one Language talk, so that, if Work from one in the other ·plant be awarded, these without any further preparatory work can be taken over, including the tools and the pre-calculated production times." 8 9 Specialists **for** work studies and other rationalization measures should possibly in Dresden trained become.

Zeiss lkon presented Anschütz & Co. Calculation documents for the Milling from bevel gears to Disposal and took for it yourself the Experiences this company at the balancing of roundabouts.90 To a certain extent there was also an exchange of personnel between the three involved works take place.

A year later, after numerous mutual Visits and inspection trips - those responsible at Zeiss lkon AG were still dissatisfied with the level of rationalization that had been achieved. They asked a new Catalog from requirements on, the T h i s t i m e e v e n included the review of the work area and the "efficiency" of plant managers, the immediate introduction of piecework in both plants, the ongoing "production time comparison with Dresden" and strict examination of order invoices.91

Motor vehicles

The motor vehicle industry already produced a high percentage **for** the makes defense. Every The capacity released through rationalization, every worker released from “civilian” production, could usually be used directly in Wehrmacht production without changing the production conditions and the workplace Speer prompted Removal of “Authorized persons for the Motor Vehicles", by Major General Adolf v. Schell 9 2, the poorly controlled competition of the main committee Motor vehicles with the main committee for tanks and tractors and finally the reshuffling of the positions of the director of the Main Committee for Motor Vehicles and the Economic group Vehicle industry93 fathered however also from fragmentation

87 Ibid.; s. a. speech in poses at the 3. 8th. 1944 (ibid.).
88 B.A VEB Pentacon Dresden, No. 149, report from Obering. Meyer (Zeiss Icon), February 24, 1942.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid, Anschütz & Co. at Zt>iss Icon, 6. and 19. 10. 1942.
91 Ibid, report Meyers above s. Trip after !Gel at the 1st/2nd 2. 1943, v. 18. 2. 1943.
92 Please refer S. 66.
93 Wilhelm Sheep, Board member of BM\V Group, became instead of from Paul Werner's

and competition in this industry, the itself on a consistent rationalization has a detrimental effect had to.94

Effective to form the Rationalization work were Factory inspections and Commission deliberations in which experts from the Motor Vehicles Main Committee and its special and working committees examine individual **car** and truck types for material savings and design simplification checked out. This is how it was done the Stoewer AG the Passenger car type 40 ("war type")95 and at the Büssing NAG the 4½ t truck ("war type") examined. The rationalization protocol, that at the Büssing NAG was recorded in Braunschweig, pointed 118 Meeting points on, in whom it around the Saving non-ferrous metals on parts of the truck was possible, and 27 points concerned simplifications in the design and equipment of the truck (e.g Elimination of the rear fenders, shortening of the exhaust pipe, simplification the hood).96

Immediately after taking office, Minister Speer demanded that the main committee be formed Motor vehicles one thorough Type restriction and Standardization of trucks. Three types (1.5 t, 3 t, 4.5 t) with identical substructure (springs, wheels, rubber profiles, screws etc.) and standardized engines and gearboxes should suffice.97 The responsible processor of military economy and Armaments Office: "Russian conditions".98

In the Years 1942 was the Variety of types in the vehicle construction already strong melted away.

Table 47
Manufacturing types of vehicles 1939 and 1942 (number of types)

	Motorcycles,	**cars,**	trucks,	car trailers	, truck trailers
1939	150	55	151	658	1367
1942	26	29	23	3	8th

Source: The effects, S. 175.

Under Wilhelm Schaaf, the Motor Vehicles Main Committee underwent a thorough reorganization in the vehicle industry before, the she completely open War conditions aligned:

"Motorcycles: This was done at the request of the Wehrmacht 125cc bike back in the war program began. However, it will only be in one Execution, namely at the Auto Union built. The 250 cc class became completely deleted, resulting in an NSU and a Steyr type will be eliminated. The 350 cm motorcycle from Auto-Union remains in the range. The exit of the super heavy Krades at BMW and Zündapp was at the special request of the leader arranged. The The entire war program will therefore only exist in the future from the 125 cc and the 350 cc motorcycle the Auto Union.

Head of the main committee (November 1942) and instead of from Rudolf Egger Director the Economic Group (February 1943).

94 A Rationalization (typification) program larger style was with first few Success already in 1939 in preparation for the war at the request of the GB for Motor Vehicles, Colonel Adolf v. Schell, developed by the economic group *(Kirchberg,* p . 131 ff.).

95 B.A Koblenz, R 3/287, Rationalization protocol v. 21. 5. 1942.

96 Ibid, R 3/284, Rationalization protocol v. 16. 6. 1942.

97 *Weyres-1.1. Levetzow,* S. 73; FB, April 4, 1942, Point 40.

98 AT WiRüAmt v. April 17, 1942, quote at *We1Jres- 1.1, Levetzow,* S. 73.

Kettenkräder: After initially being looked after by the Main Committee on Tanks, the Kettenkrad was included in the war program of the Main Committee on Motor Vehicles. A strong expansion the production had to on reason for the high requirements of the force are provided for; it will be achieved by adding several plants .

Car: The outlet of Tatras 1.31 bucket car and of Stoewer light Standard passenger car became arranged, like this that as a light car only the Volkswagen, namely as a bucket seater and as a swimmer Motorcycle rifle wagon built becomes.

Truck 0.65 t: The final outlet of Framo type became arranged, so that also in this Class only still a Type, and that is the Tricycle cart from Vidal & Son i s built .

Truck 1 t: In this Class will still be the Borgward 1-ton truck was the only type built become.

Truck 1.5 t: At dem already earlier caught Decision, two 1.5 t types to build, and that is the phenomenon and the Steyr held. The phenomenon becomes exclusively as an ambulance Built and the Steyr primarily as a heavy Wehrmacht passenger car. The replica of the Steyr type the Auto Union has now started.

Truck 3 t: There were all Measures taken to in this for the Wehrmacht's most important type class to come to real large-scale production. How earlier decided to keep the Opel and the Ford in the program. The replica of the Opel car at Daimler Benz was supported through special measures, so that the first ones were there at the end of this year Opel cars are produced. On those first planned change also from Borgward to Opel was dispensed with. For this purpose, the capacity at Borgward was made available to the Main Tank Committee. Ford's production is increased by bringing in the Ford factory in Paris expanded. The Klöckner 3-ton truck will expire in the second half of this year.

Truck 4.5 t: On the originally planned construction of a standard type at the Büssing company, Daimler Benz, MAN and Saurer was omitted because the conversion effort seemed too great. The following approach is taken: Büssing and Daimler-Benz continue to build their existing models. The companies Saurer, ÖAF and Fross-Büssing form a working group, the Daimler-Benz type recreates. MAN is eliminated. The capacity was transferred to the Panzerwehr.

Truck 6.5 t: In this type class, the 3-axle Tatra remains in the war program. It **is** now being built in a new all-wheel drive version with a 12-cylinder air-cooled engine. The vehicle is intended to be used by pioneers and for the transport of heavy loads Reich Labor Service deployed become.

Mule: The Special Offer 3 t-mule was carried out successfully despite great difficulties. In the future 3 t program, a certain number of Opel and Ford cars are planned in the mule version. Development work is underway to create it also a 4.5 t mule.

Raupenschl,epper Ost: The originally planned large number was changed. Through this will be one Re-allocation of production required however still no final ones Decisions made become could.

Wheel spinner East: At the special request of the Führer, this vehicle is being built by Skoda-Asap in Jungbunzlau recorded been.

Traffic tractor: The program is unchanged remained.

Field scluepper: The regulation of Agricultural tractor program prepared quite special

Difficulties. It was only in the last few days that final decisions could be made. which will lead to a decisive reduction in types and production sites .
Trailer: The program is in the essential unchanged remained." [99]

machinery

Most important method of Rationalization in mechanical engineering was the type restriction. In the first quarters of 1942 , the types of machines produced decreased significantly, while, for example, the mechanical engineering industry's total production of machine tools 1942 opposite 1941 from 198000 on 166000 Piece (around 16 percent), by weight by six percent and measured by the price amount by only four percent.100 In total, up to mid 1942 around 72 percent of the types were taken out of production.101
The head of the main committee, Karl Lange, issued the decree in his capacity as authorized representative for machine production or, as the Reich Commissioner for Mechanical Engineering, numerous manufacturing bans, for example for textiles, shoes, construction, building materials, laundry, printing and office machines.1° [2] However, such orders always contained numerous exceptions and were slow anyway and followed with resistance. The production plan for typewriters for the financial year 1943/44, for example, still contained 5,400 typewriters per month (compared to 16,070 in the "old production plan"), however under concentration on five from before 13 Companies and laying off 58 percent of the workforce.103
The concentration of production in mechanical engineering continued until the fall of 1943 . The Type reduction in machine tool production amounted to 74 as of October percent (3125 from 4251 construction work). [1] [04] A similar higher percentage from
Companies or parts of the company had switched to different production (including the production of weapons and military equipment). been shut down. The total production of machine tools in mechanical engineering in 1943 was still 140,000 units; the were 29 percent less than 1941 (according to Weight at eleven percent and according to the prize amount by eight percent less).105
Immediately with the production of weapons and At the beginning of 1944, 415,700 workers were employed in the mechanical engineering industry ; That meant the exemption of over 44 percent of all workers for this production.106

99 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 9088, BI. 224!., protocol the meeting of the Grand Advisory Board the Wigru Vehicle industry (lecture by Schaaf).
100 *The effects,* S. 224, Table 26; something higher absolute Pay ibid, S. 217, Tab. 16 and 17.
101 After *Frankfurter Newspaper,* October 25, 1942, quote at *Weyres P. LePetzow,* S. 48f. - The Judging by the absolute figures, Frankfurter Zeitung only based it on a (uncontrollable) selection of types.
102 B.A Koblenz, R 3/134, arrangement v. 22. 5. 1942.
103 Ibid., R 13 111/282, plan (Wigru Maschinenbau) v. 10. 2. 1943. - According to this plan divorced two of the largest producers, the Companies walker and Mercedes, completely off, ie, she went complete to production from weapons and Equipment of war above.
104 Ibid, R 13 111/397, Lineup of HA Machinery, was standing October 1943.
105 *The effects,* S. 224, Tab. 26.
106 Ibid, S. 222, Tab. 23.

Tabel 48
reduction 110n Production facilities in the mechanical engineering (Was standing October 1943)

	Production take place beforehand percent	remaining Production sites	reductions in
machine tools (57 product groups)	909	369	59
Woodworking machines (19 product groups)	393	89	77
Power machines (2 product groups)	70	25	64
Compressors and pump (7 product groups)	185	101	45
Processing machines (5 product groups)	92	29	68
Paper making machines (3 product groups) printing machines	51	13	75
(5 product groups) office machines	43	8th	81
(11 Product groups) lifting equipment	86	20	77
(50 product groups)	2068	579	72
Large- and Quick scales (12 product groups)	313	22	93

Source: B.A Koblenz, R 13 111/397, List of HA machines, “Reduction the number of the manufacturing locations in Mechanical engineering", as of October 1943.

Tabel 49
employees in the Mechanical engineering industry July 1939 and January 1944 (in 1000)

	July 1939	January 1944
In total	867.1	1120.9
of that: workers	710.0	939.7
of that: In the immediate war production busy workers	35.0	415.7
In percent all workers	4.9	44.2

Source: The Effects, S. 222, Tab. 23.

Locomotive Yen

The newly formed main committee for rail vehicles under Demag director Gerhard Degenkolb left one to construct a “refined” standard freight locomotive almost the entire locomotive construction capacity was concentrated. This “stopped the planned further development the Steam locomotive in that one period on"_i07 The "War Engine"

107 *Us belong the railways,* Berlin 1960, S. 242.

(War freight locomotive model series 52) pointed one simplified construction and primitive, robust design; People deliberately made do with a shorter lifespan the better Series capability and the Savings at raw materials and workforce. Compared to the peacetime version of the 50 series, which was built until 1941 man it, „the around 6000 individual parts ... on around 5000 too reduce, from those more 3000 Parts changed, the is called simplified, were. Became the locomotive coupled with the also newly developed tub tender, the overall use could be reduced in weight from 165 baptism 139 t (away 1943: 130 t) ever locomotive, so around 16 Percent, lowered become. The savings of time fraud approximately 6000 working hours or 30 percent... The total demand for non-ferrous metals was reduced without affecting the performance of the machine significant to affect ... Besides came instead of from Siemens-Martin Stahl largely Thomas steel for application." 108
The locomotive also showed elements of technical progress, similar to the newly developed lightweight passenger cars and large-capacity freight cars,109 but overall "could not be viewed as a modern development of the German steam locomotive ".110
rationalization and cost-cutting measures were also implemented on a large scale in signal and signal box construction the Germans Reichsbahn introduced. 111

"ZiYile" production

The kicking off for rationalization in the Consumer goods industry gave End 1941/beginning 1942 the Formation of the General General Committee Wehrmacht equipment (also: Main Committee IV Wehrmacht equipment; later: Main Committee Wehrmacht and General device). Wilhelm Zangen. Tongs floated before the rationalization through the "Organization of the commercial economy", ie through the economic groups and specialist groups to let. He arranged at, that within the Business groups all as
"General Wehrmacht Equipment" items were recorded, all the companies that produced them were grouped together into working groups based on similar products this in turn in special committees summarized would. 11 2 The Chairman the
Special Committees should, he demanded, “be industrialists who have a comprehensive Overview about the Productions of the sector 'General Wehrmacht equipment' in the industry in question" 113 ; as He wanted “a manufacturing expert” to lead a working group out of one like this Company" see, “the the most rational working methods dem relevant Manufacturing area for application brings".1 1 4
Still at the same Day empowered him the Reich Minister of Economics, his “Working for rationalization the production of general Wehrmacht equipment ..., so far itself

108 *Gottwaldt, Alfred B.,* German War locomotives 1939-1945, 2. ed. Stuttgart 1974, S. 39. Please refer also *Weyres-Y. LeYetzow,* S. 60ff.
109 *Us belong the railway paths,* p. 245.
110 Ibid, S. 242.
111 Ibid, p. 237f.
112 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 2312, AO Zangens v. January 9, 1942.
113 *anatomy of war,* S. 372, Doc. 188, Rs. Zangens to AO v. 9. 1. 1942.
114 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 2312, AO Zangens v. 9.1. 1942.

If this proves necessary or expedient, it should also be extended to other industrial production. "115

Significantly, in his orders and calls in January 1942 , Zangen repeatedly emphasized that the production restrictions and shutdowns "only for wartime Validity" had, and secured the affected Operated - most of time middle and smaller Companies - to, that "the resumption of the production after dem wars

"Secured". But now only one standard should apply, "namely, how that War quickly won become can". 11 6 Yes he missed not to emphasize, that companies whose Production program through Rationalization measures changed became, „the

necessary profitability ... somehow through Compensation" secured become must. 117

A so-called selective rationalization within the consumer goods industry, with its tens of thousands of different products and its diverse, generally only weakly monopolized structure, was a difficult task, which also had to be made more difficult by resistance from the industry itself and from regional and central political authorities . In many economic groups, neither the authority nor the powers of management were sufficient to ensure a thorough typification, a radical concentration of production on the "best companies", and corresponding production settings and closures large style or also one continuous Enforce standardization and standardization.

These difficulties and emerging Uncertainties in the apparatus of the "organization of the commercial economy" were reflected in the numerous circulars and instructions Zangens out of the first months of year 1942 reflected.118 The The original demand for the fastest possible rationalization by all means was noticeably reduced. There was not much left other than the appeal, the " concentration of production few companies" as "the most urgent and also regarding her Importance and significance

"most urgent task", 11 9 and the call to "ensure reciprocity in the exchange of experiences", 1 20 not with this "only the big ones ventures

to claim the right for themselves from the smaller companies Factory tours and Investigations above the Manufacturing process to hire, rather that vice versa

straight the large companies see their task in smaller companies and their specialists insight into their methods to grant".12 1

Characteristic of the lack of authority and assertiveness on the part of the economic groups educated Rationalization committees was it that Pliers with Speer promised to clarify "whether it is necessary to better fulfill this most important task (meant was the mentioned concentration the production - D E.) the Chairman

of the special committees should be appointed directly by the minister, including this one Appeals on the Working group leader to expand" .1 22 This happened however open

visibly not, probably because the Reich Minister of Economics one so extensive Dismantling

115 Ibid, RWiM at pliers, 28. 1. 1942.
116 Ibid, call Zangens at the operations manager, 23. 1. 1942.
117 Ibid, Rs. Zangens at the Wigru ladder pp., 31. 1. 1942.
118 For example Rs. v. 31. 1. and 5. 2. 1942 (BA Koblenz, R 13 1/1011).
119 *Anatomy of war,* p. 386, Doc. 199, AN ex. d. Discuss Zangens with the managing directors of the economic groups on March 5, 1942.
120 B.A Koblenz, R 13 1/1012, Rs. Zangens v. 30. 3. 1942.
121 Ibid, Rs. RMfBuM v. 23. 3. 1942.
122 How Note 119.

did not agree with his own competences in the field of "organization of the commercial economy".

In the spring 1942 ordered Pliers finally for his "overall task", d. H. for the "rationalization mandate", as well as for the overall supervision of the "self-responsibility of the armaments industry", the him by decree of Todt at the 6. April 1940 had been transferred ,123 "in the agreement with the Reich Minister for armament and ammunition and The Reich Minister of Economics, as his "deputy", the head of the armaments supply office in the Ministry of Munitions, Walther Schieber.1 [24] In this way, the Reich Ministry of Armaments and Munitions now had direct control the Rationalization work in the Business groups and broke with it in one domain of Reich Economics Minister a. Besides that pointed itself with this Decision already one certain Shift in balance of power within the grouping RGI - Ministry of Ammunition an.125

The rationalization in the Consumer goods industry took steps Under these circumstances progressed at a very uneven pace until the end of 1943 . In branches again In the electrical industry and the precision mechanical-optical industry, the production and technical development of consumer goods and “civilian” products in general were increasingly restricted, while the rapidly growing production in the armaments sector was restricted by the new state monopolies Institutions effective regulated and rationalized, which were either direct organs of the Ministry of Ammunition from the beginning, like the Main ring electrical engineering products, or first at one Economic group were formed, like the Special Committee on Optical and Precision Mechanical Armament Equipment. They dominated here the relevant industry sector dominant monopolies (Siemens, AEG, Zeiss), which had decades of practice in rationalization issues and cementing their new powers and Strengthening their industrial Position of power exploited.

The rationalization had a different character in industries whose raw material quotas were significantly reduced during the war and which were affected by numerous bans on use and production, such as the leather and textile industries. She was already here with most of the people Start of war used and limited itself in the essential on the concentration the remaining production in the most efficient companies and on material savings.1 [26] Here, capacities and product range were drastically reduced, the Work skills and specific craftsmanship Skills Thousands qualified

123 The latter fact had Pliers still once expressly at the 9. 1. 1942 underlined *(Anatomy of war,* S. 371, Doc. 188, Rs. Zangens to AO v. 9. 1. 1942).

124 Ibid, S. 399, doc. 207 *(=News from the RMf BuM,* No. 3, 6. 5. 1942). - This passage is sometimes interpreted as if Schieber had become deputy head of the RGI be {approximately in *DZW,* Vol. 2, p. 293 u. S. 409); this happened but later {at the 23. 6.) and became first in the *News of RMfBuM* v. July 20, 1942 (No. 7) announced (see S. 116).

125 Please refer S. 113ff. - For the time being, Zangen viewed the development as an increase in RGI's competence. Before the Select Advisory Board the RGI explained he at the 17. 7. ,,the processes that for the Admission Dr. Schieber as his deputy. In the future, technical rationalization will... no role in the past (in the RGI work - D E.) played, one remain the permanent task of the Reich Group." Schieber takes over the leadership in fulfilling these "new tasks" {BA Koblenz, R 13 1/1059, Poensgen's transcript. d. Meeting of the Select Advisory Board RGI on July 17, 1942).

126 See, for example, the reports of the “Krumm Committee” (Wigru Lederindustrie) on leather savings, production settings etc. (BA Koblenz, R 3/311, several reports from July 30th. 1943 and final report v. October 25, 1943).

skilled workers are eliminated, so that overall rationalization represents far more regression than progress in the Development which brought with it productive forces.
Various economic groups reported significant rates of increase in labor productivity, achieved through rationalization, preferably through type reduction. But it acted mostly about products, the were mainly produced for the Wehrmacht or for other specifically military purposes: “The 1295 different types of pliers from 1938 became 1942 on 48 Types crossed out, As a result, setup times fell from 27 percent to one percent of the total manufacturing time and increased the annual Performance ever workers from 120000 on 163000 Pliers In the Barracks construction
6,500 companies manufactured 100 different types; today, 450 companies only produce three; As a result, the working time per barrack has fallen from 1,100 to 650 hours and the material consumption has decreased from 45 to 46 m3 of wood 41 until 42 m3 reduced been." 127

c) For the Overall result the rationalization

The development of the German O v e r a l l, the war economy since the beginning of 1942 left no doubt that the ruling Class determined was to continue the war with rigorous means and with a tight concentration of state monopoly regulatory power and to achieve its goals despite the collapse of its own to continue pursuing the entire previous strategy.
Rationalization in German industry, enforced under the leadership of the Armaments monopolies and under dem massive Pressure one developed state monopolistic instruments primarily in 1942, but also 1943 and on Many sectors of production will continue well into the year In 1944 an enormous one Rationalization push and proved itself as the most important and most sustainable Medium to the sudden increase the Arms production, the actually reached became. The production of weapons and War equipment (the so-called final armament production) rose from Initial status in January February 1942 until for the End the same year around around 80 percent and lay in the
Average around 45 percent higher as in the Previous year. 128 This rate of growth, the itself 1943
even increased (increase compared to 1942 by 56 percent), only leveled off significantly in 1944 (increase compared to 1943 by 25 percent).129
However, the growth phases did not coincide with the annual processes. In the final production of armaments, for those in the Ministry of Armaments (Planning Office) a monthly overall index has been calculated,130 drew itself one first Increase phase from March to July 1942 and another major push for rationalization from November 1942 to May 1943 .
In the first phase, the rationalization measures initiated under Todt had an impact, while the reorganization under spear with the usual time delay of only several months in autumn shape of one rapidly increased production • output became noticeable.

127 *Frankfurter Newspaper,* 20. 12. 1942, quote at *Weyres-11. Levetzow,* S. 50.
128 *car driver,* p. 178.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid, S. 178 (ff.). To Calculation methodology s. ibid, S. 208ff. Please refer also *Weyres - 11. Levetzow,* S. 200.

Table 50
index the final production of armaments 1942/1943
(January/February 1942=100)

1942	*142*	*1943*	*222*
January	103	January	182
February	97	February	207
March	129	March	216
April	133	April	215
May	135	May	232
June	144	June	226
July	153	July	229
August	153	August	224
September	155	September	234
October	154	October	242
November	165	November	231
December	181	December	222

Source: car driver, S. 178.

The persistence of production levels from May 1943 A relatively high plateau phase until the end of the year was probably mainly due to the lagging behind of the supplier industries, 131 but is also due to other factors, such as the decline in the inflow of foreign forced laborers, and the first major effects of the Allies Air raids and the increasing conversion to one Defensive armament influenced been be.

According to our rough calculation of the labor productivity index 132, this took place in the Final armament production in 1942 as well as 1943 - after a sharp decline in the previous two years - by more than each 30 percent, whereby However, the figure for 1942 may actually be a few percent lower. It can be concluded from this that production growth in these years was largely due to increasing labor productivity, which in turn was primarily a result of rationalization. The above-mentioned growth rates were also achieved with a falling average level of qualification of the workforce: in 1942 this fell primarily as a result of the mass use of forced labor, and in 1943 also as a result of the inclusion of unskilled and inexperienced German workers into production.

For the entire industry, whose production only fell by around one percent (1942) or twelve percent (1943) rose, resulted itself for the Labor productivity Rates of increase of over five each percent.133

So the rationalization fulfilled the with pursued her Purpose of Armor increase. At the same time it was under the conditions of the fascist dictatorship and martial law, i<leale Source of profit for the size Capital. In the entire had she serious social

131 So *Weyres P. LePetzow,* S. 202.
132 Please refer S. 265ff.
133 Here, too, the figure for the increase in labor productivity in 1942 is likely to be in reality were lower, mainly because the during the arriving in summer and autumn size Number at foreign forced laborers in the number of employees per 31. 5. was not yet included.

Impact and economic consequences and reached the limits of capital and exploitation relations.

The rationalization was achieved through a system of state-monopolistic coercive regulation of a previously unknown nature Extent and efficiency enforced. The traditional one Principle of individual entrepreneurial decisions with regard to commitment to rationalization measures, standards, etc. was repealed. The compulsory regulation in this way seemingly eliminated the limits that competition and production anarchy placed on capitalist rationalization. In reality, however, it merely restricted certain effects of these basic characteristics of the capitalist mode of production. The contradictions were reproduced on another level, for example in the form of countless disputes over production restrictions and company closures at regional level, with the involvement of the Gaulines etc. Such frictions are inhibiting and slowed down the Rationalization process in strong Dimensions.

The rationalization measures remained in the Usually in tough competition -, under participation state monopolisticcr institutions, state and Party departments

- born compromises between the in dem relevant industry sector dominant monopolies, at the same time represented a victory for the large profiteers over the resistance of the small and medium-sized companies involved and increased their dependence ability from the monopolies.

Rationalization initially changed the corporate structure and the class structure the Bourgeoisie. The concentration of the production at the “Best operated” and the "Exchange of experiences" under leading participation this establishments favored the corporations over medium-sized and smaller companies and the defense companies in turn the corporations and other large companies in “civilian” production .

The companies leading in the committees and rings exercised ministerial or state powers arising from ministerial orders. None of the companies they looked after were able to comply with their rationalization requirements and evade regulatory intervention, especially there the Committees and rings in own The power that distributed arms orders, raw material quotas and labor requirements establishments controlled and above the fixing and recognition from Praise firmly have a say. Antitrust agreements above production and Sales quotas that have hitherto reflected the existing ratio of capital and economic Forces reflected to each other and had been legally fixed, but were no longer in force if necessary .

It were valid preferably businesses the at the guide the Committees and rings The companies that were significantly involved were the best companies, and it was these group companies whose capacities were generally fully utilized with the most advantageous orders. Small and medium-sized companies in particular were disadvantaged because they had less modern facilities and mechanical equipment. If they wanted to participate properly in the profit boom and not possibly be shut down, they had to procure or take over expensive modern machines and processes and had to pay license and other fees to the leading large companies and with less lucrative ones orders and supplies put up with.

The exchange of experiences often served to separate these weaker companies from the leading ones dependent on group companies close and them into the role of to pressure suppliers and sub-suppliers; that's how she put it Economic group Mechanical engineering for yours

Industry sector states that “as part of the necessary rationalization measures, forgiveness of underdeliveries increased".134

Significant for the hardening, yes for them Existential threat that the Rationalization for many small and medium-sized companies brought with it, for example Appeal from a special ring leader (Sonderring Armaturen) for the companies in his ring to “correctly understand” his measures, combined with a detailed justification for his concentration decrees and -guidelines, ,,after those the Selection the Companies he follows, at those a certain one production remain should". 135 "At such articles", was called *it* there, ,,the at another place in larger series are manufactured, must undoubtedly Those companies whose production share... so small is that the Processing times one fully inadmissible Reach height." After this “first selection” the “final company selection” takes place after various effort tests for the remaining companies. As a rule, production is based on each type of fitting at two powerful Companies concentric, the each other by means of “Best work plans” would have to come into “exchange of experiences”. .:\.Even minor savings in labor in this way make sense, although the cessation of production "may initially seem to have an unpleasant impact on the affected company in some cases." Finally, the ring leader defended himself against accusations of favoritism towards his own company with the telling "remark" from, "that not only the general guidelines, rather particularly also the individual Measures, after which the company, the I am a member, is allowed to keep production while numerous other companies are eliminated by the main ring of means of production and machine elements that is superior to us expressly approved became".

In dem “Field post letter one entrepreneur", the the "German General Newspaper" at the November 6th published in 1942 , found the here described situation from the The point of view of those affected is confirmed down to the icing on the cake. The representative of a group of small and medium-sized entrepreneurs led therein complaint about the inevitable pressure of the state monopoly Forced rationalization the existence of their Companies: “Whether it is the closure of companies, the appointment of ring leaders, the expansion of the powers of the economic groups, the establishment of imperial associations acts - always and always again are it Measures, the yourself in of their Final effect against the small and middle Entrepreneur judge. Or have you ever heard of an unprofitable large company being shut down and its machines, Workforce and assignments middle or small Pursue assigned became? Or that a Ring leader the interesting and worthwhile Work the Small and medium-sized companies, the fewer worthwhile against it dem Large company would have assigned?"136

Furthermore, the rationalization deepened the disproportions in the German economy that arose during the war. The increasing strangulation of “civilian” production, especially that Consumer goods production was a hypertrophic one Growth the Defense industry opposite, d. H. before everything the iron and metal processing

134 B.A Koblenz, R 13 III/13, memo the Wigru mechanical engineering v. 8th. 5. 1944.

135 Ibid, R 13 111/1284, Rs. of conductor of Special ring fittings (Dad) re: “Remarks to 1. Instruction to concentration the production on the most suitable companies", 31. 12. 1942; hereafter also the The following. Dad came from the Fa. Small, Schanzlin& Becker.

136 *German General Newspaper,* 6. 11. 1942, “Field post letter one entrepreneur to dem Essay ,The Giants'"; quote at *Neumann,* S. 642.

Branches of heavy industry including mechanical engineering, the vehicle and aircraft industries and large areas of heavy chemistry, the electrical industry and the fine mechanical-optical industry. Mainly in these branches, rationalization was also associated with advances in engineering, technology and scientific organization of production and corresponding generous investments. The most modern and up-to-date companies in terms of rationalization were the most of time as Branch plants the leading Corporations new built works for tanks,

airplanes, guns and ammunition, the exclusively Large series one and of the same type. [137]
The mentioned Progress concentrated itself so in quite more one-sided
Way in technically highly developed and exclusively or predominantly weapons and Equipment of war large manufacturing companies.

The Development of the productive forces as a result of rationalization, on the one hand the described one-sided and mostly on the production of means of destruction and destruction and is therefore itself predominant as Development from destructive forces to mark. What on the other hand the "civilian", peaceful human needs serving production concerned, so carried the rationalization here, as shown, by reducing types, this contributes to capacities and range drastic restrict and like that To reduce the productive forces that served to satisfy the needs mentioned on an economic scale .

It The attempts at rationalization ultimately failed to give it a systematic character that encompasses the entire national economy. In essence, rationalization is a general tendency within the development of social productive forces, “which Rationalization made necessary, and of which this itself was one important aspect", and cannot be limited to the individual company or individual Company, yes, not even on a single monopoly limited stay",[138]

but is “fundamentally closely related to questions of regulation of a macroeconomic nature linked". [13 9] Such Regulations of economic reproductive

processes that intervene directly in the ownership structure are through the capitalist Ownership boundaries drawn.

A Example therefor was the Attempt of Minister of Ammunition, the Electricity industry to reorganize “fundamentally”.[140] He prepared for this purpose in the spring of 1942 a decree on energy supply issued to him himself in his capacity as Inspector General for Water and energy all Powers of attorney and Decision-making powers

"above the future Development the Energy supply" [1 41] transmitted should. Apparently The draft decree even provided for the possibility of expropriations. Hitler showed himself first with Speers Intention, the Electricity industry central to regulate and to

137 In Hitler's command from the December 3, 1941 was expressly, „if necessary", the “Recreation of Factories with more exclusive Limitation on a only, at the best through Mass manufacturing producible equipment of war" demanded been (ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 1732). - Similar in relation on the was standing the rationalization applies naturally also for the Large facilities the synthetic production (Fuel, Buna), for Powder- and explosives plants etc.

138 *Walnut, Manfred,* p. 170.

139 Ibid, S. 175.

140 FB, 4. 4. 1942, Point 28.

141 Ibid.

rationalize, completely agree,142 threw but then, "Vochen later, suddenly to be the guardian of "private property". and refused dem Minister his Approval.143 The "state socialism" the Hitler and Bormann dem minister accused, 144 duration apparently in this, that the hundrets of smaller and medium-sized power plants municipal or regional administration on a national scale is sharply centralized and for the purpose of large-scale rationalization - The main plan was to have a streamlined network economy, but also a reorganization of the price structure - by Speer's offices and through the industrial "self-responsibility" d. H. through representatives the Large corporations should be controlled.

A year later, the Minister of Ammunition again put a draft decree on the matter up for discussion. This time the catastrophically changed military situation forced a decision; Those involved were also under the impression of the devastation caused by Anglo-American air raids, particularly on the Ruhr area and its energy base (dams). On the Boss meeting in the Reich Chancellery at the 17. July In 1943 there was still opposition to the "planned centralization and elimination of local self-government"; Interior Minister Frick also spoke clearly negatively of the " Struggle between large electricity supply companies to expand their sphere of influence."145 The Minister of Ammunition replied coolly: "It's just a fact that... Large corporations are usually the better ones Entrepreneurs with more rational generation are." Hitler's objection had itself on it reduced, that you Municipalities are not one of their most important sources of income "to carry out their cultural and charitable tasks".146 He finally signed on January 6th. August the decree, However, its validity is permanent limited to the war remain should.147

The further acting capitalist Contradictions and the itself out of them resulting Obstacles to thoroughgoing rationalization can also be clearly seen in the fact that naval armaments are up to 1943 and the air force armament up to 1944 in terms of rationalization life of its own led and itself not the central one regulation through the organs of Reich Ministry for Armament and ammunition subdued and that almost the entire chemical industry of this central location regulation until End of war withdrawn.

Even when it came to arming the army, the contradiction between the rationalization needs of corporations and the Wehrmacht's requirements for weapons and equipment was evident. increased itself with the crisis the Position and became in sometimes violent to form carried out. 148 The after dem raid on the USSR quickly changing and

142 *Picl,er,* S. 318, Table talk v. 6. 5. 1942.

143 Ibid, S. 476 f., Table talk v. 26. 7. 1942; B.A Koblenz, R 43 II/379, Bormann at Spear, July 27, 1942.

144 Ibid (both Sources). After this one execute!. Counter-statements too the the following Reconstruction .

145 B.A Koblenz, R 43 II/379, AT ex. boss meeting v. 17. 7. 1943.

146 Ibid, Bormann at Lammers, July 17, 1943 (re: "Leader's opinion" v. May 1943).

147 *RGBl.* 1943 1, S. 479, "Decree of leader above War measures in the Electricity industry" v. August 6, 1943. - Anyway it was said in the decree that the GIWE could "dispose of the facilities, materials and personnel in the electricity companies for the duration of the war" in order to "take all measures for the most expedient use of the electricity companies in terms of war economy to meet" (ibid.).

148 Please refer the above mentioned confrontation Speers with Time ornament and Leeb in the February 1943.

increasingly critical military situation and the forced changes to German military strategy had to have consequences for the typification of weapons and equipment and **for** the Batch size of your production entail.

The problem of the international rationalization of production within its sphere of influence remained unresolved for German imperialism. General Emil Leeb, head of the Army Weapons Office, lamented the fascist "arms junk shop " in his memorandum on "European Arms Concentration" dated December 1 , 1942149 coalition at. In the German Wehrmacht and at theirs be allies - including loot weapons - “At least 52 different models of caliber 2 anti-aircraft guns cm to 12.8 cm in use..., for which multiple types of ammunition and detonators must be provided"; likewise over 170 types of guns alone German army, at least 73 various armored fighting vehicles or armored vehicles "in the space of the axis", and alone in Germany at least

84 types of German ammunition with almost 400 types, not counting the ammunition **for** looted weapons. „Here "A huge area is crying out for 'planning' and 'rationalization,'" Leeb summed up and demanded that a corresponding "European armaments program" must be implemented Suitability and capacity should be transferred to Europe." Such a thing program came until There was no end to the war.

2. The Development the war production

a) Preliminary remark to Swtistik

The publication of German economic statistics was gradually stopped during the war years. It came although 1940 and Still in 1942 ever a tape of “Statistical Yearbook for the German Reich", but even the last one, although "secret", only contained information up to 1940 for areas of little relevance to the war economy and excluded all other ongoing ones rows of numbers with the years 1939 or 1938 away. Also in others Published

clearings of the statistical imperial office, for example by periodical “Economy and Statistics", 150 which appeared until the summer/autumn of 1944, there was no information about armaments production.151

Pay above the production from weapons and Equipment of war are in different Crowd and

149 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 2324. Hereafter also the The following. Partially printed in *Anatomy of War,* p. 412ff., Doc. 218.

150 Published semi-monthly until 1942, after that monthly; the last number (7/1944) was valid for the period July-September 1944.

151 In this work, three different terms of production are mainly used: Of course not complete and cleanly from each other are separate and they are not in either in any case with the in the contemporary statistics used match: *war production* includes the entire material Production for the War, then Not the clearly and exclusively for the civilian population producing Area; *Arms production* is in As a rule, understood as war production in the narrower sense, it includes everything that went into the equipment of the armed forces as a final product (weapons, ammunition, equipment) and the immediate supplier production (i.e. armor plates, engines and ball bearings as well as fuel and powder and explosives); *production from Weapons _ and Equipment of war* (in the statistics also: *final armament production)* includes finally only that for the armament and Wehrmacht equipment particular Final product.

Goodness from the arms offices of the Wehrmacht parts, and also fragments from economic groups and others state monopoly Institutions the War economy 15 2 above
However, for a long time no one supplied them systematically summarized and evaluated. That changed in... Autumn 1943. In the planning office In September 1943, the Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production established a “Main Planning Statistics Department”. created. There pulled man one group leading statistician under Rolf , vaguely together, the as "one the secret weapons" 1 53 of Ministry for that care for should, „that we", like sweeping! it later expressed, „the entire \economy - numerically - under control receive would".154
The main planning statistics department prepared statistical overviews of the production of weapons and weapons on the basis of information from the Technical Office and other offices and with the help of the apparatus of the Statistical Reich Office War equipment, some of which were completed back in 1940, especially
- Statistical Quick reports to war production. Armor Finishing 1 55
- Output overview 1940-1944: Weapons, Devices, Ammunition 156
- Production figures 1940-1945157 .

The secret armaments report submitted by the armaments minister was based on these figures dem Date of 27. January 1945 at the closest Circle his Employees sent,
d. H. in first line at "the most powerful monopoly masters, the in the Armaments Council, in the industrial councils and commissions, as Director the Main committees and main rings as well as of them subordinate numerous work and Special Committees and -rings the entire German armor in held their hands" _158 The report is already in the historical scientific literature published been.159 The still not published "Emission Overview", the opposite dem Secret report or. the “production numbers” in some cases, for example in the naval armor, more detailed Pay shows, is printed in the appendix of this volume.
J In the planning office, an overall index of final armaments production was also created on the basis of group indices from 1941 until January 1945 calculated, the as relatively reliable giJt.160
Special types of weapons were included in the planning office's statistics only incomplete or not differentiated enough recorded, particularly in the Marine- and air armament, but also at the most severe Army guns.

152 This Material, particularly that one the Main committees etc., is largely lost or destroyed.
153 *Kehrl,* S. 319.
154 Ibid, S. 466.
155 Used became the apparently last version with dem was standing v. February 1945, dating 15. 3. 1945 (ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 1732; in the following: quick reports REF).
156 From February 6, 1945 (ibid., film 42948); used by Boelcke *(Germany Armament in the Second World War,* p. 22 ff.).
157 Without Date; full accordance with Speers Armament report v. 27. 1. 1945 (printed b. *Bleyer,* Armaments Report), but without rounding off, with additional monthly numbers for 1943 to February 1945, monthly averages 1940 to 1944 and percentage calculations (ibid., FS, film 1732).
i58 *Bleyer,* armaments report, S. 349.
159 Ibid, S. 354 ff.; likewise. also (with errors) b. *Janssen,* S. 325ff.
160 In shape as well as from Graphics as also1 from tables; Tables printed b. *car driver,* S. 178ff.; graphics in ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 42948.

Between the statistics of the Ministry of Armaments and those of There were no fundamental differences in the Wehrmacht positions, but there were various differences, partly because of the Time Delay between dem Production output and the acceptance the
weapons through the Wchrmachtstcllen, 1 62 part also, particularly against End of war, because of missing minor supplier parts, because of Transport damage through air raids etc.
The development of other industrial sectors War production, taking into account imports and, in some cases, exports as well as production in the occupied territories, was recorded during the war years by the Reich Statistical Office (Department VIII: Industrial Production Statistics), and later also by the Planning Office. The most important ones are used, but they are by no means uniform and do not always agree Pay come out of ongoing statistical Overviews How

- Monthly numbers about industrial production (each with: production figures with special secret Character) 163
- Monthly Overviews about the Raw material supply (yearly with anthologies) 1 1¼
- Statistical Quick reports to War production165.

There were also numerous statistics about specific production areas in the reports and overviews of the Reich Associations, the GB Chemistry, and the economic groups and other state monopoly bodies.
The inconsistency the statistical Recording in this area of the war economy is one of the reasons for inaccuracies in the information and for their sometimes considerable deviations from one another. In case of doubt, slightly different information will be used in dm Sources in the following silently the more reliable and more complete,
d. H. in the Rule the later created, used.
After the war, a number of statistical source works appeared, among which the most important and broad-ranging was the final report of the United Statistical Strategy Bombing Sun·ey 166, the in the back then American occupation zone from German "Statistical Handbook on Germany 1928-1944" originally compiled by statisticians for the purposes of the occupying power 167 and the book by Wagenühr 1 68 should be mentioned.169

161 The concluded also *H'eyl'es-P. LePetzow,* p. 147, there he with Right assumes, that the military manipulated Pay of Ministry of Armaments immediately complained would have.
162 This hit far less applies to army weapons and ammunition than to the air force, because the army equipment, ever longer, the more more exclusive already in the Factories checked or. tested and accepted and finally, towards the end of the war, it no longer went through the armory offices, but directly to the front *(Leeb, Emil,* From the Armament of the Third Reich. The Army Weapons Office 1938-1945, in *Defense technology monthly magazines,* 1958, Beih. 4, p. 21f.).
163 Separate specimens in ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 1775 u. Movie 2353.
164 Ibid, Movie 2353 u. Movie 10609; “Anthology f. d. Year 19li1": ibid, Movie 4605; “Anthology f. d. Year 1943": ibid, Movie 5386.
165 Ibid, Movie 1732 (Was standing: February 1945); “Supplementary booklet to the Statistical Quick reports on war production, status: November 1944" in ibid, film 2353.
166 *The Effects.*
167 Ed. v. State Council d. American occupied territory, Munich 1949.
168 *car driver*
169 It are aside from that as for our analysis important the Work from *Bleyer* (arms report), *Birch field* (Fuel) and *Müller-Hillebrand* (Vol. 2 u. 3) to to name.

b) weapons, military equipment, Motor

vehicles weapons170

The rate of increase in the production of weapons in 1941 was very differentiated and reflected the production changes and restrictions that had already taken place before Bar Barossa. and also thereafter, in the Sign of Göring program, performed became. She was nevertheless - despite a drop in production in the second half of the year and contrary to reactionary theses from the “missed Possibilities" of year 1941 171 - not insignificant, so
at Gunners, ahead especially those in armored vehicles, and reached the highest value during the war years in automatic infantry weapons and aircraft-board weapons and light flak. (Table 51)
In the spring 1942 originated the new, extensive "weapons program", the Hitler at the 14. April confirmed.172 The dates for the output figures to be achieved were between November 1942 and December, depending on the type of weapon 1943. In almost all positions the specified numbers were met and exceeded. According to the “Performance Report of the Main Weapons Committee 1942/43” in December 1942, “the required Ejection heights almost everywhere not only reached, rather for the Part exceeded ... In the final stage which extends over two years The leader's demand has been greatly exceeded in almost all areas been." 173 (table 52)
In year 1942 lay the growth rate Total weapons still over the one on tanks. Grenade launchers, Car guns, aircraft weapons and anti-aircraft guns. Extensive stocks of processed and finished weapon parts from 1941 came about after months of greatly reduced production an immediate high increase in output possible; so rose from December 1941 to March 1942 the production of 10.5 cm field howitzers from 21 to 129 pieces, that of 8 cm mortars from 107 to 446 pieces.174 New developments included the 7.5 cm anti-tank gun Pak 40 with 2112 Piece, the MG 42 with 17900 Piece and the
"Assault rifle 44" with the first 91 Piece in Production. 1 75 The production from lnfan However, the number of weapons (excluding grenade launchers) stagnated and remained automatic Weapons even below the previous year's level.
The year 1943 was the year of the fastest increase in the production of weapons overall. First and foremost was the increase in the production of guns in armored vehicles to almost three times what it was in 1942, and to much higher levels heavy Gunners this Art. Strong above average rose also the Production of light artillery and aircraft armament (onboard weapons). It was still above average Increase in production of anti-aircraft guns (85 percent).176 (Tabel 53)

170 Under weapons (in the narrower senses) become in the following Section infantry weapons, Thrower and artillery all Art as well as Airplane weapons understood.
171 See p. 36ff. To Production development cf. in more detail *The Effects,* p. 179 u. p. 284ff. (tables).
172 sour, keywords, 14. 4. 1942.
173 Quote at *Weyres-11. Levetzow,* S. 61f.
174 *The effects,* S. 179ff.
175 *Bleyer,* armaments report; Pak t,O: Quick reports REF.
176 *car driver,* S. 178f.; Heaviness CHP: Quick reports REF.

Table 51
production from weapons 1940-1944 _

	Carbine			automatic. Infantry weapons			grenade launchers		
	pcs.	Percent 1940= 100	year increase	pcs.	Percent 1940= 100	year increase	pcs.	Percent 1940= 100	year increase
1940	1351700	100		170880	100		4380	100	
1941	1358544	100.5	0.5	324850	190	90	4230	97	- 3
1942	1370206	101	1	316724	185	- 3	9780	223	131
1943	2244062	166	64	435384	255	37	22955	524	135
1944	2585529	191	15	787081	461	81	30898	705	35

	On-board weapons	u. light Flak		artillery (away 7.5 cm) incl. heavy Flak			underneath guns in armored vehicles		
	pcs.	percent 1940=100	Jhl. growth	pcs.	percent 1940= 100	Jhl. growth	pcs.	percent 1940=100	Jhl. growth
1940	8412	100		5964	100		465	100	
1941	22856	272	172	8124	136	36	1032	222	122
1942	56691	674	148	14316	240	76	2328	501	126
1943	130467	1551	130	35796	600	150	8892	1912	282
1944	324801	3861	149	55936	938	56	15252	3280	72

Source: "Production figures"; *Bleyer,* Armament report.

Table 52
The " weapons program" 110n 1942 and his fulfillment (Selection; .'lrfonat average or monthly production in pcs.)

Weapon type	production in the Years 1941	Program objective	Target month	Actual Production in the target month
carbine 98 k	113212	250000	December 1943	207153
MG	7126	13000	July 1943	14641
1. Gr. W. 36	484	750	December 1942	750 (November 1942)
s. Gr. W. 34	378	1500	December 1942	1555 (January 1943)
5 cm Pak 38	172	500	November 1942	529
7,5 cm Pak 40		500	November 1942	290 (Januar 1943: 500)
1. I. G. 18	93	170	Juli 1943	170
s. I. G. 33	41	80	Juli 1943	77
1. F. H.	97	600	Dezember 1943	660
s. F. H.	43	150	Dezember 1943	182
10 cm Kanone 18	9	75	Juli 1943	35
2 cm Flak	623	1320	Dezember 1942	1706 (Januar 1943)
3,7 cm Flak	100	1000	Dezember 191,3	424 *
8,8 cm Flak	156	300	Juli 1943	373
0,5 cm Flak	43	100	Dezember 1943	117

• Reduced emissions because of Conversion on one New construction

Source: Weyres-11. Le11etzow, S. 67, p. 70f.

Table 53
production selected species 110n weapons 1942/1943 (in Stele.)

Weapon type	1942	1943
Carbine self-loader K 41 and K 43	6778	94806
MG42	17915	119875
Assault rifle 44	91	31218
Grenade launcher 8th cm and 12 cm	9780	22955
flamethrower	4618	11480
Aviation machine gun 131	7275	35022
Aviation machine gun 151	24909	57647
Le. Field howitzer	1285	4337
10 cm cannon	135	454
10.5 cm mountain howitzer 40	30	104
12.8 cm anti-aircraft gun	65	298

Source: Bleyer, armaments report; "Emission overview".

Probably the most critical point for the fascist army was anti-tank defense. New defensive weapons and heavy anti-tank guns were produced with extreme acceleration, without she the Effect the Soviet Tank weapon significant diminish could. The 7.5 cm Pak 40 anti-tank gun was the most frequently produced army gun in 1943. The production the Anti-tank (missile) devices "Tank Terror" and "Bazooka" ran in August 1943 and only reached larger series in the last quarter of the year.
"In the general was The German army, despite all the retreats and losses, was doing better at the beginning of 1944 weapons equipped than at the beginning of Russian War." [177]

Tablek 54
production from Anti-tank weapons 1942/1943 (in pcs.)

Weapon type	1942	1943
Lightweight Pak until 7.5 cm (without Pak 40)	6651	10437
7.5cm pack 40	2112	8739
8.8cm pack 43		1155
Tank Terror ("stove pipe")		50830
Panzerschreck projectiles		173000
Panzerfaust (fist cartridges)		350000

Source: "Emission Overview"; Quick reports REF; *Germany armor in the Second World War,* p. 23 (light **Pak).**

tank

For the fascists in 1941 and 1942, the armored car was the decisive offensive weapon in their land forces, with which they were in the main theater of war, the German-Soviet one Front, the Decision of war bring about wanted to. The Wehrmacht's demands for more tank and motorized infantry divisions dominated Hitler's so-called tank meetings. [17 8] However, the successive "tank programs" described a fever curve up to the spring of 1942, with the turning point occurring in the summer of 1941 by the illusions of the Göring program and at the end of 1941/beginning of 1942 by certain insights into the combat effectiveness of the Soviet anti-tank defense were,[179]
The tank meeting on November 29, 1941, the background of which is the bourgeois historiography many things Legends spun has, [1 80] meant in this respect one Turn,

177 *The effects,* S. 187.
178 sour, keywords, numbered the Tank meetings with Dead: No. 1: 2/18 1941; No. 2: May 26, 1941; No. 3: November 29, 1941; No. 4: January 23, 1942.
179 See ibid., Tank briefing No. 3 and 4.
180 Ludwig claims e.g., without reliable Sources to specify: „At the November 29th In 1941 Hitler was killed in one preceding the meeting of representatives of the Wehrmacht and industry briefing from Todt was asked to take part in the war, which was lost in terms of armaments and military terms To end it through political means." Ludwig cites as "evidence": "The transcript the following Main meeting in the Reich Chancellery proves that Hitler first showed up in one his long Monologues again to grasp was able to." *(Ludwig, Karl Heinz,*

when Hitler, inspired by Todt and the heads of the Armored Car Special Committee, in view of the heaviest tank losses since October 181, named modern mass production of uniform and simplified designs as a decisive problem for the war and sharply opposed it Constructing sophisticated tank types side by side and against each other said: “It is a bitter mistake to believe that we in the Exploitation of manufacturing possibilities are a leading state. The Constructions are in contrast to the practical production possibilities." It needs to be "much more extensive both Constructions on the production consideration taken become. It is advisable to do this primarily advising private industry to draw on. ... By simplifying the Construction elements must the liquid mass production promoted become." 182

In the Subsequently, the Ministry of Ammunition and the arms monopolies set this Course towards mass production of more modern, heavier tanks gradually through. He fought in 1942 However, it was reflected less in production output and in the reduction of the often complained confusion of types than in the constructive and manufacturing preparation for the production of such tanks. Förster/Paulus provide information regarding 1942 Quite firmly: “Neither succeeded To simplify and expand the construction program To limit a few types or their types, the production numbers could be pushed up quickly become." 183

The rulers undertook the “Adolf Hitler tank program”. In 1943 there was a huge military effort. With an unprecedented tank force, they wanted the initiative on the German-Soviet front at all costs seize again.

Data to Origin of "Adolf Hitler tank program"

“7th-9th. Sept. 1942

UH demands a Tank program with Goal spring 1944 from 1100 armored Vehicles (800 tanks and 300 assault guns) and 300 SPGs.

21. September 1942

Leader calls for an essential increase of tank production, there particularly heavy Tank again from special Meaning. The 90 Porsche Experimental Tiger should on Assault gun with

The well-reflected "Memories" of Albert Spear, in *GWU,* 11/1970, p. 699f.). These claims are plucked from the air and support themselves alone obscure “Notifications” Walter Rohlands {after *Janssen,* p. 33). In reality became from Hitler in this one days together with Dead and the OKW the "genius" Decree of Written December 3, 1941 (see p. 297f., further p. 35f.). The Explanations Hitler's on the "main meeting", i.e. the tank meeting, were, anyway after dem Schmundt's Protocol, clear and precise and ran full and quite f_ the in dem mentioned Decree laid down war economy guidelines beyond {s. rotocol inZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1742). - Ludwig, which was still in 1968 rather skeptical opposite the Inventions Rohlands and Janssens _ behaved *(Ludwig, Karl-Heinz,* Die German War and Armaments industry 1939-1945. A report about the state of research, in *Military History Notices,* 2/1968, p. 153f.). so 1970 one clearly apologetic Line, the he later (1974) to one system the transfiguration Todts as “Resistance” heroes against Hitler expanded *(Ludwig,* Technology, p. 382f., p. 388ff. and passim).

181 Please refer *The effects,* S. 165.

182 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 1742, Prot. d. "Tank meeting" **v.** 29. 11. 1941, v. December 7, 1941.

183 *Ranger, Gerhard/ Paul, Nicholas,* Demolition the Story the tank weapon, Berlin 1977, S. 205.

8.8 L 71 reworked become (became at the 12. 5. [1943] with 200 mm front[armor] from• delivered).
2.0kt.1942
demonstration Assault gun III with built-in lFH. Template from drawings the SFL on chassis IV for 8.8 Pak and sFH. Financial support ever 100 to 12. 5. 1943 (was fully maintained).
2. Olct.1942
Demand for an organic assault gun with a new special sIG on Chassis IV by spring 1943 (Extradition of the first 60 took place on 12. May [1943]. The new assault gun was created by Skoda).
5. Nw.1942
In the morning telephone call from the leader to Speer for the highest improvement of the Tigers. Immediate contraction all those involved in Kassel. Afternoon there determination, that opposite the one on the 3rd 11th placed Plan of 13 pieces 25 pieces in November complete become must. **(The number** was maintained and the program for the following months was significantly increased and exceeded).
8th. NoP.1942
beginning the Tank commission meeting on the Wartburg.
9. NoP.1942
Continuation of the tank commission meeting at the Wartburg. Decision on Tiger II and debate above Engine and transmission questions.
2. Dec. 1942
First Template one draft for the Adolf Hitler program. demonstration newer Tank types.
26. Dec. 1942
Visit at MAN concerning Panther approach.
January 3, 1943
Tank briefing at UH. Deletion of "Leopards". Decision for “mouse” according to Porsche's suggestion. Construction at Krupp, Assembly at Alkett.
17. Jan.1943
Leader meeting regarding strong increase of tank production. Promise for a corresponding authority regarding priority. Telegraphic consultation with Rohland. Verbal commitment beforehand from me that assault gun and Panzer IV immediately, panther and tiger from May at the largest Efforts compared to draft previous AR program increased can be made (despite written more fixed Objections from the main committee and weapons office kept full).
Jan 18, 1943
Telex from Dr. raw land (Main Committee) and General Philipps (Army Weapons Office) that tank production not only not increased become can, rather previous Commitment not could be held, there biggest difficulties. New planning is not possible before June.
22. Jan. 1943
UH signs the in the Meanwhile with everyone those involved coordinated Tank authority for the increased AR program.
January 22, 1943
"Call at the Armaments creators in the Tank construction (attack)."184

Several new large tank factories, such as the one in Falkensee (Demag Group), were literally built from the ground up since the beginning of 1943. Significant capacities of other production sectors, especially the motor vehicle industry, were converted to tank production, approximately sectors of MAN Group and the company Borgward, [1 85] but also

184 Compiled out of sour, Keywords. For the Hitler tank program s. a. S. 121ff.
185 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 9088, BI. 225f., Prot. d. meeting d. Wigru Vehicle industry v. 24. 3. 1943, Explanations d. new conductor Wilhelm Sheep.

Table 55
production from tanks 1940-1944 _

Year	Armored vehicles in total			of that light tank			medium-heavy and heavy tank			Armored vehicles in total (combat weight)		
	pcs.	percent 1940 = 100	Jhl. Increase in	pcs.	percent 1940= 100	Jhl. Increase in	pcs.	percent 1940 = 100	Jhl. Increase in	**t**	percent 1940= 100	Jhl. growth
1940	2154	100		795	100		1359	100		37235	100	
1941	5138	239	139	2263	285	185	2875	212	112	83188	223	123
1942	9278	431	81	3614	455	60	5673	417	97	140454	377	69
1943	19824	920	113	7927	995	119	11897	875	110	369416	992	163
1944	27340	1269	38	10012	1264	26	17328	1275	46	622322	1671	68

Source: Bleyer, Armament report. Lower Pay (without MTW/SPW) in *The effects,* S. 278f., Tab. 104 u. 105.

Table 56
production selected Tank types 1940-1944 (in pcs.)

Year	MTW/SPW 1 t and 3 **t**	Pz. III	Pz. IV	Tigers I	Panther	StG **III/IV**
1940	348	895	280			184
1941	947	1845	480			550
1942	2530	2555	964	78		828
1943	7150	349	3073	647	1850	3319
1944	9490		3366	623	3964	7628

Source: Bleyer, Armament report. Non-essentials Deviations in *The effects,* S. 163, Tab. 86.

the _work of Daimler-Benz Group in Berlin-Marienfelde, that previously speedboat engines manufactured had.186

In the Years 1943 lay Climax and Diploma one technical Re-armament on dem tank sector, the also in the statistics visible became. The Minister of Armaments declared at the meeting of the Tank Commission on December 21 , 1943, that the new tank types had now been brought to such a level of development that "the future tank will be based on this Series production based could. Now he has to main emphasis the Work **on** the improvement the created Types placed be." 1 8 7 {Tables 55 and 56)

The increase in production Light armored vehicles did not result in any increase in the size of the actual armored weapon. This was mainly an increase in personnel transport vehicles (armored personnel carrier) with one Combat weight from around 6 to 8.5 Metric tons. 188 The medium-heavy Armored car III ran in the Years 1943 in the Prod tion out of in favor of of Panzer IV (both with one Combat weight between 22 and 25 tons) and the heavy tanks, especially the "Tiger" (55 tons) and the "Panther" (approx. 45 tons).189 That worked to the effect that that 1943 the Year of largest relative increase in combat weight during the whole war was, further also the year of the absolute greatest increase Number of pieces. This fact is all the more serious since enemy air raids on Kassel (Henschel) and Berlin (Alkett, Daimler-Benz, Ardelt) in the last quarter caused significant production losses.190

1943 also reflected the gradual, initially hesitant transition from Offensive- for defensive armament of Army in a more informative way Way to resist. Already in the first half of 1943 directed the production of assault guns - relatively fast, mobile armored vehicles without a turret with large-caliber guns and strong frontal armor represented an effective anti-tank defense - a particularly rapidly increasing trend. However, at the same time the production numbers of armored fighting vehicles, the most important ones, increased Offensive weapon of the fascist army, significant to, with extensive conversion to the new, heavy types. Assault guns and self-propelled guns (guns on tank chassis with weaker armor) held together, the Panzerkampfwagen since the beginning of 1943 numerically the scales.

Motor vehicles 191

Suffered until 1941 the motor pool the Wehrmacht barely Losses. However was the Booty big. The production sank; nonetheless rose the Stocks. The Declarations above the Production for 1941 , however sketchy and particularly contradictory.192

186 B.A Koblenz, R 3/1576, Daimler Benz AG at RMfRuK, 2. 2. 1944 (Rationalization Report).

187 B.A Koblenz, R 3/1548, Speech record i. abstract out of d. report the Tank Commission v. 11. 1.
1944.

188 In In statistics, these light armored vehicles are often not listed under armored cars, but rather under Motor vehicles, which is the most statistical Differences explained (see *The Effects,* p. 163, tab. 86, and p. 278f., tab. 104f.).

189 Weight information after *Ranger/ Paul,* S. 209ff.

190 *Weyres-1'. Lel'etzow,* S. 142.

191 Below are in the related armaments statistics: trucks, cars, motorcycles, tractors including unarmored ones (Semi-)tracked vehicles.

192 The Declarations above TRUCK for 1941 differ around nearly 40 percent between 62400 *(Bleyer,*
armaments report; *The effects,* S. 175; *Germany armor in the Second World War,* S. 24) and

Table 57
production from motor vehicles 1939-1944 _

Year	**TRUCK·** (pcs.)	of that for Wehrmacht (percent)	car (pcs.)	of that for Wehrmacht (percent)
1939	101745	32	250788	8th
1940	87888	61	67561	42
1941	86147	59	35165	77
1!.J42	80512	72	27895	87
1943	92959	80	34478	95
1944	77177	87	21656	97

• Apparently incl. "mule" 3 **t** (away 1942) and 4.5 **t** (away 1943); see. *Bleyer,* armaments report, S. 363

Source: The effects, S. 281, Table 108.

To some extent it is certain that in the Years 1942, after the extraordinary high Losses in the fall of 1941 and the winter of 1941/42 caused motor vehicle production in general and, above all, truck production to increase started. The increase in Truck production came however entirely out of works in the fascist occupied areas (e.g. Renault and Ford in France), which already delivered three-eighths of total production in 1942.193 The Domestic production even fell.

While the Wehrmacht was generally still adequately supplied with vehicles in 1942 and was still able to replenish its supplies - also at the expense of the significantly higher Wehrmacht share at the production -, led the horrendous losses at Stalingrad brought about a turning point. In one fell swoop, around 50,000 trucks were lost; the car losses amounted to more than the annual production in 1942, the losses of tractors exceeded half the annual production. The resulting significantly increased production program for LK\V became but only to around 80 percent, the one for Traction vehicle too 85 percent Fulfills. The progressive Bloodletting the motor vehicle industry Product t ion,capacities in favor of other sectors of armament, particularly tank production, left a short supply of skilled workers, tool machines and raw materials Effect.

Nevertheless, 1943 was the year of the greatest overall increase in motor vehicle production. Heavy tractors and special vehicles for the German-Soviet front achieved particularly high emissions.

SG 147 (*The Ef{ects,* p. 281, tab. 108). The number differences for the following years are explained almost entirely by addition or exclusion of the production of the "crawler shovel". East" (since 1942) and the unarmored SFL "mule" (launcher carrier with 3 t (since 1942) and 4.5 t (since 1943). or from truck production. Table 57 shows the numbers of the long series from *The Effects,* p. 281, table 108, used (figures from the HA Motor Vehicles).

193 *The E{{ects,* S. 175; hereafter also the The following.

Table 58
production 110n chosen Types of motor vehicles 1940-1944 (in pcs.)

	Motor cycles	Chain bike	Truck3t	Mule (launcher carrier) 3 t	Crawler tractor East
1940	?	?	?		
1941	?	420	43800		
1942	?	985	51804	1635	1452
1943	37700	2450	49472	13000	14012
1944	33080	4490	38053	7310	11921

	Traction vehicle (unarmored)			agricultural
	1 t and 3 t	8t	18 t	tractor
1940	3824	996	240	?
1941	4 741	1320	240	?
1942	4440	1392	384	?
1943	4857	3251	643	14860
1944	2181	3298	834	10880

Source: Bleyer, armaments report; Quick reports (Motorcycles and agricultural tractor).

Airplanes

The numbers about the German one Aircraft production differ in the various sources [194] not insignificant. However, the total emissions figures are rarely more than that five percent apart. But the classification of the aircraft was depending on the recording location (aviation min Istcrium/Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force; Ministry of Armaments or hunter's staff; United States Strategy Bombing Survey) so different that, for example, the numbers of bombers and fighters in the statistics differ greatly from one another. [19 5] The following tables are used for statistical reasons the trustworthy and detailed figures from the USSBS financial statements in two different versions Classifications used.
What is certain is that it is in all the sources cited around *produced* aircraft, of which, according to the statistical recording, a certain percentage, which probably increased with the duration of the war but was difficult to determine, did not fulfill its intended purpose due to defects discovered during acceptance, damage or destruction during the transfer from the place of production to the place of acceptance or use was supplied c.[196]

194 Before everything *Bleyer,* armaments report; "Production figures"; *The Effects* among other things, reports the USSBS; *Groehler,* History of Air Warfare; *car driver*
195 Please refer e.g. b. the Comparison in *Tlte effects,* S. 149.
196 So put for example milk on the 17th 12. 1943 (ZP-P, 51st session): “The Emission of 2352 aircraft (October 1943 - DE) is not a real emission. Because of the weather there were so many hundred more planes standing there than in a normal month ... that 200 to 300 Airplanes confessed more have, which were not delivered are. Well comes one larger Number from aircraft in addition, at those everything from the cell away is finished and only the screw is missing or a capacitor or another instrument that has bomb damage gone broken is. Our places are stuffed with airplanes."

Table 59
production from aircraft 1939-1944 _

	warplanes overall pcs.	Percent Hunter pcs.	year 1939 = 100	To- below wax	Percent To-	year 1939 = 100	Zu- wax	bomber pcs.	Percent 1939 = 100	year wax
1939	8295	100		1856	100			2877	100	
1940	10826	131	31	3106	167	67		3997	139	39
1941	11776	142	9	3732	201	20		4350	151	9
1942	15556	188	32	5213	281	40		6539	227	50
1943	25527	308	64	11738	632	125		8589	299	31
1944	39807	480	56	28926	1559	146		6468	225	- 25

Source: The Effects, S. 277, Tab. 102

The shift in aircraft production in favor of fighter aircraft since the beginning of 1943 had influence on the average weight per aircraft (cell weight) from its peak in year 1942 (6.16 tons) to 5.55 tons per year 1943 and up 4.39 metric tons in the Years 1944 sank.19 7 In total calculated man for a Fighter aircraft with an expenditure of man hours from only a sixth to an eighth compared to that for a heavy bomber.198
However, the fascist air warfare strategists wavered and air armaments planners the question of priority for hunter production, as on the statistics in the Read detail until far in the year 1944 in.199 A more differentiated look into the Shifts between the individual Aircraft types give Pay, the after the Classification of the Reich Aviation Ministry (Technical Office) were compiled.

Table 60
production from aircraft 1941-1944 (monthly averages)

	total aircraft	defense plane fighters, reconnaissance distance	attack• aircraft (Battle- aircraft, night fighters, attack aircraft, destroyers) seaplanes)	Tactical single- sets Aircraft (day (close-up aircraft, long- explorer)
1941	952	308	291	105
1942	1274	455	409	156
1943	2091	891	459	354
1944	3328	2152	300	527

Source: Quick reports REF; *The effects,* S. 149, Tab. 84 (minor deviations).

197 *The Effects,* S. 276, Tab. 101.
198 *car driver,* S. 75f.
199 Please refer *Groehler,* Story of air warfare, S. 388ff.; s. a. the monthly Output figures 1943 in *The effects,* p. 156, Tab. 85.

The significant change in the Luftwaffe armor This was initiated by the development of the air warfare situation on the fronts, especially on the German-Soviet fronts also enforced on Germany itself. Since the spring of 1943, the Western Allies have multiplied their numbers their attacks from the air.

Table 61
Targets of attack the Anglo-American bomber and thrown off Bomb load 1941-1943 (in t)

Year or quarter	Area targets (e.g. a. residential areas)	Aircraft production	Ball bearing industry	Transportation	Different Goals	In total
1941	13131			7123	13407	33662
1942	35420			701	9651	45773
1943						187050
1/43	15039	4		1199	11678	27920
11/43	36243	1392		1291	7076	46377
111/43	39200	1880	294	1916	16491	60018
IV/43	28964	969	1119	6138	15515	52734

Source: The effects, S. 2f.

As itself the German Air defense against the in greater Height flying bomber as relatively ineffective proved, they stood Fascists the need, her Air warfare and air armament strategy to change. In the July 1943 demanded the Headquarters planning already "Succinct decisions" in the face of what Speer sees as the key problem: "Can we more hunters, more Build destroyers etc. and lay something we Quiet for that?" The Minister of Armaments explained even, him be "of the opinion that us under certain circumstances fewer tanks get along, for that but more Airplanes need".200 Also General field marshal Milk, boss the air force armor, emphasized, ,,that we still much more

Table 62
The most built German warplanes 1939-1945 (in pcs.)

	Me 109	Yu 88	FW 190	Me 110	Hey 111	Yu 87	Yu 52	Fi 156 (Stork)
1939	449	69		156	452	143	145	46
1940	1719	2538		1158	758	603	388	170
1941	2764	3348		974	950	500	502	431
1942	2673	3661	68	659	1357	960	503	607
1943	6388	3654	1474	1730	1405	1672	887	874
1944	14765	3286	5001	1525	756	1012	379	410
1945	3140	355	1104	45				11
total	31887*	16911	7647	6257	5678 (6478) **	4890	2804	2549

• Sum error in the Source.•• With the before dem 1. 9. 1939 built machinery

Source: Ploetz, Story of the second World War, 2nd ed., Würzburg 1960, 2. part, p. 128. 200

ZP-P, July 29, 1943, 44th session.

"We must have fighters". 20 1 However, the idea of a predominantly defensive air warfare strategy only became generally accepted in the Air Force General Staff and in the top fascist leadership a good six months later.

Warships

While a large warship (battleship "Tirpitz") was put into service in 1941 , construction of all further new and converted capital ships was stopped in 1942/43 . The Warship construction was standing from so at entirely in the Sign the submarine armament. But also the Submarine as only the Navy remaining offensive weapon of importance has been increasingly eliminated since the spring of 1943 . Went in 1941 in comparison for the New submarine construction 16 percent and 1942 38 percent the boats lost, like that were the boat losses since then the superior submarine defense of the Allies like that high that of May until December 1943 of 204 newly commissioned boats 183 as a loss registered became (90 percent).202

Table 63
Building Yon warships 1940-1944 _

	Submarines pcs.	\Water-repress. (1000 t)	Avg. tonnage ever Boat	destroyers (pcs.)	Torpedo-boats (pcs.)	Minesweepers u. torpedo catch boats (pcs.)	Fast-boats (pcs.)
1940	50	?	?	?	?	?	?
1941	219	162	738	5	6	?	36
1942	222	193	869	3	6	36	36
1943	292	221	757	6	6	66	41
1944	283	234	825	2	6	32	63

Source: DZW, vol. 4, p. 110 (submarine construction); different figures: quick reports REF; *Bleyer,* Armament Report (U-Boat Tonnage); "Emission overview" (other shipbuilding); different figures: quick reports REF.

ammunition

After a relatively strong "spurt" 203 in the Ammunition production from April to July 1940, which can probably be attributed less to the activities of the newly appointed Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition than to longer-term attack planning against Western Europe was, sank the production again, particularly after the programs for "Barbarossa" fulfilled and overfulfilled and all Warehouses and depots were full of ammunition .

201 Prot. d. GL meeting on July 27, 1943, quote after *Janssen,* S. 180.
202 DZW, Vol. 4, S. 110.
203 *The effects,* S. 179.

Table 64
Ammunition production 1940-1944 _

	ammunition in total GQu tons	percent 1940 =100	Jhl. To- wax	underneath (1000 Shot) Rifle , pistol , MG u. MP ammunition	other infantry ammunition	l. anti-aircraft u. on-board weapons ammunition	Artillery- ammunition from 7.5cm at upwards
1940	865000	100		2952520	29424	approx. 75000	27000
1941	540000 *	62	- 38	1343720	19736	77366	27075
1942	1270000	147	+135	1340320	40014	129767	56800
1943	2558000	296	+101	3174800	118444	196332	92950
1944	3350000	387	+ 31	5375440	170629	262687	107900

• *Ploetz,* S. 126, gives 740000 at; both Pay are unsure

Source: Bleyer, Armament report (checked after production figures).

From the beginning of the war against the USSH. at The Wehrmacht had a completely unexpectedly high one ammunition consumption, so that the Stocks quickly sank. The consumption at Ammunition for the 10.5 cm field howitzer for example fraud 1941 the 5Ofold the Production. 204 The army command got into trouble At the end of 1941 formally in panic and sent desperate Telegram to the armaments inspections with demands for “maximum output” of ammunition, especially artillery ammunition.205

After the winter crisis was over, the Ministry of Ammunition and the Army Weapons Office set up a new ammunition program fcst,206 Hitler on the 15th April 1942 together with the new weapons program (14. April).207 It consisted of an “immediate program”, that until March 1943 should be fulfilled, and an "expansion program", the demands of which extend until the end of 1944 and partly until mid- 1945 . 208 This already included future ammunition production in the Ukraine ("Ivan program") exorbitant Production figures planned.

Regardless of the enormous Requirements that the program at the industry, his positions were largely fulfilled. However, some of the most important types of ammunition fell significantly short of the target. (Tabel 65)

In view of the relatively low level in 1941, ammunition production in 1942 as a whole was and in many Ammunition types have the greatest rate of increase during the whole war<>s on. The Three- and multiples of the previous year's production achieved in each case in ammunition **for** PanzercrabwPhr and chariot guns as well **for** the rest

204 Ibid, S. 188.
205 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 3398, FS OKH (Boss HRüst/BdE) at Rüln, December 30, 1941, u. a. pieces. See p. 43f.
206 Please refer FB, 21st/22nd 3. 1942, Point 3ff.
207 *Weyres-11. Le11etzow,* S. 78ff.; hereafter also the The following. Please refer also FB, 4. 4 1942, point 9ff.; FB, 28,129. 6. 1942, Point 23ff.
208 In one case were the Planned figures even until for the 2nd quarter 1946 updated (10-cm cannon 18).

Table 65
The "Führer ammunition program" 90n 1942 and its fulfillment (Selection; Monthly average or monthly production in 1000 shots)

Ammunition type	Production in 1941	Program goal	Target period	Actual production
Infantry cartridges	76000	350000	?	298400 {December 1943) Goal reached May 1944
l. Gr.W. 36	120	150	?	226 (November 1942)
s. Gr.W. 34	135	1500	End 1943	1775 (December 1943)
7.5 cm Pak 40		450	center 1943	260 (June July 1943)
7.5 cm CHP u. StuG. Kan.	73	550	End 1943	600 (December 1943)
l. IG 18	81	800'	April 1943	1055 (April 1943)
s. IG 33	35	150	February 1943	182 (February 1943)
l. FH	296	3000	Beginning 1944	3452 (January 1944)
s. FH	221	1000	End 1944	617 (December 1943) {Goal never reached)
10 cm cannon 18	25	500	?	150 (December 1943) (Goal never reached)
8.8cm Flak	996	2000	?	1136 (December 1943) (Goal never reached)
10.5 cm Flak	52	150	?	201 (September 1943)

• Financial support on 1000 elevated (Nov. 1942)

Source: Weyres-9. Le9etzow, S. 82.

Table 66
production 90n Artillery ammunition (9on 7.5 cm at upwards) 1940-1944 (in 1000 Shot)

	Total	of it for Pak u. CHP	Other. Artillery. {without Flak)	anti-aircraft	fog launcher
1940	27000	1738	20290	3664	1308
1941	27075	875	9400	15400	1400
1942	56800	5250	32500	16700	2350
1943	92950	18000	56000	16600	2350
1944	107900	19400	67600	18400	2500

Source: Bleyer, Armament report.

artillery (without anti-aircraft guns), furthermore Grenade launcher ammunition, mines and certain types of aircraft onboard weapons ammunition. However, the production of infantry ammunition still remained below the previous year's level. (Tabel 66)
Overall, the army was sufficiently supplied with ammunition in 1942 , even if it was from hand in the mouth lived, d. H., the production replaced approximately the Consumption.209 From 1943 at

209 *The effects,* S. 181 u. S. 188.

Table 67
Production of selected ones Types of ammunition 1942/1943 (in 1000 Shot)

Ammunition type	1942	1943	growth in percent
Infantry ammunition (carbine, MG, MP)	793000	2453000	209
Hand grenades	18294	59281	224
S- and T- mines	3612	18816	421
8th cm Gr.W. 36	6790	16151	138
7.5 cm Pak 40	1295	4176	223
7.5 cm **CHP**	1812	7916	337
I. IG 18	4145	9448	128
s. IG 33	606	2236	269
17 cm cannon	74	212	186
12.8 cm Flak	44	548	1145

Source: Bleyer, armaments report; Quick reports REF; "Emission overview" (1. IG 18).

Consumption of almost all types of weapons constantly exceeded production, even though output reached new dimensions. Beginning 1944 they were ammunition stocks, to put it cautiously , "anything but sufficient" [210]
The Production of army ammunition rose since 1942 incomparable faster than the one for the air force and navy, namely from 1941 until 1943 to far more than five times, while for example the production of dropped ammunition (bombs) in 1942 17 percent rose, 1943 but still among the ·fell back to the old state. [211] The percentage distribution the Ammunition production Army, Air force, marine and Flak indicates clearly points to the priority of the German-Soviet front.

Table 68
Ammunition production for Army, Air Force, Navy and Anti-aircraft guns 1939-1944 (in percent of total production)

Year or. Quarter	Army	Air	Force Navy	Flak
1939/IV. quarter	61	17	10	12
1940 •	52	28	8th	13
1941	30	32	10	28
1942	46	25	8th	21
1943	65	14	4	17
1944 •	68	11	4	18

• Sum error as a result from Curves

Source: The effects, S. 284, Tab. 113.

210 Ibid, S. 188.
211 Ibid, S. 286, Tab. 115.

" *Miracle Weapons"*

The development and production of the so-called miracle weapons, new types of weapons of destruction, have been carried out at an increased pace since 1943.2 [1] [2] The most important developments of this kind, which went into series production before the end of the war and - to a limited extent - used at the front were the wing bombs with Rocket propulsion v 1 (Fi-103, "cherry stone" and the Medium range missile V2 (A4).

'None of these "miracle" or "weapons of retaliation" were mentioned in 1943 Quantities produced, no copy reached the front. But under the impact of the defeats on the Volga and at Kursk, these weapons became the highest priority in the war economy, and their serial production became feverish prepared. Large quantities at Machinery, at raw materials (stainless steels, Aluminum) and electrical equipment for the production of the missiles were withdrawn from other programs. The tooling requirements for device A 4", for example, the Special Committee A 4 already estimated on June 24th 1943 on 800 machines, including 328 “difficult to obtain machines” .2 [13] Als the air raid from the 18th of August 1943 on Jic When the Pcencmünde Army Research Institute threatened to delay production of the V 2 by many months, those responsible were forced to use huge underground facilities as an alternative solution Production facilities to be prepared. For this insured itself Minister of Armaments and Monopolies the Help from the SS at the ruthless "intervention" of thousands of people CONCENTRATION CAMP-prisoners.

In this sense, if not quantitatively, then at least qualitatively in armaments production again superiority to gain, put also the Responsible the air- and 11arinearmor on new Weapon systems. The air force developed - except the V 1 - Airplanes with Jet propulsion, of which the Hunter Me 262 still before At the end of the war, the Navy went into series production of submarines with turbine engines that were independent of atmospheric oxygen (Walter Submarine) and "Electric boats" with Batteries highest Power **for** long-distance use and permanent underwater travel, including a large boat with 1,621 tons (submerged in 1819 tons) water displacement (Type **XXI).** They came to armed action only few boats in the last Weeks of war. [214]

All of these weapons and numerous other projects were conceived and developed in 1943 and later by various Wehrmacht and official bodies without coordination. ,, Coordination plans had failed since 1943 simply because no one knew how to predict which weapons would be operational at what point in time and what kind (or how much - D. E.) Fuel you need would." 215

The scientific unJ The technical development of the atomic bomb was held by the central armaments departments for too lengthy and too uncertain, as that she she promoted in a similar way How Jie V-\Vaffcn. Anyway employed itself already before "Barbarossa" knowledge-

212 Facts above the Development the “\Vunderweapons”. *Ludwig,* technology, p. 444 ff.; also *INing, DaPid,* secret weapons; *Lusa, ·, Rudolf,* The German weapons and secret weapons of the Second World War unrl her further development, 5. ed. Munich 1964. Please refer also S. 154f.

213 B.A Koblenz, R 13 III/G9, Lineup of SAT 4, was standing 24. 6. 1943.

214 See the information in *History of the Second World War 1939-1945,* Vol. 10: The final destruction of fascist Germany, Berlin 1982, S. 324 f.; further *DZW,* Vol.4, S. 107.

215 *Ludwig,* Technology, S. 460.

corporate institutes, such as the Kaiser Wilhelm Society and the Reich Postal Ministry. For example, they conducted “attempts to obtain new sources of energy by smashing atoms.” through and applied to the military economics office and armaments office of OKW one higher Urgency level for the Building more appropriate Apparatus by the Austrian electrical company Elin AG the reference “to the importance of atomic destruction for the production of bombs with enormous explosive effects ”.216

The German ruler were so from the with the matter Familiar absolutely about the horrible Possibilities the Atomic bomb informed. 2 17 One the propagandists bomb was Gobbles, the itself already in the March 1942 detailed Speech hold let:

“The research on the area of Atomic destruction has progressed so far that under certain circumstances their results can still be used for the conduct of this war. The smallest effort would result in such immense destructive effects that one can look forward with some horror to the course of the war if it lasts any longer and to a later war .... German science is here on the height, and it is also necessary that we in this area

<lie first are; because who is a revolutionary Innovation in these Brings in war that has an even greater chance, to win him." 218

In view of the defeats of 1943, research and development work in this area was ultimately accelerated and the resources used for this increased. “The largest sums, the thrown out for uranium research were, went to the German Industry - the Auer society and the Degussa for Uranium, the IG colors for one heavy water system, the Companies Hellige and Anschütz for the Prototypes the

Ultrazen trifugc." 219 But the actual Residue in the experimental un<l At application research, the competition between the various departments and research committees and the successful educational and disruptive activities of the international resistance movement prevented it, that this terrible weapon in <lie hands the

<carriage Imperialists got into trouble. Later, before the Nuremberg Court, commented spear

<read Facts of the case cynical: „We were unfortunately not so far ..." 220

Before the Application from poison gas, from newly developed gases most terrible Effect,

<lie the IG Farben Group produced, frightened the fascists back, because she knew that their Opponents were prepared for it and simply because of them Air superiority means terrible retribution would have practice can.2 2 1

Incredible achievements of German inventors, designers and engineers based on international basic research in the 1920s and thirties Years built up, became like that to production from terrible weapons of destruction abused. The

216 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 8273, KTB WiRüAmt/Staff, Entry v. 5. 5. 1941 ex. Meeting with Maj. Pit (WNV) and Dr. Gladenbeck (RPostM).

217 Please refer *lrving, David,* The Dream from the German atomic bomb, Gütersloh, 1967, S. 109ff.
lrving mentions numerous relevant discussions between representatives of science, politics and business (with the participation of Göring, Speer, Vögler, the Reich Research Council, the HWA etc.). Please refer also *Ludwig,* technology, P. 240, p. 242 f.

218 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 10804, Goebbels TB, Entry v. 21. 3. 1942.

219 *lrving,* The Dream from the German atomic bomb, S. 238; s. a. S. 240 Note

220 *IMG,* Vol. 16, p. 579, Interrogation Speers at the June 21, 1946.

221 *Groehler,* The silent Death, S. 204 **ff.** Over production planning, Main production facilities and production of poison gas there, S. 154 **ff.,** p. 301 and passim.

ruling Circles hoped himself on the he dreamed extraordinary, as well as destructive and deterrent effects of these weapons; At the same time, the officially controlled whisper propaganda was intended to strengthen the population's "will to persevere" and keep them in control until the "final victory".

c) "Special questions the chemical Generation"

Since 1938, the four-year plan has been an immediate investment and production program Preparing for war.222 In his focus, he concentrated sharply on a few products that were indispensable for waging war or, in the most direct sense, weapons of war: mineral oil, synthetic rubber, light metals, powder, explosives and chemical warfare agents (poison gas). Planning and executive leadership for this portion of the plan took over a special one, from Goering newly created office, that of "General Plenipotentiaries **for** Special Questions of Chemical Production". The numerous other programs of the four-year plan, together with the various general plenipotentiaries appointed for them, were reintegrated into the traditionally responsible specialist authorities (Reich Ministry of Economics, etc.).

The four-year plan probably still existed as a more or less closed program, now in the form of the New Military Production Plan, but no longer as a unified organization. This in turn meant that the plan was implemented uniformly from the outset questioned.

On December 5, 1939, IG Farben board member Krauch (chairman of the supervisory board since 1940) was also appointed head of the newly formed Reich Office for Economic Development as GB Chemistry appointed became, 223 was one "immediate merger of main
industrial area of the four-year plan with the largest in Germany "Corporation" 224 entered.

The GB Chemistry and the Reich Office **for** Economic Development as its executive apparatus were now the only significant independent descendants of the former four-year plan organization. However, as early as 1939, the economic policy program of GB Chemie and its power went far beyond that the original four-year plan organization. It was de facto a A separate Ministry of Chemical Armaments was created, a "Reichsamt" actually in the old sense of the word, at least with much greater impact than that in its broad production sector Imperial War Office Germany.

The military and economic concept on which the four-year plan was based was the blitzkrieg strategy and the rapid establishment of an essentially trouble-free, fascist-dominated European "greater economic area" for later conflicts with the other imperialist ones world powers. It initially seemed to work, but then failed completely after June 22, 1941. This was linked to the eventful fortunes of the four-year plan. Both the institutions themselves and their production and investment programs, and here again different programs of varying extent and time, were subject to war-related change .

222 *tape I,* S. 16f., S. 45ff. Hereafter also the The following. Further *Petzina,* self-sufficiency policy,
S. 116ff.

223 *tape I,* S. 109.

224 *Petzina,* self-sufficiency policy, S. 123.

In general, the extent and pace of capacity expansion depended on the availability of building materials, especially structural steel, machines and equipment, and labor; This in turn depends mainly on the urgency officially assigned to the respective program was. urgencies and priorities but changed depending on the military situation and strategic situation.

What was particularly characteristic of the first two years of the war was the more or less opposite development in the expansion of fuel and powder and explosives capacities. From the summer of 1940 onwards, the high pace of powder and explosives development was gradually slowed down because little ammunition had been used in previous campaigns and large stocks had been accumulated. Was forced On the other hand, the expansion of capacities for synthetic fuel slowed down for a short time after the outbreak of war and particularly for aircraft fuel, the in the second half 1941 under the flag of the Göring program Climax crlived. [225]

As the general authority of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan In the spring of 1942 it was de facto transferred to GB Armament and Central Planning GB Chemie is going through a critical phase. If he had not integrated himself into the new war economy concept, he would have been this one earlier or later without Doubt subordinate been, for example in the form of a "main committee Chemistry". [226] At least Göring was involved in the negotiations at the time the him remaining Influence for that a, the last strength position of the old four-year plan and to maintain the Reichsamt and GB Chemie as independent departments. "As the question of the reorganization of the German economy in 1942 arose," later testified in Nuremberg Fritz ter Meer, member of the board and of the all-powerful central committee of the IG Farben Group, "Hans Kehr suggested! from the Reich Ministry of Economics that part of the chemical industry under Krauch's Reichsamt should be returned to the Reich Ministry of Economics, and some suggestions even went through so far, that the entire Reichsamt should be dissolved. However, it was the organization smoke as excellent and powerful recognized, also in execution more important Tasks from more far-reaching Meaning." [227] spear cleared one that Krauch as "so to speak "Immediate Reich" was valid. [228] One essential Justification for the need He saw IG Farben's technical and production monopoly as a way to come to terms with GB Chemie. "Today we are," he said this at a later opportunity, „in the chemical progress only and alone to work instructed by IG-farben ." [229]

Without interfering with the programs went it of course not away. Immediately after After his appointment as minister, Speer implemented a reduction in the construction volume of GB Chemicals for 1942, especially in long term Mineral oil- and light metal construction projects, however on the base one tough negotiated compromise. [230] The GB Chemistry had to henceforth the

225 *Birlcenfeld,* Fuel, S. 164. Please refer also p. 16 **ff.**

226 Please refer S. 65.

227 ZStA Potsdam, case VI, Movie 412, Doc. NI-5184, Explain under oath from ter sea **v.** April 29, 1947.

228 Ibid, Movie 413, Doc. NI-5821, Interrogation of witnesses Speers v. 12. 3. 1947.

229 Ibid, Movie 410, Document NI-4043, spear at Himmler, July 26, 1944 (concerned the project a factory for highly toxic poison gases in Falkenhagen; see. *Groehler,* The Silent Death, p. 287 and passim).

230 Most important Documents see ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 8398, memo Krauchs f. Göring regarding "shortening of the construction volume for the Time from the 1. 4th-31st 12. 1942", v. 25. 3. 1942; AT WiRüAmt ex.
Discuss at Goering at the 2. 4. 1942, v. 9. 4. 1942; WNE sockets v. 15. 3. and 10. 5. 1942;

Demand for steel and iron for his building projects like other quota holders to the headquarters planning bring forward. objection against the Decision could he at least bring it forward in a special session; In such cases, however, an agreement was always reached .

Also in the Autumn 1943, as the essential Powers of attorney of Reich Minister of Economics

on the Minister of Armaments passed over stayed Krauchs organization untouched, although they In 1939 it was formally "subordinated" to the Reich Ministry of Economics . At that time, Speer offered According to his statement in Nuremberg, Krauch was the head of the department (official group?) Chemistry in the Commodity Office at, the Krauch but refused. He pulled understandably the far more independent and more powerful position before, the he owned, explained itself but to one still narrower and "smooth" cooperation ready. [231]

In 1943 the military realities forced the Fascist planners to once again make large investments **for** the raw materials production of the GB Chemistry, especially for Fuel, Nitrogen, Fog acid and Buna. The Headquarters planning had to Krauch is therefore a fact unabridged construction volume admit: "The entire construction volume of the GB Chem in the amount of 750 million RM (790- 38 savings) will be around 100 million shortened (before especially in light metal expansion in Norway - D E.); the reduction is made by the GB Chem itself can be carried out and detected more quickly. Received for the new construction projects GB Chem additional 100 million RM, so that the construction volume of the GB Chem total for 1943 750 million (amounts)." [232]

The position of the GB Chemistry in the war economy regulatory mechanism accepted specific He lost a lot of weight and his decision-making skills were strong circumcised; "with the appointment of the minister Spear went his Influence back," said in Nuremberg Frederick Jähne, board member of the IG Farbenindustrie AG, definitely aptly. [233] However, at the level regulated by GB Chemie production There was such an urgent need for immediate warfare, especially on the German-Soviet front, but also **for** the air war, which was becoming increasingly critical for the entire war economy, that this institution, controlled by the IG Farben Group, was a significant power factor in the war until the end of the war War economy remained.

Nitrogen: powder and explosive

The raw material base for powder and explosives was primarily nitrogen, which was almost exclusively produced in the country itself. In 1938/39 there were 73 Percent of nitrogen in Haber-Bosch ammonia synthesis, 13 percent was obtained from carbide, 14 percent as a by-product of the coke ovens. [2 34] The two largest synthesis works - Leuna and Ludwigshafen-Oppau, both companies of the IG Farben Group he fathered 50 alone percent, together with eight other vVerkcn 80 Percent of nitrogen .

ibid, Movie 8630, AT WiRüAmt re: „Suggestion for the division of construction volume on the Wehrmacht's requirements through the GB Construction", dated March 21, 1942, etc. See also *Weyres-v. Levetzow,* p. 83f.

231 ZStA Potsdam, case VI, Movie 413, Doc. NI-5821, Interrogation of witnesses Speers v. March 12, 1947.

232 ZP-E, 22. 4. 1943, 37. Meeting.

233 ZStA Potsdam, case VI, Movie 411, Doc. NI-5168, Explain under oath from Frederick Jahne v. 29. 5. 1947.

234 *The effects,* S. 85. Hereafter also the The following.

Table 69
Production 110n nitrogen 1939-1944
(inl000tN)

Year	of production
1939	1020
1940	1008
1941	1021
1942	955
1943	920
1944	668

Source: The effects, S. 86, Tab. 49; Rapid Reports (1944).

The Nitrogen requirement of the Wehrmacht for powder and was explosives always during the war secured. They also gave up imports the occupied countries but took away the nitrogen for the production of fertilizers but food and other agricultural products.235 German agriculture received nitrogen in the form of fertilizers in the fertilization year 1943/44 (June-May) 36 percent less than the average for the first three years of the war, but at 55 Percent of what is available is still quite a bit considerable Crowd. In the Years 1943 made itself already Power shutdowns in the Nitrogen industry noticeable.236
The powder and explosives programs of GB Chemie and the IG Farben Group from 1938, especially the so-called rapid plan **for** powders, explosives and warfare agents and chemical Pre-products in his second version from the 13. August 1938.2 3 7

Table/e 70
Consumption 110n nitrogen by the Wehrmacht and Agriculture 1938/39-1943!44
(fertilizer year June-May, in 1000 t N)

Year	Volume (production plus Import)	of which Wehrmacht	Agriculture
1938/39	982	35	745
1939/40	1072	47	841
1940/41	1005	84	789
1941/42	1003	108	739
1942/43	960	165	632
1943/44	906•	235	501·

• estimate

Source: TM effects, p. 87, Tab. 52.

235 So Bütefisch in his Interrogation at the August 2, 1945 in Nuremberg; quote in *TM effects,* S. 86.
236 See ZP-P, 22. 11. 1943, 50. Meeting: At this meeting The fear was expressed that according to the shutdown plan presented nitrogen production up to to 35 percent failure and that with it “fertilizer even becomes zero".
237 *tape I,* S. 45ff.; *Petzina,* self-sufficiency policy, S. 119, S. 124 ff.

formed the basis for the immediate Preparation for war on this one sector and were in the war ever according to military and war economics Situation updated or revised.The Raw material situation laid this one plans that is no restriction on, but any additional production of powder and explosive as “End products complicated chemical syntheses" [2]38 required elaborate Investments. A more comprehensive and extremely forced The expansion plan should be the German one capacity on that Multiple times of the previous ones bring - at powder from 5000 on 18000 metric tons monthly, at explosive from 5400 up 18000 metric tons Noble explosive or on 34000 “blended” explosives - one height, the after Krauchs imaginations from the coming War quite was inadequate and "the least whose represents, What take place must".239 After dem “Military economics New ones production plan" from the 12. July 1938 were this Goals until 1941 to reach. The mentioned Quick plan presented for the main Plan already around shortened by half Target dates.

The Powder- and Explosive consumption the Wehrmacht stayed until 1941 far behind the production back. Since mid-1940, the pace of capacity expansion slowed compared to original plans. Only after the attack on the USSR, especially since Winter battle 1941/42, consumption increased several times and became more tense Relationship to production. Since then, the powder and explosives program has been in decline always in the highest Urgency level.

The feverish Planning since dem spring 1942240 culminated in a program that - in the harmony with the ammunition program - until about Approximately at the beginning of 1944 one Doubling the powder and the Explosive production provided. 241 The given ones Digits were largely Fulfills and even exceeded,24 [2] however around the Price huge expenses at investment resources, machinery, Construction capacity and raw materials such as coal. Until By mid-1944 the was sufferingammunition industry no serious shortage of powder and explosives.

Table 71
production and consumption Pon Puwer and explosive 1939-1944 (in 1000 t)

year	powder production	Wehrmacht consumption	explosives production	Wehrmacht consumption
1939	?	5	?	?
1940	75	26	168	70
1941	112	53	230	165
1942	148	91	291	256
1943	238	160	410	?
1944	258	?	496	?

Source: The effects, S. 87, Tab. 51; Quick reports (1944).

238 *Eichholtz,* Zum Share of IG Farben Group ..., p. 96 (work report of the GB Chemistry before the General Council of the four-year plan, version of 21st/22nd 4. 1939). 239 Ibid, p. 97.

240 Please refer FB, 4. 4. 1942, Point 16.

241 FB, 28/29 6. 1942, Point 38ff. Further FB, 23rd-25th 7. 1942, Point 24 **f.** (regarding increase of plan, expenditure etc.); FB, 10th-12th 8th. 1942, Point 35 (Diploma the Planning). Please refer also *Weyres P. Lepetzow,* S. 84 **ff.**

242 *Weyres-1'. Lvetsov,* S. 88 (Tabel).

fuel

The fascist Germany, before dem War himself without significant own Oil production and about 70 percent was dependent on imports, almost exclusively from America,243 still until spring 1944 for the Warfare, albeit "on one Hand-to-mouth basis"244 and apart from temporary and selective ones Crises, generally adequately supplied with fuel. This important fact can be attributed to several reasons, including the initial stockpiling **for** war, the ruthless appropriation of the large supplies captured in Western Europe, the considerable years of Introduce out of Romania and also the predatory exploitation the own and the more important ones Austrian oil reserves. But first and foremost she was the four-year plan policy to attribute whose emphasis right from the start has been on the investment programs of the Chemical Division or of the IG Farben Group and at this again the generation of synthetic fuel located had. Germany produced in wars as only one Country the World in big scale Petroleum products on synthetic
shear Base, 24 5 and this synthetic production performed the decisive Contribution to Supply the war machine of aggressors with Fuel.

The focus of the synthesis program was on the hydrogenation plants. Until At the outbreak of war, seven hydrogenation plants were in production, the largest of which, the Leuna plant, alone a third of the capacity had. There were three more works see shortly before production begins, and the Building of two was under attack taken been. There were 13 hydrogenation plants producing in 1943 and 15 in the spring of 1944.24 6 Nine Fischer Tropsch synthesis plants, on the other hand, produced mineral oil products amounting to around a sixth of that Hydrogen production.

The GB's plans Chemistry from 1938/39 came from the capacity of 2.4 Millions of tons of production from our own raw materials in 1938 resulted in a "mob demand coverage" of 13.83 million tons and set the expansion targets for 1942/43 8.3 millions (1943: 9.2 Millions) and for 1944 around 11 millions Metric tons. 247 This
However, the program was there from the start illusionary because of its outrageous demands at construction capacity, building materials (Steel), workers and Finally, coal and energy when the plants were in operation, even without the outbreak of war, the rest War preparations and the proportions of the entire national economy are in irreparable condition extent would have been disturbed.248

The war and the course of the war revised goals and dates. German mineral oil production expanded on a large scale, primarily due to synthetic production; but in terms of "plan fulfillment," mineral oil remained one of the weakest items in the four-year plan.249

243 *The effects,* S. 68.
244 Ibid, S. 72.
245 Below becomes here, How also in the tables, the production on Coal base understood, so IG hydrogenation, Fischer-Tropsch synthesis, brown coal smoldering or coal tar distillation and benzene production.
246 *birch field,* Fuel, S. 138ff.
247 How Note 238; *Petzina,* self-sufficiency policy, S. 125; *birch field,* Fuel, S. 231, Tab. 21.
248 See, for example, the RWiM's alarm calls about adventurism GB-Chemie planning, especially the fuel and aluminum sector, in relation to the total quantities available Coal and Energy, in BA Koblenz, R 7/478-480.
249 Please refer *Petzina,* self-sufficiency policy, p. 181f.

In 1938 came from - not very important internationally - Total German volume of mineral oil products amounting to over seven million tons, 1.6 million from synthetic production, 0.6 Million from our own oil production, 4.4 million from overseas and 0.6 Millions from continental Imports. In September In 1939, synthetic production corresponded to an annual capacity of 2.3 Million tons. 250 By 1943 it peaked at 5.75 Million tons, that was over 50 percent of the annual volume.

Table 72
Come up at mineral oil 1939-1944 (in 1000 t)

Total **year of mineral oil** (estimated)	of that Synthetic oil production	financial support	**import** from Mineral oil products	generation in occupied areas
1939 8200	2200	885	5165	
1940 7600	3348	1469	2075	
1941 10000	4116	1584	2807	332
1942 9500	4920	1678	2359	370
1943 11300	5748	1880	2766	576
1944 6830	3830	1991	960 •	360

• Only finished products

Source: The Effects, p. 75, tab. 37 (probably not without double counting); Quick Reports (1944); *Statistical Handbook,* p. 280 (oil production; minor differences to *The Etfects* and *Birkenfeld,* fuel, p. 217, table **1).**

The traditional figures for the total volume of petroleum products and **fuels** come from Sources with large differences that cannot be fully explained are, especially since the statistical documents come from a variety of different offices and institutions come. Part of these differences come from the difference in fuel (,, "Fuels" including lubricants) and mineral oil products as a whole (this also includes technical gasoline, benzene, paraffin, bitumen, etc.), as well as **the** different attribution of crude oil and its processing stages, especially in the case of imports (double counting). (Tables 72 and 73)
The forecasts about the fuel situation during the Preparation to "Barbarossa" and later also sounded gloomy. But they increased Romanian Deliveries helped out. Also restrictions in the German War economy himself made fuel for the Wehrmacht free. A Decree Hitler's November 12, 1941 the “Securing fuel for warfare in 1942”25 1 led to drastic savings and conversion measures (wood gas generator) a, also in the occupied and dependent

250 *The Effects,* S. 73.
251 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 2313. - However, it was already in December 1941 the allocation of carburetor fuel to the commercial economy compared to September 1939 from 163,000 to 41,000 t, that of diesel fuel decreased from 120,000 to 50,000 *(Weyres-11. Le11etzow,* S. 59 (quoted Tomberg report)).

Table 73
Come up and consumption at fuels 1940-1944 (in 1000 t)

Year	Fuel production	Fuel consumption	of which Wehrmacht consumption	percent
1940	6389	5856	3005	51
1941	8120	7305	4567	62.5
1942	7619	6483	4410	68
1943	8956	6971	4762	68
1944	5769	*?*	*?*	*?*

Source: car driver, p.171 (Come up), S. 55 (Consumption); Quick reports (Come up 1944; **without propellant gas).**

countries. The systematic one limited “civilian” Germans consumption fraud In the following years, petrol consumption was only about an eighth of the pre-war level and diesel fuel consumption was a third.252

Nonetheless also began in 1942 with the Wehrmacht “the time of maneuvering and becoming ever stronger "Restrictions" ,253 A temporary crisis, more of a transport crisis than a fuel crisis, hampered the advance of motorized troops during the Wehrmacht's summer offensive in the southeastern direction, especially of all places that one 1st Panzer Army, the itself in faster Advance the Caucasian oil wells, the hoped-for rescue of all hardships.254 In order to supply the attack spearheads of this army with fuel, the Luftwaffe used transport aircraft. Even camel caravans carried fuel for the tanks.

Even more than the army and navy, the air force began to feel the strain in 1942/43. A deficit of aircraft fuel, which is produced exclusively in a number of hydrogenation plants was, shines through first drastic Fuel cuts for the Pilot training at pilot schools has been taken up be.255 Exports were cut, especially deliveries to Italy.

19'13, the year of highest consumption but also highest production, also prevailed at No fuel **for** the German imperialists dangerous shortage. Still did itself in the military field already increasingly the force noticeable, ,,the operational planning in the huge dem to adapt available fuel".256 This time made more difficult a transport and supply crisis led to the withdrawal from Donec to the Dnieper in July/August 1943.25 7 In total there were at least 10 Millions of tons of petroleum products to Available,258 including around 9 million tonnes of fuel.

252 *The Eff ects,* S. 77 **f.**
253 *birch field,* Fuel, S. 156.
254 Please refer S. 485.
255 *The effects,* S. 73.
256 *birch field,* Fuel, S. 158.
257 **B.A** Koblenz, R 3/1987, Keitel at Spear, 25. 3. 194!,; Keitel remembered here to it, ,,that us with our Kw. fuel h a v e already faced **an extremely serious crisis twice, once** in August/September (1942) at Terek and Stalingrad, the second time in July/August 1943 at the Settling movement from Donets on the Dnieper".
258 After the “Statistical Quick Report to war production", Was standing: February 1945. The

In the spring of 1944, immediately before the Allies Air offensive against the hydrogenation plants, was the Fuel situation Overall, however, "extremely tense"259, particularly What Aircraft gasoline and what the "civilian" consumption within the German The war economy was affected, but also fuel for Army and Navy, which are highly dependent on imports 260 from the hand in the Mouth lived.

More synthetic rubber

From the 102000 t Rubber, the 1938 in Germany consumed became, 90 percent came from overseas imports.261 When the war broke out, two factories were producing, in Schkopau and Leverkusen, after Proceedings its main shareholder, IG Farben industrie AG, with one capacity from 27500 t Per Year synthetic rubber (Buna); Schkopau produced 90 percent of it.

The sharp decline Rubber production that would occur in a war with economic blockade had to use, should for a long time view the Plans of the Krauchplan meet. The Krauch plan of 1938 envisaged increasing the existing capacity for synthetic rubber to 5,000 per year t to 120,000 by 1942/43 t to increase 2 6 2 ; in the plan version from October 1940 was intended, the Production, starting from the capacity at that time from 40000 t, until 1942 to 110000 and up 1944 on 150000 t bring to. 2 63

A second large-scale plant for synthetic production, after Schkopau, was already under construction in West Germany when the war broke out (Hüls/Marl) and had been producing since August 1940. Bunawerk III originated after the victory of the Wehrmacht in the west in Ludwigshafen and ran in March 1943 at. Buna plant IV, at Auschwitz planned, did not reach Production.

Table 74
Come up and consumption l'0n rubber 1939-1944 (in 1000 t)

	Come up (synth. total	of which synth. production	percent	consumption	exports Rubber)
1939	99	22	22	95	1
1940	57	40	70	67	5
1941	96	69	72	74	15
1942	123	98	80	92	32
1943	124	117	94	91	25
1944	104	104	100	96	?

Source: The Effects, S. 83, Tab. 43; S. 84, Tab. 45. Deviant Numbers in *Wagenfiihr,* S. 170, table 13, and *Loyalty, Wilhelm,* rubber in Germany, Munich 1955, p. 185.

above Table 72 (after *The effects)* is allegedly not free from Double counting (there: 11.3 million t).

259 *The effects,* S. 78.

260 Please refer e.g. ZP-P, 11/22 1943, 50th session; already on this meeting was called it: „The situation is in the moment as a result the (missing - D E.) Transports out of Romania catastrophic."

261 *The effects,* S. 83. Hereafter also the The following.

262 How Note 238.

263 *Petzina,* self-sufficiency policy, S. 146.

Only Schkopau, Hüls and the facility in Leverkusen, which always Retained the character of a small test facility and was already in production in 1942 more rubber than 1938 was produced and imported at all. natural rubber, the one at Although it was difficult to replace some products with Buna, it was still sufficient until 1942 in the form of imports and loot. The care with rubber was on this Way 1942 and 1943, in the essential also 1944, definitely secured. This fact was one of the most striking results of the Four-year plan policy. [2] [64]

At the June 22 1943 was a more isolated airstrike on Huls to record, the the plant However, the production took around three months, around 12,000 t. [2] [65] Only with the Anglo-American air offensive bomber on the - each neighboring - Hydrogenation plants, from whose supplies of hydrogen and gas the Buna production was dependent, sank the Production.

d) Reason- and raw materials

In all areas important for armaments Basic materials, except for Money, There was strong foreign dependence in pre-war Germany. Even though these materials were generally "completely sufficient" for the essential armaments programs during the war until 1944, [2] [66] available were, like that because the German war economy apart from sometimes drastic consumption restrictions and replacement solutions - from the often considerable reserves, after the "blitzkricgs" in Western and Northern Europe, especially from the rich prey and, on in the longer term, from the production of the occupied territories, from the resources of southeastern Europe that it exploits and from imports from allies and neutrals countries were supplied.

Money

German armaments production, indeed the entire war economy, was based on coal to a greater extent than in any other country, because synthetic production was based on coal and the energy base was based almost exclusively on coal-fired power plants and coal gas plants, [2] [67] including synthetic production Nitrogen and the production of aluminum were additionally strained. Main consumers of coal and was coke and stayed however the Metallurgy, the in the Years 1938 46 percent of total sales

264 Please refer ibid, S. 182.

265 *The Effects,* p. 84; s. a. ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 5683, AN WWiStab, 22. 6. 1943. - On July 2, 1943 it was given the consequences of this air raid the central planning meeting decided that in the under construction Bunawerk Auschwitz with one capacity of 20000 t Buna Per Year accelerates to build and the increase of capacity to 30,000 t prepare. Krauch demanded to this one Purpose 1000 new Assembly workers and demanded that "additionally Prisoners out of dem Concentration camp Auschwitz delivered become"; aside from that must „the Auschwitz area pacified" become (ZP-E, 2/7 1943, 43rd session).

266 *The effects,* S. 71.

267 Barely more as 12 percent the Energy production based on Hydropower (*The effects,* **S.** 114 f.).

Table 75
Coal mining 1938/39- 1943144
(Brown coal in Hard coal units converted; in ***mill.t)***

Coal industry year (April-March)	In total	of which annexed areas*	percent
1938-39 _	240.3	8.0	3.3
1939-40 _	267.7	34.0	12.7
1940-41 _	315.5	76.0	24.1
1941-42 _	317.9	76.4	24.0
1942-43 _	340.4	90.1	26.5
1943-44 _	347.6	98.5	28.3

* Includes Austria, Sudetenland and Protectorate, Polish Upper Silesia and Alsace-Lorraine

Source: The effects, S. 94, Tab. 57 (conversion ratio 4 to 1).

Table 76
Stone• and Lignite mining 1938/39-1943144 (mill. t)

Coal industry year (April-March)	Hard coal („Large• German.")	of which dysentery	Upper Silesia	Brown coal	Hard brown• charcoal etc. Anthracite *
1938-39 _	187.5	126.9	26.9	199.6	12.6
1939-40 _	204.8	129.5	44.6	211.6	23.8
1940-41 _	247.9	129.8	86.4	226.8	25.9
1941-42 _	248.3	129.2	83.7	235.1	26.1
1942-43 _	264.5	131.2	94.0	248.9	30.8
1943-44 _	268.9	125.4	100.1	252.5	34.0

* Nearly exclusively out of Austria and "Sudetengau". Please refer also *Statistical Manual,* S. 280

Source: The effects, S. 92, Tab. 55; S. 93, Tab. 56.

of hard coal and four percent of that of lignite consumed, [2] [68] followed by Energy production and transport (Reichsbahn).
The German coal balance improved significantly through the annexation of foreign territories, especially Polish Upper Silesia.[269]
After the Conquests of year 1940 requested the maintenance the Business
However, the occupied countries of Western and Northern Europe recorded a significant additional export volume; These exports helped German imperialism to expand its **economic** potential that one Countries, for example that steel capacities in France, Belgium and Luxembourg, to make it largely usable. Coal exports were also essential

268 Ibid, S. 92.
269 Please refer also p. 492.

as a counter-delivery for key imports of the war economy, such as Swedish ore and Romanian oil. State Secretary Landfried characterized the function of the German coal exports apt: „Under export figured Yes everything, What from us directly dependent is: Denmark, where our Nutrition with 1/12 _ to it hangs, France, Greeks country, Norway, Croatia, Yugoslavia, Ostland, Spain, Portugal, Romania, Switzerland - immediately important for us in the war effort -, and Sweden and Italy as the countries that make an impact. It's not actually an export; It's just the maintenance of our own businesses, which we have running for ourselves over there."270

Table 77
Domestic sales and export of coal 1938/39-1943!44 (Brown coal converted into hard coal units; in M IU. t)

Coal year (April-March)	In total	of which industry	Transportation _	Utilities _	House fire	export
1938-39 _	251	88	23	30	48	36
1939-40 _	263	94	24	32	53	26
1940--41 _	320	105	30	37	68	40
1941-42 _	326	109	31	41	65	38
1942-43 _	344	110	33	45	62	51
1943-44 _	342	112	35	46	55	49

Source: The Effects, p. 96, Tab. 58. The Pay are not direct comparable with those from table 75 and 76, there she Money also in shape from coke and briquettes contain.

The German hard coal mining industry, from whose production - especially in the form of smeltable coke - Steel production and thus the entire armament depended so much on it, as far as it was concerned which concerned the conveying and supply systems underground and above ground, technically relatively good equipped. Before Location against it was the Technology few modern; Mining machines were rare and there were hardly any mechanical loading devices or conveyor belts. In European scale was nevertheless before the Get them Labor productivity in Germany (funding per man and shift) is the highest after Poland and the Netherlands.271

Under these circumstances became the Labor situation and particularly the Sink labor productivity during war was the main problem Hard coal production. Here, more directly than in other branches of armament, the pressure to “increase performance” had “the result of a frightening connection of more extensive. and intensive exploitation" .272 But the Coal tycoons could it despite all Pushing not to ensure that labor productivity remained at the level reached in the last pre-war years. In year In 1942, funding per underground worker and shift on the Ruhr fell even twice as strong as in the two previous years of the war. 273 Until the end of 1943 sank the Shift performance on under 1220 kg and lay with it at 25 percent lower than 1939 (1630 kg).274

270 ZP-P, October 23, 1942, 16. Meeting.
271 *The effects,* p. 91.
272 *Kuczynski,* Everyday, Vol. 5, S. 195.
273 *Kuczynski,* Position the workers, Vol. 6, S. 287.
274 *The effects,* p. 94.

Purely in terms of numbers the coal mining for them Conscripted German miners were adequately replaced by foreign forced laborers up to and including 1943 . The number of coal miners almost doubled Forced laborers from May 1942 to May 1943 and rose again by almost 50 by the end of the year Percent. 2 75 The total number the Miners growth through this significantly, the production against it barely. The forced laborers reached - based on calculations from the Ruhr coal mining industry - only an average of 60 percent of the output of German workers. The labor productivity of the aging German miners declined as a result of the one-sided and inadequate diet, overwork and the fatigue caused by the air raids and nervousness unstoppable after. Here in was the one Main reason for the constantly tense one Coal situation.

Table 78
Workforce and Labor productivity in the Hard coal mining October 1942 until December 1943

month	working forces (including military units) in 1000	of which abroad. forced labor	Shift funding share per miners. Workforce Weighed Average of all territories	Head (kg) total Ruhr area
1942				
October	707	167	1367	1384
November	713	175	1364	1379
December	741	205	1336	1338
1943				
January	746	214	1336	1328
February	740	214	1367	1366
March	736	220	1368	1350
April	740	225	1355	1339
May	738	224	1337	1301
June	755	243	1320	1276
July	762	252	1298	1244
August	767	259	1284	1216
September	793	288	1261	1190
October	808	306	1225	1170
November	818	320	1218	1170
December	813	327	1215	1172

Source: ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 396, Doc. NI-2819, "Imperial unification Money. Statistics shear report no. 11. The German coal industry in the Months April to December 1943. "Berlin, May 1944".

The Reich Coal Association fulfilled its estimates and production requirements one significant increase the Financial support provided namely eleven percent for 1942/43 and 21 percent for 1943/44, therefore by far not. Instead of eleven became only 6.5 percent instead 21 not once two percent achieved.276

275 *Wagenühr,* S. 154 f.; ZStA Potsdam, Case XI, No. 396, BI. 64, Doc. NI-2819, "Reich Unification Money. Statistical report No. 11. The German coal industry in the months April until December 1943", May 1944.

276 *The effects,* S. 94 (Tab.).

The "Key raw material": iron and steel

At the outbreak of war, Germany was, as in 1914, the most important steel producer in Europe, however far behind the UNITED STATES. Although it worked production in the 4th quarter of 1939 and in the 1st Quarter of 1940 and it took until the beginning of 1941 before it returned to pre-war levels, but not because of Interruption the ore feed, as originally feared by the ruling class, but above all because of the prolonged shutdown near the border Saarhütten.

Table 79
Pig iron production 1938-1944 (in mill. t)

Year	Germany or. "Greater Germany"	Occupied Territories •
1938	18.5	
1939	18.5	
1940	15.5	
1941	21.4	3.0
1942	22.2	2.9
1943	24.2	3.8
1944	19.05	1.5

• (residual) Polcn, Belgium, Northern France and Meurthe-et-Moselle, Netherlands (Protectorate since 1941 "Greater Germany" recorded)

Source: The effects, S. 258f., Table 79; S. 260, Tab. 80.

Table 80
Raw steel production 1938-1944 (in mill. t)

Year	Germany or. "Greater Germany"	Occupied Territories •
1938	23.3	
1939	23.7	
1940	21.5 ••	
1941	28.2	3.6
1942	28.7	3.4
1943	30.6	4.0
1944	25.9	2.65

• How at pig iron (Tabel 79)
•• Pre-war Germany

Source: The effects, S. 250f., Tab. 71; S. 252, Tab. 72.

The ore imports and supplies lasted over the critical period until the Lorraine-Luxembourg minette deposits fell into German hands after the defeat of France. After that was including ore supply German iron production is relatively stable and secure. (Tabel 81)
The increase in production of crude steel since 1938 up to "Barbarossa" through annexation and occupation believed itself on 35 until 40 Percent; the Capacity increase lay still far

Table 81
Financial support and import from Iron ore 1937-1944 (in mill. t)

Year	Ore mining	Fe content	Ore import (incl. esp. born)
1937	9.8	2.8	20.6
1938	15.0	4.3	21.9
1939	?	?	18.5
1940	19.5	5.7	10.0
1941	36.0	10.8	17.4
1942	33.8	10.2	16.8
1943	36.0	10.9	20.2
1944	26.1	7.8	6.5

Source: The effects, S. 247, Tab. 66 and 67.

Table 82
rolled mill products• 1939-1944 (in mill. t)

Year	Germany or. "Greater Germany"	Occupied Territories ••
1939	17.3	
1940	15.1 •••	
1941	19.7	2.9
1942	19.2	2.6
1943	21.3	2.9
1944	17.2	2.0

• Finished products, semi-finished products and forgings As in pig iron
•• Pre-war Germany

Source: The effects, S. 249, Tab. 70.

higher. [277] Something similar happened Pig iron and, to a lesser extent, also on rolled mill products.

The since 1937 made " Quota" of iron and Steel, d. H. the Division of the available " quota weight" [278] by means of "control numbers" on the "needs carriers", soon suffered a fiasco during the war. The allocated quotas exceeded production and could not more in a timely manner or in full of Height supplied become.

277 Please refer S. 494!.

278 The numbers from the raw block production were used to calculate the quota weight (slightly simplified here). at steel less 25 percent Rolling mill waste and plus of iron and steel casting as well as pig iron exports. Since 1943 the calculation started immediately the finished weight of the rolled mill products and, in addition to the casting, also purchased the forgings separately a; this more complicated system changed but the result only slightly. (According to BA Koblenz, R 13 I/1138, Memo Wigru Esl (Reichert) regarding. ,,The German Iron- and steel management", O. D (Nov. 194.3); s. a. d. calculation in ZP- E, 3. 11. 1942, 23. Meeting). Please refer further *Weyres v. LePetzow,* S. 4.9.

This gave rise to a faulty, inflationary cycle of declarations of requirements and allocations of quotas, which accelerated to such an extent, particularly after the significant decline in production in the winter (January/February) of 1942 , that **"we,"** as Speer later put it, "had an over-quota sum with to carry us around which was ten million tonnes, i.e. ten million tonnes more than what was actually produced additionally issued over the course of three years".279

The drastic New regulation in the Spring/Summer 1942 [2] [80] controlled the Disorganization

for a while, but at the end of 1943 the general manager of the business group hired iron workers Industry firmly, „that man apparently again in the old Mistake expire is" ;281 it was in the first half of 1943 above eight percent, in the 3rd quarter more than ten percent more allocated than planned been.

The distribution of iron and steel as Key raw material was the most important task of central planning. The Reich Iron Association had to submit its production programs to the central planning department and the achieved Production results to be billed. One Week after founding the RVE had Röchling as her Chairman already a "Before

proposal for an increase in crude steel production in the Greater German Reich and its areas of influence" ready,28 [2] the as next Goal one increase the production from

31.8 on 36 millions t Crude steel yearly provided. „The Planning", so explained Röchling the company representatives in the Southwest district group, "goes to 2½ Million [t] finished weight monthly in Germany and his areas of influence." [283] However had he on long view still quite other Plans: „In the European Large area must we to 85 million t Crude steel come annually. "284

The final plan of the RVE from 13. July 1942, entitled "Increasing the performance of the iron-making industry", Röchling, Rohland, Alfried Krupp and the also Birders present on the 15th July Discussed in Central Planning in 1942 , [2] [85] envisaged a production of around 2.1 so far Million t rolling and casting weight (quota weight) Per Month to 2.65 million tim 4. quarter 1942 to come. As The RVE set a dozen conditions for additional production, including availability of labor, coal and energy, scrap, [286] Machinery, construction capacity, but also extraordinary, directly surplus-profitable requirements as the "immediate increase the Phosphorus limits around 0.01 percent for at least 80 percent all SM steels", i.e. one deterioration the Quality at Siemens-Martin Stahl, and the "release of the mold requirement as circulating material", ie a disguised price increase through Shortening the Payback period for Chills around a Multiple times.

Spear, Sauckel and Pleiger secured the fulfillment all essential Conditions to.

279 ZP-P, 2. 3. 1943, 35. Meeting.

280 Please refer S. 84!.

281 B.A Koblenz, R 13 1/1138, Reichert at Poensgen, 3. 11. 1943.

282 Ibid, R 13 1/674, Röchling at Spear, 8th. 6. 1942.

283 Ibid, R13 1/596, speech Röchlings ex. d. "Reorganization of the German Iron industry". d. Seating d. District group southwest the Wigru Esl at the June 10, 1942.

284 Ibid.

285 ZP-E, July 15, 1942, 10. meeting (Attachment: plan v. 13. 7.); hereafter also the The following. See also *case 5,* pp. 172f., Doc. NI-2522, RVE report for July 1942, v. August 15, 1942.

286 "From Russia must more scrap metal come in." (Röchling; see note 283). Also Weyres-11 in detail . *Le11etzow,* S. 51ff.

On the 22nd July The decision of the central planning was made as Order to the RVE: „The of the Imperial Association set up plan must be carried out." 28 7
The Mid-August in front of Hitler ceremoniously delivered Obligation the "Saints Three Kings". Of course already over October/beginning of November for unfulfillable explained288; that was foreseeable - this was officially stated in the minutes of the central planning, "that the quota quantities for (the quarters - D E.) IV/42 and 1/43 do not reach the level required for the armaments and war economy" .289 The endlessly discussed reasons were many. The most important was the lack of labor. The essential, final cause was however, the situation that has now arisen at the German-Soviet Front, which is primarily reflected in the decline in the transport of forced labor and in the difficult transport situation - therefor coal and ore - noticeable made.
Nevertheless, the production curve climbed in the two quarters around the turn of 1942/43 and reached your Climax in March 1943.

Table 83
Crude steel production and quota weight, IV. quarter 1942 and 1. quarter 1943 (in 1000 t)

Month or quarter	Crude steel production	Quota weight
October 1942	?	2391
November	?	2364
December	?	2404
Average 4. quarter	3006	2386
January 1943	2971	2524
February	2858	2412
March	3127	2596
Average 1. quarter	2985	2511

Source: The Effects, p. 252, tab. 72 u. 73 (Generation); ZP-E, April 22nd 1943, 38th session (contingent • weight). Inadequate Pay in *Wagenühr,* p. 168, Table 9.

The upward movement inspired the RVE not only to one "Production promise" for the 3. quarter 1943 of again 2.65 million t Quota weight per month (April 22) -, little later elevated on 2.75 millions t (4. May) and even to 2.8 millions t (5. May) 290-, but to same Time also to long-term new, expansive "performance improvement plans" with Plan figures from monthly 3.35 million t Crude steel or 2.8 millions t

287 ZP-E, 22. 7. 1942, **11.** Meeting. Please refer also S. 91.
288 So particularly on the 19. meeting **the** Headquarters planning at the 28. 10. 1942.
289 ZP-E, 3. 11. 1942, 23. Meeting.
290 See each ZP-E. - On May 4, 1943 (40th meeting) a **decree** was issued in this context of the Central Planning "on the inclusion of Ukraine in the iron and metal management of the empire" decided.

quota weight, to to reach until May 1943, from 3.65 or. 3.00 millions t (until October 1944) and from 4.00 or. 3.25 millions t (until April 1945).29 1

These plans from April/May 1943, signed by Röchling, Rohland and Alfried Krupp, were based to a large extent on the expected production or "extra production" of steel, ore and manganese in the Ukraine as well as on steel supplies from the newly occupied Part France. The RVE demanded for her realization alone already at additional Coke immediately 700000 monthly t and later 1.1 million t per month (excluding Ukraine).29 2

Nothing more came of this. During May and June 1943 Pig iron production fell due to heavy air raids Ruhr area ten Percent, the Crude steel production even around more as ten Percent. 2 93 In the Summer smashed itself finally the hopes of the fascists on steel production in the Ukraine.294 Crude steel production never reached that level again level of the mentioned both quarters.295

The fascist planner found under no way out of these circumstances from the lack situation and thus from that Dilemma that the German war economy has been facing since the discussions above “width”- and "Deep" armor labored. In favor of the production of weapons and military equipment you the iron-eating investments in the defense industry, especially the longer-term, can be radically restricted. But it was It should not be overlooked that a long, exhausting war still had to be expected, and already now turned out to be numerous areas, for example with aviation fuel, Powder and explosives, metallurgical coke and various new types of weapons, an expansion of capacity as urgent necessary. ,,We knowledge but all Exactly", argued Spear, "that we will never be able to achieve the iron quantities for these programs at the same time." 296

The Result were compromises, the of course the problems not solved.

But it is not to be overlooked that the stubborn ones efforts of the RVE, behind which stood the concentrated power of the state monopoly regulatory mechanism in the war economy and also the political pressure and terror against the German and foreign workers, in that phase of the war that was extremely critical for Nazi Germany militarily and that signified its turning point, scope and level the Production not only maintained, but even increased to a level never before reached. On the basis of this The increase took place actual arms production - under strong reduction

291 B.A Koblenz, R 41/237, RVE at RMfBuM, May 28, 1943. - Since Aniang April 1943 had Hitler and Speer explored the possibility of a long-term increase in the monthly quota weight at steel around 1 mill. t about the was standing from the March discussed. The RVE took in a letter from April 10th Position *(Weyres-P. Lepetzow,* p. 124 f.). Four days later it was even an illusion “leader’s demand” on 4 million t Quota weight in the Conversation (FB, 14. 4. 1943, Point 6).

292 B.A Koblenz, R 41/237, RVE on RMfBuM, 28. 5. 1943.

293 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 3654, “Activity report of main ring Iron production in the 2. and 3. quarter 1943", v. 10. 10. 1943.

294 Please refer S. 473ff.

295 A further increase in the 1st quarter to 9.2 million. t was based on the inclusion of production in Northern Italy and in Central France (*The Effects,* p. 252, Table 72).

296 ZP-P, 12.2. 1943, 32nd session. - As Relief measure arranged spear a Investment and construction stop at. We will then “see after half a year whether we can get through the glitches All the events that have occurred in the East have been ironed out so that we can move on can" (ibid.).

of the specific Material consumption ("operating weight") - quickly and continuously progressing.
The Quality steels (Siemens Martin and Electrical steel) rose in the production faster than Thomas steel. The production share of high-quality electrical steel grew fastest. Progress was also made in the processing of Thomas steel into quality steel (wind-freshened replacement steel), the center 1943 around ten percent of Thomasstahl quantity concerned.297

Table 84
composition the Crude steel production 1937-1944 (without occupied areas; in mill. t)

Year	Total crude steel	including Thomasstahl	SM and electrical steel	including electrical steel •	percent of crude steel••
1937	19.85	8.0	11.9	0.7	3.4
1938	23.3	9.3	14.0	1.0	4.2
1939	23.7	9.2	14.5	1.2	5.2
1940	21.5	6.8	14.7	1.4	6.7
1941	26.6	10.5	16.1	1.8	6.8
1942	27.1	11.1	16.0	2.0	7.3
1943	30.6	12.5	18.1	2.8	9.1
1944	25.85	9.2	16.6	2.9	11.0

• Incl. lower amounts from Crucible steel. See. the Pay for the Reich territory from 1937 in *Statistical Manual,* S. 289
•• Minor disagreements as a result from rounding the absolute Pay

Source: B.A Koblenz, **R13** _ 1/1138, Reichert at Poensgen, November 3, 1943: Quick reports (1943 and 1944).

Non-ferrous metals

The Scale of metals, the except iron **for** the War armor of the German imperialism was of the utmost importance, comprised a good dozen: light metals, especially aluminum, heavy metals such as copper and lead and finally the steel refiners and ferroalloy metals. One German production on own There was a raw material (ore) base only at few of these metals, especially zinc, cobalt and lead. Five sixths of what is needed Zinc ore, two thirds of the Cobalt ore and half of the lead ore was mined in German mines in 1938 298 ; the zinc ore content increased even further the annexation Polish Upper Silesia. In everyone others cases was Germany is highly dependent on imports, in several cases completely. Most of the ore and metal supplies came until outbreak of war Overseas, so predominantly copper, tin and nickel, antimony, Molybdenum, Tungsten, manganese and Vanadium.299

297 B.A Koblenz, R 13 1/1138, memo Wigru Esl (see Note 278 u. 281).
298 *The Effects,* S. 109.
299 Please refer ibid, S. 109, Tab. 62.

In Germany itself existed one developed refining capacity concentrated in a few large plants, those of a handful of corporations, especially the United Aluminum Works (VAW/Viag Group), IG Farben, Salzdetfurth, Metallgesellschaft, Nord deutsche Affinery and Degussa, controlled became.

Overall, the German imperialists managed to *meet* the war economy's most urgent demands for the aforementioned metals towards the end to comply with the war, regardless changing temporary "bottlenecks".

The expansion of domestic resources (ore and bauxite mining) made only minor progress overall. In 1942 it was made use of its own raw material resources the Requirement at copper at 12.5 percent, the one Lead to 51 percent, the on Zinc too 79 Percent, the to tin 13 percent and the to nickel go ahead ten percent covered. [300] In contrast, German refinery (smelter) capacity for light metals grew significantly. Aluminum, of which Germany produced more than any other country, meant about the same thing for air force armament, what that Iron for them rest Armor. Although the production rose sharply, those provided were amounts not achieved, especially because that Raw material (bauxite), which, like most of the already processed clay, comes from abroad based was not able to be procured continuously and because later power cuts affected the highly energy-intensive alumina extraction and aluminum smelting. As early as the fall of 1942, Central Planning stated: "The increases that we had calculated in advance are not as planned Dimensions occurred, because straight in aluminum production significant Failures have occurred, which are to a small extent due to a lack of energy, but mainly due to a lack of clay clay are attributable." [301]

Metal production for the war came from several sources, apart from the original German production. The top priority was the plundering of the resources of the annexed and occupied areas, initially through confiscation and removal that one found Stocks, then through systematic exploitation the

Table 85
production and consumption from aluminum 1938-1944 (in 1000 t)

Year	Metallic aluminum	Remelted aluminum	Aluminum consumption•
1938	165.6	30	176.6
1939	199.5	40	204.0
1940	211.3	54	256.0
1941	233.6	82	274.8
1942	264.0	90	273.4
1943	250.1	104.•	248.8
1944	244.2	118	267.3

• Without export
quick reports: 128

Source: Statistical Manual, S. 293; *The effects,* S. 263, Tab. 83 (Remelted aluminum).

300 B.A Koblenz, R 2/5359, Wigru Mining (at RMdF), July 22, 1943.
301 **ZP-P,** 23. 10. 1942, 16th session.

Storage facilities for the benefit of the German war economy. A balance of the total amounts of metal transported from all occupied territories up to 194.3 showed three positions impressive picture

„Copper approximately 300000 t, of that approx. 260000 t alone out of France;
Lead approximately 96000 t, of that approx. 75000 t alone out of France;
tin approximately 14000 t, of that approx. 11000 t alone out of France";302

Based on German consumption in 1939, this corresponded to almost a year's consumption at Copper, more than that Doubles of _annual consumption tin and approximately

4.0 percent of annual consumption of lead, but at a much higher rate during the war. 303

The ongoing production of the occupied territories was transported away - to just some particularly significant posts to call -

- bauxite out of France and Yugoslavia
- copper out of Yugoslavia, Norway, Belgium
- Lead out of Yugoslavia
- zinc out of Poland
- nickel and molybdenum out of Norway
- chrome out of Yugoslavia
- manganese out of the Ukraine.304

One second, important source stayed until 194.4. the import out of neutrals and allied countries, for example from bauxite out of Hungary, Lead out of Italy, nickel out of Finland, chrome out of the Türkiye and tungsten out of Spain and PortugalJ.305

Thirdly, the supplies that had been accumulated for some time before the war played a major role, especially to bridge of lack in the first period of the war. **On** the height The stocks were carefully looked after even during the war. Despite diverse fluctuations stayed she in the general until into the second half year 194.4. into it considerably high. 306

Big relief created a shortage the drastic Limitation of Consumption of various metals, especially copper, tin, lead and nickel. The “civilian” industry and the craft was deprived of raw materials. Through countless “ Bans on use" ensured that no rare metal flowed into consumer goods of all kinds. The general decline in production in the consumer goods industry and in the construction industry itself saved a lot of metal in favor of armaments. In addition, substitute materials were developed or other metals were substituted; the most important example of this is the Exchange from copper against aluminum in electrical cables and similar arch

302 B.A Koblenz, R 3/1868, memo RWiM regarding “development the German Metal supply since Start of war and Foresight until years 1946", July 1943.

303 See. Tab. 86.

304 As far as the exploitation of foreign resources is concerned, that's how they are statistical data incomplete, inaccurate and often controversial (see d. critical comments as well as the extensive material at *hunter, Jörg-Johannes,* The economic one Dependency of Third Reich from abroad, shown using the example of the steel industry, Berlin (West) 1969, passim). Since, apart from the exact demarcation of the territory, different processing stages and metal contents must be taken into account, the statistics for non-ferrous metals are for examined Period generally in one Condition the "confusion" (*The effects,* S. 109).

305 Some positions in *car driver,* S. 54; critical objection against Carriage guide Pay at *Hunter,* S. 276.

306 Please refer *The effects,* S. 110 ff. (tables).

Table 86
Cottage production and consumption from Copper, Lead and zinc 1938-1944 (in 1000 t)

Year	Copper production (raw copper)	Consumption _	Lead production (finished lead)	Consumption _	Zinc production	Consumption _
1938	69	lj/j8	185	283	194	292
1939	67	324	186	248	231	295
1940	51	292	175	221,	318	330
1941	47	372	173	277	317	448
1942	41	238	149	238	314	449
1943	37	221	174	221	312	382
194,',	30	219	146	196	260	330

Source: Statistical Handbook, p. 293 (production); Quick reports (Lead production 1943 and 1944); *The Effects,* p. 263, table 83 (consumption). Significant lower numbers (probably without loot etc.) in *statistical terms Manual,* p. 293 ("Supply").

nits. Copper consumption fell from 148,000 tons in 1938 to 221,000 liters in 1943 tin in the same Period from 20400 on 9500 t, the one from Nickel from 12400 on 9400 t.[307]

At next position are the efforts from corporations and Research institutions to name, metals, especially Alloy metal c, among themselves to substitute or their Salary in the alloys without major loss of quality Reduce (e.g. by means of surface hardening armor plates). Company representatives such as Eduard Houdremont and Paul Goerens (Krupp) worked with ministerial support, addressed these problems decisively and achieved significant savings in steel alloy metals, especially on tungsten and chrome.

After all, those responsible seized citizens' personal property of metal objects early on, forced institutions like the church to Delivering metal (bells), they also intervened in areas of the consumer goods industry and plundered and planned further raids and destruction campaigns against the material cultural assets and the National wealth the Nation. From 1940 until 1942 became on this Way 98 257 t Copper, 18346 t lead and 7180 t Tin was mobilized for the war, primarily from the "metal donation" of the population, from the collection of bells and out of the requisition of Copper rolls from textile companies and written metal from printing factories. [308] Since 1942/43 people have been attacking also on Copper kettle and Copper roofs back and planned officially For the years from 1944 to 1946, the requisitioning of organ pipes, power cables, lead keels from sailing yachts, fire sockets from locomotives, lighting fixtures and casings from cash registers, the dismantling of curtain and carpet rods, copper boilers, door and window handles "in all houses", the "combing out" of antique shops and pawn shops and of closed down businesses and retail stores, the "combing out of the museums" and the "recording of those that have been temporarily shelved monuments" _[309]

307 Ibid, S. 111.
308 How Note 302.
309 How Note 302.

Table 87
planning from Metal "mobilization measures" for the Years 1943-1946 (int)

Year	metal	Crowd	of that ,,as secure assumed"
1943	copper	66000	60000
	Lead	12250	10000
	tin	735	600
1944	copper	65680	40000
	Lead	21325	10000
	tin	3550	1500
1945	copper	81520	40000
	Lead	8650	5000
	tin	4165	1 00
1946	copper	70500	24000
	Lead	1775	500
	tin	1640	900

Source: BA Koblenz, R 3/1868, Memo RWiM, July 1943, "Development of the German metal supply since the beginning of the war and forecast up to 1946," appendix "Metal production from mobilization measures in Reich 1943-1946 (estimate)".

In September/October 1942, as reported in the Central Planning Department, there was "a peak in the mobilization" of copper, [310] and in the fall of 1943 Kehrl stated in the same place that with copper "we were still in the best position because "The mobilization measures have increased significantly and consumption has declined". [311] One needs, confirmed the Reich Commissioner for Metals, Müller-Zimmermann, "for the next two years... no worries close".

Clouds at the horizon pulled for the fascist ones Planner on, than that Deliveries from lead and zinc out of the Italian pits on Sardinia fell away. [312] Particularly Lead be a "Dark point," reported Müller-Zimmermann. "We can still create lead through the sharpest mobilization, for example if we only publish one daily newspaper in the big cities. We would also have to overcome the resistance at the large official printing companies, such as the Reichsdruckerei and Reichsmünze can overcome. The same applies to the printing of telephone books." In the meantime, the metal "mobilization" had already taken on grotesque features, "Incidentally, the lead collection problem is also a gasoline problem, because lead from a huge number of small and micro businesses, printing companies, etc. must be collected. Maybe we can rely on the help of the anti-aircraft commandos."

The supply of ferroalloy metals to the German war machine depended largely on them Procurement from the occupied territories and through imports the Türkiye (Chrome) and Finland (Nickel) away. In the Years 1943 left the Generation of alloy steel in a jump nearly 50 percent in the Height. As biggest "bottleneck". itself chrome out of here. The Minister of Armaments pointed in one Memorandum from End

310 ZP-P, 26. 1. 1943, 30. Meeting.
311 Ibid, 15th/16th 9. 1943, 47. Meeting. Hereafter also the The following.
312 Sardinia became in the October November 1943 finally from the Wehrmacht cleared.

Table 88
Meeting needs in ferroalloy metals at failure the Deliveries from the Balkans (Chrome), from the Türkiye (Chrome), out of Nikopol (Manganese), out of Finland (Nickel) and out of Northern Norway (;\/ olybdenum) (was standing End 1943; t)

	Mangan	Nickel	Chrom	Wolfram	Molybdän	Silizium
Bestand Inland	140000	6000	21000	1330	425	17900
Zugang Inland (monatl.)	8100 •	100··			15,5	1,200
consumption (monatl.)	15500	750	3751	160	69,5	7000
Bedarfs-deckung (Monate)	19	10	5,6	10,6	7,8	6,4

• .,Through new Recovery methods in the llochofcnprocess"
,,Pit Frankenthal, Silesia, and waste"

Source: ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1732, Speer's memorandum for Hitler v. 12. 11. 191.3 regarding "The alloy metals in armaments and the importance of chromium supplies from the Balkans and Turkey".

19'13 [313] on the economic strategic importance of the Balkans, on its "preservation" in your :\Iightbrea the German imperialists - provided, that "secure conditions" would be maintained - the fate of the entire war economy depends on it seemed.

e) ,\laschines, buildings, investments

in mechanical engineering

The German I\laseh interior construction was a highly developed industry with around G,000 companies, one million employees, 9,431 million people RM sales (1942) [3 1"] and l'incm diversified production program of hundreds of products and thousands of product types. Capital concentration and lonopolyzation were in heavy engineering, in locomotive construction and in cinig<'n other branches exceptionally high. In In most areas of mechanical engineering, however, larger, medium-sized and a large number of smaller companies competed with one another. In total, the 50 largest companies each employed over 3,000 employees, around 20 to 25 percent of the total workforce; accordingly rnover busy two one-third all establishments 100 and fewer workforce. [315] The statistics

313 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 1732, Memorandum Speers for Hitler regarding.. ,The alloy metals in the armor and the Meaning the Chromium feeders out of dem Balkans and dPr Türkiye",
12. 11. 191.3.

314 B.A Koblenz, R 3/167, statistics the Wigru I\Iengineering (Wigru at planning office, January 22, 1944).

315 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 10604, Lineup ex. the biggest establishments in 13 Economic groups, n.d., n.d.; *The Effects,* p. 46f.

Table 89
Company size structure in the Machine tool industry 1938 and 1944 (after dem Sales volume)

Sales volume	number of Company sales (in percent of all companies)		share at the Total (Percent)	
	1938	1944	1938	1944
Until 1 mill. RM	62.8	66.2	13.1	12.9
1-2.5 mill. RM	16.5	16.1	14.1	17.5
2.5-10 mill. RM	17.3	14.9	45.2	42.5
10 Mi)l. RM and above	3.4	2.8	27.6	27.1
Total the Companies (=100 %)	351	465		

Source: The effects, S. 229, Tab. 34.

Table 90
The biggest Mechanical engineering company and her Sales volume 1942 (in mill. RM)

company	Sales volume
Fried. Croup AG, Eat	225.9
Rheinmetall Borsig AG, Berlin Tegel	142.2
Klöckner-Humboldt-Deutz AG, Cologne-Deutz	133.7
Heinrich Lance AG, Mannheim	110.6
United Ball bearing factories AG, Schweinfurt	108.7
Rheinmetall Borsig AG, Dusseldorf	104.4
Demag AG, Duisburg	98.0
Gehr. Poensgen AG, Düsseldorf- Rath	95.1
Henschel & Son GmbH, kassel	92.5
Puffer fisherman G. shepherd & Co., Schweinfurt	83.2
Daimler Benz AG, Stuttgart- Untertürkheim	67.7
Knorr brake AG, Berlin	66.5
MAN (Machinery factory Augsburg-Nuremberg), augsburg	65.5
Gear factory Friedrichshafen	60.0
Viennese Locomotive factory AG, Wiener Neustadt	59.0
Together	1513.0

Source: B.A Koblenz, R 3/167, report Wigru mechanical engineering for RI\HRuK (Planning Office), 22. 1. 1941,.

the The machine tool industry is somewhat representative of the entire mechanical engineering industry. (Table 89)
The 15 highest sales Mechanical engineering company united 16 percent of In total turnover on itself. Of the six largest of these companies, four belonged as corporate plants or mechanical engineering departments to three leading, vertically structured h.i.u. corporations. (Table 90)
The GermanP imperialism went well equipped with machinery in the War and stayed it also while the War years. From one significant latent Excess capacity in

the equipment with machine tools evidenced by both the low employment rate per machine tool produced in the Industry (constant around 2.3 compared to 5.7 in Great Britain) as well weakness occupation the second and third layer even in the most important branches of arms production. 31 6 lack of special machinery and equipment occurred, however in expanding Industries again synthetic fuel, the electrical steel and the Energy production.

The total production *of* mechanical engineering (respective limits) increased including the j('nigcn from Kriqrsgcrät by 1938 until 1942 on 162 percent (from 1936 until 1942 on 248 percent). The high one Pre-war pace had changed reduced, but the increase continued. The production of military equipment grew fastest, namely to 462 percent remaining mechanical engineering (new production) on 142 Percent; the export went to 66 percent or from 14.7 5.9 percent back. 3 1 7

Table 91
production and occupation in the mechanical engineering 1938-1942 (respective creams)

Year	Total production millions RM	of that "war" device"	percent	total number of employees number (End of year) in 1000
1938	5806.6	540.8	9.3	810
1939	6650.4	700.0	10.5	860
1940	7693.6	1536.5	20.0	959
1941	9080.4	2120.3	23.3	977
1942	9431.0	2500.0	26.5	1000
1943	(7411.7)	2601.5	(35.1)	1150
1944	(7286.1)	3264.2	(44.8)	?

Source: BA Koblenz, R 3/167, Wigru mechanical engineering report for the planning office, 22. 1. 1944; *The Effects,* p. 219, Table 19 (1943 and 1944); in Brackets different calculated Values (“Old Empire”?).

Table 92
production "on machine tools 1938-1944 _

Year	Piece	„Value" (mill. RM)	Weight (1000 t)
1938	182849	615	?
1939	199361	695	26!
1940	199490	793	288
1941	197960	858	306
1942	165969	821	288
1943	1"0084	790	273
194!,	110377	*65I,*	223

Source: The Ef{ects, S. 22/i, Tab. 26. See also *car driver,* S. 162f.

316 *The effects,* S. 43f.
317 How Note 314. See also Table 91.

The expressiveness sales- or" Value"paycn is however limited. The weight of the Machine types took many times considerably to and still far stronger rose her "Value", i.e. their price while the number of pieces rose less or even decreased. The information here is typical out of the Machine tool industry. (Table 92)

One second Limitation must in relation on the Portion the production from “ "war device". become. Not under that as " equipment of war" declared generation stood by that Sales volume after at frontmost Job roller bearing (Ball-bearing), Gears and Transmissions and internal combustion engines,318 i.e. supplier parts, a very high percentage of which are directly in the production from weapons and Equipment of war flowed in. With it are shown to the Pay, with those the· Mechanical engineering statistics the Production share at war showed, as questionable. This Portion rose her according to from ten until twelve percent in 1939 around 30 percent in 1942, 31 9 but in 1942 and 1943 , taking into account direct supplies for final armaments production, it was undoubtedly much higher, probably above 50 percent or. in the Years 1944 between 60 and 70 Percent.

In the study of USSBS final report above the Capital goods industries 320

In addition to the information from the mechanical engineering industry group, which regulated four fifths of capital goods production, those from the steel and iron construction industry group (for heating systems and boilers as well as railway wagons) and the electrical industry industry group (for heavy electrical equipment) are also rightly used. In this way it will a more complete one and more realistic Picture of the development of production from capital goods and with it the Investments himself won, and the

Table 93
production pon Infestation goods 1939-1944 (in 1 000 t)

	Tool machinery	Other mechanical engineering	Heating systems u. boiler	railroad material (Locomotives u. wagons)	Heaviness electrical Equipments (power plant u. Line construction u. a.) •
1939	276.6	2199.4	775.9	525.9	699
1940	288.4	1922.6	774.2	605.0	912
1941	314.7	1979,2	893.8	772.4	1250
1942	290.0	1881.2	872.0	931.3	1408
1943	272.6	1500.0	770.1	1145.2	1388
19!j4	218.1 **	986.6	521.0	906.0	1383

• Paragraph in 1000 RM
Statistical Manual, S. 295: 244.0

Source: The effects, S. 217, Tab. 16; S. 218, Tab. 17.

318 Please refer Note 314.

319 Ibid.; something higher Values until 1944 in *The effects,* S. 219, Tab. 19:

1938	11.0 percent	1942	32.7 percent
1939	12.6 percent	1943	35.1 percent
1940	24.4 percent	1944	44.8 percent
1941	28.8 percent		

320 *The effects,* S. 43ff. u. S. 217ff.

significant reallocations, the particularly during the war LaschinPnbau completed, can be see more clearly. (Table 93)

Mechanical engineering combined a relatively small sector of consumer goods production (such as small typewriters, household sewing machines, certain household appliances and fittings), a sector of armaments and ammunition production that grew rapidly during the war, and the sector of production of means of production that was characteristic **of** the industry. Significant shifts took place between these sectors instead of. While the Consumer goods sector always more comprehensive product

Table 94
branches of Machine balls with stronger Production increase or -acceptance 1943 opposite 1938

Production branch	production (mill. RM) 1938	1943	change (Percent)	comparative number Workforce*
increase				
Heaviness electrical Equipment	699	1383	+ 98+	_ 25
Machine tools	650	858	+ 32	+ 6
Lokomotiven	125	675	+440	+ 180
Kompressoren und Pumpen	4!.9	591,	+ 32	+ 4
Kraftmaschinen	290	496	+· 71	+ 45
Armaturen und Maschinenteile	259	484	+ 87	9
Maschinen- und Präzisions-werkzeuge	200	356	+ 78	+ 132
Feuerwehrgeräte	25	139	+453	+103
Abnahme				
Baumaschinen	309	275	11	38
Textilmaschinen	223	113	49	67
Büromaschinen	201	102	*t,9*	69
Maschinen für Lebens-mittelindustric	172	85	50	*71,*
Nähmaschinen	101	39	61	77
Druckmaschinen	61	12	S0	
Maschinen für Papier-crzeugung und -verarbeitung	93	9	69	86
I Iolzverarbei tungsmaschinen	62	52	16	50
Maschinen f. Schuh- u. Lederindustrie	28	13	53	77
Wäschereimaschinen	15	7	52	50
Registrierkassen	11	0,1	99	99

* The comparison number shows the percentage Change in the number of workers (wage workers only) in January 19'14 compared to July 1939

Source: The Effects, p. 218, table 17 (production; percentages of non-rounded output numbers calculated); P. 222, Table 23 (workforce). See also (insignificantly different) *Statistical Manual,* p. 296f.

tional restrictions subjected became, [321] completed itself in the production resources sector profound Reallocations. It shrank before everything the production from machines for the Equipments from branches the Consumer goods industry How Textile-, Pressure- and paper industry, while the production from machinery for the Furnishing age and newer Armaments factories - from ammunition, Tank and aircraft factory to the Buna factory and to power plant - a significant upswing took. (Tables 93 and 94) Incisive Regulatory measures met Wehrmacht and Authorities in the course of year 1942, around the machinery concentrated the priority programs of the Armor to supply and the not "necessary for war" Relation from machinery to throttle. In the June became one central Machine procurement office the Wehrmacht into the call for life. [322] At the 22. December issued the plenipotentiary for the Machine production/Reich office for mechanical engineering one Arrangement, after the so-called needs assessment created became, the the "Need every procurement from "Machine construction products" sharp check should. „As Needs assessment office is responsible that special committee or special ring..., in which Area the mechanical engineering product to be ordered is used become should." [323]

Table 9ij
Lean-like outline the Machinery investments 1943 (in Percent)

Industrial economy of that:	77.5		
Armament final production		30.4	
Basic materials		53.7	
of that:			
Mining			63.2
iron u. steel			**11.1**
mineral oil			**11.1**
Chemicals			13.6
Traffic	10		
Agriculture	8.6		
Other	3.9		

Source: Weyres v. Levetzow, S. 115f.

During the war it became obvious that the main task of mechanical engineering was to increase production equipment the armor full to strengthen and to renew, in first and foremost that of the final production of armaments itself, but also that of its basic, raw and fuel and energy base. This task was faced until the last During the war period, mechanical engineering even played a key role in the immediate war period

321 See e.g. b. the "New Plan". "\,Vigru Mechanical Engineering (office machines specialist group) for the production of typewriters v. 10. 2. 1943 (BA Koblenz, R 13 111/282), in which the production of 16,070 machines (monthly) from 13 companies ("old plan") was cut to 5,400 machines from 5 companies. Large companies such as Mercedes and Wanderer went completely under Arms production over.

322 *Weyres v. Levetzow,* S. 43.

323 Order 1/43 of the authorized representative for machine production as the Reich Office for Mechanical Engineering above the Order regulation for Mechanical engineering products v. 12/22 1942, quoted ibid .

production of weapons and military equipment. According to information from the machine tool industry during the War never less than 70 percent their production to the armaments industry (in the narrower sense) or to the Wehrmacht itself; Reached at the end of 1942 this Portion 75 percent and even exceeded it at times in 1943/44 80 Percent. 324

Rarely is it as clear as this the comparison of the development of production and the workforce in the listed branches of mechanical engineering, how sharply the rationalization screw has been tightened and how exclusively the increase in production is due to increased exploitation - increased labor productivity, but mainly increased labor intensity - was achieved; at falling Production increased Exploitation in no less Dimensions.325

Construction

The profound Reallocations in the mechanical engineering corresponded with serious changes in investment development. A more precise analysis **of the** wartime investments is required ,but a supplementary study of the construction industry Production is also one was a decisive material prerequisite for investment activity.

In the May 1939 existed in the construction industry around 28000 Industry- and 239000 Handicraft businesses with jewcils861000 or. 1624000 employees. Of that verrid1tcten Construction activity in narrower terms Senses (building, civil engineering and road construction) 7500 industrial and 80,000 craft companies with 756000 and 1096000 respectively Busy 326

The number of employees fell rapidly during the war in both industry and crafts, totaling 14 percent in 1943; There was an exceptionally high percentage in this workforce tz of foreign workers. (Table 96)

Anßcrdem busy!' the organization Dead still in the November 194/i one and a half million workers, including 1.13 million (76 percent) forced laborers.32 7

The production output of the construction industry fell even more sharply than the number of employees, apparently because of the withdrawal of the younger, more efficient workers from the Wehrmacht and because of the lower labor productivity of the forced laborers in Iceland; in the With the rationalization of production, the construction industry understandably lagged behind production sectors wide back. (Table 97)

Here too, the OT's external construction project developers are not included, those from 1941 to 1943 took on an immense size (haul of thoroughfares, bridges, railways in the west and east - 1943 "to the Caucasus" - in the Balkans, "Ice Street". Finland" etc.). After riner Lineup drr OT task group management

324 *The effects,* S. 48f.

325 The facts of the case is clear even when taken into account the price hikers, the Table 94 does not show.

326 *Tlie effects,* S. 235, Tab. 45.

327 Ibid., p. 238, tab. 50. - Apparently these were mainly people who were abducted or both withdrawals of “repatriated” persons; was previously in the occupied territory percentage undoubtedly even considerably higher.

Table 96
employees in the Construction 1939-1944 (Pre-war borders; respectively 31. 5th; in 1000)

Year	employees in Industry operated	underneath Foreign compulsory worker • (Percent)	employees in craftsmanship operated	underneath Foreign compulsory worker • (Percent)
1939	906	?	1624	?
1940	713	?	1008	?
1941	733	1.1	1036	**21**
191.2	518	t,6	721	28
19 1,3 _	,',,',3	50	701	30
191,t,	*t,31,*	53	682	?

• Pay out of slightly differing Sources
Source: The effects, S. 62, Tab. 36 (employees); S. 236, Tab. 47 and S. 237 Tab. 49

Table 97
volume the Construction activity 1938-1944 (prices from 1938; in Md. RM)

Year	Construction volume
1938	13.0
1939	12.8
191.0	8.6
19'11	6.9
19li2	t,,7
19li3	*1,,0*
194/i	3.6-3.8 _

Source: The effects, S. 55, Tab. 28.

April 1944 deceive the Construction sum Pn for 19/iJ first 1,265 billion RM, for 1942 already 2.71 billion and for 1943 even 4.1 billion RM.3 2 8
At a higher level than construction activity was the production of building materials such as ZemC'nt, circling and Gravel. (Table 98)
Given the undifferentiated information about the general declining Development of construction activity Pine analysis of its main types reveals astonishing results.
In the Years 1938 flowed one height Investment amount in the Building from *streets and waterways.* The Medium for the Road construction increased from 1932 until 1938 from 151 to 1 78/i million RM (including over 900 million RM for highways), those for construction \'OII waterways and ports from 94 to 2117 million RM, so that the total amount is over two billion RM amounted to .329

328 B.A Koblenz, R 3/1808.
329 *Statistical yearbook,* 19li1/li2, S. 609.

Table 98
production from construction materials (Stones and Earth) 1938-1944 (monthly average)

Year	Building materials total (phys. volume; panels 1938= 100)	underneath cement (1000 t)	roof tiles (million pieces)	wood wool Lightweight (1000 m2)
1938	100	1287	103	2210
1939	100.6	1313	10;;	2640
1940	72.4.	970	69	2254
1941	74.0	1118	69	2342
1942	49.3	806	57	2237
1943	55.6	91i2	*n*	2438
1944	56.1	908	73	2264

Source: The effects, S. 243, Tab. *56* and 57. Minor different *Statistical Manual,* S. 304 f.

In the first war years went road and Waterway construction relatively slow back, fell then 1943 and 1944 but "practical to zero" .330 For 1944 became - including the normal Road maintenance and -repair - for the Maximum case only three more percent of the investment amount from 1938 estimated that possibly not even used anymore became.

In year Reached in 1936 the construction of *Apartments* at its peak - Tripling the stand from 1932 - with a construction cost of 2.2 Billion RM and amounted to also in Years 1938 still with 2.15 billion RM. 33 1

In the wars went the housing quickly to 15 to 20 percent back in 1943 ; In 1944 the number of completed apartments was - however, without taking into account the barracks and “makeshift homes” - even below, about at a seventh of that of 1939,332

The Building from *Fixtures,* including in first line of so-called Westwalls ("Sieg fried line") between 1938 and 1940 approximately two billion **RM. 333**

With the campaign in Western Europe and the defeat of France in 1940 heard the fortress building on. Later buildings, such as the "Atlantic Wall" and the "Ostwall", were built by OT and Wehrmacht in the occupied areas with the one raised there materials and labor.

He stayed Building from *industrial Investments.* The Industrial construction had in the armament period and in particular in the Sign of four-year plan significant dimensions reached. Its share in total industrial investment can only be estimated. This in Investments increased until 1939 4.432 billion RM on (1936= 2.159 billion RM). 334 The construction portion will get close on two billion amount to RM have.3:i::;

The Industrial construction was, How itself turns out, the only size Area, in dem the Building-

330 *The effects,* S. 59.
331 *Statistical yearbook,* 1941/42, S. 610f.
332 *The Ef{ects,* S. 59.
333 Ibid, S. 60.
334 *Statistical yearbook,* 1941/42, S. 612.
335 *The effects,* S. 55.

active until 19/13 at the height reached, and obviously during the years 1941 and 1942 - just as the development curve of mechanical engineering demonstrated - still increased.336 goods for 1939 the industrial buildings on two billion RM to treasure, so According to the following table, the planning office stated it for 1943 at around 1.9 billion RM. To this end, the listed construction costs for the energy industry must also be considered, which is certainly considerable Part those for the transport system and, last but not least, to a large extent the sums for the construction of barracks, which until the time of industrial "relocation" were almost exclusively used to accommodate forced laborers, often served directly on the factory premises. This amounted to the construction share of industrial investments of the year 1943 estimated at 2.5 to 3 billion RM.

Table 99
outline the Construction investments 1943 ("Greater Germany"; in mill. RM)

Industrial construction	1892		
of that:			
Armament final production		699	
Rest manufactured goods industry		141	
Reason-, Raw- and Fuel industry		992	
of that:			
mineral oil			302
Chemicals			261
Money			126
Rest			303
buildings for Energy industry	392		
buildings for Transportation	525		
buildings for Agriculture	343		
Public Building (including World Cup, Air raid protection etc.)			
in total	1167		
housing	856		
of that:			
Barracks		291	
Other housing		565	
In total	5175		

Source: The effects, S. 59, Tab. 32. Please refer also *Weyres v. Le;,etzow,* S. 115 (percentages).

into account here, i.e. H. Price increases since 1938/39. From subordinate The magnitude was 1943 On the other hand, there are also industrial buildings that are used to relocate armaments factories or repair bomb damage connected and therefore not or not primarily for expansion, but rather for maintaining the existing substance of production capacity in the armor contributed.

The sharp reduction in the total construction volume since the beginning of the war had not had the slightest effect on industrial construction, that is, on investments in the production sector, until 1943. impacted, rather was quite and even on Cost the others areas the

336 Wrong or. fluctuating assessment at *car driver,* S. 38 u. S. 56ff.

Construction activity gone - in such a way that, as well as the development of mechanical engineering recognize, the Industrial investments always more exclusive focused on the arms industry.

Industrialists Fixed capital investments

As the data from the development of mechanical engineering and the construction industry agree confirm, held the industrial ones Investments not until 1943 only their high pre-war level, while all other economic investments, especially drastic the in the Housing construction and in the public construction, went back, but she increased in the years 1941 and 1942 still very considerably. At car driver

Table 100
Industrialists Fixed capital investments 1928, 1932, 1935-1944 (without energy industry)

Year	Industrialists gross investment investments (mill. RM; not price adjusted) *	Portion at the economics gross investment investments (Percent)	of that "Four-year plan"in-investments **(mill.** RM)	For the Comparison: gross investment investments (only in the Area the Germany; price-cleaned up; Prices from 1950 in mill. DM West)	net investment investments
1928	2615	**19.1**		2379	+ 726
1932	439	10.4		462	625
1935	1636	15.5		1819	+ 286
1936	2159	19.5	750	2366	+ 792
1937	2843	21.7	1500	3113	+ **1472**
1938	3691	24.2	1950	3967	+2235
1939	4432	25.6	2100	"729	+2872
1940	4861	31.8	2490	5261	+3255
1941	5254	35.0	2490	5537	+3361
1942	5564	36.6	1970	5869	+3514
1943	4906	approx.40	*?*	5079	+ 1669
1944	3505	approx.40	?	3541	- 3561

* The figures for the war years (1940-1941) are interpolated from West Germany (Krengel) and "Central Germany" (Kupky). the so-called Altreich according to the values for 1939, therefore general still to low because of the strengthen expansion "Greater Germany" in War and because of the increasing importance of arms production, including investments, in the eastern areas of the empire. The ratio between equipment and construction capital investments remained in the war years with around 3.2 to 1 like this good How constant.

Source: Statistical Handbook, p. 605 (until 1939); *Krengel, Rolf,* The long-term development of gross capital investments in West German industry from 1924 to 1955/56, in *quarterly issues to economic research,* 2/1957, S. 170ff.; *Kupl,y, Ifelmut,* The long term development of the Gross Fixed Asset Investments the Central German Industry from 1924 until 1955, in: ibid, S. 398 ff. (1940-1944); *Petzina,* self-sufficiency policy, p. 183 (four-year plan); *Krengel, Rolf,* investment assets, production and occupation the Industry in the Area the Federal Republic from 1924 until 1956, Berlin (West) 1958, p. 98, p. 106 (territory of the Federal Republic of Germany).

There are various correct statements about the fact that “in part still significant Capacity expansions performed became" [337]; but restricts this author misrepresents them on the Raw materials sector, “especially on four Product ranges - mineral oil synthesis, Buna, electrical Electricity and electrical steel" [338]

However, the investment structure within the industry changed radically. This restructuring was in its early stages already in the pre-war years (four-year plan) been recognizable. In the first years of the war it made some compromises through, as the Industry in larger Scope also "normal" investments, that is, investments that are to a certain extent independent of the State of war or in preparation on the soon hoped for post-war business were made, undoubtedly also in branches of Consumer goods industry. Since 1942/43, stricter state monopolistic regulation by the Ministry of Ammunition and Central Planning ensured that that machines and construction capacities were allocated more and more exclusively and one-sidedly to the armaments industry.

In the second half of 1943 there appear to be changes in the Investment development to have initiated, which aimed in different directions. In July/August, in view of the Failure of the Kursk offensive and the expected Soviet attacks Counteroffensive intense Consultations and Planning about it, How - before on everything Costs of investments, e.g. b. in mining (coal), but also in the actual arms industry - Iron and steel could be “diverted” according to “step plans” in order to immediately produce more ammunition and other military equipment. "The situation in the army's ammunition area, in the area of anti-aircraft ammunition, bomb production, motor vehicle supply, air damage settlement and aircraft engine production Measures to additional Deployment from Iron." [339] It must, so Hitler,

"through Reallocation from Investments on view iron released become". [340]

At 4. August laid Spear Hitler a plan, who provided the contribute to longer-term program goals weapons ("Weapon final program") "to be postponed" i.e. they run on investments to shorten, „around the for that to Time in the production of machine tools, buildings, facilities and devices flow materials for ongoing production to get released" [341] “ The same thing should for Tanks positioned become." [342]

At the same time, however, there was an increased and increasing desire for investment in industry noticeable, the itself clearly on Substitute- and New investments for the - whatever kind - transition to the post-war economy. This development could obviously not be prevented by the state monopoly restriction measures completely contained become. "There can be no doubt about it," wrote Kehr!, head of the planning office, at the end of 1943, "that the urge for substance, for improvement of company, to normal Peace repair, too replacement and new investment

337 Ibid, P.56 .

338 Ibid, S. 57. The from W. listed statistics (Capital investments in total and “Commercial and public building construction”) are apparently intended to demonstrate the sharp downturn during the war years and are irrelevant to our topic because of their undifferentiated nature (ibid., p. 160).

339 FB, 8th. 7. 1943, Point 7.

340 sour, keywords, 8th. 7. 1943.

341 FB, 4.15. 8th. 1943, Point 1.

342 sour, keywords, 4. 8th. 1943 (addition Saur: “Program became·later despite Reduction of the buildings to their original height has been achieved").

tions in the entire economy is overwhelming and contrary to the needs the War economy in the fifth War year stands, the one deceleration of the IJJ investments in favor of ... of ongoing Armament output demand The So-called,
the... of the Page Private economic considerations are overwhelming and are even influenced by tax policy favored (Depreciation)."3" [3]
Things went stormy in 1944 growth at industrial capacities in Breakdown over, especially because the production of the capital goods industries declined, but also because the air raids by the Anglo-Americans now seriously reduced the substance and because mechanical engineering and Construction in always larger Scope with Repairs with the Restoration of capacities and are busy with complex underground relocations were. However, without the high and targeted investments of previous years, there would be no production upswing in the Arming German imperialism is not possible explain that in July 1944 reached its peak and in many types of War continued until the end of the year.
The investment policy of German imperialism also had an extremely profound impact on the post-war period. If you offset the war damage against the wartime investments, you get - according to Krengel **for** West Germany - surprisingly low measures of economic destruction: "From 1944, as itself the effectiveness the Airstrikes multiplied, shrank in everyone areas of industry, the gross fixed assets of West Germany Industry so strong that on balance investments on the one hand, and war damage on the other, the gross fixed assets of West German industry in the last sixteen months of the Second World War in the Average this time every month was reduced by 1%, at first less, later significant more." [344]
However, the total gross fixed assets of industry in 1943, the starting year for this calculation, were much larger thanks to the investments made during the war years than in 1939, German imperialism was de facto even closer to the victorious powers at the end of the war stronger if also structurally complete deformed industrial apparatus opposite. Himself the Dismantling and the investment deficit Years 1945 According to Krengel, until 1948 the volume of gross fixed assets in West German industry was reduced thanks to those armaments investments, it did not fall below that of 1939.345 The majority of the population, however, lived after the war years of great material misery, its roots in the imperialist predatory war and to a large extent in the war investment policy the There were arms monopolies.

343 Kehrl at Frederick Mandrel, December 28, 1943, quote b. *Weyres v. Levetzow,* S. 117.
344 *Krengel, Rolf,* fixed assets, production and employment in industry in the Federal Republic from 1924 to 1956, Berlin (West) 1958, p. 13f.
345 Just that. 14, p. 94 f. - With his calculations, Krengel explicitly and completely exposes the West German one Post-war "virtual miracle" (ibid., p. 15). Much less clear and inaccurate, but in the Similar trend *Pritzkoleit, Kurt,* God receives the Mighty. back and panoramic view on the German prosperity, Dusseldorf 1963, p. 125 ff.

f) Consumer goods346

During the "Blitzlirieg" campaigns, consumer goods production only fell to a modest extent. After an initial decline, mainly as a result of the wave of confiscations, 347 it played out in 1940/41 under the officially propagated slogan of a "peace-like war economy" on a was standing of only few percent below pre-war levels. Far stronger than the production was However, civilian consumption fell. Instead stepped the army with approximately doubled orders as customer on.

Table 101
production and Paragraph the Consumer goods industry 1939-1944 (index: 1939=100)

Year	production	sales at the civilian population	percent from the • Total sales
1939	100	100	82.8
1940	94.1	90.4	79.6
1941	95.7	88.2	77.0
1942	86.1	74.4	72.4
1943	90.8	73.9	68.1
1944	85.4	72.3	67.8

• Total sales less direct and indirect sales to the Wehrmacht; so obviously including export and the deliveries of “other war-important supplies”, i.e. to the Reichsbahn, Reichspost, RAD, OT, DRK, air raid protection divisions of the NSDAP etc. (see ZStA Potsdam, case VI, Movie 413, Doc. PS-1456, Prot. the Meeting Gen. Thomas' “with representatives the "business" at the January 9, 1941)

Source: The effects, S. 130, Tab. 77.

The share of consumer goods production that the Wehrmacht received increased accordingly, but climbed apparently only since dem spring 1942 in different branches strongly upwards. (Table 102)
The statistics of Wehrmacht orders were undoubtedly incomplete. The RGI already reported for Summer autumn 1940 higher Pay in one Row from important Industry_

346 In the following, the consumer goods industry is generally referred to as the area of listed in Table 102 \Business groups captured, although self-evident also parts of the metal processing, precision mechanical and optical, electrical industries, etc. are to be added.

347 By the beginning of June 1940, the number of male workers had been reduced through conscription and "combing out". above 30 percent declined in the Textile and leather industry, around 20 up to 25 percent in the clothing, wood processing and ceramics industries, in breweries and maltings and in paper processing (ZStA Potsdam, IG-farben process (case VI), Movie 413, Doc. PS-1456, KTB WiRüAmt, protocol d. Discuss v. general Thomas
"with representatives of business" on January 9, 1941). After the end of the campaign in the West the Consumer goods industry again Workforce supplied been, for the Example "Participants in the World War" (from the First World War) and "people on economic leave" (see ibid., passim).

Table 102
Portion the Wehrmacht orders at production and occupation in the Consumer goods industry 1942 and 1943

Industry sector or. Economic group	Portion the Deliveries for the Wehrmacht at the Sales volume (Percent)			November 1943	
	Spring 1942	July 191.2	III. Quar-valley 1943	Number d. Be-employed (in 1000)	of that for WM-c\.orders (Percent)
Textile industry	32	42	**44**	888.1	44
food industry	?	?	25	454.1	′_y·)
Clothing industry•	16	22	23	319.9	23
Wood processing Industry	58	65	68	289.5	6S
Pressure	17	19	?	202,',	20
Leather industry	37	42	43	18G,6	63
Paper production	25	?	"J	124,t,	37
Paper processing Industry	25	29	40	107.7	40
Ceramic Industry	22	25	?	99.3	28
Glass industry	**32**	32	37	92.7	37
brewery u. Malthouse	?	?	8th	7S,8	**S**
sugar industry	?	?	5	59,t,	5
Spirits industry	?	?	?	22.0	32
In total				2924.9	38

• Recorded becomes only the wage work, ie Manufacturing out of \Vehrmacht material, „in the Manufactured probably 40 to 50 BC. II." (R 3/1802)

Source: B.A Koblenz, R 3/1802, Lineup "Portion the Wehrmacht at the industrial Paragraph. was standing spring 1942", v. 19. 6. 1943 (with hs. additions "July 1942"); *car driver,* S. 174, Tab. 4
(111/1943); S. 158, Tab. 4 (Nov. 1943).

branches: “The occupancy of Wehrmacht production in all branches of the consumer goods industry is significantly greater than is generally imagined. She cheated for example in the BP clothing industry at the End of first war year
55 percent, in the leather industry 47.5 percent and in the textile industry 43.6 percent. Also glass industry (34.6 percent), Ceramic Industry (27.3 Percent), Spirits industry (29.4 Percent) and Food industry (17.9 Percent) are in relatively larger
:.\1aßc through \Vhrmacht supplies in Claim taken."348
A sufficient one criterion for the standard of living of the population, the statistics of consumer goods production were of course also made up of several other reasons not because the - very differentiated - rationing from foods and consumer goods, because of the deterioration in quality many Were including from foods, because of the creeping one inflation and not last because of the additional “private” Supply broader Circles from the occupied areas.
In year 1942 recorded the consumer goods industry the strongest overall decline during of war in Height from ten Percent; still more quickly sank the “civilian” Sales volume

348 Ibid.

(16 Percent). With it “might the at the Civilian population reached Part only still 50 until 60 BC **H.** des reached pre-war levels have, for example a tenth less than in the Deep the heaviest Economic crisis in mid- 1932". [34 9]

In 1943 production increased Consumer goods industry again by around five percent. But the Share that of it that actually benefited the civilian sector decreased in approximately the same proportion. The increase in production was absorbed by the Wehrmacht; the production for the civil consumption stayed nearly on dem Status of the previous year. The number of employees in the consumer goods industry fluctuated over time the year 1943 violent, but remained overall nearly constant.350

In view of the loud propaganda of "total war", these facts were astonishing enough. The Minister of Armaments, an advocate of extensive decommissioning measures in the consumer goods industry, achieved Hitler's agreement in April 1943 with the "Führer" agreeing to "that by discontinuing of productions Over time, things that are no longer desirable for total war automatically become discontinued come.... This principle Can also be used anywhere else, as it is easier and with less excitement (among the population - DE) leads to success than prohibitions." [35 1] In the remaining demanded Hitler "insistent", „that Deficiency symptoms in the Rich"

- For example, he mentioned "bicycles for armaments workers" - “Initially to the detriment of the occupied areas parked become must".352

In October 1943 said Speer spoke out sharply against the overconsumption of expensive consumer goods in front of party celebrities and imposed drastic production restrictions and -decommissioningcn on numerous known in areas.35 [3] He particularly attacked the “luxury” of the Wehrmacht, which, for example, still received 824,000 riding and officer boots per year Wehrmacht received, according to SpcPr, per year out of a total of 12 Millions kg office supplies 11.08 million kg, of 730 Million bottles 440 Millions, of a million Toilets 620,000, out of 880 t Piano string wire 800 t (!), almost the entire scissor production amounting to 4.4 million pieces and 6.2 million service stamps.

A special feature of the need and consumption of consumer goods is that if there is a lack of goods, the population can still get by with the existing supply for a very long time - apart from food and non-durable goods such as certain types of work and Children's clothing, detergents, stationery etc. **On** this consumption “cushion” - part of the national wealth - That's what those responsible calculated when they throttled the "civilian" production of the clothing industry to such an extent that in 1943, for example , laundry and clothing for small children, boys and girls, even diapers and underwear, were only available in minimal quantities of less than one piece (Diapers=five Piece) per 1000 inhabitants produced were.354

It was presented as inevitable But in the course of the same year it emerged that the civilian population had been "bombed out". makeshift with the main consumer goods to Mistake, Glass or

349 *car driver,* S. 49. - W. relates this Statement under unchanged statistical requirements the year 1944.

350 Please refer *The effects,* S. 211, Tab. 9.

351 FB, 4/25 1943, Point 4. - With Forbidden were official Bans on use meant e.g. in beauty care.

352 Ibid.

353 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 3570, Talk in poses at 6. 10. 1943. Hereafter also the The following. 35/i *Wagenühr,* p. 174 ff., Table 5.

Table 103
production selected Consumer goods 1942 and 1943 (lvlonate average)

Type of goods		1942	1943	increase 1943 (Percent)
Bedsteads (Wood)		29200	73900	153
Wardrobes		14400	28700	99
Kitchen cabinets kitchen u.		?	?	52
Living room tables	approxi mately	26300	35500	35
Chairs	approxi mately	228000	340000	49
Table glass (1000 m2)		4272	5388	26

Source: The effects, S. 272, Tab. 96 u. 97; different *car driver,* S. 50; S. 173, Tab. 3.

cardboard to To produce replacements for broken window panes, etc. At the end of 1943 there were more than Six percent of living space in Germany was completely destroyed or severely damaged by air raids.355

The furniture **for** the injured parties was simply constructed and cheaply manufactured mass-produced goods, the ones in framework of the so-called “ War Edition Program" from October 1942356 was standardized was.

According to the regulation on the " War edition program" should generally "produce from consumer goods exclusively on the production of more important supplies \Varen be limited and their provision secured". The person responsible for this succeeded in enforcing this Reich Minister of Economics apparently quite inadequate. In any case, a year later the armaments minister felt compelled to make major concessions to the population in view of the situation and assured Hitler that "it is intended, in the course of taking over other war production (from the Reich's economics minister - D E.) the necessities **for** the population, especially for those who have been bombed out, through the creation of simple consumer goods and for 'l\•il also by increasing the necessary **for this** Quotas partially significant to increase"_:l., 7

In the second half of year 1943 rose also the Requirement at textiles and clothing for those bombed out by leaps and bounds. The general delivery of the clothing cards dn Population was in August 1943 exposed. Goods were only available if there was proven bomb damage or against special “purchase vouchers”. However, not even all the victims of the air raids could be supplied; production in the clothing industry was, according to official figures, Estimates by l'in third below the minimum of war requirements.358 end of year was the number the required “clothing unit” - complete equipment for two persons with Dresst>rn and Laundry - on monthly 300000 gestit'g<'n.:i., 9

355 *The effects,* S. 131.

356 See *RGBl.* 1942 I, S. 607 f., “Regulation about the provision of essential goods" v. 16. 10. 1942. Hereafter also the following. The Reich Ministry of Economics provided long lists of such “War Editions Program goods” with several hundred types of goods together (see ZStA Potsdam. RWiM. No. 10282, BI. 114 ff.).

357 FB, 6.17. 12. 1943, Point 12.

358 *The Effects,* p. 134.

359 Ibid.

Table 104
production and distribution 11011 Dishes 1943 (in 1000 pcs.)

Type of goods/quarter	production	thereof (Percent) at Bombed out	at other Civilians
Plate I quarter	12084	23	47
II. quarter	13864	26	39
II1. quarter	14141	30	23
IV. quarter	14617	41	9
bowls I quarter	1265	18	44
II. quarter	1566	20	40
III. quarter	1510	25	26
IV. quarter	1571	37	10
Cups 1. quarter	9188	18	57
II. quarter	11638	19	45
III. quarter	11677	25	26
IV. quarter	11730	37	9

Source: The effects, S. 273, Table 98. Please refer also *car driver,* S. 177, Tab. 6 (incorrect).

In all major sectors (textiles, leather goods, household goods, furniture, etc.) quality deteriorated significantly and persisted as a result of the frequent use of substitute materials in quality and durability none Comparison more with the pre-war products out of. For example made in the Years 1943/44 (July 1st - June 30th) the production of lightweight street shoes that last only one-ninth (four months) of the average lifespan from leather shoes had, already 42 percent the generation out of. 37 percent the raw materials for Leather goods passed out of substitutes including wood (2.6 million wooden shoes in 1943); It was 1938/39 15 percent been. 3 60 The Wehrmacht was of course preferably with leather shoes supplied; for the civil Ver-

Table 105
production 11011 consumer goods in the occupied areas 1943

Type of goods	Production (monthly average)	In percent of production in "Greater Germany"
twill for Workwear (1000 m)	897	27
Unity uniform cloth (1000 m)	773	30
sleeping blankets (1000 pcs.)	407	19
Heavy leather **(t** salt weight)	5000	29
leatherwork and Work shoes (1000 Couple)	290	25
Woodworking shoes (1000 Couple)	1020	39
Bedsteads (pcs.)	12900	**17**
Wardrobes (pcs.)	4500	**16**

Source: Quick Reports. Please refer also *driving a car,* P.

51. 360 Ibid, S. 135; *W agenühr,* p. 50.

need including of the bombed out, on which only 28 percent of total consumption was accounted for (1938/39: 64 percent),361 stayed so good How exclusively Footwear made from substitute materials with low durability left over.
Undoubtedly offered the German imperialists in 1943 the production of consumer goods in the fascist-occupied areas, which was at its highest level this year of war reached, still a conscience compensation and prevented a greater reduction in consumption or. the quality of goods for civilian use, but also served primarily to replenish the Wehrmacht's stocks.

g) Electrical energy 362

In the The years 1939 were in Germany (with Austria and "Sudetengau") 8257 large and small power plants with one capacity from in total 16 until 17 millions kilowatt and one production from 66.3 billion Kilowatt hours (USA: 130.3). From them were 1964 (24 Percent) public (state, regional, municipal) Factories; she united 58 percent the capacity on itself and produced 56 percent the Electric energy.
The works were scattered all over the country; but the degree of their concentration was significant in that the 113 largest plants (1.4 percent) owned 51 percent of the capacity and generated over 56 percent of the total electricity. The basis for production (in 1941) was four fifths of coal in the public works (55 percent hard coal, 45 percent lignite) and one fifth hydropower; who used private works Hydropower at most to five percent, the same for the rest Coal and gas (around 10 to 15 percent).
During the years of rearmament, the production of electrical energy was high increased enormously. From 1934 until 1939 had she itself more as doubled. But there the creation new capacities far behind the Increase in production remained behind, was This was achieved essentially through full utilization of the existing (surplus) capacity, which in 1934 was still 35 to 40 percent. This reserve capacity had been gradually used up, so that them at the start of the war was "practically nil."363
In the wars, capacity and production grew relatively slowly but steadily, averaging about six percent per year: from 16.9 million Kilowatt in early 1940 on 22 Million end 1944 - a result of major investment - or. of 66.3 billion kilowatt hours in 1939 to 86 billion [364] in 1943; those were in each case in total approximately 30 Percent. The public works grasslands one higher rate of increase on as the private. In the Years 1943 (Was standing April) were still 30 Power-

361 *The effects,* S. 135.
362 The information in this section is (unless expressly stated otherwise) the concentrated information study in *The effects,* p. 114 ff. and p. 264 ff., removed. Some Declarations also in *Wagenühr,* p. 21, p . 52 and passim. To supply the civilian population with domestic fuel, coal, gas and electricity, see *Mehl, Lutz,* Energy in War. Civilian supplies 1939-1945, Kaiserslautern 1977.
363 *The effects,* S. 115 f. (quote out of undated. (1945) report of Reich load distributor).
364 Values far too low for 1942 to 1944 at *car driver,* S. 52 (table), which presumably only covers public works (see ibid., p. 21). Other values and calculation bases also in *Statistics Manual,* p. 335.

Table 106
capacity the power plants (public hand) and Electricity generation 1940-1945 (in 1000 l,W)

Year	Rated output at the beginning of the year	Capacity increase in the current year	percent	Electricity generation (bn. kWh)
1940	9500	860	9.1	37.9
1941	10360	530	5.1	43.4
1942	10890	1030	9.5	46.5
1943	11920	780	6.5	47.3
1944	12700	600	4.7	48.7
1945	13300			?

Source: The effects, S. 117, Tab. 69 (Capacity); *Flour,* S. 200 (Generation). Please refer also *car,* p. 58 (Tab.). Deviant Pay in others To report and Testify (see *The effects,* p. 116; p. 117, Table 71).

works or barrages under construction, including large projects that will take many years to complete would have.365

That production despite the constantly tense The energy situation was not growing in the slightest faster than capacity, illustrating the desperate lack of reserve capacity.366 Furthermore, there was already a sensitive gap between the nominal capacity of the plants and their actual available capacity, far larger than in normal times usual. She made - with large fluctuations - at the public one works in the second half of 1942 it was about 20 percent and was considerably higher in 1943 . were to blame ahead of this everything the as a result the overload of the Investments grow Repair and overhaul work. “This is the time of year,” State Secretary Schulze-Fielitz reported (GIWE) in the November 1942 before the Headquarters Planning,

“unwanted repairs [to systems for] around 700,000 kW, which we didn't have last year, ... We We also see a very significant increase in the repair curve and must also to it think, that very many of these power plants 20 to 30 years old are." 367 In 1943 there were several major damages and losses due to air raids on.

The main consumer of electrical energy was the armaments industry. Overall industry and railways took up around 92 percent in 1939 , while households and public buildings only took up 92 percent 6.4 percent of electricity consumption.368 According to data from the year In 1944, the industrial contingent from the public power plants was used by various large-scale chemical companies, especially synthetic fuel and nitrogen production. 37 Percent, the factories for the production of light metals, Ferroalloy metals and electrical steel another **21** percent, mining and ferrous metallurgy 20 percent and the production from Equipment of war **11** Percent. Within of energy consumption the

365 *Flour,* S. 192.

366 In the same period, from 1939 until 1943, growth in the USA increased capacity by 22.3 percent, the production but around 69.4 percent (from 130.3 on 220.7 billion kilowatt hours) (*The Effects,* p. 118).

367 ZP-P, 17. 11. 19t.2, 27. Meeting.

368 See. the breakdown in *Statistical Manual,* S. 337 (with minor differed).

Industry proportions shifted significantly during the war years in favor of chemical, especially synthetic, production. The rule of thumb was that 40,000 kilowatt hours of electrical energy were needed to produce one ton of Buna were; the corresponding numbers for aluminum were 25,000, for magnesium around 20,000, for nitrogen 11000 and for synthetic fuel 3 000 Kilowatt hours.

The year 1942 formed one Turning point in the Energy situation. It began the time of scarcity and with it the Consumption restrictions and Power shutdowns. The too big Share already before the State monopoly apparatus established during the war on the energy sector (Inspector General for Water and Energy, Reich office for energy industry, national load distributor) decreed - each time after approval by Central Planning - general Cuts of monthly consumption at Energy, Limits for the consumption in the Peak load times and more partial Consumption cuts according to so called Shutdown lists. A differentiated Exception procedure after Priority list completed that Regulatory system. Electricity cuts found primarily while the winter months instead, d. H. to Times of peak demand and lowest supply of hydropower. They began in October 1941 and increased itself Year for year.

Table 107
Cuts of peak demand at Electric energy (percent of needs)

	October	November	December	Januar y
1941/li2	1.2	2.9	2.2	2.7
1942/43	4,'1	*li, O*	3.9	3.5
1943/44	3.2	7.8	7.1	2.5
1944/45	6.1	14.2	17.7	29.1

Source: The effects, S. 120, Tab. 73. Declarations in kWh are not available.

The energy situation increasingly became a factor that caused difficulties and even production restrictions in core areas of the fascist war economy led, particularly in the electrochemical and metallurgical Industry. Every now and then I had to the Aluminum production be throttled. In November 1943 Power shutdowns resulted in a 12.5 percent decline in synthetic nitrogen production and in electrical steel from 20 percent after yourself.

Since At the end of 1943 this proved to be the case Electricity supply almost permanent as inadequate in relation to Requirement the Defense industry.

CHAPTER VI

To war aim and German occupation policy imperialism

1. The German financial capital and the war target planning after June 22, 1941

According to the intention of those in power Circles of Hitler's Germany served the plan that had been planned for a long time raid on the USSR the destruction the socialist social order
--, their most important imperialist class goal. That ultimately gave this raid a new quality compared to the previous ones. The defeat of the Soviet Union should them at the same time the final Domination above Europe provide and her economic potential for the " Battle against Continents", [1] ie for the future conflicts with the other imperialist powers for world domination. In the practice of German occupiers This raid therefore proved to be a new level of extremely heightened imperialist brutality and fascist Barbarism.

With the first military They believed success to be within reach of their goals. From the extreme Degree of secrecy freed, they now left by means of that already from the "NcuORD" programs of the year 1940 usual A combination of euphoric planning and brutally sober calculation to develop concepts and plans for how to dominate and exploit Europe and how to prepare the next steps towards domination.

The Reich Industry Group and the economic and specialist groups, the state monopoly organs of the Reich Ministry, showed primary interest for armaments and ammunition and all major corporations and banks in taking possession of Soviet companies and mineral resources and in building one occupation regime that serves this purpose. In addition, however, the leading monopolies formulated their ideas about war aims that went far beyond this immediate objective. In doing so, they directly followed on from their "reorganization" and "wish programs" from 1940, but they wrote it down a new one step forward by her that Soviet Territory and economic potential were included as a core part of the "large economic area" to be built. On the basis of such ideas and plans was formed the entire fascist one Occupation regime in the occupied Europe further out.

a) The "Reorganization" planning 1941/42

In the first weeks and months after the 22nd. June 1941 The corporations, specialist and business groups aimed at inspired by the military Successful, upon taking possession the different economic areas and Industries in the USSR a.

1 *case Barbarossa,* S. 148, written down ex. Explanations Hitler's before d. generality, 9. **1.** 1941.

Appeared within eight days of the invasion in the East, equipped with long-term prepared, ready-to-go 'economic organizations for the areas to be occupied and with mountains of prepared statistical-scientific ones Materials that Large mining companies, the IG Farben Group, Zeiss, Siemens and AEG came onto the scene and announced their claims for the loot. Such claims and other activities regarding looting, robbery and exploitation in the Soviet Union are from the following corporations and state monopoly Institutions already for the Time from the 22. until
June 30th 1941 known2: Economic group for the iron-making industry, Economic group for materials refinement, specialist group Stainless steel, croup, Reich works "Hermann Göring", Hoesch, Otto Wolff, Gutehoffnungshüttc, Maxhütte (Flick Group), Schocller & Blck man Steel mills AG, IG color [3]; United steel mills, Flick [4]; Armament Advisory Board of the Reich Minister for Armament and Ammunition, Professional community Iron- and metal industry (professional association of 12 Economic groups within the RGI), Bergmann Elcktricity Workc AG (Siemens Group), Zeiss, Dynamite AG before. Alfred Nobel & Co. (IG Farben Group) [5]; Upper Silesian Institute **for** Economic research, Oberhütten 6. The activity the Economic group Textile industry under theirs Director Hans Croon, owner the with the Germans Bank connected Aachen Cloth factory G. II. **&J.** Croon, and dem Influence greater Textile companies How of Dierig Group was it to attribute that already beginning July the foundation of a society envisaged was the from the Reich Ministry of Economics with everyone Powers of attorney **for** the Plunder and From exploitation the Soviet Textile industry and Tcxlil raw materials economy Mistake become and in the "the private Textile industry in each respect dominate" [7] should. The Deutsche Bank pursued this Plan with dem biggest interest and urge at Croon on it, "To also take a leading role in the new opportunity that presents itself."S Hermann Josef Abs remembered some time later: "Weeks ago I called Mr. Kehr!", who remarked that we were the first to offer - There is enough opportunity for everyone to give money."9
On July 10, the chemical companies under the leadership of the IG Farben group, together with the Reich Ministry of Economics, decided on a sophisticated system of domination of the Soviet chemical industry by large German companies and syndicates and by special "Eastern companies" (Chemie Ost GmbH, Nitrogen Ost GmbH etc.).10

2 After dem Date the respective source orderly.
3 *Czollelr, Roswitha! Eichlwltz, Lockpick,* The German Monopolies and the 22. June 1941, in *Z{G,* 1/1967, S. 72 ff.; *tape I,* S. 202ff.
4 *case 5,* S. 257.
5 *anatomy of war,* S. 340 f., Doc. 167.
6 *Eichholtz, Lockpick! Hatred, Gerhart,* To the causes of the second World War and the war aims Of the german Imperialism, in *ZfG,* 7/1967, S. 1168ff. Please refer also *tape I,* p. 204f.
7 *anatomy of war,* S. 342, Doc. 169, AT Elkman (deputy director d. Germans Bank), July 9, 1941.
8 Ibid.
9 ZStA Potsdam, Deutsche Bank, **No.** A 11, Vol. 11, Marginal Abs' v. 25. 8th. 1941 at TO Kim michs, 19. 8. 1941.- Hans Kehr!, himself a textile industrialist, was general advisor and specialist for occupation issues in the Reich Ministry of Economics at the time. He played a significant role at the founding the in speech standing "East Fiber Society mbH" at 4. 8th. 1941.
10 *anatomy of war,* p. 343, Doc. 170, protocol the Board meeting the IG Colors, 10. 7. 19H.

Projects for eastward expansion also began to take shape at the Siemens Group.11 On 14. In July, Siemens-Schuckert management informed its factories that there was no cause for alarm the so-called Russian orders from the Time before the 22nd June is available, especially since a significant part of the products are "for the extraction of raw materials in the previous one area of USSR provided were and probably there too to use reach should. Here is e.g at Equipments for power plants,
for the petroleum industry, for Mining facilities and for the Transportation thought." 12 _
In the following weeks, the headquarters of the Siemens Group set up a separate organization for the occupied Soviet territories, headed by Richard Dicrcks (Siemens & Halske) and Hermann Reyss (Siemens-Schuckert) were key board members. Diercks and Reyss were responsible to the group management for "all questions related to possible support Russian electrical engineering factories, electrical Headquarters ... as well as [for] all
other organizational issues that are necessary for re-organizing these areas for our future business in Consideration come". 13
Among the most aggressive forces of German monopoly capital The light and non-ferrous metal companies have always belonged to them, especially the Metallgesellschaft, Mansfeld, Giesche, De gussa, Preußag, the Vereinigte Aluminum-Werke and - not least - the IG Farben Group, which is heavily involved in the non-ferrous metals industry. They were united in the metal industry business group, particularly in the metal mining and metal producing industry specialist groups, and had also been together for a year specially "for the purpose one generous planning on the Area metal extraction in the newly emerging "Greater European Economic Area" is organized in "metal circles".14 The two specialist groups that were already on *W.* May 1941 by circular with the laconic Regarding "large-scale economy" a directory the hoped Prey, one
"Compilation on Russia's metal supply as well as on the metal ore deposits and mines existing in Russia and metal smelters", gave theirs members at the 17. July a another vade mecum above the "main generation
places in the European Russia" at the Hand. 1 5 The special interest the metal
It excited corporations Caucasus; nevertheless recorded their general staff developed
Economic maps the USSR - like that of Mansfeld Group from the July - also the
mineral resources in the Urals, in Western Siberia, in Kazakhstan and in Central Asia.16
From the wealth of other "economic reports" and memoranda that form an integral part of war target program of German imperialism formed, The most important ones came from the offices of large corporations, the leading monopoly associations, state monopoly associations and institutions. As far as is known, at least 15 were created in the economics department of the IG Farbm Group alone between June 1941 and December 19,12 so-called Vowi reports on the industrial riches of the USSR.
Already while the first Months of war flossrn the planning of economic

11 *Siemens - Armor - War - Profits.* Of a Author col. under Lead v. Hans Radandt, Berlin, undated (1961), p. 39/t,1.
12 ZStA Potsdam, Siemens AG, No. 5378, BI. 186 R, Rs. 14. 7. 1941.
13 Ibid, BI. 176, Rs. v. 9. 9. 1941.
14 *tape I,* S. 349.
15 *Radandt,* Mansfeld, S. 262 f.
16 Ibid, S. 267.

Table 108
Economic policy Elaborations above the USSR 194111942 (Selection)

Origin or author	Title	date
IG Colors	raw material deposits and Funding in Soviet Ukraine and in the adjacent ones areas	June 1941
Reich group Industry	“Economic structure the USSR"	9. July 1941
(dit.)	"Soviet Ukraine"	9. July 1941
Reich works "Hermann Goering"	“Collection of material about deposits that produce iron and iron processing industry in Europe Brazen area. USSR" ("Report No. 3") ,,The Nitrogen industry in the USSR"	July 1941
Nitrogen syndicate	,,Capacities the Russian mining industry"	July 1941
Demag	“Company report. The factories the iron creating	1. August 1941
United Steel mills	industry in Russia. I European Part" "II. Asian Part"	August 1941
(ditto) Reich office for Soil	,,Oil in Russia"	October 1941 1941
Research Institute for Con short-term research	“ Raw material balance of continental Europe Inclusion of the European Russia and North Africa"	1941
IG Colors Chemical	,,Oil and natural gas in the Caucasus"	29. April 1942
Economic Group Industry	"The economy of the Caucasus under special consideration of chemical Industry"	June 1942
Statistical Reich Office	"USSR. Economic Atlas. Part I: Raw materials"	1942

Source: ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 10629, 10671, 10674-10677; BA Koblenz, R 13 I, No. 1146; *Archival Sources on the history of chemical Industry,* No. 6, Wolfen 1974, p. 53 ff.; *Radandt,* Mansfeld, p. 263f.

raid and Considerations about the future imperialist strategy to be pursued from a dominated Europe formed initial ideas of an overarching character. Reich Foreign Minister v. Ribbentrop certainly expected the Germans to have an activating effect role model the Japanese one Government, but at the same time reflected the generally prevailing opinion in the regime's relevant circles when he informed the German embassy in Tokyo on June 28, 1941 about the effects of the impending “Final battle solution the Russian Ask in of their Totality" instructed: “The destruction of Russian power within a relatively short period of time, which is expected from our military action, will make Germany's victory over England irreversible make a fact. If Germany in Own of Russian oil wells and grain fields, this ensures adequate supplies for the whole of Europe, so that the English blockade becomes completely pointless. The direct land connection to East Asia will also be established on this occasion." It then said: "In this way, all the prerequisites are met for the reorganization of the European area intended by the Axis powers enable." [17]

17 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 260, BI. 157f., Telegram v. June 28, 1941; sat *anatomy the Aggression,* p. 21.

Hermann Josef Abs, board member and "foreign minister" of Deutsche Bank, took an even broader, expansionist approach interests and war aims, as he at the 17th July before the Trade Policy Committee The Higher Economic Chamber **(HPA),** which included leading representatives of finance capital and the Reich Industry Group, gave a highly acclaimed lecture entitled “Europe and the USA in Economics "Contemplation" held.18 occupied him, How he in it at the beginning explained, the Problems and difficulties of a “ Regulation of the future relationship in Europe - USA"; he will introduce himself as a speaker especially with the “economic Facts and prerequisites" deal with, „the for one coming reorganization the relationships between the both large areas Europe and USA are present or created Need to become".

Then went he on the economic balance of power between the two “large areas” and on the new situation in Battle around the World domination a and explained the next steps that would have to be taken in order to successfully enter into the future conflict with the USA. The central question for Abs it was how continental Europe became an internally and externally unified economic "greater area" under German rule Domination to join together be, so that man with the USA from the position the Strength from negotiations could. Included be to take into account, so lifted he out,

"that the Expression continental Europe, under dem man until now the European States without Great Britain and Russia understood through the warlike developments in the East one new Embossing is received. Also the Economy of Russia will for the be at least to a large extent part of a future continental European economic area. What an increase this area has in terms of generating and consuming power receives, is naturally in the current was standing the Development not at all to estimate. In any case, Pr also under from the point of view of Self-sufficiency with important goods one more rounding <'rfahrPn."

Abs' comprehensive strategic concept and his detailed trade and monetary policy presentations were, of course, reserved in the text of the lecture and careful wording forced.19 In the subsequent Discussion, the some uncertainty

18 ZStA Potsdam, Deutsche Bank, No. 21913, BI. 269-307; Excerpts printed in *Anatomy of War,* S. 3!,5ff., Doc. 173 (hereafter also <read Follow<le). - members of HPA were (among a total of 26 representatives the arms companies and major banks, the foreign and overseas trade companies, the Reichsgruppe Industrie etc.) Abs, Hermann Fellinger (Didier Group; RGI), Emil Helffcrich (Hapag), Oscar R. Henschel (Henschel Group), Karl Lindemann (C Melchers & Co./Nor<ldeutscher Lloyd), August Rohdewald (Reichs-Kredit Gesellschaft) Hellmuth Roehnert (Rhcinmetall-Borsig/Reichswerke “Hermann Göring”) and Wilhelm Wohlfarth (Zeiss-Ikon/Zeiss Group). Among the guests at the conference on the 17th July August Diehn (potash syndicate), Georg v. Schnitzler (IG Farben), Oskar Sempell (United Steelworks), Albert Pietzsch (head of the Reich Chamber of Commerce) and several other leading representatives of R\VK and RGI, also officers of the OKW and senior officials from the Reich Chancellery, the Foreign Office, the Four Year Plan, the Reich Economic and the Reich Ministry of Finance. Of special interest is the fact that The resistance fighter and scout Arvid Harnack managed to take part in the meeting in his capacity as Americas representative in the Reich Ministry of Economics (see. ibid (ZStA Potsdam), BI. 332 ff., protocol the meeting).

19 The Lecture text lay in hectographed shape the conference participants before and became from Abs later too variously to interested acquaintances from banking and government circles - for example to Emil Puhl, Vice President of the Reichsbank - sent. On wording and structure of the manuscript had these width distribution and of course the

and a lack of understanding among his audience, Abs appeared once again and, "in order to gain a correct point of view," without further ado outlined his imperialist war program: "1. It can be assumed that Germany will dominate Europe after the war, 2. Even Europe is not dependent on the USA after the war, 3. the distance east and Sü<lamcrika stand dem European export open,
4. the standard of living the American worker will climb, 5. Increased costs will force America with Europe to negotiate, 6. the Southeast areas and the Eastern European areas belong to the German area and are led to a higher standard of living." \Vas the “higher Standard of Living" for Southeast and Eastern Europe As far as the German monopolies were concerned, it was a euphemistic description for certain investments "approved" by the German monopolies in sectors of the economy that were of interest to them but for profitable ones Finished warn export as “compensation” for the plundering of raw material resources. Oscar R. Henschel, head of the Henschel Group, summed up the views of those present in a formula: “Europe is not significantly dependent on America, since after the war we also have the Russian area open with his wealth ."
The statements Paragraphs came close in importance and scope to other fundamental documents at that time, such as the statements made by Hitler in his inner circle the day before on the war aims in the USSR [20] or the infamous directive No. 32 [21] absolutely even. The in this included strategic concept revealed the deepest reasons for imperialist Germany's war for world domination. It outlined essential lines of expansion for German finance capital, which were at the same time identical to the traditional expansion interests of Deutsche Bank and the financial group it led: Southeastern Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin America, East Asia. [22] What Abs took into account as a very pressing problem was the open confrontation of the “reorganized” Europe with the USA and the covert confrontation with dem Japanese imperialism around the non-European “Greater areas”. He laid out a detailed, far-reaching program for the economic policy, especially the foreign trade and monetary policy side of these disputes before.
For the "reorganization" plans of the corporations, corporate groups and branches of industry, future planning generally retained its importance, even alongside the tasks that were put on the agenda by the "expansion of space to the East", "which led to one far-reaching planning necessitate and at those first Private interests become

fact influence that there was not yet a state of war with the USA; open military confrontation was that is taken into account, but at least it was correct this one Time, not in interest the German Imperialists. Finally played the fact one Role, that the lecture in its basic features had already been prepared before June 22, 1941 (see ZStA Potsdam, German Bank, No. 21913, different pieces since April May 1941).

20 */MG,* Vol. 38, S. 86ff., Doc. L-221, records Bormanns ex. Discuss at Hitler at the 16. 7. 1941; partly. printed in *case Barbarossa,* S. 331 ff., Doc. 105.

21 *case Barbarossa,* S. 73ff., Doc. 11.

22 The core of the aforementioned financial group's expansion interests, although not directly affected by Abs' topic, traditionally also included the Middle East and the vast Central African colonial series, for the formation of which extensive planning has been underway for a year templates. (To the colonial war aims s. *Lakowski, Richard,* The war aims of fascist Germany in trans-Saharan Africa, Phil. Diss. Berlin 1970; *Eichholtz, Dietrich,* Die War Goals Memorandum of the Colonial Political Office of the NSDAP from 1940, in *ZfG,* 3/1974, p. 308ff.).

have to take a back seat." [23] The initial successes of the Wehrmacht and the colossal prospects dreamed of in the East inspired German finance capital in its pursuit Urge, in the already occupied or dominated Part Europe finished To create facts and final conditions and to bring together the European "large economic area" under his leadership at an accelerated pace. Certain focal points in his "peace planning" emerged more clearly than before. His expansive efforts were directed just as intensively as they were at the "Eastern region" at the other cornerstones of the planned "greater economic area": Western Europe, Southeastern Europe, Northern Europe (particularly Norway). You should in the following demonstrated with examples become.

In the center of War target program of the German mining companies was standing after as before the rule over the French one Minette mining and the smelting works in France, Luxembourg and Belgium. The rulers of coal and steel in the Ruhr and Saar were already among the most militant supporters of the annexation of the entire region during the First World War Lorraine ore basin.[24]

Since the beginning of 1941 , a thirteen-member commission of key monopoly stakeholders appointed and empowered by the Reich Economics Minister, headed by Hugo Klein, worked. "Small Commission", so-called reports above the "Distribution" the Iron- and Steel industry in France, Belgium and Luxembourg to the Germans interested parties. A few weeks ago <learn After the attack on the USSR, the commission published its first report, the "Expert Report on the Assessment the Luxembourgish and Lorraine Works", 25 submitted, whose The cardinal demand was: "In the Commission's view, there is a significant general interest to it, that the Transfer of ownership the factories at the Trustee done as soon as possible and that to the trustees as soon as possible binding accept regarding of property

commercial as well as of takeover price given become." [26]

The commission, now with nine members, immediately began its work continued beyond the annexation borders and finally reimbursed in July In 1942 her second comprehensive report on "The steelworks in the Minctegebict, Belgium and Northern France", the so-called Klein report. [27] The Commission was originally the Task been placed, the Meaning the Metallurgical works in the occupied west for the "reorganized" Europe and in particular for the Steel supply in the wars to determine. But she

busy itself in theirs second Report, before everything in the Final section above the " Unpart ability of entire area", in first line with the ore base. The report became to one

23 *tape I,* S. 350, Annual report d. specialist group metal producing Industry, February 1942.

24 Detailed For this *EichhoUz, Dietrich,* Das Minette area and the German Montanindustrie, in *ZfG,* 7/1977, p. 816ff.; hereafter also the following. See also *Volkmann, Hans-Erich,* L'importance economics de la Lorraine pour le Ille Rich, in *Re;,ue d'histoire de la eng:cieme guerre mondiale,* No. 120/1980, S. 69ff. See. also *Germany in the first WeUwar,* Vol. 1, S. 356ff.; Vol. 2, p. 166f.; Vol. 3, S. 81f.

25 ZStA Potsdam, Case V, Film 405, Doc. Nl-5487 (F}, excerpt from the "Expert report on the evaluation of the Luxembourg and Lorraine works according to the letter from the Reich Minister of Economics dated February 21, 1941", March/April 1941. - Except Klein, the 1st deputy. Chairman of the Association of German Ironworkers, the commission members included Jakob Wilhelm Reichert (General Manager of Wigru Esl), Carl Küttner (Stainless Steel Specialist Group), Jacob Herle (Main trust office East) and Bernard Skrodzki (Managing Director the RGI).

26 Ibid.

27 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 10637. Hereafter also the Episode,;_de. - were commission members u. a. J. W. Reichert and Carl Raabe (Flick Group).

“pleading ... pour le rattachment de Briey, Longwy el Nancy a l'Allemagne".28 "Who in lead minette mining want", so was in it to read, “I have to the Disposal over the mines of Longwy and Briey." At the end it was said, partly demanding, partly imploring, with a clear reference to the need for an early political border demarcation: „Neither the German peace still the military economy can on this indispensable iron ore and Iron area waive."

It was further especially Southeastern Europe, which in the eyes of the German imperialists underwent a reassessment in connection with the military events in the Balkans and in the Soviet Union. After the occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece and after the collapse of the USSR, according to their calculations, all of southeastern Europe fell to them How a more mature apple in the Lap and reached as safe economic hinterland unforeseeable time and irrevocably under German dominance.

On November 7, 1941, the Southeast Committee of the RGI under the leadership of Max Ilgner, board member of **IG** Farbenindustrie AG, held its constituent meeting. Its foundation was the coronation one for a long time intensive operated Employment of the German financial capital with the aim and methods his further Expansion to the southeast. These were essentially those also in the Central European Business Day (MWT) represented monopolistic Circles that she has had for months prepared had.29 They created a central state monopoly body in the Southeast Committee, which was considered indispensable and unavoidable Advice center for the fascist Government, Depending on requirements, they were also given government powers to support the expansion of the German government Imperialism to Southeastern Europe drive, direct and control and should bring together the entire planning and organizational activity in the industrial field. The committee used its seven country committees as executive bodies and also used the MWT and the Southeast European Society, which competed with it, as auxiliary institutions. 30

Conceptual thoughts about the German expansion strategy In September 1941, Ulrich v. Hassell, who serves on the board of the MWT was. Hassell, a reactionary Conservative, the opposition Circling around Beck and Goerdeler said yes as the "task" of the fascist coalition, after the war, "to take control of the order of essential parts of the European continent, including economically." 31 He advocated one long-term policy of including Southeast Europe as a reliable political and economic hinterland in the sphere of power Of the german Imperialism. He declared himself in favor of "steering industrialization" in this room from German Page out of and against their ban - as well as against an economic policy that "short-sightedly takes the standpoint of the foreign capitalist exploiter" .32

Such a tactic of long-term economic infiltration was consistent with the ideas leading Representative the German capital goods and Export industry, but also the at one active investment and Credit policy interested major banks,

28 *Freymond, Jean,* Les industrial everyone de l'acier et le basin miner lorrain (1940-1942), in *Re1 1ue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine,* Vol. 19, 1972, p. 42.

29 Please refer the relevant ones Documents in *anatomy the Aggression,* p. 130ff., and under *control to Southeastern Europe,* p. 136 fu p. 142f., as well as the intro. ibid, p. 52 ff.

30 Please refer *Handle after Southeastern Europe,* S. 50ff. (introduction) u. 136f. (Pliers at v. Wilmowsky, 7. 8th. 1941.)

31 *anatomy the Aggression,* S. 138, Memorandum v. Hassells, Sept. 1941.

32 Ibid, S. 147f.

especially the Deutsche Bank, which was heavily involved industrially and financially in the southeast. So belonged Abs to those who v. Hassell to his “extremely clear and forceful presentation” [33] congratulated.

Northern Europe formed from the 22. June 1941 at in the The ideas of the German imperialists are a fringe zone enormous continental block that extends to Arkhangelsk line - Astrachan and further are sufficient should. In this new dimension took the economical meaning Northern Europe for she partially strong away. The concerned above all the Swedish iron ore, in the The Danish perspective Food production and finally also the Finnish ones Wood resources. The mentioned goods should more plentiful, cheaper and without detour the usual foreign trade the occupied Soviet territories. On others areas planned the Germans ruler one tight economic interdependence between Northern Europe and dem occupied Soviet Territory. So should the Norwegian aluminum industry with bauxite out of Northern Russia provided become.[34] Less is known the Plan of “seizure the fishing fleet in the White Sea and yours) Transfer after Norway, around the Exploitation of their Catches for Germany over Norwegian processing plants to enable".[35] This action was in the overall calculation the Fascists included, after the in the so-called forest zone,

d. H. in dem entire middle and northern Part the RSFSR or the European part of the USSR, countless millions of people were to be left to starve .[36]

Since the cast Norway in spring 1940 had The main economic interest of the occupiers was “additional supply options for Germany with aluminum”.[37] directed. The light metal production on the basis of the unlimited there Energy resources at \Water power was valid them not only as one unique

33 *Handle to southeastern Europe,* p. 155, Section at v. Hassell, 24. 11. 1941. - One Entry in v. Hassell's secret diary dated 20. September 1941 (!J. *Hassell, Ulrich,* Vom Andern Deutschland, Frankfurt a. M./Hamburg 1964, p. 201f.) completes the picture of the ambivalent attitude of the reactionary wing of the bourgeois opposition to the imperialist war and the war goals. Like most other followers this wing swayed v. Hassell at that time between the fear of the consequences of defeat in battle against the Anglo-American supremacy and the hope, Soviet Union and thus to destroy socialism: “Perhaps the successes of these days will be in Russia (at the September 19th fell Kiev - EN) the mood...in the entire World in influence in a way favorable to the German cause. If it were possible to take Petersburg, the Donets region, even Maykop and finally Moscow, Russia would really become more dangerous Enemy retire. The supply base would stronger and the Outlook on victory for the Opponent lower. The were then really the Moment, around one to create an opportunity for peace. In fact, these successes increase the opponent's chance of victory instantly reduced, but the Base for a German victory by no means created. The moment should so under none circumstances, How all previous, missed become."

34 See *Petrick,* Two Key Documents, pp. 249ff. In detail about the place of Northern Europe in German War Target Program *Eichholtz, Lockpick,* Direction of expansion Northern Europe, in *ZfG,*
1/1979, S. 17ff.

35 *JMG ,* Vol. 36, S. 152, Doc. EC-126, “Economic policy Guidelines for Eastern Economic Organization, Agriculture Group", dated May 23, 1941.

36 Please refer *tape I,* S. 238ff.; see. d. prev. Vol., S. 454f.

37 Draft one elaboration d. Economics. Dept. of IG Farben Group for the OKW v. April 19, 1940; quote b. *Petrick,* Two Key Documents, p. 253.

Opportunity to expand German supremacy in the world in this area; At the same time, it was intended to form the basis for a rapid expansion of the German air force. In occupied Europe, Milward states, “no other individual project came along at this time in importance to the aluminum plan (for Norway - EN) same". [38]

In October 1940, the "Koppenberg Plan" was launched, a colossal project to expand Norway's aluminum capacities several times over using available water power. [3 9] This project sparked incessant, fierce internal competition between the "aluminium interested parties" , which faced each other in two powerful state-monopoly groups: the VAW group (Viag) - Dresden Bank - Reich Ministry of Finance and the IG Farben/Four-Year Plan group - Bank the Germans aviation - Reich Aviation Ministry (or Aircraft Master General). Leader representative the first grouping was Ludger Westrick (VAW); relevant representatives the second were Heinrich Koppenberg and Wilhelm Moschel (IG Farben). The IG Farben Group was not only interested in taking a leading role in the development and use of enormous production capacities for light metal. Access to Norwegian hydroelectric energy appeared to him primarily as a key problem for unforeseeable future possibilities in the entire promising field of electrochemical and electrometallurgical production.

The German imperialists' Norwegian aluminum project not only received a huge boost with the attack **on the USSR as a result of the “general** "Climate of optimism"40 that spread regarding the "new order"; it also seemed to have a new material basis to be placed. Immediately on the 23rd June 1941 at the meeting Göring on the aluminum basis for the "Goering program" it was decided "that the bauxite deposits in the north of Russia, on which very considerable alumina factories could be built lay, in first line to one Meeting needs for Norway used become should". [41] The “Light metal expansion plan Norway" became in the second half year 1941, on an equal footing with the mineral oil program, now designed to be more comprehensive and “rational”. 1940, to the key project of the German blitzkrieg and world domination strategists.

The new events prompted the IG Farben group to start its “peace planning” for Norway from May 1941 to be revised and supplemented. In his additional “ Proposals" dated 15. September 1941 he assumed that the “expansion of industrial capacity of country ... now probably as part of the Overall planning to address" be,

“that on the reorganization of the continental European economic area "42 They contained a complete concept for a society that was totally dependent on German imperialism and from exploited him Norwegian Business and with it a Model for the German Economic policy also in others countries North and Western Europe. The IG “Peace Planning” from May 1941 was supplemented in essential points, especially by the Financial support after more complete Subordination the Norwegian Industry under

38 *Milward,* Norway, S. 171.

39 In more detail ibid, p. 171ff.; *Petrick, Fritz,* To financing of “Light metal expansion Norway”, in *Contributions to Story of Baltic Sea region,* Greifswald 1975, S. 171ff.

40 *Milward,* Norway, S. 198.

41 *Petrick,* Two key documents, S. 263, Doc. 1, AT ex. d. meeting at Goering at the June 23, 1941.

42 *Eichholtz,* The Norway memorandum of IG Farben Group, S. 51, Doc. 4, "Norway Memorandum" Version v. Sept. 1941. Hereafter that too The following.

"German needs". this Demanding the capture of the majority shareholding in the Norsk Hydro group, a crucial position in the Norwegian economy, the the biggest and most expandable Industries of country , Difficult
chemistry (nitrogen) and light metal industry - completely under brought German control.43 Considering those planned for the future or already under construction have investment plans in these branches was the Norwegian economy in more acute Danger of being over-invaded by foreigners and becoming a mere economic appendage of German imperialism to descend.

At 4. In December 1941, Field Marshal Milch, on behalf of Göring, made another attempt to resolve the disputes between the companies and groups involved over the "division of European areas of interest among the individual aluminum interests." to be enclosed.4'1 It presented itself out of here, that in the meantime in Given the abundance of resources captured, a preliminary agreement had already been reached. According to this, Norway and "Northern Russia" were to form the exclusive "area of interest" of the IG-farben-Koppenberg group, while the VAW was compensated with "Southern Russia" as well as the most profitable and richest deposits and companies in southeastern Europe. France was to be exploited jointly by both. The destroyed aluminum factory in Zaporoz'e on the Dnieper should under the management of the VAW be rebuilt in the long term and **on a large scale.** On the other hand, the majority of those gathered tend to support **a part of the bloated Norwegian aluminum project** on the “extraordinary Disadvantage" to cancel, the - How Krauch it formulated- ,
“the creation of this defense industry in one so huge Concentration so far from German sphere of influence "removed" into mountains.

In fact, the participants in the consultation decided to reduce the “Norwegian light metal expansion”. Koppenberg gave the reasons in his information for Reich Commissioner Terboven for that although more complete; she are “in recent military developments as well as in the traffic problem and the ever-increasing lack of freight [space]".45

However, the German imperialists seemed to have firm ownership of the economic resources acquired in the USSR also at that point in time, there you attack in East had already come to a standstill, as secured for as long as possible. After all, vast areas of the Soviet Union, several times larger than Germany, and enormous agricultural and industrial wealth had come under their control, including the western part of the Donec Basin.

In the first November half, as the Preparations on one second. , the last - Open
sive against Moscow yet once high hopes an early termination of the war awakened them, continued a phase of intensive conferences and Consultations on fundamental problems of fascist economic and occupation policy. Göring laid down summary guidelines for the exploitation of the economic resources and Workforce of the Soviet country on long term before. At the same

43 *Petrick,* two key documents, S. 257; *Case 6.* Selected documents and judgment from the IG Farben trial, ed. deposited by Hans Radandt, Berlin 1970, p.162{., p. 230ff.; *Eichholtz,* Expansion Direction Northern Europe, p. 20{.

44 *Petrick,* Two key documents, S. 264 ff., Doc. 2, ON ex. d. meeting b. milk at the 4. 12. 1941 (partly printed in *anatomy of War,* p. 365 f., Doc. 185). Hereafter also the following.

45 *Petrick,* Two key documents, S. 259 (quote AT f. Terboven v. 9. 12. 1941 'V'· report Koppenbergs v. 8th. 12. 1941).

At that time, the leading circles of the Reich Industrial Group formulated their strategic ideas and laid in newly formed Committees like that Southeast Committee and dem East department 46 the future economic Expansion strategy firmly.

At the 7. November 1941, the day the founding of the Southeast Committee the RGI, The leaders of the RGI dealt with it in the smallest circle, to which Wilhelm Zangen only invited the senior board members of Deutsche and Dresdner Bank, Abs and Carl Goetz had, with as a result of the “political changes in the East ... newly emerging problems".47

Instead of Pliers and Rudolf Steel that urgent to the at the same time taking place Meeting at Göring's "on the orientation of the war economy towards the coughing program"4 8 were invited, Ewald Löser, then the key member of the Krupp Group's board of directors, headed the event Advice. Instead of from para was Johannes Kiehl present, except him and Goetz Hans-Günter Sohl (United Steelworks), Wilhelm Rudolf Mann (IG-farben) and Friedrich Brockhüs (Flick Group).49 A balance was taken over around a quarter of a year of predatory activity by the state monopoly machinery of the Eastern society and found it to be inadequate. To at the taking of possession, commissioning and “as quickly as possible and effective" exploitation of Soviet industrial potential in Future

"to effectively involve the private sector and to prevent the L\fonopol operations (meaning the Eastern companies - D E.) in the long term, so to speak, with your own people and with suitable set up ventures", decided man, on one to change the current procedure. From now on, the economic groups were supposed to name the "most suitable company for the Eastern companies in the specific case, which would take over the administration under specified conditions with its entire staff and other responsibilities." Löser, who held the chairmanship, did not represent anything else on Zangen's behalf as the opinion of the H.uhr companies, which the day before in the “ l h•inen circle" for the economic group Eisl'Il the visual industry has drawn up the corresponding financial statements.50

Verbal offered the RGI the Authorities at the same time dm \'educates the industry the Right to later transfer of ownership and wanted to bPnem too nd “Fraud” Firnwn make statements of the kind “that they are talking about any efforts regarding the acquisition of a Russian Stay away from the company This plan was intended to make it easier for state officials to reduce their scruples about the proposed procedure, which basically amounted to a mixture of the system originally envisaged, according to which the Soviet companies could be controlled by hand or by hand .Lease agreement to the Germans Corporation!' should be distributed with that of theirs cent rakn Y<'rw.1h ung through the Eastern societies. The property goes away was natural cum grano salis to yer, and the two gentlemen agreed with a wink: “Of course

46 To the foundation of the Eastern Department of the RGI s. *Schurmn,* New Documents of the Reich group industry "Reorganization" Europe, S. 434 f., Doc. 11, Rs. d. Chief Executive Officer the RG I, December 16, 1941.

47 ZStA Potsdam, German Bank, No. 21851, BI. 54, Invitation from Pliers for Section, 21i. 10. 191.1.

48 Ibid, FS, Movie 2325, written down ex. d. meeting i. RLM, 7. 11. 191i1. Please refer p. 34 f.

49 Ibid, German Bank, No. 21851, BI. 55H., AT Kiehl ex. d. Meeting, 11/7 U)t,J. Here after also the following.

50 See BA Koblenz, R 13 I/608, BI. 111f., protocol d. Discussion between RWi:\I (v. Ilanne ken) and Wigru Esl at 6. 11. 19"1; ibid., no. 621, BI. 14, Protocol d. meeting d. Small circle on October 30, 1941.

It was clear that the company that had once successfully looked after a business actually had a better prospect on a any later acquired." 51
solver also suggested the Authorities too recommend the fascist state should even now Share certificates "on any later acquisition in Russia" sell, with it
"from first of all... those gradual privatization of this area is actually determined". However, the other participants in the meeting rejected this proposal, which raised tempers to some extent heated, as “premature”.
As Goering at the 8th. November 1941 “general principles" above the in the occupied Soviet areas on long view to be set up “ colonial economy" presented,5 2 However, the failure of the blitzkrieg strategy already cast a shadow over the consultation. Between the lines was standing in the colonization guidelines from the November 8th that the war in the East would have to be continued in 1942 . So that was her focus - unchanged compared to the “Green Folder” - on the short term, greatest possible “Food and raw material production" for the German war economy as dem “supreme law every economic action in the re-occupied Eastern Territories". On the same day that Göring appeared before his audience with the colonization guidelines, met the Foreign Trade Committee the RGI. There pulled man Balance sheet above two Years
“Reorganization Europe" and stuck the perspective away.
Hermann Fellinger, head of the committee and head of the Didier-Werke AG group controlled by Deutsche Bank, formulated this in “programmatic statements” 53 from “more fundamental Meaning" 54 the “official opinion” 55 the Management of the RGI from the “Reorganization Europe". The big goal, that it now needs to be realized "the Greater economy in a continental European economic bloc" .56 This includes “the application of our sensible economic principles and economic planning”. this one “Large area”, the “on Reason ours position of power".57 Fellinger continued: "We strive for the best possible development of raw material sources on and the elevation of production itself with the ultimate goal one the highest possible production reason more sensible, that is, economically more sensible Planning." For this "construction work" a "leadership is necessary, which we, however, claim for Germany... Up dem In the industrial sector, this leadership task belongs to the Reich Industry Group as the appointed representative of German industry as a whole." Its Foreign Trade Committee has "the program for the economic reorganization as a whole continental European Space to put together and to carry out" .58

51 Over the Conflicts around the Transfer of ownership s. S. 411ff.
52 *Eichho/J;z, Dietrich,* Göring's guidelines **for** economic policy on occupied Soviet territory dated November 8 , 1941, in *BuUetin of the “Second World War” working group,* No. 1-2/1977 (hereinafter: The Guidelines Göring's), p. 73ff. (p. 83ff.).
53 *anatomy of war,* S. 360, Doc. 182, AT Albert ex. d. meeting d. committee at the 11/8 _ 1941, v. 12. 11. 1941 (date of cover letter). The complete one Document at *Schumann,* New Documents the Reich group Industry to "Reorganization" Europe, p. 429ff.
54 *Anatomy of the Aggression,* p. 152, Doc. 32, report d. RGI ex. d. meeting at the 8th. 11. 1941 with excerpt from of the speech Fellingers.
55 *anatomy of war,* S. 360, File note Albert.
56 *anatomy the Aggression,* S. 154, report RGI.
57 *anatomy of war,* S. 360f., File note Albert.
58 *anatomy the Aggression,* S. 155, report RG I

In the December broke before Moscow finally the Blitzkrieg strategy. In Wehrmacht and war economy came to personnel revisions and momentous changes to the situation prolonged war. But it There can be no question of the German monopolies revising their war program or even their greed for expansion temporarily reined in. In the Opposite, she waited around the Turn of the year 1941/42 came up with new, fantastic developments and plans, just as if they now really wanted to whip up the German military machine and push it further.

The perspective plans and Suggestions the German mining companies for the "European large economic area" saw the assembly the pan-European or in the German sphere of power located iron ore resources, smelting works and rolling mill capacities into a massive steelmaking block, the largest in the world. The cited memoranda about the Minette district are preceded by a recently discovered memorandum the Soviet heavy industry in the Dnepr-Donec industrial area. After thorough inspections and research on site5 [9] Accordingly, various treatment options were discussed in relevant circles of the Ruhr companies the Soviet Steel industry and considered finally between late autumn 1941 and spring 1942 a ludicrous and barbaric plan - which, moreover, was in full agreement with the “Generalplan Ost”, the “Eastern Space” program of the SS leadership, which was discussed at the same time.6° In a memorandum by Georg Bulle (Gutehoff nungshütte), one of the “Russia specialists” of the Ruhr companies and the German Ironworks Association, the reconstruction of the works and factory facilities that were largely destroyed or transported to the interior of the Soviet Union in a timely manner was not advocated, rather the “Relocation the Russian Iron Industry". Germany.

"The Machines and equipment that become available will be included Maintenance and expansion of the German steel industry ·Ukrainian iron ores are smelted in the German economic area and serve to ensure the necessary expansion the German steel production, from the out of the growing one German construction, machinery and shipping industries as well as Ukrainian domestic needs are satisfied becomes. In addition it would be necessary for the works supervised become, until their system components are needed in the German factories and then dismantled under German expert management, whereby German assembly managers are needed for a short time. At the same time we should the Train- and Waterways between Ukraine and East Germany to accommodate mass transport of ore. The German eastern coalfields Silesia and Bohemia and perhaps also the Ostmark would set up for the smelting of Easter ores have."

The choice of the "resettlement" option was justified, among other things, by war requirements; the deeper reasons, however, were clearly rooted in the German imperialist strategy of world domination financial capital:

“1) The relocation of the steelworks can begin immediately, while restoration without the commissioning, which has become unsafe due to the coal supply, is postponed for the time being become must.

2) Now, d. H. in the wars, can Germany the for the reconstruction necessitate machinery

59 Please refer S. 461.

60 *Müller, Rolf Dieter,* Industrialists Interest politics in the Frame of “General plan East", in *Military history Announcements,* 29, 1/1981, S. 128ff., Doc. 9, report from George Bull at J. W. Reichert (Wigru It I) v. 10. 11. 1941 (with Write to v. March 30, 1942). Hereafter also the following. For the “General plan East" see p. 430ff.

cannot deliver without damaging their commitment to domestic German production, which is more important for the war effort and becomes the discharge through Ukrainian Plant parts for the necessary Modernization of the existing Huts and the expansion of the Welcome Ostwerke.
3) Now in Wars can Germany for the Ukrainian Steelworks construction required skilled workers, technical Director and before everything foreman, not without Damage to the domestic arms industry, as there is already a severe shortage of these forces prevails. The Assembly manager for the Resettlement can against it good placed because that's what it's for in Germany Machine specialists are saved.
4) In the long term, resettlement for Germany means avoiding the danger that lies in it, that in Slavic territory the broad base an arms industry, like it represents a steel and iron production.
5) For a long time view needed Germany the Ukrainian ore reserve (10 mill. tFe= 15 million t of steel per year) to ensure German steel production in the ethnic German area. Because the other German ore bases are not sufficient for the desired and later required steel production of 50 millions Yes, since the Minette only Max. 20 million tons of steel production (13 mill. tFe) and Scandinavia max. 15 **mill.** t steel (10 mill. tFe) possible and the other occurrences are small (llsede and a.), uncertain (Africa, Spain etc. a.) or bad (domestic). Because of the key position of the steel industry This may be done by others not in Slavic area in the Far East, but must between Meuse and Memel lie. Therefore, the Ukrainian ore must be smelted in Germany and not in Ukraine, preferably in Germany East.
Finally may not forget become, that it
6) on wide view for Germany from The advantage is that Ukraine is protected from the Russians were robbed of their industry (meaning the evacuations before the German invasion - D.E.) and only as an agricultural country with strong population density Agricultural production and for the Exchange his Agricultural products against the industrial products is forced. Ukraine can now inevitably involved in securing the Germans food economy and the German contribute to industrial sales.
From all this one Found it would be desirable if the German Government as soon as possible the resettlement the Ukrainian Iron industry in the inner German space as necessary recognized and the security the Investments decreed, before Germans Military or administrative offices out of natural Need for order or in the \-Wishes, the To serve German steel supplies, in the long term false restoration work will begin." The business-like, sober language this report, the by no means a Secret document was, could not to hide it, that it itself at the formulated Financial support around the plan one outrageous Industrial robbery and not only the enslavement, but the decimation of the Ukrainian people acted.
In the IG Farben Group circulated center January 1942 Lists the huge Soviet plastic, Rubber- and White color works with the emphatic "Recommendation",
“towards it pay attention if in the the setup mentioned places from the German troops will be occupied so that we can then immediately contact the responsible authorities."[61] The works listed were arranged geographically, so to speak: They were in the Order of their expected Conquest by the Vehrmacht. At the top ranked the huge factories in Leningrad, Moscow and in the Ukraine. But it

61 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 3966, Listen and accompanying letter (dictation mark: Bgt) v. January 14, 1942 for Grebe (plastics), Dr. Albers (Rubber) u. Dr. White (white colors) (= Doc. NI-7468).

There were by no means missing works in Batumi, Erevan', Celjabinsk (color works), Sumgajt, Celkar and even Novosibirsk (Rubber Works).

Krauch himself had to the Turn of the year discussions with Göring about extremely serious questions of the German strategy of conquest. According to his letter dated January 27th 194262 to judge, held he the further advance to the Caucasus, at the Sources of petroleum, still for natural and essential. It was even more important to him to convince Göring that the oil fields of Kirkuk in Iraq a worthwhile one, **Yes** a still far more productive goal represented, there there the **Oil** "under "own gas pressure" and does not have to be extracted by pumping, as in the Caucasus. Every drilling there, he argued, brings in ten percent more than in the Caucasus. or even Hundredfold at Financial support. One Table and one economic geographical sketch, the strength of his writing attached, illustrated with plenty of numerical material the funding conditions not only of the Caucasian and Iraqi FC countries, but also those of the Egyptian FC countries with equal detail and urgency. Krauch concerned itself already with the approach circumstances the conquest dps Yorderen Orients:

"In the event of destruction, full performance in the Near East is likely to be restored with much be possible with less effort in terms of materials, time and work, as in the chewing case."

herb, Chairman of the Supervisory Board of IG Farben Group, boss of Reich Office for Economic expansion and GB Chemistry as well as Member of Supervisory Board the Accounts Oil, strengthened so in the middle in one critical military situation the Nazi- and military leadership Back and remembered she emphatically to it, that the in the bDisgraced Instruction No. 32 dated June 1941 [63] outlined strategy as Pinc, the main Requirements for the Expansion program the German Imperialists binding stay.[64] He did that as the spokesman more authoritative Circles of financial capital, the one Understanding about the future **Strategy for** urgent held. His PM letter at Goering went detailed Consultations in the Line the Accounts oil occasion the Supervisory board meeting this society at the January 13, 1942 ahead.[65] Only few later stuck man in the Foreign AmL the between Krauch and Göring bPspoken Conquest strategy more precisely from: ,,The goal usPres advance in Arabic space becomes next to the Occupation of the Countries Iraq, Syria and Palestine the Suez Canal and the Persian golf be.... Prepared must become the takeover the Petroleum facilities in the ship it Areaf'Il Arabia and

62 Ibid, movie 8398, Krauch (GB Chemistry) at Goering regarding "Comparison Petroleum areas Caucasus and Near East".

63 *case Barbarossa,* S. 73 ff., (Draft the) Instruction v. 11. G. 1941.

64 In the OKW struck man to that one Time under dem Impression the defeat before Moscow more timid, yes downright pitiful tones at. In one study of WiRüAmtes from January/February 1942, which is mainly documented should, that this Göring program "yes "absolutely impossible" to carry out for fuel reasons, the possibility was only spoken of in the subjunctive. ,,in the course of the war still in the possession the Russian Petroleum deposits (to get". Finally said it: "One but is clear: Without the Russian oil can we We are far from making full use of even the small amount of Russian space we have in our hands. But above all: without the Russian one Oil must the German Warfare of off now in constant increasingly weaken." (ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 10667, part Ms. a fuel memorandum from the Defense Economics and Armaments Office (Tomberg?), most likely. Jan./Feb. 1942).

65 Please refer p. 482f.

Iran." 66 It was precisely this goal that determined the author of the quoted work, Fritz Grobba, according to one the special Tasks of under formed by his leadership Staff:
“Preparation for the conclusion of agreements on the takeover of the concession from Iraq petroleum Comp. and the position from consultants under participation the Department Ha. Pole. (of the AA - D E.) as well as the positions within Germany."6 7 So that now moved into that Stage more concrete and increasing intensive planning, what had already happened a year earlier at the founding meeting of the Oil Accounts - the most important “internal German office” in this regard - as the “highest goal” of theirs Founder, the cream of German finance capital, had been apostrophized: to lay your hand on that Petroleum empire the Royal Dutch Shell on Persian Gulf.68 The crucial access on this imperium should above the chewing case occurs.
The described lively activity of the ruling circles and, in particular, Krauch's actions shed light on the prominent role of the oil strategy in the German war plans financial capital and let recognize, which excellent Place that Oil included in his concept of world domination. During the Wehrmacht's summer offensive, the von Krauch predetermined The line is clearly visible again, for example on the 10th. June In 1942 the participants of the “Oil Meeting” attended Göring acted as if be the Iraqi ones Oil wells already under **their** control.6 9
Back then they were shy German imperialists by no means give up their aspirations for an oil empire similar to that of British and US imperialism to be published in black and white. In a series of publications in a well-respected technical magazine, a certain Birk wrote: “Greater Germany, as the leading state in the economic unit of Europe, does not only strive for the abundant supply for this continent coal reserves, but also the in his habitat upcoming Petroleum treasures to mobilize.... The power and monopoly position of British and North American capital in the oil industry the World must Broken become, around the Away for one "To restructure the mineral oil supply as the basis for industrial activity and transport development for all peoples and economic units." 70 The Wehrmacht propaganda claimed in January In 1943, when the fascist troops... Kauka sus flooded back that the German army would “create the conditions for this us too our Portion at the sources of raw materials in the world and not least in the mineral oil deposits the Earth secured will" .11
The Summer offensive 1942 brought one last flowering time for War target planning and

66 ZStA Potsdam, Foreign Office, No. 61123, BI. 176f., drafted by Fritz Grobba **for** v. Ribbentrop, February 5, 1942: "Germany's advance across the Caucasus into the Arab region"; cf. also *Anatomy of War,* p. 377, Doc. 192.

67 Ibid (ZStA), BI. 193, short version the same elaboration ud T. “Advance German country after dem Arabic Space". -Envoy z. b. V. Fritz Grobba was the authorized representatives of AA at Felmy Special Staff, a combat and diversion force, the was kept on standby by the OKW for the Near and Middle East.

68 Please refer *DZW,* Vol. 1, S. 556.

69 *EichlwUz, Dietrich,* The raid of fascist German imperialism on the oil sources of the Caucasus 1941-1943, in *JfG,* 1976, Vol. 14 (hereinafter: Petroleum Sources), p. 462 ff., Doc. 1. See also p. 484f.

70 *Birk, Karl,* Fuel economy the World, in *series of publications magazine German Technology,* H. 11, Berlin (1942), S. 67 and 72.

71 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 10699, (teaching) lecture v. TKVR Simons from 28. 1. 1943 ex. „The oil".

programs. However, theirs shifted Focal points. In a certain way should that too “Ban on peace planning” by Hitler, Göring and Speer, [72] although primarily related to the construction and production of products, the energies of corporations and state monopolies Committees stronger to focus on the economic potential of the occupied Countries directly in the German War potential to include and it short term to make it usable for warfare. The monopolies had no objection to this, especially since it was for them It was obvious that as long as the war was not victorious completed was, the “Reorganization” planning last At the end Castles in the air remain had to.

What the occupied Soviet territories, so The German monopolies focused on intensifying their predatory activities in the Eastern companies and, outside of these organizations, on founding countless “Eastern companies”. Here, the fait accompli of the “reorganization” was to be created. In order to make Soviet economic resources more quickly usable, they were at times even prepared to recruit anti-Soviet entrepreneurial circles from the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, France, Hungary and other countries that were willing to collaborate the Plunder and participate in the systematic exploitation of certain areas of the occupation economy to let.73

The RGI supported and promoted it predatory Urge of the Germans industrialists to establish themselves in the occupied Soviet territories with all their weight and influence. In the from her published magazine "The Eastern economy" promised them an editorial in the spring of 1942 : ". Nobody who has an interest in being active in the East will be left out.” 74 In September, the same editorialist, editor-in-chief Hans Thode, exulted in military developments, particularly the capture of the entire Donec-Industricreviers, offer so "the Possibility ..., in the east one host
economic policy on longer view to bcdrive". [7 5] To Main concern the corporations, the RGI
and the Business groups was the question of the future Transfer of ownership to the German companies now temporarily appointed as “trustees” or “godparents” .76

The flood the economic reports, Studies and statistical elaborations from corporations, economic institutions and government agencies across all economically important countries the world rose in the year 1942 still on. At the center of attention the processor stood Southeastern Europe, Africa, the Vicinity and distance East.77 From particular interest is one elaboration the Continental oil AG from the 15. July 1942 above "The

72 Please refer *Janssen,* S. 66 ff.

73 Please refer *Groehler!Schumann,* To the Alliance relationships ..., S. 636f.; *DZW,* Vol. 2, S. 419f.;
Eichhohz, Direction of expansion Northern Europe, S. 27 ff.

74 *Thode, Hans,* habitat in the East, in *The Eastern economy,* No. 3/1942 (March), S. 37.

75 *The same,* Entrepreneurship in the East, in ibid, No. 9/1942 (Sept.), S. 125 f.
Selection "on articles out of "The Eastern economy(t), Born in 1942.
No. 3 (March) “Living space in the East"
No. 6/7 (June/July) “European Community task East"
„German trading company in the occupied Eastern areas"
„The Petroleum industry in the North
Caucasus No. 9 (September) “Entrepreneurship in the East”

76 Please refer S. 415 ff. u. S. 466f.

77 Numerous such Elaborations and Memoranda in ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 10613 ff.;
s. a. *Archi"alic Sources to Story the chemical Industry,* No. 6, Wolfen 1974.

Mineral oil industry in Egypt", [78] the coincided with the furthest German advance and Italian troops in the direction on Cairo. At that time also reported, for example the Deutsche Bank explicitly theirs Expectations for takeover Britain's colonialist positions in Egypt and "incidentally Near East". [79]

The most striking result of the war goal planning in 1942 was the East Asia program the RGI, which from Dated March, but similar again "Small report" does since longer prepared been was. In the East Asia Program, [80] from his Authors in the East Asia Committee of the RGI called it "the desired program of the German economy for the implementation of German-Japanese cooperation in the Greater East Asian economic area", the German monopolies presented Japanese Allies called for equal participation in the "reorganization in the Greater East Asian region". By "equal rights" they meant "the German nationality servants (read: German monopolies - D E.) must not be worse off in every respect as Japanese" and as well How those who dominate this space Japanese monopolies have "strong favoritism" over others powers enjoyed. That said in detail:

"Delivery is preferred of raw materials to Germany ... preferential purchase of German industrial products ... operation and establishment of bases of a German banking institution in all areas of the Greater East Asia region", namely the for this purpose complete to reorganizing German-Asian Bank, and Last but not least, the free operation of German maritime and air transport companies and insurance groups, "unrestricted by the monopolistic tendencies" of their Japanese competitors.

With the East Asia program German finance capital spread far and wide the borders of Europe and prepared economic expansion over huge distances into areas of the other hemisphere, the the Japanese ones Imperialists had conquered or planned to conquer. His war program clearly proved to be Veltherr's war program. In that document lay the seeds of later clashes and profound disputes with the Japanese, who were treated with a weak one To throw sand in Klausd's eyes about the "principle of reciprocity". thought.

Of course, the "Ncu-order" planning and policies of German finance capital were not spared from the effects of the defeat before Moscow noticeable where there is certain consideration for other capitalist ones Parlner in the "major economic area" to was meant to be taken. Übernil where the German Corporations, for example in the Electrical industry [81] and in the Autoinduslri(, [82] , the attempt companies, new, under of their guide standing inter-European Cartels and Conventions to build,

78 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 10616.

79 Ibid, German Bank, No. 10275, BI. 133, AT Section (for Weigelt), July 4, 1942.

80 Excerpts printed in *Anatomy of War,* p. 387ff., Doc. 200. Hereafter also the following. For the composition of the East Asia Committee, see ibid, p. 390, and *volume I,* p. 154 ff. Recently s. *This Alliance of Rivals*. The Pact Berlin - Tokyo. New Documents to East and Southeast Asia policy of fascist German imperialism in the second World War. Edited and filed. from Charles turner, Berlin 1978, S. 44 ff. u. S. 127 ff. (Doc. 33).

81 Please refer *wall cutter, Hermann,* plans the German electrical companies for the "reorganization of the European Economy" in the Second World War, in *JfW,* 1970, T. 4, p. 219ff.

82 See ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 4638, various. pieces. ex. d. Negotiations d. "Provisional Commission for European cooperation Automotive Industry", 1941/42.

showed itself in the Years 1942 increasingly suspicion and Resistance at your partners, be it from occupied countries such as France, the Netherlands and Denmark, or from allies and Satellite states How Italy and Hungary. This Resistance against "which emphasized Highlighting one German Guide" 83 stiffened itself in dem Dimensions, in in which the German advance in the USSR slowed down and in which the dependency of the war economy and warfare Hitler's Germany from the potential the occupied countries obvious became. Under such circumstances stayed dem German Financial capital nothing further left over, as more modest Formulas for one "Cooperation" to find - internally always "from the point of view... that be Germany war aim, viz a united Europe, under stronger German Economic management reached" _84

b) The Claim of ownership the Monopo/,e and the socialist production relations in the USSR

From Beginning on occupied the German monopolies the question after the final takeover of the Soviet "state economy" in her Hands. This Ask concerned not only the core of their robbery and expansion interests. The abolition of socialist After the destruction of the Soviet state and in connection with this , forms of ownership of the means of production " forever" seemed to them to be the decisive step towards the overthrow of the hated socialist economic and social order. Flesh of the flesh of the worldwide imperialist counter-revolution, German finance capital pursued the Restoration of capitalism in the USSR as the basic legend His class goal war.

The ruling ones Regime circles were in complete agreement on this goal. However, there were no uniform ideas regarding the methods and timing of "reprivatization". In the case of oil, for example, there was one from the outset The solution to the problem was the Continental Oil AG, a monopoly company under private law with stronger state participation and under dem dominant influence of the big ones Industrial and banking groups.85 The Soviet mining and smelting companies were first to dozens the German mining companies as "Patented companies" with a later (even if not officially fixed) ownership claim or right of first refusal were allocated and promised.86 The general ones ideas of the Germans Monopolies become approximately the suggestions of Zeiss Group87 have that for the first Time lucrative Lease agreements between dem Rich and the German

83 *Wandschneider,* p. 242, Doc. 11, transcript. ex. a seat. v. Business centers in the electrical industry, 16. 6. 1943; said there, P. 224. - The Quote relates itself on the Try of the German electrical companies since the summer of 1941, a European cartel ("European Convention on the Electrical Industry") together with the Danish, French, Dutch, Italian and Hungarian Putting companies together.

84 Ibid, S. 238, Doc. 8th, AT Riepka, 3. 6. 1942; s. a. ibid, S. 226.

85 Please refer *tape I,* S. 235ff.

86 Please refer *Czollek! EichhoUz,* The German Monopolies and the 22. June **1941,** S. 72 ff.; *tape [,* S. 202f.

87 *Anatomy of the Aggression,* p. 132ff., Doc. 28, Suggestions of the Zeiss Group fd Wigru Fine mechanics and optics, August 18, 1941.

companies provided. All risks and costs during this time were passed on to the Reich treasury and the Wehrmacht budget. The The crucial point was the reservation that the leasing companies “can acquire the leased work if the final shape of the political, constitutional and economic conditions in the occupied Russian territory can be overlooked and the German Reich intends to sell the works”.

end of July 1941 but a different line had prevailed and represented apparently from the four-year plan grouping around Goering, the IG colors and dem Reichswerke Group and from whose Support in the Reich Ministry of Economics. As at one breakfast together senior Personalities of Otto Wolf Group with Ministerial Director Holtz from the Reich Ministry of Economics "about the practical layout the future economic organizations in Russia" spoken became, explained Holtz, „that you now from dem original Thoughts the sponsorship of the different Industrial corporations above the individual Russian industrial establishments again come off be, namely from the Reasons, because you fears that this will result in certain ownership claims for the future caring Develop corporations could. Much more you want those of the corporations named Men's as individuals on behalf of the Reich the different ones works insert. He - Holtz - be yourself included however completely about it in clear up, that practical the Result in the essential the same be How at dem ur original Plan, since those deployed Gentlemen, more or less on that behind them standing Corporations or German factories work-wise support would have to. Despite this change in basic attitude, it is still the case intended, ... the already intended for certain works Gentlemen actually to be deployed there."89 That "change in the "basic attitude" was already part of the prehistory of mountain and Metallurgical Company East mbH (BHO), whose founding at the July 27th by Göring announced and on the 20th Officially completed in August became. [90] At this Opportunity announced Goering meanwhile expressly, that neither the central Administration entire sectors of the economy through the BHO and other Eastern companies nor the fiduciary administration of other branches such as. b. the chemical Industry represents the “final solution”. As soon as How possible be much more "the leasing from Operated at German" to strive for. [91] Internal let man further see through, „that itself in the Direction the Reprivati
sation the huge State-owned companies (so not only the imperial works) the Leader and the
Reich Marshal completely Some scien". [92]

The The group around Göring certainly did not make such a change in the future without the secondary intention of appeasing the German mining magnates. This seemed all the more appropriate to them since the mining companies now had many assets without secure guarantees of future ownership Forces should be transferred to the BHO.

The gentlemen of Coal and steel were indeed badly sniffed because of the over her head away hit ·new Regulations. To everything Abundance explained sub-state

88 Ibid, S. 134f.

89 Wojew6dzkie Archiwum Panstwowe w Katowicach, Upper Silesian mountain and huts male Association (Gleiwitz), No. 35, AN Reichard, July 23rd 1941.

90 See *CzoUek, Roswitha! Eichholtz, Dietrich,* On the economic policy conception of German imperialism during the attack on the Soviet Union, in *JfW,* 1968, T. 1, (hereinafter: conception) p. 163 ff.

91 Ibid, p. 164 (Goering decree v. 27. 7. 1941).

92 *anatomy of War,* p. 348, Doc. 174, AT Burkart f. Flick, August 13, 1941.

secretary v. Hanneken them the upcoming founding of the BHO: he called she "sort of one Russian viag"[93] - expressly with it, that at the until now in Outlook ge
taken Allocation of the Soviet Works to Germans Corporations "Too light for the future Entitlements for the German Companies derived become could". Ernst Poensgen answered by name Corporations are irritated because they have no aspirations would have". That was Admittedly a cheap gesture; this "renunciation" was in the - very realistic - assumption justified, that, according to Poensgens vVorten, "we the companies there are in a completely destroyed state find would". As itself Poensgens assumption in the Autumn came true, let Pliers and him through the ""Small circle" the Ruhr mining companies a resolution for the through this Circle de The facto-dominated economic group of the iron-making industry stated that "the old factories have no intention of establishing themselves in Russia."[94] The economic group should Decision "the Authorities and the Eastern society" - in theirs Board of Directors now the Author of this and through hypocritical Explanation himself moved in were! - to transfer. Anyway let she yourself loophole open and explained itself at the same time ready, "Sponsorships above to take over individual works and to staff these plants"; yes They wanted, as it was said, "from such a place There is no claim to sponsorship raise..., "To acquire such works later or to have them assigned as property". Months later, as important works of Donec district repaired were and to to produce should begin, however, it was heard differently.

The Göring decree was used internally from July 27th 1941 in the one for the mining companies The decisive question was interpreted correctly: "What is particularly interesting about the decree is the fact that the monopoly administration or the temporary exclusive transfer to management companies only out of dem Reasons happens, because due to lack at the Location existing organizations and, taking into account the enormous tasks and the necessary haste, the involvement of monopoly companies or General management companies are required - that it yourself but in no way can it be a final stage, but only a temporarily necessary measure. The principle is that a permanent and more thorough more positive Success only from the state directed private sector
expected become can - and that is why we strive for it become must, the companies gradually later into the private initiative convict."[95]

The process described is strongly reminiscent of that farce the same people involved in the summer 1940 on the occasion of the distribution of the Lorraine ironworks.[96]

The slowing down the advance in the Soviet Union, the The extensive destruction found and the never-ending resistance of the Soviet population against the restorers of capitalism created enormous difficulties for the occupiers, which led them to abandon the centralized system state-monopoly "Eastern companies". and still expand. In the late autumn 1941, than Fail the blitzkrieg

93 ZStA Potsdam, case X, Movie 425, Doc. NI-050, Prot. d. Discussion between RWiM (v. Hanneken) and Wigru Esl, 25. 7. 1941. Hereafter also the The following. - Anyway asserted also
v. Hanneken, itself on Goering calling, „that later one Reprivatization would be carried out" (ibid.).

94 B.A Koblenz, R 13 I/621, Prot. d. Seating d. little ones circle, 30. 10. 1941. Hereafter also the following.

95 *case 5,* S. 258, Doc. NI-5284, AT Kaletsch f. Flick ex. Discussion with Walter Tengelmann, 13. 8th. 1941. - Over Tengelmann s. S. 463 f.

96 Please refer *tape I,* S. 193ff. u. S. 294ff. (esp. 298ff.).

strategy was evident, discussions about ownership and “ "Reprivatization" question versus the striving for the fastest possible use of the Soviet economic resources for the continuation of the war in the Background.

As Goering at the 8th. November 1941 the “General Principles for the Economic policy in the newly occupied eastern areas" 9 7 before to the top representatives of the state and business, his comments sounded about a later clarification of the ownership structure nisse in the USSR was therefore very reserved. All agricultural and commercial businesses in the occupied territories - incorrectly described by Göring as “the property of the Soviet state” - be "dem Rich to please". Everywhere are present

"final Changes in Ownership Rights basically excluded, until the Areas in the Greater German Association have been included in the Empire. Therefore, in principle only trustee management is permitted. Trustee administration entitles the trustee not to later acquisition of property." Göring's remarks to This point revealed overall contradictions and uncertainty. The Soviet companies should “in principle be handed over to companies or individuals who have the necessary expertise and similar Investments own or in have operation". This Companies you have to out of their activity a “appropriate "benefit". On the But areas where monopoly companies were active, “for the time being the previous ones Regulations in Stay strong".

In some contrast to the promised “appropriate The plan developed here for the first time also stood for “benefit” “through cheap production and maintaining the low level levels of living", i.e through colonial Overexploitation in the worst possible way, primarily to enrich the fascist state and “the The debts resulting from the war largely fell on the empire through income that comes from to withdraw from the newly occupied eastern territories are", to cover. In the entire seen, did Göring with the In the eyes of the German monopolists, this represents a step backwards compared to the new guidelines what he had commented in the summer on the question of the "privatization" of Soviet socialist property.

Nearly on the same days stepped, how nice shown, the RGI with their opposing position on.98 The following time was apparently dominated by internal disputes the question of ownership. When Ministerial Director Gustav Schlotterer spoke in the Reich Ministry of Economics on November 21, 1941 about "fundamental questions regarding the deployment of the Eastern companies," he characterized, giving way and somewhat correcting the impression of Göring's demeanor, the Eastern societies as “ Transitional phenomena on the ways from Russian state ownership to committed private ownership, from war economy to colonial ownership Usage".99

The IG Farben group, which was always extremely well informed, had to deal with the Soviet Union relevant Questions at his Economic policy Department specially one

"Eastern Liaison Office" was created. In a management report, this office was chaired for the group from the January 3rd 1942 100 designated man the Eastern societies “just like that as

97 *Eichlwltz,* The Guidelines Göring, S. 83ff. Hereafter also the The following.

98 Please refer S. 403f.

99 “Record of the am 21. November 1941 took place in the Reich Ministry of Economics Meeting above fundamental Questions of deployment the Eastern societies", quote according to *Czollek,* Fascism and Occupation, p. 77.

100 ZStA Potsdam, case VI, Movie 419, Doc. NI-2996, “Management report the Eastern connection point via

"Purpose structures" that were "replaced in some form by the private sector" after the end of the war would. Hitler himself had the firm intention, “as possible the to give the private sector free rein." The "basic tendency" “In any case, that’s where the self-responsibility of the people is now Still time appointed in trust "To increase the number of operators and to create the conditions for independent entrepreneurship through profit sharing, which can be seen as a preliminary step to re-privatization." Despite this optimistic overall assessment, the Eastern Liaison Office advised in view of the unclear military and political situation led to strong restraint. She indicated ,,that to time for industrial activity in the East still no real chance exists", and pulled the Conclusion that “industrial planning in principle for foreseeable Time Not on places are", as long as the official conception, the East “as pure agricultural and raw material country to regard", maintained become.

The discussion about ownership became the closer it was to the long-awaited Summer offensive happened again, with increased violence recorded. The German monopolies were not willing, are uncertain about the ownership issue to have promises fobbed off. Although the strict state-monopoly regulation through central planning and the BHO was in their class interests and also offered them many extraordinary advantages and relief, it clashed violently with them on this fundamental question the corporate interests and in the tendency even with a Basic interest of finance capital. The spring and summer of 1942 were characterized by their energetic efforts to settle the question clearly in their favor. They insisted emphatically and successfully that the fascist leadership confirm their property claims.

In Göring's Decree *from the* 20. May [1] 0 [1] and dem Rosenberg's *from the* 28. May 1942 [102] Of course gave it

Compared to the guidelines currently in circulation, there is only new information in certain legal formulas and departmental issues. “The entire movable and immovable property of the USSR, its constituent states, corporations, associations and associations, that of the economy served has", became as “special economic assets” defined.[103] His

Administration was de jure transferred to the Rosenberg Ministry, whose consent was given to “orders, in particular "Disposals " [104] was.

Göring's decree **was,** instead of " creating clear conditions **for the future"** 105, very contradictory and only in addition suitable, to add fuel to the fire. True, the faded one returned formulation again, that the fiduciary Administration from Soviet property

Russia", 3. **1.** 1942 (partly printed in *anatomy of the war,* p. 369f., Doc. 187). Hereafter also the following.

101 *Guidelines for the guide the Business in the re-occupied Eastern areas* (Greens folder), T.II, Sept. 1942, p. 123, “Principles for the fiduciary Administration in the occupied eastern territories" (Goering to Rosenberg), May 20, 1942.

102 Ibid, S. 124, ,,Regulation above the special economic assets", May 28, 1942.

103 Ibid (§ 1).

104 Ibid.

105 Ibid., "Principles..." Hereafter also the following.- In no way to the reciprocation of the monopolies could Goering with his note on the “great experiences” of the main trust office in the East in the annexed Polish territories he demanded to use (ibid.). The boss the HTO, Max Winkler, had at Göring a few weeks earlier on it urged, the “fragmentation of the trust system” through the “establishment of a special one Office of the Reich Marshal - General representative for trust administrations" to put an end to it (ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 375, AT Winkler f. Göring, April 21, 1942).

through Eastern companies or individual companies should serve "to prepare and facilitate later privatization". "Especially in the Eastern region", probably primarily in the Baltic republics of the USSR, "as soon as possible, the European (ie capitalist - DE) Economic forms are to be restored". The monopoly companies, which are "reminiscent of the Soviet Russian economic form", are therefore “generally intended only for a limited transitional period”. But the tenor of decree was the Emphasis of Soviet property as
"Special assets of the Reich", the later "proceeds" of which were used to "cover the costs of the war" intended was. „Final ownership regulations", was called it, be “Basically excluded until further notice”. Trustees and tenants have “no right to acquire property at a later date”. “As far as possible, individuals and not large operating companies” should be appointed as trustees. If the Soviet property is later “exploited” - An often overused demagogic formula was found here - the “respect for the "Being a frontline fighter is crucial."

However, the practice of occupation rule belied these principles from the outset. Two days later already, on the 22nd May 1942, had to Göring in one “Order on the production of weapons and ammunition and the expansion of the energy industry in the occupied eastern territories” [106] the GB Rüst, i.e. Speer, “the direct right of disposal the from him certain manufacturing facilities" transmitted. It became the institution of “sponsor company” created: „To Restoration, Furnishings and for the In order to operate the production facilities, efficient companies in the Reich must be used as sponsor companies." That was the end of it clear, that the Soviet large-scale companies, as far as available and usable, in the hands of the Germans Arms monopolies come into being would. In order to salvage himself and salvage something from the principles mentioned, Göring had merely added an ineffective phrase according to which it was "desirable" to "bring in a larger number of companies."

It was the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition, Albert Speer, who made the decision advance at Hitler undertook, around the Monopolies from supreme Job binding the future Transfer of ownership confirm and accept to let. The Occasion Significantly, the expansion of the Donec area into the German one offered his intervention Armaments Center and the personnel and material Difficulties, who appeared there. In Speers protocol the “Leader’s meeting” from June 4, 1942 was called it succinctly: “The Führer uses this opportunity to return to the fact that he does not have monopoly companies in the east wishes, rather that the Private initiative should be switched on." [107] This was immediately followed by a working note from the minister: " grains - Pleiger communication" .[108]

Speer's arguments, which led to Hitler's statement, had already been the subject of discussions in leading circles of arms companies and the war industry Organizations been. So wrote Heinrich Wisselmann, Director the economic

106 ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, film 19467, Göring-AO v. May 22, 1942; *Occupation, robbery, destruction.* Documents on the occupation policy of the fascist Wehrmacht on the Soviet table territory 1941-1944. Edited by Norbert Müller, Berlin 1980, p. 228f., Doc. 91.

107 FB, 4. 6. 1942, Point 34.

108 Ibid. - This important one Note, the grains as Deputy Göring's and the de facto head of the Eastern Economic Management Staff and Pleiger as head of the BHO is missing - like many other things - at Boelcke in his File publication *(Germany armor in the Second World War,*
S. 135).

Mining group, with reference to discussions at the end of May in the Reich Ministry of Economics, he considered it “entirely expedient to give the support of individual Eastern companies to those to be handed over to corporations that have agreed to provide sponsorships in the sense of from Minister Speer to accept the proposal made. If these companies like me been communicated by you is, in addition, the expectation of the later transfer of ownership of the works under care is promised, then I have the certain confidence that these works will achieve the desired, absolutely necessary goal lead become. The sponsoring companies become I Them YOn case to case make a name for yourself." [109]

The new “leader decision” soon made the rounds as an internal authority document. Jakob Wilhelm Reichert, managing director of the iron-making business group Industry, transmitted dem Eastern Department the RGI at the June 22 Information about this document, which was only "read out from the files" in the Reich Ministry of Economics six days earlier and not given to the gentlemen of the \Virtschaftsgruppe had. [110] "In this is referred to," reported Reichert, “up a meeting with the Reich Minister Dr. spear with the Führ!'r, in the sense of being drawn in Russian Metallurgical works and Mines to increase of Armament potential. In this connection is the question been raised whether The works are better managed by private trustees in order to accelerate everything \Vicdcr construction to come. Further is already of that the speech, that the for that still to determining private corporations the companies dem wars behah<'n could." [111]

Truly a more resounding Success the monopolies, the the previous, mainly from the Four-year plan grouping yerfightcne Conception strong shocked and testified to the outstanding position, the the forces around the Ministry of Ammunition now in the state monopoly power apparatus had achieved!

The East Economic Staff summarized the latest developments in mid-June together: “Although the question of the final granting of ownership rights to companies is still not present can be decided, however, it will be possible to make promises to the companies providing support in the eastern regions that their efforts and material expenditure will be recognized and taken into account in the future." [112] Confirmed in front of a larger committee of representatives of the central fascist authorities, the occupation administrations and the eastern companies Schlotterer in the August 1942 this one Viewpoint: “The Eastern societies have in the occupied Eastern areas the coming private sector to prepare. Next to and in Mr should itself therefore already now the German Sole proprietor actuate ... If you use it later ... have a moral right to consider all those companies and individuals, who are now selfless and successful on Reconstruction of the Business cooperate." [113]

109 B.A Koblenz, R 13 XX/42, H. 2, Wisselman at RWiM June 3, 1942.

110 Ibid, R 13 I/1074, Wigru It! at RGI (Eastern Department), June 22, 1942.

111 Ibid.

112 Economic Staff East, Material collection, (KTB) entry. v. 15. 6. 1942, quote at *Dallin,* S. 397f.

113 ZStA Potsdam, FS, movie 10636, “Summary of the in the meeting of 7. August 1942 in front of representatives of the Presentations given by the Supreme Reich Authorities and the Eastern Companies involved about the tasks the German economy in the occupied Eastern Territories", August 12, 1942; *Occupation, Robbery, Destruction,* p. 237, Doc. 95.

The .RGI now gave the signal in “The Ostwirtschaft”, the official organ of its Eastern department to further advances. Given the temporary successes the fascist
During the summer offensive, she made an unmistakable demand to the state authorities Governing bodies the war economy, it should “ from responsible Page the breakup from state steering and Entrepreneurial initiative now in attack taken be" .114
The “organization of the commercial economy”, i.e. primarily the RGI and its economic groups, should at the transfer of the Soviet property play a decisive role in monopoly ownership. The Trust administration have fulfilled their role as a temporary solution; The previous Trustees are now the first priority “called, in the ones they built Operated permanently to stay".
On this one editorial appointed itself also other business bodies, approximately the exclusive
“Economic Ring”. It apply, was called it there, on dem occupied Soviet territory
"to create new property bases" and to begin with a "division of powers" in the economic field. 11 5 The appointment of “sponsor companies” was welcomed and demanded legally binding commitments for the subsequent transfer of ownership.
Your practical Precipitation found the Development after the “leader statement” from the 4. June 1942 especially in the from November 1942 onwards between the BHO and German corporations concluded "sponsorship" contracts according to the "Principles for the management of sponsorship companies of Berg- und Hüttenwerksgesellschaft Ost mb H. (BH0)".116 **On** the Within a few months, the most important paths through these contracts emerged works of the Soviet Ferrous metallurgy (smelting, steel and Rolling mills) and heavy engineering in the Donec region and the Dnieper bend have direct control over them the German mining companies and a handful of other arms companies. Alfried Krupp's statement after the war testified that the monopolies contained therein Clause about the later ownership regulation, so reserved, not least for reasons of demagoguery and the deception of one's own supporters 117 was formulated, interpreted as a firm promise of ownership. The company would have, as Krupp put it, that contractual clause "favored", "after which the Fa. Croup, if it Should these Russian companies later be sold to private industry, they were contractually guaranteed a right of first refusal. Without this right of first refusal there would have been a risk that another company would benefit from the experience we had invested there came were." 118
The defeat from Stalingrad made neither the practical Attempt, in the ownership question to create a fait accompli, nor to put an end to the fundamental discussions on this question. On the contrary, "under the pressure of the war events, the willingness of the central state authorities to implement the principle of deferring sales increased of nationalized economic assets in the occupied Eastern areas'

114 *Tlwde,* Entrepreneurship in the East, p. 125f.; hereafter also the following. See also *Concept for the “reorganization” of the world,* S. 90.
115 *The economic ring,* No. 42/1942 (16. 10. 1942), p. 912f., quote at *CzoUek,* fascism and occupation, p. 84.
116 Partially printed in *anatomy of war,* S. 411, Doc. 217. Detailed For this S. 466f.
117 Before everything were Hints on later ones Entitlements and Expectations the “Frontline Fighter” and
"War participants" is a constant argument in official and party circles against "early" transfers of property, the them, apart from its demagogic content, seemed to be of domestic political relevance.
118 ZStA Potsdam, case X, Movie 615, Doc. NIK-10330, Aff. Krupps v. 7. 7. 1947.

11 9 Baltische Öl GmbH, a subsidiary of Continental Oil AG, sat still in the November 1943 a real one Purchase contract with the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories about the oil shale works in Estonia that they were exploiting . 120

If the German imperialists in the occupied Soviet territory did not succeed in eliminating the socialist production relations in their essence, neither in agriculture nor in industry, this was due to the stability of the socialist social order. The Soviet power was not only at the front through the heroic Red Army defended; also the mass of the The population in the occupied territories, linked to her by thousands of threads and underground contacts, proved their worth to her in the most difficult situation Loyalty. She offered the occupiers a ceaseless, all-encompassing and diverse resistance, which contributed significantly to the fact that the management of the economy by the foreign exploiters everywhere was only ephemeral, had a provisional character.

c) plans for the Payback the German War guilt.den

At the end of 1941, when the German imperialists suffered a fiasco with their blitzkrieg strategy in the USSR, where they were using the fastest means and the relatively least enrich effort most uninhibitedly wanted to, a problem arose stronger and more topical, with the claim of the monopolies to be unrestricted exploitation the riches of the Soviet country in the Connection and also formed a part of their war aim program. It was about covering the costs of the war. Measured against the benchmark of national debt (Reich debt), these costs showed the highest rates of increase during the entire war in the period of preparation and the beginning of the aggression against the USSR .

Table 109
The Imperial debt 1937/38-1942!43 (in Md. RM)

fiscal year	Imperial debt	growth opposite the previous year (in percent)
1937/38	19.2	(13)
1938/39	30.7	60
1939/40	47.9	56
1940/41	86.0	80
1941/42	137.7	60
1942/43	195.6	42

Source: Andexel, Ruth, imperialism - state finances, Armor, War, Berlin 1968, p. 110ff. - The actual costs of war were of course significant higher and became except from the Imperial debt out of the Government revenue and out of the out of the occupied and dependent values pressed from countries (occupation costs, clearing).

119 *Czollek,* fascism and Occupation, S. 100. A in this regard Correspondence between Rosenberg and Göring v. April 1943 s. in *Occupation, robbery, destruction,* p. 250ff., Doc 101.

The cost of the war was increasing rapidly, but the ultimate enjoyment of its fruits, apparently already tangible vicinity, was thanks to dem Resistance of Soviet people suddenly in the distance removed. The realization of a war goal - Payment of war debts or coverage of further war costs - made the realization of others - immediate enrichment of finance capital and rapid restoration of private capitalist property relations in the USSR in his favor - increasing Competition.

Kruppdircktor Löser felt it the dilemma of the ruling class when, on November 7, 1941, in the inner circle of RGI top representatives and major bank bosses, he came up with that "somewhat fantastic plan" [121] emerged, which was intended to kill both birds with one stone, so to speak. The empire should "if necessary have share rights in any later acquisition in Russia in the \Verte the relevant Issuing papers". In doing so, Löser wanted to achieve "gradual privatization of this area is actually determined" as well as "that the Reich Finance Minister will provide the appropriate amount of money receives, purchasing power skimmed off becomes, and that on this initiated in a manner it will be that the empire will use the huge assets of the East that may accrue to it reduction the War debts used". Himself at the argument the Worries Löser was obviously thinking about the "front fighters"; he suggested taking part in the business" to involve broader circles in the sense of personal entrepreneurship" and "not just the political ones less popular Corporations". So that was what he had in mind system of " "People's Share". the base of the naked imperialist robbery before.

Although such a solution generally seemed "premature" to the other meeting participants, [122] the real core of the contradiction fixed in the proposal remained. Göring formulated the long-term ones claims of the state following Days:

"It is the Führer's clearly expressed will that the debt burden caused by the war of Rich to the largest part out the revenue to cover is that from the newly occupied Eastern areas pulled out become must." [123]

The Eastern companies received the condition, the so-called lock profits, ie the difference between the prices in the occupied territories and German prices and similarly the significant wage difference to be paid to the Reich treasury. [124] Hitler himself supported the Reich Finance Minister in his efforts to lower prices and wages among all circumstances on lowest level to hold.125 "The Wins out of the price below

120 Please refer *Czollek,* fascism and Occupation, S. 100f.

121 ZStA Potsdam, German Bank, No. 21851, Bl. 55ff. (57), AT Kiehl (German Bank) about the Meeting, November 7, 1941. Hereafter also the The following.

122 Ibid., p. 58: "The whole plan is in this current political and military conditions premature, in particular as long as man still not white, How the political fate of occupied Russian territory, namely the Ukraine, be becomes. The practical Distribution of Russian Share wealth is distributed appropriately to the share owners would huge difficulties encounter.... Finally is not to misjudge that at the Construction of the shareholders speculated on the back of the empire without their own risk, dem at one different types Development, as she dem Suggestion underlying, the entire burden would fall to him alone." (Löser's plan contained, as a precautionary measure, the shareholder's right to exchange his shares "after the end of the war" for Reich bonds at nominal value).

123 *Eichhouz,* The Guidelines Göring, p. 109.

124 *Czollek,* fascism and Occupation, S. 83.

125 *picker,* p. 207f. (Table conversation from 25. 3. 1942). - Hitler's Statements to War debt issue see further ibid, p. 273 (12.4. 1942), p. 311f. (May 4th 1942), P. 318 (May 6, 1942).

“distinctions must be made between eastern areas and imperial areas,” said In March 1942 he declared his approval of a memorandum from the ministry, "to be given exclusively to the Reich." 126 This "Leader's instructions" also corresponded the related passage in Göring's “Principles for the fiduciary Administration in the occupied Eastern areas" from the 20. May 1942.121

However, the high expectations placed on the lock profits were deceptive. Reich Finance Minister Schwerin v. Krosigk complained bitterly that the Eastern companies rather grants demanded from the state coffers, as that she Surpluses and Wins delivered. 1 28 Out the "East" could, so said he, 20 annually Billions of RM are being pumped; However, “the occupied eastern territories would have to be put under far greater financial strain than is currently the case” and, above all, “state preponderance "underpinned".

German finance capital took an ambivalent stance in the face of such demands and proposals. Of course, it had a significant interest in restructuring the state's finances, since there were significant amounts of money in the vaults of the major banks and corporations - and growing - buzz at Imperial bonds were stored. But the interest of the big monopolies and Monopoly groups also aimed with particular vehemence at direct enrichment in the occupied countries first and foremost the unhindered one exploitation the Soviet one areas and on the Privatization of the Soviet economy.

One In this context, specific interests arose for the major banks. With the significant role they played in the war financing system, 129 the mutual relationship solidified Dependence on the state or state finances and the banking system. Their fate was therefore more closely and directly linked to that of the state finances than that of anyone group of industrial groups.

It was therefore It is no coincidence that the representative of a major bank, namely Karl Rasche, a board member of the Dresdner Bank, put his idea of "perhaps the largest amortization plan in economic history to date" 1 30 up for discussion in the most renowned and widespread business magazine "Der deutsche Volkswirt" in December 1941. On closer inspection, Rasche's plan was a further development of the ideas that Ewald Löser had presented a month earlier to the participants of the aforementioned RGI meeting - including representatives the Germans Bank and the Dresden Bank - explained had. 13 1

Rasche declared that the main goal was to "mobilize" the "economic assets" stolen in the USSR for the purpose of "paying interest and repaying all expenses." of war and the following Investment time". In keeping with Löser's spirit, he suggested issuing share certificates, the specific form of which he could vary introduced: "Man can the interested party depending on character, profession and Suitability the eastern values transferred for cash and with it much from the one at the moment unemployed

126 Ibid, S. 208.
127 How Note 101.
128 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 485, p. 164ff. (170), Doc. NG-4900, Memo Schwerin v. Krosigks for Goering et al re: „Administration, Business and Finance the occupied Eastern areas",
4. 9. 1942 (so-called hyena letter). Hereafter also this The following.
129 Please refer *Andexel,* p. 101ff.
130 *Quick, Karl,* Secured East room - stable overall economy, in *The German Economist,* 16. Jg., No. 12/13, v. December 19, 1941, S. 394. Hereafter also the The following.
131 Please refer Note 121.

tie up purchasing power; It will be possible to create shares and make them available to the private market in return for more or less rapid redemption; Bonds could also be issued for public and private enterprises and finally, to a large extent, from pensions (ie from pension papers, e.g Pfandbriefe - D. E.) Use do.... doing it is ever after sense and Purpose the forgiveness every Variant for individual interested parties: war participants, four-year plan entrepreneurs, new farmers, state residents, etc. conceivable." Of course, that was a more well-thought-out, more sophisticated concept to follow circling the own people with the Bait the economic riches the Soviet Union the Money or. the capital for the "investment time" out of the Bag lure, the Financial oligarchy but the "Shares" with "more or less quick repayment", i.e. H. with deferred payment, wanted to reserve.
The defeat on the Volga devastated this imperialist dream, so that such plans are no longer possible - at least not publicly - w e r e discussed further .

d) 1943: Old and new Illusions

The Defeat on the Volga **for** war goal planning of the German imperialists a drastic turning point. [132] The War entered the critical phase **for** its authors. This defeat and the growing resistance of the peoples in the occupied and satellite countries significantly changed the priorities of the fascist "reorganization" and occupation policy. The ruling Circles of Hitler's Germany were forced to their War goal planning "stronger realities of to adapt to war".1 [33]
As a component and result of intensive, partly bitter internal discussions and disputes that began in the fall of 1942, reached their climax in the spring/summer of 1943, and reached "a certain conclusion" toward the end of the year. [134] found, a new flood of announcements emerged, secret ones memoranda, internal plans and programs. An attempt was made in two ways to adapt "peace planning" to the changed military and political balance of power. On the one hand, it was increasingly subordinated to the purpose of ensuring the maximum exploitation of the economic and military resources of fascist-dominated Europe and the occupation regime in the occupied ones countries as a whole. In the demagogic guise of a "European Economic Community" and a "European Confederation of States", based on the old reactionary, anti-Soviet accented European and Western ideology seen for a targeted, propaganda-effective publication or Spread, should this type of game the "Reorganization" planning the requirements for that create,
"the Forces Europe for ours victory largely to mobilize and a Condition

132 Please refer *concept for the "reorganization" the* ***World,*** p. 99 ff. Detailed discussion the topic in *Nestler, Ludwig,* approaches to modify the war target planning and the occupation policy Hitler's Germany (Autumn 1942 until spring 1943), in *bulletin of working group "Second World War",* No. 3-4/1978, S. 3ff.
133 *anatomy the* Aggression, S. 23.
134 *Piskol,* Conceptual plans and Measures, S. 98.

to bring about, which relieves us internally and strengthens us externally against the enemy ."135

So far, on the other hand, for the territorial ones expansion goals of German imperialism were discussed from now on - Of course, that always happened less common -, became increasingly exercised restraint. corrections at the previous excessive aim became suggested. The “Burg

"Science of success," said one of the most important ones memoranda that time, lies in it "with the Reachable (to) be satisfied". 1 36

In the center the Discussions above the "Reorganization" moved the “Russian Ask", d. H. the problem, how through certain changes in politics opposite the peoples of the USSR a favorable turn on the most important theater of war, but at least what was conquered should be held, secured and firmly integrated into the European "greater economic area". could.

All attempts to create a new conception of “reorganization” planning and foreign policy in general to develop and enforce, order itself into the since In the summer of 1943 , the fascist strategy became increasingly clear to work towards "gaining time" until the latent differences between the English, Americans and Soviet Russians came to fruition and our production apparatus changed conditions under the rapidly increasing air danger and our new monkeys are comprehensive impact".137

As far as the documentation and analysis of the discussion of the war goals of the period under study was concerned, in which the Wehrmacht leadership and the heads of the party and official apparatus as well as leading circles of finance capital and key representatives of the state monopoly apparatus of the war economy took part, a number of important works have already been carried out on this subject appearedcn.1 38 The focus of the investigation below is on the participation of representatives of the monopolies and other leading forces of war economy apparatus at this discussion, one that is still insufficiently researched aspect of the topic.

End November 1942, as itself the catastrophe at the Volga already As the situation began to emerge, Reich Economics Minister Funk publicly highlighted it as one of the most urgent economic policy tasks to “mobilize the entire European economic forces and one European economic policy with the to align clear objectives in a uniform manner, thus the European one Business in the Future crisis- and blockade-proof

135 File note from Cecil v. Renthe Fink (AA), 9. 9. 1943, quote in: *turner, Karl!Dress, Hans/Hate, Gerhart,* European plans of German imperialism in the second World War, in *ZfG* 7/1971, S. 927; *DZW,* Vol. 4, p. 308. Please refer also *anatomy the Aggression,* S. 25 u. S. 198ff., Doc. 43ff.

136 *Eichlwltz,* “Paths to de-Bolshevization ...", p. 44 (Memorandum v. Richard Riedl ex. "The Russian one Ask", March 1943).

137 *Anatomy of Aggression,* p. 191, doc. 41, recording by Ambassador Rudolf Rahn for Ribbentrop, 19. 8th. 1943. - To what extent the described concept is “purely tactical and propagandistic in character” wore *(concept for the “reorganization” of the world,* p. 104), is to a large extent a question of the evaluation of objective reality by those involved in its formation. In any case, the new tactical variants in the “reorganization” and in the occupation policy emerged on the basis of objective changes in the military and political balance of power, which also revealed serious differences in fundamental terms raised questions.

138 *Eichholtz,* „Ways to De-Bolshevization ..."; *anatomy the Aggression; World domination in the visor; concept for the “reorganization" the World; Nestler;* u. a.

" ,[139] General Emil Leeb, head of the Army Weapons Office, took up this demand and made it more concrete to the effect that “a European armaments program should be determined according to suitability and capacity Europe turned over become" mustc. [140]
The military events the next Months forced the Fascists already, from
to move away from the recipe of open violence they are familiar with. The disputes that followed over the concept of Europe turned into a major one part straight around the Problem, with which means and if necessary on which Detours man the
“Claim of leadership” of German imperialism in Europe so obvious and growing inability and Shortage at enforce repressive forces could.
As the Cream of the Financial oligarchy in the discussion intervention, goods in the meantime Plans of the Western Allies for an economic one - capitalist - Post-war order [141] known become. They quickly gained popularity among the rulers Circling the neutral countries, the satellite states and the collaborating bourgeois forces in the occupied countries, especially since the victory of the powers behind these plans was now seen as very likely. The German big bourgeoisie reacted very sensitively to this. The participants of the meeting of the advisory board of the Reichsbank on
June 24, 19'1314 [2] dealt in detail with possible counteractions. You can, so said itself Ministerial Director Reinhardt, the "Propaganda" the Opponent with those plans "not do nothing watch", there otherwise the Impression arise can<', Hitler's German country lack it at any "Conception" for the "Reorganization" more economical, especially financial circumstances in the post-war period. Kurt Lange, Vice President of the Reichsbank Directorate, stated that the “responsible German authorities” should “work with a pan-European Economic plan come out, in dem of that went out will that Germany with the others countries a for all Parts auspicious trade"; the southeastern European countries in particular must be reassured with the help of generous promises about the payment of their clarification demands. Hermann J. Section' Suggestion went in the same Direction: „Germany have probably There is hardly any possibility of countering these plans with something similar. On the other hand, we could show which Advantages with one generous Trade policy tied together are."
The impulses that came from this advice to the core of the financial oligarchy were undoubtedly significant. The RGI management has been preparing since the beginning of June, A "redesign of foreign advertising" was tackled on a broad front by the large monopolies. According to Wilhelm Zangen's suggestions should “the German Business advertising in the Abroad a new Face received".1 [43] The sense the

139 *Fun1r, ·walther,* state steering and entrepreneurial initiative, in: *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeüung,* November 29, 1942.
140 *anatomy of war,* S. 412 ff., Doc. 218, Memorandum from general Emil Leeb, 1. 12. 1942. Please refer S. 137 u. S. 327.
141 Before above all the decisions of Hotsprings (8. 5th-3rd 6. 1943) and the plans for the restructuring of the capitalist economic and monetary world, which were also used for propaganda purposes dem War (Morgenthau-White plan; Keynes plan); s. *anatomy the Aggression,* S. 26(.
142 ZStA Potsdam, German Bank, No. 21004, protocol the meeting of Advisory Board of the Reichsbank v. 24. 6. 1943. Hereafter also the following. Likewise *Piskol, Joachim,* On the development of the post-war foreign policy concept of the German monopoly bourgeoisie from 1943 to 1945, in *JfW,* 1969, part 2 (hereinafter: Post-war concept), p. 330.
143 *Anatomy of War,* p. 429ff., Doc. 233, minutes of the meeting of the Propaganda Commission IG Farben Group v. July 21, 1943. Hereafter also the The following.

Action consisted - such as in the relevant guidelines of the IG- Farben Group - in this, opposite the “America nimbus” the "to convincingly demonstrate Germany's leading and helping position in European foreign trade during the war" and at the same time "to spread understanding of Germany's economic and social post-war goals" using arguments from European and Western ideology. To the Initiators the action belonged the Reich Ministry of Economics and the president of the Advertising Council the German one Business, Heinrich Hunk.

Hunke, publisher of the fascist economic magazine “Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft”, was a close colleague of Goebbels as a district economic advisor for the Berlin district. The Deutsche Bank had just appointed him as a member of its board of directors. For a long time had he itself, Page at Page with Wireless, as speaker the tactical more maneuverable and more careful fraction the German Monopoly bourgeoisie in Affairs the

"European economic community" profiled. In the September 1943 grasped he the Status of the discussion about the concept of Europe in his “10 theses of the German and European economic policy", which he discussed in his lecture on " "The core questions of the economic-political struggle in the present" were explained. [144] He joined in it the propagandistic usable Summary of the views of the said group, to which, under the pressure of the situation, the main forces of monopoly capital now acknowledged themselves.

Hunke promised the “European nations” - assuming the “German claim to order and leadership in Europe” - the “development of the European productive forces”. German help, lasting mutual economic relations, Employment and “securing and increasing the standard of living through our own efforts and together Work".145 The "private property" at means of production, which Danger the

"Entrepreneurial personality" and "the right to operate one's business according to autonomous principles" should remain undiminished. Hunkcs article wore a much more defensive character than similar works from the previous war years. He emphasized that there was "no planned economy" to fear; the German "claim to order and leadership" was "neither a claim to power nor an attempt at exploitation"; it give no “plundering” either Europe" by Germany. "Germany is not plundering Europe, but also made possible during the war the functioning of the other European ones economies."

However, the horse's foot was clearly visible. There is a “minimum requirement” towards them "European nations", that's what it said, viz “at any time Access to the essential goods and utilization of Europe's productive forces for common purposes Defense".

According to their author, Hunke's theses were with key representatives of the war economy agreed, including with Hans Kehr!, his Certainly not without consent agreement with spear and Wireless bcknowledge etc. [146]

The inner circle of supporters of the new "Europe" concept was characterized by the dominance of major bank representatives and by a narrow economic and/or state monopolistic intertwining, even strikingly through familiar personal Be-

144 *World domination in Visor,* p. 358 **f.,** Doc. 148, **article** by Hunke in “The German National Economy”, No. 27, September 3, 1943 (excerpt); *DZW,* Vol. 4, p. 155ff.; s. a. *Pislwl,* post-war conception, p. 331.

145 *World domination in the visor,* S. 358f. (Article hunks); hereafter also the The following.

146 Please refer *Pisl,ol,* post-war conception, S. 331f.

drawings, for example between Funk (Reich Ministry of Economics/Reichsbank), Abs (Deutsche Bank), Zangen (RGI/Mannesmann/Deutsche Bank), Fischböck (Creditanstalt Bankverein/Deutsche Bank; also General Commissioner for economics and finance in the occupied Netherlands), Blessing (Unilever/German Bank), Reithinger and llgner (IG Farben) and Hunke (Advertising Council of the German Economy/Deutsche Bank). [147] important ones Connecting lines walked from this group to Foreigners Government office, to Speer and to Goebbels.

This concept was actually not new; instead of open violence, annexation and unregulated plunder, there was political and, above all, economic cooperation with the bourgeoisie of the subjugated and dependent countries under the leadership of Hitler in Germany at the expense of the working masses and on the basis of common anti-communism and anti-Sovietism provided. Originally was she the conception of the core of the said group been. During the spring and summer of 1943 but united on their basis apparently the majority of the German big bourgeoisie. Here in were included Circles about Goerdeler and v. Hassell, of course with their push for an alliance with Anglo-American imperialism and their renunciation of an explicit "German claim to leadership" remained isolated for the time being.148

The German imperialists After Stalingrad, the pressure of events was already too great exposed, than that she her new Concept of Europe would have in the did implement can, what - quite apart from the internal and external resistance - would have required considerable organizational preparation and corresponding political powers. After all, this concept apparently served as a foreign policy platform for the political group that emerged in the first half of 1943 for a short time to form Speer, Goebbels and Göring began.149

The pooling of European economic resources made real progress in this direction for the fascist war by the Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production. In September 1943, the powers of the Reich Ministry of Economics were transferred to the Ministry of Armaments; This meant that his powers in the occupied countries were concentrated with the Minister of Armaments, especially those in the area of the raw materials industry. Immediately afterwards, Minister Speer concluded with dem minister the Vichy government Bichelonne a official German-French industrial agreement. The Ministry of Armaments also founded the “European Circle” in the fall of 1943 from Hans Kehr! operated on behalf of Speer. This working group, which "included everything that had any status and name in the economy of Hitler's Germany," was given the task of "the planned and rapid deployment of all European economic forces." for to ensure a “successful defense of “Fortress Europe”.150

That for the German Imperialists most difficult problem was the “ Russian Question". This was a matter of life and death for them. Here they faced socialism as an enemy, with dem no collaboration and no imperialist understanding conceivable

147 See also the Membership in “European Circle” (later: “Working group for foreign trade issues") according to *Schumann,* post-war planning, p. 398ff.

148 Please refer *Eichholtz,* ways to De-Bolshevization ...", S. 22; *Pislwl,* post-war conception, S. 332 **ff.;** *concept for the "Reorganization" the World,* S. 114 f.

149 *BletJer,* Totaler War, S. 115 **f.;** *concept for the "Reorganization" the World,* S. 112.

150 *concept for the "Reorganization" the World,* S. 106f.; s. a. *Schumann,* post-war planning, **S.** 398ff.

was. And here lay for them at the same time the deeper sense of entire War: the destruction of the socialist order, the Appropriation and exploitation of the Soviet economy and force potential "for always" and with it the Ascension to first world power, for the
“Ruling people in the world historical Senses". [1 5 1]
For the most others European Countries saw the fascist Concept of Europe from 1943 the political sovereignty or bargaining sovereignty and the economic autonomy or lock she at least not out of. In the USSR but they should state Order will be destroyed and socialist production relations will be liquidated. Significant compromises on the original war aims were far less of an option here for the German imperialists than in the rest of Europe. Therefore, any ideas were rejected and Suggestions for one modification the expansion and towards occupation policy the USSR on violent opposition out of the own Rows.152
More sophisticated, more elastic methods of subjugation, oppression and exploitation had existed since the summer/autumn of 1942, under the immediate Impression of the Soviet popular resistance, representatives of the Rosenberg Ministry and the generals suggested; they received support from circles that were closely linked to finance capital.153 The scale the one under consideration drawn changes in towards politics the peoples of the USSR was extensive. It ranged from the restriction of mass shootings, arson and deportations to the cessation of "subhuman" and colonial or colonization propaganda to the granting of pseudo-sovereignty to puppet governments made up of \Vcissguards and treacherous collaborators while fomenting the internal forces Opposites.154
Your Climax achieved the Controversies after Stalingrad, in the Spring 1943. To this Time appeared the weightiest from those contributions for the Theme, the immediately the Circling the German financial oligarchy. It was the closest 200 pages strength Memorandum from Richard Riedl, titled "The Russian Ask. Thoughts on Redesign Eastern Europe", the with one Recommendation out of dem IG Farben Group was directed to Hitler. [1 55] Riedl, as an honorary and Board member of Central European Business Day with widen Circling the Financial oligarchy intimate known and with Section,

151 *World domination in Visor,* p. 336, Doc. 139, Memorandum by Giselher Savoy on “The Future the German one Reign in Russia", August 1942.

152 The Conception the "political leverage" and especially the one Fake sovereignty for individual state structures Soviet soil was in May 1943 rejected by Hitler as unreal *(DZW,* vol. 3, p. 343ff.).

153 A Example therefor is the Savoy memorandum (note 151), the towards the end 1942 with the same wording also under dem Title “Westerner imperialism or German Order in the East?" the Reich Ministry of Economics and other Place shipped became (BA Koblenz, R 7 XII/13a). The daily newspaper “Munich Latest news", whose "editor" Wirsing was, located itself in the possession the Bosses of Haniel Group (Good Hope Hut). It is to accept that itself the opinions the Group management and her closer circles,
e.g. the Germans Bank, in the Memorandum of savvy Nazi journalists and SD agents Wirsing reflected. By Paul Pleiger, head of BHO, RVK and the mining group the Reich works “Hermann Göring", is known, that he after Stalingrad the line of Rosenberg Ministry supported *(Anntomia of War,* p. 420, Doc. 223, AN above Meeting at Rosenberg, January 22, 1943; *DZW,* Vol. 3, p. 345).

154 Please refer *Vojna "tylu vraga,* Vypusk 1, Moscow 1974, Cape. VI; *DZW,* Vol. 2 u. 3, passim; *Dallin,*
passim.

155 *Eichholtz,* „Ways to De-Bolshevization ... ", S. 13ff. Hereafter also the The following.

Ilgner, v. Wilmowsky, Neubacher, v. Hassell and others personally connected, that was it IG Farben Group and the Germans Bank particularly vicinity. His The memorandum was one of the rare documents that at the time did not only deal with the controversial issues Questions of occupation policy, but also and above all dealt in detail with the war program and the overall strategy of German imperialism. She was probably lying Hitler before, or it was him presentation held above it. In any case, their basic ideas played an important role in the subsequent disputes in the Führer Headquarters Role.

The memorandum expressed the more or less clear “insight” that the USSR - at least this Just - not completely to defeat be. With it Germany not in the "most dangerous phase of war of exhaustion" devices, was it after Riedl urgent, to identify “political levers” that would lead to the overthrow of Bolshevism and the destruction of the state structure USSR applied He proposed a policy of "organic dissolution of Russia into its national components" with the aim of "removing as large a part as possible from the community of Soviet peoples and incorporating them into the 'New Europe'", primarily the the Stalingrad region and Ukraine enlarged around "Ciscaucasia" (with Baku) - i.e. the heart of the German war aim program. Overall, according to Riedl's plan, the German sphere of power beating Part the USSR approximately 70 Millions of people, almost half of their population. This enormous workforce potential, which at the same time would have meant an enormous expansion of the sales market for German industry, was the central item in Riedl's calculations; in this context he referred to the Colonization or "resettlement" plan as absurd and unreal.

According to Riedl, the main economic goal was to include the parts of the USSR that were to be separated and dismembered into the "European economic area", the establishment of which he saw as an intermediate phase before further conflicts for world domination.

As central Issue the Memorandum peeled itself the Thought out of here, that one economically profitable and politically permanent integration the occupied areas into the sphere of power dps German Imperialism without participation of the Population not possible be. Her :\-litwork and "Help" including military Aid quotas but must - under "faster" and “more thorough” Elimination of all Soviet ones officials - he buys become with “more national Freedom", i.e. with dem concession one political pseudo-sovereignty for the Ukrainians, the Belarusians and the people the Baltic Soviet Republics.

From another point of view, namely the “labour deployment of foreign peoples” Wilhelm Tengelmann, chairman of the mining company Hibernia AG, came to similar demands and conclusions as Riedl. You have to constantly keep an eye on so was called it in his “Experience report” from May 1, 1943 [1] 56, ,,that the East in the future of our people an important role will play". In particular, “we need the Ukrainians”; all in all, the Soviet ones should forced laborers treated and influenced in this way become, ,,that she itself later in of their Hometown to German guide and theirs

156 ZStA Potsdam, Case XI, No. 727, BI. 89ff., Doc. Pleiger-465, memorandum by Wilhelm Tengelmann above "Experiences from the work of foreign peoples in the Ruhr mining, taking into account the conditions at the mining company Hibernia Aktiengesellschaft, Herne", May 1, 1943. Hereafter also the The following.

"We want to confess our desire and thus become the bearers of the new European order that we are steering."

No one is needed further discussion of the illusory character of the listed war goal demands, including the more sophisticated, "modern" ones advocated here directly by monopoly representatives variant the oppression and Exploitation, the Tactics of pseudo-concessions and internal ones softening.

After the failure of the Kursk offensive, the hope of victory disappeared in broad circles of finance capital.157 In view of the advance of the Soviet army, recently drawn up programs such as Riedl's turned out to be mere scraps of paper. From now on, demands for war goals, especially demands for annexation, were only heard sparingly and generally seemed much more meek and "modest" than before. Of course, opinions on this differed widely, What one in your own sphere of power become can hold. While for example wise Paul Pleiger Beginning September still with it calculated, in the to clearing Donec industrial area soon again victorious to move in 158, stuck Serious \\'agemann, Director of Institute for Economic Research and the Closely linked to the IG Farben Group 159, the Field of conquest goals to be realized already much narrower. He kept it so led he in a speech at the end of July 1943 before internal circles out, for right, now to "make peace": "We would then keep half of Poland, half of Italy and the Balkans and could in the remaining on the Ukraine waive." 160

Wagemann's opinion - the one with v. Hasscll had close professional and personal relationships 161 - came closer to that of the group around Carl Goerdeler. This group had itself since End of 1942 "in the east [for] the Boundaries from approximately 1914" 162, so for "half Poland", as War goal demand pronounced. With the constantly strapa adored anti-Soviet justification, "that all European peoples west of Russia must secure themselves against Russian supremacy and domination," she once again expressly formulated this in her statement as, in her opinion, a moderate minimum demand for the British Government certain "Peace Plan" from the Summer autumn

157 At the beginning of the offensive, expectations and hopes had apparently flared up again. At this time, Friedrich Theodor Prinz zu Sayn and Wittgenstein approached the Deutsche Bank via the Creditanstalt in Vienna for help in "buying back" his "Russi "schen Güter". Director Franz Heinrich Ulrich was in some embarrassment about what his "dear prince" to answer be. He consider it "premature, negotiations about it to lead," wrote he finally the Creditanstalt; he believe, „that in the reprivatization, How as Prince Wittgenstein has in mind, nothing can be done on our part. How Otherwise, I leave open his reports, which are based on an order of magnitude of 300,000 acres and more." (ZStA Potsdam, German Bank, No. A 1, Vol. 37, Ulrich at Walter Tron, July 19, 1943).

158 Please refer S. 475.

159 ZStA Potsdam, case VI, Movie 414, Doc. NI-6544, Arfid. Max Ilgner, 30. 4. 1947.

160 Ibid, FS, Film 3345, FS Gauleiter Lauterbacher (South Hanover-Braunschweig) to Bor man, September 4, 1943.

161 *v. Hassell,* From the Change Germany, passim.

162 *Spiegelhild of a conspiracy.* The Kaltenbrunner reports to Bormann and Hitler about the assassination attempt on July 20, 1944. Secret documents from the former Reich Security Main Office. Published by the Peter Archive for historical and contemporary documentation, Stuttgart 1961, S. 236f., „Explanation to Atlantic Charter", December 13, 1942.

1943.163 “European security against Russia” 164 included in the group's plans except for The demand for annexation that had been scaled back at the said border represented the firm intention of having the rest of Poland and the Baltic Soviet republics under control and within the sphere of influence of the "greater European economic area" as a cordon advanced to the east. to keep and also Southeast Europe as a sphere of interest of to reliably shield German imperialism. This program corresponded to Goerdeler's urgent demand, which he later (November 1944) put down in prison, to "take up the Russians the Line Lake Peipus - "To throw back the Dniester". 1 65

Since the summer of 1943 it was military guide Not Hitler's Germany more able to an offensive one to develop concept. This fact was clearly reflected in the war objective planning and program. Gradually, the imperialist one took the place expansion in Europe and beyond Europe, stronger and stronger, a different goal in the Foreground: securing your own Class rule beyond possible defeat.

But still far until far in the Year 1944 into it had the imaginations the German imperialists from the completion of war after How before the fulfillment more essential War goals in Europe are a prerequisite - Goals, the them before above all as a “European Economic Community” and in the East as “securing” the borders with the Soviet Union that were pushed out as far as possible articulated.

Excursus: Political and economic backgrounds of “General plan East"

With the 22nd In June 1941, the floodgates opened for the extreme and destructive anti-Sovietism that had been at the core of the fascist regime's foreign policy doctrine and ideology from the start. It revealed itself to the human and anti-progress character of fascism in his Totality.

The class concept of the most reactionary elements of the German finance capital found one in particular barbaric Expression in the infamous “General plan East" 16 6 (GPO), dem one

163 *Aruitomyedes war,* S. 432ff. (p. 435), Doc. 236, "Goerdeler's Peace Plan" Summer/autumn 1943.

164 Ibid, S. 435.

165 *Knight, Gerhard,* Carl Goerdeler and the German resistance movement, Stuttgart (1954), S. 536, Note 100.

166 See the documentation (in German) in *Pospieszalski, Karol Marian,* Hitlerowska polemika z “Generalplan Ost” Reichsführera SS, in *Przeglqd Zachodni,* 2/1958, p. 346ff.; *Heiber, Helmut,* The General plan East, in *VfZ,* 3/1958, p. 281ff.; *European strategies of German Capital 1900-1945,* ed. Reinhard Opitz, Cologne 1977, p. 869ff.; *Madajczyk, Czeslaw,* Generalplan Ost (hereinafter: GPO), in *Przeglqd Zachodni,* 3/1961, p. 66ff.; likewise. in *Polish western affairs,* 2/1962, p. 391ff. (with more expanded intro English; in the following will hereafter quoted). The scientific analysis of GPO became recently continued in the profound study by Kärny, the I owe essential suggestions *(Kamy, MiroslaP,* Generalni plan Vychod, in *Ceskoslo1Jensky casopis historicky,* 3/1977, p. 345ff.). See also *General'nyj plan “East”,* in *Voenno-istoriceskij especially,* 1/1960, p. 83 **ff.;** *ZastaPenko, GI Tel' puchoPskij, B.,* Dopolnitel'nye Dannye O “General'nom plans ‚East', in ibid, 7/1964, p. 119ff.; *NedorezoP, AI,* Fasistskie plany germanizacii slavjanskich stran v gody vtoroj mirovoj vojny, in *Nemecko-Fasistskij occupational rezim (1941-1944gg.),* S. 129ff.; *Noskva, A F.,* General'nyj plan East. K itogamous izucenija v sovetskoj i pol'skoj istoriceskoj literature,

Key importance with regard to the character of the planned world hegemony of German imperialism under fascist Sign applies. The General Plan East had several versions, of which only one has so far been found as a complete document. The creation of the versions and their connection to each other are due to lying testimony from some of those involved before the war crimes tribunals after dem War additionally confused, from the Research until now not
perfectly clarified and are often presented inaccurately in literature, including Marxist literature. [167] The importance of the GPO is highlighted in well-known works by bourgeois authors underestimated and misinterpreted. [168]
The plans for "Germanization" and "resettlement" for the Czech and Polish territories occupied or annexed since 1938/39 were not from the outset parts of a "general plan" or "overall plan" (Himmler); with these terms became obvious only operated in connection with the attack on the USSR. Before, and also still afterward - worked the Fascists in relation on the “Poland question” with one
“local plan” (or several "close plans") for the annexed Areas[169] and one
"Fernplan", although the substance of the "Fernplan" is not apparent from the previously known documents.[170]
Only on the 22nd. June In 1941, these plans took on a new dimension and were included in overall planning of GPO. The Expression “General plan East" came from probably from Himmler himself encouraged, either out of dem Reich Security Main Office (RSHA)

in *Sovetskoe slavjarvvedenie,* 3/1965, p. 72 ff.; more detailed *diesel, be,* Zachvatniceskie plany gillerovskoj Germanii n/a vostoke Evropy, in *Issledovaniya po slavjarw-germanskimotrvsenijam,* Moscow 1971, p. 178ff.; *Besymensky, Lew,* Special Files "Barbarossa". Documents, Representation, interpretation, Stuttgart 1967, p. 238ff.; *Madajczyk, Czeslaw,* Dalsze documenty dotyczllce Generalnego Planu Wschodniego, in *Dzieje Najrwwsze,* 3/1971, p. 195ff.; *Bezymenskij, LA,* General'nyj plan "Ost", Zamysel, celi, rezul'taty, in *Voprosy istorii,* 5/1978, p. 74ff.; *Müller, Rolf-Dieter,* Industrialists Interest politics in Frame of “General plan East".

167 So *Bezymensky; Ramme, Alwin,* The Security service the SS. To its function in the fascist power apparatus and in the occupation regime of the so-called General Government of Poland, Berlin 1970, p. 217 ff.; s. also the relatively detailed one Dealing with the problem in *DZW,* Vol. 2, p. 118ff., p. 427ff., p. 435, p. 445; Vol. 3, p. 368.

168 Please refer *Reitlinger, Gerald,* A House on sand built. Hitler's Violent politics in Russia 1941 to 1944, Hamburg 1962; *Dallin.*

169 See the documentation from *Datner, Szymon!Gumkowski, Janusz!Leszczynslci, Kazimierz,* Wysiedlenie ludnosci z ziem polskich wcielonych do Rzeszy, in *Biuletyn Gwwnej Komisji Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowslcich w Polsee,* Vol. 12, Warsaw 1960; *Szulc, Waclaw,* Wysiedlenie ludnosci polskiej w twz. Kraju warty i n/a Zamojszczyznie oraz popelnione przy tym zbrodnie, in ibid., vol. 21, Warsaw 1970; *Luczak, Czeslaw,* Wysiedlenia ludnosci polskiej na twz. pretty good wcielonych do Rzeszy 1939-1945, in *Documenta Occupationis,* Vol. . Poznan 1969;
also *Madajczyk, Czeslaw,* Polityka III Rzeszy w okupowanej Polsee, Vol. 1, Warsaw 1970, (hereinafter: Polityka), p. 306ff. (p. 336); *Karny,* S. 346f., p. 357ff.

170 *Karny,* S. 357 ff. (360 f.), argued in this Ask convincing against opinions How
that of *Heiber,* p. 285, who identifies the “remote plan” with the GPO. - The “Germanization” plans for The Czech territories since 1938, which were included in extensive programs, especially in the summer of 1940, are documented in *The Past Warns.* Documents about the Germanization and extermination policy of the Nazi occupiers in Czechoslovakia, together, with Prev. u. Note Mistake v. Vaclav kraal, Selection d. Doc. v. Karel Fremund and Väclav Kral, Prague 1960.

or - because it is around emen technical term of state planning system acts - from the planning office of the "Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of the German Nationality" (RKF).171

As the name of a specific plan document, it was used for three documents known from the sources:

1. for the SS-Standartenführer Prof. Dr. Konrad Meyer(-Hetling), head of department (HA II: Planning) in the Staff headquarters of RKF [172], at the same time director of Institute of Agriculture and agricultural policy the Donut University, for Himmler wrote Plan from July 15, 1941, which has not yet been found. Its content can be reconstructed to a limited extent after the comments in this regard from Meyer in dem under 3) listed document as well as in his Cover letter at Himmler from the 15. July [173];

2. for a elaboration by the RSHA, Office III (SD Domestic), Group III B (People and Public Health), for the the Director the mentioned Group, SS-Standartenführer Dr. Hans Ehlich, was responsible. This document dates from late 1941/early 1942 and has not yet been found either. However, there is an extensive memorandum from Government Councilor Dr. Erhard Wetzei, as representative of the racial policy office of the Reich leadership of the NSDAP, employee responsible for racial policy in Alfred Rosenberg's office .Reich Ministry for the occupied eastern territories with a variety of relationships the Fascist authorities and institutions dealing with the matter, dated April 27, 1942, entitled "Statement and Thoughts on the General Plan East of the Reichsführer SS" [174], in which the most important facts of the RSHA plan are presented and commented on in detail and were criticized;

3. for the Memorandum Conrad Meyers "General plan East. legal, economic and spatial Basics of Eastern construction", dated from the June 1942, Himmler but already at the 28. May 1942 sent.175

The elaboration Meyers dated July 15, 1941 within three weeks and According to the accompanying letter, "first outlined the broad scope of the future feasible settlement project, ie, he (the GPO - D.E.) treated which arises from the To be available more available settler families resulting settlement claim, the settlement areas and -sections as well as whose Capacity". [176] She contained so Principles and Before blows for the perspective "Germanization" the to middle 1941 areas that fell into the fascist sphere of influence of Poland. In addition, in view of the expected rapid collapse of the USSR, "the demarcation of new settlement areas was planned on the basis of a development of 30 years" and the "idea" was expressed Areas through so-called settlement markers forever under solid German

171 *Heiber,* S. 285.

172 RKF was Himmler. The RKF office under SS brigade leader later SS group leader and SS Obergruppenführer - Ulrich Greifelt with several main departments (later: offices), by Hitler's decree of 7. 10. 1939 founded, had since dem 21. 6. 1941 the status of an SS main office. In 1942, Meyer became head of Office VI and soon afterwards of Office Group C SS Oberführer promoted.

173 Please refer *Eichholtz,* General plan East, S. 256, Doc. 2.

174 Complete in German Language printed at *Pospieszalski,* pp. 346-369; *Heiber,* S. 281 to 325 (with further documents); *European strategies German capital 1900-1945,* S. 869-894 .

175 Complete in German Language printed at *Madajczyk,* GPO, S. 391-442 .

176 Please refer *Eichholtz,* general plan East, S. 256, Doc. 2.

to bring control. 177 The memorandum also contained figures about German human reserves **for** the settlement. Meyer included it in his second memorandum in 1942 . These figures could have been obtained from the RSHA, in its preparation the same or similar ones Digits appeared.178

The second Document, a apparently only few pages comprehensive Paper, arose between late autumn 1941 and At the beginning of 1942 in RSHA. 17 9 It based on the now from Hitler, Himmler and Heydrich formulatedc:n Statements above the Colonization and Colonization 1 so of future dominated "Eastern Room" until for the Ural and the to The extermination of the native population in the tens of millions planned for this purpose 1 81 , further on the "Experiences" of mass murder, the to that one Time "'ehrmacht and SS, especially the SS "Einsatzgruppen" collected in the occupied Soviet territories.

The elaboration also dealt with the settlement of the areas envisaged through German, primarily but with of extinction or “resettlement” 182 the resident Population - How at all the RSHA after own characterization in “ethnic politics” saw “eliminating negative” as his primary task, in the contrast to the "positive read out" another Offices. 1 83 planning included an area that included the entire occupied Poland, the Baltic Soviet republics, large parts of Belarus and "Western Ukraine" (the areas of Zitomir, Kamcnec-Podolsk and partially from Vinnica) included. In dem comment

177 Please refer *Madajczyk,* GPO, S. 435, p. 409; for the following Declarations s. ibid, S. 437/440. - Except the Settlement markers hit Meyer apparently also already the also in the GPO version from the May 1942 (see below) again emerging planning from “Scoring settlement bases” before. Anyway wore Himmler Hitler in the July 1941 “Projects for one immediate colonization Soviet Territories through the creation German Bases" before after *Noskol'a,* Zachvatniceskie plany ..., p. 184).

178 Please refer the analysis this Connections at *Kdrny* P. 374 f. Misleading against it *Heiber,* S. 289.

179 The evidence for this dating of the document is as follows: "'etzel had knowledge of his Origin in the RSHA since November 1941 *(Pospieszalski,* S. 347), noted at the 7. 2. 1942, „that the General plan East from this Job (RSHA - D E.) comes from" *(World domination in visor,* Doc. 131, p. 319) - which may, but not necessarily, depend on the conclusion the work on the document testifies, and wrote until for the 27th *t,.* 1942 his memo about it.

180 Colonization is the construction here one colonial exploitation system, under colonization against it understood the (German) settlement.

181 From the Bach-Zelewski testified in Nuremberg a speech by Himmler to twelve SS group leaders from the beginning of 1941, in which the extermination of 30 million Slavs was described as "the purpose of the Russian campaign". was announced *(IMG,* Vol. 4, Nuremberg 1947, S. 535ff. (536), witness hearing of Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski on January 7, 1946). Hitler’s programmatic statements in the context mentioned in the meeting of July 16, 1941 *(Barbarossa case,* Doc. 105, p. 331 ff.). On 2. 10. 1941 explained Heydrich the Tops of the "Protectorate" administration, how a "German upper class" should be advanced against the "storm tide of Asia" "far into Russia, far to the Urals", to which the local residents are called "Helots". would have served *(The past warns,* S. 125, Doc. 19).

182 At that time, the fascist term “relocation” was generally either a cover name or a euphemistic phrase for physical extermination (see the analysis at *Kdrny,* p. 377f.).

183 *Heiber,* S. 285 (quote Nuremberg. Doc. NO- 1761).

Wetzeis of April 1942 emphasized that "in the meantime" there were apparently "new settlement projects", namely "lngermanland" (Leningrad region), the subsequent Russian ones areas until to line Lake Ladoga - Valdaj Heights - Bryansk, the Dnepr arch, "Taurien" (Cherzon area) and Crimea, which would have been included in the plans. [184]

On the examined territory - i.e. without taking the last-mentioned areas into account: it was planned to resettle 31 million of a total of 45 million inhabitants to “Western Siberia” after the war. For the individual Nationalities were percentages stated: There should be 80 to 85 percent of the Polish, 75 percent of the Belarusian and 65 percent of the "West Ukrainian" population to be deported. The remaining 14 million should as Workforce stay there and in the Course about 30 years old, as far as being “capable of being Germanized” This means, Wetzei noted, that the previous "tendency" of the RKF office to " deport the foreign peoples capable of being Germanized into the old Reich" has obviously been abandoned.

At to be settled Germans stood in contrast loud plan (after \-Vetzel's compilation) 4.55 Millions available all “resettlers” from “Russia”. Those already resident or settled Germans and their biological reproduction, furthermore “to a certain extent Scopes immigration from settlers out of others Germanic "Countries" included, came Wetzei estimates a total of eight million 30 years; in the GPO, on the other hand, ten million are earmarked, what he for to high grabbed hold.

The Writing sharpened ice, one limited, but around so dangerous, typical fascist “Racial Planners” was an important supplementary document to the GPO, although the author, from his official position, was unlikely to have had any significant influence on the actual planning. In his detailed critical commentary he itself primarily with the “Difficulties” of the plan, the he before above all in the "biological" numerical disproportion between Germans willing to settle and the crowd of the remaining population saw but also in the planned forced deportation of an average of 70 percent of the population; especially since it will be quite clear to those who remain behind that such a forced evacuation is likely to result in the destruction of their brothers and sisters." The population number From the outset he considered the number of areas in question to be significantly higher (60 to 65 Millions), as from the RSHA estimated; however, knew he very well, that Many millions of Jews, communists, partisans, etc. were exterminated during the war according to fascist plans become should.[185] .

The sense the Suggestions sharpened ice went there, between the individual nationalities, between agricultural and urban populations, between the “racially determined dull mass" and the intelligentsia (this be in in all cases to isolate, liquidate or deport) to be more differentiated in order to serve the “interest of the Germans Eastern policy" better to serve, ,,other people for itself (should probably be called: itself for her - DE) to be consumed". This included the idea, in addition to the "deutschung" in Germany or the occupied areas and next to the deportation the

184 This and the the following after dem Wetzei memorandum *(Pospieszalski,* S. 347 ff.; *Heiber,* S. 297ff.).

185 *Kti.rniJ,* S. 366f.

"Undesirables" to Siberia [1] [86] also the methods of administrative, technical, etc. support services by suitable "undesirables" in the administration of the actual Russian vast territory apply comprehensively. This idea came from Of course, not just from Wetzei. As a participant in a meeting at the Rosenberg Ministry on January 4th In February 1942 he recorded with satisfaction that - probably not least under the impression of the "Blitzkrieg" fiasco in front of Moscow - the representatives of the RSHA, the Race and Settlement Main Office present (RuSHA) and of RKF, unanimously with this idea friends;

"The Germans," explained the representative of the RKF "should the position of the Spartans out of Latvians, Estonians and the like existing middle class position the perioea, the Russians, on the other hand, the position of the Helots have" .[187]

The territorial one Splitting Russia, the "racial leaching" and the "destruction of the biological power" of the Russian people, which, as Wetzei complained, was "virtually not mentioned at all" in the GPO despite its "particular danger", formed an essential part point of his investigation.

Finally Wetzei considered how to counter the Germans' reluctance to settle, that is, how to have the prospect of a settler's farm or a "forest estate" in the East would be tempting. He also assessed the biological increase of "Germanness" compared to the locals at **Apply** appropriately rigorous measures against the latter long view optimistic. Anyway be also "the UNITED STATES, Canada and Australia was colonized and settled by the Anglo-Saxons... although not right away Millions and millions "were available to settlers".

The extensive Memorandum from the 28. May 1942 (84 typewritten pages to including tables and graphics) was prepared by a larger group of scientists under Meyers Line about the same Time written as a sharpie Comment wrote. She pointed that is none externally visible, probably but a internal connection with the GPO dC's RSHA. Meyer was on the 2nd. January 1942 for the lecture at been Himmler, as the RSHA plan straight in Himmler's hands arrived be had to, and had from him "guidelines and "Work orders" received.[188] The memorandum represented both a fundamental revision and an extensive addition to his elaboration from the July 1941 .

Karny writes apt: „The General plan East from Meyer Hetling is no ordinary ·plant. Just completely isolated becomes the historian such a shocking one Connection of science and crime find. The General plan, which comes from the RSHA protruding1-:ing - that is simply a volatile stitched together plan of genocide and stick for a long time Mastery from emptied of people areas as basis for new Conquests. The Plan is not deceptive other things, has no scientific ambitions." [189] Meyers plan against it was the, what Himmler now demanded, there the Wehrmacht itself

186 In Siberia saw Whet egg for the future also a "European settlement and raw material area" that "until Lake Baikal has always been an old European settlement area" and should become one again, especially "in view of the Greater Asian idea" of the Japanese competitor; in such a one "European" protectorate under German He saw supremacy in his mind already "the Industrial areas of Kuznetsk, Novosibirsk and Karaganda ... with full "Work hard".

187 *World domination in the visor,* S. 320 (f.), Doc. 131.

188 *EichhoU::,,* General Plan East, p. 259. - Himmler will probably at least become more comfortable with his existence and the Main data of RSHA plan known made have.

189 *Karny,* S. 371.

on prepared the summer offensive that would finally deal the death blow to the USSR. It acted around a "Plan, by learning a developed technology the scientific Work, the power of invention and the ambition the leading fascist scientists Germany", one Plan, “the the to the criminal phantasmagoria of Hitler and Himmler led to a perfectly developed system, thought through down to all the crucial details, calculated down to the last mark". [1]
[90] Meyers Plan [1 9 1] contained one complete Systematics the “Germanization”: one exact sketch of the breakdown and the internal structure of the future “Settlement areas”, a detailed one Presentation of the to be set up legal and administrative “settlement regulations”, in particular the Codification of land theft in the form of a new one property right on land, and finally one detailed list of the effort (labor, financial Medium) of the entire, on the Period from 25 until 30 years project.
The from Meyer predetermined three Categories from “settlement areas” were from so an integral part of the views and of the vocabulary the one with it concerned central fascist organs Hirnmlers and of his devices:
1) Areas that need to be “full-fledged within the shortest possible time R e i c h s g a u e n w o u l d h a v e to be expanded" or, according to a formulation that Himmler liked to use, "totally Germanized" [192];
2) so-called Settlement marks (,,Brands of empire"), subdivided in Circles and offices, the "at the foremost front of German ethnicity one special Reich's task have". In this one areas be, like that Meyer, *,,to vital Backup of the empire* not only the use of means of power and organization, but especially of German people as a *down-to-earth population* . Here, in a completely foreign environment, German ethnicity should be rooted in the soil and its biological existence secured for the long term." The brands should be in the plan period - and already while the first three fifths of the year - to 50 percent “Germanized” become;
3) so-called settlement bases (cities with strong German garrisons, surrounded by German villages) at junctions along the railway lines leading to the settlement markers and highways. She should to 25 until 30 percent b e “Germanized” .
Territorially, Meyer understood the areas to be “totally Germanized” as the already annexed parts of Poland; he described three large territorial complexes as future settlement markers, two of them on Himmler's "\Veisung" - the Leningrad one area (“Inger manland”) and the Crimea with the Cherzon region ("Gotengau") - and one after own proposal, namely the "Memel-Narew area", ie Lithuanian, Belarusian and Polish Area approximately until to line Klaipeda-Kaunas including of back then

190 Ibid.

191 In the following quote after *i\,fadajczyk,* GPO.

192 A “total Germanization” could occur according to the SS concept either through partial settlement Germans and “repopulation” the remaining native Population or but through "Total settlement" with Germans will take place. As a deadline for the "Germanization" of agriculture annexed Himmler had set five years for Polish areas; Meyer estimated in his step-by-step plan for the necessary material measures “for the Construction the agricultural companies, the Local supply businesses and the ancillary facilities" at least 15 Years, until for the complete Diploma 30 Years *(Madajczyl,,* GPO, see 428ff.).

Bialystok district 193; finally he called 36 settlement bases, of which 14 in the General Government (including Warsaw, Krakow, Lublin and almost all other big ones cities), 14 in the Baltic Republics or on dem ways after "Ingermanland" and eight in the Ukraine between the Eastern border of General Governments and dem “Gotengau”. The settlement bases, in the Distance of approximately 100 km created, should ever around 2000 km2 - _ the size of a to two counties in Germany - include.

The figures about the need for German settlers, which he had probably researched in collaboration with the RSHA 194, Meyer mainly took his plan from the previous year and also named "a currently impossible number of Russian Germans" as well as 650,000 to 750,000 Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians and 80,000 Gorals, who "were selected from the non-Germanic people through systematic selection and performance breeding be won" could. With in total 5.65 millions "available settlers" could follow in his opinion the “need” be covered, which he with 1.5 Millions for the annexed territories, 1.99 Millions for them Brands and 1.36 1 billion for the bases calculated.

The territorial ones laid down in Meyer's plan Claims and also what he claims Human reservoir went so far above the GPO of RSHA beyond.195 Meyer

193 The to Meyer's GPO Maps cannot be found; Estimated fraud the ones in it intended Area of the three “brands” 100,000 to 120,000 km2: “Ingermanland” (excluding the possibly areas included from Novgorod and Pskov) = 20000 until 25000; "Gotengau" = 50000 until 60000; "Memel-Narew area"=30000 until 35000 km2.

194 Between the RSHA plan (according to Wetzei) and Meyers GPO there were the following correspondences regarding of the “available settler forces”:

	Meyer (within 25 years)	RSHA (within 30 years)
Settlers out of Germany	3990000	3700000
"Camp resettlers"	100000	20000 (+30000)
“Scattered Germanism” (out of southeast and Eastern Europe)	500000	
“Volksdeutschtum out of Overseas"	160000	200000
“Germanic Settlers out of North and Western Europe"	150000	
"Russian Germans"	*)	600000
“Those to be Germanized” Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Gorals	750000	
Total	5650000	4550000

*) At Meyer "one currently not to overviewing Number" *(Madajczyk,* GPO, S. 440).

195 Reiber, who received only the summary of Meyer's memorandum back in 1958 (see *Eichlwltz,* Generalplan East, p. 260ff., Doc. 5) knew, claims on the contrary, it is "a comparatively quite modest program" *(Heiber,* p. 290) compared to that of the RSHA; similarly, Eisenblatt, who considers the RSHA plan to be identical to Meyer's GPO version of July 15, 1941 and Wetzei's memorandum in misinterpreted in this context *(Eisenblatt, Gerhard,* Baselines the politics of Reichs opposite dem general government 1939-1945, phil. Diss. Frankfurt a. M. 1969, S. 212; s. also S. 205 f. Note 4; S. 206f).

also advocated a significant expansion of Himmler's sphere of power in the East and demanded that the settlement marks be completely removed from their previous constitutional status "for the duration of the construction." Territorial associations to outsource and directly under the leader of the sovereign power of the Reiehsführer-SS as Reich Commissioner for the consolidation of the German people... assume". The Settlement bases known as “SS and police bases higher Order" expand would be, should in the view on the
“Germanization” also belongs to the RKF to be assumed; He should have “exclusive power of disposal above the entire one settlement purposes arising reason and floor into the Eastern areas" to be entitled.
We avoided going **into** further future prospects and speculations in more detail Meyer. It be Task the “next Generation", so was called it in dem short "Outlook",
“For the first time, the northern and southern ones Direction of the historical Germanic trains to one closed in the middle "To connect space and thus finally secure European culture".
The changed ones However, the circumstances of the war after the Battle of Moscow and the occupiers' experiences with the Soviet popular resistance persuaded Meyer to oppose this RSHA plan a changed "Relationship to the repopulate" to demand. At him, who before without a doubt - certainly already in the GPO from 15. July 1941 - from Himmler's as a prerequisite for German "Eastern Space" planning The stated “decimation of the Slavic population by thirty million”196, it now sounded different: „There on the cooperation the in the areas now down-to-earth Population cannot be dispensed with, must be the to creating an international order in the eastern region aimed **at** pacifying the residents there. This pacification is achieved by that the necessary provision of settlement land for the settlement of German people is not, as was previously the case, through evacuations, but by implementing the previous residents on something else collective farm and Sowehoseland with simultaneous Land ownership rights are granted. This implementation must bound be at one sensible choice after dem Performance principle and with a social Rise of the positive Forces of the alien ethnicity go hand in hand."
For a convinced fascist “ethnicity” and Settlement planner was the a remarkable concession at the real war situation, if also pragmatic Reasons for motivation - Procurement of millions of cheap (forced) labor for the “Eastern construction” - certainly a very big one role in it played and the chosen wording a “resettlement” the "negative" Forces not only confided, rather a castle. Expressly mentioned Meyer for the Example the urban Population the "Brands", the radical to decimate be: „In the longermanland became the future urban population with 200,000 (1939: 3200000) assumed, in Gotengau the urban population to 650,000 reduced (1939: 790000)." In this The invoice was the planned extinction Leningrad included. The Deurbanization and Reagrarization the occupied Soviet areas was a conceptual one Basic component of GPO, whose Class salary in the further still analyzed become becomes.
Himmler replied already after few days, the GPO gradient him "in total quite good". [197] He expressed see to that problem the “relocation” not directly; his critical comments aimed but straight on it there. He was not agreed with it, „the

196 Please refer Note 181 *(/MG,* Vol. 4, S. 536).
197 *Eichholtz,* General plan East, S. 264, Doc. 6. Hereafter also the The following.

The General Government and the entire East Country should only be provided with bases." It must include "the total Germanization of Estonia and Latvia as well as the entire General Government." For Himmler, the "Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia" fell into the same category. Planned in Lithuania even him a “total settlement” by Germans, since there they “are less likely to expect Germanization of the existing population” could. The Total deadline for the GPO sat he without further ado from 25 until 30 down to 20 years.

In one nearly to the same Time held speech counted he under the areas, the within 20 years after dem wars "total German settled" become would, also the Crimea and “longermanland” on.198

He now demanded from Meyer a “comprehensive settlement plan” (also: “overall plan”; "General Settlement Plan") "in the form of the General Plan East" for submission to Hitler. Next wanted he has a rough draft, ,,out of dem It is clear what we need as a whole in terms of people, workers, funds, etc. need, and continue what we have in each individual of the four five-year plans".

During the Wehrmacht's offensive in the summer/autumn of 1942, the SS leadership's involvement with the GPO reached its peak. The speech quoted on June 9 shows how Himmler evaluated the material that Meyer's version offered him. On September 16, he presented the GPO to the assembled SS and police leaders with barbaric openness detail before, already spoke of “settlement pearls” to Don and Volga and reveled in further plans that he has on 400 to 500 years calculated; then they should areas until for the Ural so far be Germanized, that "instead of 120 millions 5-600 Millions of Germanic peoples are present".199

During the offensive, Himmler, anticipating victory, ordered extensive measures to implement the GPO. In the second half of July he commanded SS Obergruppenführer Frederick Wilhelm Krueger, Secretary of State and Himmler's Governor in the Government of general government, and SS group leader Odilo Globocnik, dem SS and Police leader in the District Lublin, the since longer planned "Germanization" of the Zamosc and Lublin-Land districts200; in August he traded with the "Reich Commissioner of Ukraine", Gauleiter Erich Koch, "Germanizations" larger style in Of Ukraine, vicinity Himmler's Field quarters “Hegewald” (Area Zitomir), at Vinnica and at Korosten from 2 01; still in the October November commissioned he the SS and Police leader for Crimea, “everything necessary for planning and later settlement of Crimea with Germans People to cause" 202.

198 *Ilimmler, Heinrich,* Secret speeches 1933 until 1945 and other speeches, ed. v. Bradley F Smith and Agnes F. Peterson with an introduction by Joachim C. Fest, Frankfurt a. M./Berlin (West)/Vienna 1974, p. 158, Ilimmler's speech to senior section leaders and heads of the main office SS, June 9, 1942.

199 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 3608. Excerpts from the Speech in *world domination in Visor,* p. 339f., Doc. 140.

200 *DZW,* Vol. 2, S. 136, S. 445.

201 Ibid, p. 435; *Koehl, Robert L.,* RKFDV. German Resettlement and population Policies 1939-1945. A history of the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germandom, Cambridge 1957, pp. 151f. In addition to "Hegewald", this also included the area around Hitler's headquarters "Wehrwolf" near Vinnica ("Eichenhain") and the railway junction, which was important for both places Korosten at the Main route after Kiev.

202 B.A Koblenz, R 70 (Soviet Union)/35, ,,Report above the work results of from the

The implementation of the GPO progressed furthest in the Zamosc area, where the first mass “relocations” were started in the most barbaric manner at the end of November 1942 became. The different phases the "Action Zamosc" ("Relocations",
,, resettlements", "pacification operations") extended itself on above a Nine months, until the end of the summer of 1943.203

The Zamosc County - It was listed in Meyer's GPO version as a "settlement base" - and neighboring districts of the Lublin district were to be transformed into the first German "large settlement area" in the General Government. This area had for the fascist ones planner the Meaning one decisive node: It should firstly a “settlement base” at the Main way of communication from Germany after
"Taurien" or the Crimea (and thus also to Caucasian oil) and secondly as a pillar of a German one "Ethnic bridge" between a "Germanized" Baltic region and Southeastern Europe (Bessarabia - Transylvania) serve.

The scope of “evictions” and “resettlements” on Soviet territory was both in view of the fascist planning as also compared to the Zamosc project is lower. The time that the fascists on Soviet ground remained, was too short for them to be able to put the GPO into practice there on a larger scale. After all, the “relocations” in 1942 in Lithuania and the Zitomir region became larger. They affected several tens of thousands of people and included several hundred thousand hectares. 2 04 On the Crimea became in the Years 1943 to September/October, as the eviction through the Fascists began twelve so-called rural districts “to made in German villages".205

However, with the objective of GPO from the beginning to inseparable also the mass murders committed by the SS task forces in collaboration with the Wehrmacht, and later the final solution to the Jewish question; fell until October/November 1941 alone The Einsatzgruppen in the USSR served over 300,000 Soviet citizens, primarily Jewish citizens Origin and communists, for Victim. 2 06 This same was particularly true of the mass murders of Soviet prisoners of war and the cruel war against the partisans the “pacification” actions in the affected areas. In a broader sense, the German imperialists' forced labor program was also part of the GPO, which alone included an estimated five to tens of millions of Soviet people deported from their homeland.

In the Autumn 1942 ran itself the German offensive everywhere firmly. Despite it let Himmler at the
November 12th remind him of his order from June 12th. l\foyer reported on November 13th 1942 still once for the Speech at him and delivered him then at the 23. December

R. fd F. d. V. Commands assigned to the SS and police leader for the Crimea to carry out the tasks of the Reich Commissioner for German Consolidation Folkdom in the time of Winter 1942/43 until spring 1944", v. May 31, 1944.

203 In more detail s. *DZW,* Vol. 2, S. 445; Vol. 3, S. 368; *Zamojszczyina - Special laboratory SS,* 2 vols., Warsaw 1977.

204 Lithuania: *Madajczyk,* GPO, S. 399; *Koeh!,* RKFDV, S. 149f.; Zitomir: Please refer Note 201.

205 How Note 202.

206 *DZW,* Vol. 2, p. 125ff. - Taking into account the incomplete and complicated sources, Wilhelm calculates the total number of Jewish people who were killed by the fascists on Soviet territory to be over 2.2 million *(Krausnick, Helmut/Wilhelm, Hans-Heinrich,* The troops of the ideological war. The operational groups of the security police and the SD 1938-1942, Stuttgart 1981, p. 621.

the desired "compilation of basic figures and maps as a basis for a general settlement plan", which has not yet been found. [207] Regardless of the fact that the war situation had now fundamentally changed, Himmler also wanted these "rule figures" to be revised upwards knowledge; he shared Meyer on 12. January 1943 as his authoritative Opinion with:

"The eastern settlement area includes Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Belarus and Longermanland as well as the whole of Crimea and Tauricn. These areas mentioned must totally Germanized or totally populated become." [20B] _

The last document above the Continuation of GPO and of general settlement plan apparently a letter Meyers to Himmler front 15. February 1943.209 Meyer shared in it that he was helped to rework the "documents for a general settlement plan" submitted in December 1942 and sent along a map and a table. On the The "rooms" were marked on the map, to which his investigations now extended; out of the table resulted in an "initial overview of the scope (presumably: of these rooms - DE) and the current population status". Both documents are research not known. Further is apparently - despite different Information from the main staff office of the RKF2iO - Neither the GPO nor the general settlement plan succeeded.

The defeat at Stalingrad, the turn of war, the also the "Overall planning" put an end to it, preventing further "large actions" and orders from Himmler to realize the GPO. As "Germanization" continued, the fascists encountered bitter popular resistance. In the case of Zamosc, large sections of the population took part in many Split of Poland to it. [211] Despite more bestial The resistance spread inexorably with "pacification actions". The occupation authorities saw agricultural production in the affected areas as "critically endangered" and therefore finally called in State Secretary Herbert Backe and Göring. Hirnmler had to stop the "Zamosc operation" in March 1943 and issue a general order about it in mid-May: "In view of the general political situation, further settlement (with Germans - EN) first to set Any settlement from Poland is until on additional prohibited." [212]

So the practical implementation of dP ended GPO, hardly that they started with a fiasco. The military defeats on the German-Soviet front, the partisan and popular resistance condemned the SS variant of the destruction of socialism like all others variants to failure.

The In its basic components, but especially in its main political aspect, GPO was not an original creation of Hitler, Himmler or other fascist ideologues. He had his immediate precursor in the Eastern policy of German Imperialism.

207 Please refer *Eichholtz,* General plan East, S. 269, Doc. 10.
208 Please refer ibid, S. 270, Doc. 11.
209 Please refer ibid, S. 271, Doc. 12. Hereafter also the The following.
210 In one Write the Department of RKF at the Personal Rod Himmler's from April 7, 1943 on February 15, 1943 Himmler's clever facilities (maps and table) - apparently in error - referred to as a "revised general settlement plan". (ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 3350).
211 *DZW,* Vol. 3, S. 368.
212 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 13380, FS Ilimmlers at Krueger, 17. 5. 1943, quote in FS llimmlers to Greifelt, May 18, 1943.

These date back to the beginning of the imperialist era and appeared heavily in the war target programs of the most reactionary circles during the First World War the Monopolbourgeoisie, the large agrarians and the intelligentsia come to light.

In the War aim memorandum Pan-German association from the September 1914, the Hein Rich Claß, the association chairman, wrote it and Krupp, Hugenberg and others were key representatives the Large industry stimulated or. approved had [213] , became the territorial

Demands against tsarist Russia were justified by the fact that Germany had to accept the Russian one Enemy in population and -growth so weaknesses, „that he in all Future not in the Position be becomes, us in equal Way to endanger".2 [14] The Memorandum saw fine "extensive expulsion the Population and one colonization through German farmers" 215. Distributed become should also the residents the to annexing territories East- and Northeast France.216 Behind one "colonization" from Belgium, Estonia and Courland presented itself in the December 1914 the War Committee the German Indu strie. [217]

Highlights of planning and propaganda millions of people were expelled from areas of that time Russian Rich were the memoranda the Business associations from industry, agriculture and medium-sized businesses from 10. March and 20th May 1915 and the so-called Professor's memorandum from the 8th of July the same year. Here became required,

"that the in the west to expecting size *industrial/,e* Increase in power a Counterweight through a equivalent in the east to acquiring *Agricultural area* find must", around

"Large-scale German rural settlement as well the repatriation of those abroad, namely in Russia, living and now disenfranchised German farmers in the

"to enable German imperial and economic territory" and "the military power of German country through sufficient Propagation his Population Russia opposite to strengthen". [21 8]

The "extraction of sufficient agricultural settlement area," it was said - presciently on the fascist "Blood and soil" ideology - in the Memorandum of May 20 , 1915, was necessary "to secure the income flowing from strong agriculture Sources of our national people's strength, especially ours population increase, and with it to strengthen ours military Strength".219

In the Professor's petition signed by 1347 intellectuals, which was submitted by the Pan-German Association with the leading participation of Emil **Kirdorf,** Hugenberg, Carl Duisberg, Stresemann and representatives the Large agrarians How Gustav Roesicke and wolfgang Cap

213 *Germany in the first World War,* Vol. 1, S. 358f.

214 *World domination in sight,* Doc. 29, p. 93, "Memorandum regarding national, economic and social policy Goals of German people in current wars".

215 *Germany in the first World War,* Vol. 3, S. 104.

216 *Health rule in sight,* doc. 29, p. 93; see also ibid, Doc. 23, p. 82, memorandum v. Hermann Röchling, August 31, 1914: „In dem ore area (from Longwy Briey - EN) Today almost only Italians live Alsace-Lorraine and Poles, people who come through Germans are to be pushed out... For this would I should be if it has to be carried out with other, general interests in mind."

217 Ibid, Doc. 32, p. 101, record Stresemanns about audience at Reich Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg and State Secretary Delbrück on December 8, 1914. In this context, Delbrück mentioned "a not very desirable one and little valuable Estonian rural population" and, as another "undesirable addition", the "Polish ones, who are at the lowest level of culture". Jews" (ibid.).

218 Ibid, Doc. 35, S. 109f., Memorandum v. 10. 3. 1915.

219 Ibid, Doc. 36, S. 112 f., Memorandum v. 5/20 1915.

organized been was, spoke man without make-up from the “Germanism” and from the "Barbarian flood from the East".220 The section "Russia" contained in nuce all the basic elements and arguments, including the racial ideological ones, which were characteristic of the GPO.

So are the class-related - economic, political and ideological - roots of the Conception of the GPO in the history of German imperialism can clearly be traced back 22 [1], In the GPO, the most diverse reactionary tendencies from the history of capitalism and imperialism came together under the bracket of the most barbaric Racism on new species together and became cast into a new shape. This is how they appeared for that to be suitable for broad layers of the to make the planned crimes plausible to the German people easier to pull in and deeper to get entangled in it.222

The scope, size and severity of these crimes appeared as a qualitatively new element in the GPO, both in terms of their geographical extent and the number of people affected and, above all the ins Eye formulated methods mass expulsion or extermination. This is explained primarily by the reaction of German imperialism the new historical Situation, the he itself after the October Revolution. In the First World War, the continued existence - which should be weakened as much as possible - Taking tsarist or capitalist Russia into account, its most reactionary representatives after 1917 saw their "national" and world-historical mission in this, the socialist to wipe out the Soviet Union and the “giants stick Cake" (Hitler) as "large area" one German World empire to incorporate. The fascist theory of newly dimensioned "large areas" understood the "Eastern area" as an essential, even a main component of a "Greater Germanic Empire", which in turn was a prerequisite for the lasting realization of the GPO concept.223

It is also worth examining the question of the extent to which other traumatic experiences of the German imperialists with the liberation struggle at the end of the First World War and during the revolutionary post-war crisis contributed to the extreme nature of this concept contributed and the "Fuse" through extermination and made German settlement the core point; especially the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire multi-ethnic state, further the "Experiences" the Freikorps gangs in the Baltics and in Upper Silesia.

Hitler himself played a key role in breaking out of the mass of reactionary and barbaric ideas, the since years, yes, yes since decades in imperialist or. upper middle class

220 Ibid, Doc. 38, S. 119, S. 121, Memorandum v. July 8, 1915; *Germany in the first war,* Vol. 2, S. 169f.

221 Other sources e.g. in *Petzold, Joachim,* On the war aims of the German monopoly capitalists in the First World War (Documentation), in *ZfG,* 6/1960, p. 1369ff.; *Czollek,* fascism and Occupation, p. 13ff.

222 Joachim C. Fest dismisses the “Lebensraum” and “Greater Reich” “visions” of Hitler and Himmler as a “delusional system” that, as a “singular”, i.e. H. A phenomenon that was exclusively linked to the people mentioned arose and immediately disappeared again with the “Third Reich”. and nothing as the “Lack of ideas of National Socialist will to power himself" reflected (Introduction to *Himmler,* p. 13ff., p. 22).

223 See *EichhoUz, Dietrich,* “Greater Germanic Empire” and “Generalplan Ost”. uniformity and Difference in the fascist Occupation system, in *ZfG,* 9/1980, p. 838ff.

It was widespread in circles to put together a new concept of genocide.224 One such "ideological transformation work" 225 was naturally neither a Novelty in the Story the civil ideology How the ideal Substrate this Work. Also the "Monomania" 226, with the Hitler the self-made ideology until to his End attached, is quite common among fascist ideologues and politicians and can increase their personal charisma towards vulnerable classes and strata. Commoners historian see in this Of course after as before a Reason, Hitler to one case "more for the psychiatrist as for the Historian" 227 and with it him and the Domination of To make fascism a singular and inexplicable phenomenon in German history.

As Hitler in "My Battle" (1924) the "Land policy the Future" summoned, the the "Germanic train" in the after his Opinion ready to collapse "Huge in the East". must, 228 tied he at absolutely known imperialist ideas at.

He walked in the intellectual traces for example his partisan and Fellow putschist Ludendorff, the at the time himself the "Land Ober-Ost" as future German to helped to establish a colonizing area.229 Following the geopolitical views of Karl Haushofer's school, he concentrated his demands on the eastern direction of expansion, ie on the destruction of the socialist Soviet Union.230

Anyway acted it is with Hitler at that time it was just about the Leader one not yet very significant, straight at one Coup failed party, and his ideas had none Chance on realization need to receive. Already from powerful circles he protected heavy industry a few years later in his so-called Second Book (1928). the "Land policy the Future" as" spatial politics" the "Spread of own Volkes", that is as expulsion, destruction or at least enslavement of other peoples.231

224 For the "scientific" precursors of this concept, see: u. a. *Petzold,* conservative theorist of German fascism; *Trip, Wolfgang,* Departure into the illusion. To Criticism of bourgeois philosophy in Germany, Berlin 1964; *Heyden, Günter,* criticism of the German Geopolitics. beings and social function one reactionary sociological School, Berlin 1958.

225 *fascism and ideology 1,* Berlin (West) 1980, S. 75 *(The Argument,* Special volume AS 60). r.

226 See *Hildebrand, Klaus,* Hitler's "Program" and its Realization 1939-1942, in *Beginning of War 1939.* Unleashing or Outbreak of the Second World War?, edited by Gottfried Nied hart, Darmstadt 1976, p. 180. Also the "cynical distance from their own ideology" among the fascists leaders (very largely understood at *Petzold, Joachim,* The objective function of fascism in the subjective Self-image the fascists, in *ZfG,* 4/1980, S. 370) remained of course within the tight Barriers hers reactionary class consciousness or within the limited scope provided by the interests of those they represent Class let them.

227 So *Hillgruber, Andrew,* Sources and source criticism on the prehistory of the Second World War, in *Beginning of the war in 1939,* p. 392 (f.).

228 *Hitler, Adolf,* My Battle, 6th ed., Berlin 1930, S. 742.

229 See *Strazas, A.S. ,* "Zemlya Oberost" i Germanskie celi na vostoke v gody pervoj mirovoj vojny, in *Voprosy istorii,* 8/1964, p. 49ff.; s. also *Koehl, Robert Lewis,* A Prelude to Hitler's Greater Germany, in *The American Historical Review,* 1/1953, p. 53, S. 55 f.; *Czollek,* Fascism and Occupation, p. 15f.

230 *Heyden,* S. 112 ff.; *Petzold,* conservative theorist of German fascism, S. 133.

231 *Hitler's Second Book.* A document the year 1928, deposited. and comment. v. Gerhard L. Weinberg, Stuttgart 1961, S. 79; s. further S. 78ff., 99f., 105, 219f.

The main turning points in the further development of the concept GPO - to be mentioned here only in the briefest form - were the establishment of the fascist dictatorship, the start of the war in 1939 and the June 22 1941.

After the most reactionary and most aggressive Forces of finance capital the fascists Power had pushed, could terrible political disaster out of the ideological dragon seed grows. Since the 30th January In 1933 the "Bodeni:,olitik der Future" became a state maxim. Hitler was already concerned with the "technique of depopulation" in 1935 and agreed Hermann Rauschning: "We have a duty to depopulate, how **we** the duty the appropriate Care the German one have population. It becomes a technology of depopulation must be developed. What does depopulating mean, you may ask? Do I want to eliminate entire tribes? Yes, sort of, on that it will come out. The nature is awful, that's why we can it also be. If I the blossom of the Germans in the steel storm of the coming war, without feeling the slightest regret for the precious German blood that is being shed, should I not then have the right to send millions of an inferior, like that Vermin multiply Eliminate race, not by me exterminated, but only by systematically preventing their great natural fertility from having an effect. For example, by keeping men separated from women for years. ...It There are many methods to eliminate an unwanted tribe systematically and relatively painlessly, at least without much bloodshed, to extinction to bring." [232]

These ideas, now become a supporting political The concept of the regime was never an absolute secret, but was kept in the ruling regime Certainly discussed in financial capital circles. Hjalmar Schacht, for example, recognized its significance; he was itself - Back then, understandably not without skepticism - "It is clear that the only way to make room **for** German settlement along the entire eastern line is to completely depopulate the population in question Areas". [233]

Even after the 30th January 1933 would have The path to bloody practice can be blocked for the fascist race planners. Only the war unleashed by German imperialism opened up this path for them. With the defeat of Poland, the first phase of the realization of the "Eastern Space" concept began. Significantly, all powers in this area were given to Heinrich Himmler, who with his apparatus for internal security and political stability of the fascist regimes to care for had. After Hitler's Decree

"For the consolidation of the German people" from 7. In October 1939, Himmler chose the designation "Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation German ethnicity" to. [234] His On-

232 *Rauschning, Hermann,* conversations with Hitler, Zurich/Vienna/New York 1940, S. 129.

233 At Knight v. Epp, 1935; quote after *boom, Hans,* The origin of Second World War - Revision or Expansion? in *Start of war 1939,* p. 70, p. 91. See also *Trel'or-Roper, Hugh Redwald,* Hitler's war aims, in *VfZ,* 2/1960, S. 130, the, not without apologetic intention, one memorandum shafts same content at Hitler from 1934 mentioned (without sources). Allegedly played here the notorious one interest shafts, Epps, the Deutsche Bank etc. at colonial destinations especially in Africa as an important motif with, that them in front a one-sided one East orientation with the low Opportunities for realization warned, the she to _ calculated at that time.

234 *IMG,* Vol. 26, S. 255, "Decree of leader and Reich Chancellor to Consolidation German ethnicity from the 7. October 1939". - In the Decree came the Designation "Reich Commissioner" not before; to Himmler's self-appointment p. *Bllchheim, Hans,* The SS - The instrument of domination, in *anatomy of SS state,* from Hans Buchheim u. a., Vol. 1, Olten/Freiburg i. Br. 1965, p. 220ff.

gifts were loud Decree the “repatriation” of Germans abroad, “the creation of new ones German settlement areas through resettlement" and the Elimination of damage the influence of such foreign people Sections of the population that represent a danger to the Reich and the German national community." Hitler, as he had recently expressed to Rosenberg, demanded that "a broad belt of Germanization and colonization" be pushed in front of the previous German border and that a "German granary" be built. created will.235

Poland was, long term seen, for the Fascists Apron and Test case for the “Land policy the future". But the Course of war brought it with him yourself that only there, in the annexed areas of Poland and in parts of the General Government, during a five-year period Occupation period the “Germanization” crime in on a large scale and at all crucial stages. From the ghettoization and extermination of Polish Jews to expropriation and "resettlement" and murder of millions of Poles, over The politics of the "German People's List" and the settlement of Germans and "people of German descent" brought from all directions, up to the "Aktion Zamosc" and the robbery of "good-blooded" Polish children, took place in these areas so much It's monstrous, that any Trying to use the GPO as a “mere” plan, as

To trivialize "daydream" and "chimera". 236, must end in dangerous apologetics. In the GPO find each other - albeit on a new scale - the same, yes 1939/40 **for** Poland developed Basics of the procedure again: the one always “belts” that push further out the Germanization and colonization", the construction from “Volkstumsbrücken”, "large settlement areas" and “settlement bases” in the further offshore to the east Space for the purpose of "Encirclement" of “Genesis” and maximum Disintegration of the conquered room "in possible many parts and Splinter", the "racial exercise", “bloody Germanization" and finally liquidation the remaining "Islands" strange “Ethnicity”.237

The basic idea of the GPO, namely pushing the "settlement belt" eastwards, was, according to the course of war, developed step by step. In the first At this stage, the annexed Polish territories formed this belt; in the second, the General Government was added. These two Stages were apparently in Meyer's GPO version.

235 *Alfred Rosenberg's political diary from the 1970s 1934,135 and 1939/40,* ed. and explains. v. Hans Günther Seraphim, Göttingen/Berlin(West)/Frankfurt a. M. 1956, S. 81 (29. 9. 1939). Hitler had As Rosenberg recorded in his diary, the complete program for future action towards Poland was already ready at this point: “He wanted to divide the now defined area into three strips: 1. between Vistula and bug: all of Judaism (also from the empire), as well as all somehow unreliable elements. An invincible eastern wall on the Vistula - even stronger than in the West. 2. At the previous border wide belt the Germanization and colonization. Here would come a big Task for the entire People: one German granary to create, strong peasantry, good Germans to relocate from all over the world. 3. In between one Polish 'Statehood'. Whether the settlement belt can be advanced after decades remains to be seen in the future." (ibid.).

236 *Heiber,* S. 291f.; *Graml, Hermann,* To discussion above the Fault at the Second World War, in *Start of the war in 1939,* p. 469.

237 After the Depiction at *KcirniJ,* S. 354ff., the primarily Himmler's speech from the February 29, 1940 before the Gauleiters of the NSDAP and its infamous memorandum for Hitler regarding. "Some thoughts about "The treatment of foreign peoples in the East" from May 15, 1940 *(VfZ,* 2/1957, p. 196ff.; here undated) analyzed; s. also Note 235.

sung from July 15th 1941 recorded. The third, quickly overtaken stage (additionally the Baltic Soviet republics, Belarus, large parts of Ukraine) was reflected in the RSHA plan from late 1941/early 1942. The next, fourth stage was the one that Himmler gave to Meyer in January 1942 as a guideline for the GPO version of May 1942 (additional "lngermanland" and "Gotengau"). The following stages were then with this version itself and with those already described further demands Himmler's to the GPO identical.238

In more organizational respect undertakings the Fascists already before the raid on the USSR considerable efforts to develop its mechanism of rule for the expected new ones Setting up goals and tasks.

The "Germanization" policy in Poland was under the direction of the RSHA, which in this capacity also acted as an office of the RKF. Heydrich was responsible for the central processing of deportations and "resettlements" since December 1939 Adolf Eichmann (Office IV=Gestapo).239 Over the course of the year 1941 they went with corresponding Powers of attorney to Office III (SO Inland) over,240 in which the GPO was created in its version from the end of 1941/beginning of 1942.

A wealth of preparatory and accompanying Measures and orders Hitler, the SS, the Wehrmacht and other fascist organs of power **for** "Barbarossa" testifies to how early and comprehensively the ideal and organizational prerequisites for the decisive stage for this completely new dimension of the fascist " space politics" created became. Beginning announced in 1941 Himmler in the mentioned Speak up the Wewelsburg before the closest circle of his SS group leader the destruction from

30 l\fulions Slavs as "Purpose of Russian campaign". 241 One Row more inhumane Orders and guidelines of the OKW (guidelines on special areas for directive no. 21 (Barbarossa Case)" of March 13, 1941; "Guidelines for the Treatment of Political Commissars" [Commissioner's Order] of June 6, 1941; “Decree on the exercise of the Martial jurisdiction in the Area "Barbarossa" [jurisdictional order] front May 13, 1941; the

Basic Order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army “ Regulation of the deployment of the security police and the SO in the association of the Army" from 28. April 1941 and a.) 242 and the Education the SS task forces 243 prepared the organized genocide already before

dem raid on the USSR before.

At the Awarded June 21, 1941 a Decree Himmler's the "Department of Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of the German Nationality" the status of an SS main office under the new name "Stabshauptamt", broken down into official groups and offices; The new office had a constantly expanding network of RKF representatives in the occupied areas areas of Poland and - after the 22nd June 1941 - in the USSR. The huge apparatus of other main offices (RSHA, RuSHA, ethnic German middle point) stood by the RKF

238 *Karny,* S. 368 rubles

239 *DZW,* Vol. 1, S. 470.

240 *Karny,* S. 3591., p. 369f.

241 See note 181 *(/MG,* vol. 4, p. 536). According to the Nuremberg source, it is usually incorrect: Weselsburg.

242 See the documentation in *Occupation, robbery, destruction;* on the commissar's order in detail *Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf,* commissar's order and mass executions of Soviet war prisoners, in *Anatomy of the SS State,* p. 161 **ff.** (p. 198ff.); see also *Müller,* Wehrmacht and occupation, p. 61 **ff.**

243 *DZW,* Vol. 1, S. 560; Vol. 2, S. 125.

for his special Tasks for disposition.2« That was it the organizational mechanism to realization of GPO created, the after Opinion his Author the monstrous Objective of the "Eastern reconstruction" and its problems was.

The cardinal problem for fascism, the Destruction of the revolutionary workers' movement, the the Hitler regime in the interior already realized to have believed took place after June 22nd 1941 the nature of the global military conflict. The fascist ideologues who have always been the social Antagonisms are relegated to racial differences Class struggle in a Racial struggle falsified and the moving cause of social development in this way from the reality dangerous to imperialism into the mystical-transcendental had moved away, started the war of annihilation against the Soviet Union as a racial struggle in a new dimension .

With it walked itself also the Status of Anti-Semitism, of Kerns the German Fascist racial ideology that came before - especially until 1939 - first and foremost had to fulfill a domestic political function. The fascist rulers left politics of pogroms and from expulsion to that of mass murder and genocide245, which itself now but not alone against the Jews and those of Jewish origin people, but also against the people Eastern Europe, Ahead the people the Soviet Union. Anti-Semitism proved itself more clear as ever previously as the Output stage to incomparably more comprehensive forms of racism, not just in theory and ideology, but in the barbaric practice of genocide. He also merged in self-understanding and in the propaganda of the fascists stronger than before with anti-communism and anti-Sovietism. In this way, the regime itself essentially lifted the cloak of secrecy that lay over the social content of anti-Semitism.

The class function of racism in imperialism and its particularly pronounced form during Fascist dictatorship in Germany has already been examined from the Marxist side.246 As an ideological cover for the rational 247 imperialist core of the GPO, it plays only a secondary role in our analysis of this very core. As form-determining However, Element took over the ideology especially in the GPO as a specific part of the imperialist war aim program. The SS offices and planners involved were the fascist organs responsible for the division of labor for the development and spread of racial ideology with priority responsible were. rabids representatives this

244 *Buchheim,* S. 223 **ff.;** *Koehl,* RKFDV, S. 84.

245 *Pätzold, Kurt,* From expulsion to genocide. On the causes, driving forces and conditions of the anti-Jewish policy of fascist German imperialism, in *Faschismusforschung* , p. 205 **ff.**

246 Please refer *the same,* Fascism, racial madness, Persecution of Jews. One study to political Strategy and Tactics of Fascist German Imperialism (1933-1935), Berlin 1975; *Drobisch, Klaus/Goguel, Rudi/Müller, Werner,* Jews under the swastika. persecution and extermination the German Jews 1933-1945. Under cooperation v. horst jackdaw, Berlin 1973.

247 The annihilation of nations or extermination of the Jews, first once simply characterized as an irrational event, in the face of which "reason is speechless" (Eberhard Jaeckel, quote according to *fascism and ideology 1,* p. 72), can from bourgeois ideologists effortlessly call it "metahistorical" from the history and continuity of imperialism Dominance excluded become.

ideology, especially Himmler himself, it also served as its own substitute religion, whose creators they thought they were.

Takes man but so, How civil Authors this do, the ideological appearance for the whole being, the ideological shell for the social content, so you get there to the fundamentally wrong one Thesis that it is a matter the GPO is nothing more than an outgrowth of the fascist racial madness with the interests of capital either was incompatible or at least had absolutely nothing to do with them had. [2 48] But even if it is not easy, beneath the ideological rigidity and deformation are the political and economic ones Objectives of the GPO to recognize, like that Let at least emerge flawlessly both historically and theoretically and represent.

The GPO was just part of the diverse German war target planning imperialists and also only a Part - in a way the SS variant - the Planning for the "Eastern Space", particularly those that came about under Göring's and Rosenberg's leadership (readable approximately out of the “Greens folder" and "Tan folder") are known.249 Of course, the GPO was not only the most long-term plan, but it also drew an extreme consequence of genocide from the abundance of other plans. He represented the most pronounced racist Variant that had three dominant aspects:

1) the extermination and, which largely meant the same thing, the deportation of countless millions of "racially undesirable" natives, especially members of Slavic peoples;
2) the predominantly agrarian character of the new settlement by Germans, "Incorporated Germans" or members of other "Germanic" peoples;
3) the helot position of colonial forced laborers, which was intended for untold millions of those locals who were not exterminated or not “Germanized” become should.

we ask in view of these facts according to the ratio of the GPO to the expansion and exploitation interests of the imperialist bourgeoisie, this is how the problem turns out to be involved. On the first View they contradict mentioned three Main aspects these interests: the extermination of millions of the native population deprived monopoly capital of exploitable workers; the tendency towards re-agrarization pushed industrial and Bank capital at the “Eastern construction” in the Background; the Helot status of the remaining urban and rural local population made it more difficult or prevented their exploitation as free and especially as qualified wage workers. By the way, these contradictions were confirmed by contemporaries - Monopoly capitalists, military men, politicians of the fascist regime - recognized and discussed.250

248 Hildebrand claims e.g., Hitler's "Program", under which he his "dogmatic" basic racial political views and Goals understands, have “basically exactly that Opposite of that" contains, „What those political forces, the him 1933 to Power helped, from expected him" *(Hildebrand,* p. 222). Joachim C. Himmler's world of ideas is called Fest in the same way Connection a “delusional system”, “that only taken seriously become deserved because it for some Time, anyway, Story made" (intro. to *Himmler,* S. 15). Similar to *Heiber,* p. 292.

249 See this broad documentation in *World domination in sight; concept for the “reorganization” of the world; DZW* Vol. 1-6; etc.

250 Please refer the Documentation in *World domination in the visor; concept for the "Reorganization" the World; Eichholtz,* „ Ways to De-Bolshevization ... " ; recently *Rolf Dieter Müller.*

Where the issue affected acute economic interests, primarily in the annexed ones Polish areas, the German financial oligarchy immediately and unhesitatingly took action Position. The RGI concerned itself in one Statement of Principles from the September 26 , 1941 explicitly so: „The need and urgency the general, also the commercial one settlement of the incorporated eastern areas be assumed to be known to those involved in the settlement. The main goals of the settlement also extend to the ethnic Germanization of the incorporated areas and the formation of a racially perfect one human wall against the further east, How on the Reconstruction and the expansion one powerful Business. A primate the one before the others Subtask can not accepted become, because it would just be annoying. The overall goal is: Racially healthy people on an economically sound basis. The settlement of the incorporated eastern areas is indeed a very urgent matter Task and demanded therefore one special Financial support. This Task but is only one Subtask the Greater German Planning. Healthy is the economy in the East only if it is aimed at the German economy as a whole and if the German economy as a whole Business blooms." 251

This "clear cancellation the Reich Industry Group at the primacy of racial politics" 25 2 had one considerable importance for reducing the influence of the RKF on the economy in the East. She concerned but only that primate of racism about the Economics and was, as R.-D. Müller correctly states, "no general rejection of the national socialist colonization plans for the "Eastern region"". 253 Similar disputes took place in the summer of 1942. 254

Also under the GPO experts themselves - Himmlcr, Heydrich, Meyer, Wetzei - As the documents cited show, there were varying opinions and discussions both about the extent and methods of "relocation" and about the future role of cities or the (raw materials) industry. Hitler warmed to Himmler's "resettlement" and agricultural settlement plans255, but at the same time he significantly promoted the conception and measures of Göring, Speer, Pleiger and the arms monopolies and large banks involved, which were preparing to control large-scale Soviet industry on a large scale and for a long time Visibility back on track to (Dnepr-Donec area; oil production in the Caucasus) and for the German one war economy and warfare to produce to let.256

It would be completely wrong to conclude from the existence of the contradictions mentioned that the GPO and the imperialist interests of monopoly capital are incompatible and unrelated to one another. The fundamental contradiction and the deep instability of the imperialist system under the sign the fascist dictatorship were expressed precisely in this, that the most consistent, most radical implementation and defense of those interests Fascists to means and Methods took effect **that** were exactly the same Interests contradict had to.25 7

251 *Müller, Rolf Dieter,* S. 122, Doc. 7.
252 Ibid, S. 110.
253 Ibid.
254 Ibid, S. 113.
255 Please refer e.g *picker,* S. 329ff., Table talk v. May 12, 1942; S. 484f. (July 27, 1942).
256 See. against it the one-sided interpretation from Hitler's attitude at *Reiber,* S. 303 Note 20.
257 Kaiser rightly notes a "tension" between the economic needs of monopoly capital and the simultaneous political needs of its fascist capital Domination *(Emperor, Peter M.,* Monopoly profit and Mass murder in the Fascism. **To**

In the age of the anti-imperialist revolution and the victory of socialism, such means must, apparently indispensable to achieve the most far-reaching imperialist goals objectives, against this himself sweep, she endanger and in cancel as a final consequence. Imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism He doesn't just bring the forces that will eliminate him onto the scene, he brings them itself emerged in the form of the modern working class, its core, the large-scale industrial proletariat, and the revolutionary workers' movement, which for the first time created an economic, political and military base in the USSR. Did German imperialism want - as a pioneer of world imperialism - To reverse this development and make it impossible forever, and thus to stabilize his rule forever, he had to use means that ultimately also had characteristics of his own Development negated.

Such contradictions "between the political security requirements and the immediate profit interests" 258 marked the German warfare and war target planning since June 22nd 1941. The idea of the occupied territories of the USSR, but also the other occupied countries, on the duration to dominate and exploit was profound unreal. The attempt, one such "millennial" Establishing imperialist foreign rule could only mean perpetual war and a state of war or extermination affected peoples and thus their resistance. "And Hitler and Himmler were generally consistent enough to recognize that this was not an alternative at all, but rather that them to fulfillment of their Goals basically just a The path was open: war to extinction. An end result that could not be satisfactory for the monopolies."259

The basic motivation for the GPO was not racial ideology, but rather a decidedly political one. namely the interest at the "Fuse" of once conquered huge space in the East. This "Fuse" - a keyword the imperialist Expansion and occupation policy in general - was directed against the resistance of the subjugated peoples, in the "Eastern region" above all against the unbending resistance of the Soviet people, which the fascists faced from day one.

The aforementioned transfer of powers for the "consolidation of the German people" to Himmler at the beginning of the war, enforced against the resistance of various competing fascist institutions, and the expansion from function and apparatus of the RKF on the 21st. June 1941 revealed the priority that safety or They had to have "security" and actually had them when it came to carrying out the planned crimes against other peoples. The rational core of these grew in the hands of the SS crime ("Fuse", i.e. permanent Mastery through suppression or extermination) and the irrational racist cover as tightly as possible.

Explainedly was the War against them USSR a "battle of annihilation". Hitler sharpened his generals already on the 30th. March 1941 a: "\If we don't take it that way, then become we that is the hit the enemy, but in 30 years becomes us again the komrnu-

economic function of the concentration and extermination camps in fascist Germany, in: *leaves for deut;scl1e and international Politics,* 1975, 5, special print, S. 5), that also in others as fascist regimes occurs. Please refer also the confrontation with civil "middle class" theorists (including ultra radicals) in this Ask at
Opitz, Reinhard, Over the Origin and prevention from Fascism, in *The Argument,* 1974, 7-9, p. 570ff.

258 *Emperor,* S. 5.

259 *tape* /, S. 90*I*

nistic Enemy face each other." 260 At the 16. July 1941 met he, intoxicated by at the beginning the Wehrmacht, “fundamental statements” about the objectives and Methods of the war against the USSR.261 He sharply highlighted the connection between the transformation of "giant space" in one colony of German imperialism and the "pacification" or. "Fuse" of Conquered out. The conquered areas would have to ,,so quickly as possible to be pacified; this is best done by that you just anyone wrong look, shoot dead." According to Hitler, the partisan war also had again his advantage: he gives us the opportunity to eradicate what stands against us." "He shoots, Relocate Etc." called Hitler “necessary Measures" for the desired ,,final Regulation". For all Future may "west of Ural" never allowed become, “that someone else carries weapons than the German"; the German soldier must always "secure the regime split".

Incidentally, the political and military "securing" of German rule took precedence over "racial politics" in Hitler's decision-making process. In conversations with Himmler at the 5. April 1942 he explained for example multiple in the same senses, ,,he be not a particular fan of all attempts at Germanization, insofar as it is not possible to secure them ideologically", that is, "a perfect ideological orientation of these (Germanized - D. E.) Elements on the Germanic Empire". So that pointed he, How Bormann at this Job noted, the hopes Himmler's on "Blood fishing expeditions" in the occupied countries, especially in the organized ones Room “well-bred” Children, as a “dark theory” from.262

Accordingly varied Himmler this "Theory" and brutalized she into the Excessive. On September 16 , 1942, he explained to those gathered in his field headquarters SS and police leaders his “First principle”: “Everyone good Blood... "If you meet somewhere in the East, you can either win or you'll have to kill it." 263 The brave hero Resistance of Soviet people strengthened him in the Follow-up time only still in his fix Idea. In the Practice of barbaric fight against the Partisans but came the real core of this idea emerges: he explained to commanders on December 16 , 1943 the navy, ,,basically the command given, also the women and Children this Partisans and Commissioners kill to leave".264

In the Summer 1942, during the preparation of the “Final Solution to the Jewish Question” in the General Government and the “Aktion Zamosc” with which it was realized of the GPO on a large scale begin should, formulated Himmler in one Write at Kruger the double -

260 *Halder,* Vol. 2, S. 337, Entry v. 30. 3. 1941 (Speech Hitler's before the general meeting).

261 *case Barbarossa,* Doc. 105, p. 331ff., minutes Bormanns about meeting Hitler with Göring, Rosenberg, Keitel, Lammers and Bormann on July 16th. 1941 (Nuremberg. Dole L-221). Hereafter also the following. - According to Hitler, "Reich territory" and "German settlement" were to be: the entire Baltic States, western Ukraine (Galicia), the Crimea with extensive hinterland in the north, the area of the Volga Germans, "the area around Baku" and the peninsula Cola "because of the big nickel deposits" (ibid.).

262 *picker,* S. 253, S. 255, Table talk v. 5. 4. 1942.

263 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 3608.

264 Ibid, Movie 1571 (Speech also in printed form). The Thought, “Germanic blood in The whole To take the world, to steal it and to steal wherever I can," Himmler already had before dem War pronounced *(Himmler,* S. 38, speech before the SS group leaders on the 8th 11. 1938) and culminated in his speeches in Posen and Bad Schachen in October 191.3 (4. 10=PS-1919; 6. 10; 14. iO=L-070; 24. 10).

ideological and political - Purpose of the SS's entire "Eastern Area Policy"; the planned ones Measures be "to the in the senses the Reorganization Europe necessary "ethnic separation of races and peoples as well as in the interests of the security and cleanliness of the German Empire and its areas of interest". [2]5? Himmler had Hurry, „the huge German Lifelines at streets and tracks", the itself after the plans the German Summer offensive 1942 until at least at the Volga, at the Caucasus and until Baku extend should„on "their intersection points". To "secure" settlement bases.[266]

The first orders and measures for the practical implementation of the GPO date from this period and cost tens of thousands of Polish and Soviet citizens in the following months the material existence and in most cases life. Your full meaning opens up itself us, however only from the fact that Himmler in the August 1942 was given full powers to combat partisans in the Reich Commissariats. [267] "Securing" the "lifelines" had acquired extremely acute importance, and Himmler took it Opportunity true to test the GPO's recipe against popular resistance. „The is the best security!" [268]

Both the German settlement and the extensive agrarianization of the areas emptied of people had an eminent political significance under the auspices of "security". In this context, the Germanic "race" was ideologically alienated and encoded Synonymous with a politically reliable population. Political reliability in the fascist sense was to be ensured by large-scale settler farms (40 to 100 ha) and estates (250 ha and more) on the best available soil [269] bought or rewarded, secured by the military and terrorist organs and by the internal and external Pressure from "foreigners." Race" enforced become.

At At this point, however, there were a variety of ideas running in the GPO together, including those that had an abstruse, antediluvian character such as the idolization of the "Germanic peasantry" and his "blood and soil"; but they all fit into that here dominant "Security" concept.[270]

One so far from neglected in research The problem in our context is the extensive identity of the GPO's extermination and agrarianization concept with the plans to destroy the largest Soviet cities organizational and intellectual centers the revolutionary workers movement. The common one political The denominator to which both can be reduced has not yet been investigated.

265 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 5548, Himmler at Krueger, 19. 7. 1942.

266 AT (Himmler's?) v. 21. 7. 1942, quote after *Reiber,* S. 290.

267 *DZW,* Vol. 2, S. 433f. (Instruction No. 46 d. OKW v. August 18, 1942).

268 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 3608, Speech by Himmler v. 16. 9. 1942. By Bach-Zelewski, in August 1942 from Himmler to his "special representative for the Gang Combat" testified later before the Nuremberg Court the close connection, the for the fascist leadership there was a difference between the mass murders in the fight against partisans and the objectives of the GPO; he reiterated this to the representative of the Soviet prosecution, „that the Battle against the partisan movement pretext for the Extermination of the Slavic and Jewish population was" (/ *MG,* Vol. 4, p. 538, hearing of witnesses vd Bachs on January 7, 1946).

269 *Madajczyk,* GPO, S. 437.

270 Furthermore, the reactionary ideas mentioned clearly had an indirect connection with this concept anti-proletarian Component.

It is a historical one Imperialists common ones Experience, that the The working class is the leading force of the anti-imperialist resistance and the communists are its organizers. German fascism owed its power and even its existence to this lively experience of the German monopoly bourgeoisie. The SS, their main function In the system of fascist rule, the regime was “secured” through terror, drew the appropriate conclusion for the “Eastern area”: the resistance had to be broken through terror; The most extreme form of terror must be used against the Soviet population, which was "contaminated" by Bolsheviks Extermination, be applied. It has been proven that the desire for destruction was directed in the “Eastern Area”. primarily against the urban population of millions, before especially against the working class of cities such as Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev and Stalingrad. The “dumb masses” (Wetzei) outside the cities were, the fascists argued, decimated and leaderless as “work people.” probably manageable, but not the industrial workforce of the big cities.

Secretary of State Herbert Jaw, the Agrarian dictator of German Imperialism, the bar baric anti-Soviet hatred and naked fear of "Bolshevism" with the scientific and sober calculation one “Greater area” strategists Association, demanded already at the 23. May 1941 in the infamous “ Economic policy Guidelines for Eastern Economic Organization, Agriculture Group" the radical "destruction of the Russian processing industry in the forest zone", ie in the entire non-black earth area of the RSFSR including Moscow and Leningrad.271 The agricultural surpluses of black earth area should exclusively after west flow and the Self-sufficiency and "blockage resistance" of from Germany dominated European "major economic area" to back up. „The consequence is the Non-delivery (with Close !"communications - DE) the entire forest zone including the main industrial centers Moscow and Petersburg From this follows inevitably a Die as well as the Industry How one huge Part the People in the previous subsidy areas Many 10 million of people become superfluous in this area and will die or go to Siberia emigrate must."

Backe and his co-author, Ministerial Director Hans-Joachim, gave the "justification" for this plan Riecke, next to the one mentioned economic policy objective, "that the Great Russians, whether in tsarist or Bolshevik style, are always a fundamental enemy not only of Germany but of Europe." But that it is mainly the “Bolshevik embossing" the industrial workforce **was,** the jaw There were fears of resistance and uprising, which was mentioned elsewhere, albeit in a cryptic way: It would be “after "Knowledge of the Russian mentality and the processes as they expressed themselves after the World War and in war communism" is not justifiable, "the Russian processing industry (including mechanical engineering) to obtain".

The largest cities of the USSR, as centers of world socialism and the revolutionary workers' movement, were to be abandoned to complete, barbaric destruction, as the fascist leadership intended from the outset. This plan was of great concern to Hitler, especially at the time of the German offensive, i.e. H. in the summer of 1941 and in the summer of 1942. On the 5th/6th July 1941 he dealt with the fate of Moscow: “Moscow as Seat this Teach (of Bolshevism - D E.) become from the ground disappear,

271 / *MG,* Vol. 36, p. 135ff. Hereafter also the The following. Please refer also Partial vehicle in *World domination in Visor,* p. 298ff.

as soon as the valuable goods are taken away; to work with the Russians in the factories there, don't be us possible." 272 Immediately then 1 am 8th of July, held Colonel General Franz Halder, Chief of the Army General Staff, lectures to Hitler. As a result of the meeting he noted: “The Fuhrer's decision is firm it, Moscow and Lenin just like that ground even to make, around to impede, that People in this stay that we then in winter would have to feed. The Cities should through the Luftwaffe destroyed become. Tanks are allowed for this not used become. ,popular catastrophe, the not only Bolshevism, but also Muscoviteism, was deprived of its centers." 273 At 16. July repeated Hitler, he wants Leningrad "to raze to the ground" about it then "the Finns to give".274

A few months later, Leningrad actually faced the fate of complete annihilation. In the fall it was decided in the OKW and the OKH that the city should, just as it did later Moscow, through Artillery shelling and Aerial bombardments destroyed become. The fascists checked several variants of the hermetic Lockdown the city to their population of millions through grenades, bombs, Mines and before everything through hunger to eradicate. 27 5 In the Rod the before Leningrad standing 18. army considered man the "Advantages" one complete Starvation: "a) A greater Part the communist Population Russia, which is to be found among the population of Petersburg, is thereby eradicated. b) We need 4 million People not to feed." 276

Approximately to the same Time met man similar Preparations to destruction Moscow. "This city", so expressed join Hitler a visit to the headquarters of the Army Group Center, “no German soldiers were allowed to enter. It should be enclosed within a wide arc. No soldier, no civilian, whether man, woman or child, is allowed to leave them. Every attempt is welcome \Vapan violence to reject. He have precautions to flood Moscow and its surroundings using huge systems and drown them in water. Where until now Moscow stand, become a more powerful lake educated, the the metropolis of Russian people the Look the civilized \Veit for always revoke become." 277

The same wishful thoughts of a dehumanized anti-communism were directed at Stalingrad. In one Meeting between Hitler, Halder and Field Marshal General Wilhelm List on the 31st In August 1942, Halder noted: “Stalingrad: destroy the male population, female transport away." 27 8 This plan of mass murder was with the

272 *Hitler, Adolf,* monologues in the Führer headquarters 1941-1944. Heinrich Heim's notes, ed. v. Werner Jochmann, Hamburg 1980, p. 39.

273 *Halder,* Vol. 3, p. 53, entry by. 8th. 7. 1941 (lecture with Hitler). For the planned Fate of Leningrad and Moscow see also *Besymenski,* p. 229ff.; also *KTB of OKW,* Vol. 1, p. 1021, document appendix, "Special Files" Appendix 13, July 8, 1941”.

271, How Note 261 *(Case Barbarossa,* S. 334).

275 *DZW,* Vol. 2, S. 53, S. 56 (Facsimile: Lecture notes WFSt/Dept. L/Warlimont, v. September 21, 1941).

276 *Occupation, Robbery, Destruction,* S. 75f., Doc. 19, study out of dem AOK 18 v. November 4, 1941; see also *Müller,* Wehrmacht and occupation, p. 121f. How such plans for the destruction of cities with millions of inhabitants should be realized, later showed this Fate the city Warsaw, where the fascists took cruel revenge for the Warsaw Uprising from August 1944 onwards and with all consequence a made an example of annihilation (see *DZW,* Vol. 6, chap. 9; in print).

277 *Schlabrendorff, Fabian v.,* officers against Hitler, Frankfurt a. M./Hamburg 1959, S. 61 (after Transcript of present Fruit. Henning v. Tresckow).

278 *Halder,* Vol. 3, S. 514, Entry v. 31. 8th. 1942 (Attachment e.g. KTB: „Notes out of Meeting with Cunning at Hitler u. Individual notes from the 31. 8th. 1942").

The fascists' intention to politically "secure" the city once conquered is justified: "The Führer orders that when the city is penetrated, the entire male population should be eliminated, since Stalingrad, with its million-strong population, is entirely communist population particularly dangerous be." [279]

At this horrible, political one Objective until to excess consistent destruction plans had the Wehrmacht leadership authoritative Portion. In equal Way corresponded that Colonization program Göring's with the political intentions of GPO. After this program, behind which an authoritative one faction of German financial capital and which Hitler also represented, the Soviet country should into a colonial exploited and dominated German dominion, into an agricultural and raw material appendage of German imperialism transformed 280 The "security" concept of the GPO should According to the SS, and not only the SS, the political Basic requirement create for it.

A more striking proof for the narrow one inner relationship of the colonization program with the They were GPOs already quoted guidelines Backes.28 [1] In them fought - in full accordance with Göring's program 28 [2] and, How in this, under largely foregoing ideological cloaking, but rather with ice-cold calculation - direct economic interests of the leaders financial capitalist Circle down:

- the creation of European agricultural self-sufficiency Costs of the USSR (Ukraine or southern Russia), which seemed indispensable to these circles for the worldwide continuation of the war against the Anglo-Americans, but which also occurred in peacetime through cheaper food about wage pressure and Dumping invaluable promised profit benefits;
-, the availability of inexhaustible raw material resources (primarily agricultural and forestry raw materials, petroleum, iron and steel, manganese, light metal);

279 *KTB of OKW,* Vol. 2/1, Frankfurt a. M. 1963, S. 669, Entry v. September 2, 1942.

280 See also *volume I,* p. 238ff. In Göring's guidelines from 11/8 _ 1941 was the destruction of the metropolitan Population in the same barbaric Callousness announced:
"The urban population can only eat very small amounts of food receive. For the big cities (Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev) nothing at all can be done for the time being. The resulting consequences are harsh but unavoidable." *(Eichlwltz,* Göring's Guidelines, p. 93).

281 See note 271. - This kinship was already personified in Backe himself, who was under the authority of the Representatives for the Four-year plan (Goering) Agriculture and food economy in Germany and largely also in the occupied territories and at the same time - as SS group leader - was on good terms with Himmler ("our friend Backe"). Significant was a report from the German News bureaus (DNB) from the
24. 7. 1942; afterwards "State Secretary Backe, in agreement with the Reichsführer SS, Heinrich Himmler, the Head of office in the staff headquarters of Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of Germans ethnicity, SS Oberführer Prof. Dr. Konrad Meyer, for "Planning officer for the settlement and rural reorganization appointed to the Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture, the Reich Director for Agricultural Policy and the Reich Farmer Leader" (ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, Movie 19619, personnel file cheek). To the multiple personal union between RKF and Reich Ministry for Nutrition and agricultural. also *Buchheim,*
p. 237 f. (not without an apologetic tendency regarding the attitude of the ministry mentioned); further *Koehl,* RKFDV, p. 164.

282 The three most important documents that contain Göring's program are the "Green Folder" from June 1941 *(Barbarossa case,* doc. 112, p. 363ff.), Göring's decree v. July 27, 1941 *(occupation, robbery, destruction,* Doc. 76, p. 178ff.) and the so-called Bergmann Protocol the Meeting v. 8th. **11.** 1941 *(Eichholtz,* Die Guidelines Göring, p. 83 ff.).

- the disposal of millions of (forced) workers for difficult and monotonous work (agriculture, raw materials industry, construction industry);
- the development of an unprecedentedly large sales market for German industrial finished products, which had to generate unrivaled high profits, especially when the Soviet manufacturing industry was largely eliminated (agricultural machinery and equipment, artificial fertilizer, industrial consumer goods, armament, vehicles etc.). [283] This concept was correct absolutely agreed with the GPO and had his “safety” concept for direct Requirement.

If the political intentions in their consequence - Extermination and agrarianization - economic Interests to thwart threatened or thwarted, this was a contradiction that was ultimately insoluble for the German imperialists and was based on their war program and their fascist system of rule. It was “the fundamental contradiction between the ruling fascist-imperialist clique and the peoples that broke out, here in the form of the contradiction between the world rulers and exploitation plans and the political possibilities of the German imperialists" [284] in the age of transition from capitalism to socialism .

Mirrored the GPO in racial idcological Concealment one - politically dominant - extreme annexationist line in the German Big bourgeoisie reflected, so he had accordingly also critic within this Class. Wider circles, including also annexationistcr forces, finally caught the critical mood in the Autumn 1942, as the summer offensive the Wehrmacht itself stuck had, and with Sharpness sat the discussion around the Key points of the GPO according to the defeat from Stalingrad a. At you involved itself military, Representative of financial capital, leading fascist politicians and higher Officer, Nazi scientist and writer. [285]

In the spring of 1943 A whole series of memorandums openly called for, with widespread agreement, to restrict the "Germanization" policy and to use the "old methods of colonial policy and imperialism "Expansion" that can be given up "if necessary still compared to the Negroes Africa and Australia" [286], but not more on dem

283 Backe had expressly demanded that southern Russia “must get its industrial consumer goods from Germany or from Europe". "Russian competition in the forest zone must therefore fall" *(World domination in sight,* doc. 126, p. 298). Gauleiter Erich Koch, the "Reich Commissioner for Ukraine", was still holding June 1943 stated that the future of Ukraine lay, on the one hand, in its “settlement possibilities” but, on the other hand, in being “for Europe... a first-order sales country create" *(Dallin,* S. 175). The connection between agricultural settlement in the East and the creation of sales markets for the German Industry was already there in 1928 Hitler: Finish it "in most generous Wise our lack of space people in the East", so need it “no longer his country offspring as factory workers in the big cities to push", but can him settle “as free farmers on their own land” and thus become “an internal market for German industry open up, the she slow from the raging Battle and the Scramble for the so-called place at the Sun can withdraw and remove from the rest of the world" (*Hitler's Second Book,* S. 218f.) See also *Hitler,* Monologues, p. 331, p. 334 (6. 8th, 8th 8. 1942).

284 *Tape, I,* S. 10.

285 For discussions and modifications of the general war aim program since autumn 1942, see. *Nestler;* further *DZW,* Vol. 2, pp. 421f.; Vol. 3, p. 337ff., p. 409ff.

286 *Eichholtz,* „Ways to De-Bolshevization ... ", S. 33 (Riedl memorandum).

soil of Europe" [287] could apply. The “settlement goals” should be “set in such a way that at an optimum *new* People's soil as few peoples as possible are affected by them and are therefore in contrast to us and we can be all the more certain of the friendship of the others (Poles against us, Ukrainians for us)".288 Now "the achievement of short-term goals important to the war effort should not be made impossible by propagating limitless settlement goals".289 Most detailed argued against the "Germanization" plans of the former Austrian politician and old fascist Richard Riedl, board member and honorary member of the Central European Business Day, member of the trade policy committee of the Reich Chamber of Commerce, chairman and member of the supervisory board of corporate companies etc., in his Memorandum above the "Russian Question" from March 1943.290

The military ones events at the German-Soviet front had Alles this one reviews and suggestions however already a long time ago the substance withdrawn. The Stalingrader Battle had the GPO like everyone else variants imperialist strategy of conquest rendered obsolete. Found the first Measures his practical execution in the essentially in spring 1943 her End, so became the planning himself approximately around the same Time set. When Meyer asked Himmler about continuing his work on the "General Settlement Plan", replied Himmler: „Yes, I reflect me. The lies on my work table. I think already at this Things." 291

In the Did, Himmler, whose apparatus directly with dem Resistance the subjugated peoples and who faced the difficulties of df's plan to oppress Europe, so concrete and full How no one andcrrn presented, [292] let itself not of that dissuade, until last on the “Germanization” strategy of GPO to set. Stubborn held he in particular at dem already in the spring 1943 failed plan firmly, in the district Lublin and in adjacent Galicia “the eastern border areas General gouvernementes as first with one German Population to provided". [2] 93 Beginning July came he - in Expectation one new offensive success the Wehrmacht - with Governor General Hans Frank agree, „until Beginning of year 1944 the colonization of circle

287 B.A Koblenz, R 6/60a, Memorandum “24 theses to Location" by Theodore Oberlander, 15. 3. 1943.

288 Ibid. The At the same time, the CEO of the Hibernia Group made the same argument, Wilhelm Tengelmann, a narrow one Friend Görings, before: “Den Poland become we never for us win, the Ukrainians need we" (ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 727, BI. 102, Doc. Pleiger-465, memorandum "Experiences out of dem Work use the Foreign peoples in Ruhr mining, taking into account the conditions at the Hibernia mining company stock corporation, Herne", May 1, 1943).

289 *World domination in the visor,* Doc. 146, S. 354, study from Oberlander v. June 1943.

290 How Note, 286.

291 *Addendum to the Documentation "General Plan East",* in *VfZ,* 1/1960, p. 119 (without exact Date : „April 1943"); *Bezymensky,* S. 84, gives as source therefor one File note by SS-Obersturmbannführer Brandt (Personal Staff RFSS) v. 10. 6. 1943 via a message from Meyer (to Brandt?) v. 15. 5. 1943.

292 In Bad Schachen he commented on this to his audience: “Where we have occupied a country, people don't like us. It's strange that people don't like us ... " *(IMG,* Vol. 37, Doc. L-070, p. 499, speech by October 14, 1943 before Wehrmacht orders hatern). The The following after *Eichholtz,* “Great Germanic Rich" and “General plan East", S. 839f.

293 *Eichholtz,* General plan East, S. 272, Doc. 13 (Himmler at Hans Frank, 3. 7. 1943).

Zamosc and the Germanization of the old Hanseatic city of Lublin".294 The second phase of the "Aktion Zamosc" (June to August 1943), which had already begun, had almost exclusively the character of a "pacification operation" in view of the extensive resistance of the population, especially the partisan resistance. The Red Army's offensive on the entire central and southern front ultimately exposed the fascists' "settlement problem." completely obsolete.

Analyzed man Himmler's Talk out of of the following Time, of autumn 1943 until Beginning In 1945, when he was after Hitler the was the most powerful political representative of the regime, So the question of the "ultimate goal" of the war recurred in them, which was always formulated in the same way as threefold: The first goal was to push back the borders of "Greater Germany" and thus the " ethnic border" by 500 kilometers to the east announced. This was that is apparently a more modest Claim as the one in 1942/beginning of 1943 in the latest versions of the GPO raised, but still aimed the “Germanization” at least the Baltic Soviet republics, entirely of Poland and the western parts of Belarus and Ukraine as “ "Volkstumsbrücke" to Southeast Europe.

“The second big task that we are given,” Himmler announced, “is winning and the Incorporate the Germanic peoples, the Norwegians, Danes, Dutch and Flemish, into the Germanic Empire. If we do this 25, 30 Millions of our best blood body of the people add can, this 25 until 30 Millions, the brothers and Sisters of ours race and ours blood are then enlarge we the Base ours people from
90 on around 120 Million." 29 5 This both Goals reached, would it to the Realization
of third go, at the "Reorganization" of “German Germanic world empire" 2 96, including the rest Europe.

Still declared on August 3, 1944 Himmler all of these Goals for “immovable”. Far in
front of the Settlement boundary must the “defense limit” pushed become; the air force must
„in the East - speak let's take it easy - at the Ural stand". Because for the “future air war" be a “Wiggle room from 2000, 3000 km" necessary.2 97

This at least until in the second half of year 1944 into it represented line proved given of course of war as utopia, as blanker Craziness. politics and ideology of the had fascist leaders itself to this one time opposite the class interests monopoly bourgeoisie, those she sprung were, in essential areas has already hardened and become independent to such an extent that serious contradictions exist within the ruling Class broke up, the at the 20. July 1944 open character assumptions. But it can even no Doubt to it consist, that it that Ceterum censeo the most reactionary and aggressive elements of finance capital remained to eliminate the socialist order in the USSR and to liquidate the resistance of the Soviet people through the “extermination of Bolshevism”.

294 Ibid.
295 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 4141, speech Himmler's v. 24. 5. 1944 (in Sonthofen before generals).
296 Ibid, Movie 3361, speech v. 25. 7. 1944 (in Grafenwoehr before officers).
297 Ibid, speech v. 3. 8th. 1944 (in poses before imperial and Gauleiters).

2. Studies to Economic policy the Occupiers m the occupied areas the USSR

a} steel and Money (Dnepr-Donec region)

In The second August half fell in 1941 Krivoy Rog with his iron ore and Nikopol with his significant Manganese ore deposits in the hand more fascist Troops. On the 25th. In August the Red Army surrendered Dnepropetrovsk. In mid-October the German offensive units invaded into the Donec area. There they were in the course of the brought to a standstill in the next few weeks. In the south, SS troops took Rostov on November 21st, but the Soviet Southern Front threw she in the Course of their Counteroffensive until Again at the beginning of December at the Mius back. The The front was closed at this point through the middle of the industrial area, from Donec east of Slavjansk via Krasnyj Luc along the Mius to Taganrog on the Sea of Azov. It was not until July 1942 that the Wehrmacht entered this section back on the offensive at.

The part of the district occupied in the fall of 1941 remained under fascist rule for almost two years (October 1941-September 1943), the 1942 occupied eastern part only half a year (July 1942-February 1943), the northern part of 298 over a year (July 1942-:September 1943). Over the Donec basin as They had everything German imperialists, that is just one half **Year,** namely from July 1942 until February 1943, however more as two Years about the industrial cities in the Dnieper bend and two and a half years about Nikopol and Krivoy Rog (until February 1944).

For the close integration of economic, military and political interests of warfare and war aim policy German imperialism and The fascist occupation provides primary importance **for** his war program of Dnepr-Donec industrial region resounding Proof.

On this huge one industrial area dem continent only that Ruhr area comparable, had since Summer 1941 the German Monopolies concrete Expectations Registered. It was intended to provide them primarily with manganese and iron ore. The Upper Silesian mining companies for example considered it as her future "Foreshore", d. H. as Raw material- and Supplementary room. [2 99] Later, after the defeat before Moscow, wanted man it to one immediate source of economic aid first Make ranks for the aggressor's armies. Already in the Dnieper arch was that Image that the conquerors offered, for her not very encouraging.

Through Blasting and through Fire were the conveyor systems and electrical Installations of mining in Krivoy Rog and in Nikopol destroyed or difficult been damaged. The main machinery and Aggregates had punctual into the Inner the Soviet Union transported away become can. So were missing in 13 huge huts, steel, rolling and tube works of Dnieper region from 26400 Electric motors 23850,300 The great Dnepr power station was blown up; in the dam gaped one breach from 190 m wide and 18 m deep.301

One more huge disappointment expected the intruders, as she the western

298 The Area approximately between Slavyansk, west Vorosilovgrad (Lugansk) and Krasnyj Luc.

299 *tape **I,*** S. 204f.

300 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 722, BI. 19, Doc. Pleiger-201, Travel report from Küttner u. Stick about “The Iron industry in the Dnieper bend", November 1941.

301 *Zagorul'ko/Judenkw,* S. 108.

Part of Donec district “largely destroyed”302 found. Here was it the Soviet defenders managed to systematically prepare and carry out evacuation and destruction more completely than in the Dnieper area. There is, the mining representative reported to the South Economic Inspectorate Stalino, "not a single mine, the immediate bar - even in the presence of energy - would be operational",30 3 The reports of the group experts, the, hurriedly into the uniform of “special leaders” and “War Administration Councils” (KVR), inspecting mines and factories, sometimes still under fire, directly behind the front line took, confirmed this. 304

The Economic Inspection South or the BHO305 initially had their hands full to do with a minimum of coal for the most basic needs of manganese ore mining and transport and the Troop to procure. Still until End 1942 covered extensive coal deliveries out of Upper Silesia the Requirement "approximately until to Dnieper line" 306 and not only put a strain on the German coal balance, but above all on the already extremely tense transport situation in the south of the front most sensitive. They attacked further east Occupiers initially on the Coal dumps back. „The own Financial support (in the Donec basin - DE) only reached a significant level towards the end of 1942 , around 20,000 tons, equal to 10 percent of Russia's Financial support." 307

The Water- and Coal-fired power plants of Dnepr-Donec region were as well sustainable

302 *Halder,* Vol. 3, S. 278 (Entry ex. 10. 10.-3. 11. 1941).

303 Report No. 2 of the Special Representative for Mining of the South Economic Inspectorate, 13. 11. 1941; quote according to *Riedel, Matthias,* mining and ironworks industry in the Ukraine under German occupation (1941-1944), in *VfZ,* 3/1973, p. 256. For the South Economic Inspection see *Müller,* Wehrmacht and Occupation, P. 91f., p. 144 f.

304 BA Koblenz, R 13 1/1141 to 1143 u. 1147. - Sometimes the experts (listed below) recognized this reluctantly at, „that already the older mixed Metallurgical works the Eastern Ukraine need not shy away from a comparison with similar German plants and that the new plants began to become very serious competition for the iron-making industries of all other countries as far as their planning and technical equipment are concerned." (ibid., No. 1141, Wesemann report).

First Reports German Corporate professionals above the mining industry in the Ukraine 1941:

Author	reporting period	subject
KVR Dr. George Bulle (Gutehoffnungshütte)	23. Aug. to 15. Sept. 1941	Ironworks and mines in western Ukraine (Dnieper Bend)
KVR Dr. Carl Küttner (specialist group Stainless steel/ Flick Group) u. KVR Plug	Sept./Nov. 1941	"The Iron industry in the Dnieper bend"
KVR Dr. Ulrich Faulhaber (iron-making business group Industry)	Oct. 1941	Dnieper lnd ustry area
KVR Dr. Fritz Wesemann (Maxhütte/Flick Group)	Oct./Nov. 1941	“The Ironworks of eastern Ukraine"

305 To BHO S. 412 ff. - Since March 1942 managed the BHO the Hard coal mining in the Donec district itself (ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 417, BI. 187, doc. NI-4332, BHO work report for 1942, Dec. 1942/Jan. 1943).

306 Ibid, No. 722, BI. 63, Doc. Pleiger-208, Aff. Hans Nail, April 17, 1948.

307 Ibid.

destroyed like the coal mining facilities, so that a serious virtuous circle arose: there was a lack of electrical energy to put the coal mines back into operation , especially the flooded ones to pump out pits; the chronic lack of Coal again worsened the energy balance further.

The military setback') since November 1941, The extensive destruction, the ongoing, comprehensive active and passive resistance of the Soviet population and the extraordinary organizational and transport difficulties in the industrial area, which was largely still in the middle of the operational area, sobered up the ruling circles. The zeal of the corporate powerhouses weakened, and they increasingly tended to let the Wehrmacht and the authorities clear away these difficulties, initially without extensive use of their own forces and resources. Their immediate interest increasingly focused on ruthlessly transporting ores and other raw materials, especially manganese, to Germany. They demanded urgently further the return of the specialists who had been sent to the East in large numbers. At a meeting of the Eastern Economic Management Staff on December 18 , 1941 chaired by Paul Körner explained it those present therefore for necessary, "the "to release the forces withdrawn from German industry for the Eastern mission back home to the greatest possible extent", including primarily the senior specialists.308

In the form of the BHO, under the given circumstances - although not smoothly - a developed form of state monopoly control over the wealth and resources of the mining area in the conquered Soviet territory, combined with concentrated regulatory power that was based on the strongest use of the power of the fascist state. Through the chairman of its administrative board, State Secretary Paul Körner, the BHO was closely linked to the name and political prestige of Göring, and as his deputy, Körner was responsible for both the commissioner's business for the Four-year plan and headed the Eastern Economic Management Staff. Paul Pleiger ruled society since its inception - initially under the name of a managing director - a particularly unscrupulous and experienced confidant of the German coal magnates, who served as chairman of the mining company the Reichswerke "Hermann Göring" as Chairman the RVK and as Reich Commissioner for Coal already had considerable state monopoly power and also had close, direct connections to leading representatives of the party, state and Wehrmacht [309] . On the 10th In January 1942, Göring appointed Pleiger "Reich Commissioner for Coal in the Occupied Territories." [310] and thereby expanding his powers the entire sphere of power Hitler's Germany out of.

Of course smuggle the Corporations selected Manager and Confidants in the decisive positions the BHO. The authoritative Employees the BHO, the in Berlin or directly at Location and Job, in Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporoz'e and Stalino,

308 Ibid, No. 416, Bl. 188, Doc. EC-38 M, "From the Chief Wi Staff East on the 23rd 2. 44 approved structure for the collection of materials on the history of the Wi Stab Ost", February 21, 1944 (here: minutes of the meeting of the Economic Management Staff East from 18. 12. 1941).

309 Of Pleiger's "closest" connections to Wehrmacht Major General mentioned Hans Nagel, at the time boss the Economic Inspection South, "especially (those) with dem Quartermaster General Wagner, the general Stapf (1942-1944 boss of the East Economic Staff - D. E.) and the South Economic Inspectorate" (ibid., No. 722, p. 66, Doc. Pleiger-208, Aff. Nagel, April 17, 1948).

310 B.A Koblenz, R 10 VIII/3 (after *Riedel,* S. 261).

were active, had previously important Post in the leading ones corporations and Associations of the German mining industry. In many cases, as heads of war administration, they had the rank of general. The mining division was headed by Erich Winnacker, who had already been a member of the board of directors in the 1930s of Austrian, significantly from the Alpine Montan Group, which was controlled by the United Steel Works and later majorized by the Reichswerke Group. Winnacker was also the head of the Mining group in the economic inspection South. Responsible for the metallurgical sector Group experts such as Peter Lillig, iron expert from the Röchling Group, and Herbert Monden, previously in leading position in the Upper Silesian mining industry (Oberhütten Group). Heinrich Korschan, board member of the Krupp Group, represented the Krupp cannon dynasty.

A particularly exposed one The role was played by Walter Tengelmann from the known The von Montanstarkigen family, members since 1930, later chairman of the board of Essener Steinkohlenbergwerke AG (Flick/United Steelworks). Reactivated during the war, he was in monopoly and military circles generally as " Captain Tengelmann". Im In the summer of 1940 he had already worked as the "OKW-WiRüAmt representative for the ore mines in Lorraine". [311] At the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union, the Ruhr magnates launched him - surely not without protection Göring, the with his Brother Wilhelm Tengelmann (Hibernia) was a close friend - into a key function. In the first months after the Wehrmacht's invasion of the Dnepr-Donec region, the so-called group Tengelmann (also: command Tengelmann) as military association of the "Special Representative for Mining of the Economic Inspectorate South" - even Tengel manns - employed. She followed on the heels of the fighting troops and had with regard to the USSR's mining industry, the same predatory order and similar military powers and Command powers like the Petroleum Commandos in the oil field.

In the Practice behaved it itself so, that Tengelmann as the Special Representative the host

inspection of the Tengelmann Group the necessary command authority provided. End of 1941 had itself the condition has become naturalized that officers of the Special Representative dozens of the "at the Tengelmann group Do service".3 [12] The core of the group consisted of qualified people cadres and Loot specialists.

Core inventory the "Group Tengelmann" End 1941 [31 3]

45 Academics out of dem Mining
2 academics dem Metallurgy
3 Academics out of dem mechanical engineering
14 technicians (Mechanical engineering school or technical
educational institution) 50 miners (advanced class)
24 Miners (upper class)

The Tengelmann group was there before any other interested parties. The leading ones Corporations received crucial information first hand. The unit provided services for the BHO Preliminary exploration and preparatory work.

In the Connection with the appointment Pleigers for the Reich representative for the coal in the occupied areas went out in the January 1942 the function of mentioned special

311 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 8290, Report Tengelmanns at WiRüAmt, July 21, 1940.
312 Ibid, Movie 3964, Attachment e.g. report d. deputy Special Representative for Mining the South Economic Inspection v. January 4, 1942.
313 Ibid.

commissioned for mining, and the group Tengelmann took over after of their Reorganization into the "Technical Battalion 26 (mot) Mining" (TB 26) largely his powers. The TB 26 consisted of an extensive battalion staff and three companies; "Experts" in special leader uniforms could be added to him as "reinforcement" at any time.314 His team was made up of military reconnaissance and security troops, police and SS units, secret service agents, pioneers and miners. His received technical instructions it from the BHO, the to this purpose a special connection point set up. Moreover was A BHO "working staff" was attached to the battalion, consisting of Tengelmann himself as battalion commander and three others Corporate experts consisted.315

The military subordinate relationships were complicated and probably controversial. In one Draft for the Battalion operational orders from the beginning 1942 it said, it be "the Economic Inspection South assumed" 316 ; but was here one Deletion before taken and for it "1. "Tank Army" has been added - that fascist elite connected, de.ssen determination it already at the offensive of the previous year had been the front and center of the Soviet Union's most coveted economic wealth Violence bring to. The TB 26 was a Troop unit of army. His Tasks - "Security", reconstruction and continuation of mining and iron metallurgy eastward of Dnepr and of Dnieper arch the "overall plan" of the BHO 317 - asked him the large corporations, in individual cases probably internally and directly, in general and official about Economic Management Staff East, Economic Staff East and BHO.

First while the Preparation The fascist summer offensive of 1942 resulted in new, long-term plans for the Dnieper-Donec region The aim was to significantly redesign the production structure in the entire industrial area. In Hitler's directive No. 41 dated 5. April 1942 318 became as main goal the offensive the "Breakthrough in the Caucasus Space" 319 and to Stalingrad. There were at least 1,200 to Baku km to cover. This meant around two and a half thousand kilometers to the German border, so that is tremendous Supply and transport problems had to arise.

This should be remedied. A very extensive production program was created for Ammunition, the in the Ukraine generated become should, the so-called Ivan program. "In the Ukraine should size Ammunition manufacturing raised become", so agreed Hitler and Minister Speer on 14/15. April 1942. 320 On this occasion, Speer requested extensive powers for the occupied Soviet territories: "The technical questions in the occupied eastern territories (road construction, waterways, energy supply and military buildings) should as well as in planning How in execution central from mean Departments planned and executed become." 321 He noted further for the planned Ammunition program: „The existing Factories with new Machinery, this

314 Ibid, "Service instructions for the commander of Technical battalion 26 (mot) mining", n.d. (probably beginning February 1942).
315 Ibid., "Special arrangement for the deployment of the 26th Technical Battalion {mot) mining in Area the Army Group South", n.d. (drafts v. February 1942).
316 Ibid.
317 Ibid, "Service instructions ... " (How Note 314).
318 *The second World War.* Documents, S. 153ff.
319 Ibid, S. 154.
320 FB, 14th/15th 4. 1942, Point 19.
321 Ibid, Point 17.

but in a primitive design without consideration on waste in place and workers. The establishment of ammunition production and all associated operations Industry should be independent of the Reich Minister for the East (meaning Alfred Rosenberg - DE) in direct traffic happened." 322

This decision added in the major military strategic concept and in the planning of war objectives the German imperialists, to their realization the should serve as a summer offensive. It was about the creation of a large arms center in Ukraine, halfway to the Caucasus, the Persian Gulf and India. The consultations with spear about this inspired Hitler's imagination so much that he im His confidants discussed the plan for a "four-track" railway line between Upper Silesia and the Donec basin discussed that a track width of four meters have and

on which, in addition to freight traffic, double-decker express trains run at one speed of 200 km/h should travel. 323 “Just be like that possible, the eastern area - especially economically - to open up in this way, like it ours plans." 324

On the 22nd Finally, on May 1, Göring authorized Speer as GB Rüst to initiate the “manufacture of military equipment” on Soviet territory. “For this purpose, GB Rüst receives the direct right of disposal over the production facilities it has designated.” “Efficient companies from the Reich were to be used as sponsor companies” in Soviet companies become.325

The weeks until for the beginning the Summer offensive passed away with soundings of Reich ministers for armaments and ammunition, the Wehrmacht, the BHO and the armaments companies regarding the !\Possibility, in the Ukraine "one Ammunition manufacturing biggest

scope to discharge the Home industry to raise".3 26 Hermann Röchling, Before seater the RVE, received at the 18. June from Goering the appointment as “Reich representative for iron and steel in the occupied Gcbid" 327 , the the position from Pleiger in the

coal economy corresponded. He assigned this function to the “Eastern Territories” (and the Netherlands) his deputy Walter Raw land.328

At the 28. .June arranged Hitler "for the quick Reconstruction" the Coal mining in the Donecgc offers “a series of special measures”. 3 29 The order was issued at the beginning of July 1942 Speers to Edmund Geilenberg, in Dnieper-Donec region the “To explore the possibility of starting ammunition production soon and to draw up a smelting plan.”3 3 0 Geilenbcrg was officially appointed Speer's "Representative for Ammunition Production in Ukraine."

322 Ibid, Point 19.
323 *picker,* S. 299f., Table talk v. 27. 4. 1942.
324 Just that. 300. - *Schramm* misinterprets these omissions in his detailed foreword (ibid., p. 91). Hitler's under Disregard of the connections as a “waking dream”.
325 ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, film 19467, AO of the BfV "above the Manufacturing from weapons and ammunition and the expansion the energy industry in the occupied one Eastern areas", 22. 5. 1942; *Occupation, Robbery, destruction,* p. 228!., Doc. 91.
326 ZStA Potsdam, Fall XI, No. 722, BI. 50, Doc. Pleiger-204, “Excerpts out of the war diary of the Eastern Economic Staff", entry dated May 31, 1942.
327 Ibid, FS, Movie 10608, Decree Göring, 18. 6. 1942.
328 Ibid, Rs. Röchlings, 20. 11. 1942.
329 B.A Koblenz, R 41/270, Hitler decree v. 12. 10. 1942 regarding “Reconstruction the Mineral oil industry in Caucasus".
330 How Note 326 (p. 51, Entry from the July 9, 1942).

In this way, the ammunition minister built together with his large industrial mentors and the professionals of the Defense companies one special state monopoly organization for the large ammunition project. They viewed the BHO as just one of several instruments they used to carry it out. They perceived the bureaucratic and tight consolidation of heavy industry in the occupied Soviet territory, especially the metallurgical and iron processing works, in the BHO as a significant obstacle to the development of the initiative of the large corporations - i.e. for the protection of their own profit interests -, which is the basis for them of success was. The Corporations himself wanted and should the actual to be the carrier of the "lwan program", behind which there was the greatest urgency; namely, that was to say all-round state aid, faster Success and higher Profit secured.

At the 4. June 1942 stirred spear Hitler to the already mentioned "leader's opinion" at, "that he (Hitler - DE) does not want monopoly companies in the East, but rather that private initiative should be involved."331 This statement was certainly given priority on the "lwan program" or on the Iron- and steel industry Ukraine obtained. On it also indicates a "remark" Walther Schiebers, which took place at the beginning of May Conversation between Slider and Flick fell; thereafter existed already to this Time

"the plan ... to loosen up the previous monopoly character of the mining and smelting company. At least want man on dem Area the Armaments industry for larger areas separate G1 large corporations out of Germany as Care companies pull in." 332

In any case, the Soviet ones in question were de facto Over the course of the following months, armaments plants were largely removed from the BHO's direct control and transferred to the German ones by the dozen through a system of so-called sponsorships Arms companies "distributed".

Corporations such as Flick, Krupp, Mannesmann, Reichswerke "Hermann Göring", Vereinigte Stahlwerke and Gutehoffnungshütte took a direct part in this "new regulation in the Ukrainian coal and steel industry" 333 · In turn - like at the beginning of the war against the USSR - The greed and jealousy of competition on the part of large corporations made waves. The Soviet one Iron and steel industry from Dnepr to the Volga stood now, in the summer/autumn of 1942, for "distribution"; in view of the initial successes of the fascists The Stalingrad factories were even "distributed" on the offensive.334

On November 3rd In 1942 Pleiger signed the "Principles for the Leadership from Sponsored companies of the Berg- und Hüttenwerksgesellschaft Ost mb H. (BH0)". 335 The regulations contained in this document were a compromise between the various, sometimes diverging interests of the BHO and the Ministry of Munitions, the state Institutions and the Corporations. According to the fascist definition, the Soviet mining industry remained a "special economic asset of the German Reich". The BHO remained the overall trustee of this asset. It also took over all the financing of the development of the companies, especially the investments. "The sponsorship is a Escrow order the BHO at the Godparents." (§ 1) The "sponsored business"

331 FB, 4. 6. 1942, Point 34; please refer S. 416f.

332 *case 5,* S. 160, Doc. NI-1697, AT ex. Discuss between Flick, Burkart u. slider, 6. 5. 1942.

333 Ibid, S. 275ff., Doc. NI-3680, AT from Küttner for Flick, August 6, 1942.

334 Ibid, S. 274 f., Doc. NI-3664, AT Flicks ex. Discuss with Pleiger, 13. 7. 1942. - Compare there against the evil apologetics in *Riedel,* p. 269ff.

335 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 417, Bl. 173H., Doc. NL-3689 (A); hereafter also d. The following.
Please refer also *Anatomy of war,* S. 411, Doc. 217.

was, it went on to say, "neither legally nor economically part of the home business." The godfather ran the business "in the name and for Invoice from the BHO" (§ 10) However, the last paragraph weighed heavily in favor of the "godparents": " The BHO will work to ensure that the sponsor is involved in the final settlement of the ownership of the industrial companies in the occupied eastern territories in accordance with his cooperation in the development the one there Business taken into account becomes." (§ 23) Alone just the fact that you added such a paragraph, cast a significant light on the complicated one Constellation of interests and on previous ones Conflicts.

The The Flick Group brought the largest heavy industrial complexes, the Reichswerke Group and dn Krupp Group itself. The Mitteldeutsche Stahlwerke AG (Flick Group) and the Reichswerke AG for mining and smelting companies "Hermann Göring" were founded Jointly at the end of 1942 the Dnjepr-Stahl GmbH, a "sponsored company" in which Flick was given the leadership. [336] While the Stahlwerke Braunschweig GmbH, a group company of the Reichswerke, when dividing the loot primarily the works in Zaporoz'e received, ,,where ammunition production "was essentially to be raised," Flick took it upon himself to "look after the entire iron-making side,"33 [7] and took control of the large one Steel, rolling and Tubeworks in the Space Dnepropetrovsk

Krupp settled in Mariupol (Zdanov), where he several large, less took over the badly damaged steel and rolling mills, and also placed his hand on the new machine factory in Kramatorsk. The list of "patent companies" also included a large number of other German companies Defense companies. In March 1943 one put on one meeting drs Board of Directors of the BHO states, that "everything that is available" has now been awarded in terms of "sponsorships". standc". [338] (table 110)

The reconstruction of heavy industry in the Dncpr-Doncc-Gcbict was for the German imperialists difficult, complex and ultimately hopeless An undertaking with which they were also busy at a time of the heaviest fighting in the south of the German-Soviet front (summer 1942 to spring 1943). For the "Iwan program" almost all machines had to be ordered in Germany and delivered from there. The repair of the power plants and the reopening of the coal mines also new machines, electric motors, Turbines and aggregates required Large German companies took over like the AEG, which was responsible for the recommissioning of the Dnepr power plant near Zaporoz'e, and the Deutsche Bergwerks- und Hütt<'Il Baugesellschaft mbH (Reichswerke Group). The BHO's investments for this purposes made according to various estimates from those involved a B<•trag between 100 and 200 **million RM** out.339

Similar to in the case the refinery plants for the Caucasian petroleum used them Here too, German imperialists expressed the willingness of circles of the French and Belgian bourgeoisie to "cooperate" in the occupied Soviet territories, which they did if necessary also with massive political pressure and by confiscation. The BHO and the with her associated German Monopolies realized 1942 you guys

336 *case 5,* S. 283f., Document NI-3666, AT v. Küttner f. Flick, 26. 10. 1942; ibid, p. 28t,, Doc. Nl-5289, AN Flicks ex. Telephone with Pleiger, **11/11/1942** .

337 Ibid, S. 283.

338 Just that. 280, Document NI-3660, Prot. Flicks about d. meeting d. Board of Directors of the BHO, March 31, 1943. Another protocol about this meeting in: ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 417, p. 205ff. (212), Document NI-5261.

339 Ibid, different Affid. (Nail, slider, II. Kuhlmann).

Table 110
„ directory the sponsor companies" the BHO, was standing End 1942/Beginning 1943 (Selection)

"Patent company"	Soviet Operation
Dnjepr-Stahl GmbH	hut "Dzerzinskij" in Dneprodzerzinsk (Kamenskoye) wagon factory "Pravda" in Dneprodzerzinsk
	"Petrovskij" smelter at Dnepropetrovsk
	plant "Lenin" in Dnepropetrovsk
	Coke chemical plant "Kalinin" in Dnepropetrovsk plant DSMO in Dnepropetrovsk
	hut "Liebknecht" in Niznedneprovsk
	factories "Comintern" **1-111** in Niznedneprovsk plant "Artern" in Niznedneprovsk
Reich works "Hermann Göring"	plant "Zaporozstal"' in Zaporoz'e
steelworks Braunschweig GmbH (Reichswerke Group)	factory "Molotov" in Dnepropetrovsk
Fried. Croup AG	
	hut Zaporoz'e
	"Azovstal" cottages I and II in Mariupol'
	pipe factory "Kujbysev" in Mariupol' plant
United Steel mills AG	"Il'ic" in Mariupol'
Mannesmannrohren-Werke AG	(New) "Stalin" machine factory in Kramatorsk
	"Kirov" factory in Makeevka
Hoesch AG	"Andreev" smelter in Taganrog
Gutehoffnungshütte AG	pipe plant Taganrog
	Hut Krivoj Rog Ilütte
	Kramatorsk (Old)
Klöckner works AG	Machine factory
Dortmund-Hörder Hut Association	"Ordzonikidze" in Kramatorsk Hut
AG Dortmunder Union Bridge Construction AG	"Frunze" in Konstantinovka Hut Stalino
	hut "Ordzonikidze" in Enakievo (Rykovo) Hut
Siemens Schuckertwerke AG	Stalino (steel construction department)
	plant Rucenkovo (partial)
Brown, Boveri & Cie. AG	manufacturing company in
Dynamite Nobel AG	Stalino
Westphalian-Anhalt	plant "Vorosilov" in Dnepropetrovsk (partial) hut
explosives AG (Wasag)	Zaporoz'e (as "sub-godfather")

Source: ZStA Potsdam, Case XI, No. 722, BI. 106ff., Doc. Pleiger-214, Appendix 6 ("List of sponsor companies") e.g. Work report the BHO for the Year 1942, January 1943.

Plan, see valuable facilities for the reconstruction of the Dnepr-Donec region, especially heavy ones roller train motors, „out of disused \Vcrken the iron creating Industry in the occupied Belgian and French territories". "The military commander's help," it was said in the Work report the BHO for that In 1942, "this was achieved partly through negotiations with the French government, partly through confiscation". 340

The BHO and the "sponsor companies" could itself not only on the resources of German

340 Ibid, case XI, No. 417, BI. 198 (f.), Doc. NI-4332, Work report the BHO for the year 1942, Jan. 1943 (excerpt).

and occupied European hinterland and on the sustainable Help the central planning, of Ministry of Ammunition and another more central Institutions support, but they also enjoyed preferential rights with the Wehrmacht leadership and occupation authorities. Pioneer-, Building- and other Special teams the Wehrmacht as well as Front units the OT became **for** her purposes assigned. Himself numerous Generals stood directly in theirs Service: „The Hut management Ukraine became, as well as the other BHO administrations, the in the Ukraine employed were, several Generals to Support assigned, e.g. B. the Generals from Rüdt and Breithaupt. Her task was it, opposite the military and civil German Place the Possibility of effect the Mountain hut East in reasonable senses to strengthen." 341

The Soviet one Population provided that German intruders a daily struggle around every Ton of coal and every kilogram Metal. In the Donecrevier Conspiratorial groups that disguised themselves as collaborators worked with particular success and Post in the Occupation administration clothed. „The illegal Group, those in the conductive German organs for the Use of the Donec Basin's businesses had an effect their people in many German Business centers, in works and pits. The illegals gained the trust of the Hitler fascists, organized acts of diversion and thwarted the restoration work on a large scale. They prepared the technical documentation so that the most seriously damaged factories and mines should be restored as a priority. As a result, the Occupants wasted significant resources and time. However, companies, mines, workshops and aggregates that required insignificant repairs were declared unrecoverable. In this way, e.g. b. the Zuyevo power plant, one of the largest in the Donets basin, for 'unusable' found."342

Despite their best efforts, despite cruel terror, the occupiers only managed to gradually and haltingly get production back on track. End of December 1942 were in the Donec basin at Electric energy after dem Annual report the BHO for 1942 "first 5 percent the earlier installed Performance again operational". 343 The Ford tion of *Hard coal* reached at the end of 1942, hardly any much higher Percentage. Were in the March 1942 but still fewer as 10000 tons Money promoted been, so The funding in December amounted to 392,000 t344 and reached a maximum of 19,000 t at the beginning of 1943 per day.345 The production of *crude steel* only came to a small extent in October 1942 Scope in Corridor. 346 In the December 1942 were 11 from 18 smelting works again in operation, but only produced a total of 5,000 tons.347 In the last quarter of 1942, an average of 8,000 to 10000 tons finished *products* Iron and steel produced - from Tank parts and machinery until to screws and nails. 348

341 Ibid, case XI, No. 722, BI. 72, Doc. Pleiger-209, Aff. Heinrich Kuhlmann, 11. 6. 1948.
342 *Story the Communist Political party the Soviet Union,* Vol. 5/1, Moscow 1974, S. 544.
343 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 417, BI. 184, Doc. NI-4332 (How Note 340).
344 Ibid, BI. 188.
345 Ibid, BI. 208, Doc. NI-5261, Prot. d. meeting d. Board of Directors the BHO, 31. 3. 1943. - In total became in the Donecrevier under the crew 4.1 mill. t promoted *(Müller,* Wehrmacht and Occupation, p. 156 f.; according to German Declarations).
346 B.A Koblenz, R 131/660, Lineup ex. armament and Raw materials companies id occupied Soviet territories, undated (probably July 1943).
347 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 417, BI. 201, Doc. NI-4332 (How Note 340).
348 Ibid, BI. 201 f.

The Installation of *iron ore* mining Krivoy Rog was "deferred" been, [34 9] since manganese ore mining is primarily in N ikopol should be restored. Assembled like this the occupiers in Krivoy Rog “several 10,000 t” machinery and other material away and transported it in “several Thousand railway wagons" to Nikopol. Also Workforce out of Krivoy Rog abducted she in greater Number there. Until the end of 1942 there was there is no mining of iron ore; 347,000 tons of ore supplies were carried away for this purpose and through the RVE sold been. First Beginning 1943 ran the Funding in Krivoy Rog at. In May 1943 became 32,000 t ore funded350 - fewer as two percent of a month's production in the Pre-war.351 In total, the occupiers only funded 203,000 t Ore.352

Much cheaper saw cs for the German Imperialists at *manganese* out of. In the In late autumn 1941, the first ore mines near Nikopol began working again. The occupiers ruthlessly did everything they could to speed up the production of this most important ferroalloy metal to increase. Although “the mechanical equipment of manganese ore mining
completely renewed become" had to, [353] became until finally December 1942 on raw ore 642000 t (= 106400 t Mn content) and at concentrate (predominantly out of ore reserves) 103000 t (45000 t Mn content) funded.3M The Annual production 1942 corresponded
approximately the half the Soviet Pre-war annual production. Anyway covered the stolen in 1942 125700 t manganese 102 percent Of the german Manganese consumption.355 Im Years 1943, **for** which the Intruders originally one doubling of the 1942 result ,356 the corresponding numbers were 164,800 t and 97 percent.357 _

Of all things as the turning point of the war Stalingrad loomed, swayed the responsible war economy institutions of Hitler's Germany had high hopes for the year 1943. In January 1943 would the Dnieper power plant supply electricity again; This, they expected, would lead to a rapid upswing in coal production and the smelters could be put into operation more quickly and would be taken with coal from the Donec basin and Using ore from Krivoj Rog to produce the raw material for the “1wan program”. Speer expressed on December 19th to Pleiger optimistic, the Headquarters planning calculate firmly with it, that from the Spring, at latest from center 1943 at
“Ukraine's production in the overall iron distribution "can be installed".358 In the meantime the German aluminum industry and the chemical industry were also included in the planning; GB Chemie wanted to build explosives plants, the Vereinigte Aluminum-Werke AG and the Luftwaffe planned an aluminum plant near Zaporoz'e.

349 Ibid, BI. 188 (ff.); hereafter also the The following. Please refer also *Riedel,* S. 272.
350 B.A Koblenz, R 13 1/660 (How Note 346).
351 *Zagorul'ko!Jewish kw,* S. 238.
352 How Note 349.
353 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 417, BI. 190, Doc. NI-4332 (How Note 340).
354 Ibid, BI. 195.
355 *Hunter, Jörg-Johannes,* The Economic Dependence of the Third Reich on foreign countries, shown on Example the steel industry, Berlin (West) 1969, S. 205, tab. 26; something higher numbers ibid, p. 211, table 28.
356 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 417, BI. 212, Doc. NI-5261 (How Note 345).
357 *Hunter,* S. 205, Tab. 26.
358 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 11246, spear at Pleiger, 19. 12. 1942.

End of January/beginning of February 1943 The Soviet troops of the Southwestern Front pushed the Donec across a broad front between Charkov and Slavyansk and pushed deep from the northeast in the Donec basin into it. She penetrated the first half of February until to a few dozen kilometre after Stalino and Dnepropetrovsk before. At the same time sold the Soviet southern front wiped out the enemy the eastern one Territory and threw him to back to the Mius.359

The breakthroughs of the Soviet Army forced the fascist high command to make quick decisions. Already at the end of January the dispute was about whether the southern section of the German-Soviet front on the Don and Donec should be shortened and at least part of the Donec basin should be evacuated. Hitler bitterly and fundamentally opposed this. For him, since Stalingrad, it was about "the whole meaning of this campaign." [360] In his view of the "impossibility of giving up the Donets region,"36 [1] he was influenced by the constant urgent ideas of Speer and other leading representatives of the war economy and the arms monopolies confirmed: " February 4, 1943. Reich Minister Speer and the General Director for the Donets Basin Pleigcr give the Führer a lecture about the situation in the arms industry. Excluding the Donets Basin, whose annual production is 6 to 7 million tonnes (steel - DE) amount, be no increase in armor possible. The guide explains, the Donezbeeken may not given up because he would then no longer be able to wage war." 362 Hitler received in the first days of February from spear specially one Memorandum363 above the Position in the Industrial area and the Urgency of the “lwan program”.

Of the Need, on the positions at the Mius to go back, could Field Marshal V. Manstein First convince Hitler after he - v. Manstein - at 6. February its last "trump card" played out had: ,,Short before my Flight after Soldering (to Hitler - EN) was the Chairman of Presidium the Imperial unification Money, Paul Pleiger, in my headquarters been ... Him had me said, that the possession the coal deposits around Shakhty, so in dem Part of Donets Basin, the east of Mius lay, in is in no way decisive." The one won there coal is supposedly not cokeable and not useful **for** the German locomotives. "This one had an objection Hitler from the position the War economy nothing more to oppose!" [364] Around a collapse the Southern Front to avert, became finally far-reaching operational Resolutions caught. The High command the Wehrmacht let freshness forces out Western Europe and out of Germany, underneath Elite associations the Armed SS, lead towards and she in the endangered Front section focus. In the second February half urged the Fascists in strengthen counterattacks the Soviet one Southwest Front on the northern banks of the Donc back.365 Hitler flew himself twice after Zaporoz'e to the headquarters of Army Group South, ,,around from there the Operations in the southern part of the Eastern Front".366

359 *Story of Huge Patriotic war the Soviet Union,* Vol. 3, Berlin 1964, p. 133ff.; *Ersov, A G.,* Osvobozdenie Donbassa, Moscow 1973, S. 60ff.

360 *Hitler's situation discussions,* S. 84 (December 12, 1942). Please refer also *DZW,* Vol. 3, S. 78f.

361 *from Manstein, Eric,* Lost ones victories, Bonn 1955, p. 442.

362 *Greiner, Helmuth,* The Top Wehrmacht leadership 1939-1943, Wiesbaden 1951, S. 436f.

363 Until now not found, however mentioned in *Hitler's situation discussions,* S. 122, Note 1.

364 *from Manstein,* p. 443.

365 Please refer *DZW,* Vol. 3, S. 80/82, S. 84 ff.

366 *Greiner,* p. 439; sat *from Manstein,* S. 454 u. 467. - Hitler was from the 17. until 19. 2. u. at the 10. 3. 1943 in Zaporoz'e.

This Operations were a beating Example for the close connection between the war aims of German finance capital and the conduct of military operations. It is true that this strategy generally and broadly always corresponded to the world domination program of the monopolies; This time, however, she followed him immediately and corresponded to him operational framework even in detail the clearly formulated interests of the monopoly masters and Armament chiefs.

The successes of the operations of February/March 1943 gave the top representatives of the German War economy once again creates a false sense of security. They were firmly counting on a final stabilization of the military situation; Above all, they had high hopes on the one for him summer planned Offensive.

At the expansion and exploitation of industry on the Donec and Dnepr beat them a feverish pace. Right now, their year and a half of efforts promised to bear fruit. The Dnieper power plant had been supplying energy since January 1943. Coal production rose relatively quickly again after the slump in February and March. The transport situation was to some extent stable.

After all, the focus of planning in the spring of 1943 shifted more from the Donec basin to the Dnepr. The management of Dnjepr-Stahl GmbH argued to the Berlin authorities at the end of May that they were building here "in a strategically less dangerous area." 36 7 An object as sought-after as the pipe works in Mariupol (Zdanov) was suddenly valued is therefore less because the conquest of the oil sources of the Caucasus, for the exploitation of which pipe production should be initiated as a priority, is now a long way off had moved.368 “The main focus of the construction today,” it said in the letter quoted, “is in Ukraine itself, which could not have been expected to this extent in the fall of last year. Dnieper Petrovsk lies far behind the front and is the key point of the whole Ukrainian position of the empire. " 369

Shortly thereafter - in June - the top managers inspected the German war economy itself this "Key position". Successively traveled Pleiger, spear and Geilenberg

Table 111
Planned generation from lFH ammunition and Crude steel in the Dnepr-Donec region

lFH ammunition			raw steel (for the corresponding amount of blocks, Wire, profiles)	
October 1943	5000	Shot	July 1943	235 t
December 1943	100000		November 1943	4700 t
March 1944	250000		December 1943	11700 t
September 1944	750000	„	September 1944	35000 t

Source: ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 3965, Dnjepr-Stahl GmbH to BHO, May 24th. 1943, report (Mon den/Dnieper steel) above Visit Geilenbergs from the June 19 to 22, 1943, from the June 24, 1943.

367 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 3965, Dnieper steel GmbH at BHO, 24. 5. 1943.

368 Ibid. - From the 30. 6. 1943 dated one Marginal note (v. Carlowitz) on dem quote Write v. May 24, 1943: "Pleiger has already decided that Liebknecht (smelting works in Dnepro Petrovsk/Niznedneprovsk; instead of "Kujbysev" in Mariupol - D E.) is put into operation. Godparents 50 % man man, 50 % Dnieper Steel."

369 Ibid, Dnieper steel GmbH at BHO, 24. 5. 1943.

Table 112
"Pleiger plan" and actual Coal mining for the occupiers Donecrevier

	Plan (monthly funding)	Financial support
December 1942	500000 t	392000 t
January 1943	750000 t	450000 t
July 1943	800000 t	455600 t
End 1943	900000 t	
End 1944	2-2.5 mill. t	

Source: Compiled from ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 3964, Report of the BHO, Donets Coal Dept., June 1942 (Attachment); ibid, FS, movie 3965, Dnieper steel GmbH at BHO, May 24, 1943; further case XI, No. 417, BI. 208, Document NI-5261, (How Note 345).

Table 113
Pre-calculation of the Energy supply of Dnepr and the Donec region (in kW)

	Dnieper region	Donets region
Summer 1943	170000	90000
Beginning 1944	350000	150000
End 1944	450000	170000

Source: ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 3965, Dnieper steel to BHO, May 24, 1943; see. also Krauch's numbers (ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 11712, BI. 128, "Energy situation in Ukraine. More obvious ahead was standing Summer 1944", Attachment e.g. Writing. GB Chemistry at the RWiM, September 22, 1942).

the Dncpr-Donec area. The The Minister of Ammunition felt compelled to Reductions from "Ivan program" to announce [370] ; in the general reigned but euphoria before. The in this one weeks of June 1943 _ enormous Planned numbers included in the rule the Period until Autumn or. until End of 1944. (Tables 111-113)
The production of lFH ammunition from September 1944 would have the half the average monthly German Total production for 1942 corresponds to 37l
As the weakest point in their plans The fascists Power supply. But also lay here far-reaching Planning and Estimates before.
In the July 1943 failed the Pursue "Citadel", the Summer offensive the Weir
does at Kursk, in the course of the first week. On July 12th 1943 kicked the Soviet army north from Kursk, three weeks later south the City to counteroffensive. In the second August half went the attack in one general offensive against the Army groups center and South above. Beginning They began in September Fascists out of the Donec area to flood back. On the 9th of September Stalino was released on the 10th. September Mariupol. On the 22nd In September, Soviet troops reached the Dnieper between Dnepropetrovsk and Za Poroz'e. At the 14th. October the occupiers had to Zaporoz'e, October 25, Dnepropctrovsk clear.[372]

370 Ibid, report (Monden/Dnieper steel) ex. Visit Speers at the 17,118. 6. 1943, v. June 18, 1943.
371 *Bleyer,* armament report, S. 364.
372 *Chuilww, W. I.,* Guardsmen on dem Away after Berlin, Berlin 1976, S. 83 ff.; *Ersw,* S. 181ff.

Wherever the occupiers found the time and means to do so, they practiced the criminal policy of “scorched earth” with furious consistency and general staff-like precision.373 With that Wehrmacht worked here the representatives of the BHO and the monopolies hand in Hand. they saw her Aim in it, ahead of schedule Destruction of all the basis of life of the Soviet people, if possible all material usable for the war economy - Raw materials, semi-finished products, machines and systems as well as all kinds of food - and also to deport the entire working population to the West. The concept of “ "Eviction" and "exploitation" had already taken place the earlier withdrawals, especially since the beginning of 1943 followed with the utmost unscrupulousness. Now its realization took on new dimensions at.

In the July 1943 grasped the responsible persons the BHO - in the Connection with the New
version of the “Ivan program”, the coal and energy planning - the cannibalization of numerous factories located near the front (Kerc, Taganrog, Mariupol, Stalino, Makeevka, Konstantinovka, Kramatorsk) and the concentration of production in the most efficient ones Operated further in the Backland into the Eye. Already to this Time hiked value
full machinery and whole Production equipments after Germany. 374 After in
Kharkov on the 6th August the After the "evacuation"375 began, it began in the Donec region on the 10th. August to prepare the "loosening up".376 From the middle of the month onwards, important preliminary products were produced for the “lwan program”, in particular Siemens-Martin-Stahl, by order Speers out dem Territory after Germany transported away. Also more and more coal trains with Heaped coal migrated west. As first City should Taganrog
"cleared" become.377

In the run one four days meeting from the 19. until 22. August discussed Hitler and spear detailed the situation in the Donec area. Hitler put, so Speer noted, “explicitly stated that the Donets region further in ours possession remain should," added but, allegedly on Urge of minister, in consideration one possible
"Forced eviction" added that "everything in the Donets area not necessarily necessary is, from there to disappear have".378 Power plants and factory halls should be dismantled or prepared for removal, and crude steel blocks should be removed more quickly.379

From this made approval the war economy organs immediate extensive use. From September 1st onwards, one "evacuation" order followed another. On the 8th. appeared in September Hitler again in the headquarters the army group South in Zaporoz'e and advised with v. Manstein the Position at Location and Job. 380 Three days later became for the

373 See *Müller,* Wehrmacht and Occupation, p. 248ff.; *History of the Great Fatherland war the Soviet Union,* Vol. 3, passim; *DZW,* Vol. 4, p. 165ff.

374 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 3964, report (n.d.) ex. <l. Trip Pleigers in the Ukraine from the 30. 5. until 10. 6. 1943, v. 11. 6. 1943; *case* .5, S. 281f., Doc. NI-5219, Central Germans steel factories AG at Ironworks Company Maximilian Hut AG, 22. 7. 1943.

375 “Evacuation” here means the total plunder of the area, the deportation of all material goods and the population and finally the planned, complete destruction *of the Or* the military eviction understood.

376 *reed!,* S. 274f.

377 Ibid.

378 FB, 19th-22nd 8th. 1943, Point 15.

379 Ibid.

380 *Pon Manstein,* S. 526f.

Area the South Economic Inspectorate ordered, east of Dnepr a 40 km wide desert zone to create.381

With it was serious the Location too those Group representatives and Armament departments clear the until now not yet with one final Retreat, rather with it expected had, in the foreseeable future - similar to in February March 1943 in the north Part of the district - again after Stalino and Return to Taganrog to can. Still in the first September meetings was Pleiger immediately to v. Manstein flown and had him in this assumption "Paralysis" and Dismantling instead of blowing up and destruction suggested.382 He had to let someone else's generals teach him. He decided on September 8th , "that production for the Ivan program should also be switched on in Krivoy Rog," [383] so he received already two days later by the Minister of Armaments the Instructions to dismantle this program "completely." [384] On September 17th, at the beginning of the "evacuation" of the Dnepr cities, he ordered, on Speer's instructions, "the phasing out of Ivan production" in Zaporoz'e, too Center, an.385

The hectic pace at which the German occupiers are withdrawing from the Donec area had to, hindered she to it, the Territory after your plans to "clear". A significant part of the machines and systems that were intended for "cannibalization" or removal remained behind and were destroyed by the special teams and demolition squads of the 6th. Army and the 1st Panzer army home. The invaders, however, had several weeks left to plunder in the Dnieper region of the country before the general Destruction.

The representatives of the defense companies and the BHO certainly did not leave the destruction of everything that remained behind to the military alone. They prepared the destruction expertly themselves and, if possible, monitored its success. For the demolition of the factories and vital facilities in Mariupol, “the one deployed in the Donets region Company of the mining battalion, reinforced by special leaders from the BHO, taking into account the extraordinary importance of Mariupol for the Russians and the importance of a "To be made available for thorough destruction . " “The destruction took place on the 22nd. September 1943 ordered by State Councilor Pleiger. Asked deadline 4-5 days... The plant is destroyed. Consumed ammunition 59 t explosive and 60 Piece Aerial bombs (500 kg)."387

The data on the occupiers' total loot of "clearance goods" is incomplete and contradictory. The at the retreat out of dem Donec area and the eastern Ukraine

381 *reed!,* S. 280.
382 Ibid, S. 282 f.
383 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 416, BI. 189, Doc EC-38 **M,** „From the boss Wi Rod East (Like Note 308), KTB entry v. September 8, 1943.
384 Ibid, KTB entry v. 10. 9. 1943.
385 Ibid, KTB entry v. September 17, 1943.
386 Ibid, No. 417, BI. 219f., Document NI-6371 (=Excerpt out of Doc. EC-38 M), „From the boss Wi staff East ... " (How Note 308), KTB entry v. September 4, 1943.
387 Ibid, No. 455, BI. 48, Doc. NID-15571, report d. BHO, Zaporoz'e, at Pleiger, 1. 10. 1943. - As preliminary Report went at the same Day one telegram at Pleiger away: “Leaving Zaporozhye today after thorough Blasting." (Ibid., FS, film 11246).

According to German information, the stolen industrial and agricultural products and means of production were transported away on a total of 3,000 railway trains.388 According to a report by the South Economic Inspectorate dated November 5, 1943, 248 wagons of looted goods from the hard coal mining industry (pumps, motors, transformers, switches, cables, etc.), 413 Wagons from the iron metallurgy works (Machinery, plant parts, Asbestos, ferroalloy and other Non-ferrous metals etc.) and
67 wagons of "return goods" from the power plants (turbines, transformers, electrodes, cable drums, Non-ferrous metals etc.) carried off. 389 Out of dem Area the Dnepr
Cities including Kiev reported 3,437 wagons of looted goods from iron and steel factories and 518 wagons the Electricity plants. 3 90
They made desperate efforts Fascists, at least Krivoy Rog and especially N to keep ikopol, and even took money for it serious military strategic disadvantages Purchase.39i The extraordinary importance of the N ikopoler manganese had the German imperialists since Stalingrad multiple discussed. As early as February 1943, like that RVE
it put it, “apparently important decisions have been made on the military side become" had to, 392 developed the Imperial unification a report for Hitler
and the OKW, in which it - certainly not without practical pessimism - warning meant the failure of the production from Nikopol mean "for the at least a failure of 42 percent at the Crude steel production".393 In a more detailed analysis of At the end of February, it calculated the loss in crude steel production if fully sustained after nine months generation the Stocks consumed be would, even on nearly three quarters of the Planned quantity for 1943,394
On the 30th September/1st October 1943 Speer **thought** Hitler “about the importance of the Nikopol manganese ore steel production" Lecture and briefed Chief of General Staff Zeitzier afterwards in Hitler's Order in the same Senses.395 spear strengthened Hitler was evident in the persistence with which he insisted on the Dnieper bridgehead east of Za Poroz'e every to hold the case.
At the November 11th - Zaporoz'e had long since been liberated - said Armaments Minister Hitler Presentation on "The Meaning of Nikopol and **Krivoy** Rog **for** German iron production". 39 6 Become N ikopol given up, so argued he, then would the German
Manganese stocks will be exhausted within 18 to a maximum of 24 months and steel production will largely come to a standstill. It become In addition, "any increase in iron production will be made significantly more difficult" since the steelworks capacity will be reduced by the conversion on manganese-saving Proceedings stronger claimed and fully occupied become.

388 *Müller,* Wehrmacht and Occupation, S. 260.
389 *Riedel,* S. 279ff.
390 Just that. 281. Further uncertain figures in *Case 5,* p. 289, Doc. NI-4500, and in *German armor in the second WeUwar,* p. 289 (gives for the “Dneprbogen” without source reference 7800 wagons “with commercial goods, machines, factories and raw materials "Companies".
391 *Medlicott, W. N.,* The Economic Blockade, Vol. 2, London 1959, p. 646.
392 note the RVE re: Nikopol, 15. 2. 1943, quote b. *Hunter,* S. 208.
393 Ibid.
394 note the RVE re: Nikopol, 26. 2. 1943, quote ibid.
395 FB, 30. 9.-1. 10. 1943, Point 21.
396 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 1732; hereafter also the The following.

Finally would in this Trap an additional 10,000 skilled workers needed will be provided by the new one Confiscation action excluded would have to be.

The Wehrmacht leadership then made increased efforts to defend the Dnieper line southern from Zaporoz'e. [397] The bridgehead east from Nikopol was the most developed and remained the longest contested of all German Dnieper bridgeheads. [398]

At the end of January 1944 the Soviet troops in southern Ukraine began attacking again, took at the February 8th N ikopol and liberated at the 23. February Krivoy Rog. This meant that the rule of the German imperialists over the industrial area on the Dnepr and Donec came to an irrevocable end.

b) oil (Caucasus)

Petroleum, the indispensable and promising raw material, was a primary economic war goal for the Germans Imperialists. It was their decades-old dream to own an oil empire equal to that of their British and North American competitors. Were the Western Allies in the First World War - according to the popular saying of Lord Curzon, which was inaugurated at the time circles - on a wave of oil to the victory been worn, so wanted this time the German imperialism on Soviet oil, so to speak swim to the “final victory”.

This oil "strategy" won in the framework of the War goal planning in the Second World War was completely different and unequal more significant weight than in the First World War. This was due to the rapid advance in motorization, as well as to the sharply increased economic importance of chemistry and related industries everywhere, and in Germany as well outstanding state monopolistic influence IG Farben Group. It but at the same time touching from the lack of fuel **for** military Purposes that worried the Wehrmacht leadership. The inadequacy of our own production and supply of fuel threatened the limitless imperialist conquest plans to be curtailed in the most sensitive way. The thin one Fuel blanket had to have a spacious and versatile one impose serious limitations on warfare by modern means.

So far they had synthetic production temporarily plugged the gaps and made "lightning field trains" of a moderate size possible. With the attack on the USSR, the war took on completely new dimensions. According to the military's calculations from the beginning of 1941, a threatening situation was bound to arise from mid-August of the same year stand, there then the Fuel stocks expected consumed were and only ongoing production was still available. [399] The “refilling of fuel stocks,” it said in an expose of military economy and Armaments Office of the OKW on the “Barbarossa fuel situation” from May 1941, be "only possible if later Large imports from new areas done" .[400]

397 See. *from Manstein,* S. 563ff.

398 *Chuikov,* S. 86; *Lelyusenko, D D.,* Moscow - Stalingrad - Berlin - Praga. Zapiski koman darma, 2nd ed., Moscow 1973, P. 205H.

399 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 415, Bl. 56, Doc. PS-1456, AT v. general Thomas ex. Speech b. Keitel and Jodl at the 8th. 2. 1941; ibid, BI. 48, AT v. Thomas ex. Speech b. Goering at the 26. 2. 1941, v. 27. 2. 1941.

400 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 8273, KTB WiRüAmt/Staff, Entry v. 16. 5. 1941.

The War against them USSR should have the Gordian node smashed and the aggressors the Sources of the Caucasian oil, after Maykop, Groznyj and from1 · everything after Lead Baku. German side calculated man with one Petroleum production capacity the Caucasian territories from approximately 28 millions t (Baku 22.5 Millions, Groznyj 3 Millions, Maykop 2.5 Millions) and with the use one Row from modern Large refineries.401

The conquest of the oil resources of the Caucasus was one of the two most important economic goals of the imperialist class. and predatory war against the USSR. The motto of the infamous “Green Folder” from June 1941 was: “As much food and mineral oil as possible for Germany too win is the economic one Main objective of the action." 40 2 In the adventurous fascist strategy, the disposition of the Soviet Petroleum is a crucial one economic requirement After the destruction of the Soviet state, German imperialism successfully asserted its position as a world power and world domination against its major imperialist competitors .

The military Planning for the incidence in the Caucasus region, the in the July 1941 accelerated already found their basis in the instructions No. 21 (“Barba Rossa Case”) from the 18. December 1940 403 , later expressly in the Instruction No. 32 („Before• preparations for the time after Barbarossa") from 11. June 1941 404 and in the Supplement to instruction no. 33 from 23. July 1941, in the was ordered as soon as possible "over the Don after to advance into the Caucasus" 405 •

Since June/July 1941, special Wehrmacht units were on call as loot capture teams for oil and oil facilities ready. At 3. June The South Mineral Oil Command was formed in the strength of one battalion, which occupied the western Ukrainian oil region of Borislav/Drogobyc at the end of June. On the 23rd In July, the North Mineral Oil Command set out, the the Estonian Oil shale mines in possession take should. 406 In the July became the

Mineral Oil Command K (Caucasus) was set up, which was intended to occupy the main target, the Caucasian oil sources. 407 All of the units mentioned were staffed by corporate specialists or were led by them.

Mid-July In 1941, final decisions were made on the political form of the occupation regime to be established and on the personnel of the future “Reich Commissariat”. On 17. July shared Göring and Keitel General Thomas the result of the consultation at Hitler from the Previous day 408 with. For the Ukraine, the “Eastland” and the **Muscovites**

401 *birch field, Wolfgang,* Illusions in the Caucasus 1942/43, in *Science, economy and Technology.* Studies about history. Edited by Karl-Heinz Manegold, Munich 1969 (hereinafter: Caucasus), p. 85.

402 *case Barbarossa,* p. 365, Doc. 112.

403 Ibid, S. 140ff., Doc. 36; sat *Grechko, A A.,* The battle around the Caucasus, Berlin 1971, p. 32ff.

404 *case Barbarossa,* S. 73ff., Doc. 11.

405 *Hitler's Instructions for the warfare,* p. 143.

406 *Kasper, Banns-Heinz,* The Petroleum in the Robbery plans of German fascism in Preparation and implementation of the Second World War *JfW,* 1976, T. 3, p. 73.

407 ZStA Potsdam, Case XI, No. 417, BI. 120f., Doc. NI-2021, “Tasks of the Mineral Oil Group at Wi Rod East, the Wi In, Wi Commands and branch offices" (with Cover letter to RWiM Account oil), July 22, 1941. Hereafter also the following.

408 *IMG,* Vol. 38, p. 86ff., Doc. L-221, records v._Bormann ex. Meeting b. Hitler on July 16, 1941.

Area be three Reich Commissioners appointed, the one for the Caucasus be against it "Not yet determined. The But the leader wants it to be more economical Head of the Caucasus the messenger Neubacher used becomes." 409

Hermann Neubacher, an Austrian old fascist, was from the IG Farben group in the 1930s as connection and Confidant for Austria and "for the IG business in Southeast Europe". been. 410 Im He took war, from Göring and Hitler, inspired and instructed by Krauch and llgner, supported extremely important political events positions in the Ministerial rank a. 411 With Neubacher was so a Man the IG Farben and the account oil "as petroleum commissioner intended for the whole of Russia with headquarters in Maikop". 412 Neubacher himself boasted yourself in the Follow-up time with it, that he "on Instruction "The Führer was supposed to take over a special Reich commission for the oil industry in the previously occupied Soviet Russian territories" 413 , and had already set up his "operational staff" for the Caucasus together. With Krauch (GB Chemie), E. R. Fischer (Reich Ministry of Economics; Account oil)414, Heinrich Bütefisch (Head of Economic group fuel industry) and Neubacher, the IG Farben Group had its representatives and representatives in leading positions in all areas of oil and fuel policy German imperialism crucial state and state monopoly power organs.

On July 22, 1941, the Account oil from Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs the power of attorney dem occupied Soviet territory "all required Measures with After-

409 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 415, BI. 34, Doc. PS-1456, AT v. Thomas ex. Lectures with Göring and Keitel on July 17th 1941, v. 18. 7. 1941. - Originally, still before dem Attack on the USSR, should Göring Neubacher as Reich Commissioner for the Caucasus region have named *(Dallin,* p. 254). Dallins Testify to ours Theme are in total extremely poor and often misleading.

410 *anatomy of war,* S. 168f., Doc. 61. - His tight connection to IG Farben Group, starting point and basis for his entire later activity, Neubacher mentioned in his after the war written memoirs not a word *(Neubacher, Hermann,* Special order Southeast 1940--1945, 2. Edition, Berlin(West)/Frankfurt a. M. 1957).

411 Important Features Neubachers:
January 1940 - "Special Representative for Economic Affairs at the Germans Embassy in Bucharest"
(End) 1941 - Envoy 1. Class and "Commissioner for Petroleum Matters in the south East"
October 1943 - Special Representative Hitler's for the "uniform Leading the fight against the Communism in the Southeast".
(Radarult, Hans, The IG Paint industry AG and Southeastern Europe until 1938, in *JfW,* 1966, T. 3, p. 179ff.; *Handle to Southeastern Europe,* passim).

412 ZStA Potsdam, German Bank, No. 9593, BI. 112, AT Weigelt for Section, October 29, 1941.

413 Neubacher to Hans Frank, 18. 8th. 1941, quote b. *radar result,* The IG Farbenindustrie AG and South Eastern Europe until 1938, p. 180.

414 Serious Rudolf fisherman, since 1929 authorized representative, later director in the IG Farben Group, End
In 1932 von Krauch and llgner began familiarizing themselves with the oil industry commissioned since 1933 on this one area under consideration his active membership in the NSDAP launched by the group into key economic policy positions. As department head for mineral oil in Reich Ministry of Economics particularly tight Contact to Göring, he had been the oil account since it was founded senior board member of this company (alongside Karl Blessmg and Hans Brochhaus) and at the same time Managing Director the Borussia GmbH, that state one investment company, the the absolute Share majority the Accounts oil managed (see *volume I,* p. 235ff.).

pressure to operate", i.e. in first line "in the own names or through Subsidiaries all the Petroleum industry serving Investments in Possession" to take/i1 5 She was confirmed again the “exclusive right to Extraction, processing and for Trade in petroleum products" and explained the "Groups mineral oil at Wi Stab Ost, den Wi In, Wi Commands and branch offices" to their executors organs. The ones mentioned military organs and the the Accounts oil or theirs Subsidiaries should the simplicity and the For the sake of “personnel savings”. "until on additional, at least in theirs leading Persons, be the same as persons". Also Goering confirmed the Konti oil, like already in the “Greens folder", her comprehensive and exclusive Powers of attorney.416 The Accounts oil transformed itself within shortest deadline in a extensive Corporation that is its predatory Tentacles all over the East and Southeastern Europe stretched out.

Table 114
Subsidiaries the Continental oil AG (Was standing 110m 13. January 1942)

	Founding date	capital (RM)
Continental oil GmbH •	May 1941	1000000
Baltic oil GmbH	July 1941	1000000
Eastland oil Sales GmbH	October 1941	50000
Ukraine oil Sales GmbH	?	50000
East oil GmbH	?	100000
Continental transport AG	September 1941	3500000

• With 4 Romanian subsidiaries that work with around 23 percent of the Romanian one Petroleum production involved were

Source: ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 417, BI. 337ff., Document NI-10162, Protocol of 2nd meeting of the supervisory board the Accounts oil at the January 13, 1942 (Report Blessing); s. a. *Czollek!Eich1wltz,* conception,
S. 173f.

The Ost Öl GmbH (Ostöl), probably in August 1941 into the Called to life, should be under the subsidiaries the account oil the most important role play. Theirs were takeover and operation of the Caucasian oil wells. At the end of 1941, this company had already purchased drilling equipment, vehicles and other operating equipment for around 16 million RM the "first use" further orders in the amount of 70 to 75 millions RM awarded to German industry and loan agreements with the major banks for these sums completed.417

Barely a few weeks had passed since Konti Oil was given the green light to operate on occupied Soviet territory when the fanfare of the first military successes sounded more muted. The heroic resistance led at the end of July/beginning of August the Soviet one troops the Operational plans of the Wehrmacht always more absurd. Still on July 23rd Colonel General Halder, Chief of General Staff of the Army, had given Hitler a lecture on the dates for further German advances: “Roughly in one Month (25. 8.) you can accept our troops around Leningrad, around Moscow, in

415 How Note 407 (BI. 115ff.) Hereafter also the The following.
416 *Czollek!Eichholtz,* S. 162f., S. 174f.
417 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 417, BI. 341f., Doc. NI-10162, (Report blessing) and BI. 353 (Report fisherman).

line Orel - Crimea. Beginning October at the Volga, *beginning November around Baku, Asked for."* [418] Halder's dates applied to the goals that Hitler and Field Marshal *von.* Brauchitsch itself in the at the previous day drafted Addition to Instruction No. 33 [419] plugged in
had. But already one A week later, under the pressure of the heroic defense efforts of the Soviet Army, Directive No. 34, in the Hitler the advance into Caucasus and other goals "for now to reset" [420] ordered.

In the military economy and Armament Office of OKW broke End July 1941 serious Doubt: "Question, What on dem Petroleum area so to do is, because something must did become. Only 2 months left. Russian imports uncertain in terms of timing and quantity. Chief of raw materials department want a Basic plan working out for the most unfavorable Case, d. H. without every Introduce out of Russia. way out only Restrictions. Man can then perhaps just about getting there." 421

At the 29. July drew the boss of office, general Thomas, in the presence E R. Fischer's a Sad picture of the fuel situation in the coming winter: "Requirements around 1170,000 moto, cover around 700000 moto (German and Romanian Generation); Lack of demand around
400000 moto, without stock of 1 liter consumption for military operations." [422] Fisherman meanwhile was with one way out at the Hand: ,,All Drilling rigs in Germany, Hungary and Romania insert. On this Way perhaps ten percent increase the generation to to reach." 423 At the following Day recorded the same source Fischer's "Opinion, that Antonescu no political difficulties make will if we while of war the Petroleum reserves Romania onto outermost exploit." [424] On the Meeting from the 4th of August at general Warlimont in the Wehrmacht command staff about the expected Fuel situation in the winter 1941/42 became accordingly the of suggestions Fischer's as most important Temporary resources "for some Months" the "Increase the Romanian one Petroleum production through ruthless Dismantling (exploitation)", for themselves Göring at Marshal Anlonescu insert should, expressly "in the view on incurred Russian Happen (Maykop and Grozny)" y foreseen.425 Something similar was found for Hungary into the Eye. Warlimonts expectations for 1941 were to this Time however still
highly excited: "GenQu skeptical with reference to Baku, Warlimont against it more optimistic." [426]

In the run the Autumn months smashed itself more and more as well as the military "Blitzkrieg" hopes as also the economic policy ones Objectives the German imperialists. Now changed at the Occupiers illusionary hopes on the oil

418 *Halder,* Vol. 3, S. 107, notes f. Speech b. Hitler v. 23. 7. 1941 (mine Highlight - D E.).
419 *Hitler's Instructions for the warfare,* S. 142ff. (dated v. 23. 7. 1941).
420 Ibid, S. 145 (3Q7. 194 .
421 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 8273, KTB WiRüAmt/Staff, Entry v. July 28, 1941. - The last quote
Sentence is from Thomas hs. painted.
422 Ibid, Entry v. July 29, 1941.
423 Ibid.
424 Ibid, Entry v. 30. 7. 1941.
425 Ibid, Movie 1775, records v. major Rudelsdorff (WiRüAmt) about meeting b. General Warlimont (Wehrmacht command staff/chief L) on the 4th 8th. 1941 (statements by Colonel Becht (WiRüAmt/Chief Ro)). - Göring and Hitler negotiated along these lines in November 1941 with Mihai Antonescu *(AdaP,* series D, Vol. 13/2, S. 689ff., Doc. 505, and S. 726ff., Doc. 519, meetings from the 26th and 28. 11. 1941). Romania were called "compensation" Investments at the future Big oil interests in the Middle East", at "Russian and Iranian petroleum interests" offered (p. 690).
426 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 8273, KTB WiRüAmt/Staff, Entry v. August 5, 1941.

with pessimistic assessments and calculations of the fuel situation. It met with devastating ones News about the evacuations and comprehensive Destructions one that the Soviet ones Before the Wehrmacht invaded, defenders had been able to do so almost everywhere. "Hardly anything to expect from Maikop," Thomas noted in this Connection ahnungsvolJ.427

The Controller the Accounts let oil itself Meanwhile not in the least from their intense Preparations for the conquest of Caucasus dissuade. Her military shock troop, the excellent equipped Petroleum Command Caucasus), worked about Odessa and Cherzon towards Rostov before. This unit - in Battalion strength - was subordinate to the South Economic Inspectorate of the East Economic Staff, but also had direct control links as well as to this one himself as also to the Ladders and Spezia

list the Accounts Oil. Her commander was Captain Eric Want, a brother in law from Hugo Stinnes [428] , in the Civilian professional board member the labor union Elwerath, of biggest

German oil producing company, whose more authoritative Owner (owned by at least 312 of the 1000 Kuxe). Wintershall AG was.429 Elwerath and Both included Wintershall the founding companies of Konti Öl. Want played for the potash oil group Wintershall-Elwerath one similar, however not like that significant role How New

bacher for the IG Farben Group. [430] Still End October let the Men's the Accounts oil prepare the establishment of a special "radio link from Maykop to Bucharest", the "at the 1. 12. "should stand".431 The plan for a "Caucasus pipeline" to lay, was however given up, „there the Building at least 2 Years last would". [432] For that

A large program **for** the construction of petroleum boiler wagons was started in October/November.433

The Reconquest from Rostov End November and the size Counteroffensive the Soviet army beginning December thwarted in front of Moscow all plans for the time being account oil, the, How Fisherman at the 13. January 1942 before dem Supervisory Board stated, "As instructed

expected (had) to be deployed in the Caucasus in the fall of last year." [4 34] He let at this Opportunity also the "repeated laying of appointment"

Not unmentioned, the constant changes to operational plans and preparations are required made have. [43 5] Blessings and Fisherman insured, the Preparations **for** the "Caucasus operation" would nonetheless with Reprint pushed forward; she

427 Ibid, Movie 8274, KTB WiRüAmt/Staff, Entry v. October 22, 1941.
428 Ibid, German Bank, No. A 1, Vol. 32, AT Sippell for Section, 11. 1. 1941.
429 *Kasper, Hanns Heinz,* The Petroleum extraction Germany in the Time from 1933 until 1945, diss. (B) TU Freiberg 1974 (hereinafter: *Kasper,* oil production), p. 17, p. 259 u. S. 265 (datings at Kasper not exactly).
430 Features Wills (after *Kasper,* Petroleum Extraction, p. 75ff., p. 101f. u.S. 65):
1939 - Director the Petroleum Commission of the Wehrmacht
1940 - Special Representative for the oil industry in the General Government
1941 - Director of Mineral Command South (L'vov).
431 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 8274, KTB WiRüAmt/Staff, Entry v. 23. 10. 1941. - In Bucharest had Neubacher his Field Office.
432 Ibid, Entry v. 24. 10. 1941.
433 Ibid.
434 Ibid., Case XI, No. 417, BI. 353, Doc. NI-10162, Minutes of the 2nd Meeting of the Supervisory Board Accounts oil at the January 13, 1942.
435 Ibid, BI. 353 f.

But they demanded that the hundreds of skilled workers needed get the drilling material at the right time etc. available would be provided. Man must of that go out, so they explained, “that the Russians are at After their withdrawal from the Caucasian oil fields, drilling equipment and refineries were dismantled and transported away, as was done in the same way in other already occupied oil areas."436 Chairman of the Supervisory Board Walther Funk stated Company as Reich Minister of Economics appropriate state Measures - “be she also still so drastic" - in View.437

As summer approached, the Conti Oil and its executive bodies accelerated their preparation for the long-awaited new offensive. On the 29th. March 1942 was given the importance and the scope of the Caucasus project through the decree of the OKW the Petroleum Command (K) to the technical brigade mineral oil (TBM) formed and expanded, which consisted of three battalions and a number of special units438 and in the late summer of 1942 6500 Man counted.439 Erich Homburg was appointed commander of the TBM, a highly decorated one General out Göring's Air force.

boss of staff the TBM was Want, so for the major advanced. 440

With it was on dem Climax the fascist summer offensive, whose Main destination Baku was, ,,one size organization created been with thousands on workers who

"We waited behind the front until access to the mineral oil fields had been cleared." 440 a

The actual management of this According to Krauch's statement, the organization was in Drn's hands from Neubacher and Fisherman. 440b Also all others Key positions in the TBM had professionals the Large corporations inside.

The brigade's subordinate status was and remained unclear. Although Göring had all powers regarding Caucasian oil and TBMs based on Hitler's authorization for itself complained, sheltered the TBM in the area of operation de facto to the respective army economic leader. However, she made an effort even before the offensive began around the direct Insinuation under the head of the military economy and Armaments Office, General Thomas,44 1 and finally, after Thomas' removal from power, he reported to the chief of the Eastern Economic Staff, General Stapf.

Negotiations began at the beginning of 1942 the Account oil with French industrial circles. The German side offered, the French people at dem hoped huge Oil business to contribute; The compensation consisted of the dismantling and exploitation of French oil refineries Konti oil in the USSR to reassemble wanted. Blessings claimed after dem wars, the French Industrialists - ,,anyway some"(!) - be

"I was enthusiastic about the idea at the time."44 2 However, it came about despite having to take pressure on the French Page no Convention conditions. In the Summer

436 Ibid, BI. 353.
437 Ibid, BI. 335.
438 Ibid, FS, Movie 1810, Implementing Order v. general Thomas v. 7. 4. 191.2 for the OKW decree v. March 29, 1942.
439 *birch field,* Caucasus, S. 86.
440 *Thomas,* S. 331f.; *Kasper,* petroleum extraction, S. 101 f.
440a ZStA Potsdam, case VI, Film 410, Doc. NI-6524, Affid. Krauch, April 29, 1947. 440b Ibid.
441 Ibid, FS, film 1828, TBM to WiRüAmt, May 13, 1942. - This request was made, although the Decrees from the 29. 3. and from April 7, 1942 (see Note 438) already the Insinuation under boss OKW/WiRüAmt provided.
442 Ibid, case XI, No. 178, BI. 88, process protocol, Interrogation of witnesses Blessings, 9. 9. 1984.

The accounts of oil resorted to threats and violent measures. Here she pushed Göring, the GB Chemistry (Krauch) and other departments before.44 3

The economic policy decisions of the German imperialists became increasingly difficult in 1942 under the Influence their fuel calamity. The lack of fuel killed the operational planning of the Wehrmacht Restrictions on and restricted the mobility and freedom of operations of tank and air force units in particular. Finally played he an essential one role in the choice of the main strategic direction fascist summer offensive. Hitler and the OKW already mentioned in the Instruction No. 41 of April 5, 1942 as the first and most important task of Offensive the "Major operation in the South section ... with dem Goal, the Enemy forward of Don to

to then destroy the oil areas in the Caucasus Space and the transition over the Caucasus himself to win". 444 Keitel acquaintance in the presence from Thomas and Riecke under six eyes: ,, What is clear is that the operations of the year In 1942 we had to get to the oil. If this fails, can we in the next one Don't have any operations for a year." 445 In the same notch hit Hitler, as he at the 1. July 1942, at the beginning of the offensive at a senior commander's meeting the Army Group South in Pol ta especially cocky, but not without the awareness of possible danger explained: "If I had the **oil** from Maykop and Grozny not get, then must I this one liquidate war." 446

Grecko is coming After an analysis of the strategy of the fascist high command, it came to the conclusion that "the tendency was to focus the main forces of the German armed forces on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front was asserted the more clearly it itself loomed, that the Thought of 'Blitzkrieg' fail would and a longer war was to be expected." 447 The motives for the campaign plan for the summer of 1942 were, of course, not purely of a military economic nature. This plan was "dictated primarily by political motives"44 8 , that is, it was not only intended to exploit the Caucasian oil sources the violence of the German imperialists, but with the capture of Stalingrad and of Caucasus the Soviet Union himself the thread of life cut off and

at the same time the Away free up for one offensive warfare against the British one World empire in Direction Closer east - Middle east - India.4 49 Sun hung in the Years 1942 the The fate of the peoples of this area depends directly on the resistance of the Soviet people. end of June 1942 began between Voronets and Rostov the fascist summer offensive. Under the impression The first attack successes took place on July 10th Göring in his East Prussian headquarters one "Oil session" instead of, on the the responsible persons the

443 See *Eichholtz,* Petroleum Sources, p. 474, doc. 1; P. 499, Doc. 4. - Blessing denied this fact in Nuremberg and claimed exactly the opposite: The accounts of oil and especially fishermen had against such Methods Resistance accomplished! (ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 178, pp. 93f.; ibid, No. 179, 106ff., Interrogation Blessings v. September 10, 1948.

444 *The second World War.* Documents, S. 154, Doc. 36.

445 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1829, AN v. Thomas above meeting b. Keitel on the 28th 5. 1942 ("preliminary discussion"), dated June 1, 1942. - Hans-Joachim Riecke, ministerial director in the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture, was also head of the main agriculture group in the Eastern Economic Staff.

446 *IMG,* Vol. 7, S. 290, process protocol, Interrogation of witnesses v. GFM Paul at the February 11, 1946.

447 *Grechko,* S. 35.

448 Ibid, S. 36.

449 Fundamental to the strategy of fascist German imperialism towards the Middle East Middle east *Tillmann, Heinz,* Germany Arab politics in the second World War, Berlin 1965; further *Hirszowicz, Lukasz,* III Rzesza i Arabski Wsch6d, Warsaw 1963.

Account oil or the Ostöl together with Göring in the closest Final preparations for the advance of the TBM and the petroleum specialists of the monopolies are circling immediately behind them Attack spikes the Wehrmacht met. The meeting served the purpose, still to initiate a series of decisions at the highest level in a timely manner that the bosses the Account oil appeared as a priority.

The protocol the meeting is - as well like that the second meeting at the November 21st over [450] - an in his Concise unique document both imperialist Greed for expansion as well as the developed and complicated interaction and the interplay of military, political and economic power within the state monopoly mechanism. The representatives of the oil companies conducted the negotiations skilfully so that Göring, whose complacent bravado was not disturbed, got everything that was important to them decisions in theirs senses or prepare let. He promised especially workers. When the speech came to this delicate point, it became apparent that those present were already in the throes of the offensive's success the early conquest of the Iraqi oil fields (Mosul, Kirkuk) as secure taken into account. Göring promised rapid support Oil tanker construction. He said on Fischer's insinuation there expressly the violent expropriation of the French refinery owners in the event that no agreement was reached between them and the Conti Oil regarding the dismantling and transport of their refineries to the east. He used strong words about the supposed lack of available drilling equipment and asked the Help both central planning and especially the Hermann Göring Group are in prospect. Above all, he had used his influence with Hitler so that the TBM, which had been "made available weeks before to the west of Rostov ,"[45 1] immediately joined the ranks of the front attack armies - in the direction of the Caucasus they were 1st and 4th Panzer Armies planned - was calculated. This also meant there was a chance to use the enormous amounts of drilling equipment and other things Material, the the freight from 80 until 100 freight trains corresponded, to be transported to the oil districts at the same time as troop supplies. For particularly urgent transports to the oil region, Konti **Öl** even had Air Force aircraft at its disposal .

After the instruction no. 45 of July 23rd 1942, which was the main thrust of the German units to Stalingrad and to the south - to the eastern Black Sea coast and the Caucasus - steered were “the entire east coast of the Black Sea” and “the high-altitude area to take possession of Maikop and Armavir", and "to gain the area around Grozny" and finally “the area around Baku takes possession take".45 [2] These operations walked under the code name “Edelweiss”.453

In the first August week bumped Elite units the 1st German tank army - the to Part through Airplanes with fuel provided become had to [454] - from Northeast towards Maykop before. On August 9th the first tanks entered the city; the following day it was evacuated by the Soviet Army. The high command was already in place on August 1st the Army Group A arranged, "Coming soon in Rostov arriving

450 Both Protocols printed in *Eichlwüz,* petroleum wells, p. 462 ff. Hereafter also the The following.
451 *Thomas,* S. 331.
452 *The second White war.* Documents, S. 175, Doc. 38.
453 Please refer the comprehensive Depiction of strategic background of Planes "Edelweiss" and the course of the fighting at *Ibragimbejli, Chadi.i Murat,* Krach "Edel'vejsa" i Bliznij Vostok, Moscow 1977.
454 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 18429, KTB the Army Group A, Entry v. 2. 8th. 1942.

When the advance detachment of the petroleum brigade appeared in Rostov, they should immediately cross the bridge (the only undestroyed Don bridge in the city - D. E.) to lead, she would follow behind the 1st Panzer Army further preferred be" .455

However, the oil fields were still far to the southwest "in the mountainous and jungle-like terrain"56 of the high valleys led into the mountains and extended approximately parallel to the ridge line of the Caucasus from northwest to southeast over a length of over 100 km. From the City were she in the Average 60 until 70km _ removed. In the second In the middle of August the German troops were defeated fierce resistance in the southeastern, older part of the oil region, and it was only in the first half of October that they also occupied the northwestern part Part.

At the beginning of September the fascists managed to form a bridgehead across the Terek towards Ordzonikidze and Groznyj; their repeated attempts to break through further and Groznyj too conquer, failed but bloody. That left it Baku, the capital of Soviet Azerbaijan, was also inaccessible to them. The occupiers conquered Groznyj Beginning October the the furthest west located Oil field at Malgobek about half. They didn't get any further. The Probes there were under constant pressure Shelling from the Soviet side, so that the TBM exploration teams had to be content with determining that the The degree of destruction was the same as in the Majkop district.'57

End October summarized the TBM: ,,The operational Condition all fields is from Malgobek to the Taman Peninsula, as experts predicted, the same: the most intensive destruction of the surface facilities, complete nailing of the boreholes, extensive material evacuation. Probes with good production are destroyed most carefully. Apart from usual methods: throwing in stones and iron parts, dropping poles and riser pipes and cementations, steel mushrooms of 30-40 were created specifically for this purpose kg weight installed, whose heads fit exactly into the piping and at the Foot movable Jaws carry, the, if it succeed In order to grasp the mushroom, it should slide onto the thickened foot end and clamp it against the pipework." 458 Most fields were strong mined. "Blown up and burned out Also included were the power plant in Apscheronskaya and the refinery in Krasnodar, which was connected to the oil region by a pipeline and produced, among other things, aviation fuel ."459

The Majkop oil fields were closed until the end of October, with the exception of about five Weeks in August/September, in the main thrust of the Caucasus grouping of the Wehrmacht. On bending or break the German troops here Fight along the road and railway in a southwesterly direction over the mountains to Tuapse. But straight here bumped she on hardest Resistance. 20 kilometre before Tuapse The German attack continued on the 23rd. Finally stuck in October, about 75 kilometers from Majkop. No wonder that the TBM specialists were doing clean-up work during this and the following period, but hardly any re-exploration, drilling and extraction work larger Style possible were, especially there Parts of the oil district in more immediate

455 Ibid, Entry v. 1. 8th. 1942.
456 Ibid, Entry v. 21. 8th. 1942.
457 *birch field,* Caucasus, p. 90; ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 18429, KTB the Army Group A, entry from October 6, 1942.
458 *Occupation, Robbery, Destruction,* S. 242, Doc. 97, report TBM (simple) v. 28. 10. 194.2.
459 *birch field,* Caucasus, S. 87.

Close to the front stayed. General Thomas later noted that "the petroleum brigade had to work for a long time under enemy fire in the Maykop area." [460]

In addition, the partisans and resistance fighters helped to thwart the invaders' plan, the the German war machine with Soviet oil wanted to eat. Of the 142 partisan detachments and groups operating in the Krasnodar and Ordzonikidze region operated, drew itself through special activity those Departments out of,

in those workers of Majkoper oil district fought. [461]

Under these circumstances, those the precarious supply and transport situation, the Lack of fuel and later The oncoming autumn and winter weather also helped also an urgent one command Hitler's dated October 12, 1942 about the "Reconstruction of the petroleum industry in the Caucasus"[462] few. With this decree the account should oil the local workforce and material supplies are secured. The workers should be fed in such a way that their willingness and ability to work is guaranteed deduction to others Work was prohibited. Material and equipment were to be produced at the highest level of urgency and to be brought in at an accelerated pace as Wehrmacht transports. The railway network in the oil region should be repaired as a matter of priority.

Of the enormous difficulties and insoluble problems To whom the German imperialists stood, testified the second "oil meeting", that on November 21, 1942 near Göring took place,[463] two days before the German 6. army in Stalingrad locked in

became. The circle of active participants the meeting was essentially the same as at the July 10 meeting. The main representatives of the oil accounts, Fischer and Bentz [464], stood under dem fresh Impression one Inspection trip into the Oil area from Maykop.

„The was the largest Disappointment", gave Fisherman to, as he from the found Zerstönmgen and from dem determined Resistance of Soviet people reported. [465] It be less complex and time consuming, everywhere new to drill. Have man however the Drilling equipment with more unspeakable Effort at Location and Job done, so dived always strong again Demolition crews the Partisans on, around the Drilling locations again to blast away. You have to practical - so Fisherman - „every drilling with Wire entanglement and with Bases". [466] At the same time were the Intruders angry determined, the once Did not conquer again to reveal, and from dem adventurous Urge animated, the Raid in year to continue in 1943, around possible soon at the most productive Sources of Caucasian oil.

460 *Tlwmas,* S. 332.

461 *Velikaya otecestvennaja vojna Sovetslvgo Soju:.a 1941-1945.* Kratkaja istorija, 2nd ed., Moscow 1970, p. 181.

462 BA Koblenz, R 41/270, Hitler's order regarding "reconstruction of the mineral oil industry in the Caucasus" dated October 12, 1942.

463 Please refer *Eichholtz,* petroleum wells, S. 483ff., Doc. 4.

464 Professor Alfred Bentz, the four-year plan representative for the promotion of oil production", leading head in the Reich Office or in the Reich Office for Soil Research, a authority in the field of petroleum extraction technology and extraction, put his scientific skills to the test in close cooperation with the petroleum monopolies of the Konti Öl and the GB Chemie in the service of war preparation of the fascist regime and the predatory ones imperialist expansion in the wars.

465 *Eichholiz,* petroleum wells, S. 488 (Doc. 4).

466 Ibid, S. 487.

Meanwhile had itself north the German Caucasus front, not more as 500 kilometers from Majkop, that fundamental change in the military Situation completed, the the brought about a turn in the war. At the 19. November 1942 sat the Soviet offensive at Stalingrad. On November 23rd , the iron encirclement ring around the city was closed. But it wasn't until the relief attempt from Kotel'nikovskij collapsed in mid-December and at the end of the month strength As Soviet forces gained considerable ground in the counterattack towards Rostov, the occupiers realized that the days of their rule in the Caucasus were numbered. General Thomas described the situation as follows: “Since during the time of the Stalingrad battles still hoping To still be able to hold the Maykop oil region, it was very difficult for the Eastern economic leadership to determine how the extensive transports for a long time the reconstruction of the oil region continues after Maykop area should run." 467

The around this time again overwhelmed 13 Drilling probes in the area brought in around seven tons of crude oil Per Day.468 New drilling had begun. From about 10,000 t material that, despite the greatest transport difficulties, reached the central material warehouse in Armavir had reached around 1,500 t the district itself reached. The “big effort the drilling rigs", from dem the fascist planner dreamed and the them already
in the April 1943 one Monthly production from 10000 t Oil 4 69 to back up should, found but not
more instead of.

Beginning January 1943 he began withdrawal of the Wehrmacht of Caucasus, Terek and Kuban over almost 600 kilometers, which are multiplied turned into a quick escape. The occupiers
left weapons and military equipment in large quantities, looted goods and even wounded people. 470 That is advocated it the Experts | still at the 5. January, the Repair
the Krasnodar refinery and the planning work for another new one in Armavir. But man calculated “temporarily” no longer included one further opening up the oil fields; The ongoing German production of hundreds of drilling rigs should be stopped. "The brigade's main material storage facility," it was said, "must now be moved further back. Unfortunately, we do not yet have a detailed destruction program to Disposal." 471

On the 17th January received the TBM in Majkop eviction notice; the next day she began with dem Retreat. “Destruction squads” remained for the time being back to on command the “plans of destruction” to carry out.4 72 On the 22nd The State Secretary agreed in January
Paul Körner, head of the Eastern Economic Staff, and General Stapf, Chief of the Eastern Economic Staff, said that, as stated in a diary note from the Eastern Economic Staff euphemistic was called, „the main emphasis now the Oil shale in Estonia" be and
"that the Forces the TBM elsewhere for the Mission reach" should.473 tags on it, in

467 *Tlwmas,* P. 374.

468 *birch field,* Caucasus, S. 90. Hereafter also the following Numbers.

469 End October 1942 was in the TBM with 7500 tons monthly in the April, with 45000 t in July and with 82500 t in the October Calculated in 1943 been *(occupation, Robbery, Destruction,* pp. 243f., Doc. 97, report TBM v. October 28, 1942).

470 *Velikaya otecestvennaja vojna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945,* S. 226; *Thomas,* S. 370.

471 *Occupation, Robbery, Annihilation,* p. 248ff. (249), Doc. 100, AT WiAmt ex. Discuss b. General Thomas with E R. fisherman, Bentz among others on January 5, 1943.

472 *birch field,* Caucasus, S. 90.

473 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 416, Bl. 201f., Doc. PS-3013, „From the boss Wi Rod East at the

At the last minute, Göring gave the order to destroy the Majkoper district facilities.474 The next day, January 24th , Armavir, the most important loophole for the fleeing TBM, was already liberated by the Soviet army. The occupiers were able to do so in their pressure Hurry the there huge "advanced storage warehouse" the TBM, the 10000 t Material, including ten complete drilling rigs, contained, not resolve more, the No advice transport more away. They blew up it into the air. 47 5 The TBM itself escaped with effort. The brigade, "which, according to instructions from the Supreme Command, was only supposed to leave the oil areas with the fighting troops, lost theirs Withdraw the mass of the material and came severely decimated to the area west Rostov back".476 At the 29. January moved first Soviet Partisan detachments in Maykop a.477 End of The Maykop area was liberated for a month. A few weeks later the accounts were carrying oil and the heads of the German war economy buried their "Eastern Oil Plan": "The entire Eastern Oil Plan including Kherson can in the Connection with the Position in the east quiet placed become." 478

With it disappeared the oil of Caucasus but still by no means out of dem War target program of the German imperialists. In the programmatic elaboration by Richard already quoted Riedl on "The Russian Question" from the spring 1943 47 9 occurred this clearly visible. The Ukraine, there as future Satellite state with political pseudo-sovereignty conceived, should be in the east until on the Donbogen line - Stalingrad - Volga estuary and in the southeast to for the Caucasus to be expanded. But Riedl held it for "meaningless". how much from "Ciscaucasia", that according to his imaginations to Baku was enough, ultimately "to future Ukraine beaten or as southeastern Border mark under (German - DE) military administration provided become" would, there this area "for Russia ... in each Trap lost" go.480

Such plans and wishful dreams corresponded the military Planning still until late summer 1943 . The point from which the fascists wanted to unravel "Ciscaucasia" again was the Taman Peninsula, the so-called Kuban bridgehead or "Goth's head". Hitler still had it on the 21st. January In 1943, when Army Group A reported to him that around 500,000 were going to the bridgehead Mann said, "In this case, the oil area in Maikop could be included in the Gotenkopf".481 Although this illusion few days then dispersed, he stubbornly stuck to his intention, "An extensive bridgehead on the Kuban (to claim, out of dem he to given Time the Handle after dem oil of Caucasus to renew commemorated". 482 At the 13. March 1943 received the Army Group A the strict Command, „the

23. 2. 1944 approved outline for the material collection to Story of **Wi** Staff East" (KTB entry dated January 22, 1943).

474 Ibid, Entry v. 23. 1. 1943.

475 *Thomas,* S. 374; *birch field,* Caucasus, S. 90.

476 *Thomas,* p. 370. - Birch field gives at, the TBM be above the peninsula Kerc been returned *(Birkenfeld,* Caucasus, p. 90).

477 *Grechko,* S. 343.

478 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 1726, AN ex. Meeting between herb, Slider (RMfBuM) and Sweep! (RWiM) at the February 25, 1943, v. February 26, 1943.

479 Please refer *EichhoUz,* „Ways to De-Bolshevization ... ", S. 28ff.

480 Ibid, S. 35.

481 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 18429, KTB the Army Group A, Entry from the 21. 1. 1943.

482 *Y Manstein,* S. 423.

Gothic head and the Crimea in any case to hold".483 Until September Several hundred thousand men and disproportionately strong air force forces, which the fascists urgently needed in other parts of the front, doggedly defended the Taman Peninsula up to the mouth of the Kuban as well as the city and port of Novo Rossiysk.

After the Kursk battle in the July August 1943, from the one general offensive the Soviet Army theirs Exit took, after the liberation from Kharkov (23. August) and After breaking through the Mius position, the Soviet troops launched a decisive attack on the Kuban at the beginning of September above. The German high command, which had been "in view" of withdrawing from the bridgehead since mid-August,485 gave the final order for eviction and "clearance destruction" at the 4. September 1943. 4 86 In this one command found itself the infamous fundamental one Instruction, only "scorched earth" to be left behind: "The opponent must have a completely unusable, long-term, uninhabitable, desolate Country, where still mine blasting for months occur, take over." 4 8 7

On the 9th October 1943, after thirty days of bitter Battle, the Taman Peninsula was completely of the Occupiers freed. „The gate for the Caucasus", that's what it said this one day in Order of the day of Commander-in-Chief the Soviet North Caucasus Front, general 1. E Petrov, „is for the Enemies ours Hometown finally slammed."4 88

This meant that the oil strategy of German imperialism suffered a fiasco in the Second World War. Forever was decades The cherished and never given up dream of German finance capital to found an oil empire on the oil sources of the Caucasus as a foundation for its quest for world power and world domination has been shattered.

3. War economics Results of the occupation policy

The economic Exploitation of the annexed and occupied 4 8 9 areas began - since 1938 - in each case immediately with the occupation of the country in question. In the second half of year 1940 she took a systematic one and also geographically comprehensive character 1941 to the Balkans, 1941/42 extended to extensive areas of the USSR and reached her in 1943 most intense stage.

1940 German imperialism, in addition to "Greater Germany", had the potential of large parts of Europe from Brittany to Bug and San, played a role in the war economy as early as 1941 , when it was excellently armed and equipped fascist Army of millions in the Soviet Union occurred. 4 90 That one fact became

483 *KTB d. OKW,* Vol. 3/2, S. 1421, Doc. 7, "Operation order No. 5 (Instruction for the Combat leadership of the next Months)" of OKH v. March 13, 1943.
484 *Groehler,* Story of air warfare, S. 355 ff.
485 *KTB d. OKW,* Vol. 3/2, S. 944, Entry v. 14. 8th. 1943.
486 Ibid, S. 1455, Doc. 25, command of OKH v. 4. 9. 1943.
487 Ibid, S. 1455.
488 **Quote** b. *Grechko,* S. 491.
489 In the following are under "occupied" or "occupied" areas the annexed Areas usually or to be understood analogously as included; necessary distinctions become explicit noted.

also an important domestic political factor in Germany. The consciousness in Europe about Having enormous resources at one's disposal and the hope of a correspondingly comfortable life pushed back the impulses of reason even among many who had reservations about the regime and made it easier for those in power to manipulate the brains.

For the Years 1942 and 1943 and himself still for 1944 can the, What the Occupiers at Pump economic power from the occupied territories into their war economy, in his Meaning even not high enough assessed become. The accelerated Upswing in arms production, achieved despite the collapse of the blitzkrieg strategy outside Moscow and the turn of the war Stalingrad, would be without the ruthless one exploitation of these areas were just as unthinkable as the relatively high material standard of living of Germans Population, especially the amount of their food rations.

It was on two points economic Contribution of the occupied territories to the German imperialists of decisive importance Meaning. Without the stolen industrial ones Raw materials, especially Money, iron ore, steel and Steel vcredler, bauxite and Copper, and without the drudgery of foreigners Forced laborers in Germany would not have been able to continue their war for much longer after the failure of the Blitzkrieg strategy can.

Further should the German "nutrition problem"4 [91] be solved in war (and for all future times), mainly through the conquest of Soviet Ukraine and other Soviet territories. In this respect, however, the high expectations of the German imperialists were not fulfilled. But they were all forced out of occupied Europe Quantities of food were considerably.

A Part the Industry in the occupied countries produced further on Order German Military departments and war economy authorities weapons, war equipment and military equipment for the fascist Wehrmacht. 4 [92]

An important yardstick Clearing debts and occupation costs were incurred for the plundering of the occupied countries, the two main financing methods, with the help of which Occupiers exploited these countries.

An exact and complete quantification of the overall result the fascist loot and exploitation politics in the occupied areas Europe is not possible. In the fascist economic statistics, the territorial status of the occupied areas is shown separately, but hardly ever that of the annexed areas. A number of important factors of economic exploitation and plunder cannot be recorded at all or only sporadically, especially requisitions and Looting through the group and the individuals Occupiers, the Losses of the occupied countries due to the manipulated currency relations, whether organized or unregulated Black market purchases occupier, her enrichment at " clearance goods" and the masses Destruction of assets dem Retreat.

490 The value of all the economic and other goods stolen from the occupied territories by the German occupiers by the summer of 1941 is 9 billion f (90-100 billion RM) has been estimated *(Krm,cenko, G. S.,* Voenno-promyslennye potential SSSR i Germanii i effectivelynost' i ispol'zovanija v vtoroj mirovoj vojne, in: *Vtoraja miroi,aja i,ojna,* 1. Book: Obseie problematic, Moscow 1966, p. 58).

491 *AdaP,* Series D, Vol. 13/1, p. 311, Doc. 239, Telegrams Ribbentrops to the German Embassy Tokyo, 25. 8. 1941, or on all remaining missions, 26. 8. 1941.

492 After rougher estimate for 1943 20-25 Percent. Please refer S. 507f.

The Exploitation of economic potential the occupied areas were Of course Limits set. The resistance of the peoples in his diverse to form destroyed the The aggressors' hope that this potential could be transformed into an effective "large-scale" war economy system to integrate. Above all met the on the occupied Soviet areas to. There, where is average two years long Industrial areas and Raw material resources of more powerful capacity in of their hand, succeeded it neither to them at Iron ore, coal and steel, let alone at Oil, to extract significant quantities n. 493 Add came, that War and occupation the original Economic structures the occupied countries in many cases largely destroyed and their economy so deep ruined that production in wide areas of the manufacturing industry and agriculture fell a fraction of pre-war levels.

a) Reason- and raw materials

The annexation of Polish Upper Silesia immediately after the start of the war significantly improved German imperialism's *coal balance* . The funding performance in Polish Upper Silesia - 41.65 Millions of tons of hard coal in the last year before the war 1938/39 (Coal marketing year from April to March) - rose to 70 in the following years million t (1943/44) or 26 percent the "Greater German" Production. 494 In the Years 1943/44 the annexed territories (Polish Upper Silesia, Alsace-Lorraine, the Czech territories and Austria) produced approximately 98.5 Millions of tons of coal in total (lignite in proportion 4.5 to 1 on Hard coal units converted); the were 28.3 percent the "Greater German" Production.495 Out of Polish Upper Silesia came further approximately 7 millions t

Table 115
Coal mining in the German sphere of power 1939/40-1943144
(brown coal in Hard coal units converted; in mill. t)

Coal year (April-March)	"Greater Germany d"	of which: annexed territories	In percent	Occupied areas
1939/40	267.7	34.0	13	(96.9)
1940/41	315.5	76.0	'.l4	87.3
1941/42	317.9	76.4	'.l4	89.9
1942/43	340.4	90.1	27	89.3
1943/44	347.6	98.5	28	84.7

Source: The Effects, p. 94, table 57. The annexed territories include Alsace-Lorraine, the Czech territories ("Czechoslovakia"), Austria and Polish Upper Silesia understood. The whereabouts of the figures for Luxembourg are not clear. - Minor differences between percentages and absolute starting numbers may occur when the absolute numbers are rounded down are; the Percentages are after the unrounded Pay calculated.

493 *Zagorul'ko/Judenko;,,* S. 252U.

494 *The Effects,* S. 92. Unfounded high is the ibid, p. 71, without accurate Date mentioned number from 90 mill. t; quite secure to low are against it the at *Madajczyk,* Polityka, Vol. 2, S. 546, Tab. 50, specified Pay (around 40 Min. t !ur 1943/44).

495 *The effects,* S. 94, Table 57.

Coke (15 percent of German production). 496 The occupied areas (excluding the annexed ones) received funding in the same year 84.7 Millions of tons of coal, mainly in the respective country were consumed themselves - indirectly to a considerable extent also for German purposes, especially in France and Belgium.497

The care the metallurgical Industry with *Iron ore* was Beginning of war one of the huge Care for the German Imperialists. In the so-called Old Reich (Limits from 1937) were 1939 at Iron ore (Fe content) 3.7 million t promoted in the to to the outbreak of war annexed areas additionally 1.2 million t. 4 98 This amounts covered 35.4 percent of German Iron ore consumption.499 The campaign in the west 1940 brought the biggest the at that time known European iron ore deposits, the Minette area in Eastern France and Luxembourg, in the Power of disposal the aggressors, the with it her supply situation with one Blow significant improved ah. By no means full of Utilization promoted the Minette mining from July 1940 until July 1944 - to around 60 percent its capacity in the annexed areas Lorraine and Luxembourg located 500 - 35 million t Iron ore (Fe content).501 In contrast fraud the German Production (limits from 1939) in the same Period 28 millions t and the import out of Sweden 23.3 million t.50 2 Meager a one-third the promoted Minette became after Germany loaded, approximately 43 percent processed the Lorraine one and the Luxembourg metallurgy

Table 116
Portion the annexed and occupied areas at the German Iron ore supply 1939-1944 (in 1000 t Fe content)

	ore consumption („large Germany")	of that out of annex. areas	out of okkup. areas (France u. Norway)	Column 2 & 3 in percent v. Split 1
1939	13900	1203		9
1940	11699	874	170	9
1941	17055	6280	2327	51
1942	17521	6249	2653	51
1943	18468	7566	2710	56
1944	13500	4748	?	?

Source: Hunter, S. 108, tab. 10, p. 187, tab. 22 u. S. 189, Tab. 23. - For 1940 (2. Half) missing in column 2 and 3 apparently the German minette purchases from Lorraine and Luxembourg; from 15. 8. In 1940 they no longer appeared in the import statistics, which included German production statistics she but first away January 1941 a. After *The effects,* S. 247, app. Tab. 67, were in 1940 out of „Belgium and Luxembourg" 629000 t Iron ore (with approximately 32 percent Fe content) introduced.

496 Ibid, S. 71.
497 Ibid, p. 71 u. S. 94, Tab. 57.
498 *Hunter,* S. 71, Table 7.
499 Ibid, S. 131, Tab. 16.
500 Just that. 179, Table 20. Not essential differing Pay at *Milward,* The New Order and the French economy, p. 215, Table 37.
501 *Hunter,* S. 180, Tab. 21.
502 Ibid.

gy, and the remaining quarter was smelted in the remaining French territory and in Belgium.5° [3] Of course, the ore smelted here went into German armaments production at a rate that was almost as high as the iron produced in Germany itself, be it through Steel export after Germany, be it through Armament deliveries on "relocated" German orders. This in Germany (including Lorraine and Luxembourg) Since 1941 , more than 50 iron ores have been processed percent from the annexed areas.

steel was the most important Basic material for the Arms production. Through Expansion and war gained the German imperialists within a few years the disposal of more than that Double the original capacity the German one Steel industry, which was already one of the largest in the world. Was the capacity in the "Altreich". the war approximately 23 millions t Crude steel in the Year, so expanded she the occupation Austria and the Czech areas around 3.3 millions t,504 of Poland around 2.1 millions t,505 France at 10 million, Belgium's by 4.3 and Luxembourg around 2.9 millions t. [5] [06] Mainly through the annexations until Summer 1940 growth the German Crude steel capacity from 23 to approx. 39 million t,507 in the occupied areas (especially in Belgium, northern France, Meurthe et- Moselle). more 14 until 18 millions t, so that the German mining powers with 43 until 57 Millions of tons of crude steel counted on their immediate sphere of influence. [508] This did not include the capacity of the Dnepr-Donec area, which lasted two years under fascist occupation located.

The actual production from Crude steel lay considerably under the capacity limit, in "Greater Germany" to approximately one Fifth, all in one German sphere of power even a third J.509 The annexed and occupied n areas produced per year the Highest total production (1943) 40 percent of all crude steel, namely almost 14 million t. Only 4 of them came Millions of tons from the occupied, just under 10 Millions of tons from the annexed areas. [510] (Table 117)

For the German war economy indispensable Basic materials were the *steel peredlers,* above all Ferroalloy metals How manganese, nickel, chromium and tungsten, the, melted into the raw steel, this one only that **for** High performance or Stainless steel characteristic Impart hardness, toughness and corrosion resistance. The German imperialists obtained two of the most important of them, namely manganese and chromium, exclusively or predominantly from the Exploitation of occupied areas.

The Happen at *manganese* at Nikopol (Ukraine) and at Ciatura (Grusinia) were for

503 Ibid, S. 179.
504 *The Effects,* S. 101.
505 *Hunter,* p. 175.
506 *The effects,* S. 101.
507 *Hunter,* S. 301. According to different Information from the Wigru iron workers Industry of 1945 (10.1.) believed itself the capacity of the "Altreich" in 1938 approx. 24 mill. t and rose until 1943 around 2 million t; the capacity of the annexed territories at around 11 mill. t added, this resulted in a total capacity of "Greater Germany" of around 37 for 1943 Million tons Crude steel *(Schumann,* RGI post-war planning, doc. 4, p. 286).
508 *Hunter,* S. 301.
509 Ibid, S. 302; *Schumann,* Post-war planning the RGI, Doc. 4, S. 286 (exploitation in "Greater Germany"=83 percent).- *Jäger* (p. 302ff.) lists the primary causes of underutilization Coke- and Labor shortage.
510 *The effects,* S. 252, Tab. 72; *Schumann,* Post-war planning the RGI, S. 268 u. 284.

Table 117
Crude steel production in the German sphere of power 1939-1944 (in mill. t)

	"Greater Germany" annexed and occupied territories	of which: annexed and occupied territories	Column 2 in percent from column 1
1939	23.9	2.3	10
1940	23.1	3.9	17
1941	32.0	11.2	35
1942	31.0	10.5	34
1943	34.6	13.9	40
1944	28.5	10.2	36

Source: Hunter, S. 305, Tab. 47; *Statistical yearbook,* 1941/42, S. 75+. Deviant Values **for** Split 1 (1941=31.8; 1942=32.1) at *car driver,* S. 52; The *effects,* S. 250ff., Tab. 71 u. 72.

Table 118
robbery Soviet manganese ore 1941-1943 (in 1000 t Mn content)

	consumption in "Greater Germany"	of which: robbery from the USSR	Column 2 in percent from column 1
2. half 1941	63.8	25.5	40
1. half 1942	55.7	39.0	70
2. half 1942	67.4	86.7	129
1. half 1943	84.1	94.8	113
2. half 1943	85.8	70.0	82
In total	356.8	316.0	89

Source: Hunter, S. 205, Tab. 26.

the German Monopolies a important economic strategic war aim. In the the first period of the war huge Manganese reserves Hitler's Germany on less than the half decreased.511 The conquest of ore district from Nikopol in August 1941 seemed the manganese worries the German Defense companies too remedy. For over two years could she itself on the largest Manganese ore deposits Europe support, that she - after Removal greater found Ore- and Manganese stocks - ruthless from loot. (Table 118)

In reality, conditions were much more favorable for the occupiers. If you add the low-percentage ores (up to 30 percent Mn content) not included in the statistics and the quantities delivered to third countries, the total amount is out of the USSR stolen manganese around above 35 percent higher, namely at 428400 t.512

511 *Hunter,* S. 197.

512 Ibid, S. 206. - After *Sorokin, G. M., u. a.,* Nemecko-faliistskaya sistema ograblenija i eko nomiceskoj ekspluatacii okkupirovannych territory SSSR, in: *Nemecko-Fasistskij occupation nyj reim,* S. 160, corresponded the one Total amount of 1,136 mill. **t** ore and concentrates. After German Sources are in total 1,782 mill. t transported away been (ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 10694, lineup of the OKW/Field Economics Office v. November 1944).

The significantly increasing consumption was therefore full during the specified time and beyond out of the Soviet areas; for a longer period of time Even the supplies were replenished significantly.

At the start of the war, supplies also dried up *Chrome ore* the main sources of supply German imperialism. The existing stocks of chromium melted, as in manganese, until the Balkan campaign was reduced to less than half.513 The war changed things again the Position fundamental. The German occupiers laid 1941 hand to all Chromium ore mines of Yugoslavia and Greece, including those particularly important deposits that lay in the part of Macedonia that fell to Bulgaria. In September 1943 The Albanian mines, which had previously been exploited by Italy, also fell into German hands.

Table 119
Portion the occupied Countries Southeastern Europe at the German Chrome ore production 1941-1944 _ (in 1000 t deployable Cr-lnhaü)

	Chromium ore consumption "Greater Germany"•	Deliveries from Yugoslavia, Greece and (from autumn 1943) Albania	Column 2 in percent from column 1
1941	25.6	4.4	17
1942	21.7	28.4	131
1943	35.8	22.1 ••	62
1944 (Jan. - Nov.)	37.4	35.6	95
May 1941 until November 1944 total	103.0	89.6	87

• The German total chrome consumption was (accounting for the intervention in stocks and the import from chrome metal) larger as the stated chrome ore consumption and fraud from 1939 until 1944 yearly average around 40000 metric tons (*The Effects,* S. 264, Tab. 83; *Hunter,* S. 264, Tab. 39).
Against it is the number for 1943 in Column 2 probably too low. Franz Neuhausen, the "General authorized for the Metal ore mining southeast", reported for this Year one Promotion of 166801 t of ore with 35,953 t of chromium content (of which 27,105 t = 75 percent from Macedonia alone, 8,397 out of Greece, the rest out of Serbia and Northern Albania). Originally planned was a Crowd from 48000 t (ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 10749, report Neuhausens v. April 26, 1944).

Source: Jäger, p. 255, table. 37 u. p. 263, tab. 38. (Releasable chromium content= 75 to 85 percent of the analytical chromium content).

Almost half 514 of the total German chrome ore imports (extractable Cr content) in 1941 until 1944 (123,000 According to this information, tons) came from the occupied areas of Yugoslavia (55,832 tons); the next largest suppliers were Greece (25991) and Albania (7734 tons).515 Except Chrome ore became yearly

513 *Hunter,* S. 248.

514 After the Declarations Neuhausens (ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 10749, report Neuhausens v. April 26, 1944) probably more as the Half.

515 *Hunter,* S. 255, Tab. 37 (May 1941 until November 1944).

several thousand tons of chromium metal and ferrochrome imported; These quantities also came primarily from occupied countries (Norway, France, and since 1943 Italy), as well as from Sweden.516

As the largest aluminum producer in the world, Germany relied almost entirely on imports *bauxite* reliant, that one mineral from which nearly the total amount the most important metal for the war economy alongside iron. The bauxite deposits of France - Main exporter to Hungary of bauxite - were located exclusively in southern France, especially in the Italian-occupied area. But political pressure German occupying power and extensive Barrier the French from The rest of the sales market meant that French bauxite production was largely equal to that of Germany since the end of 1940 War economy made usable became.

The French Bauxite production reached 1942 nearly the Pre-war height and stretched in the following one and a half years under the pressure the German delivery demands far exceed their previous ones capacity limit.

TabeUe 120
production French Bauxite for the German War economy 1940-1944 (in 1000 t)

	French production	of which deliveries to Germany	Column 2 in percent from column 1
1940	489.0	?	?
1941	586.3	232.1	40
1942	644.2	230.7	36
1943	912.1	484.4	53
1944 (Jan.- June)	?	240.2	?

Source: Milward, The New order and the French economy, S. 238, Tab. 47.

The proportion the French Deliveries of German bauxite consumption amounted to approximately 1941 on 93 percent, in 1942 to 84 percent. 5 17 In the first half-year In 1944 the French share was Deliveries to the German bauxite import which also only Hungary and - with distance - Yugoslavia (Croatia) played a role, after all still 38 percent (excluding June = 45 percent).518

Of the French aluminum production, which had fallen sharply since 1942, a total of 52 percent (104,000 tons) fell between mid-1940 and mid-1944 Germany.519 Refers to the Aluminum- and Alumina supplies a, so brought Hitler Germany In 1941 it was already 70 percent, in 1942 it was 80 percent and in 1943/1944 (first half of the year) an even higher percentage of French bauxite production (1938= 12 percent).520 According to incomplete information These quantities and the rest of the imports were enough for the Germans Bauxite requirements with Excess to to satisfy. 521

516 Ibid, p. 264.
517 Ibid.; *The effects,* S. 263, app. Tab. 83 (here no Pay for the remaining war years).
518 *Milward,* The New order and the French economy, S. 240, Tab. 49.
519 Ibid., p.239, table 48.
520 Ibid, S. 238f.
521 Declarations only for 1941 and 1942 in *The Effects,* p. 263, app. Tab. 83 (Come up (metal content) 272400 or 332400 t, consumption 250200 or 275,400 t).

The supply of the Wehrmacht and the War economy with *fuel* was a critical point first Ranges. The synthetic production from fuel in Germany he• reached her high status in the Don't war last Cost those resources at Money. theirs starting material -, the in the occupied areas in the Power of disposal the German Imperialists got into trouble. But synthetic production and import alone were far from covering the consumption of petroleum products. Oil production in Germany and in the occupied areas covered while the War years only between 25 and a good 40 percent of consumption.5 [22] This was pushed forward until the outbreak of war Financial support in Germany became from 1941 at strong braked, surely already in the view on the still for this Year expected influx Caucasian petroleum. The Financial support on the more productive fields in Austria however drove one, without before robbery-like Extraction methods to shrink back, from 1939 until In 1944 this increased tenfold.523 The occupiers in Poland and the Soviet Union did something similar Western areas before; but the Resistance the Population and the Party sanen 5 [24] left production there even in 1943, at its peak, far behind **pre-** war levels stay behind.525

Table 121

Share of oil production in annexed and occupied areas in fuel Persumption of Germany 1938-1944 (in 1000 t)

	consumption "Large-of Germany" to Mineral oil products (Fuels u. lubricating oil)	German earth oil production ("Old Empire")	Oil production in Austria, Galicia in (Poland) and West Ukraine (USSR)	column 3 percent from Split 1
1938	6150	540	52 •	1
1939	?	716	173**	?
1940	5856	1056	538	9
1941	7305	901	867	12
1942	6483	742	1247	19
1943	6971	710	1504	22
1944	ex. 5000	719	1514	approx. 30

• Only Austria

•• Austria and Polish Galicia only. When calculating the percentages, the slight difference in quantities between the crude oil produced and the mineral oil products made from it was not taken into account

Source: Please refer Note 522.

522 These and the figures in the following table are calculated or compiled from various sources, which do not agree in every case, which is only partially explained by different calculation bases *(Wagenühr,* p. 172; *Birkenfeld,* fuel, p. 218, transl. 3 ; *Kasper,* Petroleum production, p. 59, S. 68, S. 71 u. p. 81; see. further *The effects,* p. 75, Tab. 37; *Statistical Manual,* S. 501).

523 *Kasper,* petroleum extraction, S. 71.

524 Over the effective actions the Partisan General SA Kovpaks in western Ukraine Oilfield (Summer 1943) s. *Vershigora, Peter,* In the ghost forest, Berlin 1958, S. 632ff.

525 *Kasper,* petroleum extraction, S. 74 (note 1) u. S. 81.

b) Agricultural Products

In the second half of September 1941 - spectacularly announced and widely exploited for propaganda purposes - the first food transports from the occupied Soviet territories to Germany. Right at the beginning these transports took place for which the fascists had to fulfill an important domestic political function, on a considerable scale at. During the first three weeks met 33 Trains with cattle and 350 Railway wagons with high-quality food in Germany, a total of 18,547 livestock alone Bovine, 727 Pigs and 1304 Sheep.526

The outcome of the battle Moscow poured wormwood into the wine of the conquerors. What happened next was different than they had imagined Until the end of the occupation, the essential importance of the food resources of the occupied Soviet territories for the German Imperialists "not actually in the Delivery of Reich (the in nearly higher Dimensions through the small General Government carried out

Table 122
In the occupied Soviet areas stolen Agricultural products 1941/42-1944 (in 1000 t)

product	1941/42 •	1943	1944 (1. Quarter)	Together	Of that after German transported
Grain••	3999	4653	641	9293	1301
Meat•••	386	169	25	581	73
Fat 0	288	286	16	620	320
(of that Butter)	(108)	(64)	(4)	(207)	(21)
potatoes	1768	1408	105	3282	
roughage	883	1332	293	2508	
Sugar	149	231	22	401	62
Eggs (mill. pcs.)	575	498	6	1079	133
Fish 00	25	41	1	68	1
legumes	95	99	16	210	32
Vegetables u. Fruit 00	219	268	16	503	10
Textile raw materials 000	39	22	24	85	?

• From the founding the ZHO (July 17, 1941) until End 1942
Bread- and feed grains including milled products and Seeds
Incl. Livestock (slaughter weight) and poultry. Below the ZHO numbers rounded off at the Rosenberg Ministry (Doc. PS-327, abbreviated in *Anatomy of War,* p. 464, Doc. 262), the total figure for meat (622,000 t) is the only one that differs from the total figures given here (Split 4) considerably upwards

0 Butter, oils and Oilseeds (Oils and Oilseeds in Commercial fat converted). Split 4 incl. 30000 t butter for the Wehrmacht, the not above the ZHO billed became

00 Incl. Canned goods. Regarding fruit and Canned fruit no information for the 1st quarter of 1944

000 Flax, Hemp, Cotton, \,Full and Animal hair

Source: ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 10634, ,,Fifth work report" the ZHO; for Textile raw materials: *anatomy of war,* S. 471, Doc. 267, Overall report the East fiber GmbH f. 1941-1944 .

526 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 10634, 1. "Work report" theZHO f. <l. Time v.17. 7. until 21. 10. 19"1.

will), but in the Relieving the empire (and its means of transport) from the Delivery the at the Eastern Front fighting troops with many products".5 27

From the after Germany arriving Soviet agricultural products came from 94.5 percent from Ukraine.5 2 8 Only the oil crops played a decisive role in the domestic German supply balance.5 29 (Table 122)

The ZHO figures presented here do not include the requisitions, looting, black market purchases and "clearances" carried out directly by the Wehrmacht530 or by the civilian occupation authorities. The ZHO transported 32,900 "clearance goods" during the retreats Wagons off, including 22,400 Grain, oilseeds, seeds, etc. and 9000 loaded with agricultural machinery and other means of production_5.'l1

According to Soviet Sources and calculations were of grain alone in the Ukraine in Years 1941 around 1 Million tons confiscated and for purposes used by the occupiers. In 1942 and 1943, the fascists robbed about 4.1 per year in the occupied Soviet territories until 4.2 million tons of grain and 1.1 Millions of tons of meat. Accordingly, the total figures for exploitation in the country were 1941 until 1944 far higher than the ZHO figures; for grain they were at least 10 million tons, for meat an estimated 3 million t. The occupiers raised these quantities by leaving agriculture without seeds and the Soviet farmers and their families Hunger revealed.532

In addition to the occupied Soviet territories, Poland, France and Denmark also played an important role in the food balance of German imperialism. The majority of Poland's agricultural surpluses came from the annexed territories (Wiel kopolska, Pomorze). As the Institute for the World Economy noted retrospectively in 1945 , "in the four years in which the harvest benefited the German food industry in its entirety, there was an (annual - D. E.) Surplus of one million t of grain (or appropriate amounts of flour) and 200000 t sugar is at least possible and has probably been achieved, quite apart from the further effects that can be achieved by restricting consumption (! - D E.) Quantities".533 These were the Polish starvation rations Population in the "Warthegau" and in Danzig-West Prussia in Height of 53 up to 57 percent of Germans,5 34 who are eloquent here “Consumption restriction”. became. The delivery target the annexed Polish areas fraud

527 Ibid, Movie 2348, ,,The war economy Contribution Eastern Europe **for** the Rich 1936-1944" (elaboration from the Institute for the World Economy), undated.

528 Ibid, Movie 10634, ,,Fifth work report" the ZHO for the Time v. 1. 7. 1943 until 31. 3. 1944 (v. July 15, 1944).

529 Ibid, Movie 2348, ,,The war economy Contribution Eastern Europe ... ".

530 After - certainly too more lofty - estimate the ZHO (ibid., film 10634, "Fifth work report" the ZH 0) made her Deliveries to the \Vehrmacht 80 percent of what the German troops had in terms of agriculture products for own Total consumption from the Land withdrawals.

531 *anatomy of war,* S. 464, Doc. 262, Attachment e.g. Write Rosenberg's at Bormann v. October 17, 1944 (PS- 327).

532 *Sorokin u. a.,* S. 159.

533 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 2348, ,,The war economy Contribution Eastern Europe ... ".

534 *Madajczyk,* Polityka, vol. 2, p. 44, tab. 81,. After Calorie count calculated for a family three children aged 7 to 12.

while the Harvest years 1942/43 and 1943/44 at Grain 3.1 millions t, the were over 13 percent of the quota imposed on agriculture in Germany (pre-war borders). 535 They were with it in this relationship next one occupied areas the USSR that at the most plundered from everyone occupied and annexed areas.

From the General Government, whose population, especially in the cities, according to the Governor General Hans Franks words on dem "absolutely starvation status"536 lived, became significant amounts at agricultural products after Germany gone.

Table 123
Deliveries of agricultural and commercial products dem Generalgou1Jernement to Germany/Switzerland 1940/41 to 1943144 (in t)

financial year	Grain	cattle	Fat	potatoes	Sugar
1940/41	40000	7510	800	121000	4500
1941/42	58000	21498	900	134000	4465
1942/43	633470	54272	7235	434350	28666
1943/44	571682	53768	1355 *	387741	27546

• Planned "export". Significantly different figure (7700 tons) in *Fajkowski, J6zef,* Wies w ogniu, Warsaw 1972, p. 37

Source: Madajczyk, Polityka, Vol. 1, S. 533, Tab. 46.

The French Grocery deliveries climbed After the failure of the Blitzkrieg, they took first place within a year German "import" statistics. Under increasing pressure from the occupiers, they should be sent out together with the increased deliveries the General Government and from other occupied countries compensate for the lost income from the dreamed-of large agricultural empire on Soviet soil.537

Table 124
Deliveries French Agricultural products at Germany 1940141-1943144 (in 1000 t)

Marketing year	grain	meat	fat	potatoes	wine (mill. 1)
1940/41	1160	162	16	43	396 (230)
1941/42	950	146	45	20 (58)	397 (220)
1942/43	1429	253	22	296	459 (330)
1943/44	1423	211 (133)	?	375	401 (260)

Source: According to *Milward,* The New Order and French Economy, p. 257f., tables 53 and 54 (rough text in brackets Deviations the stated there Sources among themselves); Fat: ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 391, BI. 7, Doc. NG-1053, "Figures about the German war food economy", O. D

535 Ibid, S. 62, tab. 88. - The beginning of the harvest or financial year is for grains and fat A u g u s t 1st **,** for meat 1. September; not uniform the marketing year for potatoes, sugar, etc. is calculated (usually begins September **1st** or October 1).

536 *Piotrowski, Stanislav,* Hans Franks Diary, Warsaw 1963, S. 380, Diary entry v. 14. 12. 1942 (Speech Franks before Political Ladders the NSD;'\P).

537 See. *Milward,* The New order and the French economy, S. 255.

Denmark's forced contribution to the German war food economy was at Meat and butter exceptional large. Danish agricultural production fell sharply under the German occupation, with meat falling from 488,000 tons in 1939 to 275,000 tons Years 1942 (1943: 281,000 t), at butter in the same period of 183000 to 109000 t (1943: 125000 t). [5 38] Accordingly they sank Deliveries to Germany. Still delivered Denmark still more butter as all other occupied areas; the Meat deliveries were only from those from the occupied Soviet territories and France.

Table 125
Danish Grocery deliveries at Germany 1940/41-1943!44 (in 1000 t)

financial year	Meat	butter	Cheese	Fish
1940/41	190	64.6	5.6	101
1941/42	183	35.8	4.8	113
1942/43	62 (80)	37.9	2.7	93
1943/44	150	52.0	4.0	104

Source: ZStA Potsdam, Case XI, No. 391, BI. 10, Doc. NG-1053, "Figures on the German wartime food industry", n.d.; 1943/44: Ibid, FS, Movie 10630, File note (BfV/Nutrition Business Group) v. August 22, 1944 (number in brackets ibid); e.g. T Numbers that deviate greatly upwards and downwards, ibid., film 13430, extra. List (hs.) "according to the Reich Plenipotentiary".

One relative complete Overview on the Robbery of agricultural products For the most informative year in this regard (1942/43), Minister Herbert Backe and his right-hand man, Ministerial Director Riecke, at the beginning of 1944, when they reported on Göring's fulfillment at the beginning of August 1942 demands made on the occupied territories to to report had.53 [9] Göring's strong from the Wishful thinking influenced Circulations had been scaled back to more realistic figures from the outset, but still largely were not achieved. At least there were impressive figures for this year, during which the German sphere of influence continued to expand as in all other years of the war. The turning point of the war that occurred on the German-Soviet front during this year could last until July 1943 on the extent of the agricultural exploitation of the occupied areas, even in the USSR, does not yet have a general and far-reaching impact. (Table 126)

With larger gaps, a similar balance can be drawn for the following financial year set up. (Table 127)

Riecke's report of January 1944 was followed by a list which, despite its incompleteness and despite discrepancies with regard to other figures, nevertheless provides information about the overall trend from 1940 to 1943. (Table 128)

538 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 13764, list (IG Farben/Volkswirtsch. Dept.?) according to Danish statistical Sources, December 1944.

539 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 10649, "Final report above the completion the Reichsmarschall demands in IV. War year for the occupied eastern territories as well as for France, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, General Government, Serbia-Banat", January 7, 1944 (signed: Riecke). - Denmark and Greece were not reported; the annexed areas were not taken into account. A first version of the report (without Soviet. areas) came from v. 15. 10. 1943 (ibid.).

Table 126
robbery 110n agricultural products out of annexed and occupied areas, financial year 1942/1943 (in 1000 t)

	Grain	Meat fish)	fat (cheese)	Potatoes _	Sugar (jam)	vegetables and fruit	hay and straw
Occupied areas the USSR	2910	262 (13)	256 (3)	1251	151 • (21)	256 ••	1550
Poland of that general government	1359	130	28	1670	208	?	117
	633	54	7	434	29		109
France	1400	250	27 (12)	296		377	770
Denmark	7	fl2 (93)	38 (3)				
Netherlands	22	35	8th (11)	139	19	498	239
protectorate	189	13	1	88	148		39
Serbia and Banat	120	5	19		5	22	9
Belgium	51			25	40	31	131
Norway		8th		135		13	78
in total•••	5319	624	317	2368	391	?	?

• Expressly as "Minimum quantities" designated (without consideration additional “Taken” by the troops, etc.)
•• Only 11 Months (1. 9th-31st 7.)
Pay out of dem Riecke report; voices not with the present added table match. - As a result Comparison of sources arise differences to *DZW,* Vol. 2, p. 430

Source: How Note 539; for Poland and Denmark: ZStA Potsdam, Case XI, No. 391, p. 5ff., Doc. NG-1053, “Numbers for German war food economy", O. D.; further the in Tab. 122 and 125 cited sources.

The German deliveries ("subsidies") to the occupied areas - including deliveries at the Occupation organs - were for the three settled economic years Same with meat Zero, in grains deceive they are almost 1.3 million t, for fat 118000 t.540
Measured by the annual average of grain harvests in 1942 and 1943 in Germany (18.8 million t),541 meant the six million tons of grain that the occupiers took home in 1942/43 Declarations from the occupied ones areas pumped54 2 , 32 percent; even with deduction of 241000 t "Grants" this share was over 30 percent.
The Come up from Meat in Germany himself believed itself 1942 _ 2.37 million t, in Years 1943 only still on 1,859 million t.54 3 The out of the table for 1942/43 readable 765 000 t Meat from the occupied Areas, calculated on that Own income 1942 or on the Average from 1942 and 1943 _ 32 and 36 percent respectively.

540 Ibid.
541 *Statistical Manual,* S. 124.
542 Please refer Table 126 (also for the following Calculations in the Text).
543 *Statistical Manual,* S. 231.

Tabel 127
robbery pon *agricultural products out of occupied areas, financial year 1943/1944 (in 1000 t)*

	Grain	Meat fish)	fat (cheese)	Potato-fine	Sugar	vegetables and fruit	hay and straw
General Government•	437	36		339	24	?	59
France • •	1265	163	21 (11)	372		183	623
Denmark	35	150 (104)	52 (4)	?	4	12	?
Netherlands •••	21	17	7 (1.5)	189	13	245	372
protectorate •	146	14	1	43	59		36
Serbia and Banat 0	186	4	13	6	8th	58	8th
Belgium° 0	27			37	10	27	158
Norway° 00		5 (307)		174		15	64

• 1. 9th-31st 5. (9 Months)
1. 8th-30th 6. (11 Months)
8th. 8th-8th 7. (11 Months)
0 1. 9th-30th 4. (8th Months)
00 1. 9th-30th 6. (10 Months)
000 details for 8th Months (Meat; Potatoes), 9 Months (Fish; Vegetables u. Fruit) or. 10 months (Hay u. Straw).

Source: ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 10630, Compilation above Deliveries 1943/44, 20. 7. 1944; ibid, AN v. 22. 8th. 1944 (Denmark); ibid, film 10637, "Delivery demands of the Reichsmarschall **for** the V. War year 1943/44 at the occupied and incorporated areas and was standing the Deliveries until End June 1944 for the main food and Feed in t", August 18, 1944 (only France, Belgium, Netherlands and Norway). See also the sources for tables 123 and 124.

Tabel 128
"Overall balance" the exploitation ***the*** *Agriculture the occupied Areas 1940141-1943!44 (in 1000 t)*

financial year	Grain	Meat	Fat
1940/41	1272	269	137
1941/42	3232 (2000=62 %)	468 (262=56%)	140 (84=60 %)
1942/43	5319 (2910=55 %)	624 (262=42 %)	317 (256=80%)
1943/44 („Plan")	4200 (1730=41 %)	455 (148=33 %)	109 (68=62 %)

Source: How Note 539. In Brackets Portion the occupied Soviet areas.

Measured against German butter production, Danish deliveries alone accounted for an additional six percent in 1942/43 (37,900 t), from 1940 to 1940 In 1944 a total of almost eight percent, so not quite the German consumption of one month per year.™ From the occupied Soviet ones areas fetched the German Imperialists 1942/43 around 70000 t, About what Of course, only around 10,000 t after Germany arrived; those were in total over 11 percent of German Butter production.MS What oil fruits concerned - the Raw material basis for margarine, cooking oil and high-quality animal feed -, Hitler's Germany was largely dependent on supplies from outside. In 1942 and 1943 An average of 70 percent of these "imports" came from the occupied Soviet territories.546

Potatoes were added 1942 and 1943 in Germany 50.5 and 36.1 million t harvested.Wed The sum of 3.6 million t to be calculated from the table made up seven (compared to 1942) or eight percent (compared to the average). both years).

c) weapons and Equipment of war

The Scope of the Wehrmacht, Relocation orders" fluctuated between 1941 and 1943 strong. He moved - According to the sketchy German sources, which are undoubtedly estimates contain [548] - between three and six billion RM. (Table 12!.l)

For Overall, in 1942 there was a significant decline in Wehrmacht orders. Probably had this the concentration and rapid increase the Armaments production in the "Greater German" Space essential Influence, the raw materials and workforce in strong increased Scope out of the occupied areas after Germany withdrew. The decline concerned nearly exclusively those Western European Countries, whose Portion Around the end of 1941 90 percent fraud, in the October 1942 but only still almost 80 percent make up tc.54 [9] In contrast rose relative and absolutely the Order backlog in General Government, further (with Distance) in Denmark and (under fluctuations) in Norway.

The Deliveries at H.üs t approx learn stayed in the year 1942 overall apparently around some way behind the contract programs. An order backlog of around **RM5.5 billion** at the end of the previous year (December 1, 1941) were in the first nine months of 1942 deliveries worth 3.25 Billion RM over.550 But the discrepancy between orders and deliveries remained in the longer term - judging by the example of the General Government - slightly. (Table 130)

From the entire Deliveries out of Armament "relocations" were eliminated in the Years 1943 on France 40 Percent, on Belgium/Northern France 17 percent and to the Netherlands and the General Government 14 percent each.551

544 Ibid, S. 215; s. Table 125.
545 Ibid.; s. Table 126.
546 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 2348, „The war economy Contribution Eastern Europe ... ".
547 *Statistical Manual,* S. 124 f.
548 The statistics included the "immediate and recognizable indirect" Wechmacht orders (*Thomas,* p. 358).
549 Please refer Table 129.
550 *Thomas,* S. 358.
551 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 4571, "Military economics findings from 5 War years", elaboration of OKW/Field Economics Office (W. Tomberg), November 1944.

Table 129
" Wehrmacht orders" at the Industry the olckupierwn areas 194111942, (mill. RM /Number the documented companies)

	L April 1941	1. December 1941	May 1942	1. June 1942 (inclusive). underdeliveries)	1. July 1942	end July 1942	**1st** October 1942
France (without Northern France)	1699/1442	3168/?	2560/2559	3197/2638	1758/1096	1833/2040	1906/?
Netherlands	759/640	9Q/,	815/82	1021/1046	627/805	616/749	634
Belgium and				516/1745	376/770	402/1045	
Northern France	t.85/1980	856	500/1627	161/709	93/142	109/573	li84
G Eneralgouverncmeut	263/271	367	373/382	394/386	423/319	485/357	525
Norway	59/275	69	'18/187	48/188	61/187	88/238	86
Denmark	52/268	107	126/264	178/264	120/278	124/325	134
Serbia		7	1"/81	19/101	12/60	13/130	14
Salonika			'1/13	4/13	15/93	30/128	8th
Greece•					183/241	216/207	
Croatia					24/22	31/23	

* under Italian occupation

Source: Compiled after ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 6499, Overviews above Wehrmacht orders (RMfBuM/Armaments Office); *DZW,* Ild. 1, S. 533; Ild. 2, S. '129; *Thomas,* S. 291 u. 258.

Table 130
Military orders for the Business
of the General Government 1941-1943 (in mill. RM)

year	average!. Order backlog	Deliveries
1941	280.9	277.3
1942	441.4	413.5
1943	639.8	629.1

Source: DZW, Vol. -., S. 185.

After French Post-war calculations amounted to the Production of war material including military Buildings for German purposes 1940 to 1944 in terms of value to ten percent (115 Billion ffrs.) of all products and services used in France by the occupiers.552 However, a considerable part of the other industrial production for the occupying power (186 billion ffrs.) should probably be added. 55 3 France particularly supplied trucks and other vehicles (from 1941 to 1943 in total value from around 22 billion francs), aircraft and aircraft engines (15 billion francs) and electrical and precision mechanical products and optical Industry (9 billion ffrs.).554 In the Years 1942 became 35421 Trucks, 16,533 trucks produced the following year; that was 44 or 15 percent of the total German population Truck production.555

The share of the annexed territories in the German Arms production cannot even be determined with any degree of accuracy. It was undoubtedly high, probably even disproportionately high, since areas such as Austria and the western parts of Poland were experiencing particularly rapid growth Pace too Armaments facilities in "Greater Germany" were expanded and were also given preference in later years of the war when relocating production that was important to the war effort from areas at risk from air warfare. Reliably estimated figures for individual types and types of weapons exist for Austria.

Table 131
Portion Austria at the Arms production "Greater Germany" (selected types of weapons; in percent)

carbine (K 98 k)	11	tank IV	52
MG (MG 34 u. 42)	12	Hunting Tiger	100
MPi (MP 40 u. 42)	40	fighter plane Me 109	29
15 cm cannon 18	nearly 100		
l. F H.	18		
s. F H.	7		
8.8 cm Flak 36	13		

Source: Schausberger, Norbert, armor in Austria 1938-1945, Vienna 1970, S. 178.

On the other hand, it was apart from the "Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia", the share of the occupied (not annexed) areas in the production of weapons, equipment and equipment for the Wehrmacht, in relation to the capacity of these areas and to production in Germany, not very significant. It can't do that be speech, that the In this respect, the occupiers would have fully exploited the war economic potential of the fascist-dominated European "greater area". They prevented this from happening the resistance of the peoples in its diverse to form and further their own need for security, especially in the production of weapons and weapon systems. Plus it drew the German arms companies before, the occupied Countries at raw materials and workers empty

552 *Milward* ,The New order and the French economy, S. 276, Table 61.
553 Ibid.
554 Ibid, S. 133, tab. 16.
555 Ibid, p. 132, Table 15; *The effects,* S. 281, ext. Table 107 (here something higher Total numbers than *Bleyer,* Armaments report, p. 363; according to those listed there Figures from the Speer report from January 27, 1945 are 45 and 20 percent respectively).

plunder, and were eager to steal means of production, materials, workers, and production experiences and -secrets exclusively for your own to exploit profit.
In particular In the areas of armaments, however, the industry in the occupied areas made a significant contribution to supplying the Wehrmacht with armaments, particularly in the areas of shipbuilding, electrical engineering (communication equipment) and optics, the production of Motor vehicles and aircraft.

Table 132
Portion occupied areas at the German Arms production in the Years 1943 (in Percent)

	weapons	ammunition	Motor vehicle	Schiff hau _	Airplanes	Message• device	Optical device
France	1.5	1.4	11.9	6.4	6.5	5.0	2.8
Belgium/Northern France	0.8	0.7	1.3	11.9	0.1	10.7	0.2
Netherlands	0.1	0.1	0.8	14.0	**1.1**	8.3	3.5
General-government	1.8	3.9	1.2		1.0	3.6	1.6
Denmark	0.3		0.3	1.5	0.1	0.5	
Norway	0.3	0.3	0.7	1.9		0.5	
Serbia					0.1		
Together	4.8	6.4	16.2	35.7	8.9	28.6	8.1

Source: ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 4571, “Military economic findings from 5 years of war", November 1944 (calculated on the basis of the “delivery values”; without taking into account the annexed ones areas and des Protectorate). - The listed numbers or Deliveries went - as "relocated" production - in the German statistics are directly incorporated into the figures for German armaments production and can usually not be separated out again, or only with difficulty.

Measures man the in the table stated total shares one very Rough method of the share of the total "value" of the individual groups in the German "final armament production" 556, the shares of the occupied territories in the total production in 1943 amounted to weapons and War equipment:

in weapons	0.42 percent
ammunition	1.8 percent
at Motor vehicles in	0.68 percent
shipbuilding	3.0 percent
at Airplanes	3.4 percent

The production of the occupied territories in these five groups made in 1943 so overall 9.3 percent “German” arms production (weapons and war equipment). Apart from the remaining groups that cannot be converted, the production figures for the annexed areas and the protectorate must be added. With an approximate total value the Arms production ("Armament final production") of year 1943 from 25 billion RM 55 7 supplied itself those 9.3 percent on around 2.3 billion RM.558 Different

556 Please refer *car driver,* p. 69, table; values there on the basis constant prices are calculated (see also *The Effects,* p. 144f.).
557 Calculated after *car driver,* S. 73; s. a. *The effects,* S. 145.
558 This sum is below those listed pay for the Wehrmacht orders (around 40 to 45 Percent), there in the the latter Amounts for News• and optical Device,

Expressed: The production of weapons and military equipment in the occupied areas covered the Wehrmacht's needs in 1943 for an ample month - with the involvement of the Protectorate, an estimated period of one and a half months.

d) Clearingschul.den and Crew costs

Clearing debts and occupation costs were the two most important financing methods that the German imperialists used to exploit and plunder the occupied countries applied as far as they it at all for felt necessary, the appearance of payment or. more mutual Trade relations to preserve. The Debts in the bilateral
"Clearing transactions" arose from deliveries of goods and services from the occupied, but also from the allies and satellite countries with Germany that were not faced with corresponding German counterdelivery. They increased from a few hundred during the war Millions upon many billion Reich mark. She were a more important Gauge **for** the Plunder before everything the occupied countries.
In the clearing balances the became fascists mostly just that one Part the Clearing debts visible, the so-called clearing accounts.

Table 133
Germany's clearing debts both main creditors of the Billing per traffic 1939-1944 (in million RM)

	In total-total	of that: Frank-rich	Belgium	Hungary	Dane-mark	Yugoslav. (Serbia u. Croatia tien)	Romania n whom	Slovakia
End Oct. 1939	409			54	10		33	23
End Oct. 1940	770		90	7	179		59	65
End Oct. 1941	2991	653	524	130	342	57	348	185
End Oct. 1942	7365	2232	1636	525	534	156	573	265
End Oct. 1943	14064	5240	3610	976	911	881	669	426
End Dec. 1943	14185	5812	3873	1049	1009	946	697	460
End Jan. 1944	15852	6164	3996	1180	1046	940	701	488

Source: ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1816, list of the OKW/Wehrwirtschaftsamt, o. D.; for Oct. 1943, Dec. 1943 and Jan. 1944: ibid, Movie 8398, Lineups (OKW/Feldwirtschafts government office) v. 24. 1. and 23. 2. 1944. - Totals cleaned up from so-called credit balances.

Clothing, Machinery, general Wehrmacht equipment, so-called. commercially available Device u. a. contain were (see *Thomas,* p. 358).

At the end of 1943, four occupied countries accounted for 82 percent of the stated debt amount. The general rate of increase was approximate reproduced correctly; A offers an even clearer picture itself...,. both in terms of absolute height the school as also in with regard to the order of the affected countries - as soon as the several countries Equivalent to imposed "Reich papers"55 9 (Reich treasury notes) are included become.

Table 134
Clearing debts Germany 1943/1944 (incl. schools in imperial papers; in mill. RM)

	November 6, 1943	June 30, 1944	7/31 1944
Total	23085	31600	33216
of that:			
France	5315	7902	8217
Netherlands	3775	5593	5805
Belgium	3636	4710	5395
General Government	3649	4162	4265
protectorate	1092	2425	2459
Yugoslavia (Serbia u. Croatia)	876	1252	1404
Denmark	916	1233	1264
Romania	682	1068	1134
Hungary	988	982	1006
Bulgaria	544	823	816
Switzerland	589	647	658
Slovakia	444	561	574

Source: ZStA Potsdam, Reichsbank, No. 6449, BI. 56(., 165(. and 182f., Elaborations from the 6. 11.
1943, 8th. 7. and 10. 8th. 1944.

Occupied countries took the top seven places with a total share from 87 percent (July 31st 1944), including this General Government, the Netherlands and the Protectorate, which occupied the lowest places without taking into account the investment of their assets in these papers, which only poorly concealed the open, state-organized exploitation by Hitler's Germany. The German debts on their clearing accounts, when added together, amounted to less than 100 millions **RM.560**
German foreign debt in its two main forms has been rising inexorably since 1940/41 and with growing Tempo. (Table 135)
The problem of evaluating such numbers and calculations is highlighted by the fact that occupied Soviet territories in it as clearing debtor Germany were listed. "Foreign trade" with these areas was manipulated in such a way that that he "only for the Part above clearing billed"56t became. Man offset delivery

559 ZStA Potsdam, Reichsbank, No. 6449, BI. 56(., record the Reichsbank (Economics Dept.) ,,About the Plans for solution of the clearing problem", November 15, 1943.
560 Ibid, FS, Movie 8398, Lineup (OKW/Field Economics Office) by 31. 12. 1943, v. 24. 1. 1944.
561 Nuremberg. Doc. EC-86, abstract out of the elaboration the Research center for military economy
"The financial ones Benefits of the occupied territories until March 31, 1944" dated 10. 10. 1944, printed at *Kuczynski,* Position the workers, Vol. 6, p. 342.

Table 135
„German Clearing debts and other foreign debt" 1939-1944 (in ‚maybe. RM)

	Clearing	in Imperial papers created Credit				
		Netherlands	Gen.- Gov.	**Protect.**	Bulg.	Together
End 1939	335					335
End 1940	953		1			954
End 1941	3251	1289 •	749	781*	103	6172 •
End 1942	8052	2440 •	1738 •	993	305	13528 •
End 1943	14253	4187	2786	1161	567	22954
Sept. 1944	19967	6045	4442	2340	689	33483

• Added through ZStA Potsdam, Reichsbank, No. 6449, BI. 8th, elaboration above the "Development the German clearing debt" v. May 31, 1943

Source: ZStA Potsdam, Reichsbank, No. 6449, BI. 188, Lineup above "German Clearing and other foreign debt" **v. 1/1/1944** .

ments out of Germany at occupation offices, Eastern societies and German "Eastern companies" against stolen national products that were transported to Germany and sold at minimal prices (wholesale prices).

Even when considering the various types of occupation costs, the fascists' calculations and reports did not take into account the plundering of the occupied Soviet territories. With of excessive greed and haste, in Of them the Soviet To exploit resources and their war economy tried to fill up potential, held even the bureaucratic pedantry of the regime. At an attempt, the financial In order to record the results of the occupation policy in the USSR, its initiators themselves had to admit that the total amount calculated - with 4.5 Billion RM less than the Norwegian, be in the did "unlikely low" and must billions higher have lain. 5 62 Under Under these circumstances, any calculation of the occupation costs and generally the financial "performance" of the occupied areas remains fragmentary and questionable.

As far as figures about crew costs are available, it must be taken into account that these costs are not exclusively economically relevant events, that she As a rule, accommodation, transport and other services for the occupiers were not covered and that the different Compulsory courses the Reichsmark as well as the Black market prices and purchases distorted the Reichsmark bill in different directions .

Approximate relations between the payments of some occupied Countries at Occupation costs and comparable financial tributes are described in a report by the "Research Center for military economy" from autumn 1944. (Table 136)

According to estimates by the Bank for International Settlements (1944), the total amount of occupation costs paid was for the period from July 1940 to September 1944 at 84 billion RM, those 9.1 billion RM at forced "loan" at the Empire to be attributed would be.5 63 The Total the from Hitler Germany blackmailed

562 Ibid, S. 343.
563 *later, Max,* The financing of war, Lucerne 1950, S. 104, Tab.

Table 136
Crew costs and similar tributaries Payments occupied Countries until March 31, 1944 (in billion RM)

General Government	**1.6**	primarily "military contribution"
Protectorate France	2.4	mainly "Matriculation
Belgium	34.3	contribution" Crew costs Crew
Netherlands	5.7	costs Crew costs
Denmark Norway	8.4	Central bank "loans" occupation
	1.4	costs (approx. 35 percent) and
	5.0	central bank "loans"

Source: Kuczynski, Lage the worker, vol. 6, p. 331ff.; Figures on the impact of black market prices or purchases again cleaned up.

"European Medium" believed itself for the mentioned Period including 31.5 billion RM Clearing debts on 124.6 billion RM.564 After Estimates Kuczynskis for five full years (1940-1944) on the basis of it source she cheated -, including contributions from the annexed territories - 140 to 145 billion RM.565 If one considers the financial result of the exploitation of foreign forced laborers in Germany to be close to 70 billion RM566 added, so you come to one sum, the the One and a half times the average annual German national income during the war accounts for.567

564 Ibid.
565 *Kuczynski,* Position the workers, Vol. 6, S. 135.
566 Please refer S. 530f.; *Drobischl EichJw"/J,z,* S. 638.
567 See. *Kuczynski,* Position the workers, Vol. 6, S. 133 {„national income").

Capital concentration and War profit

Milk: It are many People, they have her Fatherland in the heart, but their business also in the head.
Rohland: You can say that the two are absolutely parallel running. Because if man the can increase production everyone at hand.

(Headquarters Planning, 23. Meeting, 3. November 1942, re. iron quota)

From the fascist dictatorship, German finance capital expected conditions of exploitation that would maximize its profits: unshakable stability of its economic and political rule, complete subjugation of the working class to a regime of undisturbed exploitation and an expansion of its imperialist economic power into European power Supremacy and to the first world power. In the Wars should make all these dreams come to fruition. In fact, the armaments boom fueled by the war created a boom the participating companies, especially the large corporations, a unique profit blessing and an unheard of increase in their economic and state monopoly power positions - While the situation of German workers deteriorated rapidly, millions of foreign workers did forced laborers under terror and hunger fronts and the blood from Hundreds of thousands German soldiers to profit from the occupation and Plunder stranger Countries converted became.

1. The mechanism the profiteering

a) LSO and Fixed price system

Before 1938 were Prices for Armaments on the Base the Tender the Wehrmacht orders contractually agreed, [1] since the end of this year the official guidelines for price determination reason of Cost of goods sold in services for public contracting authorities" (LSÖ). [2] The to price paid sat itself according to LSÖ out of the proven and checked Cost ("Cost costs") and one on it calculated Profit surcharge ("benefit surcharge") together. A extreme Example for the Effects of LSÖ Systems were the "colonial contracts" of GB Bau (Todt) for the construction companies during the construction of the "West wall": "The entrepreneur only had the one from made to him expenditure to prove. He received this reimbursed from the state with a percentage profit surcharge. The higher so the expenditure became, around The profit was so greater. This resulted in a premium for inefficient work methods. The entrepreneur did not save on materials, every wage increase brought him additional profit. The result was, that in The price and wage structure was severely shaken in the affected areas of the West. "[3] Profits increased after this regulation significant, although the Wehrmacht positions (Department or. Office group contractual and Price checking system of military economy and Rü-

1 *Thomas,* S. 134.
2 *RGBl.* 1938 I, S. 1624f., v. 15. 11. 1938; s. For this *Zumpe,* S. 269f.
3 *Schwerin v. Krosigk, Lutz Gf.,* It happened in Germany. Images of people ours century, Tübingen/Stuttgart 1951, p. 298.

stung office) through tests and controls on prices pressed. But The expansion of the large arms companies required enormous financial resources for the replacement, renewal and expansion of production facilities and mechanical equipment. The relationship between their urge for rationalization and expansion on the one hand and the amount of profits on the other hand, the corporations found it increasingly unsatisfactory the constant controls and repeated price checks by external Wehrmacht officers are extremely annoying. In addition, companies that were not very profitable received relatively high prices the the cost of the product was the basis for the price; The leading arms monopolies felt that they were at a disadvantage compared to smaller companies. The incentive to rationalize Longer-term investments and complex development work remained low, and the costs were worthwhile for the producers possible high to hold. With it were “But also straight away "More workers and materials tied up", [4] resulting in significant losses war economy efficiency was recorded.

Preparations for a change in the pricing system dated of the Todt was appointed Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition in March 1940.5 The leading representatives the German Arms monopolies the Dead itself supported, demanded an official reorganization of the system as one of the most important and urgent measures of arms prices. This is what they saw an essential basis for the Security and stability high profits.

It was the one in the numerous meetings The “opinion of the people” that was clearly expressed at that time Industry ... that through the new foundation of the Ministry of Armament and ammunition, the Wehrmacht's price checks should be significantly restricted."6 End March/beginning of April lay Dead already “suggestions for the education of Group prices",7 the by Walter Borbet (United Steelworks), Emil Gobbers (Mannesmann) and others came from. „The attack was directed against them LSÖ," reported the representatives of the military economics and armaments office were bitter. “The industry wants an individually determined, but fully untouchable Fixed price." [8]

The disputes over the price system obviously lasted a long time. The temporary military successes certainly made it easier for those responsible to postpone the proposed fundamental change. Probably but were the causes **for** the long delay with which the fixed price system was introduced deeper. According to Milward's sparse information, Göring's decision on this cardinal question of the war economy was [9] therefore a long time coming wait because the Four Year Plan organization fiercely opposed the proposed new system. There is certainly some truth to this; However, the background to this fight remains obscure. The Four Year Plan Organization - the was to that one time largely a synonym for the

4 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 2313, minutes of the meeting at the GLM on October 22, 1941 (Remarks by William Werner).

5 Please refer detailed *tape I,* p. 121ff.

6 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1778, investment report for the KTB WiRüAmt/Abt. Contract and price auditing (1. 4th-30th 6. 1940); see *anatomy of* the *Kriegs,* p. 243ff., Doc. 114, AN from Karl Albrecht above the meeting the RGI at the March 27, 1940.

7 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 1778, KTB WiRüAmt/Dept. contractual and price checking, Entry v.
4. 4. 1940 above Discuss at the RMfBuM.

8 Ibid, Investment report (How Note 6).

9 *Milward,* war economy, S. 65f.

Reich Office for Economic Development and "New Military Production" **plan",** both under the aegis of Krauch and his IG Farben experts. It can therefore be assumed that it is about the profit boom for the large producers that is expected from the fixed price system of weapons and War equipment that the group around Göring and I didn't want to let Krauch get out of hand. The synthetic, the rest of the chemical industry and others, Reason- and raw materials generating Industries could at this one system that could not be applied to them, they definitely fell behind the competition for profit. Certain experiences had been gained in this regard during the First World War.10

Another, perhaps more important, reason for the delay was rooted in the overall interests of those in power Class. At Zumpe, of course, the fundamental change in price and profit policy misunderstands which one The fixed price system brought with it the reference relevant to our context is the "experiences of the First World War with regard to the huge War profits and the political impact on mass sentiment "11 These experiences led the German rulers to introduce the fixed price system only after they had officially issued corresponding regulations on profit and dividend restrictions - Laws that, however, were predominantly optical or propagandistic and declaratory in nature. 12 The chronological sequence of the Actions in 1941/42 not by chance:

12. June 1941 - Dividend Tax Ordinance13
20. June 1941 - first Announcement Göring's above the change the "Profit measurement at Armaments contracts"14
6. November 1941 - Decree and Guidelines Göring's above Fixed prices15
31. March 1942 - Profit Transfer Ordinance16
19. May 1942 - Framework decree above unit and Group prices 17

At the 20. June 1941 turned itself Goering to the Reich Finance Minister and the Reich Prize Commissioner and he searched she, until at latest for the 1. July new guidelines **for** the "Profit measurement in defense contracts" to design: "The Rating of profit at Armament contracts were previously awarded based on sales or the capital required for operations. There is no incentive in this process to make excessive use of operating capacity. In the wars comes it me but exclusively on the Attraction to highest output at Equipment of war at least effort."18 Of a replacement the "Himself-

10 Over the background to the Groener-Merton memorandum of July 12, 1917 see. *Gossweiler, Kurt,* big banks, industrial monopolies, state. Economics and politics of state monopoly capitalism Germany 1914-1932, Berlin 1971, p. 76ff.
11 *Zumpe,* S. 270{.
12 Please refer also S. 533 ff.
13 *RGBl.* 1941 I, S. 323ff., „Regulation to Limitation from Profit distributions (Dividend Levy Ordinance)" dated June 12, 1941.
14 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 2312.
15 Ibid, Movie 2354.
16 *RGBl.* 1942 I, P. 162, "Ordinance on the recording of extraordinary increases in profits during of war (Profit Transfer Ordinance, GAV)" v. March 31, 1942.
17 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 8442, BI. 19 Ru. ff.. „Arrangement above Unit or group prices" (BfV/RK fd pricing) v. May 19, 1952 *(=DRA,* No. 117, dated May 21, 1942).
18 Ibid, FS, Movie 2312, Available BfV at RMdF and RK f. d. Pricing re: "Profit measurement Armaments orders" from 20. 6. 1941. Hereafter also the following.

cost prices" the LSÖ through fixed Prices was still here not the speech, but only from "performance increase" or -deductions... in addition to the previous profit calculation. However, it should be examined to what extent the performance bonus can be left tax-free so that the desired goal is not jeopardized again through taxes or profit skimming becomes".

Göring only returned to the topic in November, this time in view of the shambles of the blitzkrieg concept. The decree and directive of November 6, 194119 were undoubtedly related to the large central deliberations that took place Göring to the following days held, particularly with the conference at the 7. November, the itself with the

"Alignment the war economy on that Armaments program" occupied, 20 She probably came about with the strong assistance of Todt. "Armaments contracts must, according to this," it said in the accompanying decree to the "Guidelines for price and profit assessment for defense contracts," "basically be awarded at fixed prices, namely at the same fixed prices **for all contractors.** When determining the fixed prices the Conditions of the good one, not that one medium-sized companies." The Guidelines differentiated between "Uniform prices" and - first still no further differentiation - "Group prices". All fixed prices should from Working staffs established become, existing from "Clerks the Wehrmacht, of Ministry of Ammunition and the Price Commissioner".

The central idea of the new price system was the elimination of taxation on war profits: ,, Have the Reich Commissioner for the pricing or the bodies commissioned by him confirm the fixed price, the resulting profits are not subject to profit transfer § 22 KWVO."

In the following months found the Fixed prices in shape of unit and Group prices entry into broader areas of arms production. They came, as the Army Weapons Office disapproved, "in contrast to the previous procedures. not through contractual agreements between the delivery company and the Wehrmacht part, but through one-sided fixing through the (according to Göring decree respectively used - D E.)

Working staff "achieved". 21 standard prices, ,,after the Documents the working companies" 22 determined, were valid for all producers of relevant product. Were prizes for Armaments as Unit prices accepted, so stayed she for the Length of time of the war or the order remains unchanged consist. Since dr The profit achieved was "not further examined and skimmed off by the price commissioner" 23 , the large, modern armaments companies, usually the leading monopoly companies, were able to achieve enormous, largely uncontrolled profits Profits and Surplus profits make the at the most rational working at the factory has the biggest Profit." 24

Where several or numerous Pursue with strong more different more individual Profit-

19 Ibid, Movie 2354, Erl. Göring's re: "Profit measurement at arms contracts" and "Guidelines for the Price- and Profit measurement at arms contracts" v. November 6, 1941. Hereafter also the The following.

20 Please refer S. 34f.

21 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 3398, Rs. HWA at Rüln, 10. 2. 1942.

22 B.A Koblenz, R 3/1547, speech Speers on the Gauleiter conference in Munich at the 24. 2. 1942.

23 Ibid. - Not that one to be discharged Additional profit was per rata the Sales calculated (see BA VEB Pentacon, no., protocol. d. meeting in the operations directorate on the 18th. 6. 1942).

24 *anatomy of war,* p. 373, Doc. 189, protocol from Charles Albert above the meeting of the big one advisory board of the RGI on January 13, 1942 (Explanations Todts).

rate produced similar military equipment, group prices were introduced in two or more categories. The (lowest) “group price 1” was with the same conditions as the unit price. The Group prices II and higher However, they did not enjoy any tax relief.

According to Thomas, the fixed prices were around ten percent lower the average level achieved25 and thus corresponded to the production conditions of the most efficient companies, ie in the Rule of large defense companies. The progressive rationalization primarily gave the large monopoly companies a wide variety of opportunities to achieve their goals to increase profits, yes to multiply.

Finally appears itself the Fixed price system under Spear prevailed to have, the, as in other areas, also has an influence on the pricing policy as well as the representative for the four-year plan and the Wehrmacht offices were pushed back and finally eliminated. The long-awaited framework decree In any case, the fixed price system only appeared on the 19th. May 1942, signed *by the* new Reich Price Commissioner Hans Fischböck (since February 1942), a man closely associated with finance capital, especially the Deutsche Bank, "in agreement" with the Minister of Munitions, the OKW and the Reich Minister of Economics.26

So far Unit or Group prices I was delivered, it was omitted Profit transfer obligation not only in accordance with § 22 KWVO, but now also according to§ 5 GAV. The Lawmakers pushed hard for the introduction of fixed prices: “Companies, which do not have uniform prices or to Group prices I delivery, have to expect that she at the forgiveness of orders opposite such Pursue disadvantaged become, the the Execute the order at standard prices or group prices I. If there is a restriction on the orders to be awarded can these in first line be withdrawn from companies that do not deliver at standard prices or at group prices I. With the withdrawal of the orders, the resulting preferential treatment in the allocation of resources also ceases (workers, Raw materials, Operating resources)." (§§ 4 a and 4 b)

The Fixed price system acted as a very stronger more economical lever as well as the Climb production, especially through large-scale production, as well as its rationalization and modernization. That was one the main reasons for this, that rationalization in the armaments industry has made such rapid and comprehensive progress since the beginning of 1942 .

The Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition subsequently rejected all attempts by the Wehrmacht, the Reich Ministry of Finance and the Reich Price Commissioner, the arms producers the itself out of dem Fixed price system resulting Opportunities for profit in any way to prune. Charles M. Hettlage, general speaker for economics and finance in the Ministry of Ammunition, emphasized at every opportunity emphatically, “that be Ministry fundamentally against one taxation is the the will to perform kill" .27 in early 1943 achieved spear from Hitler an important one Authorization, about which he noted:

“The leader is... I agree that I submit to him a decree according to which I am entitled to make price changes if necessary in order to achieve an increase in performance to establish, and after dem I to Price changes at armaments the

25 *Tlwmas,* S. 138.

26 Same as note 17. Hereafter also the following. - The non-participation of the Reich Finance Minister is revealing .

27 B.A Koblenz, R 2/20934, File note dated 16. 1. 1943 ex. interminist. Discuss re: Regulation of the Profit transfer at the January 12, 1943.

The price commissioner must give my consent *beforehand* ." [28] At the same time undertook he made a decisive advance, all Regulatory powers on the Area the Armaments prices largely at to concentrate and sat down it through, that the military economics office of the OKW in April 1943 the contract and price review system was transferred to the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition. [29] The minister expanded on this success through important decrees of August 11, 1943. [30]

After taking over the production-regulating functions of the Reich Economics Ministry, the Reich Minister issued a decree for armaments and war production, extremely generous profit guidelines also for the industry that does not directly produce armaments. According to the "Price Adjustment Principles" of November 10, 1943, twice the LSÖ profit or 25 percent of the "reasonable cost price" was to be tolerated as profit before officially ordered price reductions came into question. The fixed prices were once again declared unchangeable. [31] A year later, the Minister of Armaments expressly declared that these prices would only be reduced in the event of "intentional or grossly negligent price violations from "significant impact" is permissible.[32]

In year 1944 went with the regulatory authority in air armaments also the pricing department of Reich Minister of aviation on the Reich Ministry for Armament and war production. " **We** now finally have," Hettlage wrote with satisfaction, "uniform pricing, Price check and price correction **for** all armaments contracts, regardless of which part of the Wehrmacht or which other department of the Reich acts as the client under private law." [33] In this context claimed the Armaments office now the appropriation all "Price adjustment amounts from defense contracts" and thus finally and completely opposed the - as Hettlage put it - "Narrow thinking becomes more uniform Departmental particularists" [34] through.

At what incredibly high profits the fixed price system in the course of the war years led, should only at this point A report from the head of the production office for consumer goods in the Ministry of Armaments from July 1944 shows that in a large textile company (Leipziger Wollkammerei), which had been converted to ammunition production, the price of blanks for infantry projectiles had risen to "a tenth of the original Price in Armaments production reduced "could be".35

Crucial raw materials and basic materials for the war economy, such as coal and iron, were not produced under the fixed price regulations; but she could The mining industry benefited from the general increase in profits naturally not unimpressed remain. In the Years 1941 were that is the Ruhr

28 FB, 18. 1. 1943, Point 24.

29 *Thomas,* S. 371. Please refer also S. 132.

30 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 4566, GB Armament Decree on pricing for armaments contracts (Rüst-Preis-Verlaß)" (also in *news iks RMf BuM,* No. 28, v. 6. 9. 1943, Anl. 1) and 1. Implementation instructions (Price Org. Decree) v. 11. 8th. 1943.

31 B.A Koblenz, R 2/5245, Court of Auditors d. German Rich at RMdF, 15. 2. 1945.

32 Ibid. - Opposed in vain the Reich Finance Minister; his vague threat for example, "It was intended from 1943 onwards or 1944 the group prices initially at 1/2 and the following year to fully submit to the transfer of profits", took no one serious (ibid., R 2/5242, AN RMdF ex. Meeting in the RMfRuK on the 18th 4. 1944, v. 20. 4. 1944).

33 Ibid, R 3/1741, RMfRuK (Hettlage) at RMdF, October 24, 1944.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid, R 3/1551, Seebauer at Spear, June 18th 1944.

mining companies in the Consciousness of their secured appearing Monopoly profits still
"agreed in the opinion that nothing should change in prices during war" .36 A But a year later I saw that different out of. If suitable Opportunity the heads of the Imperial Coal and Iron Associations wore Pleiger, Röchling, Rohland and Alfried Krupp - In Speer's presence, Hitler expressed her view of the "unsustainable sales price development for Money, cast iron, Workpiece and Scrap metal" before and explained one
"Redetermination" of the prices as "urgently required".37 Hitler accepted this demand and explained itself on Speers Suggestion with Price increases away 1. January 1943agreed, the however "on the price basis the wider Population none Have influence, rather
"should be placed essentially on the manufacturing production of the iron-making industry". 38; as compensation should the since Increase in production that has been discussed for a long time at coking coal and pig iron for the IV. quarter secured become.39

Apart from the official "looting of the state treasury" (Lenin) through the fixed price system, there were excess profits of the most diverse kinds, on which enriched the entrepreneurs. Towards the end of the war, the Reich Audit Office produced a whole list of such excess profits (after § 22 KWVO "not justifiable additional revenue") together, the "to Damage
contributions to the Reich treasury at the same time more unjustified in war Favoring entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurial associations" 4 0 in Height from several billion RM annually led:

- Excess profits from inflated fixed prices (or fixed cost prices, market and list prices)
- Over profits as a result to higher Guide prices (with proximity calculation) in the Defense sector
- Over profits as a result official to high fixed unit and Group prices (were mentioned "extraordinarily high profits" of 38 percent and more)
- excess profits officially approved excessive, from economic policy Green the one not lowered prices (e.g. **for** soap, some food, etc.)
- Over profits as a result on the entrepreneurial side not punctual donemmrr, after § 22 KWVO more necessary Price reductions
- Excess profits from committed violations of this Price law except§ 22 K\VVO (price calculation regulations, maximum price orders etc.)

In contrast, complacency and mendacity were mixed in the reports written in 1943/44 the former head of the OKW's Economics and Armaments Office, General Thomas, who viewed the OKW's price control policy as a successful instrument for containing and skimming off "excessive" profits and as a basic prerequisite for the introduction the Fixed prices prize.4 1 Different had it itself in the August 1942

36 Ibid, R 13 1/1059, Prot. d. meeting d. little ones circle, 30. 10. 1941; s. ibid, meeting v. August 14, 1941.
37 FB, 13. 8th. 1942, Point 45.
38 Ibid, Point 45 u. 46.
39 This requirement was not met (see pp. 363f.); therefore- and from others Found- there was no general price increase. At least Pleiger still claimed in March 1943, he has for a coal price increase the "empowerment of leader"; he but refrain on it in respect for development the general one Location (BA Koblenz, R 2/5359, Pleiger Schwerin v. Krosigk, March 3, 1943).
40 B.A Koblenz, R 2/5245, Court of Auditors d. German Rich at RMdF, 15.2. 1945. Hereafter also the following.
41 *Tlwmas,* S. 134ff.

belonged, as he in circles of Armaments inspectors about the “behavioral Industry", also with regard to the fixed price system, said: "It is basically the case that when someone new comes or a new facility **is created,** industry leaves with this new facility because it believes that it can inherit more there than it at the old one happened... That's just how the industry behaves." 42

b) Depreciation

The depreciation(amortization), normally valuable replacement the itself consuming during production or the moral fix worn ones Capital parts and as such an important price component, received in the armaments and War economy one novel Function. „In the stock corporations", so is called it in Golls Analysis in general, "be the Depreciation not after the actual transfer of value, but rather according to financial policy aspects 43 After _ 1935/36 in Germany the Armaments economy fully utilized had, were it in ever bigger Proportion to a means the plundering the State treasury at the expense of work people, too one mechanism the Realization of Maximum prices and Surplus profits become. Armaments works for the Requirement and on Order the Wehrmacht and the civilian arms authorities (four-year plan, later Reich Ministry for Armament and ammunition) built became, came in the Enjoyment one advantageous official Amortization regulation. Tools and machinery could with 20 to 25 percent, the buildings and the rest Furnishings with 10 Percent, in total so approximately for the double sentence, written off become. Different species from “Special depreciation” were common, e.g such on Reason of possession the Pursue at tax vouchers of
“New ones financial plan" out of dem Years 1939. 44
In However, in corporate practice, bypassing the provisions of the Commercial Code - has always been high Rates for depreciation are common, at least when it comes to machines, tools and other inventory concerned. So was it The annual “custom” of probably most monopoly companies is that “machinery and mechanical equipment, tools, operating and business inventory are listed on the balance sheet at RM 1. written off" were.45 At Siemens & Halske fraud the sum this Purchases that “are immediately written off in accordance with previous practice” in the 1942/43 financial year 23.7 alone million RM, the “in advance at the expense of the gross surplus are offset ".46
The corporations' so-called Ostwerke were particularly favored. It was, for example, complex of Auschwitz works of the IG Farben Group - around

42 *Wagner,* S. 179 (quote speech Thomas' before the armaments inspectors in Hanover at the August 29, 1942; ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 1741).
43 *Goll, Günter,* balance sheets and profits. Guide for the external analysis of the annual financial statements of West German companies stock corporations, Berlin 1958, p. 157.
44 *Zumpe,* 295f.; *Faingar,* p. 240; ZStA Potsdam, case X, Film 421, Doc. NIK-12801, annual report d. Fried. Croup AG f. 1939/40 (mentions “special depreciation due to our tax voucher ownership”).
45 ZStA Potsdam, Statistical Reich Office, No. 2704, Bl. 99, Declarations the Robert Bosch GmbH; s. a. *Koebel Tusk,* S. 29f.
46 ZStA Potsdam German Bank, No. 18861, page 29, AT German Bank (Rösler) v. April 28, 1944.

Factories and Investments, the in the eastern, weaker industrialized regions, in the areas annexed since 1939 or in the General Government. These works could - according to George v. Schnitzlers (IG Farben) - as a whole at 20 percent annually, meaning in five years the machines are immediately depreciated at 80 percent. [47] This regulation - one enforced by law acceleration of capital turnover
- drove the designated one The cost share for fixed capital used is several times higher the actual costs beyond; in the same dimensions rose - at guaranteed price costs - the Profits.
Apparently The rates mentioned increased during the course of the war; because v. Schnitzler said 1945 in one others sworn Explanation out of, that at the Ostwerken
"The entire assets could be depreciated in the investment year."48 "The immediate consequence of this was," he said continued, "that the IG, although it spent about 500 million marks on average over the last few years, did not need to increase its capital considerably and that the IG's balance sheet under 'operations and facilities' remained practically the same Amount had." [49]
The information about the actual amount of amortization are sparse even for the pre-war years. The average one Depreciation rate in the Industry fraud about seven Percent; the IG Farben Group wrote in contrast in the Years 1939 171.2 alone millions RM or 27.4. percent his share capital away. [50] The “Eastern depreciation” of the factory facilities of his “Ostwerke” amounted to 1941 until 1944 to the unbelievable sum from 431.5 millions RM.5 [1] The Statistical Reich Office presented in one study already for 1939 firmly, the Asset depreciation the examined 52 Large companies the Reason
material and The defense industry “exceeds ... the - already plentiful - Depreciation in 1936 by more than 50 vH (excluding renovation depreciation). The depreciation therefore retains its original character, that of the use of the assets to compensate for capital wear and tear, completely lost; rather, they are one become a financing instrument." 5 [2]

c) Billions in gifts out of the State licenses
(fnyestition loans, Subscriptions, tax policy)

The financing of the development of Germany's armaments potential and its further rapid expansion during the war was largely financed by state money. Next to state incentives to private monopoly Investments How Price- and

47 Ibid, case VI, Movie 410, Doc. NI-5197, Affid. v. Schnitzlers v. August 9, 1945 (contain **in** Collection Affid. v. March 27, 1947).
48 *case 6,* S. 83, Affid. v. August 8, 1945 (in Collection Affid. v. 18. 3. 1947).
49 Ibid.
50 *Faingar,* S. 249 (mill. RM):

Year	Share capital	Amortizations
1937	514.5	105.1
1938	605.0	135.7
1939	624.8	171.2

51 ZStA Potsdam, case VI, Movie 416, Doc. NI-10016, Affid. Helmut dike fisherman, 21. 6. 1947.
52 Ibid, statistics Reich Office, **No.** 196, BI. 24, report from the July 1941 above “Development of the industrial Financial and Earnings situation 1936-1939".

Sales guarantees and the war risk clause53 took away the granting of state or state-guaranteed guarantees (“Reich guarantor”) Loans at the Arms monopolies and their direct Subsidization during the war was much greater than in the pre-war years. The corporations particularly preferred them when, in accordance with the acute war needs, capacities were expanded, whose profitability did not seem sufficiently assured after the end of the war. After the projects were completed, however, they became less pressing one privatization and received actually by means of “ capital cut" or as "lost grants" millions upon millions as gifts from the state treasury.

In the pre-war and war years, a number of state-owned and state-private monopoly investment armaments banks and financing institutions emerged the economic one Research Society mbH (Wifo), the Heeres-Rarmungskredit-AG, the Bank the Germans aviation AG (until July 6 , 1940: Flugzeugkontor GmbH) and Armamentskontor GmbH, which generously advanced the corporations' investment projects and "lost" significant parts of their loans from the outset "subsidies", that is, gifts worth millions to the monopolies. They were often institutions or affiliated with companies that managed their considerable shareholdings; They also maintained subsidiaries or branches in the occupied ones areas.

The Armaments Office GmbH was founded by the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition in April 194254 and by Karl M. Hettlage, Generalrefrr:nt for Economics and Finance in the Ministry. It represented the most developed type of the defense financing institutions mentioned, which both carried out credit transactions and own Investments or company managed (so the Armaments office u. a. the Mittelwerk GmbH) as Grants and subsidies were also paid and special plans of the state monopoly regulatory bodies to relieve the burden on the armaments industry either in commercial terms manner or financed by funds perdu (see above). the Armaments office for example the “generator campaign”, the “Barracks Action”. “Scrap campaign” and the “ Copper expansion campaign" 55).

The Armaments Office, founded with a share capital of only one million RM (increased to 25 million RM at the beginning of 1944), had hundreds of millions of RM at its disposal; The Reich Finance Minister had to make these funds available as a lump sum, because of his complaints above the size Number “More worrying or at least more opaque Cases"[56]

53 Also: War risk clause: Obligation of Rich or. the lender, the to "relieve" tax or other financial burdens on investing armaments companies if war orders ceased or declined significantly (see *fVeyres-JJ. LeJ Jetzow,* p. 192 f.).

54 The founding date is sometimes found to be May 1942 (BA Koblenz, R 3/1789, ed. ex. "Tasks of the Armaments Office", dated February 17, 1943, o. V.), in *Janssen,* p. 41, even the 13th. 7. 1942 (in misinterpretation of the source: *News of the RMfBuM,* No. 8, August 7, 1942). But Speer mentioned them Founding as “caused” in his speech on the 18th. 4. 1942 (BA Koblenz, R 3/1547, speech to the district economic advisors, district department heads for technology and district representatives the DAF on April 18, 1942).

55 BA Koblenz, R 3/1789, AN RMfBuM regarding "Tasks of the Armaments Office", February 17, 1943; ibid., R 2/21736, AN RMdF, 13. 4. 1944. - Generator campaign: conversion of trucks to be powered by wood gas generators; Barracks campaign: construction of forced labor barracks for armaments companies; Copper expansion campaign: replacing the K. in electricity lines with aluminum and iron (including occupied countries in Western Europe).

56 Ibid, R 2/21736, AT RMdF v. April 13, 1944; s. a. File note v. 18. 5. 1942.

of the Armaments Office's transactions remained ineffective. In contrast, Deutsche Industriebank (parent company the Heeres-Rütungskredit-AG) and the Bank of German Aviation received credit quotas from the Reich Ministry of Economics. These contingents grew from a total of 750 million RM center 1940 to RM1.1 billion mid 1941, to 1.7 billion RM center 1942 and finally to 2.5 billion RM Mid-1944. [57] Furthermore, the banks mentioned undoubtedly accessed abundant sources of credit from private (large) banks and other financial institutions. The Heeres Armaments Loan AG alone quantified her Total loan volume End March 1943 on 1.25 billion, End March 1944 approximately 2 billion RM.58

Of the numerous methods of government investment financing for defense construction, the “Montan scheme” and the “IG scheme” are among the most common. According to the Montan scheme, the construction of an armaments plant proceeded in such a way that the parent company (i.e. the armaments company or a branch designated by it for this purpose or subsidiary - EN) because of a order of the HWA one Factory plant is building. The factory belongs to the Reich." [5 9] As the bearer and owner of the resulting work acted one from the Wehrmacht (HWA) created “collection society”. for Montan industry mbH" (short name: Montana). [00] "The Parent company founded a subsidiary that then takes over from the The factory that was built by his mother is leased and operated. The rent consists of a percentage of the tenant's gross operating surplus." [6i] The IG Farben Group, for example, founded a “parent company” specifically for the construction of armaments plants based on the Montan scheme. the Luranil Construction Company mbH. The completed factories became at one

"Subsidiary"; in the case of the three large poison gas factories in Gendorf, Dyhernfurth and Falkenhagen, this was Anorgana GmbH. The explosives companies Dynamit Nobel AG and Wasag built the corresponding factories themselves and had them run by them subsidiary company Company to recycling chemical products mbH and Deutsche Sprengstoffchemie GmbH operate.62

Under IG scheme was understood, “that the empire opposite Only one company is responsible for both construction and leasing i.e. about the founding of a special society for the lease and the operation apart becomes. The Rental interest is not based on the operating surplus of the system, but rather on the amortization and interest required for the system."63 The monopolies preferred this procedure wherever they were it because of the interlinking of the production system and production other plants in the group **considered** “undesirable”. Costs and selling prices Possibility of control through this Rich subjected become".64

57 Ibid, R 3/460, “armament” and War financing in the 3. Rich", O. D (Post-war elaboration).
58 report the Heeres-Rustungskredit-AG for the fiscal year 1943/44, quote at *lVeyres- v. Levetzow,* S. 195.
59 ZStA Potsdam, Case VI, Movie 412, Document NI-5685, AT (IG Farben Group) ex. Discuss in Troisdorf, January 31, 1939.
60 Please refer ibid, Court of Auditors of Germans empire, No. 5499 u. 5500, various pieces. - The society
shaft changed in June 1944 your names in “Montan Industrial plants GmbH".
61 How Note 59; *case 6,* S. 139.
62 How Note 59.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.

In the course of of the war disturbed the Monopolies on the mining scheme more and more constant monitoring supervision of State or the military Departments. Extremely difficult was to replace the property titles of the empire through privatization, which was obvious given the favorable production and profit situation and would have offered a significant incentive for the corporations. Finally, Montan showed itself in many ways in the eyes of the monopoly power to petty. „At to be set up machinery in the Inland", noted Hermann J. Para (German Bank) over a interview with Günther Quandt at the 23. September 1942, "The Wehrmacht takes the position that German weapons themselves have to finance such machines, which can also be used in peacetime, while the Wehrmacht is making them just machines, the pure war use have, to takes over financing. Quandt wants to continue the discussions in the near future with the aim of all investments on Cost from To reject German weapons."65

Since Autumn Won in 1942 the Ministry of Ammunition increasingly influence on the Montan and began at the beginning of 1943 with a sale of the works to the armaments concerns.66 The Powder-, Explosive- and poison gas production, the synthetic production and aircraft production were branches with particularly high Portion at state financing means and -Help. That alone IG Farben Group received in the course of the pre-war and War years at state investments, loans and Subsidies 4.9 billion

Table 137
State investment funds, Loans and Subsidies for the IG Farben Group 1933-1945 _
***(in mill.** RM)*

I. Investments of Reichs		
a) Investments the Montana in Works operated by the IG Paint industry AG of which:		58.3
Döberitz	12	
Wolfen	20.3	
Schkopau	10	
Auschwitz	16	
Inorgana GmbH		280
of that:		
Gendorf	145	
Dyhernfurth	135	
dynamite AG		180
GmbH to recycling chemical products		1985,7
Chemical factories Huls GmbH (Marl)		15
Monturon GmbH (Falkenhagen)		90
German Blasting chemistry GmbH		402
Eibia GmbH		286.7
Westphalian-Anhalt explosive AG		46.7
Commodity commissions AG		4.8
b) Investments the Bank the Germans aviation AG		182.7
c) Investments the Economic Research Society mbH		66
d) Other Investments of Reichs in works the IG		96
Total:		3693.9

65 ZStA Potsdam, German Bank, No. 15807, BI. 167, AT Section regarding Germans Weapons· and ammunition factories AG, September 23, 1942.

66 FB, 6.17. 2. 1943, Point 16; *Groehler,* The silent death, S. 239; s. a. ibid, S. 232f.

II. loans from the empire the IG Farbenindustrie AG and on IG-controlled companies		
a) Loans of OKH		19.5
including:		
Ludwigshafen	3	
Heydebreck	16	
b) Loans the Bank the Germans aviation and of Reich Aviation Ministry		457.1.
including:		
Schkopau	40	
Staßfurt u. Aken	44	
Heydebreck	80	
Auschwitz	30	
Moss beer tree	65	
Merseburg (Leuna)	68	
Huls	30	
Pölitz	47.4	
c) Loans the Economic Research Society mbH (for Pölitz)		14.7
d) Loans the Germans Building- and floor bench (for Pölitz)		3.8
e) Loans the Germans Industrial bank (for Auschwitz u. Pölitz)		35.6
f) Other Loans of Reichs (for Schkopau and Hüls)		188.5
Together:		719.2
III. grants (subsidies) of Reichs for Contract attachments		77.5
including:		
Staßfurt	30.5	
Aken	21.5	
Bitterfeld	9.2	
IV. "Eastern Aid" Tax subsidies (IG Paint industry AG and Ammonia plant Merseburg GmbH) as a result "Eastern depreciation" 1941-1944 _		359.9
of that:		
Savings at		
Corporate tax	233.8	
Profit transfer	95.2	
Trade income tax	30.9	
v. Lost ones grants of Reichs		40.9
of that:		
Moosbierbaum	30	
Staßfurt	10.9	
Total		4891.4

Source: ZStA Potsdam, Case VI, Film 416, Doc. NI-10016, Affid. Helmut Deichfischer, 21. 6. 1947 (to Document NI-10004, "Financial connection between the IG and the offices of the Reich and the Wehrmacht").

RM, underneath 360 millions RM “Eastern tax aid”, 41 millions “lost Grants" and 720 millions RM on loans that through increased depreciation were repaid.67 The German Airplane- and aircraft engine industry was to one not insignificant percentage Help from funds from the State treasury built been and developed in the wars with State aid in large tempo further. The State or. the Wehrmacht entered in the Rule not himself as “more public” investor and owner from Shareholdings on. The Investments were made by the bank of German aviation as between switched state monopolistic institution held, in whose Supervisory Board next to officials of Reich Aviation and of Reich Ministry of Finance Hellmuth Roehnert (Rheinmetall-Borsig/Reichswerke), August Kolb (Degussa) and other Monopoly representatives sat and the after private capitalist Usages managed. The Investments the bank of the Germans achieved aviation with 267 millions RM end 1939, 539 million RM in the years 1942 and 856 million RM in the Years 1944 one considerable Height.68 In relation to for the Total capital or to the Total investments the But that was the aircraft industry a quite a small amount.

In contrast became the corporations the Air force armor while of war by means of “capital average” - reduction and Redetermination of value the original

Table 138

Origin tks invested capital in tkr Aircraft industry (was standing January 1942; in mill. RM)

I. Own Medium the Aircraft industry (incl. bank loans)		until 31. 8th. 1939	1237
		away September 1, 1939	4006
		together	5243
of that:	Investments the Bank d. German Aviation:	until August 31, 1939	269
		away 1. 9. 1939	537
	Loans the Bank the Germans Aviation:	until 31. 8th. 1939	267
		away 1. 9. 1939	1512
II. Public Medium		until 31. 8th. 1939	360
		away 1. 9. 1939	1174
		together	1534
of that:	Aid	until 31. 8th. 1939	219
		away September 1, 1939	621
III. Total funding around			6777

Source: BA Koblenz, R 2/5551, „Overview above the investment and financing the Air Force Armaments Industry", as of January 23, 1942.

67 ZStA Potsdam, case VI, Movie 416, Doc. NI-10004, Affid. Helmut Dike fisherman v. June 21st 1947;
case 6, S. 37.

68 B.A Koblenz, R 2/5550, AT RMdF v. December 12, 1939; ibid, R 2/5551, AT RMdF v. July 24,

1942

u. September 30, 1944. - Main post the Investments were 260 mill. RM=97.56 percent the shares of Junkers aircraft and engine factories AG (1942).

Investments in the sale (reprivatization) of state-owned companies or production facilities - around a billion RM fortified.69

The Heinkel company, for example, which before the war only had its main factory near Rostock, had become a large corporation with 18 factories towards the end of the war . 70

The Navy acted similarly, generously financing the expansion of the shipyards.71 One significant source the Enrichment, the exclusively for the huge monopolies flowed, were Gaps and Exceptions in the Taxation. Tax fraud on a large scale, camouflaged and covered from one Pleiades smarter Corporate lawyers and tolerated from the state bureaucracy, was already always a privilege the Large companies. The complicated civil tax law always left room for large-scale taxation Manipulations. On the occasion of an examination of the tax behavior of the Krupp Group, the Reich Finance Minister expressed this circumstance cautiously with the remark, it would come "at Large companies often before, that the one or other Ask first in the Trains one Audit clarified and decided will".72

Tax rebates served in various forms as direct investment aid. An unpublished decree from the Reich Finance Minister dated 22nd July 1942, that in "extraordinary circumstances", especially in the "expansion of armaments facilities". the Wehrmacht, if "the Medium therefor otherwise out the Reichskasse would have to be raised in another form", their profit transfer amounts should be partially or "left or left to the full amount" to the companies concerned.7 3

In the same Direction worked the "Eastern tax aid" and the general Tax relief terments for Capital investments abroad, ie before especially in the occupied territories. German Equity investments in others countries Europe favored a Decree from the 24. December 1942, consequently the Corporate tax on the Profit shares out of this one Investments "partially or quite enact" become could.7 4 In the Reich Ministry of Economics became the opinion on this represented, such a tax favoritism should "only then (as) justified" admitted become, „if the German Bank company (in this specific case the Deutsche Bank Work - DE) actually through the The size of the participation is decisive influence on that Institute wins."75 So far is only few about the enormous Tax benefits known, the the Country the large corporations granted. Overall, there was no doubt that this number was in the order of many hundreds Millions, yes by billions RM. One of the big ones profiteers In this regard was the Salzdetfurth Group. As the next to dem Wintershall Group, Germany's largest Potash company bought Salzdetfurth in the second half the thirties Years all

liche Shares of Mansfeld Group including the since 1933 from States full subsidized _ "Copper Company" (Mansfeld's Copper slate mining AG) on76 and

69 How Note 57. At Addition of the sums for army and Navy "should Amounts stated become, the the Multiples of 1 billion RM" (ibid.).

70 *Germany armor in the Second World War,* S. 11.

71 See e.g. b. *Hieke, Serious,* H. C Stülcken Son. A German shipyard fate, Hamburg 1955, S. 141f.

72 B.A Koblenz, R 2/20881, RMdF at RWiM, 2. 5. 1940.

73 Ibid, R 13 V628, Rs. the District group northwest the Wigru Esl, August 13, 1942.

74 Ibid, R 13 XX/45, H. 2, Rs. Wigru Mining v. January 4, 1943 re: Decree RMdF v. 24. 12. 1942.

75 ZStA Potsdam, RWiM, No. 10079, Bl. 5, AT v. 13. 9. 1943.

76 *Radandt,* Mansfeld, S. 145f., S. 164 f.

cupped already at that time (1937/38) occasion the Reorganization of Group in the Kali range the Country on dem ways one Tax rebate.77

In the in 1942 _ the Group, whose Get rich in the meantime over coal, potash and salt, copper, petroleum in Germany and over stolen raw material resources and production facilities in many European countries, a massive attempt to escape taxation as much as possible through a major coup. For this purpose, the organizational principle should be applied to the entire group, ie the group including its "organ companies" tax as treated as a unitary enterprise. In this way, the profits of the highly profitable should be against the Profits or losses of the less profitable ones (including the subsidized) companies are offset and only then be taxed. Rudolf Stahl, chairman of the group and deputy head of the RGI, presented the Reich Finance Minister with political and blackmail sounds before, "It must be possible to find a way to ensure that the National Socialist regime is satisfied in the interests of fiscal justice Principles-adapted further development of opaque old-style corporate structures (probably a swipe at the Wintershall Group - D E.) into new, clear and transparent ones that are adapted to today's sensibilities to give tax advantages to constructions at least but not to disadvantage",78 Although the responsible ministerial officers against the Application voted, was the desire of the group in shape one "Individual benefit" approved.79 The "support" of Mansfeld's Copper shale mining amounted, according to records from the Reich Ministry of Economics in year 1943 to 34.5 millions and a year 1944 to 39.5 Millions of RM.80 were also highly subsidized other corporations of metal ore mining (Stolberg zinc; Schlesag) and many other monopoly companies.

One the biggest businesses with Tax- and at all with state funds in favor of private monopoly ownership made the Krupp Group. Hitler signed in November 1943 specially a Imperial law, the so-called Lex Krupp ("decree of Guide about the Fried family business. Krupp").8 [1] This law was on years of operation and personal ideas of the Krupps Hitler came about and created - according to the Krupps' plan for all time - a special property and inheritance law for the family Krupp and for him Krupp Group. Because of the "Outstanding, unique services to the military strength of Germany Volks", which the company had acquired, according to the preamble of the decree, Bertha Krupp, as owner of the Krupp family assets and main shareholder (de facto sole shareholder) of Fried. Krupp AG, was authorized to "use these assets to establish a family business with special "to establish a regulated succession". The Reich Finance Minister It was transferred to the taxation of the newly founded company and in the event of that Inheritance tax applies to "particularly regulated succession". "in the sense of this decree". Alfried Krupp took over this entire group assets officially from his mother Bertha Croup. The group, with effect from 15. December 1943 into a personal company (according to Statute: retail company) converted, should

77 B.A Koblenz, R 2/20898, various pieces.

78 Ibid, R 2/20899, steel at Schwerin v. Krosigk, 27. 3. 1942.

79 Ibid, RMdF at Steel, 31. 12. 1942 and 19. 1. 1943.

80 Ibid, R 7/342, elaboration ex. „Support of Mansfeldian copper slate mining", O. D

81 *RGBl.* 1943 I, S. 655f., Decree dated November 12, 1943; hereafter also the The following. Please refer also *Manchester,*
S. 436ff.

in the future will always be in the hands of a Krupp as the universal heir and “sole owner”. He became industrial Hereditary farm, for eternity Benefices of the Krupp family explained.

The essential one Purpose of law duration in it, the family Croup at the Takeover of the group assets from Bertha Croup and the Group management from Gustav Krupp to save countless millions in inheritance tax through her son Alfried. The group assets was - without the “fiduciary” or under "Lease" managed Companies in the fascist occupied areas - on above one billion Ri'l'l rose; to time of Use of power Hitler's had it approximately 260 millions RM82 be. One Careful calculation by the Reich Ministry of Finance resulted in the villa not being taken into account Hill 959 million RM, of which 656 million RM were operating assets of the AG, investments worth from 188 millions RM and Securities in the Face value from 115 millions RM.8 3 Krupp's tax liability In the event of inheritance, the total would have been considerably more than 400 million RM/¼ a sum that every bourgeois state would have to pay in exchange for a significant state share in the Capital of the company in question could have been redeemed. Even after that conversion into a sole proprietorship had, despite application all legal ones Tricks, about 120 million Paid RM become must.85

Under the national"socialist" dictatorship found itself 1944 - in the middle in the War, as on
rivers of blood on the battlefields fins - one other “Solution”: Krupp should be five annually percent of as taxable to be shown profit, d. H. approximately five millions RM, "on unlimited Time" at the Reich Ministry of Finance dissipate.86

The “Erbhofgesetz” only gained its full significance for one of the largest mining and armaments companies in Europe after the fall of the fascist dictatorship, when Germany lay in ruins and Alfried Krupp, after a short stay in the Nuremberg war crimes prison, lost his entire fortune, according to calculations his own lawyers are still worth billions from the Americans' confiscated assets received back. The restoration of autocracy the Krupps about one of the largest Corporations of the Federal Republic of Germany - and later the "European Economic Community"
- happened on the basis of special law Hitler's out of dem Years 1943.

d) Excellent pro{ite out of Forced laborB7

The declared goal is global control of raw material sources, sales markets and capital investment spheres of German imperialism and that The core of the planned “reorganization” of the riches the World, had for him only sense under the Requirement, that the life-

82 ZStA Potsdam, Case X, Film 421, Doc. D-192, Asset composition in the Krupp con- Zern (until 1937).
83 Ibid, Reich Ministry of Finance, No. b 718811, BI. 195 f., Hedding (RMdF) at Joeden (croup), 12. 6. 1943.
84 Ibid, BI. 251ff., recording RMdF, 12. 5. 1944 (more accurate Amount: 413.2 million RM). Means the most dubious Manipulations and "accommodation". finally 81.9 million RM as extreme minimum calculated out (BA Koblenz, R 2/20902, AT RMdF, May 1944).
85 ZStA Potsdam, Reich Ministry of Finance, No. b 7188/1, AT RMdF, June 10, 1943.
86 Ibid, BI. 281 R, Schwerin v. Krosigk at Lammers, 18. 9. 1944.
87 The The following based on *Drobish! Eichholtz,* S. 626, p. 637 f. The profit total has been checked and corrected. See. also in this one *Vol.* S. 243ff. u. 281ff.

The labor power of millions of people made such sources of profit flow. He sought this all the more emphatically and aggressively because of the lucrative sources available to him There was a lack of particularly profitable exploitation, such as workers from colonies, colored people or otherwise discriminable sections of the population the the USA, England and France ver added.

As while of war Workforce out of many countries Europe to millions in Germany performed forced labor, this was a specific form of their exploitation and the enrichment of German finance capital. In general, the employment of foreign workers in developed imperialist countries is as old as imperialism and Colonialism itself. In the First World War the German had Imperialism has already had experience with the mass use of forced labor in its own country. In the Second World War, the mass exploitation of foreign workers, although itself an essential war aim, was also intended to provide a means of achieving enormous goals of conquest across the entire globe with disproportionately little economic gain of our own potential ʟᴜ track.

Not simply the hunger for extra work and surplus value, but the greed for surplus profit was a driving motive of the fascist forced labor policy and the company forced labor regime. The lowest demands, the highest and safest profits were expected the Arms monopolies from those forced laborers, whose They squeezed out labor power most blatantly, without regard for health and life, who could drive and terrorize them most barbarically and who gave them the lowest wages and other expenses cost. That's where it came from the growing preference the monopolies for Soviet forced laborers, for prisoners of war - among them again in the first place Soviet tables - and also for Concentration camp prisoners.SB

End 1944 worked over in Germany 8 million, with There are probably almost 9 million concentration camp prisoners of all nationalities forced laborers. The fluctuation caused by death, flight and Arrest, through Accident and Illness as well as through contract expiry, was so large that the total number of foreign deported Forced laborers, including prisoners of war and forced laborers in concentration camps, are by no means overestimated at 14 million. Towards the end of the war there were foreign ones forced laborers about 40 percent Soviet Citizens, 25 percent were of French and 15 percent of Polish nationality. Their total number consisted of about 6 million civilian workers, 2 million prisoners of war and over one half a million concentration camp prisoners as well approximately 170,000 justice prisoners together.

An overview of the entire State and business profits from forced labor during the war years, the itself on one average Number from 4.5 millions compulsory

88 See. S. 281 ff. - A hideous tug of war between monopolies and fascist State set, for example with the RVK campaign of February/March 1943 a, the demanded that at the Wehrmacht or. at the Country to paying Fee for the Work Soviet prisoner of war - According to the GBA, “already designed to be very accommodating” (BA Koblenz, R 2/5359, Rs. GBA v. 17. 2. 1943; d. there calculation s. S. 218 d. prev. Work) - on about a quarter (!) to belittle (ibid., TO RMdF v. 27. 2. and Pleiger **at** Schwerin v. Krosigk, March 3, 1943). The coal mining industry's demands were largely met within a few months; In 1944 the entire mining industry came into effect the enjoyment of the negotiated “preferential regulation” (see *RABl.* 1944 I, S. 137, GBA Order ex. "Payment for prisoner-of-war work in mining" from March 25, 1944; cf. RABZ.1943 1, p. 477ff., GBA order ex. "Payment for prisoner of war labor" dated September 8, 1943). See in detail *Dispute,* p. 273ff., see p. 280ff.

workers, on one Value Added Rate out of 100 percent (considering the reduced work productivity and predominantly simple nature of the work performed) and an average wage of 50 percent compared to the standard wage (without surcharges) for an unskilled worker German worker receives (1500 to 1800 RM annually). one total from 60 until 70 billion RM. The mentioned total is a minimum value; The need to save, the need to starve, and the hindrance to consumption due to a lack of goods remain in this disregarded.

2. concentration from capital and profit

a) Business statistics

The Concentration process in the German Business reached until for the Years 1943 after the official statistics such level, that one sixth of all stock corporations have exactly five sixths of the total share capital and two percent of stock companies have over half of the share capital had. However, if you take the actual one into account State of monopolistic interdependence in the German economy, these figures will still have to be corrected significantly. According to Faingar, it can be assumed that not only half, but “at least two thirds of the German share capital is owned or controlled by them 150 companies that only made up two percent of all stock corporations."89

While the number of stock corporations did not change during the war years, with insignificant fluctuations, the number of companies with a share capital of five million RM or more grew very significantly, by almost that Half, the number of capital giants with share capital of 50 million RM and above is almost double. Due to this accumulation process, the average capital rose ever Public company significant in the Height. So it rose not only the part of the large stock corporations in the total share capital - namely unequal faster than in “peaceful” times -, but the bourgeoisie as The whole accumulated enormous wealth during the war, so that the level in the scale of the undertakings generally changed shifted strongly upwards. (Table 139)

Dem Appearance of the numbers after step the Concentration process before everything through capital

accumulation, which took place in all size classes of stock corporations, but less so further centralization of capital power, ie through the absorption of the smaller capitals by the larger ones. However, capital accumulation was accompanied by the further centralization of monopoly ownership of the means of production by the financial oligarchy; it was “simultaneous,” as in an analysis of the Statistical Reich's office from mid-1944 was called, "a summary the scattered share ownership follows not just yourself limited to the agglomeration within the framework of the corporations, but the also applies to an individual, a family or a group, often a large number from shareholders replaced have. From this Development are also Stock market securities

89 *Faingar,* p. 38. F. is one of the 108 largest stock corporations (see Tab. 139) the 42nd GmbH with more than 20 million RM share capital (1942) added.

Table 139
The Public companies in Germany 1938-1943 _

	In total- number the AG	In total- Shares- capital of the AG (Md.RM)	Through- sectional capital per AG (mill. RM)	Number the AG with 5 mill. RM u. more share capital	percent the Total the AG	Shares- capital (Md.RM)	percent of entire share capital
1938	5518	18.7	3.4	616	11.2	14.4	76.6
1939	5353	20.3	3.8	669	12.5	16.0	78.8
1940	5397	21.5	4.0	693	12.8	17.0	79.1
1941	5418	24.9	4.6	779	14.4	20.2	81.1
1942	5404	29.1	5.4	877	16.2	24.2	83.2
1943	5367	29.7	5.5	896	16.7	24.9	83.3

	Number the AG with 50 mill. RM u. more Shares- capital	percent the Total the AG	Share capital (Md.RM)	percent of entire share capital
1938	59	1.1	7.3	38.8
1939	63	1.2	8.0	39.2
1940	71	1.3	8.9	41.2
1941	89	1.6	11.2	45.0
1942	107	2.0	14.1	48.4
1943	108	2.0	14.6	49.5

Source: Business and Statistics, H. 7/1944, 8/1943, 6/1942, 17/1941, 21/1940; in addition also *Faingar,*
S. 35ff.

recorded been, from those man earlier assumed, that here one particularly width scattering of the Share ownership exists." 90

Even though the number of stock corporations stagnated, there were significant changes in the ownership structure, including changes that were not reflected in the statistics. First of all, it should be taken into account that closed companies and companies with closed operations and parts of operations continued to exist de jure and in the statistics, which otherwise would have shown an even greater concentration of capital must. This companies - mostly out of the lower Size classes - were eliminated from the production process and saw themselves separated from capital accumulation, from their markets and from the technical Further development excluded.

The fact that the state monopoly arms organization noticeably accelerated the process of vertical and horizontal monopolization through the centralization of capital had a far more significant impact. The large armaments producers have tied up numerous small and medium-sized companies as suppliers of equipment parts, assemblies and accessories rule by official order of the committee and Ring leader. She brought she many times through Reproduction licenses and technical

90 ZStA Potsdam, Statistical Reich Office, No. 2823, BI. 75, elaboration fd Reich Minister of Economics, May 26, 1944.

Advice on complete economic dependence. Many of these dependent companies fell the Capital supremacy the Defense companies and Banks for the Victim. They probably remained de jure independent businesses, but were secretly bought out, right the previous owners were on their way of capital increases for the purpose of expansion and rationalization investments by those investing or issuing Large companies and Banks majorized.

The distribution of wealth the corporations according to the official survey for 1940 confirmed the facts in a more concentrated manner economic power of large companies. The Companies with capital of one million RM or more (12.4 percent of all corporations) accounted for 90.7 percent of the capital total assets of all corporations, those with five million RM capital and about it (3.5 percent) 72.8 percent and those with ten millions RM capital and above (1.8 percent) 62.2 percent of total assets.91

Table 140
Assets the "unnatural Persons" (NNP) 1940

	Number	percent	Total assets (RM billion)	percent
NNP in total	54542	100	38.5	100
of that:				
Corporations				
in total	31185	57.2	34.4	89.4
including:				
Corporations	3875	7.1	31.3	81.1
(in Brackets: NNP)	(4412)	8.1	(33.6)	87.3
with 1 mill. RM Assets and more				
Ditto. with 5 mill. RM	1086	2.0	25.1	65.1
Assets and more	(1187)	2.2	(26.5)	68.8
Ditto. with 10 mill. RM	559	1.0	21.4	55.6
Assets and more	(603)	**1.1**	(22.5)	58.3

Source: B.A Koblenz, R 2/24140, property tax statistics 1940. Preliminary results, Sept. 1942. Percentages after the unrounded ones Pay.

b) The Dipidenda levy order Pom 12. June 1941

The exceptionally high rate of increase in total share capital in 1941 and 1942 is explained primarily by the extensive capital increases, the the Corporations in these years carried out. This appearance hung with Changes in the dividend legislation together, Yes she was a component the same.

Occasion for the new " Regulation to Limitation from Profit distributions (Divi dendentax regulation)" (DAV) from 12. June 1941 was the expiration period of the

dividend 91 See Table 140.

Restriction Act of 4. December 1934, 9 [2] of the so-called Bond Stock Act. From Reich Economics Minister Funk found out the banks, the Reichsgruppe industry etc. already in March 1941, it be “It is to be expected that dividends from an AG will be over 6 percent one Special taxation subjected and that at the same time AG, the are considered to be under-capitalized, are given the opportunity to 'correct' their capital ."93

Also Hitler involved itself at the discussion about the planned regulation.!¼ The internal justification of the draft regulation revealed the domestic political core of the measure; it must after all, so was called it in this, “politically the ideas and prejudices of large sections of the population must be taken into account. In order to ensure a dividend policy that does not exceed the visually desirable level of dividends when distributing economically justifiable profits, special measures are required, as has happened in other countries."[95]

Until June advised those responsible official and state monopoly committees and those Monopolies - primarily the Reich Ministry of Economics, Major banks and RGI - in permanence. Violent was about the cheapest for the monopolies Modalities argued. The DAV96 limited finally the dividend distribution and payout on usually six percent of the share capital - in this respect no innovation compared to the Bond Stock Act from 1934. At higher Distributions was against recently the levy of 50 to 400 (!) percent of the additional distribution to the state is prescribed. But it was at the same time ensured that the dividends since the Pre-war years almost everywhere in the War economy in constant rise understood were, the Shareholders are not restricted to become needed. The war profits were too high for the monopolies themselves with the aid of all of their accounting skills and manipulations, the dividend, that part of profit, the in the words of Carl Fürstenberg, one lead the banker the Weimar Time, on no way to hide anymore is, under the one given Conditions would have constantly on keep it six percent or below can. The regulation let the Corporations not only free Hand, rather demanded from expressly in addition on, their share capital by so much "correct" that the same dividend amount, the until now for the Example ten, twelve or 15 percent of share capital, future only six percent of increased share capital represented. In this one

92 *RGBl.* 1934 I, p. 1222f. "Law on the distribution of profits in corporations (Bond Stock Act)", dated December 4, 1934 (with a validity period of three (fiscal) years); extended for a total of six years *RGBl.* 1937 I, S. 1340, "Law amending the Bond Stock Act", v. December 9, 1937. - See *Zumpe,* S. 91 and p. 290f., and *Kuczynski,* location the workers, Vol. 6, S. 22, the prove that this "Dividend Restriction Act", which sets the distribution rate to 6 Percent limited, but fixed additional amounts for a longer term in a fund for imperial bonds to be purchased, was "actually not directed against the big capitalists, but against the small and middle bourgeoisie" (Kuczynski) and the Monopolies one era the “self-financing” of their Expansion investments pp. opened.

93 ZStA Potsdam, German Bank, No. 21166, “Newspaper of the Headquarters for the Directorates of the Branches", March 18, 1941.

94 Ibid, AT for Rösler, 24. 3. 1941.

95 Ibid.

96 *RGBl.* 1941 I, S. 323ff., „Regulation to Limitation from Profit distributions (Dividends the tax regulation)" v. 12. 6. 1941. Hereafter also the The following.

The balance sheet trick was the whole secret of this wave of capital increases at almost all important defense companies. That was the core of an action that was in public demagogic as Profit limitation of the corporations, presented as "victims" of the industry and which is very important dem Target set in scene had been **,** the "psychological intolerable"9 7 high dividends during wartime **for** the public disappear allow.

In anticipation of the regulation, since the beginning of 1941 , the monopolies had postponed general meetings, postponed the decision on the dividend rates of their companies, withheld their dividend declarations for 1940 or withheld profits. They subsequently decided on capital adjustments or prepared them for 1942 , which often doubled the share capital and sometimes even increased it several times over. In many cases these capital increases were based on genuine undercapitalization, ie a lag in the capital caused by the growth of productive funds capital coverage; But fundamentally it was the abnormal level of profits out of the war boom, the the defense companies the distribution of profits pro rata of the share capital caused difficulties. Their overwhelming economic power was as well their profit so noticeable increased to take this fact into account had to become.

In the second half of year 1943 was the Process the Capital adjustments in the Essentially completed, and the shareholders of the defense companies had to issue new, higher shares by issuing additional shares or by overstamping the old shares amounts Received billions in gifts.

Table 141
Capital increases of the Public companies on Reason the Dividend levy11 regulation 110m 12. June 1941, 1941-1943

	number d. increase . AG	Share capital (RM million) before	after	increase (in percent)
June-December 1941	340	2004	3238	61.6
January December 1942	807	5427	8107	49.4
January-October 1943	125	1083	1448	33.7
In total	1272	8514	12793	50.2

Source: Business and Statistics, H. 7/1944 u. 8/1943.

Pritzkoleit 98 achieves very similar values overall. (Table 142)

Nearly a Quarter all Public companies had her Nominal capital around in total increased over 50 percent. As a result , the total capital of all German stock corporations (1940) increased by almost 20 percent. In addition, there were approximately 1.2 billion RM in capital increases in limited liability companies, so that the entire Top-up amount on around 5.5 billion RM belief.99 This unprecedented

97 *The German National economy,* No. 11-12/1943, quote b. *Faingar,* S. 41.
98 *Pritzkoleit,* S. 52 **ff.**
99 *Faingar,* S. 40.

Table 142
Capital adjustments 1941-1943 _

Number the social	economic sector or Economic group	capital adjustment from mill. RM	on mill. RM	around mill. RM	around percent
31	Mining u. fuel ind.	1374880	1965970	591090	42.99
40	Ironworks lnd., Iron- u. Steel construction, Foundries	362259	576834	214575	59.23
14	Metal industry	173248	299926	126678	73.12
136	mechanical engineering	489890	800672	310782	63.44
30	Vehicle industry and Vehicle accessories	224691	324387	99696	44.37
56	Electrical industry	758818	1394326	635508	83.75
7	Precision mechanics and optics	21894	40771	18877	86.22
28	Material refinement u. related Iron industry branches	36246	57456	21210	58.52
26	Iron-, Steel- u. Sheet metal goods	62117	137752	75635	121.76
16	Metalware u. related Industries	42920	53900	10980	25.58
65	Stones u. Earth, Glass u. Ceramics	208901	295606	86705	41.51
42	Building- u. Real estate company	95035	155389	60354	63.51
19	Wood processing lnd., Sawmills	14950	23095	8145	54.48
102	Chemical Industry	1507294	2176786	669492	44.42
29	paper products u. - processed, Pressure, Movie	80040	143339	63299	79.08
29	Leather, Shoes, linoleum	85176	130452	45276	53.16
172	textile u. Clothingindustry.	465191	719564	254373	54.68
63	Groceries- u. beverage industry	158895	314039	155144	97.64
129	Breweries and Malthouses	371523	552445	180918	48.70
20	sugar factories	87665	143228	55563	63.38
16	Spirits are ustry	19850	29440	9590	48.31
45	trade	144896	217836	72940	50.34
13	holding u. financing societies	263339	349686	86347	32.79
19	Banks u. Credit institutions	199855	329505	129650	64.87
9	trust u. revision societies	4270	9930	5660	32.55
53	power supply	1293222	1734460	441238	34.12
34	Traffic and carrier	111729	169148	57419	51.39
3	restaurant u. accommodation Business	5832	8914	3082	52.85
43	Insurance	256163	353136	96973	37.86
	Ditto. (deposited Cape.)	165123	262676	97553	59.08
1289	In total	8920789	13507992	4587199	51.42

Source: Prit:r.koleit, S. 60f.

Around 60 percent of the profit distribution in shares came from the so-called hidden reserves (via higher valuation of the assets). The nominal capital was not shown anywhere the Societies but in the Usually exceeded by a multiple of ßl0 The rest flowed from the open reserves (reserves) on the balance sheet. “This is what we are experiencing at the moment,” wrote the “Leipziger Neuesten Nachrichten” on the 21st. September 1941, “a balance sheet revolution of the greatest style." [101]

Since the group of stock corporations involved in the increase is almost all large companies with more than 5 million RM share capital comprised - her average capital each society cheated before the Increase 6.7 Millions, afterward 10 million RM -, also became the real pace and level of concentration of capital and the profits, if also still unclear, recognizable.

Companies that had literally overeaten on arms orders and corresponding investments increased their capital by particularly large amounts and jumped rapidly growing profits accumulated.

Table 143
Capital adjustments selected Pursue on Reason THERE v 1940141- 1942143

company	Share capital (RM million) beforehand	afterward	increase on percent
Dürener Metalworks AG (Quandt Group)	4	20	500
German Weapons· and ammunition factories AG (Quandt Group)	17.5	70	400
press and rolling mill AG, Dusseldorf (United steel mills)	5.69	22.76	400
Fritz Werner AG	3.6	**12**	333
Siemens & Neck c AG	**140**	400	286
Central Germans Steel mills AG	28	75	268
Continental Rubber Works AG	34	88.4	260
Arado Aircraft factories GmbH	20	50	250
Accumulator factory AG (Quandt Group)	21.25	46.75	220
Siemens Schuckertwerke AG	120	240	200
German Industrial bank AG	100	200	200
Degussa	34	68	200
pulp mill Waldhof AG	33.25	66.5	200
United Ball bearing factories AG	30	60	200
Wasag (IG Farben Group)	25	50	200
Christian Dierig AG	23.5	47	200
Heinrich Lance AG	**18**	36	200
Philip Holzmann AG	12.9	25.8	200
Kalle & Co. AG (IG Farben Group)	10	20	200
Pittler machine tools AG	5	10	200
United Aluminum Works AG	40	75	188

Source: Pritzkoleit, S. 63 ff.; various File volumes of Reich Ministry of Finance (BA Koblenz, R 2).

100 Ibid.; please refer also *Goll.*
101 Quote at *Wenceslas,* S. 227 (ff.).

The tip of one iceberg comparable, became such a part of until then achieved profits of German financial capital visible, and like a highlight became the stark disproportion between the enrichment of the big bourgeoisie the war and the deterioration of the situation work Population illuminated.

Quite and even on "optical" Effect was the Profit transfer regulation (GAV) from the March 31, 1942102 calculated. According to her, in the event of "exceptional increases in profits", the Reich Finance Minister *could* demand that a share of the profits, to be determined by him, be transferred to a special profit transfer account at the tax office. The Finance Minister wanted to decide how the amounts would be used "after the end of the war". feature (§ 1). Furthermore, should corporations with one income from more pay more than 500,000 RM per year, one and a half times the war surcharge on corporation tax (§ 2). An executive order of the same date However, 1 0 3 explained the sales achieved on the basis of standard prices and group prices I accordingly Request for excepted from this provision (§ 5).

It was therefore clear that the regulation was in no way directed against the arms monopolies, but rather only the "civilian" production companies that profited from the war economy, i.e. especially the mass of small and medium-sized companies, stronger to war financing was used become should.

c) Investments and "original Accumulation"

The war economy and abundance of profits offered arms companies excellent investment opportunities and increased the incentive to invest. They saw investments as a good opportunity to invest a large part of their profits.

In the years 1939 until 1943 took the investments in the Defense industry to such an extent that this period became a high point in the history of German capital investments at all.104 These investments primarily strengthened the power of the leading Defense companies and major banks.

The IG Farbenindustrie AG, next to the United Steelworks the largest private German group, invested in 1941 until 1943 1.7 billion alone Reichsmark, more than ever. otherwise in their history. (Table 144)

The United Industrie-Entrepreneurship AG (VIAG), the holding company of the VIAG Group, one the largest state-controlled German Corporations, invested in Years 1943 alone above her 100 percent Subsidiaries (United Aluminum minium-Werke AG, Ilseder Hut, Ilse Mining AG, RWE and others) around 220 million RM. 1 05 The largest Group the air force armor, the Junkers Group, took in the Years 1941 investments in the amount of 165 million RM, in 1942 even in the amount of 307 million RM before. 106 Frederick Flick had alone for his Corporate ownership at the Dysentery (Harpen/Essener hard coal) in the first War year a Investment program from dozen-

102 *RGBl.* 1942 I, p. 162, „Regulation about the Recording extraordinary increases in profits while of war (Profit transfer regulation GAV)", v. March 31, 1942.

103 Ibid, S. 162ff., „First regulation to execution the Profit Transfer Ordinance", dated March 31, 1942.

104 Please refer S. 381ff.

105 B.A Koblenz, R 2/17664, AT RMdF v. 13. 6. 1944.

106 Ibid, R 2/5484, AT RMdF (O. D.).

Table 144
Investments of IG Farben Group 1933, 1936, 1938-1944 (in mill. RM)

	1933	1936	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
IG Paint industry AG	28	128	245	184	151	258	400	449	362
Subsidiaries (100 % participation.)	5	43	117	88	92	155	140 •	88 •	59•
Rest corporate societies	2	11	42	86	114	99	65	45 •	?
Total••	36	181	404	359	358	512	605	582	?

• estimate
Total differences as a result rounding the Line items

Source: ZStA Potsdam, Case VI, Film 413, Doc. NI-10001, Explanation. under oath v. Helmut Deichfischer, June 1947.

the millions RM set up. He wrote Mid 1940 at Serious bus cooling, General Director of Harpen, “that we do it together with Essen hard coal from surpluses or tax-free depreciation could probably be carried out over the course of 4-5 years, assuming that that we from here yearly 12-15 million mark for New buildings apply could ten".107

The investments were financed from three sources of financing: from the defense companies' own funds ("self-financing"), from state Loan and subsidy funds and from private bank loans. After the verdict of official observers took place a “More profound Change" straight on dem Area the financing methods;

"while the growth first with Help the share and the Bond nourished became, like it too dem meaning of Stock corporation in principle corresponds, has himself in the run the Time the Self-financing or the financing in the closed circle increasingly enforced." 108 Self-financing was encouraged by state economic and financial policy and represented one of the main forms of profit use. The corporations made use of them Preference for risk-free, on long term profitable investment projects, at those she one Influence of State or an addiction from the banks not wished or possible small amount hold wanted to. The most brutal Fonn the enrichment the German monopoly bourgeoisie, the expansion and concentration of their economic Might, was the, What Kuczynski "one Return to the old Methods the primitive, the original Accumulation" 109 calls: the robbery of Capital, that is, from Pursue and whole Business sectors, first in your own country through "Aryanization", then, since 1938, in matchless larger Scale in the annexed and occupied areas. Acted according to the economic nature of the matter Of course it is not about accumulation from Capital, ie around accumulation of capital Exploitation, and also not around those "Expropriation the big crowd from reason and Floor and foods and Working instruments", 110 the Marx the "Before-

107 *case 5,* S. 231, Doc. NI-3513, Flick at bus cooling, June 23, 1940.
108 ZStA Potsdam, Statistical Reich Office, No. 2823, Bl. 75, elaboration for the RWiM, May 26, 1944.
109 *Kuczynski,* Position the workers, Vol. 6, S. 40.
110 *Marx,* S. 789f.

"history of capital", but rather about the violent centralization of already existing capitals made possible by war and fascist terror [111] on a national and international scale. However extensively this method was used in occupied Europe, so was minor in the eyes the German imperialists' achievements compared to their plans for the future spanned continents.11 [2] After all, the annexations and military campaigns of German imperialism between 1938 and 1942 to a significant extent to Capital concentration in in the hands of the financial oligarchy.113

d) Leading Defense companies

The German *mining companies* completely monopolized the hard coal mining, iron ore mining, iron and steel production and rolling mills as well as largely brown coal mining. With their vertical structure, they all reached deep into the processing area, especially into the Armaments industry (in narrower terms senses).

The German mining industry was clearly dominated by the Ruhr companies, while the Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG (Stahltrust) dominated the Ruhr. Your monopoly structure remained largely unchanged during the war. Two Large corporations stepped in however to dem a good dozen [114] existing added: The Reich works “Hermann Göring”, in the year Created in 1937 in preparation for the war to exploit the iron-poor German iron ore deposits, but only became a huge mining, armaments and shipping company through the robbery or German fascism's control over companies and entire branches of industry outside Germany increased; further the mountain hut group with headquarters in Teschen (Cieszyn), the, under Leadership of the Germans Bench standing, Polish-Upper Silesian and Czech mining districts from French and other foreign property.

The Giant corporation the *United Steel mills* was in the Years 1936, encouraged through the

111 The most likely scenario would be the robbery of socialist businesses in the fascist-occupied area USSR from one attempt or of methods “more original Accumulation" in the Meaning of the violent creation of capitalist production relations out of speak of non-capitalist production relations, since here there is actually a "historical process of divorce between producers and means of production" (ibid., p. 753) in imperialist, historically perverted shape - from socialism back to capitalism - completed should be.

112 Please refer S. 392 ff.

113 However, these appear to be far exaggerated in view of what came to light in our study Data the quantitative Testify in the from *Kuczynski,* Position the workers, Vol. 6, S. 41, thesis put forward: “The ordinary one took place between 1938 and 1942 Form of accumulation as we had known it until then, in Germany despite the huge profits heavy industrial Monopolists are no longer the ones bigger role. The at The vast majority of the capital accumulated annually came from primitive, “original” accumulation through robbery and terror. The character of accumulation was fundamentally changed, was in many ways similar that before several hundred years, Yes, went Furthermore, in the emphasis on predatory warfare as the best means of accumulation."

114 *dysentery:* United steel mills, croup, Hoesch, Haniel (Good Hope Hut), Klöckner, manly man; *1vlittle Germany!Ruhr:* Flick; *Upper Silesia:* Oberhütten-Ballestrem, Schaff gotsch, Donnersmarck, Pleß; *Saar:* Röchling, Stumm, Dillinger Hütte; also some state ones (Preussag) and smaller or mixed Corporations.

from him promoted and supported **Hitler government, on** initiative **of Chairman of the Supervisory Board Fritz Thyssen was reprivatized** with **the help of** Deutsche Bank.US The resistance of **leading company representatives** at times caused the **group to lose a certain amount of position** in the structure of state-monopoly **power relations** against the **Founding of the Reichswerke116** in **1937 and** the **emigration of Fritz** Thyssen [117] **in 1939.** But the fascist state made no move to expropriate the **emigrant** 's **assets or** at least the capital share **of Thyssen as the leading major shareholder the** United **Steel Mills to nationalize;** it **became** in the **December 1939**
only a **" Trustee" for the** Thyssen assets **in person** from Otto **Steinbrinck,** one
the general representative of **the Flick Group, which thereby transferred to the** steel trust.US The **Chairman of the Supervisory Board** took over the previous **Chairman of the Board Albert** Vögler, the **gray** eminence of German **finance capital, a trusted advisor to Hitler** since 1933 .
On the eve of the Second **World War,** the steel trust operations combined 25.5 **percent of** the German **hard coal production,** 26.5 **percent of coke production, 38.1** percent of pig iron and almost 40 percent of steel production **and** employed 400,000 **workers and** employees.119 The steel trust, with its hundreds of connections **to other** industrial companies **and banks,** cartels, business associations **,** technical **associations, etc.** next to IG Farben, the most powerful **group** of German finance capital, **itself represented** an **agglomerate of** almost 20 (sub-) **corporations,** the **about** 600 **establishments with** a **capital of four** until controlled **five billion RM** . [1 20] **The Parent company alone (share capital:** 460 **million RM)** owned investments **in 1942 in the nominal** amount **of 814.4** million **RM.** [121]
Vögler made **himself** indispensable during the **war as a mentor to Fritz** Todt **and** especially **Albert Speer and filled dozens of the** most important positions in the **apparatus of the** committees **and** rings of the **ammunition and** armaments ministry **with** his confidants, **among to** them **first Position** board member **(or deputy Chairman of the Board) Walter Rohland, who took over as Chairman of the Group's Board of Directors** in the **fall of** 1943 . raw land was valid in the War economy since 1940 with Right as "Tank Dictator" (Head **of the Armored Cars Main Committee) and since 1942 also as an** “iron dictator” **(deputy**

115 *Gossweiler,* ***Kurt,*** The United Steel mills and the major banks, in *JfW,* 1965, T 4, S. 37ff.

116 Please refer *Volume* ***I,*** p. 51. Detailed see *Riedel, Matthias,* Eisen and coal for the third Rich. Paul Pleiger's position in the Nazi economy, Göttingen/Frankfurt a. M./Zurich 1973; *Zumpe, Lotte,* critically Coal-iron-steel 1936/37, in *JfW,* 1980, T. 1, p. 137 **ff.**

117 Thyssen, one the earliest Sponsor and most eager partisan the Hitler fascists, **ver** fought a aggressive anti-Sovietism and "Urge eastward", doubted but to it, that Hitler's Germany could achieve military success against the united Western powers. The “Blitzkrieg” and the Four year plan concept had to go his opinion fail. He stayed in September 1939 after the declaration of war Britain and France in Switzerland, where he was there at that time. Immediately before his trip he had In an open telegram to Hitler, he described him as a traitor to National Socialism referred to because he made a pact with Bolshevism closed (AG K \Varschau, case VI, Il. 7, minutes p. 2041, Witness interrogation Günther Frank Fahle).

118 Over Steinbrinck s. *case 5,* S. 357ff.

119 *Faingar,* S. 48.

120 Ibid, S. 49.

121 Ibid, p. 78. Before dem Wars: 680 mill. RM.

tender leader and the actual leading representative of the RVE and the main iron production ring).

The Vereinigte Stahlwerke group, which has always been a stronghold of Greater and Pan-Germanism, was a pioneer of the “reorganization of the European major economic area”. In contrast to the IG Farben group and, for example, the Flick group, its representatives but more in the background the threads and worked above the from them majorized associations, Syndicates and Cartels at the “Peace planning”. His rulers, especially the one who is well-versed in politics and is tactically adept birder, knew, that you thanks of their economic Abundance of power her “Right”, the right of the stronger, would be able to demand it when the time came; but until then they wanted what they wanted on a “small scale”. Circle", in the economic group, etc. led smaller competitors within the mining group and also the government did not do much extensive and open-hearted requirements alienate.

The company's expansion beyond German borders initially affected Austria. He had to have significant influence on the Alpine Montan Group Of course, albeit under favorable conditions, the Reich works resign - as a result of its weakened state monopoly position compared to the Four Year Plan grouping in this phase [122]; around so intensive operation he the" remodeling and reorganization of Böhler Group into the German Reich"[123], which was previously formed by setting up a holding company in Switzerland Control and possible interventions by the Austrian chen state withdrawn been was. Over the Economic group iron creating industry and above officially plenipotentiary Commissions took he authoritative Influence on the

"Reorganization" of the Polish-Upper Silesian mining industry (1939), but especially on the distribution of the Lorraine and Luxembourg smelting works (1940/41) [124] and on the perspective Planning the "Reorganization" of the entire mining district (1942) [125]. In the

In 1942 he established himself as one of the BHO's leading "sponsor companies" in the heart of the Donec region solid (Stalino, Makeevka etc.).[126]

The *Krupp Group, which* was already a nucleus for later military armament during the period of secret rearmament before 1933, was in the war because of its high production of steel, especially stainless steel and special steels, [127] its powerful mechanical engineering and steel construction capacity, its numerous patents and licenses on processes and products and the long-standing Production experience his Academic subject- and Special workers one of the most important, in some areas the leading producer of guns and tanks and Warships (submarines). In the Area of Group, the shortly before the war approximately 110000 employees had, worked after five war years in German-

122 See *Volume I,* p. 48ff.; with other accents recently *Zumpe,* S. 192ff. u. S. 208ff. On the controversy surrounding the Alpine Montan and the negotiated compromise see *Karner, Stefan,* The integration of the Austrian mining industry into the German war armament: The Alpine montane 1938-1945, in *the bleed,* 1/1981, p. 17ff.

123 B.A Koblenz, R 2/20898, elaboration for RMdF, 23. 6. 1939.

124 Please refer *tape I,* S. 294ff.; *case 5,* S. 214ff.; *anatomy of war,* S. 257ff.; *DZW,* Vol. 1, S. 385ff.

125 For this detailed *EichhoUz,* The Minette area and the German mining industry, S. 816U.

126 Please refer S. 468.

127 Two companies in the Krupp Group alone produced nine to ten percent of of all stainless steel produced in Germany (BA Koblenz, R 3/1803, product “specialist lists” (RMfRuK), Status: 1. 12. 1944).

country and the occupied territories ultimately employ almost 280,000 people, including almost 100,000 foreign workers Forced laborers.128

While the During the war, the group comprised 81 companies in "Greater Germany" alone, a total turnover of annually not much less than one billion RM had and with with capital assets of over one billion RM (1933: approx. 260 million R M) , h e reported his share capital as in the pre-war years with a fictitious 160 million RM.129

Alone at immediate Armament contracts from army and Navy received Croup during four war years, from 1939/40 until 1942/43, total 840 millions RM.130 boss of this group, the Quality and pace the German Armament from Beginning to those who have a significant say, was until 1943 Gustav Krupp from Bohlen and Haibach, after that Son Alfred. Gustav Croup had in the spring 1933 the Reich Association the German Industry on fascist lines or on a course of rearmament.131 The following year he had committed himself even more deeply to Hitler when he persuaded him to eliminate the SA leadership at the June 30th 1934 encouraged. 1 3 2 So he always had huge Influence on Hitler and

Table 145

Pig iron production, steel production and Sales volume of Krupp Group 1932/33, 1933/34, 1938139 until 1943/44

fiscal year	Pig iron (1000 t)	Portion at the German Total prod. (Percent)	Crude steel (1000 t)	Portion at the German Total prod. (Percent)	of which: electrical steel (1000 t)	Total sales **(mill.** RM)
1932/33	665	13.9	838	12.0	26	191
1933/34	1196	15.4	1307	12.1	48	298
1938/39	2017	10.5	2098	8.7	129	759
1939/40	1649	10.8	1851	8.9	144	775
1940/41	1553	8.1	1766	6.9	178	892
1941/42	1450	7.1	1678	6.4	190	959
1942/43	1572	6.5	1670	5.4	178	770
1943/44	1401	6.2	1536	?	184	?

Source: ZStA Potsdam, case X, Movie 421, Doc. NIK-13035 and NIK-13037, “Statistics Handbook of the Krupp company", September 1944.

128 *Manchester,* p. 470 (for Germany and occupied territories 277,966 employees of the group as of 30. 9. 1944). In the 81 companies of the Group in “Greater Germany” worked from 1940 to 1945 in total 70000 civilian foreign workers, 23000 Prisoners of war and 5,000 concentration camp prisoners (AGK Warsaw, case X, Vol. 95, ADB 32, Document NIK-13173, Affid. Hans Too bad, December 16, 1947).

129 Affid. A pity (see Note 128); *Faingar,* S. 51; ZStA Potsdam, case X, Movie 421, Doc. D-192,
“Compilation and Comparison of own assets of Krupp Group" (until 1937).

130 ZStA Potsdam, case X, Movie 421, Document NIK-13035, “Statist. Manual the Fa. Krupp", September 1944. In contrast, 1932/33: 9 million RM.

131 *anatomy of war,* S. 109ff., Doc. 24, Gustav Croup at Hitler, April 25, 1933, and ibid, S. 123ff., Doc. 35, Draft one Memorandum of Imperial status the Germans Industry, v. 13. 2. 1934; ZStA Potsdam, Case X, Film 423, various documents (NI-904, NI-909, NI-910, D-353, NIK-5982).

132 *Gossweiler, Kurt,* The role the Monopoly bourgeoisie at the bringing about the Röhrn affair, Phil. diss., Berlin 1963, S. 494.

kept until far in the War the Possibility direct access to him.1 [33] At the The company was partly because of its greed for profit and its monopoly claim, partly because of its conservative nature Management methods are not particularly popular because of™ itself but in crucial ways Questions are often asked directly about Hitler. His personal friendship with Hitler kept Krupp warm during the war with particularly thoughtful "gifts."135

In the state monopoly armaments organization of the Reich Ministry for Armament and Ammunition, the Krupp Group was primarily opposed to the United Steel Works in a relatively weak one Position. The three big ones Main committees for tanks, weapons and ammunition were formed after Erich Müller left as head of the Main Committee weapons in the Years 1942 [13 6] from Competitors Krupps directed. In the Imperial iron association was The imbalance between the two deputy leaders Rohland and Alfried Krupp is obvious. Krupp representatives played a more significant role in technical commissions for the development of military equipment and for the use or Replacement of deficiency and exchange metals (Paul Goerens, Eduard Houdremont, Erich Müller).

During the war, the Krupp Group proved to be one of the most aggressive robbers and looters among the vultures [13 7] who pounced on the riches of the occupied countries. His foray began in Austria and extended without fail across Poland, Czechoslovakia, the countries of Western, Northern and Southeastern Europe and into the USSR, where the Krupps intended to build a second industrial empire in the Ukraine. Her hand lay from Donec to to the Atlantic, from the North Cape to to the Mediterranean on dozens of stolen (expropriated, confiscated, "leased") industries, especially ore mines, machine factories, shipyards. [1 38] The Krupp representatives went, similar to the IG Farben bosses [13 9,] even so far, an obnoxious representative the foreign financial world - in this one case a Member of French

133 *Trialls,* Vol. 9, Washington 1950, case X, p. 781ff., witness statements. by Karl-Otto Saur, 8th. 6. 1948. See also ZStA Potsdam, case X, Movie 422, Document NIK-8032, timeline the Visits Hitler's at Krupp from 1934 to 1940 (ten visits).

134 *Trialls,* Vol. 9, Case X, p. 834 f., witness statement. by Walther Schieber, 27. 5. 1948. Schieber, for example, mentioned Krupp's objections to the methods of the RMfRuK, especially to the Furnishings the factory representative of ministry; the Group be clumsy, ineffective, the "problem child", the "Reichsbahn in industry" (ibid., p. 842).

135 For the 20. 4. 1942 "gave" he Hitler the first produced" Tiger" tank; Hitler appreciated that as "be best birthday present" (ZStA Potsdam, Case X, Film 421, Doc. NIK- 11350, Speer to Krupp, 28. 4. 1942). Three months later, Krupp "gave away" the first finished "Gustav" gun ("Iron Gustav," also "Dora"), the heaviest gun of the war (80 cm); he wants, wrote like that he Hitler, "von "To refrain from calculating this first copy" (ibid., Film 422, Doc. D-375, Krupp to Hitler, 24. 7. 1942). See also *Manchester ,* p. 419.

136 ZStA Potsdam, case X, Movie 428, Doc. NIK-11803, Affid. Eric Müller, June 24, 1947.

137 *Tria"ls,* Vol. 9, Case X, p. 501, witness examination of Arthur Rümann, 22. 1. 1948. The term "carrion vulture" comes from Rümann, who on May 18, 1940 Alfried Krupp and observed other industrialists "distributing" Dutch industrial objects using a map .

138 Detailed information material in AGK Warsaw, case X, Vol. 104H. (ADB 51ff.).

139 Please refer *tape I,* S. 55.

branch the Rothschild family - by French Collaborators the To play into the hands of the SS, so that he was sent to Auschwitz perished.140

Friedrich *Flick* built his family company after the First World War using war profits. Constantly expanded through various financial manipulations and with state help, was the Group already in the second Half of the twenties mainly in Silesia (Oberhütten), in the Ruhr area (Stahltrust) and in Central Germany (Mittel stahl) involved. After 1933 built Flick him before everything on dem criminal ways from "Aryanizations" of the greatest style, promoted and covered by the top of the politically ruling class Fascist clique. 141 He was one the most active Supporter and Driver of rearmament. Since the beginning of 1932 had he politically more and more towards the Hitler fascists oriented. His relationships became Hitler and especially Göring soon extraordinarily tight. He supported Göring immediately after the 30th. January 1933 helped build up the air armament and provided him with one of his group directors, Heinrich Koppenberg, to manage the Junkers Group; From then on, his group factory ATG (Allgemeine Transportanlagen GmbH, Leipzig) produced Junkers machines itself.142 Later he was "in contrast to others Industrialists" with Göring in the controversial founding and in the consolidation of the Reichswerke in the federal government.143 For this presented itself Goering with his names and his political Weight behind the Flick's "Aryanization" project against the Petschek brothers - the largest and most profitable of its kind ever.144

Flick was one of the most prominent Members of the "Circle of friends of the Reichsführer-SS" and let his from here resulting links - e.g. B. testified SS Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff, Himmler's close confidant, later a "friendly relationship between Flick and me"145 - play in favor of his group, including in procurement from workers out of Concentration camps.146

At the beginning of the war, Flick - the third largest German steel producer behind the Stahltrust and Krupp - a huge steel and brown coal base in central Germany, northern Germany and Bavaria, extensive Coal interests in the Ruhr area and a large number of important machine, locomotive and wagon building factories scattered all over Germany, especially in Silesia, Saxony, Berlin-Brandenburg and Siegerland, and produced tank parts, weapons, ammunition and aircraft. In year In 1939 he employed 80,000, in 1944 over 130,000 people; were in the latter number Estimated 60000 foreign forced laborers contain. 147 The flick

140 *Manchester,* S. 404 ff.

141 *case 5,* S. 353ff., study above "The 'Aryanizations' of Flick Group" (from Karl-Heinz Thieleke).

142 To Koppenberg s. *Thyssen, Fritz,* I Paid Hitler, London/New York 1941, S. 270f.; to ATG s. *case 5,* S. 108ff.

143 *trials,* Vol. 6, case V, S. 579f., Witness testimony v. Eric Gritzbach, 3rd/4th 6. 1947; s. a. ibid,
S. 245, Doc. NI-3488, Goering at Flick, 13. 8th. 1937.

144 *case 5,* S. 394 ff. (Study Thieleke).

145 ZStA Potsdam, case VI, Movie 420, Doc. NI-6025 F, Affid. Charles Wolff, 30. 4. 1947.

146 Please refer *case 5,* S. 178; *Drobish,* Exploitation, S. 50f.

147 *Case 5,* p.178 (editor's estimate); the US prosecutor's office in the Flick process estimated the number the Employees probably to low, namely on over 120000, including over 40,000 forced laborers (ibid., S. 26ff., Closing argument d. prosecution, 24. 11. 1947).

Group included finally directly 132, with Daughter- and Subsidiaries approximately 300 corporations. The Flick Group had total capital assets 2.5 to 3 billion RM [148] ; "that of him (Flick - D E.) controlled capital should approximately 3 times so large been be." [14 9] In the Years 1943 quantified itself the Net profit alone out of eleven Major works of Group on 182.5 millions RM.[150]

During the war, Flick was a member of the presidium of both imperial associations in the mining sector and sat on the advisory board of the economic group iron-creating Industry and was after the Invasion of the USSR in a leading position (Member of the Board of Directors) in the BHO active. His company representatives took important positions in the German armaments organization, especially in the areas of (stainless) steel production and mechanical engineering.

The company had that unbecoming Chunks of Petschek's "Aryanization" had not yet been digested when, in the summer of 1940, Flick intervened with the greatest unscrupulousness in the battle between the mining companies over the "distribution" of the Eastern French and Luxembourg mining companies a and secured itself against violent competition (Röchling, Hoesch) the "Trusteeship" over the Rombacher Hüttenwerke (Societe Lorraine des Acieries de Rombas), one the most modern and most profitable Lorraine Steelworks.[151] Had he in Polish Upper Silesia despite that of him registered "fundamental claim" [15 2] Having lost out to the Reichswerk and Krupp on significant parts of the loot, it achieved the leading position alongside the Reichswerk in the division in 1941/42 the Heavy industry of Dnepr-Donec industrial district in "Sponsorships". The factories the Soviet Steel industry in the Dnieper arch, the the raw material for the

The "lwan" ammunition program was supposed to deliver the munitions program Reich works jointly founded Dnieper steel GmbH slammed and got stuck "under the leadership of Medium steel" [153], d. H. in the hands from Flick. The Crude steel capacity the eight from Flick to be operated Soviet Metallurgical works exceeded with 2.8 million metric tons by 50 per year percent the entire Pre-war capacity of Flick Group (1939= 1.86 millions t).[154] A special one stormy Capital concentration carried out itself at the Group the *Reich's works "Hermann Göring".* In the The year was 1937 "Imperial works AG for Ore mining and ironworks 'Hermann Göring'" as a state one Auxiliary companies of the four-year plan on the very uncertain economic Base the meager and still barely developed German Iron ore deposits with Reich resources founded been. In Austria and in the annexed territories of Czechoslovakia as well as through "Aryanization" in Germany Group 1938/39 through the robbery of numerous large, lucrative companies out of different Industries, including world-famous ones Defense companies like this Alpine Montan Group and the Skoda works, so bloated, that already at the beginning of July 1939 Group holding company "AG Reichswerke, Hermann Göring'" formed been was. The originally modest capital of the Montangesellschaft from

148 *Faingar,* S. 52.

149 *Ogger, Günter,* Frederick Flick the Size, 3rd ed., Bern/Munich/Vienna 1971, p. 233; s. a. ibid, p. 382ff. (Attachment).

150 *Oh/sen, Manfred,* billion for the vulture or The case of Frederick Flick, Berlin 1980, S. 306.

151 *case 5,* S. 214, S. 222ff., S. 234ff. (various pieces).

152 Ibid, S. 237, Doc. NI-2505, Flick at Poensgen, 2. 10. 1940.

153 Ibid, S. 284, Doc. NL-5289, AT Flick, 11. 11. 1942. Please refer also S. 466!.

154 *case 5,* p. 286 (Doc. NL-3671, Prot. d. Discuss at Medium steel at the 14. 1. 1943) u.S. 477.

5 millions RM was already in April 1938 on 400 million increased been; that of the holding company fraud first 100 Millions, few later already 150 millions RM.155 After Start of war embodied itself the Group anew in biggest Scope mines, smelters, Factories and Investments all Art in Poland, in France and in occupied by others countries. This was followed in August 1940 a breakdown of the entire group the holding company in three subgroups, a so-called Montan block, a Weapon block and a shipping block, decided. This Reorganization was finally contracted on January 17, 1941 fixed. The capital the Holding company was here 250 million RM increased. 1 56

structure of Reichswerke Group (Was standing 17. January 1941)

AG Reich works “Hermann Göring"
(share capital 250 million RM)

Reich works AG for Mountain- and Cottage businesses "Hermann Göring" (share capital 560 millions RM)	Reich works AG for Weapons- and mechanical engineering "Hermann Göring" (share capital 80 millions RM)	Reich works AG for Inland shipping "Hermann Göring" (share capital 12.5 millions RM)

Alone in the mining block 24 subsidiaries were united, including leading mining companies in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and France. The investments at Company, the the Rich in this one block at whose founding contributed capital totaling over 1.1 billion RM.157 These investments were undervalued and only half of the amount was invested Assets of the new company are used to achieve this Undercapitalization the taxes lower and profits higher.

The Reichswerke Group located itself nearly complete in imperial possessions; above 90 percent of Common shares held the Rich in shape of Reich Ministry of Economics. He so it was no Part the “Party economy”.158 Neumann held him falsely for "the Attempt the Political party, the economic Base for her Domination to create". 159 Likewise few he was one Private domain Göring's, 160 also if Goering itself himself gladly as “supreme Chief of Group" 161 apostrophized. Line and control of entire group How the

155 ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 3961, Vowi report (IG-farben) on “Group structure and development the Reich works AG for Ore mining and Ironworks 'Hermann Göring'" from the
19. 10. 1939 (Timeline).

156 Please refer ibid, case XI, No. 399, BI. 4 ff., Doc. NID-13842, report the Economics Department of Dresdner Bank on the Hermann Göring Group v. December 21, 1940; ibid, BI. 64, Doc. NID-13956, Paul grains at RMdJ, January 1941.

157 Ibid., Reich Statistical Office, No. 448, BI. 1ff., “Reichswerke “Hermann Göring”. The corporate companies. As of March 31, 1941”.

158 So *Neumann,* S. 354 ff.

159 Ibid, S. 358.

160 Something like that *Kuczynski,* Situation of the Workers, Vol. 6, p. 38; see *Eichholtz,* Fascism and Economics, p. 67 f.

161 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 3962, Göring to Pleiger, 31. 8. 1940. - The claim, head of the group to be, could Goering neither on economic still on legal basics,

Subgroups and subsidiaries were - under a kind of supervision from Göring as Representatives for the Four-year plan - in the hands one small Clique of financial and armaments powerful, high fascist officials and military and state monopoly officials the four-year plan grouping, underneath Paul Körner (four-year planning authority), Hans Kehrl and Hermann v. Hanneken (Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs), Generals Thomas and Leeb, Hellmuth Roehnert (Rheinmetall Borsig), Heinrich Wisselmann (Preußag), Paul Pleiger and Paul Raabe (General Directors of the Montanblock).

With a capital of over 900 million RM without Shareholdings and with the disposal of a total capital of over 2.5 billion RM [162] kicked the Group now on an equal footing with the IG Farben group and the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, their fiercest competitor he become was. Only this could itself with him measure; and even she He threatened to overtake him with his production program, which was entirely geared towards war production, which ranged from the extraction of ore and coal to the ready-to-drive tank, the finished gun and the explosive grenade, and with the around 600,000 workers who worked for the war Group toiled.

There is one for the group's main plants more precise list of workforce numbers. In the June 1944 were from the in the Table specified 416477 employees

32 percent in the occupied and annexed Czech areas, 23 percent in Poland, 13 percent in Austria and only 22 percent in Germany (borders from 1937) .163

Table 146
employees in the Major works of Reichswerke Group 1941-1944 _

Month	employees in total	including: Foreign forced laborers including war prisoners	in percent
December 1941	306423	130084	42.5
June 1942	317631	142077	44.7
December 1942	350640	171466	48.9
June 1943	372804	189997	51.0
December 1943	407374	235192	57.7
June 1944	416477	244291	58.7
December 1944	373401	215116	57.6

Source: surgery, R. J., Göring's "Multinational Empire". Contribution for the International symposium "International business and Central Europe 1919-1939" (MS), n.d., Table 3 (= USSBS Special paper No. 3, regarding Hermann Göring works).

rather only on his function as representative for the Four-year plan support. That claim was therefore respectively only this way weighty How the mentioned state monopoly Position.

162 How Note 155. - *Faingar,* S. 54, mentioned foreign Estimates until to 6 Md. RM (for 1943).

163 USSBS Special paper No. 3, re: Hermann Göring works, quote after *surgery, R. J.,* Göring's "Multinational Empire". Contribution for the International Symposium "International Business and Central Europe 1919-1939" (MS), n.d., Tab. 3.

The Reichswerke's expansion of power was a thorn in the side of private German corporations and major banks, especially the mining companies. They probably approved of the state-owned company in one certain extent to, in the annexed and to take over state-owned mining companies in occupied areas into its administration - always but with dem reservation one later Reprivatization or one comprehensive "Reorganization" of the ownership structure in the countries mentioned. Furthermore, they were prepared to agree if the Reichswerk as a state company in their place and in their favor particularly delicate problems for example the "Aryanization" [1 64] or the brutal expropriation of foreign capitalists. But of course they were aware of the broader objectives that the four-year plan grouping had set with them from the start Reich works pursued, not hidden remained. Pleiger shouted in the In the spring of 1940, at the height of his career as the group's chief manager, Göring remembered this goal: one of the Reichswerke's "tasks" since its founding, he wrote to him at the time, was to "turn the parent plants into the largest European group "and to take over economic policy leadership in the German mining industry". [1 65] For the time being, of course, the unbridled expansionism of those who took office under this motto could be overcome Don't channel the company.

The first changes occurred in the course of 1941 . With Pleiger's appointment as chairman of the RVK in March 1941, the mining companies, especially the Ruhr companies, committed themselves to him, even though it appeared to be the other way around. [1 66] Pleiger himself, later asked about his reasons for accepting the chairmanship, gave one insightful Answer, the a Light on the Conflicts of 1941/42 : "I wanted to clear myself of the accusation that I supported state capitalism companies." [167]

The invasion of the Soviet Union apparently marked the beginning of a "period of decline." the HGW" [1 68] ago, the the later Events of the year 1942 effected. The founding of the BHO in August 1941 already made it clear, albeit in a compromise form, that the Reichswerke in the USSR not how previously in other countries would be able to switch and act - although the Soviet industrial enterprises were all state property. Against the use of the previous methods of industrial robbery in Montanbe ·I, who clearly divided the Reichswerke before, stiffened the resistance of the German monopolies. Given the completely changed standards of expansion and exploitation policy in the USSR, which the German imperialists were counting on, there would otherwise have been fears that heavy industry would be majorized by a state-owned company. This resistance found increasing resonance with Todt (later with Speer), with Hitler and finally with Goering.

At the end of 1941, leaders spoke out Representatives of the Reichswerk, presumably requested by Göring to consider a reorganization involving partial re-privatization of what Göring contemptuously described as a "junk shop". Group. Pleiger advocated for mining operations because they were unprofitable be (!), absolutely under

164 So at the "Aryanization" of lgnaz-Petschek property *(Case 5,* S. 434ff., study Thieleke).
165 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 714, BI. 8th, Doc. Pleiger-101, memo Pleiger f. Goering v. 20. 4. 1940.
166 Please refer *tape I,* S. 132ff.
167 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 396, BI. 19, Doc. NL-3342, Affid. Pleiger, January 17, 1947.
168 Ibid, FS, film 3961, writing!. Witness statement from Rudolf Diels (1942/43 chairman of the shipping block) about "foundation and growth of the HGW, 1937-1942", dated June 17, 1947.

To retain state influence and not to deprive them of the protective name “Goering”.169 Wilhelm Voss, Chairman of the Board of weapon blocks, hit before, some To reprivatize weapons and machine factories.170

At the 23. March 1942 ordered Goering the resolution the previous Group structure.171 The Umbrella company (AG Reich works “Hermann Goering") became liquidated. The three blocks assumed Goering itself directly. The Montan block stayed as State-owned company exists. The comparatively insignificant Shipping block remained also under state Influence. What the main Subgroups and Subsidiaries of the weapons block concerned, especially Skodawerke, Brno weapons and Steyr-Daimler-Puch - that is most profitable all Group companies -, so should "her Repatriation in private hands initiated become".172 The resolution of Weapon blocks happened still in the course of of year 1942. 17 3 The Block holding (Imperial works for Weapons- and mechanical engineering "Hermann Göring") was liquidated, but its apparatus with 300 employees apparently existed continue further.174

The events described did not change the existence or scope of the Reichswerke Group as a *mining company* and thus its basic substance. But they ended the one from the financial oligarchy uncontrolled expansion of this state-owned company in the economy and thus had - combined with the simultaneous reprivatization of others state-owned companies - fundamental Meaning as renewed, explicit and principled Rejection of the fascist regime all nationalization tendencies.

The Reichswerke mining company consolidated in the following period. His sales increased 1943 on above 2.4 billion RM; the were 163 percent opposite 1941. 17 5 The

Table 147
Sales volume of “Montan Blocks” of Reichswerke Group 1941-1944 (in mill. RM)

Year	Total sales	including: Germany (borders v. 1937)	Alpine-Montan-group	Upper Silesia. establishments	establishments in the „Protectorate" u. in the "Sudetengau"
1941	1491	364	156	243	483
1942	1930	584	205	307	552
1943	2433	683	327	348	724
1944	2342	699	371	344	698

Source: surgery, S. 26 (= USSBS Special paper No. 3, re: Hermann Göring works).

169 Ibid, Movie 3962, Pleiger at Goering, December 9, 1941; s. a. ibid, „Suggestion Pleiger for construction the Hermann Göring Works" dated November 9, 1941.
170 Ibid, Voss at Göring, November 7, 1941.
171 Ibid, arrangement Göring's v. March 23, 1942.
172 Ibid, Rs. Pleigers at the Boards of Directors in the montane block, 29. 4. 1942.
173 Ibid., film 3961, ed. (RWiM): "The increase in state-owned companies in private law form through the inclusion of Reichswerke AG 'Hermann Göring'" (Autumn 1944). - By the way, Steyr-Daimler-Puch AG used to be 93 percent was in (Austrian) state ownership (ibid.).
174 How Note 168.
175 *surgery,* S. 26.

The entire Reichswerke group (mining and shipping block) was comprised in 1944 278 companies with 2.51 billion RM Capital.1 7 6

The Reichswerke Group occupied important positions in the state monopoly apparatus the War economy. The key position dem Coal sector had as Chairman of the RVK Pleiger himself. As general manager (later chairman of the presidium and board of directors) of the BHO, he managed the loot of mining operations and raw materials found in the occupied Soviet territories for the German monopolies. Edmund Geilenberg was appointed head of the Main Ammunition Committee by Speer in the spring of 1942 . A little later he put him in charge of the "Iwan" ammunition program in the Ukraine.177

The representatives of the Reichswerke, with their state monopoly functions, were firmly integrated into the system of regulating the war economy. They had good orders above dictatorial powers on the assigned to them - usually particularly complicated and risky - Areas of responsibility, but had to fulfill the requirements of the central military economic authorities, primarily the Central Planning and the Reich Ministry for Arms and Ammunition, and were under their leadership, control and criticism. This new constellation of forces reflected Göring's decline in power as the representative of the four-year plan and the increasingly dominant power Position of the Minister of Ammunition and those supporting him Forces contrary.

The *IG Farben Group* was next to the United Steel Mills that most powerful Monopoly formed in the German Business. He was valid as the largest Chemical Trust the World. He had dem Steel Trust in advance, that he a entire industry, the Chemical industry, on all crucial ones Sub-areas completely or significantly monopolized and that he in still unequal higher Dimensions a international monopoly represented, the itself since his Consist 17 8 the capitalist World market on widen areas the Chemistry with two or three foreign corporations shared.

Starting from the older areas of chemical production (basic chemicals, paints, pharmaceuticals, photographs), the IG had moved into the area of synthetics and plastics and had achieved an absolute monopoly position there over the course of barely two decades. Through the industrial use of nitrogen synthesis, it dominated a large part of the world's nitrogen and nitrogen production fertilizer market and gained a monopoly-like position in the production of powder and explosives through the nitrogen monopoly and numerous specially developed raw materials. The synthetic production of fuel and other mineral oil products using a technically and industrially favorable hydrogenation process gave **it** a broad monopoly on this for rearmament and war since the early 1930s also a crucially important area, and in the area of aircraft fuel there is even a total monopoly. It completely monopolized the production of artificial rubber (Buna), the since 1936 in industrial scale started. From greater Meaning **for** they were the armed forces from her developed Poison gases (1943: 95 percent= IG production). On the IG omitted further a more significant Portion the Light metal production (Aluminum,

176 ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 3961, table (StRA) “The undertakings of the “Hermann Göring” companies after number and Capital. As of March 31, 1944”.

177 Please refer S. 65 u. 465.

178 The global monopoly position was sufficient in extensive areas of chemical production the Founder companies of Group until before his founding in the Years 1925, partly to the beginning of the century back.

Table 148
production of IG Farben Group from products, in those the Wehrmacht quite or mostly from the Group dependent was, 1936, 1938-1940, 1943 (in 1000 t)

Yea r	Synthet. rubber (100 % off dependency)	Stabilizer gates (100 %)	Tetra ethyl lead (100 %)	Magnesium (88 %)	powder (70) and explosives (84 %)	Nitrogen (75 %)
1936	0.8	1.4		11.6	40.4	400
1938	5.7	1.8		13.0	68.7	520
1939	22.0	2.7		16.6	80.8	554
1940	40.7	4.0	5.4	18.4	101.6	557
1943	118.0	10.9	7.6	27.4	353.0	600

Source: ZStA Potsdam, case VI, Film 420, Doc. NI-10008 & NI-10010, Explain under oath v. Ernst Struss v. June 21 and 22, 1947.

Magnesium). The company's global exports made it the most important source of foreign currency for the fascist state; Various raw materials that are extremely important for rearmament could only be obtained through the network of the IG foreign connections are procured from foreign countries and continents. In short, without the IG, German fascism would have no one can wage war.

So did the United Steelworks like it or The Reichswerke Group employed more people or had higher sales but their position in the German economy, how George V. Schnitzler 1945 before the US military court stated, not with the of the IG Farben Group to compare; ,,as well as the extent of their Both the activity and the opportunities for making a profit were significantly more limited ."179

The share capital of IG Farbenindustrie AG was almost one billion in the 1930s RM and rose in June/July 1942 through Capital adjustment and capital increase to 1.42 billion RM.180 The vaunted alleged “width "dispersion" of the Share capital had been reduced so much during the war and the concentration of capital ownership in a few hands had progressed to such an extent that that at the share exchange (1942 to 1944) of 1.6 million Small stocks to 100 and 200 RM in 1941 (in the Values totaling 300 RM = 37.5 million percent) finally only 1.3 in 1944 million (worth a total of 229 million RM = 16.4 percent) remained.181 The group's sales reached and exceeded the three billion mark during the war.182 The group's investments rose from 36 millions RM in the Years 1933 on over 600 millions RM in the Years 1942.183

The IG owned 62 own Works, too 100 percent Investments at 70 companies and 50- to 100 percent Investments at further 119 Companies - in total around 400 domestic

179 Quote at *Faingar,* S. 56f.
180 Of that 80 mill. RM in Preferred shares with 12.5 times Right to vote.
181 After ZStA Potsdam, case VI, Movie 412, Document NI-8935, statute the IG Farbenindustrie AG v. 1938 (with Attachment). For 1938 were the Numbers: 299 mill. RM in Small stocks
=41.5 percent of share capital from 720 mill. RM.
182 Please refer Table 152.
183 Please refer Table 144.

investments and 500 investments in foreign companies.184 All in all, controlled the Group a Capital of estimated six to eight billion RM.185

The group employed in 1939 150,000, in 1942 185,000 and in 1944 (October) around 240,000 people, including 83,300 foreign forced laborers including concentration camp prisoners. [1 86] During the war, over 3,000 chemists worked in the company (1943); of that were nearly 1300 with scientific Work busy (1940). [1 8 7] The GP total costs the scientific work in Wars amounted to 100 to 100 per year RM110 million . [188] The IG had more than 40,000 valuable patents, which provided an invaluable additional represented capital. [1 89]

After the fascists came to power, IG Farben proved to be the driving force and nurturer of rearmament and expanded its diverse relationships with the Nazi party and the state apparatus into a solid network of state monopoly influence. [1 90] Carl Krauch became the central figure in this network. As early as 1933, as Bosch's liaison to the Luftwaffe (Goering), he was entrusted with the preparation of the Feder-Bosch Agreement [1 9 1]. 1935 he spoke internally Consultations with milk and Goering the "huge points of view" [1 92] the Upgrade after exclamation the Compulsory military service through and was essential involved in the creation of the new state monopoly power bloc Göring/IG Farben, which took its organizational form in 1936 in the four-year plan organization found.

The new general concept of fascist Germany's economic preparation for war, institutionalized in the four-year plan, should originally no lower than Supervisory Board Chairman Carl Bosch himself, but on the advice of his friend Vögler, how already 1933, Krauch named. [1 93] As GB Chemistry (since August 1938), as Director of the Reich Office for Economic Development (since December 1939) [1 94] and after Bosch's death (1940) as chairman of the supervisory board of the group united Krauch in war one unique state monopoly power itself.

The expansion interests of the IG Farben Group were as extensive as its production and profit interests. [1 95] These were the interests of the most developed, chauvinistic and imperialistic elements of German finance capital in this respect, as represented on a similar global scale by Deutsche Bank. The main lines and directions of expansion of these forces clashed clearly, in many cases in detail, in the fascist war and conquest plans (Southeastern Europe; Western Europe; Ukraine/Caucasus; Closer and Middle East; supremacy against Anglo-American imperialism). IG Farben represented these interests during the war (and pretty before the war) in one dominance and with one penetrating power, How

184 *case 6,* S. 65, S. 67 (Affidavit. Explanation v. Werner Hagert, 26. 7. 1947).
185 *Faingar,* S. 57.
186 ZStA Potsdam, Case VI, Film 420, Doc. NI-3761, Diagram "Workforce Movement" (Affid. Ernst Struss, 20. (31.) 1.1947); ibid, Doc. NI-11411 (=copy out of NI-3761).
187 *Faingar,* p. 55; ZStA Potsdam, case VI, Movie 413, Document NI-9487, Affid. Serious Struss, August 30, 1947.
188 Ibid (Affida. Struss).
189 *case 6,* S. 175 (Judgment reasons).
190 For this in more detail *tape I,* S. 39ff.
191 From the December 14, 1933; s. *German Story in Data,* Berlin 1967, S. 704.
192 ZStA Potsdam, case VI, Movie 410, Doc. NI-4718, milk at herb, July 23, 1935.
193 Ibid, Movie 414, Doc. NI-10386, Affid. Paul grains, August 29, 1947.
194 Please refer *tape I,* S. 108ff.
195 For this detailed ibid, S. 55ff., S. 144ff.

she their global monopoly position and their state monopoly position in the fascist Germany corresponded.

The two dominant Germans *Electrical companies,* Siemens and AEG overwhelmingly monopolized production in their area during the war. The regulation of the The committees and rings helped to produce armaments great exclusive representatives of these two monopoly giants. They also provided two CEOs, Lüschen196 (Siemens) and Bücher (AEG). the most important advisor to the Minister of Armaments. Both Corporations were very closely with the German bank connected.197

According to the employment figures of the electrical industry business group, at the start of the war (1. October 1939) out of total 492000 employees in 2119 Companies in the industry alone in the Siemens group 135,000 and in the AEG group 77,000, in the group companies jointly controlled by Siemens and AEG a further 34,000, a total of around 246,000, ie 50 percent.198 This level of concentration increased during the War, apparently after yet significant.1 [99] The production capacity of the both Large corporations that steadily and strong grew, was after three years War as well as entirely on defense production and switched to the production of equipment for investment projects by the defense industry and the Wehrmacht. (Tabel 149)

The *Siemens Group* was the third largest German industrial group after IG Farben and Vereinigte Stahlwerke. It was the largest monopoly company in electrical engineering in Europe and that second largest in the World. The top of the Group, which consists of a hardly manageable variety from each other intertwined companies or equity investments, Siemens & Halske AG, the actual group holding company, and Siemens-Schuckertwerke AG. The share capital of these two alone Societies quantified itself until April 1942 on 260 millions RM, since May - through capital increase resolutions of the general meetings - to RM640 million. The actual total assets of both companies, however, amounted to over 1.6 billion **RM,200** The Balance sheet the Siemens & Halske AG pointed Equity investments in Height from

196 Frederick Lüschen was since 1941 deputy Chairman of the Board the Group holding company Siemens &
Halske AG.

197 The links between Siemens and Deutsche Bank traditional closely *(Report on the Investigations in relation on the German Bank* (Omgus report, November 1946), in German language ed. v. Institute for Marxist Studies and research, Frankfurt/Main 1971 (in following: *report above the German Bank),* S. 117ff., p. 348ff.). At the AEG stepped in The second half the 20s Years in the Trains the back then Wave of concentration the Deutsche Bank as leading Bank details at the Job the Donut trading company - a mark the "Era Books". *(Koebel-Tusk,* p. 9/df.).

198 BA Koblenz, R 13 V/184, Wigru's statement of employee numbers, as of. 1. 10. 1939. The number of employees in the electrical industry rose to around 700,000 during the war (1944), the Net sales from 4 billion RM (1939) on around RM6.5 billion (1944); B.A
Koblenz, R 13 V/120 and 121, Lineups the Wigru v. 18. 7. and 4. 1. 1945.

199 The monopolistic concentration in the electrical industry can be assumed to be considerably higher because of the dependence of smaller corporations and companies on AEG and Siemens. Eg also indicate the AFA Group and the DCGG Group (see Tab.) Capital connections and the composition of the supervisory boards to close cooperation with AEG. The AFA was once even considered a "sub-group" of AEG *(Saling's Börsen Jahrbuch for 1928129,* p. 7).

200 *report above the German Bank.* S. 350.

Table 149
*employees the biggest Pursue the electrical industry, 1. October 1939 and 30. Nwember **1943***

Company	group affiliation at the 30. **11th** 30th 1943	employee status am 1. 10th 1939	am November 1943
AEG, Berlin	AEG	63343	91075
Siemens Schuckertwerke AG, Berlin	Siemens}	110548	77840
Siemens & Halske AG, Berlin	Siemens		65924
Telefunken GmbH, Berlin	AEG	16889	31031
Accumulator factory AG, Berlin (AFA)	Quandt group	5656	13925
Osram GmbH, Berlin	Siemens and AEG	11579	13296
Brown, Boveri & Cie. AG, Mannheim/Heidelberg	BBC	8732	12500
C Lorenz AG, Berlin	ITT (GEC)	9608	11448
Sachsenwerk Light- and Power AG, Niedersedlitz	AEG	5354	6626
Elin and Schorch works AG f. electrical Industry, Vienna	DCGG	(3898)	5210
Gema Total f. electroacoustic. u, mechanical Apparatus mbH, Berlin	?	?	5171
Siemens Planiawerke AG, Berlin	Siemens	4238	5068
United Eisenbahn-Signalwerke GmbH, Berlin	Siemens	2178	4965
Voigt & Haeffner AG, Frankfurt a. M.	DCGG	4162	4630
Siemens cleaning works AG, Berlin	Siemens	3327	4277
DeTeWe German Telephone works u. Cable industry AG, Berlin	Siemens	3972	4211

Source: B.A Koblenz, R 13 V/184, Lineups above Numbers of employees by 1. 10. 1939 and **by** 30. 11. 1943, O. D

389 million RM.201 The Siemens Group thus exercised significant or had a controlling influence on over 100 companies within Germany and was involved in around 200 foreign companies. 202 The entire workforce of the “House of Siemens” - i.e. mother- and wholly owned subsidiaries - reached mid-1943 almost a quarter of a million. 203 The Group sales was around 1944 two billion RM.2 04

The The company's entire production capacity was dedicated to armaments. Siemens Schuckertwerke AG, for example, reported at the end of 1943 that it was “almost exclusively for urgent important to the war effort Tasks active".205 The main work from Siemens &

201 ZStA Potsdam, German Bank, No. 18861, BI. 2, AT Rösler, German Bank, above Supervisory board meeting of Siemens & Halske, February 26, 1943. Please refer also *Faingar,* p. 78.
202 *report about the German Bank,* S. 118.
203 ZStA Potsdam, Deutsche Bank, No. 18861, BI. 25, Report d. Directorate of Siemens & Halske the supervisory board, December 30, 1943 (Employees in the fiscal year 1932/33: 61,000).
204 *Report on the German Bank,* S. 118.
205 ZStA Potsdam, German Bank, No. 18861, BI. 26, report the Directorate the Siemens Schuckertwerke AG the Supervisory Board, December 30, 1943.

1943, Halske (Wernerwerk) produced 80 percent of its sales for the Wehrmacht; half of this went to the Air Force.206

Siemens was the company that, alongside the Vereinigte Stahlwerke and the IG Farben held the strongest positions in the state monopoly mechanism of the war economy. Friedrich Lüschen, board member and later deputy chairman of Siemens & Halske, played an outstanding role as a close confidant of the Minister of Munitions and as the main committee and main ring leader. Rudolf Bingel, Chairman of the board of Siemens-Schuckert, sat in Engen advisory board of RGI and, as a prominent member of the Himmler Circle of Friends, was a supporter of the SS and the group's liaison to the SS leadership. The Ifonzern was, not least thanks to this direct relationship, a leader in the exploitation of concentration camp prisoners and similarly discriminated against and more terrorized German more Jewish Origin involved. Hanns Benkert,

Board member (deputy) of Siemens-Schuckert, was particularly close and personally friendly with Todt 2 0 7 and was, first as head of the main committee, later, under Spear, as "Reich representative for standardization and typing", for the inner

Circle of top representatives of the Reich Ministry for Armaments and Ammunition. At the same time, he was part of the entire group, together with Wolf-Dietrich v. Witzleben (board member of Siemens & Halske and Siemens-Schuckert), primarily responsible for the Exploitation of at least 60,000 foreign forced laborers, the concentration camp prisoners and the Jewish forced laborers. 2 08 Important state monopoly positions were occupied by the Group also with Charles Küpfmüller and Philip Kessler. 2 08a

The Share capital the *General Electricity Society (AEG)* in height from 180 Million RM, the blocking minority (25 percent) of which had been in US hands (GEC/Morgan Group) since 1929 , was transferred in 1942 in connection with the merger between AEG and Gesfürel increased to 260 million RM in 209 and "corrected" to 264 million RM in 1943 . With this sum, the company, which was still around 100 percent undercapitalized, controlled numerous electrical companies through an extensive and complicated investment system, but also owned majority or significant stakes in powerful industrial companies and leading arms monopolies in other sectors, including Focke-Wulf Flugzeugbau GmbH, Ago-Flugzeugwerke GmbH, Deutsche Werft AG, Büssing NAG, Hirsch (Finow) Kupfer- und Messingwerke AG, the Borsig locomotive works GmbH, the Hochtief AG and Olympia Büromaschinenwerke AG. "Originally in the area of the pure electrical industry active," it said already in "Saling's stock market yearbook for 1928/29", " she has through their financing companies and through their own investments of a financial and technical nature on the size Area the processing mining industry and Precision mechanics out of-

206 How Note 203 (BI. 24R).

207 *Siemem;- armor- War- Profits.* From a collective of authors under d. Line by Hans Randandt, Berlin undated (1961), pp. 53f.

208 Please refer ibid, p. 48 (1942). After dem *report above the German Bank,* p. 358, he was busy Group End 1944 only 35000 foreign Forced labor, what is unlikely. 208a In the two volumes homemade Group biography *(Siemem;, George,* The Away of electrical engineering. Story of house Siemens, 2. Edition Freiburg/Munich 1961) are the state monopoly position and activity of Group while of war only few meaningless lines dedicated (Vol. 2, S. 342).

209 Declarations, if not different noted, after *Koebel- Tusk.*

stretched and power plants and electric railways along with their coal supply through the acquisition of brown coal mines sphere of power."2 1 0

The company owned investments AEG in height of 266 million RM (1942).211 The Sales volume of the group (parent and wholly owned subsidiaries) amounted to 1.6 to 1.7 billion in 1942 RM.

The Group busy to this Time 175000 Workforce (1932: 30000). The part of the foreign forced laborers rose within approximately one year (1941/42) from 25 to 35 percent the Workforce. „Since more than one and a half years have we on it pointed out", so explained AEG board member Otto Koehn on the Factory Directors Conference Group at the 5. November 1942, „that the only Away out of dem Labor shortage and the recruitment of foreign workers is. The AEG also had great success with this, because from the in the Industry used foreign workers has she more than 5 percent, from individuals Nations even 6 to 8 percent receive." 212 individuals Factories, such as Borsig-Lokomotiv-Werke GmbH, employed over 70 percent foreign forced laborers.213

The AEG Group manufactured almost all types of armaments, but especially electrical equipment for aircraft, submarines and other warships, artillery, tanks and V-weapons. Even at the beginning of the war, production for the war had absolute priority. A few months after the start of the war, Karl Kimmich (Deutsche Bank) after one Supervisory board meeting of Group: „The composition of current
order backlog became How follows announced: export 17 Percent, Wehrmacht 51 percent, Four-year plan 30 percent, Civil business 2.3 percent." 214

The influence of the USA monopoly capital on the group was considerable 215 and had an effect not only through its direct capital participation in AEG, but also through its connections with those close to AEG Pursue like Osram, C. Lorenz AG, mix & Recovered AG and Gesfurel. The since decades existing links between
GEC and AEG closed monopolistic production and Patent agreements a; There had been an agreement on free patent exchange since before the First World War, the last one in the years 1938 the Length of time from 17 years been extended was.216

During the war, the AEG Group remained in contact with its American business friends. After the USA entered the war, as He was forced to take more cautious tactics with regard to his American relations, gave him great weight in arms production and armaments organization and his unprecedented War benefits from the necessary support to overcome any disadvantages from its “profit brotherhood” (Koebel-Tusk). with the USA monopolies to turn off.

Already in October 1940 he found it The so-called settlement between Siemens and AEG took place, in which the two competitors controlled most of the companies that had previously been jointly controlled divided among themselves. The Company Telefunken was then completely owned to the AEG Group - the on this Way after Opinion his Directorate "a one-time,

210 Quote *Radandt, Hans,* AEG, a more typical group, Berlin 1958 (in the following: AEG), S. 7.
211 *Faingar,* S. 78.
212 Quote at *Radandt,* AEG, S. 48f.
213 KTB d. Borsig Locomotive Works, Dec. 1942, quote ibid.
214 Quote at *Radandt,* AEG, S. 34; AT v. February 3, 1940.
215 Please refer also *Faingar,* S. 176f.
216 B.A Koblenz, R 2/20900, Boards of Directors the AEG and the Gesfurel at the RWiM, October 13, 1941.

shiny Business" made.2 17 Siemens brought at this Opportunity the miner Electricity works AG, the Vereinigte Eisenbahn-Signalwerke GmbH and Klangfilm GmbH wholly own it. Osram stayed more communal possession (with GEC participation). 21 8 Obviously, the leaders of both companies were pursuing important goals of both an economic and political nature in this “demarcation of interests”. Everyone wanted their own way for the coming confrontation of Germans with that Anglo-American imperialism must be prepared, whereby the assessment of the likely outcome of this showdown - German sole domination or dominance or condominium over the world - differ want.

A year later, in October In 1941, AEG, with the help of Deutsche Bank, carried out the above-mentioned merger with Gesfürel (Gesellschaft für elektrounternehmen AG), an old, important holding company in the German electrical industry that had many aspects threads with foreign monopolies, also with the GEC and with the AEG connected themselves. Equipped with a share capital of 80 million RM, Gesfürel brought AEG numerous flourishing production companies (stag copper, the Ludwig Loewe factories, Norddeutsche Kabelwerke, Ago) and others significant holdings, especially in Pursue the electricity supply, a.2 19

This merger was also part of a hidden, long-term one Group strategy. At a time where the The US's intervention in the world war was only a matter of time, the leaders suggested AEG several birds with you one flap. They reduced by one with the fusion connected Capital increase of their Company the Capital share of the IGEC (International Holding of GEC) from 25 on 18 percent and thereby largely eliminated the Danger, that at Seizure of IGEC holding as "Enemy assets" through the fascist state, which could somehow disrupt the company's management. At the same time, the Gesfürel, based on a contract concluded in 1936 , with no time limit agreement with the IGEC about the mutual Right of first refusal on their or AEG shares, "in the event that there are military complications with the United States and thereby the confiscation and possible exploitation of American property in Germany, your right of first refusal has been **registered with the trustee for the foreign assets in Germany** ." Finally , so argued the merging parties parties, "might the American one Company" - in Consideration that

"friendly agreement on general cooperation as major shareholders of AEG" - “The transfer of ownership to Gesfürel appears to be the most tolerable. In case of now intended merger with Gesfürel would then go with us everyone whose Right also transferred their right of first refusal for the American AEG shares to AEG, which would also claim this in due course. In this case too, the Americans would agree to this transfer of ownership, as they have previously worked on a friendly basis with AEG."

Also the uninitiated observer recognizes, that it itself at this plan one in advance with the IGEC mapped out maneuver acted, in addition organized, „that her (the AEG - D E.) industrial Relationships to the American Company also for the Post war period possible few endangered become". The merger agreement, decided on the

217 *Radandt,* AEG, S. 35 (quoted Protocol from Charles Kimmich, German Bank, ex. Presidential meeting of the AEG v. 12/12 1940).

218 Different *Faingar,* S. 79, S. 177.

219 The The following after B.A Koblenz, R 2/20900, Boards of Directors the AEG and the Gesfurel at the RWiM, October 13, 1941.

AEG general meeting on 19. February 1942, carried the intentions of its initiators Invoice; the merger became hypocritical backdated October 1 , 1941 .
The positions of the AEG Group in the state monopoly mechanism of the war economy were exceptional strong, but still - at least since 1942 - with that of Siemens Group Not comparable. It seems as if whether CEO Hermann Bücher, one of Minister Todt's mentors from the start, will reflect on the failure of the blitzkrieg concept and in view of the When the USA entered the war, although he was still nominated as a member of the "Reich Armaments Council", he withdrew from active participation in a prominent position. Top positions were taken by board member (deputy). Hans Heyne as Head of the main committee and Board member Waldemar Petersen
as head of a development commission (long-distance shooting). Philipp also came originally Kessler, Member of Engen advisory board the RGJ2 [20] , under Dead Chairman of Ammo
tion Advisory Board or the Armaments Advisory Board and head of the Main Committee on Ammunition, later one of Speer's closest employees, from the Division of AEG (and Siemens).
Both major electrical companies were leaders in the “Reorganization Europe" involved -: about at the Drafting the predatory “Country reports” the RGJ22 [1] and another "Wish programs" at the negotiations above “European Conventions” under German Leadership [222] and, not last, at the “Order relocation” and the "Care"
of “sponsored companies” in the occupied Western European countries [223] . They showed the greatest interest in the Dutch Philips group. During the war, this important competitor came under German "trusteeship", in which AEG was mainly represented ruled. Phillips became already as German Property considered: „The is
one German Company. It is practical a branch operation the company Telefunken." [2 2']
Particularly intense Precautions and Measures met the Electrical companies for the Plunder and appropriation of the USSR's operations and resources and for the development of those expected there unlimited Sales opportunities. [2 25]
In the precision mechanical-optical industry, the *Zeiss Group took on* the "absolute leading role" at yourself.226 This world famous and on his Area world's largest corporation increased its sales during the fascist rule to that Tenfold. Production for the Wehrmacht at the parent company Carl Zeiss Jena rose from around a third of total sales in 1931/32 over 80 percent in the war years. (Table 150)
The unique monopoly position of Zeiss meant that the company always enforced its demands from the Wehrmacht and the authorities, for example for investment loans, for maximum prices for military equipment and for sole decisions on the granting of reproduction rights. There was no competition Group in filling the crucial state monopoly positions in the War economy. Its leaders, primarily Paul Henrichs and Heinrich Küppenbender, ruled unreservedly the Great the Economic group Precision mechanics and Optics, the Reich office for

220 After Ludwig felt Dead Kessler “sometimes as one ,from the Reich group "Industry opposed partners"' *(Ludwig,* Technik, p. 362; without citing the source).
221 Please refer *tape I,* S. 164ff., S. 351ff.
222 Please refer *wall cutter,* S. 219ff.
223 Please refer *Siemens - armor - War - profits,* S. 41.
224 ZP-P, 26. 1. 1943, 30. meeting (Spear).
225 *Siemens - Armor - War - profits,* S. 39/41; *Radandt,* AEG, S. 46f.
226 *Carl Zeiss Jena, Once and now.* From one Author collective under Lead from **wolfgang** Schumann, Berlin 1962, p. 538.

Table 150
Sales volume from Carl Zeiss Jena 1938-1944 _

Year	**Total sales (million RM)**	**of that Military turnover** (Percent)
1938	115	63
1939	142	74
1940	170	78
1941	216	82
1942	189	81
1943	236	S2
1944	104	80

Source: Carl Zeiss Jena. Once and now, S. 510.

optical and precision mechanical Products of the two special committees for optical and precision mechanics Device and finally the in September 1943 educated Main committee ses Precision mechanics and Optics. The rationalization in the Industry sector went on This is how the operations of the Zeiss Group, especially the main plant, take place in Jena, for the Focus of entire industry explained became, in those - also with regard to the period after the war - new devices developed and were manufactured, while the other companies either eked out an existence as suppliers or were transferred the simple equipment groups. The Zeiss Group's claim to power shows itself here also in the Area the scientific research and Development, those in the system state-monopoly capitalism became the almost exclusive domain of the Zeiss Group." 227

The Zeiss Group's imperialistic greed for expansion manifested itself during the war in its infamous, global “reorganization” programs228 that he, so far the The fascist Wehrmacht achieved this through barely disguised robbery and state-monopolistic production control throughout occupied Europe to realize searched.

3. Total profit: 100 billion

The published balance sheets, profit and loss accounts and business reports of corporations are treated to perfectly executed deception and fraud by means of a variety of manipulations that are difficult to understand the Publicity and not last also opposite the economic and

227 Ibid, S. 535f.

228 See in primarily the memorandum from the July 1940 about the “Development possibilities of optical and precision mechanical Industry in Europe and Overseas" *(Tape 1,* pp. 339ff.), furthermore the "Suggestions for the Installation Russian more optical and precision mechanical industrial plants through German specialist companies" from the August 1941 *(Carl Zeiss Jena,* S. 548ff.). Detailed in addition *Schumann, Wolfgang,* The war program of Zeiss Group, in *ZfG* 4/1963, p. 704ff. Please refer also *the same,* The Zeiss Group in the system of state monopoly capitalism while of Fascism, in *JfW,* 1962, T. 4, p. 115ff. Lately *The Alliance of the Ril'alen,* p. 18ff. and doc. part.

State financial authorities. However, the political role plays a role in deceiving the public Tactics and caution compared to the Exploited, dependent people and competitors, at dem Fraud at the Authorities however the aspired economic Advantage the decisive role. “The balance sheets are falsified to such an extent that only a knowledgeable balance sheet reader can with Help more complicated more analytical Calculations a picture of the real ones processes in one Public company make can." 229

The massive capital accumulation of the defense companies and major banks during the war years occurred both on the way the accumulation of the own profit as also on the accumulation of debt capital (stock issues, mergers, loans, bonds) and government money. In the end it was and is that in the capitalist company or Profit generated in the group provides valid information about the economic conditions as well as about the conditions of exploitation and on which at the same time its economic strength, its future development and, to a large extent, its political influence depend.

But just the actual quantity and composition of profit is the best kept secret in the World of finance capital. In the Annual reports of the corporations, which were published until 1942 and unpublished in 1943 and partly in 1944, figures appeared about raw and net profits (also: Gross- and l\'et1o profits). The net profits were from 1941/42 calculated in such a way that they generally corresponded to six percent of the share capital, ie the maximum permitted or dividends that can be distributed without progressive additional taxes. These numbers are for the Analysis worthless. But even if the figures from earlier years are updated, the amounts of profit remain unaccounted for, which are reflected in balance sheet items such as reserves, provisions and other reserve fund formations.

The in the balance sheets and To report the Corporations designated· net profit
"is only a fraction of actually out of the workers pressed out profits", only
“a tiny residual amount” of this profit.230 Goll guides the reader in his serviceable work based on the internal, confidential balance sheets of a small arms company, Julius Pintsch KG (until 1936: Julius Pintsch AG),231 the huge discrepancy between the public designated and the actual one Profit in mind. (Table 151)

"This Example exhausted still not even all variants the concealment of profits, since the many possibilities of undervaluing and overvaluing the capital parts, the actual ones Rating manipulation, just for the Part to Expression come." 232

One internal asset accounting of the Krupp Group pointed of reserves disclosed in the balance sheet became, already for the pre-war years approximately the ninefold total and at

"Internal" reserves that were hidden there were about five times the amount reported net profit out of. Under the open Reserves calculated the statutory reserves and special reserves, provisions of various kinds (post as by far the largest reserve) and impairments; under the inner or breastfeeding Reserves significant

229 *Goll,* S. 58.

230 Ibid, S. 57.

231 Julius Pintsch KG was a subgroup (electrical industry/machinery) controlled by the Philips Group (German Group). and plant engineering); At the beginning of the war that was a concern Pursue 1200, in the November 1943 above 2000 workers and Employee (BA Koblenz, R 13 V/184, lineups the Wigru Electrical industry as of January 1st 10. 1939 and as of 30. 11. 1943).

232 *Goll,* S. 57.

Table 151
Internal Profile calculation the Julius Pinch KG 1942

net profit loud trade balance	17136 RM
- plus depreciation on Tax vouchers	210000 RM
- plus Special depreciation	4200000 **RM**
- plus Entrepreneur's wages	306088 **RM**
- plus Donate	139223 **RM**
- plus accruals for Profit transfer	980710 RM
- plus Payments at the shareholder	1392800 **RM**
- plus Tax advance payments	4314347 **RM**
- plus Tax back payments	3291333 **RM**
	14851637 RM
- minus Profit carryforward 1941	823061 RM
- minus withdrawal out of the reserve	414736 RM
net profit loud internal Final balance	13613840 RM

Source: Goll, S. 57.

Totals of further value adjustments (on inventories, accounts receivable, investments, bills of exchange, securities) and reserves different Art.233

Within of Siemens Group, the man international because of his huge ownership Investments "Excellent Holding company" to to name used to denied the group holding, Siemens & Halske, in the fiscal year 1942/43 theirs entire Dividend amount **(13.1** millions RM) with the income from their investments,234 which is 19.5 **Millions** _ RM supplied, „so that the entire Excess out of the own Fabrication from Siemens & Halske internal to Depreciation and [forl Strengthening the inner one Reserve used been be must" .235 Also after the spectacular increase in share capital in May 1942 from 140 to 400 million RM ordered Siemens & Halske still have enormous reserves. In a secret memo, Oswald Rösler (Deutsche Bank) recorded the result of the supervisory board meeting on February 26 , 1943 : “Lie in the stocks RM 120 million in reserves (non-capitalized overhead costs) and in the securities RM 20 million in added value compared to the current Stock market prices." 236

Also is the gross profit "a from the capitalists extraordinarily more confused Term that does not give a correct picture of the actual profits of the industry".237 At least it contains some more components of the overall profit, including the largest part of the open reserves mentioned; in addition, taxes and other payments to the state, which are direct the Conservation, Backup and expansion the Domination of financial capital

233 ZStA Potsdam, case X, Movie 421, Doc. D-192, “Compilation and Comparison of the Krupp Group's own assets", O. D - As of September 30, 1937, the open reserves of the group 153.4 mill. RM (nearly so much How the entire share capital of 160 mill. RM), the inner ones Reserves 76.6 and the designated net profit a total of 16.2 million. RM (ibid.).

234 Amount of shareholdings: RM 388.655 million (ibid., German Bench, no. 18861, BI. 2, AN Rösler v. February 26, 1943).

235 Ibid, BI. 30, AT Roesler v. 28. 4. 1944.

236 Ibid, BI. 3, AT Roesler v. 26. 2. 1943.

237 *Faingar,* S. 247.

as Whole serve and so indirectly, at the same time but also directly benefit the individual monopolies in the form of government contracts. In order to determine more precisely that total profit the defense companies **for** capital accumulation and profit distribution remains, and assuming more real dimensions, one can, as Faingar suggests, use a certain percentage of gross profit or sales.238
After the war, internal data came to light for the IG Farben Group, according to which a to some extent applicable Picture results.

Table 152
Sales volume and profile of IG Farben Group 1932, 1933, 1936-1944 (in mill. RM)

Year	Turnover (sales)	Gross profit (from sales)	Net profit•	Retained profit	Net profit• in v. Sales volume	percent v. Gross profit
1932	876	71.5	47.0	47.0	5.4	65.7
1933	894	122.1	73.5	49.1	8.2	60.2
1936	1297	250.8	140.2	55.4	10.8	55.9
1937	1515	295.7	188.1	48.1	12.4	63.6
1938	1647	274.2	191.3	55.2	11.6	69.8
1939	1990	376.7	240.0	56.1	12.1	63.7
1940	2158	374.6	298.3	58.8	13.8	79.6
1941	2539	477.3	316.3	71.1	12.5	66.3
1942	2904	571.7	266.9	77.3	9.2	46.7
1943	3116	549.4	300.5	81.7	9.6	54.7
1944	2565	322.3	148.8	85.0	5.8	46.2

• net profit "before the use of profit for Reserves Etc."

Source: ZStA Potsdam, Fall VI, film 410, Doc. NI-10002 and NI-10003, Affid Helmut Deichfischer, June 11 , 1947.

Sharply marked here too the Difference between the net profit shown in the balance sheet and the net profit determined internally by the group, which is probably not significantly reduced. This was in the war years an average of ten to eleven percent (between 6 and **14** percent) of sales and an average of 60 percent (between 46 and 80 percent) of gross profit. 23 9 The actual net profit of other defense companies can also be estimated from the basis of the maximum rates determine in an approximate size.240
After such a calculation from various sources, Faingar comes to the summation of Net profit of seven the most significant German Corporations while

238 Ibid, p. 250. - At latest for the War years takes hold Faingar however opposite the listed Pay of croup and of IG Farben Group much to low, if he determines, "almost two thirds" The profits of stock corporations are “not distributed been, but as 'silence' "Reserves left behind" (ibid., p. 40).

239 Faingars Calculation method (25 to 30 percent of gross profit or 15 to 20 percent of the sales) appears in contrast as not acceptable. (Ibid., p. 250).

240 That the Profit share in the years 1941 until 1944 sank, is however quite unlikely and must be increased Attributed to the art of accounting obfuscation become.

the entire Time from 1933 until 1945 on the digit from 20 billion RM (German Bank 5 Md.; IG Colors 4 Md.; United Steel mills 3 Md.; Reich works 3 Md.; Siemens 2 billion; croup 2 billion; Flick 1 billion).241 During the war years, at least 12 billion of this sum was likely RM is omitted.
The mentioned Ratios are for the War years only as rough Approximate values

Table 153
Profits pon Defense companies (supplier companies) 1939-1943 _

Year	of workforce	turnover (mill. RM)	net profit according to trade balance (mill. RM)	Adjusted operating profit• (RM million)	Ditto. in percent v. Sales volume
Voigt & Haeffner AG, Frankfurt a. M. (DCGG Group)					
1939	4683	33.1	0.5	7.6	22.8
1940	5246	35.8	0.5	7.2	20.2
1941	5934	39.7	0.7	7.2	18.2
Serious Leitz GmbH, Wetzlar					
1940	3542	21.5	1.0	3.8	17.5
1941	3302	26.2	4.7	6.2	23.8
1942	3088	22.6	0.4	4.1	18.2
Koch's Wire sewing machine factory, e AG, Bitterfeld (Oetlcer Group)					
1940	1710	10.7	0.2	2.1	20.0
1941	1812	10.8	0.15	2.0	18.0
1942	1908	12.5	0.15	1.9	15.0
Aluminum werlce Göttingen GmbH					
1941	1270	19.1	2.8	2.8	14.6
1942	1133	18.5	1.6	1.6	8.4
1943	1278	20.7	2.5	2.5	12.0
GustaP Fisherman KG, Zöblitz (Archeducation) - in 1000 Reichsmark -					
1941	80	387	45	67	17
1942	84	480	74	98	20
1943	92	562	100	127	22
Frederick Reitz OHG. Albrecht (Suhl) - in 1000 Reichsmark -					
1941	7	72	38	38	52.3
1942	8th	79	46	46	57.8
1943	11	62	29	29	46.9

• Dem Operation remaining Profit (=expelled net profit plus as Reserves etc. used profit shares)

Source: BA Koblenz, R 2/5240 to R 2/5243, “Evaluation of the special tax audit reports" (above tax audits 1942-1944); Percentage calculation the unrounded Pay.

241 Ibid., p. 248ff. - These profits also generated enormous private income for the monopoly owners and top managers. Friedrich Flick, for example, paid income tax alone 7.9 million RM for 1942 and 8.3 Mill. RM for 1943 (ZStA Potsdam, FS, film 3960, AT Flick for Kaletsch, February 23, 1945).

consider. This is demonstrated by the fact that medium-sized companies, including corporate companies, and even many smaller companies - approximately in the range between 30 and 300 employees -, who participated as suppliers and subcontractors in the flourishing war business, "huge profits" 242 scored. At the beginning of 1944, the fascist authorities noticed “that, in general, small and medium-sized companies were making profit rates that were too high, that unreasonable profits had arisen, particularly in the case of under-deliveries, and that further profits in the machine tool industry many times translated are".243 Here became sometimes Net profits of 20, 30, even 50 and more percent of sales. (Table 153)

Behind such complain above to height Wins straight the small establishments stuck - except the fear of political unpleasant attention - a good portion Hypocrisy. This establishments had simply not the same sheer unlimited Possibilities like large companies and Group companies to hide their profits. Further were she's used to it, theirs Operation high overhead costs, especially those faux frais of corporate bureaucracy, possible largely to save, and be it on Cost the cooperation and overtime the Small business owner and of their Familys himself. Finally they claimed How from the files to see, her few extensive and often outdated Machinery actually until for the extreme, became but from your clients at Liquid assets were kept very tight.

What the Total mass of the War profits and their concentration the large arms monopolies concerned, like that had which apparently extreme high Profit rates more numerous small and medium-sized businesses on it because of the the relatively small absolute size of the profits is of no noteworthy value Influence.

Nevertheless, it highlighted the presumed huge profits of the arms monopolies when smaller companies, such as the Fischer company listed in the table, which had manufactured toys during peacetime, started producing sheet metal parts within four years of the war for air armament theirs Profit on the Tenfold could increase compared to the pre-war years.244 At the Friedrich Reitz OHG, a supplier of weapon parts, the adjusted net profit for a year exceeded that entire operating assets.245 But also the adjusted net profit of Aluminumwerke Göttingen GmbH with a workforce of around 1,200 people, which produces aluminum-steel safety nuts in large series (1943= 240 million pieces) made, came 1943 the height of business assets (unit value=2.49 million RM) equals.246

In one analysis the “earnings situation the industry" 24 [7] reached the Reich Statistical Office in 1941 after careful internal calculations and estimates to determine that that in the years immediately before dem wars the profit situation the examined a representative selection of large companies the armament and basic materials industry "significant cheaper" been be, as it the for 1938 and 1939 reported net profit in Height from unchanged 6.7 percent of balance sheet equity

242 B.A Koblenz, R 2/5241, report from tax inspector Bode above tax audits, 29. 11. 1943.

243 Ibid, R 215242, AN RMdF v. April 20, 1944 about d. Discuss re: Group prices at the RMfRuK on April 18, 1944.

244 Ibid, R 2/5243, Explanation the Fa. Fisherman v. 24. 6. 1944.

245 Ibid, R 2/5242, Audit report (1944).

246 Ibid, R 2/5243, Audit report (1944).

247 ZStA Potsdam, statistics Reich Office, No. 2702, BI. 1ff., “Earnings situation the industry", TO StRA v. 7. 5. 1941. Hereafter also the following.

indicated. “You increase it the visible Win around the cautious estimated excess depreciation and Accruals", that's how you come **for** the years 1937-1939 to a net profit of “ at least 15 percent of the paid-up share capital or at least 10 percent of the balance sheet Equity". Elsewhere 13 percent of the (e.g. T. not fully paid) nominal capital is given as a guideline for the average net profit achieved. For the war years still have to significantly higher Sentences accepted especially after the introduction of the fixed price system.

The fact that the estimates of the Reich Statistical Office were very conservative is shown by profit figures calculated by the mechanical engineering business group. According to this, around a sixth of all mechanical engineering companies were considered taxable reported profit 248 from 1938 to In 1940, before the introduction of the fixed price system, an average of 19 percent of the share capital.2411For four selected companies that produced "Wehrmacht equipment", This rate was average to 35 percent.250

Sales figures (net sales) are available from the electrical industry business group up to 1944.251 You calculate from it after the ratios the IG-farben overview (table 152) the corrected Net profit, this is how you get values that approximately the magnitude reproduce correctly.

Table 154
UTT111atz (net sales) and more valued Minimum profit (out of UTT111atz) in the Electrical industry 1932,1933, 1936-1944 (in mill. RM)

Year	Sales	Estimated Pure profit (corrected). Sales volume	In percent
1932	1224	66	5.4
1933	1260	104	8.2
1936	2268	245	10.8
1937	2500	310	12.4
1938	3200	372	U,6
1939	3990	481	**12.1**
1940	4300	594	13.8
1941	5180	645	12.5
1942	5370	494	9.2
1943	5916	571	9.6
1944	6500·	377	5.8

• Estimated through Economic group Electrical industry

Source: B.A Koblenz R 13 V/121, statistics the Economic group Electrical industry (January)

1945. 248 In the for the Financial authorities certain internal tax balances the Corporations must "except dem biggest Part the for Steer designated Amounts also the [the) amounts in excess of tax-recognized depreciation and in general the quiet and open accumulated parts of Profits dem commercial law 'Net profit' must be added" *(Goll,* p. 89).

249 B.A Koblenz, R 13 111/353, statistics the Wigru Mechanical engineering, 30. 12. 1941.

250 Ibid.

251 Ibid, R 13 V/121, statistics the Wigru electrical industry, (January) 1945.

Unfortunately are this Net profit estimates **for** the Years from 1941 until 1944 particularly unreliable, primarily because a Decline in the profit share of sales and thus the amount of profit, as well How at the IG Farben Group, so also here quite is unlikely. Such extraordinarily high profits in the electrical industry, which do not come from sales, but rather Example from investments flows are not recorded at all.

The Reich Finance Ministry kept pushing for this, but in vain, on the wave of profit the the Armaments industry swam, to skim more, i.e. into the Treasury to return. Significant for the situation was approximately the State Secretary Fritz's plans Reinhardt, in 1943 from a comprehensive, for several years retroactively Accounting and auditing around 4.5 billion RM to gain additional money for the Reich treasury.252 The failure of this plan was equally significant. General Walter V. Unruh, from Hitler was authorized in November 1942 to review the military deployment and the appropriate activities of all those employed in the Wehrmacht and the state apparatus,253 motioned to Reinhardt to refrain from his elaborate plan; he gave him the meaningful one Note, “that the industry would be prepared to compensate for previously unrecognized operating surpluses a surcharge to pay the previous taxes" 2M - one information that undoubtedly on one Agreement between v. unrest and authoritative representatives the industry (RGI) based.

What remains revealing about this episode is the audacity of the arms industry's monopolistic claim to profit, with a pinch of guilty conscience because of its irrefutable war profiteering. The monopoly owners' generous offer inadvertently pointed to the abundance of profits that the war gave them.255

The total profits of the ruling class of fascist Germany cannot be accurately recorded. A wide variety of factors flowed into this sum, all of which can of course be traced back to the exploitation and plunder of the working masses of our own people and the subjugated foreign peoples. According to our preliminary Knowledge can only the attempt should be made according to existing ones statistical Circumstantial evidence to a Approximate value for the arms industry.

Corporate tax statistics provide an approximate but relatively real reference point for calculating total industrial profits. The corporate tax is an income tax and becomes in corporations, d. H. legal Persons,

252 ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, Movie 19491, report v. State Secretary a. D. Mussehl (Deputy of Gen. v. Unruh) at Killy (Rkzl.), January 29, 1943.

253 Please refer *DZW,* Vol. 3, S. 181.

254 How Note 252.

255 The armaments industry made use of this surplus. b. also their contributions to the “community aid for the German economy” to the RGI, which included decommissioning aid until the end of 1943 and ongoing decommissioning support in height from 117 mill. RM paid out (BA Koblenz, R 12 1/26, confidential Material d. RGI newsroom, Jan. 1944). The payments the RGI moved in individual cases between monthly 20,- RM and 3.3 mill. RM (ibid., R 13 XX/198 H. 1, Report d. RGI v. 16. 2. 1943). “Do it financially the Shutdown doesn't matter," Zangen explained, "since other companies have more sales for it." (ZStA Potsdam, FS, Film 8273, KTB WiRüAmt, Entry v. 16. 1. 1942 ex. Thomas' conversation with pliers). The Reichsgruppe Handel also paid generous support to closed businesses.

in particular in corporations and others economic ventures on which Basis of income, ie of as taxable to be shown Profit, calculated and collected. According to the corporate tax statistics compiled by the Reich Ministry of Finance up to 1941, the total income of all corporations increased from 1939 until 1941 of 7.3 to 10.75 billion RM, underneath the of corporations (stock companies and GmbH) from 6.5 to 9.5 billion RM. The corporations with an income of two million RM and above alone accounted for 4.6 or RM7.1 billion yourself.256

Table 155
income the unlimited corporate tax payers 1939-1941 _

	Number	index	Total income (RM million)	index
Unlimited corporate taxable in total				
1939	78416	100	7326	100
1940	81919	100	8661	100
1941	83299	100	10746	100
Of that: Corporations 1939				
	19501	24.9	6483	88.5
1940	19829	24.2	7536	87.0
1941	21328	25.6	9516	88.5
Unlimited Corporate taxable persons **with** 2 **mill.** RM income and more				
1939	544	0.7	4558	62.2
1940	626	0.8	5419	62.6
1941	754	0.9	7121	66.3

Source: BA Koblenz, R 2/24140, preliminary results of the corporate tax assessment for 1939 and for 1940 “after the records of the Reich Statistical Office from March 1942 and April 1943 as well as the table for 1941, undated.

Zumpe25 has 7 because of others The corporate tax income is sourced according to the respective tax rates (30 percent up 1940/41, 37.5 percent per year 1941/42 and 48.75 percent converted since 1942/43 and further, slightly higher figures 258 preserved, which tended to be the same until 1943/44 Development prove.
The stagnation visible there However, gains, especially in the later years of the war, correspond in no one Way the reality. At that time there was the fixed price system, the an ever larger part of the production of taxation and thus of the calculation made withdrawn. "In this respect" noticed Zumpe with Right, ,,gives the Development the

256 BA Koblenz, R 2/24140, Preliminary results of the corporate tax assessment for 1939, 1940 and 1941, v. March 1942, April 1943 and table (n.d.).
257 *Zumpe,* S. 410, Note 4.
258 Higher u. a. allegedly because of this, because at Zumpes Art the calculation all and not only the ,,unlimited" corporate tax payers recorded become.

Table 156
Development of gross profit (income) all corporate tax payers 1938/39- 1943!44

Year	Gross Profit (RM Million)	Index
1938/39	8055	100
1939/40	10758	134
1940/41	11617	144
1941/42	13655	170
1942/43	13982	174
1943/44	13651	169

Source: Zumpe, S. 410, note 4; there mistakenly billions instead of millions. Index calculation corrected by me.

Corporate tax is only the trend, but by no means the actual explosion in profits again." 259 Closes one from these numbers 260 on the total amount of profits the" "Corporations" during the war years and takes account of accounting concealments, Tax discounts etc., you arrive at a sum that is probably over 100 billion RM should be. What cannot be taken into account, mind you, is the enrichment of the monopolies through robbery and plunder and the already treated Gifts worth billions the Treasury. Of the mentioned Sum is one Quarter to one third as “normal” Profit from civilian production that did not serve the immediate needs of warfare. According to this rough estimate, they are purely German war profits Financial capital 70 to 80 billion RM to be estimated. 2 61

259 *Zumpe,* S. HO.

260 The results of the corporate tax statistics presented here are those we have used so far Pay out of second hand as faulty out of (see *anatomy of war,* S. 32 f.; *DZW,* Vol. 4, p. 510f.).

261 Faingar estimates the amount of government contracts to industry during the war approximately 700 billion RM and the profits, the of that dem monopoly capital fell to also on 70 to 80 billion RM *(Faingar,* p. 253).

CHAPTER VIII

The German Agriculture in the wars

From Joachim Lehmann

1. The Preparation for war

In the period from the transfer of power to fascism until the eve of the war, a comprehensive system of state monopolistic regulation of production and distribution was imposed on German agriculture. Already existing institutions of the state apparatus were significantly supplemented by the new compulsory organization of the Reich nährstand. The exercise of massive state monopoly pressure was aimed at the absolute integration of agriculture in the preparation of a imperialist war and on the Orientation of this industry to the requirements of war.1

1 To general agricultural policy Initial situation cf. *Lehmann, Joachim,* Framework conditions for German war preparation Agriculture in the 1930s in WZ of the Wilhelm Pieck University of Rostock, business and linguistics. Series, H. 9/1983, p. 48ff. To the state monopoly Organization of agriculture Beginning of the fascist Diktatur *Zumpe,* Economy and State, p. 101ff., *Lehmann, Joachim,* studies on agricultural policy and agriculture in fascist Germany during the Second World War (1942-1945), Diss. A, Rostock 1977, p. 3ff., *Melzer, Rolf,* Studies on the agricultural policy of the fascists German imperialists in Germany in the system of war planning and warfare 1933 to 1941, Phil. Diss. Rostock 1966, p. 1-94, *Herferth, Wilhelm,* The Reichsnährstand - an instrument of fascism in preparation for the Second World War (with special consideration of the development of the Reichsnährstand in the years 1933 to 1935), Phil. Diss. Berlin 1961, p. 78ff., as well as *Hoeft, Klaus-Dieter,* The German Agricultural Policy fascism as Medium to Preparation of second World War, in ZfG, H. 12/1959,
S. 1205ff. Fundamental Marxist assessments in *Hoernle, Edwin,* The Struggle for the Peasants, *the same,* German farmers among the Nazi swastika, in *Edwin Hoernle* - A Live for the liberation of peasants. The work of Edwin Hoernle as an agricultural politician and a selection of his agricultural policy writings, Berlin 1965, p. 443f., 469f., *the same,* The Agricultural Policy of the National Socialists and the tasks of the KPD, in *Edwin Hoernle* - To the alliance between workers and Farmers. One Selection his agricultural policy Talk and writings, Berlin
1972, S. 193ff.
At *Gies, Horst,* The Reich Nutrition Stand - Organ of professional self-government or instrument state economic governance? in *ZAA,* 21. Jg. 1973, S. 216 ff., *the same,* Tasks and problems of the National Socialist food industry 1933-1939, in *VSWG,* H. 4/1979, p. 466ff. and *the same,* The role of the Reichsnährstand in the National Socialist system of rule, in *The "Führerstaat": Myth and Reality.* Studies on the structure and politics of Third Reich, Stuttgart 1981, p. 270ff. remains the aspect the Preparation for war largely ignored. Clearer the Statement by *Farquharson, John E.,* The Plow and the Swastika. The NSDAP and Agriculture in Germany 1928-45, London/Beverly Hills 1976,

Although the war theorists and plans of German imperialism Although the deeper causes of the defeat in the First World War had to remain essentially hidden, certain "experiences" flowed into the policy of preparing German agriculture for a new war, which was practiced after 1933. This required the view on industry, incomparably weaker private concentration and centralization of agricultural capital and production through a state-monopoly forced unification of the to compensate for agriculture.2

A more crucial more organizational step for full inclusion of agriculture into the state monopoly system of preparing for a war economy was the establishment of the compulsory organization of the Reich Food Stand in September 1933. [3] The Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture, Richard Walther Darre, received corresponding powers from the Coercive Cartel Act of 15. July 1933. In the Reichs nährstand, all agricultural and food industry, forestry and timber businesses, agricultural cooperatives, agricultural trading companies, the food industry, and the newly established economic associations in the field of agriculture and food industry were forcibly brought together, which meant that everyone had to be a compulsory member employees included.

The organization of imperial nutritional status, formally one “professional” facility and as Such Darre in his capacity as Reich peasant leader was vertically divided into state, district and local farming communities, which in fact controlled the state apparatus in the countryside underpinned by that she "was subject to the official and technical supervision of the Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture" and "to the audit by the Court of Auditors of the German Reich".4 Horizontally, its organs were on the level of imperial leadership, the State and District farms in initially four, later three main departments - "The Man" (ideology), "The Farm" (production) and "The **Market"** - structured. Was with her the centralized one State monopolistic steering apparatus was created, which from the monopolies' point of view appeared necessary in order to combine the fragmented agricultural production and its distribution for its intended function. A important instrument more fascist Agricultural policy as well as in

P. 106. Remarkable those in *Kutz, Martin,* war experience and war preparation. The agricultural economy Preparation on the Second World War in Germany dem Background of World War I - Experience (MS), Hamburg 1982, p. 22ff., position taken on Relationship between crisis management and war preparation.

2 At *Melzer* (p. 8th) one to absolute view the processes.

3 *RGBl.* 1933, I, S. 488, Law above the Construction from Coercive cartels from July 15, 1933; *RGBl.* 1933, I, law on the responsibility of the Reich for regulating the corporate structure of agriculture of July 15, 1933, p. 495; *RGBl.* 1933, I, law on the provisional structure of the Reich Nutrition Council and measures for market and price regulation agricultural products from 13. 9. 1933, p. 626. Supplementary and further regulations, nine in total, until February 1935.

4 *Tornow, Werner,* Chronicle of the agricultural policy and agricultural economy of the German Reich from 1933-1945, reports on agriculture, 188th special issue, Hamburg/Berlin 1972, p. 13. This subordination relationship was regulated by the First Ordinance on the Provisional Structure of the Reich Nutrition Stand, *RGBl.* 1933, I, S. 1060, dated 8. 12. 1933, the law to maintain and increase purchasing power, *RGBl.* 1933, I, P. 233, dated 24. 3. 1933 and an order from the Reich Food Minister dated August 17, 1934, *official news of the Reich Food Office,* (hereinafter *DR)* No. 8, dated October 20, 1934, S. 100.

The Reichserbhofgesetz of September 19335 represented both economic and political aspects.6

With regard to the preparation for war, it remains to be noted, even taking into account certain restrictions,7 that a temporary strengthening of capitalist farms was achieved, the that is in itself opposed the striving of monopoly capital for further concentration of agricultural production, but under the given conditions Conditions in the interest of rapid Preparation to the war requirements Purchase taken was.8

The main aim of all the measures introduced was to reduce foreign dependency in food and feed. The self-sufficiency slogan of “achieving the food freedom" had in the general war economy context still one

5 *RGBl.* 1933, I, S. 685, 29. 9. 1933. In addition Regulations ibid, v. 19. 10. 1933, 19. 12. 1933, 27. 4. 1934, 24. 7. 1933 and 4. 7. 1935; Above regulation became lifted and new summarized through the Inheritance Law Ordinance, *RGBl.* 1936, I, S. 1069, 21. 12. 1936. and the Inheritance Court Procedure Rules ibid, S. 1082, 21. 12. 1936.
Some the from the rural population as particularly pressing perceived Conditions have already been set in an ordinance dated April 26, 1939, just that. 843 and then under the pressure of the war events through Regulations from the 28. 9. 1940, *RGBl.* 1940, I, S. 1311 from the
22. 1. 1941 and *RGBl.* 1941, I, S. 60, decisive but through the so-called. Hereditary training regulation from the 30. 9. 1943, *RGJJl.* 1943, I, S. 549 changed.

6 To discussion about it see: *Zumpe,* Economy and Country, S. 104 ff. referred to the Statements by *Helling, Gertrud,* On the land policy of German imperialism between 1918 and 1945, in *JfW,* 1963, T. 3, p. 2/df., *Mottek, Hans/ Becker, ·waUer!Schröter, Alfred,* Economic History of Germany, Ein Grundriß, Vol. 3, Berlin 1974, p. 306, *Paterna, Erich et al.,* Germany from 1933 to 1939, Berlin 1969, p. 66f., *Kotow, G. G.,* Agrarian conditions and land reform in Germany, Part I, Berlin 1959, p. 60 f., *Hoeft, Klaus-Dieter,* Zur agricultural policy German imperialism from 1933 to to the present, Berlin 1960, p. 48ff., *Herferth,* (Diss.) pp. 75f., 207f., *Melzer,* p. 14 - *Petrushow, A.,* agricultural conditions in Germany should be added and the agrarian reform, Berlin 1948, p. 218, *Herferth, Wilhelm,* The Reichsnähr stood - a instrument the war politics of fascist German Imperialism, in *WZ University of Rostock,* Business and Linguistics. Series, issue 2/3/1968, p. 228f. - and, based on the thesis that the market organization and hereditary farm law formed the "actual state-monopolistic substance of the Reich's agricultural estate", argues for the inclusion of the problem of agricultural indebtedness in the assessment of the law. *Kuczynski, Jürgen,* Standardwerk above the German monopoly capital, in: New Germany, 5.16. 7. 1980, Zumpe's evidence for the Reichserbhofgesetz is not yet sufficient. *Grundmann, Friedrich,* agricultural policy in the Third Reich. Claim and reality of the Reichserbhofgesetz, Hamburg 1979.

7 *Lehmann,* framework conditions, S. 49.

8 Detailed and comprehensive statements by *Jatzlauk, Manfred,* studies on the social-economic structure of German agriculture and the development of its crop production between 1919 and 1939 (An analysis of statistical mass data on the Basis of statistical publications Reich Office). Phil. Diss. A, Rostock 1982, p. 169ff. *slipway,* S. 25, calculated for 1939 on the basis of *Statistical yearbook for the*
German Rich 1941/42, S. 112, in total 689665 Hereditary farms with one Portion from 21.5 % at the Total the establishments and 38 % at the Total operating area. On the herewith ver
Neumann, S. , has already made a related concentration process. 457ff., attentive; further *v. Saldern, Adelheid,* middle class in the “Third Reich”. Craftsmen and retail farmers, Frankfurt/New York 1979, pp. 78, 87f., *Grundmann,* p. 101ff.

special foreign exchange component. [9] The aim was to meet the foreign exchange requirements **for** agricultural imports in favor of the arms industry trimming. By means of the "production battles" [10] that were propagated and conducted from 1934 onwards, this was achieved through an increase and in to a certain extent also restructuring the domestic production is aimed at. The focus of the "production battle" was the increase in animal production, its conversion to the farm's own feed base, the expansion of oil plant cultivation and the expansion of forage crops.

All in all The level of self-sufficiency could only be increased from 80 percent in 1933/34 to 83 percent in 1938/39.11 The dependence on imports was particularly clear shortly before the start of the war Food with 30 percent and at Fat at 43 percent. Secretary of State Herbert jaw lifted in one later publication the allegedly "undeniable successes" of the "production battle" that lead to considerable reserve formations, but at the same time had to admit that that "up individual and very important areas , the ongoing shortage at times could not be avoided Additional production ultimately nothing.13

The main goal of the "production battles" was intensification of production, so this had to be carried out appropriately market regulatory steps are accompanied, if it should have the intended effect.1 [4] The market organization of the Reichsnährstand served this purpose. The main associations and imperial offices formed the organizational pillars of the market organization system. Also based on that Coercive Cartel Act of 15. July 1933 and essentially formed by the end of 1935, the main associations became responsible for the movement of goods on the internal market, while the Reich offices primarily controlled agricultural foreign trade. This set of instruments made control possible and steering the flow of goods, the regulation of pricing system and the Ver-

9 *Petzina,* self-sufficiency policy, S. 30ff., S. 91.

10 By Herbert Backe on 2nd place. Reich Farmer's Day announced in November 1934, although the justification was of course not based on preparations for war, but rather on the current concerns of the farmers the Foreign exchange shortage the gave arguments *(Jaw, Herbert,* Performance for the people, in: The end of liberalism in the economy, Berlin 1938, p. 27 ff.). See also *uwin, Clifford R.,* The production battle 1934-1936, in *ZAA,* 22. Year 1974, p. 209ff.

11 *Petzina,* self-sufficiency policy, S. 95; see. *tape I,* p. 23f., different numbers at *Small, Burton H.,* Germany's Economic Preparations for was, Cambridge, Mass. 1959, S. 49, the on the basis one unpublished study from Emil·woermann, ,,The Nutritional situation the World", one increase from 81 on 89 % mentioned. Optimistic about purpose and therefore unrealistic the significantly higher lying verte by *Ertel, H.,* The Basics of German National Nutrition, Leipzig 1938, p. 63.

12 *Jaw, Herbert,* Around the Food freedom Europe, Leipzig 1942, S. 19.

13 *Kuczynski,* Position the workers, Vol. 6, p. 240.

14 In response to the agrarian crisis, corresponding steps had already been taken since 1930 *(Tornow,* p. 72, *Zumpe,* 112f.), which after 1933 were "the result of old demands of the large landowners ... as well as acute, deep contradictions and socio-economic effects. those in particular through the agricultural and Economic crisis worsened had been, How also the planning Preparation one new war" *(Zumpe,* S. 121) continued quickly and systematically. Backe qualified appropriate measures under Hugenberg as "first" practical Attempt the market regulation, the very good succeeded." (BA Koblenz, Estate Jaw, No. 3, Big One report goat grove, 1946, p. 14f.).

work and an influence on consumption already in the war preparation phase. Above all, however, the market organization, in connection with the fixed price system, separated the direct producer from the market to a certain extent and thereby made him further directly dependent on state or semi-state-state monopolistic bodies. From special “military economic” importance was the one Reich positions transferred Task of stockpiling.

Agricultural sciences were increasingly included in the war preparations. After a certain concentration of research capacity had already taken place in 1934 in connection with the "production battles", this process was continued with the formation of the so-called Research Service as a Reich working group for agricultural sciences in the May 1935 on one new Level upscale.15 Structured in seven from the subject area here differentiated working groups should the Research service summarizes the agricultural science potential and uses it specifically to solve the problems that are considered urgent, e.g in relation to increasing soil fertility, rationalization and mechanization, preservation and storage of agricultural products and the development of new processing technologies.

With the announcement of the four-year plan in 1936, which initiated a new phase of preparation for war and resulted in changes in the state-monopoly mechanism of the overall economy 16, started also a new phase of agricultural policy.

A Nutrition Business Group was established within the four-year plan apparatus. It was her responsibility, within the scope of practicality Preparation for war above the person of its head to coordinate the measures of the Reich Ministry of Food and the Reich Food Council with those of the four-year plan. Göring appointed State Secretary Darres, Herbert Backe, to head the Nutrition business group and to be responsible for the four-year plan. Due to the structure and powers of the four-year plan apparatus, Backe was authorized to give instructions to his minister. In fact, this meant that Darre increasingly lost influence on agricultural policy,1 7 because Backe represented views on essential issues that differed from those of his formal superior.18 In addition to current agricultural problems, this primarily concerned the location and the function of the imperial state in the political and ideological and economic system of fascism. The divergences related on the Ask, if the Reich Nutrition Stand or the fascist party for the ideological influence on the rural population is responsible, and on the subordination relationship of the Reich nutritional status to Reich Ministry of Food.

The ideological disguised “professional” Special interests Darres and his At-

15 Decree of the Reich Minister of Education and Reich Minister of Food regarding. the establishment of the research service (Reich Working Group of agricultural science), in: ***Meyer,*** *Konrad,* research for people and Food, special issue 8, 1938, p. 4.

16 *tape I,* S. 13ff.

17 *L<win,* S. 220: "A review of the minutes of the General Council of the Four-Year Plan also makes it clear that effective control of agricultural policy had been taken out of Darre's hands." However, Lovin cannot be followed in his interpretation of the Four-Year Plan policy as the end of the "production battles". For Backe's dominant position, see also *Carroll,* p. 131.

18 Please refer e.g Backes position to regulation the fat economy (BA Koblenz, **R** 26 IV/4, Bl. 17, protocol the meeting of little ones Council of Ministers at the 21. 10. 1936).

hangers had an effect increasingly disruptive to the politics of war preparation 19 The measures introduced as part of the four-year plan were based on “production battle” and market organization and aimed at a maximum increase in agricultural production as well as one if possible extensive Recycling of the products.

Among the concrete political and economic Under these conditions, efforts to consolidate land had only a very limited effect.20 The terms and On the other hand, coercive measures in the event of alleged “poor economic management” have already been implemented for hereditary farms was considered had, became with the" regulation to Backup the farmer

"shafting" from the 23. March 1937 also on all others establishments extended. 21 This Ver order saw Reprisals until there to Insertion of trustees or to Compulsory leasing, which was permitted in connection with the for the financial year 1936 introduced for the first time “court card” 22 , one Compulsory proof from above 150 business management

Information that regulation and monitoring every company. With it demoted they turn the farmers into vicarious agents of the fascists Agricultural policy without any possibility of influence. One also in the March 1937 introduced intense Wirtschaftsberatung 23 completed the state monopoly's coercive instruments; not a farmer was allowed to undergo such "\business consulting" ie control of his entire activity.

State price regulations were systematically used **to** accelerate the development of existing production reserves used. This goal served 1937/38 Price reductions **for** nitrogen and potash fertilizers as well as **for** agricultural machinery and devices. Simultaneous increases in producer prices **for** potatoes, rye and milk stimulated together With the price reductions **for** inputs, agricultural production increased to a certain extent. The price regulations mentioned do not mean an end to the price gap between the industrial production resources required by agriculture and the agricultural products. 24 In addition became through the Price-

19 As Example the lengthy Fight between Darre and DAF above Responsibilities at the „Care" foreigner Workforce in the years 1938 and 1939 (ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, film 19578).

20 *RGBl.* 1936, I, Reallocation law from the 26. 6. 1936, S. 518. *RGBl.* 1937, I, Reich reallocation regulation from the 16. 6. 1937, S. 629. *RGBl.* 1936, I, First regulation to Reich reallocation order from the April 27, 1938, S. 425. *RGBl.* 1937, I, Real estate transaction notice from the 26. 1. 1937, S. 34.

21 *RGBl.* 1937, I, March 23, 1937, p. 422.

22 Also introduced on the 23rd 3. 1937; see. *Melzer,* p. 23. According to the head of Reich Main Department II, Brummenbaum, their aim was to “produce to the last farm to overlook and to direct" *(Notices for agriculture,* H. 46/1935, p. 981).

23 arrangement of Reich peasant leader re: Business advice from the 20. 3. 1937, in: *DR,* No. 11a, March 22, 1937.

24 *Klemm, Volker et al. a.,* agricultural history. From the bourgeois agrarian reforms to the socialist ones Agriculture in the GDR, Berlin 1978, S. 126. Comprehensive Factual information near *Hanau, Arthur! plate, Roderich,* Die German agricultural price and market policy in the Second World War, Sources and Research to agricultural history, Vol. 28, Stuttgart 1975,
S. 5ff. (For criticism to the fundamental ones Positions of the authors see *Klemm, People,* Country economic price and market policy - for whom?, in *J(W,* 1978, T. 2, p. 177ff.). Furthermore *v. Saldern,* S. 71, *v. Kruedener, Jürgen,* Conflicting goals in the National Socialist Agricultural policy. A contribution on the management problem in centrally controlled economic systems, in Journal of Economics and Social Sciences, H. 4/1974, p. 348f.

changes particularly the Revenue for the traditional products of Large land ownership increased, far less for rural production. Smaller farms were also often dependent on purchasing supplies from large farms. Also the price corrections With regard to the promotion of mechanization and wider use of mineral fertilizers, the main concerns came from agrarian capitalists benefit businesses.25

The "special ·preferred role" 26 of the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture with its area of responsibility had early institutional consequences in the agricultural sector for the mobilization event as well as for comprehensive preparatory measures Measures. Even before the proclamation During the "production battle", a "Special Representative for Food Security" was installed at the Reichsbauernführer27 and a "Nutritional Economic Research Office" was set up on April 1 , 1934 to draw up annual war nutrition plans.28 On a broader level, this work was continued from May 1936 by new "Food Security Departments"29 , which acts as a central office at the Reichsbauernführer and in the same way at the state and district farmer leaders employed became. She were with the annual elaboration so-called

Nutritional balances are commissioned, which include the entire production and the expected requirements, namely the fascist Wehrmacht, to identify had. 3 0 Them incumbent it, for the

In the event of an emergency, a "general staff plan for food mobilization" according to a kind of mobilization calendar 31 to create and thus also to secure the need for forces for the in the Frame the War food economy into the Eye caught

institutions and the coordination of all food-related measures with the Reich Ministry of Food, the fascist party and the Wehrmacht. Was in the staff office of the Reichsbauernführer the department A for responsible for drawing up war food plans.32

The coordination and poll served a 1937 from the "General Plenipotentiary for

25 *Jatzlauk,* S. 305f., *clamp, u. a.,* agricultural history, S. 135ff.; further statements for large companies 100 hectares at *stake, Robert!Wilke, Jürgen,* To Application of mathematical-statistical methods in agricultural history - A cliometric study of the history of German agriculture in the era of fascism, presented using economic data on the structure and agricultural development Large companies in the Güstrow/Mecklenburg district (1936-1943/44), with a chapter on multidimensional statistical method "factor analysis", Diss. B, Berlin 1979, p. 79ff.

26 *IMG,* Vol. 36, p. 225, Doc. EC-177, Minutes of the 2. Meeting of the working committee of speakers for the defense of the Reich.

27 *special money, E L.,* Agricultural Production policy in the 2. and 1. World War, Economic and social sciences. Diss. (MS), Frankfurt/Main 1944, S. 13.

28 *IMG,* Vol. 36, S. 261, Doc. EC-258, The Preparation the economic mobilization by the general representative for the War economy, as of the end of December 1937.

29 arrangement of Reich peasant leader re: the Construction one Job for food security from April 29, 1936, in *DR,* No. 183, April 29, 1936, S. 227. ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 5G6, BI. 34ff., Doc. C 396/NID-15305, report the Job for Food security from the Reichsbauernführer on February 14, 1939.

30 *Meinhold, Willy, Die* agricultural Generation conditions in the wars, Jena 1941, S. 8th.

31 *Untermann,* F., war food economy. The General staff work the Food security, in *Odal,* H. 11/1939, p. 948f.

32 *Herferth, Wilhelm,* Der fascist "Reichsnährstand" and its position Officials in the Bonn state, in *ZfG,* H. 5/1962, p. 1059.

the war economy" on the basis of secret Reich Defense Act from the
21. Command staff formed in March 1935, In its "Nutrition and Agriculture" department, the Reich Ministry of Food was represented by an expert from its Department II (Production and Agriculture). [33] At the same time, the preparatory decisions were already made regarding the subordination of the production and market departments of the Reich Food Stand and the main associations to the Reich Ministry of Food in the event of mobilization, as this was formally at the same legal level The provinces and districts lacked a corresponding substructure.[34] The immediate preparation for the war was also served by a "framework regulation on the organization of the war food industry" developed jointly by the Reich Ministry of Food and the Reich Food Industry Basis for all laws regarding the The war food industry was intended and the designs were available by mid-1938 and from September 1938 the country and District farmer leaders as Secret matter with dem title
"Regulations to introduction the "War Food Economy" delivered were.[35]
At the End of same year received the "Nutritional economics "Research Center" was given the task of prognostically determining the situation of the food economy in fascist Germany in the course of the first quarter of 1939 for the period up to August 1, 1939 and further for the first and second economic years of an assumed war.[36] This work should have all the details and Sub-areas of the production from the formation of reserves to the distribution to the various users and, above all, the expected and conceivable effects of the war on production and consumption analyze.
The war food plan of April 1, 193937, presented as a "Secret Reich Matter", characterized the situation in the Direction that the ins eye caught Food rations could be covered quantitatively, but significant problems in terms of quality were to be expected. About it out made the Experts | on the Decrease in yield attentive, which would inevitably occur as the war continued due to the withdrawal of workers and resources as well as the deterioration in foreign trade conditions. With regard to the It was pointed out that inventories could only provide temporary compensation for the expected production losses as a result of the war. As part of the partial mobilizations of autumn 1938 and spring 1939 it too one examination and perfection of instruments.
To Acquisition possible more precise Documents above Economic process and conditions from the national scale down to the individual company have been the existing surveys for years [38] expanded and supplemented by new forms under the direction of the Reich Nährstand been [39].

33 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 454, BI. 14, Doc. NID -15675.
34 *Melzer,* S. 39.
35 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 556, BI. 35, Darre accusation.
36 The entire Occurrence ibid, Reich Ministry for Nutrition and Agriculture (hereinafter RMEL), No. 825/2.
37 Ibid, BI. 8ff.
38 See *Dillwitz, Sigrid,* Sources on the socio-economic structure of the peasantry in the German Empire after 1871, in *JfW,* 1977, T. 2, p. 237ff.
39 For the The following s. *Fensch, Hans Ludwig,* Work and Goals of Reich nutritional status on the field of agricultural business research, in *Meyer, Konrad,* agricultural policy - a basic ethnic science, Neudamm 1943, p. 69ff.

The variants of accounting statistics and reporting service that have been in use for decades and the Imperial land valuation resulted one abundance from Declarations, which, however, required relatively long evaluation times and trained reporters. The complete absorption of the cultivated land offered the district farmers the basis **for** rigorous interventions in production planning and order every company.

The already mentioned “court card” was from each Manager himself to lead. She When properly managed, it offered a complete picture of the company's economic situation. The use of court cards was the subject of a comprehensive educational campaign, but was also enforced by the threat of punishment. They then provided them during the war essential basis for Interventions in the operational management.

Based essentially on the information on the farm maps from the individual local farming communities, the district farming communities so-called district economic folders compiled, the all significant Data this Organizational level contained. Their extensive comparability made them an important instrument for larger administrative units for the coercive regulation of agricultural production, the quotas and distribution of foodstuffs, but also the allocation of means of production and workers. In more appropriate Way existed statistical Documents for each individual State farming communities.

The policy of intensive war preparation [40] on agriculture in the four-year plan showed significant burdens with obvious negative effects. At the Sixth Reich Farmers' Day in 1938 itself Darre to remarkable Forced to admit. He meant growing criticism from leading figures in the fascist party as well as increasing discontent under the work rural population that's right open Presentation existing difficulties encounter to can, and admitted "how much the economic difficulties, such as the lack of work and the overwork of the farmer's wife, are today almost in contradiction" to the standard postulates of fascist agrarian ideology and that the time has come "when a fundamental solution to the problem cannot be postponed." The - of course not so called - Preparations for war led to “conditions in the countryside... to begin to take a direction of development that will cause irreparable damage to our national body can inflict".4 [1] Jaek came to a significant conclusion at the end of January 1939 Analysis.

"1. The current level of intensity of German agriculture is generally in arable farming his peak reached.
2. The utilization of significant production reserves, especially in the processing industry, is failing on the price conditions.
3. The withdrawal from approx. 400000 agricultural workers since 1933 endangered first the retention

40 The interpretation problems arise in connection with the instruments used bourgeois authors particularly clear, for example *Saldern,* S. 71; *Kruedener,* S. 356 f., highlights a "moral suasion" as a variant for solving the permanent fascist dilemma of goal and potential. In this respect, an obvious misunderstanding of historical reality also by *Schreiner, Giinter,* The development of German agricultural structure policy from the founding of the empire in 1871 to the end of the Second World War, in *reports above Agriculture,* New episode, **H.** 2/1975, S. 297.

41 *Darre, Richard Walther,* Departure of peasantry. Reichsbauerntag speeches 1933 until 1938, Berlin 1942, S. 115, **111,** 116.

the today Intensity, secondly, has he about very large wage increases to a crisis in the Agriculture led.

4. This crisis in the Agriculture is no uniform rather meets the By the nature of things, those companies rely on the strongest and most constant manual labor are. These are Refining companyc, ie the farms. While the farms with predominantly arable farming and little processing are still today a pension find, there she yes next to the possibility of mechanization and So that people's savings can also receive help from the labor service, the army, the rural service, foreign migrant workers, etc., the processing companies, ie the peasant farms, collapse due to the absolute lack of workers and as a result of wage increases.
5. Collapsing peasantry and shortage of refined products such as butter, bacon, lard, Eggs, stand thus in causal Connection." 42

There is little left to add to this balance of six years of fascist agricultural policy. Reports from agriculture at this time provide vivid evidence of the State Secretary's statements.43 Maybe agriculture compared to the First World War from the perspective of those in power Class unequal better for the new War prepared was, could from an Err The achievement of the broad goals, particularly with regard to reduced import dependency, is only very limited the be speech.44

The unmistakable successes of this policy, 45 which was consistently associated with an incredibly intensified exploitation of the working classes of the rural population, were significant points of weakness.

2. The state monopoly Organization of the War food economy

After the outbreak of the Second World War, the fascist agricultural politicians set out to also the Agriculture in Germany on the “absolutely new "Conditions" of the war that "caused a qualitative change of fundamental importance" 46 represented. 'While all the important steps taken so far were geared towards the anticipated event of war, this mainly happened after September 1, 1939 on it at, the **For** this prepared the case state monopoly to set the apparatus in motion. The measures implemented since 1933 in the agricultural sector made it possible in a special way to achieve the fiction ('iner “Peace Economy”47 to maintain, by demagogic on the practically for a long time Agricultural policy pursued under the aspect of war referred became.

Next to such in a way strategic agricultural policy Components How R<- Is-

42 B.A Koblenz, R 2/18872, Memorandum "Depiction the Position the Agriculture in peace and War" from January 20, 1939.

43 ZStA Potsdam, Reich Chancellery, Movie 19578, Memorandum "The Position the Bavarian Country-
business in the spring 1939", Reich governor from Epp at the March 1, 1939 at Lammers.

44 *Jaw,* food freedom, S. 162.

45 This one aspect emphasized *Kuczynski,* Everyday• Vol. 5, S. *66.*

46 *tape I,* S. 64.

47 See. ibid, S. 69, *DZW,* Vol. 1, p. 198f.

With market regulations and the Reichserbhofgesetz, targeted efforts had been made for a long time, the war economy mechanism in the narrower sense in the area of To give birth to agriculture.

All the facts confirm the assessments, repeatedly and complacently put forward by leading fascist agricultural politicians and their clients, that in 1933 “the period of pacification of agricultural policy” came to an end;48 “all measures from 1934 onwards were practically to be viewed as measures for total war”. [4 9] All in all, Darre stated in November 1939: “The entire work of agricultural policy since the seizure of power was already under the sign of the Preparation for an eventual one War."5()

a) From August 1939 until 1941/42

Of fundamental importance for further developments under the conditions of the imperialist war was the “Ordinance on Economic Administration”5 [1 issued in August 1939], in the Issues of nutrition and agriculture were given detailed consideration. § 2 the Ordinance authorized the Reich Food Minister for his area of responsibility, "departments, organizations of economic self-administration and other bodies... to be fully or partially subordinated to state administration, to state administrative authorities to incorporate or to dissolve". In Section III became the Construction from country or provincial nutrition offices the respective supreme state authorities and the Reich Nutrition Organization was ordered to be subordinate to the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture or the state nutrition offices. § 9 finally determined the formation of nutrition offices the lower administrative level of the Circles.

The Economic Administration Ordinance perfected and legally consolidated all the steps taken to concentrate responsibility and centralize the apparatus since 1933. The now also legal subordination of the supposedly “professional” Reich nourishment class to the fascist ones State apparatus changed in the Practice the daily Work barely something, which he now, under the conditions of the war, served as the foundation of the Reich Food Ministry in one since longer tested territorial and factual structure fulfilled. Important features of state-monopoly capitalism became apparent here, in particular the regulation and distribution of production by the state in close cooperation with other, specially created ones Organizations.

Parts of Reich nutritional status, the Department of Reich peasant leader with dem Staff Office

and the administrative office - The staff remained largely intact and remained with this organization on a regular basis. [52] They worked in the field of political and ideological and professional Instructions with the Departments A the Nutrition offices together.

The Reich's main department I, "Man", which was primarily concerned with ideological influence, and the departments subordinate to it in the state and district farming communities also remained in existence.

48 *Meinlwld,* S. 7.
49 ZStA Potsdam, Fall XI, No. 73, BI. 141, Doc. NG-021, speech Backes at the February 6, 1943.
50 Ibid, No. 392, BI. 12, Doc. NG-453, Memorandum Darres "Tasks the production in of agriculture in wars”.
51 *RGBl.* 1939, I, S. 1495ff., August 27, 1939.
52 ZStA Potsdam, RMEL, No. 901, BI. 235.

Since the complete state monopoly regulation of the food market can only be achieved through the full power of disposal of the commissioned state departments over the relevant Agricultural products feasible appeared, laid at the August 27th 1939 one
"Ordinance for the provisional safeguarding of the vital needs of the German people"53 actually established the rationing of important foodstuffs and identified violations under severe punishments.
On August 28th, the Reich Food Minister published an "Ordinance on Public Management of agricultural products".54 It de facto represented the introduction of the war food economy four days before the attack on Poland.
§ 1 reaffirmed public management for the purpose of "securing the supply of food and feed to the population and the armed forces" and the responsibility of the Reich Food Minister for regulating the production, management and consumption of agricultural products. This comprehensive authority and Responsibility was for the nutrition offices in § 3 stipulates that "the proper economic management in the producer businesses must be ensured and all measures must be taken to ensure cultivation, livestock farming, harvesting and the timely delivery of products as well as management and distribution". had. The work of the nutrition offices was broken down according to § 5 into the two complexes of demand coverage and consumption regulation. These two areas, in In practice, referred to as departments A and B, the former consisted of the production (main department II "The Farm") and market departments (main department III "The market") in the state and district farmers' associations of the Reichsnährstand formed while the tasks of the second from state Administration departments perceived became.
Under the in total 37 paragraphs, the detailed Determinations contained, came the §§ 21 (seizure) and 26 (ensuring execution) are given particular weight. The confiscation, as an essential prerequisite for management, began in the field and in the stable and actually only ended when the product was handed over to the consumer. For the implementation of coercive measures became if applicable Police involvement is expressly provided for. Provisions on the obligation to provide information, the obligation to maintain secrecy and penal provisions completed this prototype of a wartime economic law, the aim of which was to "the political gagging, the intensified terrorization and forced manipulation of the people through the most comprehensive economic policy possible Regulation" as the main purpose of all war economy Legislation55 on one important Sub-area to complete.
The Management regulation regulated the Merger of the production and distribution-relevant parts of the Reich nutritional organization with the fascist state apparatus, what which is usually taken over by the state and district farmer leaders Management of the nutrition offices on the respective level underlined. This fairly smooth transition of the mentioned parts of the Reich's nutritional status documents a new quality in the development of the state monopoly steering and regulatory mechanism in the area of agriculture and must at the same time serve as evidence of the war-oriented structure and Efficiency of development of this organization apply.

53 *RGBl.* 1939, I, S. 1498, 27. 8th. 1939
54 Ibid, S. 1521, 28. 8th. 1939.
55 ***DZW,*** Vol. **1,** S. 198.

The effectiveness of the construction found, which was characterized by a "functional fusion of responsibility for both production and distribution policies,"56 seemed guaranteed for precisely this reason to be.

The one on the 4th The War Economy Ordinance5 7 issued by the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich in September threatened in its § 1, concerning "conduct detrimental to war", the person who supplies raw materials and products that are part of the vital needs of the population - without a doubt, agricultural products fell under this collective name - "destroys, sets aside or withholds and thereby maliciously endangers the coverage of needs", prison, penal servitude and even the death penalty.

Eleven days after the management regulation, on the 7th September 1939, a whole package of regulations on the public management of the most important foodstuffs and other agricultural products was issued, all of which came into force on September 25th. September in Power kicked.58 In the Enforcement of § 36 the Management regulation from the

27. In August 1939, the Reich Food Minister determined that the main associations responsible in each case and imperial offices manage the management to would have taken over. At the same time, the regulations contained precise instructions about the food cards, the ones from now on about the lives of people in fascist Germany accompanied.

Particularly important as statistical planning material on Imperial level were the so-called th " War food balance sheets" 5 9 . They were used as part of the planning for a war year (1. August to July 31) from Reich Ministry of Food developed and constantly checked. It was based on the official harvest estimates, the livestock counts, the import and export statistics, the reports of the administrations of the occupied areas, reports from the Reich offices and main associations about stocks, population statistics and the current consumption figures of the individual consumer groups. Divided into an income and expenditure side, they showed their own on the one hand Harvest, existing stocks, the transition stocks from the previous marketing year and imports from other countries, ie in the Plural of the cases the looted property invaded countries, and on the other hand the total consumption the Civilian population and the Wehrmacht for industrial processing required quantities of agricultural products, exports, seeds and wastage and other losses.

Already before beginning of a new one fiscal year Estimates based initial balance sheet drafts were drawn up. Ongoing reviews revealed relatively early indications that if the balance sheet would be balanced or if a deficit is to be expected. One like this Result then formed the basis for the political leadership's decisions about necessary ration cuts **or** possible ration increases. Deficits in the nutritional balance were attempted **through** increased plunder of the occupied balance countries.

After graduation After the preparatory work, the draft balance sheets were finally discussed at a meeting of representatives of the Reich Food Ministry, the Reich Food Council, the main associations and Reich offices and were personally approved by the Reich Food Minister. Continuous checks were then carried out

56 *Melzer,* S. 54.

57 *RGBl.* 1939, I, S. 1609, 4. 9. 1939.

58 Ibid, p. 1609, 9/4 1939.

59 On the war food balance sheets ZStA Potsdam, Case XI, No. 550, BI. 70ff., Doc. IV B 16, affidavit. Hans Joachim Riecke; *Riecke, Hans-Joachim,* nutrition and agriculture in the wars, in *Balance of the second World War,* Oldenburg 1953, p. 338.

the main associations and the Reich Ministry of Food in order to draw up new balance sheets and corresponding ones in the event of drastic changes, for example in the event of bad harvests or after the liberation of occupied territories to initiate ration changes.
Even during the current financial year took place a continuous one Surveillance. A final balance gave the actual occurrence and the real consumption again. In the first war years certain - in connection with the fascist blitzkrieg strategy contemplating - in total still comparatively reserved Methods the Proceed. The in the Trains the Preparation for war developed Instruments became further developed and changed situations adjusted.
Supported on the after tens of thousands counting army of Reich nutrition officials who held were, in the villages closely with the mayors and the local group leaders the NSDAP to interact was through the combination from more intense Propaganda, controls and exemplary Punish one relative size effectiveness reached. For example, however, was man engaged, control as agricultural "Advice" to camouflage. A such>s consulting [60] was also already in the pre-war years in the Frame the “Generation battles” were set up been. From the Recoveries to the fascist Defense power surrendered in War intensified Necessities for the professional Advice alone on dem court those left behind Peasant women. on the other hand had to also many qualified Specialist advisor Military service afford. The Lack of strength became through the A relationship in the meantime annexed areas invaded Neighbore states in the Advisory system tightened. efforts more different Art around remedy resulted in a tighten central Steering, Instructions and guide through Ministry and Reich's nutritional status.
Already in the spring 1940 issued the responsible fascist Place one ver sharpened "Ordinance on penalties and criminal proceedings for violations of regulations in the area of management of restricted products"[61], the p r o v i d e d for high penalties for violations of the orders *of the* management offices. The nutrition offices could submit the criminal charges.
In the Connection with one already in the October 1939 from Himmler at the police he According to the instructions given to support Reichsnährstand [62], a complete system of repressive measures was available. It was all about the possibilities the What emerged for the fascists from the initial successes of their war machine was that such a comprehensive system of oppression still applied relatively cautiously, taking into account the mood and attitude of the rural population became.
Regardless, there were signs for agriculture in winter 1939/40 first problems, which inevitably out of Recoveries and out of dem decline in the Delivery with means of production for the agricultural one generation revealed.[63] In the In contrast to the fascist propaganda, which assumed an absolutely secure food situation, saw Secretary of State Herbert Backe on 14th of February 1940 on one meeting of General Council of the Four-Year Plan “in today’s reassurance the public in in reference to the

60 Cf. on this ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 392, BI. 50f., Doc. NG-t,53, Memorandum Darr{, see
“Tasks of production in agriculture in the war" from November 27, 1939; ibid, BI. 82, Doc. NG-453, Opinion Darres on the “Agricultural War Production Plan” (10. 11. 1939)" from November 27, 1939.
61 *RGBl.* 1940, I, S. 610, 6.4. 1940.
62 *Melzer,* S. 67.
63 See. S. 596ff.

secured Nutrition the largest Danger". M Around his suggestions Maintaining and partially increasing production To emphasize it, he opens it the "mistakes" in the First World War. These led to the fact that, after the quick victory hoped for, “the productive power of agriculture was irretrievable there" been be. Before this one background held he it for necessary,
“that a similar alternative does not arise again, especially after a short victorious one War food worries will continue for many years become."
Backes Considerations formed short Time later the substance of Göring's "Appeal to the country folk", with dem the German Agriculture continued and specified
“Production Battles” as war program imposed were.65

b) From 1941/42 until 1943

The military situation at the end of 1941, characterized by the failure of the "Barbarossa" plan and the defeat of the Wehrmacht in front of Moscow, forced the fascist leadership to orient itself towards a longer-term war. The state monopoly management system in the war economy was significantly redesigned in the course of the first half of 1942.66
In this overall context are the processes the Darre's detachment was assigned at the beginning of May 1942. The immediate cause was difficulties in the food sector, which are in the Ration cuts the spring of 1942 knocked down. Actually though the reasons were deeper and dated already from the pre-war period.
Given the war situation The attitude of the fascist leadership clique towards Darre became decisive influenced of the opinion about his abilities regarding practical production policy and “food security”. The efficiency of the policy pursued by Darre doubted influential representatives of the fascist regimes more and more.6 7 This suspected, that his superficial ideological oriented "Blood and soil" policy the danger of neglecting the burning current Nutritional questions are mountainous. At the same time they affected the continued existence of the Reich Main Department I as a sworn entity Home power Darres and the from pursued **her** Conception a special position for farmers in the society's claim to leadership fascist Party.6 8 With Secretary of State jaw was for a Revirement in the Line the Agricultural policy a personnel alternative available, which at the multiplying ones economic difficulties out of the Sees the fascist ruler better requirements for a policy in the interest of continuation of war offered. cheek had since his takeover

64 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 392, BI. 116f., Doc. NG-1408, Explanations State Secretary Backes in the General Council (of the J.L. Four-Year Plan) on February 14, 1940.
65 *National Socialist Country mail* (in the following *NS rural post office),* April 23, 1940.
66 See. S. 41ff.
67 ZStA Potsdam, case **XI, No.** 546, BI. 119, Doc. 1B 28, interrogation Göring's at the 6. 9. 1946;
Goebbels, Joseph, diaries, S. 205 (19. 5. 1942), S. 208 (21. 5. 1942). See details *Lehmann,* investigations, S. 16ff.
68 ZStA Potsdam, Fall XI, No. 546, BI. 106, Doc. IB 25, Affidavit Günther Pacyna on August 1, 1948; NS party correspondence, no. 148, June 27, 1942. On the basic attitude of the NSDAP *Pätzold/Wei{Jbecker,* p. 305, 336f., 345. A reference to sequences that have existed for a long time in BA Koblenz, NS 35/4, copy one writing Darres to Hess from the March 7, 1938.

In 1933, he took over the leadership of the Reichsnährstand and the Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture, reflecting his interest in agricultural and food-related tasks and related to this focused on economic policy issues. As early as the 1930s, he was involved in production policy and business management the to preparation of Agriculture on the War the decisions made are significantly influenced. His acceptance into the four-year plan apparatus at the end of 1936 had considerably expanded his influence on agricultural policy. Backe had actually been since Start of war the guide the agricultural policy, the Country- and Food industry mne.

The formal deportation of Darre was delayed until the 20th. May 1942 waiting for you. On this day, Darre was sent on "sick leave" and at the same time Backe was entrusted with the management of Darre's offices as Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture, as Reich Farmers' Leader and as Reich Leader in the Reich Office for Agricultural Policy of the Reich Leadership of the NSDAP.69

In a programmatic speech on June 27, 1942 in Hanover, Backe formulated the basic positions of his policy in a formulation that was clearly pointed against Darre: “The future tasks cannot be solved through vague romanticism, but only through real idealism. It is not who did something that is important, but rather that something is done. It's not prestige or responsibility that matters, but... just the task itself." 70

The decisive factor for Backe's use was his professional qualifications, which he believed to be his qualifications the ruling one Class suitable appear let that him transferred Reorganize and manage department.

Further “advantages” of Backe emerged in the eyes of the Fascist leadership clique from the extensive agreement with Himmler on fundamental questions of interest to both sides, especially in the Settlement and “Germanization” policy, out of the close cooperation with Göring in the four-year plan and from a positive relationship with Bormann, as he supported the fascist party's absolute claim to "people's leadership". also in the agricultural Area unconditionally respected.

The convinced fascist Backe was given the “ideological and political orientation of the rural people... within the framework of the party's leadership" 71 transferred, which now means “more than before... the political leadership principle of the party emerges" 72 could. Consequential solved he immediately the so far still continuing Reich main department I of Reich nutritional status and transmitted her Tasks, "That's it itself around such the political leadership acts(s)", dem then in the September in " Reich office **for** the rural people" renamed “Reich velvet **for** Agricultural Policy" of the NSDAP. 7 3

69 ZStA Potsdam, press archive former Reichslandbund, RW Darre 12 (old signature). BI. 59, DNB report from 23. 5. 1942. More detailed about the process and factual Background of the replacement Darres *Lehmann,* Investigations, pp. 15ff., 20ff. and 72ff.

70 *NS rural post,* **No.** 27, July 3, 1942.

71 *Greater German press service,* **No.** 152, 3. 7. 1942.

72 Nazi party correspondence, No. 148, 27. 6. 1942. Statements by Backe after the War in internment about differences with Bormann (BA Koblenz, Nachlaß Backe, No. 3, Large Report Ziegenhain, 1946, p. 40f.) and one clearly Apologetic affidavit Prof. Carl Heinrich Denckers, Bonn, dated 19. 12. 1948 as part of Backe's denazification process (ibid., No. 9) correspond the historical one Facts not.

73 *Folkish Observer,* (in the following *VB),* No. 249, 6. 9. 1942.

From the perspective of Backe, who "proclaimed a series of fundamental reorganizations in the agricultural and food sector and committed himself to a concentration and activation of forces," offered fascist rulers "by consistently continuing the principles he had already developed in the conception of the "production battle". the best conditions he through already in the thirties and at the start Ideas about the organization of a society developed in the 1940s European agriculture, which was subordinate to the interests of the German monopolies, was supplemented by the division of labor.75

Under the condition of what he considered to be a given “breaking through the constraints of space,” he called for the “entire German economy to be committed to the implementation the German Agricultural policy with dem Goals, one **for** centuries viable

structure the Agriculture in Central Europe to to reach." 76 jaw went at his Conception the “Large-scale agriculture” from one powerful Agriculture in Germany out of, the "with theirs Battle around the Food freedom the Away has shown the also the remaining States to describe have".77 The stolen and occupied areas that “the role of the previous one world market take over" 78 should, were

“the rich experiences” of fascists Agricultural policy for the “central, orderly management of the entire Food industry. . . available" 79 asked. A continental European food economy "as an association of peoples of the same or related race and the same area" 80 did not have “the self-sufficiency of every single European state,” but rather “the self-sufficiency Greater areaPs Continental Europe"8 1 to the goal. The professional politician Backe calculated soberly, that at dn given dominance of Germany the sacrifice such politics barely more left over stayed, as "now around so

more Understanding **for** constructive Plans" 8 2 of fascist aggressors to have.

Backe's policy, which was directed against the rights and interests of the European peoples, found its clearest expression in his participation in the planning and implementation of the criminal attack on the Soviet Union.

In the agricultural area, he was the main initiator and main responsible for this raid.83 jaw brought **for** one such a task based on his origins, his life path and his qualifications - he was so-called Russia German and had itself scientific with the Russian Agriculture concerned84 -

74 *Magazine office of Reich nutritional status* (in following *ZD),* 29. 6. 1942.

75 For this and to further aspects *Lehmann, Joachim,* Fascist Agricultural policy in the second World War. To Conception from Herbert cheek, in *ZfG,* H. 10/1980, p. 948ff.

76 *German Agricultural policy* (in the following *DAP),* H. 1/1942, S. 7.

77 *International Agrarrundschau* (in the following IAR), H. 2/1941, S. 13.

78 *DAP,* H. 1/1942, S. 7.

79 *Jaw,* food freedom, S. 235.

80 Ibid, S. 216.

81 Ibid, S. 218.

82 / *AR,* H. 2/1941, S. 11.

83 tape I, S. 238f.; jaw became - after one already previously guided interview - at the 12. 4. 1941 with corresponding Powers of attorney Mistake, the "under everyone circumstances were to be kept "strictly secret" (BA Koblenz, Darre Estate, No. 20, empowering Backes as leader the business group Nutrition through grains from the 12. 4. 1941, Secret Reich matter!, copy).

84 jaw had 1925/26 a dissertation *“The Russian grain industry as basis the country and National economy Russia"* written, which then but from him not submitted became.

from the The perspective and interests of the monopolies are particularly good conditions.85 All of Backe's statements with regard to the USSR were characterized by blind anti-communism, coupled with a barbaric, almost unimaginable contempt for humanity. 86

Backe reorganized the state monopoly organization of the war food industry according to his plans. On the basis of the "Fuhrer Decrees" for administrative simplification from 28. August 1939 and from the 25. January 19428 7 went he to it, ,,one clear distribution of tasks between dem Reich Office for agricultural policy, dem Reich nutritional status and dem Reich Ministry of Food to carry out. At the same time revealed itself the possibility of fundamental administrative simplification and the structure of a simple and clear organization in which all available forces are concentrated on the most essential could." 88

Such a principle enabled the shift to production-relevant focuses as well Arrangement with the fascist party the the political Competencies of the now dissolved Reich Main Department I were passed over. The Reich Headquarters Department II, in which the office of a retaliation warden was newly established, was transformed from the former RHA I into the "professional, social, economic and legal support of the rural people, including followers, work deployment and the implementation of the new ones land order" transferred.89

A subsequently newly formed RHA I had purely administrative tasks and was headed by a civil servant instead of the previous one by a volunteer employee. With an order from Backe dated 29. May 194290 In addition, the decisions regarding administrative simplification, which had been more or less sporadic since the beginning of the war, were systematically planned and thoroughgoing Measures in significantly expanded scope and with considerable consequence continued or replaced. Procedural routes were increased by Decision-making authority lower Departments shortened and few effective

In preparation for the attack on the USSR, he published it "For Official Use Only" in 1941. in the Self-published. In one new Preface went he of that out of, that the Task,
"to create a greater Europe, ... the inclusion of this space (the European one) is imperative Part the Soviet Union - J. L.) in the Greater European Business" demand.
"The long-term goal must be to *increase production* , but *the short-term task* is firmly in front of us: *sufficient Surpluses for Europe* to deliver" (ibid., p. I, IV). For further information see *Lehmann,* agricultural policy, p. 54 f.; further *Brandt,* p. 57 f.; *Dallin,* p. 51.

85 To this Problem *Lehmann,* investigations, S. 38ff.

86 In this context, it is noteworthy that Backe completely excludes this topic in his personal report during his internment (BA Koblenz, Nachlaß Backe, **No.** 3, Large Report Ziegenhain, 1946). See. also *Lehmann, Joachim,* For the Statement value biographical-historical Sources to Agricultural history of the Fascism _ in Germany, in *problems the Agricultural history of feudalism and capitalism,* (hereinafter *PAFK),* T. XIV, Rostock 1982, p. 41f.

87 ZStA Potsdam, RMEL, No. 945, BI. 76ff., copy of IC 2-282 re. Administrative simplification (undated, 1943).

88 *Jaw, Herbert,* Healthy ones Agricultural policy - Requirement one healthy food economy, in *The Four Year Plan,* H. V/1942, p. 314.

89 Ibid, p. 314f.

90 The Declarations follow reports in the ZStA, RMEL, No. 344, BI. 76, transcript to IC 2-282 (undated, 1943), and No. 945, BI. 45ff., Reichsbauernführer to Goebbels on 16. 8th. 1944.

Reporting procedure discontinued. The “Personal Staff of the Reich Farmer Leader” and the seven were completely liquidated Main departments of the staff office.
In addition, all special representatives and special services as well as numerous departments and departments within the existing structure were eliminated. The reorganization of the state and district farmers was carried out according to the scheme of the Berlin headquarters .
A side effect of the rationalization of the apparatus was that, in particular, those facilities that emphasized positions were eliminated Darres represented.
Beginning 1943 started then one further concentration in Area the Market organization through the formation of new associations and the consolidation of existing main associations and imperial offices.9 [1] This action was in mid-May ended without changing anything in the principle of the state monopoly market regulation that had been pursued so far.
At the end of 1942, the “Institute for European Agricultural Research and Food Economics” was founded, headed by Halle agriculture professor Emil Woermann entrusted became. [92] Main task this Four Year Plan Institute was in Trains
the analysis of the agricultural and food industries in order to achieve scientification European countries in order to obtain reliable information about their supply options for the fascists war machine to get. [93] As an employee of Backe and on behalf of the "Central European Economic Day", Woermann was increasingly active in southeastern Europe from 1942 onwards on the way.94
Repeated meetings of the research service also dealt with problems of exploiting Europe's agricultural potential for the plans of the German imperialism. From such meetings became reported, that "really usable
Results **for** the economic policy Guide" achieved became. [95]
The tense supply situation explained the great attention, di the fascist agrarian leadership complete Delivery of all products by dedicated to agricultural operations. The farmers' understandable attempts to at least partially break the obligation to deliver increased.96 For To punish these “offenses”, an extensive list of punishments was applied, which was obviously no longer sufficient propagandistic influencing more and more added and in the effect replaced. Draconian punishments were intended to force surrender and curb the spread of evasion. End 1942 was, for example a farmer for slaughter

91 RGBI., I, 7. 1. 1943, S. 22, 30. 4. 1943, S. 173, 11. 5. 1943, S. 303.
92 University Archives Hall (UAH), No. 17209, Personnel file Woermann, BI. 87. Cf. also ZStA, case XI, No. 143, p. 66, interrogation of Hans-Joachim Ricke on the 13th 8. 1948.
93 Ibid. and with *Riecke, Hans-Joachim,* nutrition and agriculture in the war, in *the balance of the Second World War,* Oldenburg/Hamburg 1953, S. 341 as well as in the tendency Similarly in *Kehrl,* p. 206 there is the apologetic claim that the institute with The results of his work should have contributed to correcting excessive delivery demands from the political leadership.
94 UAH, No. 17209, Bl. 81f., Bl. 179ff.
95 *DAP,* H. 3/1942, S. 96.
96 Weimar State Archives (StAW), Thuringian Ministry of the Interior, No. 68, District Administrator of Arnstadt at the April 23, 1942, ZStA Potsdam, Case XI, No. 391, Doc. PS - 914, p. 46, speech Bake in front imperial and Gauleiters the NSDAP on February 6, 1943 in poses.

of an unregistered pig, sentenced to nine months, his wife sentenced to six months in prison.97

On the question of increasing political Due to pressure on the rural population, Backe worked closely with Bormann. On 12. June In 1942 he dismissed all departments of the Reich Ministry of Food "with everything Reprint on it to that it necessary is, at everyone important nutritional measures the Party Chancellery to participate in a timely manner. The tense food situation will require far-reaching measures in the next few months. These measures will not be successful if she not on the part the party and yours Outlines on time and were thoroughly politically psychologically prepared and underpinned."98 In the In practice, the fascist party was involved in the press from the party office down to the last local group .

The so-called “yard inspections” were seen as a particularly effective means of controlling individual businesses. Until mid- 1942 , the inspections were only sporadic from a changing group of people been made. In the Summer 1942 caused "the for this Year to expecting supply situation" the Reich farmer leader to the demand, “the collection and delivery of agricultural products more as previously ensured through farm inspections".99 Jm late summer 1942 then continued one reinforced propaganda for the Farm inspections a. Spending from the strong expanded Tasks the Farm inspections, as their Caused the War and by him created Conditions highlighted became, they spoke openly the function of inspections as an aid to improving performance. Fundamentally and detailed took the Reich Chairman of Reichsnährstand, Gustav Behrens, in the Spring 1943 statement on the comprehensive tasks of the court events commissions [1 00] by detailing the control of production and market performance regulated. In summary, the task was: “Achieving the highest possible production and market performance is what it is most essential Goal the use of the Court issuing commissions." [1 0 1]

A problem for the Initiators the large-scale Farm offering campaign surrendered in selecting people suitable for this purpose. Similar to other coercive measures, the willingness to participate among the village population was not particularly strong. The individual saw no possibility of this cooperation in one of the kind Commission to revoke, so tried he in the Rule at least everything to do to check in with neighbors or not to make relatives unpopular. Such a situation caused the responsible forces in the Reichsnährstand to take repeated positions with regard to the Requirements, the at members the Court inspection commissions

97 *ZD,* No. 90, 23. 11. 1942; similar No. 14, 22. 2. 1943, StAW, Thuringian economic ministry, No. 304, price monitoring agency, 17. 7. 1943.

98 ZStA Potsdam, RMEL, No. 2348, Reich Minister and Reich peasant leader on June 12, 1942 Dept. 1-IX of Reich Ministry of Food. See. also ibid, case XI, No. 391, Doc. PS-914, p. 46, Backe's speech to Reich and Gauleiters of the NSDAP on January 6th. 2. 1943 in Poznan.

99 State Archives Magdeburg (in the following StAM), State farming community Saxony-Anhalt, No. 118, express letter from the Reich Farmers' Leader to the state farmers' associations dated July 17, 1942 regarding farm inspections.

100 *NS rural post,* No. 18, 5. 3. 1943.

101 Ibid.

are to be provided. Such urgent appeals were made both centrally and regionally [103].
To instruct the commission members, regular waves of meetings were held, in which the main aim was to give those involved a motivation for the measures to be carried out. It was made obligatory for the commission members to "take the greatest possible account of the dissemination of these ideas within the framework of the farm inspections." [104] The central orientations regarding the farm inspections increasingly required the participation of the mayors and the local group leader the fascist party in order to make the farm and field inspections an account of the entire local peasantry. As a result of such an inspection, all those "who did not operate properly" should be identified and publicly denounced. [105] The farm inspections simultaneously allowed control of all of the farmers' business information. e.g. b. in livestock counts to always more aggravated Punish. [106]
In the January 1943 became the regulation to Backup the Land management from the March 23rd 1937 new caught. [107] She pursued the Goal, under simplification of Process business owner to exact Compliance granted Production requirements to force. The threatened ones Reprisals were enough until for compulsory auction. [108] Multiple times became through the Departments of Reich nutritional status Trust process against defaulters producers initiated. farmers became "as stumbling block for the performance of "company" defamed or because of allegedly missing Performance "not more tolerated". [109] forced leasing, Abmeation or Trust administration were for she the Result the declared Intention, establishments "monitor, advise and look after to let, around the ordered Economic process ... ensure". [110] This Coercive measures found from 1941/42 increasingly Application and met often the on dem court remaining Women the one for Military service confiscated Farmers. Significant for the Class character these measures was the different consequence at of their Enforcement, the itself in one very much gentler Treatment from landowners or -tenants expressed. [111] To same Time dedicated the fascist Agricultural leadership the "Farm sponsorship" Increased attention. At itself as volunteers agreement between dem Operations manager or his Deputy and one Court godparents as special shape the Business advice

102 Ibid, see. Note 67.
103 StAM, State farming community of Saxony-Anhalt, No. 118, State farmer leader at district farmers, October 27, 1943.
104 Ibid, State farmer leader at district farming communities, n.d., re: gatherings 1st to 6th February 1943.
105 Ibid, State farmer leader at Reich peasant leader at the 5. 6. 1943.
106 *ZD,* No. 90, 23. 11. 1942. State Archives Dresden (StAD), Reich nutrition level, No. 11, protocol
one Service meeting the Main Department II at the 29. 3. 1943.
107 *RGBl.,* I, 20. 1. 1943, S. 29, S. 35.
108 *Newspaper service of Reich nutritional status* (in the following *ZdR),* No. 36, 15. 2. 1943.
109 StAW, State farming community Thuringia, No. 84 b; Examples see *Lehmann, Joachim,* Measures by the fascist leadership to maintain and increase production in German agriculture during the Second World War, in *PAFK,* T VII, 1977, S. 102, note 17.
110 StAW, Thuringia State Farmers' Association, No. 220, § 2 of the statutes of the "Agricultural Trust Association for the State Farmers' Association of Thuringia, GmbH." dated March 16, 1940.
111 Ibid, No. 625, No. 677, here in many Examples for one such Practice.

thought, she should get out of the Recoveries resulting professional problems at the Management remedy. Under the Conditions growing Convocations from agriculture and at the same time increased demands on production, the transfer of a farm sponsorship took on the character of a coercive measure in many cases, for which the legal provisions always offered a handle. Details were uniformly regulated in an order from the Reichsbauernführer from spring 1943 . [11 2]

For the fascist agricultural politicians, court sponsorship represented the highest form of all those activities that were used in propaganda were summarized under the collective name "community aid". Over the course of the war, "community aid" took on an increasingly comprehensive character. While initially it was primarily about neighborly assistance, limited to occasional temporary help, especially during harvest times, it gradually became partly forms of collective machine use and limited division of labor in the communities. **In order to** disguise the elementary war economic interests, the propaganda was linked to the lying slogan of a " national community" which shows the class-based differences in the interests of the vast majority of the peasants and the ruling class class should conceal. At The organization and implementation of “community aid” combined state coercive measures and targeted propaganda [11 3] and all available agricultural organizations included. Nevertheless, the various forms of community help All in all, relative to other measures voluntary actions of the farmers or their relatives to judge.

In addition to the dense network of restrictive regulations, measures and massive Repressions turned that regime under the Pressure the War events also adopted the tactic of concessions. A maneuver of this kind was carried out with the hereditary court legislation. After minor modifications to the Hereditary Farm Act had already been made in the first period of the war, the Hereditary Farm Education Ordinance was introduced from the 30. September 1943114 one crucial Correction, the repealed or weakened some provisions that were perceived as particularly unfair and oppressive. This was primarily about improving the situation of surviving spouses, daughters and other family members who were traditionally entitled but who had no rights since 1933, and in some cases Breakthrough of the prohibition of burdens.

Before everything the reassurance the confiscated farmers should a "Fuhrer's Decree" from the 28. July

1942 [115] and an ordinance of March 17, 1943116, which first restricted the change of ownership and possession of agricultural land and then for the duration of the War prohibited.

The politics of the fascists should be influenced intensively by propaganda Support leadership as effectively as possible. The importance of influencing the ideological masses was expressed not least in the fact that, in addition to extensive use of broadcasting the diverse Publication organs of Reich nutritional status

112 *ZD,* No. 16, March 1, 1943.

113 StAW, Thuringian Ministry of Economics, No. 189, BI. 10, District Administrator Arnstadt on March 12, 1942, StAM, State farming community Saxony-Anhalt, No. 184, notice 5/43 the State peasantry from January 4, 1943.

114 *RGBl.,* I, 30. 9. 1943, S. 549.

115 *RGBl.,* I, July 28, 1942, S. 481.

116 *RGBl.,* I, March 17, 1943, S. 144.

were preserved, although in other areas newspapers and magazines already had a significant impact Embrace her Appear set had to.
The Defeats the Years 1942 and 1943 led also under the rural population to make a more realistic assessment of the situation. The widespread experiments can serve as an indication of this apply, the close-knit network the Capture and delivery to through breaking.
The regime, on the other hand, used its propaganda influence in close cooperation, massive Pressure and terror as well as in conditional Dimensions also concessions - ultimately unsuitable means that, in this area too, "contradicts that are becoming increasingly apparent between the potential of the fascist war economy and the war aims Of the german imperialism to bridge".1 [17]

3. The Production conditions in agriculture and the labor situation

A complex and comprehensive analysis of the development of the social structure and the most important socio-economic and economic indicators in German agriculture among the Conditions of the imperialist There are significant issues facing the war so far Obstacles in contrast to. While **for** the Weimar republic and the first Years
the fascist dictatorship of monopoly capital in Germany that needs to be addressed in this direction Questions her fundamental Answer found have, [11] [8] remains for the
During the war the problem remained open because of the complicated sources. The lack of statistical documentation in this **regard** the War years and the fact that the surveys carried out after the war do not allow a representative comparison due to various, partly methodical and partly territorial changes, do not allow any satisfactory statements to be made based on the sources found so far with respect to the Problem mentioned at the beginning.
Reflect the work submitted so far on the history of German agriculture during the war this situation clearly.119
Although so statements about development the individual Although company size classes, the use of wage labor, the use of machines or the stocking of livestock are not possible in the individual years of the war, it seems conceivable on the basis of one scattered, partially also fragmentary and with it in his Statement the production conditions of agriculture during the war, based on the provision of agricultural machinery and equipment, mineral fertilizer and opportunities, are occasionally limited in material for the use of workers.

117 *Layout the German Story,* S. 473.
118 See. *Jatzlauk,* S. 44ff., 182ff.
119 See. in particular *Peuker, Eduard!Starck, Heinz,* The role of agricultural production and food production in the war preparation of German/West German imperialism, Diss. B, University for Economics Berlin-Karlshorst, Berlin 1973, also
Jllelzer, Lehmann, investigations, and *Hanau!Plate, Farquharson,* S. 22Hf.

a) Company size structure

The Grouping of agricultural There are dangers inherent in farms depending on the amount of agricultural land available to them. These lie in the application of usable area as only one criteria under the Conditions of capitalist agriculture. [120] The disregard of such important features as the use of wage labor, the use of machines, the presence of large livestock, etc. etc. must be at the intensive agriculture that we are dealing with have, then lead to a blurred and distorted picture if one is based on an exclusive classification the agricultural Usable area extensive Conclusions regarding the social structure want to derive. Given these restrictive premises, the following description of the size of the company can only be seen to a limited extent as a characterization of the social structure. Because of the lack of documents for the time of the war, it has to be opened the survey from 1939 can be used.

Table 157
Number and agricultural Usable area after company size classes, German Rich 1939

	Number	%	LNF in Ha	%	0 LNF
0.5- 2 Ha	1136098	29.5	1123486	3.4	0.99
2 5 Ha	932898	24.2	2820222	8.5	3.02
5 - 20 Ha	1332291	34.6	11751043	35.6	8.82
20 -100 Ha	412191	10.7	11063192	33.5	26.84
above 100 ha	36064	0.9	6283905	19.0	174.24
In total	3849542	100	33041848	100	8.58

Source: statistics of Germans empire, Vol. 560, S. 54.

At When looking at the list, the relationship between proletarian and small farmers is particularly striking one and medium and large farms on the other hand, in relation to the number of these farms and the agricultural activities carried out by them Usable area in the eye. While the first two size groups, with a share of 53.5 percent of the number of farms, had 11.6 percent of the total agricultural area, the other two groups had a share of 45.4 percent and 69.7 percent of the total agricultural land available. The capitalist ones, which only make up 1.1 percent of all companies Large companies even were able to use 18.6 percent of the area.

On the eve of the Second World War, agriculture offered, not least as a result of six years fascist agricultural policy, the Picture one after How before in the Comparison to Industry significant shattered Production. The Proletarianization process has been since Transfer of power at the fascism as well pushed forward been How the capital

120 See. *Lenin,* The capitalist system the modern Agriculture, in: *Factories,* Vol. 16, S. 431ff., *ibid.,* New data on the laws of development of capitalism in agriculture, I. Episode: capitalism and Agriculture in the United States from America, in: *Works,* Vol. 22, p. 51f., *dill joke, Sigrid,* The structure the Peasantry from 1871 to 1914. Shown on the basis the German Reich statistics, in: *JfG,* 1973, Vol. 9, S. 50ff., *Jatzlauk,* S. 44 ff.

listic concentration. This was reflected in the increase in the number of establishments and the increase the Operating area the Size groups from 10 until 100 hectares. [121] This result showed itself however "fewer in the concentration the Soil management as much more in the concentration the workers, the Livestock and the machinery in the companies over 20 ha Operating area."[122]

For the Assumption, that itself in the basic structure the for sketched in 1939 structure during the war nothing serious changed, gives it different Clues. Once

In this context, the actual extent of changes must be much longer time between the Get in Consideration pulled become. [123] On the other hand, it is

specific provisions in the area of land law must be taken into account. Already in July 1940 became one Reich Lease Protection Regulations enacted, [124] of them goal probably primarily in one extensive restriction of the lease change to Backup one continuous

normal production see is. A two Years later published “Issuance of the Leader on the restriction of traffic on agricultural land"[125] aimed at the same Direction, where in addition the aspect one reassurance the Farmers drafted into military service were expressly taken into account. A new regulation from March 1943[126] prohibited finally from at this point in time at under Reference to the July decree 1942 the the entire limited range that was previously possible Change of ownership Land.

b) The agricultural businesses and her means of production

Land use

In the Difference to Company size structure is the Development the Land use for the years 1939 to 1944. The application of agricultural technology, the supply of nutrients to the soil and the situation with the workforce, which will be examined in the following sections, are always to be seen as conditions of agricultural production against the background of the use of soil as the main means of production in agriculture. (Table 158)

Already in the years of preparation for war since 1933, the agricultural area had been steadily decreasing. The significant increase from 1939 to 1940 is explained by the Annexation of this period. During the war years, the decline in agricultural land continued. When comparing both periods, the significantly greater extent of the decline can be seen, which only occurred from 1943 to 1944 something was braked, as it increasingly at the substance the Production possibilities w e n t at all .

This process must be viewed in relation to the development of the extent of waste and unlanded land become. While this part of the land fund from 1933 to 1939 in increasing

121 *Kotov,* S. 124 ff.
122 *Jatzlauk,* S. 179.
123 See. the Basic statements at *Jatzlauk.*
124 *RGBl.* 1940, 1, S. 1065, regulation to unification of Emergency lease law from 30. 7. 40.
125 *RGBl.* 1942, I, S. 481, 28. 7. 42.
126 *RGBl.* 1943, 1, S. 144, 3/17 43.

Table 158
Land use 1933-1944, Reich territory 1937 (selected positions in Ha)*

Year	Agricultural usable area	boring and unland	Paths and railways	Training and flight area Etc.
1933	28863297	1504897		
1934	28781322	1486664		
1935	28752377	1460438	1474270	
1936	28746842	1430978	1481036	
1937	28724103	1394363	1488486	
1938	28537175	1305363	1503638	
1939	28535469	1197851		
1940	28729683	1213240	1473574	326528
1941	28646826	1213591	1548320	386446
1942	28576574	1226290	1556622	363870
191.3	28498233	1244332	1565904	415009
1944	28459376	approx. 1250000		approx. 499000

* Away 1940 including of annexed Sudeten- and Memel area.

Source: Statistical Handbook of Germany, Office of Military Government of Germany, Ministerial Collecting Center, Economics Division, Fürstenhagen 1946, La A II 2. This bilingual hecto graphed, merely Material distributed for the use of the American military government contains, as a kind of precursor to *the Statistical Handbook of Germany 1928-1944,* published by the State Council of the American Occupied Territory, Munich 1949, partly more extensive and more detailed statistical material as this.

Table 159
Land use 1933-1944 (Outline the agricultural Usable area) Reich territory 1937 (selected positions in Ha)

Year	Farmland	Meadow	pasture
1933	19839428	5625829	2653734
1934	19715563	5623072	2681263
1935	19404563	5658841	2909887
1936	19421771	5641284	2902905
1937	19408527	5607530	2914848
1938	19176513	5586646	2926095
1939	19125667	5637431	2895188
1940	19163465	5632174	3066754
1941	19063844	5712761	3120147
1942	18867184	5628295	3197164
1943	18736069	5658174	3211783
1944	1868260/i	5982418	3126350

Source: Statistical Jlandbook, La A II 1.

Dimensions could be reduced, it increased over the course of the war Increasingly in 1940. The partial interruption of this development from 1943 to 1944 can be explained by the simultaneous slowdown in the development of agricultural land .

Essential for the contexts of interest here is the development of the area for Transport buildings as well as for Training • and airfields. The shown here Numbers that show a steady increase from 1940 onwards, with one exception that does not refute the trend let, prove one Land requirements especially for military purposes.

When looking at the agricultural area for the period of interest here, there are also significant ones Changes on. (Table 159)

The proportion of arable land fell by around 481,000 hectares between 1940 and 1944. This process was inconsistent in the individual years and also became so from 1943 to 1944 considerably in his extent reduced. The itself at the same time The ongoing increase in the size of meadows and pastures did not fully compensate for the loss of arable land.

The causes of the changes in the structure of the Agricultural land must be primary and decisive in the development of the labor force situation and the situation in the industrial resources sector, which is still to be examined be searched. Permanent grassland required significantly less use of technology and labor in general, and qualified labor in particular. In this context, it must be mentioned that the expansion of the area of permanent grassland ran parallel to this a restriction on arable pasture and fodder cultivation on dem Farmland.1 [2] [7]

Soil, the main means of production, recorded a continuous decline in the share of agricultural land in the total land fund throughout the course of the war, a process that was reflected in the share of arable land within the agricultural land. In both cases the course was from Years 1943 to 1944 quantitatively slowed down, there a further reduction in the previous pace the Basics the Nutrition decisive endangered would have.

Agricultural machinery and Devices

The efforts to increase agricultural production in preparation for the war objectively required an increase in the quantity and quality of the use of machines. The measures introduced in this direction brought relative success in that an increase in the number of machines in agriculture was achieved [128] , the level the technical equipment in Comparison to industry however was low and because of the Earnings situation the Agriculture behind the from the requirements necessities to be derived from agriculture and the delivery options of industry. The clear state of affairs forced leading fascist agricultural politicians to make corresponding admissions.1 [29] The forced rearmament policy prevented this Enforcement of technical progress as well as accordingly the social

127 *Woermann, Emil,* Ten Years Generation battle and food industry, in: *DA.P,* Notebook 4/5, 1944, S. 117.

128 See. *Melzer,* S. 207 ff.; *Zumpe,* S. 282f.; *Stake! Wilke,* S. 38 f., 79 ff., 148, *Jatzlauh,* S. 305, *Clamp* u. a., agricultural history, S. 136f.

129 See. Darre's speech at the VI. Reich Farmer's Day, in: *NS rural post,* 2. 12. 1938; *Baclce,* Food Freedom, p. 196 ff.

Requirements as well as in relation to the desired nutritional self-sufficiency, [130] made "the application modern machines... to increase the natural fertility impossible on earth." [131]
Under the production conditions of the war, the use of agricultural technology was added Attempts to maintain and increase production are of particular importance. The demands resulting from the defeats of the fascist Wehrmacht in 1941/42 and increasingly in 1942/43 to agriculture and from the specific nutritional situation Derived requirements to increase the cultivation of root crops, oil crops and cover crops were not comprehensive due to permanent labor problems Machine use only among largest difficulties to meet.
The Paragraph agricultural machinery developed itself in the Wars like out of Table 160 visible.

Table 160
Annual Paragraph from Agricultural machinery (in 1000 RM)

1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
465256	542785	491047	504875	493027	459177	263075
(in %, 1939 = 100)						
85.7	100.0	90.4	93.0	90.7	84.5	48.4

Source: The effects, S. 218, Tab. 17 u. S. 219, Tab. 18.

One clear decline directly after Start of war followed one increase - which can also be seen in connection with the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 and its plunder - and then from 1942 onwards an unstoppable and increasing one Sinking until 1944.
To detection the actual feeder from Agricultural machinery at the Agriculture in Germany is foreign sales of agricultural machinery to draw on.

Table 161
Annual export from Agricultural machinery (in 1000 RM)

1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
40900	42500	32000	56800	103900		37300

Source: The effects, S. 219, Tab. 20.

The effective supply to German agriculture fell even faster than overall sales, as exports were deducted from this is. The export share always seems to have remained relatively high, like that Comparison of 1938 and 1944 results. Although the peaks of 1941 and 1942, associated with the peak of fascist expansion, not more reached became, stayed the Pre-war level but nearly

130 *Hoernle, Edwin,* The German fascism destroyed the Agriculture, in: *Communist International,* H. 2/1939, S. 178ff., quoted at *Melzer,* p. 207.
131 *This.,* farmers underm Nazi swastika, in: *Edwin Hoernle - peasant liberation,* S. 493.

receive. [1 3 2] The compulsion to make full use of all agricultural resources still within the fascist sphere of influence appears to be present their increasing restrictions the victorious advance of the Soviet army and in the Result of liberation struggle of the Peoples of Southeast Europe this Development stimulated to have.

Also the Comparison of the Sales of agricultural machinery with dem of Overall mechanical engineering illustrates the limitations of this branch of mechanical engineering. The relationship was still fraudulent in 1938 469.8 to 4931.9 millions RM, that's how it was it In 1944 one of 306.4 to 5 439.3 million RM. [1 33] An increase in total mechanical engineering sales of 10.3 percent was offset by a decrease in agricultural machinery of 34.8 percent - at a simultaneous decline in the share of agricultural machinery in total sales from 9.5 to 5.6 percent - opposite. A show from the Limitation the Production capacity conveyed a comparison of Number of employees in the Agricultural machinery industry. This sank from 65500 in the July 1939

Table 162

Development of the agricultural iron quotas 1939-1944 (basic quota, containing agricultural machinery, Tractor, Nutritional economics Machinery, Packaging, maintenance needs of agricultural businesses)

quarter and year	quantity in t
I/39	200000
II/39	200000
III/39	200000
IV/39	130000
I/40	149500
II/40	154 750
III/40	153350
IV/40	159850
I/41	169838
II/41	197000
III/41	187000
IV/41	174000
I/42	174250
II 42	174000
III/42	174000
IV/42	165000
I/43	154500
II/43	121994
III/43	124500
IV/43	90500
I/44	92500
II/44	88500
III/4t,	89000
IV/44	61000

Source: ZStA Potsdam, RMEL, No. 1583, BI. 53.

132 It must noted become, that the Declarations for Agricultural machinery in The effects, Statistical *Handbook* and *Statistical Manual* apparently because of more different Provenance e.g. T significant Deviations show, the at the given Source location not a r e verifiable .

133 *Statistical Manual,* S. 296f.

to 37100 in January 1944, 1 34 d. H. to 56.6 percent of the level in 1939, whereby it should be noted is that these employees too no longer exclusively with the production of Agricultural machinery were concerned.

The situation in some areas of production corresponded to the overall situation. Losses in production facilities due to bombing raids, the loss of previously occupied areas as a source of raw materials, but above all the priority given to armaments caused a rapid decline in agricultural machinery production.

A basic condition for the production of agricultural machinery and equipment was the corresponding Material provision at When assessing the effectiveness of material contingents, it should be noted that, for the reasons given, they no longer correspond to that production weight corresponded. (Table 162)

The ongoing dismantling the quotas were interrupted by one certain Increase in During the preparation and the first phase of the attack Soviet Union with the Goal, for whose comprehensive Plunder also to be equipped with agricultural technology. This development stagnated in mid-1942 and resulted in a permanent reduction until the end of 1944, interrupted only by the slightest increases. A percentage calculation makes this even clearer. At the end of 1944, a good 30 percent of the Quota from Available at the beginning of 1939.

For a reduced "war building program" fewer types were available following this background production results record:

Table 163
Production figures from Agricultural machinery (in t)

quarter	1/43	IV/43	11/44	% from 1/43
Drills	4750	1225	600	13
Threshing machines	7750	1400	700	9
Multiple devices	6240	860	400	7
Grass mower	10000	7000	1500	15
Mower binder	15000	1900	850	6
Potato digger	9400	1000	500	5
Dairy machinery	2672	1500	750	29

Source: ZStA Potsdam, RMEL, No. 1595/1, BI. 25.

These production figures are more relevant than the allocation quotas to the Reich Ministry of Food, because the industry's limited production capacities require processing even the reduced ones Allotments always allowed less.135

A "Reich Board of Trustees for Technology in Agriculture" (RKTL), which was set up in 1928 by the Reich Ministry of Food, was concerned with the complex issues of typing, standardization, material savings and series production as part of the preparation for war when examining agricultural technology issues. Under the Conditions of war and before dem background the shown

134 *The effects,* Appendix, S. 222, Table 23.

135 See. *Lehmann, Joachim,* problems the care the German Agriculture with agricultural machinery and equipment in the Second World War, in *JfW,* 1981, T. 1, p. 65.

With regard to the allocation of materials, these problems had to become more important. State Secretary Backe orientated himself in this Connection on it, with waiver on New developments and the associated stagnation of technical standards ensure that "enough machines are made available for the entire agricultural sector in order to achieve the necessary in-depth impact." [13 6] With this goal, he called for comprehensive typification and the associated series production. [137] The conditions created by the war also favored the series production and type consolidation projects, which had previously failed due to the profit-oriented competitive situation. From this resulted itself Follow for the competing Manufacturer in such a way, that only still
"Experienced producers with service" remained in the business, [1 38] which generally meant that the economically strongest and most influential producers retained their positions, at least for the time being claim and expand could. It is worth mentioning that, of all people, Otto Sachs from the market-dominating company Lanz, who was also head of the Special Committee for Food Equipment, was credited with special contributions to the type adjustment. [13 9] The connection with the expansion of Lanz's monopoly position, which, in contrast to smaller producers, was ideally equipped for series production, lies on the Hand. Straight The big players in the industry used the rationalization efforts to rigorously eliminate weaker competitors by citing the alleged requirements of the war. At the same time it was under the credo "It is not state control but entrepreneurial initiative that is decisive". about it woke up, that the "entrepreneurial Freedom" not was touched. The declared aim was to "promote the freedom of movement of entrepreneurs while increasing their personal responsibility with the aim of achieving the greatest possible increase in performance in entrepreneurial self-management." [1 4 0] This demand for further involvement of monopoly representatives in this state monopolistic steering apparatus was met as part of the simplification measures in the state steering apparatus through an order from the representative for machine production,141 which also opens up the possibilities for the increasing concentration process in the Agricultural machinery industry improved.
The organ of under dem Chair of tight Backe employee Hans Joachim Ricky
standing RKTL, „Technology in the Agriculture", represented in one editorial foreword to one Contribution from Otto Sachs the following Opinion: „The German Agricultural technology, so far loosened up in theirs Structure, very diverse, but with many Parallel lines, concentrated itself under the force of war. concentration but means compression and Hardness." [142] With this Development followed the Agricultural machinery industry general trend in the War economy of fascist Germany 1942/43.143

136 *Jaw,* Food Freedom, p. 175.
137 *The same,* Technology and Agriculture, in: *Odal,* H. 4/1941, S. 257.
138 *The four-year plan,* H. V/1942, S. 236.
139 ZSTA Potsdam, RMEL, No. 2009, BI. 36, material for Honorary doctorate Otto Sachs, undated (September 1942).
140 *Hanke, WI Müller, H.,* Entrepreneurial initiative and state steering in the Agricultural machinery industry, in: *Technology in agriculture,* H. 1/1943, p. 2.
141 Mentioned ibid.
142 Ibid, H. 7/43, S. 95.
143 *DZW,* Vol. 3, S. 235ff.

Concerned voices 144 because of the possible adverse consequences of concentration and series production for the technical Progress became solid opposed. Otto Sachs flatly denied a standstill in agricultural technology and referred to the "creative initiative" triggered by the war,145 while Riecke supported the state monopoly division of labor in the Way marked that he gave the state the basic and special research and the industry its practical application and implementation at the same time Coordination function of the RKTL 146.
Already 1942/43 began itself problems at the processing the assigned material quotas to be signed off.

Table 164
Iron- and Steel quotas for selected agricultural supplies (Operating weight in t)

	Quotas IV/42 u. 1/43	Deliveries away 1. 10. 42 until 3/31 43	Residue at the 31. 3. 43
Straw baler wire	4500	2092.5	2407.5
Potato baskets	2500	1385.2	1114.8
agricultural Chains	4040	2 794.2	1245.8
Shovels/spades	900	385.5	514.5
Forks	2800	1925.8	874.2
Sickles	280	83.2	148.8
Scythes	900	650.4	249.6
Plowshares	17321	itt001,1	3319.9
Harrow tines	1400	681.9	718.1
Machine spare parts	889	454.3	434.7

Source: ZStA Potsdam, R IEL, i\'r. 1582, Bl. 167.

The Caused therefor must in the competition the with more absolute priority equipped armor seen 147 The allocation of materials no longer corresponded to real production. Regardless of this, a tough battle was waged for the steel contingents. Cutbacks prompted Backe to make a statement of principle to Armaments Minister Specr in the summer of 1942.148 The arguments taken into account in it, relating to the essential function of agriculture in the fascist war economy, were also used again and again in the period that followed. Backe countered the argument of increasingly limited production capacity with a statement from authorized representatives for the Machine production Charles Long, the to this one time

144 As Example for the away 1943 repeated clearly becoming Care for around one Research is also left behind with the resulting demand for the establishment of a state institution, such as a Reich Agency for Agricultural Machinery Research, *Baron POn Ow,* in order to be the German one Farming technology, in: *Technology in the Agriculture,* H. 6/1943, p. 89ff.
145 *Sachs, Otto,* standstill in the agricultural technology, ibid, H. 7/1943, S. 95ff.
146 *Riecke, Hans Joachim,* Criticism, ibid, H. 8/1943, S. 121f.
147 ZStA Potsdam, RMEL, No. 1595/1, p. 68, Jaw on spear on 21. 10. 43. He pointed out that as Result more comprehensive Production restrictions "the biggest part the capacity of the agricultural machinery factories is now available for armaments."
148 Ibid, No. 1941, BI. 129f., jaw at spear at the 20. 8th. 42.

the processing of the from cheek requested Contingent believed to be able to assure. [14 9] Not least because of the increasing In response to complaints from the state farmers, the Reich Ministry of Food constantly made advances in this regard. [150]

The overall situation prompted Backe to do so at the beginning of 1943 The full extent of the restrictions cannot yet be foreseen was, to the admission, that everything in the future machinery and devices still to expect be, not crucial to production be could.[15 1] Agricultural politician have repeated her requirements after increased country machine production or but at least the conservation of existing Equipment degrees with impressive figures regarding the possibilities for increasing work productivity tried. [1 5 2] The lack of elementary Requirements gene had to this argumentation ultimately ineffective make.

The fascist agricultural leadership sought a way out of the reduced production of agricultural machinery the resulting situation the imposed neighborhood or Community aid and the formation of neighboring or cooperative machine communities. One such shape the development material-technical production reserves, in the principle already before dem War started, [1 5 3] became so significant intensified. She "corresponded to the profit motive of the large machine owners and introduced a system with semi-feudal elements - Labor, manual services, product rent - enforced capitalistism production ratio" .[1 54] Such from the Nazi propaganda as practiced Cooperation that was misinterpreted as a “national community” got the fascists into argumentative difficulties,[155] there "some spiritually wandering minds" here in rather "the beginning a way to Collectivization" meant to be seen. [1 56] was reflected in the increasing number of horses hired and in an increasing number of oxen.[158]

The development was essentially characterized by the resort to the extremely intensified exploitation of human labor through all types of manual labor. Above all, the mass forced labor of foreigners and prisoners of war offered this “way out” for German imperialism. The increased workload of German workers in agriculture should not be overlooked in this context become.

The technical potential of German agriculture suffered greatly during the war due to reduced equipment, obsolescence due to a lack of supplements and significantly increased wear and tear Losses that occur relatively long term impacted.

Already 1941 had Jaw, based on Investigations of Institute for Economy-

149 Ibid, BI. 132.

150 See. *Lehmann,* problems, S. 75.

151 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 391, BI. 40, Doc. PS-914, speech Backes before the imperial and Gauleiters of the fascist party on March 6, 1943 poses.

152 For example, there, No. 411, Dole. R-124, BI. 136f., Attachment for the 39th session the Central planning on April 23, 1943.

153 *Melzer,* S. 211. 154 *DZW,* B<l. 2, p. 321.

155 *Lehmann,* Measures the fascist Guide, S. 89ff.

156 Schwerin State Archives (hereinafter StAS), special archive “VdgB”, No. G 80, copy from *ZdR,* No. 244, 1. 12. 43, *Backhaus, Karl-Ileinz,* German agricultural policy strengthens willingness to perform.

157 *The effects,* S. 133. 158 *Statistical Manual,* S. 190.

research, calculated, that the Investment needs the German one Agriculture only in the area of agricultural machinery and equipment approx. 12 billion Reichsmarks.159 The magnitude of the problem is based on the 8.4 billion total investments in agriculture in the period from 1925 to 1934, clearly. The economic dimensions are clear from the fact that the ever-decreasing supply of agricultural machinery and the increasing wear and tear associated with increased loads Investment needs with each year of war only increase could.

Claims from one sufficient agricultural machinery production up to 1943, one secured spare parts supply and one the requirements sufficient Raw material allocation policy of the Reich Food Minister in 160 were influenced by these facts refuted.

fertilizer

\-Because of their comparatively universal application possibilities, based on the size of the company the fertilizers one special meaning too. Mineral commercial fertilizers were in the thirties years at the care the floors with the main
plant nutrients with approximately 60 percent involved. With the "Regulation to Securing the Fertilizer- and seed supply" from the 9. November 1939 161 became the success
extensive efforts to increase the use of commercial fertilizer continue. They left the importance of mineral fertilizers in basic documents of fascist agricultural policy in the wars appropriate consideration find. 162 One short after Start of war

After the analysis carried out, which highlighted the changes and underlined the negative consequences of reduced fertilizer application, Darre concluded that there was an urgent demand for the new building from Nitrogen plants and after increased Phosphate import at. 1 63 Some Months

Backe later highlighted the strained supply of commercial fertilizer in order to improve it to enforce supply. 1 64

The general representative for special issues relating to chemical production, Carl Krauch, on the other hand, believed at that time that there would be a “secure fertilizer supply”. to be able to.165

Two years later the development was obvious. end of April 1943 Woermann had to go in the Headquarters planning 1 66the decisive Declines in the Nitrogen- and Phosphate-

159 See. *Jaw,* food freedom, S. 197 f.

160 **See.** *Riecke,* Nutrition and Agriculture, p. 343.

161 *RGBl.,* Part I, S. 2261.

162 In more detail *Lehmann, Joachim,* Production conditions the German Agriculture in the second World War. The Example fertilizer, in: *WZ the UniP. Rostock,* Geography and language skills Row, H. 7/8/1979, p. 479f.

163 ZStA Potsdam, Case XI, No. 392, BI. 52, Doc. NG-453, memorandum “The tasks of production the Agriculture in wars" from the November 27, 1939.

164 Ibid., BI. 103ff., Doc. NG-1408, remarks in the General Council (of the four-year plan, JL) on 2/14/40.

165 *NS rural post,* 16. 2. 40

166 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 411, BI. 129f. Doc. R-124, Presentation “The nutritional situation and the Requirements for conservation the Production performance the German one Agriculture",
39. meeting the Headquarters planning at the 23. 4. 43.

confirm supply. Potash deliveries had remained relatively sufficient up to this point. Woermann underlined his serious concerns by pointing out that further restrictions in the Fertilizer supply to one not only proportional, but constantly increasing decline in the must lead to income.

The out of own production to winning potash fertilizer could from the Agriculture in the following Volumes consumed become.

Table 165
Kalii, consumption (in 1000 tons Purity $K2_0$)

1933	719
1934	820
1935	949
1936	941
1937	1156
1938	1256
1939	1216
1940	1366
1941	1225
1942	1348
1943	1150

Source: Hanau/Plate, p. 21. Compiled on the basis of statistics in the Statistical Yearbook for the German Reich, Economics and Statistics as well as unpublished compilations from the Reich Ministry of Food, comparisons showed extensive agreement gene with those available elsewhere material different provenance.

The consumption became away 1937 decisive elevated and lay also while of War until 1943, with fluctuations in each of years, between 34 and 59 percent above the average consumption from 1933 to 1936. This is where the attempt comes into play through increased Potash use the acute Phosphorus deficiency at least partially to balance, a determining one Role. This Development clarify also the P a y per hectare consumption .

This source leaves larger Fluctuations recognize. One for 1943 designated repeat

Table 166
consumption and production 1-'0n Kali

1939	1940	1941	1942	1943
Potash consumption (Per Ha LNF in kg K2O) _				39.33
37.42	31.26	38.82	36.67	
Changes in percent opposite 1929				+5.1
	- 16.5+	_3.7	- 2.0	

Source: Information of United Company archives of VEB Combine Kali, Staßfurt, letter from the 6. 5. 75.

increase of hectare consumption would stand hereafter in Connection with one expanded total production in the previous year.
The agricultural Lime consumption showed the following Picture:

Tabelkl67
Lime use (in 1000 t Cleaned up CaO)

1936/37	1937/38	1938/39	1939/40	1940/41
1673.8	2052.8	1966.9	1866.9	2251.9

Source: Statistical Manual, S. 187.

Also here falls the significant increase away 1937 on at more inconsistent Development in the both first war years. After the existing Documents it can be assumed that man engaged was, 1942/43 and 1943/44 the level from 1940/41 too hold.
Both Kali as also lime became out of obtained from domestic resources. At Phosphoric acid was one completely different situation. Apart from Thomasmehl as a by-product at the steel production, duration in this one case absolute Import dependency.
The Phosphorus fertilizer consumption took below Development.

Table 168
Phosphoric acid per use (in 1000 t Cleaned up $P2_0$)

1933	462
1934	545
1935	636
1936	606
1937	690
1938	762
1939	454
1940	351
1941	319
1942	340
1943	335

Source: Hanau/ plate, S. 21.

After the increase in 1937, a serious decline occurred immediately with the start of the war one that, based on 1937 and 1938, was 34 and accounted for 40 percent. In relation to the average for the years 1933 to In 1936 it was almost 20 percent. Until In 1941 the dismantling continued. This year only around 57 percent of the average consumption from 1933 to 1936 was recorded. In 1942 there was a slight increase, which continued in 1943 became.
The until Woermann's calculations for hectare consumption dating back to 1942 convey the picture of a uniform and nevertheless rapid decline in the use of phosphorus fertilizer up to this point.

Table 169
consumption at phosphoric acid (in kg Pure nitrogen Per Ha LN F)

1938	1939	1940	1941	1942
24.0	26.7	15.8	12.3	11.8

Source: Woermann, Emil, Ten Years Generation battle and food industry, in: *DAP,* H. 4.5/1944, S. 118.

With The drastic reduction in consumption that began at the start of the war is particularly noticeable.
Nitrogen took because of his immediate and quick Effectiveness, the widths Possibility of application and its high effectiveness in increasing yields, it holds a special position among commercial fertilizers. The conditions of the war strengthened this role. Its importance grew due to increased root crop cultivation and the expansion of oil plant areas.

Table 170
consumption at Nitrogen (in 1000 t Purity N)

1933/34	382.9
1934/35	426.8
1935/36	490.7
1936/37	571.7
1937/38	634.4
1938/39	718.2
1939/40	704.4
1940/41	675.6
1941/42	661.0
1942/43	600.0
1943/44	482.0

Source: Values until 1940/41, *Statistical Manual,* p. 187, for 1941/42, ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 411, Doc. R-124, BI. 55, protocol the 20. meeting the ZP from the 29. 10. 42, for 1942/43, ibid, BI. 86, protocol the 29. meeting the ZP from the 18. 11. 42, for 1943/44, ibid, BI. 197, protocol the 57. meeting the ZP from the 18. 5. 44.

The increase of consumption took place in the thirties more continuously, although here too there was a significant jump compared to 1937. Based on the annual average from 1933 to 1936 , more than half was additionally consumed at the start of the war. Now a steady decline began, which increased increasingly from 1942/43 . 1943/44 was almost the same level a c h i e v e d from 1933 to 1936 .
Another important source for the history the fascist War economy results in the Consumption amount is significant different, for the percentage Development in the years 1942/43 and 1943/44, based on 1938/39, but nearly identical Values. (Table 171) The hectare donations went from 21.5 kg 1938/39 on only still 11.5 kg in the Years 1943/44 back.167

167 *Germany* armor *in the Second World War,* S. 264.

Table 171
consumption at Nitrogen fertilizer (in 1000 t)

1938/39	745
1939/40	841
1940/41	789
1941/42	739
1942/43	632
1943/44	501 •

•estimated

Source: The effects, S. 87, Tab. 52. *Hanau/ plate,* S. 21, give away 1941 e.g. T significant lower ·values at.

The connections with the overall situation are illuminated by a comparison with the development of the direct situation Wehrmacht consumption.

Table 172
More direct Wehrmacht customs at Nitrogen (in 1000 t)

1938/39	35
1939/40	47
1940/41	84
1941/42	108
1942/43	165
1943/44	235

Source: The effects, S. 88, Tab. 53.

The increase of the Wehrmacht's needs approx. 670 percent in the years 1943/44, based on 1938/39, and at least 500 percent based on 1939/40 as the base year the direct one competition of the imperialist war.

The situation in Transportation had an impact the conditions the priority military transports, increasing losses and destruction caused by air raids are becoming increasingly restrictive on the Transporting fertilizers by rail. [1 68]

The regime did a variety of things Efforts to increasingly use less fertilizer possible effectively to use. From so-called Hardship fund became certain quantities are allocated in addition to the ever smaller quotas. But the hardship funds were also dependent on the overall situation continually reduced. The basis for the allocation of additional quotas was the farm card and, crucially, the company's market performance. Hardship fund, originally intended only for nitrogen and phosphorus fertilizers, were also for 1943 Kali formed. The introduction of a system of reference cards should ensure the administrative implementation of the allocation process. One Press campaign supported such Control measures.

The use of the resulting manure was propagated as a way to compensate for the lack of mineral fertilizer. The manure, which varies in quantity and quality on each farm, was important in mitigating the consequences of nitrogen loss. The Nitrogen content of Stable manure was in the Course of the war however also back•

168 See. *Lehmann,* production conditions, S. 483ff.

gone. This was mainly due to the declining protein supply of livestock with corresponding consequences for the quality of the stable manure. Nitrogen fertilization, in turn, had a decisive influence on the protein yield of the grassland. A cycle was broken here.
The Meaning of fertilizer problem led to his ongoing discussion also in the fascist leadership. [1 69] Of course, the insoluble contradictions between limited potential and armament requirements on the one hand and most urgently agricultural needs on the others Page not solved become. this will for example recognizable at the suggestion, „at least temporarily this To avert the consequences of insufficient potash supply... "To improve the potash content of the soil through particularly good tillage and cultural measures, insofar as these measures can be carried out under wartime conditions."170 These conditions were determined by the described situation in agricultural technology and the labor problem that still had to be investigated. The constraints imposed leave such intentions barely appear feasible.
The war-related undersupply of fertilizers is particularly clear and depleting with agricultural inputs was confirmed immediately after the end of the war. [171] It was in the nature of things that the effect of the undersupply of the soil, the effect on it Overexploitation, even immediate, but above all showed long-term effects. This fact - favored by the meteorological situation in 1944/45 - The catastrophic consequences of overexploitation on yields per hectare only began to subside End of war come to light.

c) Workforce

For decades, German agriculture had suffered significant labor losses due to rural exodus. This tendency increased the conditions of intensive armament and War preparation. From 1933 to In 1939 the number of agricultural and forestry professionals fell by almost 1.5 million. This bloodletting made the labor shortage a "central agricultural policy problem" even before 1939. [172] The fascist regime tried to overcome the resulting difficulties before the war in two fundamental ways. These were the development of German labor reserves and - to the extent that they became more and more exhausted for a variety of reasons - about the employment of foreign workers. The number of statistically recorded foreigners in agriculture took away 1937 erratic to. With nearly 190000 put them in 1938/39 more than 43 percent of all foreign ones workers in Germany.173

169 For example, ZStA Potsdam, RMEL, No. 1941, express letter Bakes from the 20th 8. 42 on Spear; No. 2039, Telex Bormanns from the April 19, 1942 at Jaw. Meeting between spear and Hitler on the 1st and May 13 to 15, 1943, quoted in: *Germany Armor,* p. 252, S. 264.

170 *Becker, A.,* Contemporary issues the potash fertilization, in: *The agricultural goods,* No. 178, 10. 12. 43.

171 *The effects,* S. 133.

172 StAW, State farming community Thuringia, pre. No. 301, State farmer leader Puckers up a business meeting between the heads of the employment offices on 10/11. 9. 1942 in Weimar, p. 1.

173 See *Lehmann, Joachim,* foreigner workers in Germany 1933 to 1939. To Scope, to Development and structure of their Occupation, in *Foreign worker policy of Imperialism,* {in the following *FAP)* H. 8th, Rostock 1980, p. 19.

The one from the fascist The war unleashed by German imperialism now offered new opportunities to continue the long and inglorious tradition of employing foreigners in agriculture to a previously unknown extent and with a new criminal quality. The Urge after the particularly profitable exploitation The number of foreign workers was additionally stimulated by the fact that German agriculture in comparison with others economic sectors particularly strong from Collections for was affected by the fascist Wehrmacht. Already in the first period of the war, 40 to 45 percent of the male workforce had to Do military service.174 In In Thuringia the number was on May 1st 1941 at 64 percent and was for February 1, 1942 with 80 to 85 percent of all agricultural workers subject to military service were accepted.175 The increasing losses, particularly at the German-Soviet Front, had to the Position tighten. End 1942 fraud the number of those employed in the UK of agriculture 647657.176 This were 12.3 percent of all men born between 1897 and 1925 who were considered indispensable, a comparative figure more modest Share for one so important branch of National economy. In
the first four months of the year 1943 Agriculture had to employ 96,024 farmers and agricultural workers in turn the relative highest Contribution to New recoveries afford. 177 It

It also remains to be noted that, in addition to the quantitative losses, there is a loss that cannot be expressed numerically at Expertise and Qualification occurs had to.

Immediately after the outbreak of war, the mass of Polish prisoners of war was channeled into agriculture and civilian workers from Poland were promised.1 7 8 She played it Introduction the Root crop harvest as well one role as the
present Experiences with foreigners, the ones apparatus of Reich nutritional status and the Reich Ministry of Food in cooperation with the labor deployment authorities. Excessive demands from the agricultural leadership, Backe demanded, for example on 20. The deportation of 1.5 million Polish agricultural workers to work in German agriculture in December 1939179 certainly had an activating effect on the deportations, without reaching the desired extent at this point became.

Despite the forced deployment of foreigners, agriculture's replacement needs increased from the collections are ongoing. Beginning 1942 became he on 860000 The number of workers was 180. At least 600,000 of them were to be provided through forced deportations become. This Task should the for the general representative for the work

174 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 415, BI. 140, Doc. PS-1456, v. Zitzewitz-Muttrin as Agricultural representatives at an industrial consultation with General Thomas on January 3, 1941.

175 StA **W,** State Farmers' Association of Thuringia, pre. No. 301, additional work Dr. Thein for state farmers • leader Peuckert, regarding work effort, from 1/7/42 . _

176 ZStA Potsdam, Movie No. 19481, quoted in *DZW,* Vol. 3, S. 186.

177 Ibid, Movie No. 3583, Report of GBA from the 9. 6. 1943, quoted in ibid, S. 212.

178 Magdeburg State Archives (hereinafter StAM), State Farmers' Association of Saxony-Anhalt, No. 244, BI. 75, Reich peasant leader at State farming communities from the 21. 9. 39, BI 77. imperial farmers
leader at State farming communities from the 23. 9. 39.

179 *Seeber,* P. 117. Ibid., p. 114 ff. detailed Discussions on the early phase of development. Extensive material in the documentation Praca przymusowa Polak6w pod panowiem Hitlerowskim 1939-1945 , *Documenta Occupationis IX,* Poznan 1975.

180 StA **W,** State Farmers' Association of Thuringia, pre. No. 301, Peuckert at a meeting of the heads of the employment offices on 10/11. 9. 1942 in Weimar, p. 2.

Gauleiter of Thuringia appointed in 181, Fritz Sauckel, solve the concerns in agriculture, the Thuringian state farmer leader Rudolf Peuckert as “Beauf he wears for the Work use in the Agriculture and "War food economy" came to hand. The effort to meet the labor needs of agriculture was reflected in dem at the 20. April 1942 published program Sauckels.1 8 2 Based on that "Principle", ,,Seed and harvest of the German peasantry and all European areas under German control with the aim of the highest yields", from his point of view, the "solution" now became "in addition to the total capture of all German workers, the bringing in of foreign workers was the most urgent necessity". The timing of the forced labor transports was set the months of May and June was intended to ensure “that the bringing in of foreign workers... can also be effective under all circumstances for agricultural work in the German food industry sector". The implementation of this program brutal Manhunt in widen Split of Europe, tied together with a preserve slavery for the Victim, the following Results, the the until now achieved Scope of the Forced labor **for** civilians still expanded significantly.

Table 173
Workers in German agriculture 19-39-1944 (excluding trade, dairies, fishing, forestry, etc.), reference date 31. 5.everyone year, Reich territory 1.9.1939 (in 1000)

	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Workforce (German, Foreigner, prisoners of war, Men, women)	10850	10345	10360	10898	10973	10862
Men	4671	4641	4839	4897	4746	4507
Women	5979	5703	5520	6002	6227	6355
German	10732	9684	8949	8969	8743	8460
foreign exchange u. War prisoner	118	661	1411	1929	2230	2402

Source: Statistical Handboolr, part I, B, 1 af, to critical analysis the Declarations for the Extent of deportations and the use of forced labor see chap. IV, Section 2c and *Seeber,* p. 89ff. Despite the objections that have to be made, it is worth using for a comparative examination of the entire war period proven from this source.

After the decline in the agricultural workforce from 1939 to 1940 by around 500,000 changed itself this Condition first again 1942. From from there stayed the Number of the total number of employees by 1944 was slightly above the initial value of 1939. However, there were changes in the structure of the agricultural workforce changes. 1941 decreased by then constant The proportion of women reached that again in 1942 1939 level around 1940, and then increasing slightly until 1944 . The proportion went down within the group of women German Women from 99.6 percent in the May 1939 until September 1944 on 87.7 percent back. 1 83 The development thus corresponded to the trend of the decline in the German workforce at all, whose Number 1944 with 8460000 only still meager 78 percent everyone in the agricultural workers.

181 See. Cape. IV; *DZW,* Vol. 2, S. 312; *Eichholtz,* prehistory of GBA, S. 339ff.
182 StAW, Thuringian Ministry of inside, No. 1638, BI. 77, from here the following Quotes.
183 Percentages calculated on the Base from *The effects,* S. 203, Tab. 2.

Table 174
Workforce in the War economy of fascist Germany 1939-1944 (in 1000)

	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Overall economy	39415	36042	36281	35671	36527	35730
Agriculture	10850	10345	10350	10898	10973	10862
Foreigner in General economy	301	S03	1753	2645	4837	5295
prisoners of war in Overall economy		31, p	1316	1489	1623	1831
foreign exchange u. Kgf. add.	301	1151	3069	4134	6460	7126
Foreigner in Agriculture	118	412	769	1170	1561	1767
prisoners of war in Agriculture		249	642	759	669	635
foreign exchange u. Kgf. add.	118	661	1411	1929	2230	2402

Source: Statistical manual, part I, B, 1a-f, 6a, G, 7a, G, Sat, G.

Dit> supply of agriculture with workers is always to be seen in connection with the Overall economy.
Hereafter it went Development at the Agriculture more continuous than in the entire economy. In general, the constant increase in foreign forced labor forces from 1939 until 1944 . Only those Number of those deployed prisoners of war took since 1943 away.
More Outcrops enabled one percentage conversion the absolute Pay.

Table 175
Workforce in the War economy of fascist Germany

	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
in percent						
Overall economy = 100						
Agriculture	27.53	28.70	28.56	30.55	30.04	30.40
Foreigner	0.76	2.23	4.83	7.41	13.24	14.82
Prisoners of war		0.96	3.63	4.17	4.44	5.12
foreign exchange u. Kgf. add.	0.76	3.19	p.46	11.58	17.6pp	19.94
foreign exchange u. Kgf. in Total w. =100						
Foreigner	100.00	69.76	57.12	63.98	74.87	74.30
Prisoners of war		30.24	42.88	36.02	25.13	25.70
Agriculture=100						
Foreigner	1.09	3.98	7.43	10.73	14.22	16.27
Prisoners of war		2.40	6.20	6.96	6.10	5.84
foreign exchange u. Kgf. add.	1.09	6.38	13.63	17.69	20.32	22.11
Out of!. u. Kgf. in Land=100						
Foreigner	100.00	62.33	54.50	60.65	70.00	73.56
Prisoners of war		37.67	45.50	39.35	30.00	26.44
foreign exchange u. Kg(. in Total w. =100						
Portion the Agriculture	39.2	57.4	46.0	46.7	3,5 _	33.7

Source: s. Table 174

The increase in the proportion of agricultural workers up to 1942 appears remarkable. Fundamental changes also occurred in 1943 and 1944 not a. Absolutely continuous increase recorded as well as the forced deployment of civilians foreign workers as well as prisoners of war. The relations between the two groups differed in agriculture from the overall economy in that there was a higher proportion of prisoners of war throughout the entire war period. It is then worth emphasizing the fact that that, percentage seen, the Agriculture while of entire During the war there was always a higher proportion of foreign workers available in relation to the total number of employees in this area. However, the difference increased both in absolute terms and in proportion away.

Such a statement should not obscure the fact that that in comparison to the overall economy and Agriculture the absolute Dominance the latter in the Years 1940 in the was dismantled in the following years. From the middle of 1940 a change took place in his favour before everything the commercial Business a. [1] 84 This was "apparently the increased initiative the Monopolies to attribute the not more in favor of the Agriculture wanted to stand back". [1] 85 Increasing and successful pursuit of the monopolies The profitable exploitation of foreign forced laborers caused fascist agricultural politicians to constantly emphasize the demands of agriculture. Backe called this “procurement the required workforce" a the both “decisive factors" for the Success the “ War Generation Battle" 1942. [1] 86 As programmatically may also an announcement Peuckerts viewed become: „The production and performance Germany builds on two the whole supporting columns on the Nutrition and Armor. Each of these pillars needs a firm and unshakable foundation in the mission. all available Forces and more reinforced Work performance each Individual." [1] 87 A Year

Later, in March 1943, Backe again took the opportunity to point out to the fascist leadership that "the crucial problem of nutrition is the satisfaction of labor requirements."188

Two facts caused to such Statements and demands. It was a matter of pushing back agricultural interests during the allocation process 'foreign workers and the annual redistribution of these forces from agriculture, particularly to armaments, mining and forestry. Increasingly happened here one preference of the industrial sector, before especially the arms monopolies, which have increasingly clear advantages in the exploitation of forced laborers opposite the Agriculture win could.189 This Urge became finally just limited through the system sustaining aspect the need agricultural production **for** the Continuation of war.

A special problem resulted itself for the fascist regimes out of the specific application conditions the forced laborers in the Agriculture, the one barracked Accommodation

184 See. *tape I,* S. 94f.
185 Ibid, S. 95.
186 *VB,* No. 80/81, 21st/22nd 3. 1942.
187 *ZdR,* No. 91, April 22, 1942.
188 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 391, BI. 35, Doc. PS-914, cheek on 6. 2. 1943 in front of Reich and Gau leaders in Posen.
189 For more detailed information, see *Lehmann, Joachim,* On the use of foreign forced laborers in German agriculture during the Second World War (with special consideration the Years 1942 until 1945), in: *FAP,* H.1 , Rostock 1974, p. 143ff.

and work in columns was generally only permitted on estates. This is difficult to prevent when used on farms For the fascists, contact with the Germans carried the political danger of radiating influence from people who had not been exposed to their intensive influence for years.100 These dangers were intensified after the attack on the Soviet Union and the mass deportation of Soviet citizens, the not only the hatred of everyone invaded peoples but were able to combine this with the political knowledge of the citizen of a socialist country. This fear had caused Darre to cancel the planned foreign deployment in February 1939 Prisoner of war with dem argument reject, that this "Focuses of decomposition ... for Soviet-Russian propaganda".19 [1] This touched on a moment at an early stage that runs like a common thread through the fascist forced labor policy in the Second World War, namely the Fear before the charisma of the ideas of socialism. Under the actual conditions of war, such considerations had to be put aside to step back from economic constraints that they ever lost sight of became.

Finally, it must be assumed that the inhumane exploitation of millions of foreigners is a decisive factor represents that agricultural production is maintained could.

In addition to foreign forced laborers, German workers who had not yet been employed in key occupations formed another conceivable reservoir for satisfying agricultural needs. By location As a matter of fact, this could primarily involve the forced deployment of women and young people, the temporary deployment of the Reich Labor Service and the fascist Wehrmacht, and in a very limited manner Scopes around Implementations from other professions act.

Important Basics put the " Regulation to Assurance of labor requirements for tasks of particular state-political importance" 19 [2] , the compulsory service regulations [1] 9 [3] , one "Regulation above the use of the older school youth" 194 and " Guidelines for securing land management" 195 , which is determined by regulations for the Reich Labor Service Hitler Youth, the fascist one party and the Wehrmacht were supplemented. When assessing this potential, it must be taken into account that it is overwhelmingly... Part consisted of non-permanent workers.

The question of the use of German labor was closely related to the course of the war. This is underlined by the relative reserved Handling the given Possibilities until 1941. The defeat the fascist armies before Moscow and the resulting consequences also had to increase interest in German workers reinforce like that is due to the exploitation of foreigners. As part of the efforts to develop the German workforce that began at the turn of 1941/42 , the "Ordinance on the Use of Additional Labor Forces" was of particular importance Workforce for the Food security of German people" from the

190 To this one problem ibid, S. 148ff.
191 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 454, Doc. NID-14941, Bl. 13.
192 *RGBl.* 1938, I, 23. 6. 38, S. 652.
193 Ibid, 14. 2. 39, S. 206f.
194 Ibid, 22. 9. 39, W. 1867 f.
195 At the 27. 3. 40 and 19. 4. 41 from the RMEL enacted, StAW Reich nutrition level, Hand file B,
RMdl from the 25. 4. 40, Bl. 5, quoted at *Melzer,* S. 153 or. *ZdR,* No. 102, 6. 5. 1941.

7. March 1942.196 She provided for agriculture, so to speak the v rgriff represents on measures that last one year later for the whole War economy initiated became. With her became the double Goal tracked, as well as "all in the villages still existing Ren serve at those skilled in agricultural labor and capable of agricultural work forces to mobilize", 1 97 as also to prevent “that the women living in the countryside not justifiable and always still increasing proportions the agricultural Work withdraw".19 8 In close cooperation between fascist Political party, State authorities and Reichsnährstand formed “triple committees” in villages, consisting of mayors, local farmers’ leaders and local group leaders, who selected the relevant workers “with regard to the local authorities involved in the creation”. 199 had to be recorded in top-secret “registration rolls”. Sauckel’s statement on 27 September contained additional and more stringent provisions. Compulsory reporting regulation issued in January 1943, which was based on the Hitler decree of January 13th.200

The effectiveness the Göring regulation in front of March 1942 and the Compulsory Reporting Ordinance from January 1943 must be viewed skeptically. Since the proportion of men recorded with these five percent barely exceeded, 2 01 appears it permitted, the Development of women's mission to be used as a criterion. A message from the end of July 194220 2 admitted 1.1 millions Messages out of more as 58000 communities 813000 actually forces deployed. With a proportion of women of around 95 percent were Of these, 90 percent are only intended for temporary use during peak periods in agriculture . In these Numbers is just the propaganda support of the Regulation to see. Actually the number of females increased German Workforce from May 1941 to May 1942 by 304,000.20 3 At the same time, the proportion of German women in the agricultural workforce fell by 2.5 percent back. See you in May 1943 reduced the Number around 8000. Onto Whole remained seen the Scope the occupation female German workers during the whole war below the value in May 1939. The drastic dismantling from 1939 to 1940 by 360,000 and from 1940 to 1941 by a further 320,000 became never compensated. First in the Summer 1944 was the As of May In 1940 it was just exceeded again.

The one recorded since 1942, based on 1939 The greater extent of women's employment was due to the employment of foreign forced laborers.

The ruthless use of women2' was confronted with a fundamental problem, which for the fascist leadership consisted in resolving the contradiction that arose from the years of demagogic propaganda about the role of Woman in society and now occurring economic constraints resulted.204

196 *RGBl.* 1942, I, S. 105.

197 *Dr. Hatesaul,* Farm work secures the war food, in: *NS rural post,* March 20, 1942.

198 StAW, Thuringian Ministry of Economic Affairs, No. 189, BI. 3, president of Central Germany State Employment Office on 7. 9th 1942 the employment offices.

199 Ibid, BI. 1, Strictly confidential Write of Presidents of Central Germany State Employment Office the Thuringian State government from 11. 3. 1942.

200 To Origin and the aim the Mandatory Reporting Ordinance see. *Bleyer,* Totaler War; *DZW,* Vol. 3, S. 188f.

201 See. *Lehmann,* mobilization S. 553f.

202 *VB,* No. 211, July 30, 1942.

203 This and the following Declarations after *The effects,* S. 203, Table 2.

204 See. For this *Melzer,* S. 139ff.; *Lehmann,* Mobilization, S. 552ff.

In addition, there was a certain degree of economic security for the soldiers' wives through cash benefits granted to them by the state.

All this is against the background of the fact of a tremendous workload on the rural population to see. Already 1941 were working hours between 75 and 90 weeks hours determined been.205 Particularly "the until onto mark battered ones German farmer's wife"206 had to do the "normal" double work in the household and on the farm and had to Conscription of the man take on a large part of both its work and responsibility. The unheard of burdens also faced by working Germans in the Agriculture gave rise to demands from “the farmers and, above all, the farmers’ women in your Worker not come to a complete standstill let. 207

One like this Situation forced constant, albeit in the As a rule, the use of the fascist Wehrmacht, the Reich Labor Service, the Hitler Youth, members of the so-called compulsory year and state year and the school youth is limited to different periods of time. 208

The overall only limited effect of the efforts to mobilize German workers has different reasons. On the one hand, the mass of the German population was not prepared to voluntarily contribute any more to the war effort. Added to this was the fear of mood swings. The obvious divergence of political considerations and economic constraints caused a wavering attitude in the fascist leadership and for a long time resulted in a dilatory treatment of the problem .

The kidnapping foreign forced laborers in German agriculture were encouraged and even made possible a cautious policy on this issue. The criminal forced labor policy in particular had the result that the loss of German workers in agriculture from 1942 was more than compensated for quantitatively. This assessment must take into account that their workforce e.g. B. fluctuated greatly over the seasons as a result of implementation in the armaments industry. Unsatisfactory demand regularly arose during peak work times. The limited use of agricultural technology also led to an increased need for human labor.

However, the quantitative compensation mentioned never corresponded to compensation for the loss of qualitative technical substance due to confiscations from agriculture lichen professionals and operations managers.

Despite this restriction, it remains to be stated that the great burden on the German working people and the unrestrained exploitation of the foreign workers were an essential prerequisite for the "performance" that agriculture represented in the fascist structure War economy provided. Objectively, this led to a strengthening of the fascist potential and thus the possibilities for the extension of the Kricgf.

205 *Grewe, Wilm,* The German Village in the war effort, in: *ZdR,* No. 228, 4. 12. 41.

206 StAW, state farmers' association Thuringia, No. 304, *Dwinger, Edwin Erich,* And the Agriculture?, p. 3.

207 StAM, state farmers' association Saxony-Anhalt, No. 241, situation report the State Department II from July 1, 1942.

208 See. For this *Lehmann,* lobilization, S. 556ff.

4. Agricultural production

a) Plant production

The Ask, „What need we at production in the Wars?" answered Darre End 1939 on the Crop production based with following Tasks for the Agriculture:
„1. in total higher harvests, 2. expansion, at least maintenance of root crop cultivation, 3. expansion of one business-owned feed base (intercropping, silo, alfalfa, appropriate pasture farming, corn, etc.), 4. the achievement of a supply of fiber plants necessary for the German economy, 5. increased vegetable cultivation, 6. oil plant cultivation." 209
The necessary freedom of movement in the control of crop production through a shift in the cultivation structure should be achieved primarily through increased yields per hectare. The limitations of such changes in the structure of cultivation were made clear from the outset: "They only achieve apparent success. However, the hole appears then at one others Job and hits the production with undiminished Power." 210 The freedom for one The best way to expand oil crop cultivation to cover the minimum fat requirement was to reduce spring barley cultivation were created because spring barley hardly played any role in human nutrition .
In addition to the determining factors of workers, agricultural machinery and equipment as well as fertilizers, the weather naturally had a lasting influence on yields. The bad ones To harvest at grain 1942, at Potatoes 1941 and 1943, at oil fruits in the financial years 1940/41 and 1942/43 and caused by sugar beets in 1943 were mainly due to winter damage, missing or excessive rainfall, extreme weather conditions in general attributed.211
The tasks for agriculture led to production policy demands and instructions, taking into account the specific production conditions out of Basic pattern resulting from the constraints in the course of the war relative variable to the given Location adjusted became.
The slogans that had, in principle, already been issued during the "production battles". **for** the Crop production also in the wars following Contents: 212

1. No restrictions the Bread grain areas
2. achievement from Maximum yields in the root crop cultivation, before everything at potatoes and sugar beets
3. Peak performance in the Vegetable growing
4. increase of oilseed cultivation

To achievement this Goals became in turn required:
1. Most careful Tillage

209 ZStA Potsdam, Fall XI, No. 392, BI. 17, Doc. NG-453, Memorandum Darres "Tasks of production in agriculture in wars".
210 Ibid, BI. 21.
211 For example, it emerged from the 82 frost days the winter of 1941/42 the need for 2.5 millions hectares winterized agricultural land to be broken down and reordered in the spring of 1942. See *DAP,* 1. Year, 4/1943, p. 128.
212 *NS rural post,* No. 49, 4. 12. 42, „The Generation battle in the 4. year of war", speech Backes in poses at the 29. 11. 42.

2. Best Care of fertilizer
3. Maximum possible seed change
4. Most skillful Exploitation the existing Workforce 213

With the premise "Bread, potatoes, fat and vegetables are the basis of our national diet" the Cultivation planning is subject to annual modifications. The determining factors for this were the workforce and operating resources situation, weather-related failures, the changing consumption structure and, last but not least, the different possibilities for exploiting agricultural resources depending on the course of the war attacked, occupied or dependent countries.

For 1942/43, due to the great winter damage and the resulting decline in cultivation, the priorities for 1942/43 were to make up for this, without significantly changing the structure to change.

One certain exception formed the root crops. At Due to the primacy of increased hectare applications, a limited expansion was envisaged for potatoes at the expense of oats, speculating on the plundering of the Soviet Union. Sugar beets should probably through trade-offs at wrinkles and fodder beets reinforced cultivated become. Oil crop cultivation was to compensate the Damage and for fulfillment the to increase demands for fat supply, a determination that also applied to 1943/44.

In addition, the average for the years 1938 and 1939 was used as a benchmark for bread grain. Under the duress of the Development found in fertilizers Legumes alongside attention to their nutritional function as nitrogen collectors.

Table 176
bread cereals; cultivation, Yields and harvest 1933-1944, Reich territory 1937

Year	Cultivated area in ha	Yields per hectare in German	Harvest quantity in t
1933	6841728	20.9	14331447
1934	6688601	18.1	12140333
1935	6646213	18.3	12145346
1936	6598256	17.9	11813374
1937	6130568	18.6	11383378
1938	6301642	22.5	14184313
1939	6280619	21.0	13207276
1940	5871517	18.2	10656370
1941	6037143	19.2	11602403
1942	5095566	**18.1**	9225515
1943	5773029	20.8	11984581
1944	5632499	18.3	10293804

Source: Statistical Handbook, La b 3.

213 Here had man the very different Workload for the different Cultures in mind. At Overall, relatively low workload for grain and high labor requirements for Root crops lay e.g the Values for Grain at approx. 70, for Beets but at
540 Hours Per hectares. See. *ZdR,* No. 13, 2.4. 43 (after Calculations for Pomerania). The Basic relations remain from secure to be accepted regional Different untouched.

Table 177
Bread grain cultivation. Yields and harvest in the Average the Years 1934-1939=A andl940-1944
=B, Reich territory 1937

Area in ha	Income in dt/ha	Harvest quantity in t
A 6440983.1	19.40	12478503
b 5681950.8	18.92	10752534

Source: The Calculations took place here and for the still following Average calculations the basis the relevant information in the *statistical Handbook.*

The Development the Crop production in Germany, readable at Cultivated area, yield per hectare and Harvest quantities will be discussed below shown as an example [2 14] become. For grain production existed need and with that intention in it, the supply with Bread and nutrients as well as dem absolutely required feed grains to secure. (Table 176 and 177)
Taken together, the two types of bread grain, rye and wheat, decreased the area under cultivation and yield per hectare, as well as the resulting harvest quantity, based on the average of the pre-war years. The average calculators level out such exceptions as the winters in 1942 or the particularly weather-favorable harvest in 1943. In comparison to the years before 1940 the cultivated area was on average almost 760,000 hectares fell back, yields per hectare fell by one quinton, and the annual harvest volume decreased by an average of 1726,000 tons.
Similar went the Development at feed grain('.

Table 178
feed grains; Cultivation, yields and harvest 1933-1944, Reich territory 1937

Year	Cultivated area in ha	Yields per hectare in German	Harvest quantity in t
1933	5139691	21.7	11136572
1934	5169103	18.1	9331963
1935	4915230	19.8	9718467
1936	4931519	20.2	9956807
1937	5153682	20.8	10706637
1938	4951426	24.0	11895727
1939	5134059	21.6	11092837
1940	5296492	20.5	10842430
1941	4977170	19.2	9575271
1942	5369628	21.2	11369150
1943	4449507	21.2	9416636
1944	4339148	18.4	7976877

Source: Statistical llandbook, La B8 .

214 For a more comprehensive treatment that includes more types of fruit than is possible here, see *Lehmann, Joachim,* Crop production in the fascist Germany during the second world war, in: *WZ the University Rostock,* Ges.- u. linguistic knowledge Row, H. 1/2, 1980, S. 21 ff. (hereinafter: PHanzenproduktion).

Table 179
Feed grains: cultivation, Yields and harvest on average over the years 1934-1939 = A and 1940-1944 = b Reich territory 1937

area in Ha	Income in dt/ha	Harvest quantity in t
A 5044168.8	20.75	10450406.0
b 4886388.4	20.10	9836073.6

Source: Calculated after Table 178

Absolutely seen The cultivated area also went here and relative The harvest quantity fell even more, with yields per hectare only decreasing dropped significantly at the end of the war. The overall overview The following tables provide information about the grain supply in fascist Germany:

Table 180
Grain farms and Imports of Grain 1939/40-1944!45, Reich territory September 1, 1939 (in 1000 t)

	1939/40	1940/41	1941/42	1942/43	1943/44	1944/45
harvest	25121	27489	23947	23895	23263	25328
Introduce	3835	2353	3560	4425	6433	6073
In total	28956	29842	27507	28320	29696	31401
Introduce in %	13.2	7.8	13.2	15.6	21.7	19.3

Source: Brandt, S. 610, with Relation on *Woermann, Emil,* Diagrams to German and European Food industry, Berlin 1944.

Table 181
Grain supply Germany 1938139-1943144, Reichsgebi, et September 1, 1939 (in mill. t)

Seizure and consumption	1938/39	1939/40	1940/41	1941/42	1942/43	1943/44	1939/40-1943/44
Harvest quantity	29.6	27.5	24.0	23.6 •	22.7 •	23.9 •	121.7
import surplus	2.5	2.1	2.2	3.0	5.1	4.6	17.0
Initial stock	4.8	8.8	7.5	3.1	1.8	2.5	8.8
Available Crowd	36.9	38.4	33.7	29.7	29.6	31.0	147.5
seed and shrinkage	3.0	3.0	2.9	3.0	2.9	2.9	14.7
Person!. consumption	12.4	14.1	13.8	13.2	12.8	14.5	68.4
feeding	12.7	13.8	13.9	11.7 •	11.4 •	10.5 •	61.3
consumption total	28.1	30.9	30.6	27.9	27.1	27.9	144.4
Ending inventory	8.8	7.5	3.1	1.8	2.5	3.1	3.1

• from 1941/42 onwards, the harvest quantities can be used as a result of producers' underreporting of bread grain areas higher earnings expected will be the main ones the Feeding too good came. Under consideration this fact would itself approximately the following Values result:

Harvest quantity	23.9	23.2	24.9
feeding	12.0	11.9	11.5
consumption total	28.2	27.6	28.9

Source: Hanau/Plate, p. 49. The deviations from 1941 onwards result from the fact that Brandt compensated for the producers' underreporting of bread grain in favor of the fodder area. Such false information was made in order to at least partially evade the obligation to deliver bread grain. Estimates *ibid* p. 46ff. take an additional harvest of around 300,000 for 1941 Metric tons, for 1942 from 500000 metric tons and for 1943 from more as one million tons of, the probably primarily for the feeding from Self-sufficient livestock use found.

The harvest quantities took, with T h e clear exception was the year 1943, which had favorable weather conditions away. There apparently the Border the Consumption reduction 1942/43 reached was, could the respective initial stocks, a Gauge for the solidity and Balance of balance sheet, no more the economic requirements suffice. The reduction in initial stocks allowed the early Introduction and delivery of the harvest in the Course of the war increasing Meaning get. Through economic incentives as well as massive ones Pressure was what was aimed for here Goal surely with regional ones Different and with Prolongation symptoms in the last War year largely achieved.215 Backe's prophecies from the beginning of 1940 that... at A change of only ten percent compared to a normal grain harvest would result in a failure, "which would destroy almost the entire bread grain reserve that has been built up over years of effort of a year",2 1 6 were more than fulfilled.

The root crops were particularly important from the perspective of using the soil as intensively as possible Meaning to. Her comparatively higher Nutritional yield and the move

Table 182
Potatoes; cultivation, Yields and harvest 1933-1944, Reich territory 1937

Year	Cultivated area in ha	Yields per hectare in German	Harvest quantity in t
1933	2888817	152.6	44071412
1934	2906650	160.9	46780621
1935	2750294	149.1	41015558
1936	2792572	165.9	46323564
1937	2887839	191.5	55309725
1938	2893010	175.9	50894104
1939	2833917	182.0	51625554
1940	2812471	188.9	53119251
1941	2744695	158.7	43555689
1942	2777073	181.9	50243776
1943	2664720	135.4	36068947
1944	2704362	142.9	38645333

Source: Statistical manual, La b 22.

Table 183
Potatoes; cultivation, Income and Harvest on average
Years 1934-1939=A and 1940-1944=B,
Reich territory 1937

area in Ha	Income in dt/ha	Harvest quantity in t
A 2844040.3	170.88	48658187.7
b 2740664.2	161.56	44336599.2

Source: Calculated after Table 182

215 See. For this *Lehmann,* crop production, S. 25 ff., in particular Tables 19 until 22 there.

216 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 392, p. 93, Doc. NG-1408, Speech Backes at the 2/14/40 in the General advice (allegedly of Four-year plan, J. L.).

Table 184
Potato supply Germany 1931/32-1943!44, Reich territory 1937 or 1. 9.1939

	01931/32 -1935/36	1936/37	1937/38	1938/39	1939/40	1940/H	1941/42	1942/43	1943/44
in Mio t									
Erntemenge	42,4	46,3	55,3	50,9	56,3	57,4	47,7	54,4	42,5
Einfuhrüberschuß	0,0	0,1	0,1	0,1	0,5	0,2	**1,3**	2,4	2,2
Verfügbare Menge	42,4	46,4	55,4	51,0	56,8	57,6	49,0	56,8	4/i,7
Verwendung als:									
Pflanzgut	6,2	6,4	6,4	6,4	6,9	6,8	6,8	7,0	6,8
Schwund	3,4	3,7	4,4	4,4	6,6	5,7	4,8	4,4	3,4
Mensch!. Verzehr	12,4	13,0	13,0	13,0	16,0	19,4	21,3	26,3	22,5
Verfütterung	**17,1**	19,9	25,7	22,3	23,1	21,6	13,4	15,3	11,0
Techn. Verarbeitung	3,3	3,4	5,9	4,9	4,2	4,1	2,7	3,8	1,0
Verfügbare Menge= 100									
Pflanzgut und Schwund	22,6	21,8	19,5	21,2	23,8	**21,7**	23,7	20,1	22,8
Mensch!. Verzehr	29,2	28,0	23,5	25,5	28,2	33,7	43,5	46,3	50,3
Verfütterung	40,3	42,9	46,4	43,7	40,7	37,5	27,3	26,9	24,6
Techn. Verarbeitung	7,8	7,3	10,6	9,6	7,4	**7,1**	5,5	6,7	2,2

Quelle: llanau/Plate, S. 55.

exercises in the consumption caused to constant repeated demands after retention or even expansion their cultivation.
The Potato production had at the Consumption habits as well as **for** the feeding as well as **for** the human Nutrition fundamentals Meaning. (Tabel 182 u. 183) By 1941 to 1944 showed the cultivated area at a in total inconsistent Picture a decrease, the itself in Boundaries held. The with beginning of the year 1942 reinforced propagated cultivation expansion was significantly different expected Declines in both yields per hectare out of. The justification for this comes from the situation in terms of labor and agricultural technology and Fertilizer derived Fears prove the Yields per hectare, which were relative until 1942 high stayed, then but decisive went back. The Minus difference at the Harvest quantity fraud in Average the War years over 4320000 t Potatoes.
The overall unusual importance of the potato supply during wartime as food and feed requires that the development of supplies be taken into account and Consumption. (Table 184)
Table 184 shows that, as harvest quantities declined, efforts were made to compensate for the deficit through increased imports, which also included looting from the occupied countries. Particularly is striking the reversal of the relationship between use as animal feed and for human consumption. That had to happen the complete dependence of the pig herds on the respective Potato location has the greatest influence on the meat and fat supply.
Constantly stricter delivery requirements, changed sorting regulations, which... a increased Potato content targeted, as well Feeding bans **for** Potatoes, which appeared to be usable as food, prevented the planned rebuilding of the pig population. The decline in technical processing had similar reasons.
The sugar beet came as the fruit with dem highest Nutritional yield excellent meaning too. Their usability for human nutrition in the form of sugar and her Mission as Feed secured her one special Place.

TabeUe 185
sugar beet; cultivation, Yields and harvest 1933-1944, Reich territory 1937

Year	Cultivated area in ha	Yields per hectare in German	Harvest quantity in t
1933	304051	282.2	8578909
1934	356484	291.6	10394343
1935	372687	283.6	10567953
1936	388723	311.2	12095827
1937	455443	344.7	13701278
1938	501771	309.8	15545731
1939	502943	333.4	16769799
1940	536878	307.4	16503186
1941	543536	296.0	16086105
1942	547398	299.6	16402663
1943	543993	268.5	14607216
1944	543139	251.7	13670809

Source: Statistical manual, La b 23.

Table 186
sugar beet; cultivation, Income and Erme in Average of Years 1934-1939=A and 1940-1944=B, Reich territory 1937

area in Ha	Income in dt/ha	Harvest quantity in **t**
A 429675.16	312.38	13179155
b 542994.20	284.68	15453995

Source: Calculated after Table 185

Measures introduced at the beginning of the war to expand sugar beet cultivation (price incentives, subsidies, bonuses in kind) were reflected in the development of the cultivated area low. With yields per hectare and harvest quantities, on the other hand, the fact became apparent that beets produce high area yields, but this is associated with equally high demands on soil cultivation and nutrient supply are. Despite the existing here Problems lay with the harvest quantity, due to the expansion of cultivation, during the significant throughout the war the average of the pre-war years. In comparison of 1944 and 1939 however, stood by one more as 40000 ha of expanded cultivation almost 3100000 t sugar beet fewer to Disposal.

The absolutely How relative height Workload for root crops, at that time at Beets in turn twice as high as for potatoes, concentrated in certain work peaks that could only be efficiently managed with temporary workers. These became increasingly difficult to obtain as the war dragged on and the overall labor force situation became increasingly tense. As well as Cultivated area like Income was also significantly determined by the availability of sufficient labor. Could do extra work forces are not made available on time Crop losses inevitable.

The import dependency for fat supplies, known as the "fat gap", led to its resumption or to expand the cultivation of oil crops.

In war they had to persistent or Temporary interruptions in trade relations with traditional fat suppliers as well as the limited opportunities to import concentrated feed for domestic butter production make the problem even more evident. A relatively low level of self-sufficiency in fats (50-60 percent) in the last year before the war forced us to accept the risk of overwintering Susceptibility to pests risky cultivation from oil fruits.

The most important oil fruits were, in the Series their meaning, Rapeseed and Turnips, followed at a considerable distance by linseed, poppy seeds and hemp seeds. Flax and hemp were aside from that as Fiber plants used. Residues at the Oil extraction found as animal feed Use.

The area cultivated for oil crops increased more than tenfold between 1933 and 1939 . 2 17 From the beginning of the war until In 1944 there was another increase of over 450 percent. Different plants were involved in this development to varying degrees involved.218

217 Please refer Tab. 187.

218 See. *Lehmann,* crop production, S. 30f., tab. 30 until 35.

1940/41 and 1942/43 was the cultivation especially severely affected by overwintering. In the Wars dominated clearly Rapeseed and turnips. Flaxseed cultivation was comparable stable level. The the picture dominant rape cultivation was with the exception of strong affected by weather year 1942 from 32 percent 1941 above 56 percent 1943 on finally 63 percent of entire oil crop cultivation in the Years 1944 elevated. Such a huge increase was caused by targeted Control measures achieved. In addition to price subsidies gave es N'aturalpremicn in the form of oil cake, cooking oil and fat as well as additional Quotas from Nitrogen fertilizer. [219] Included came it to Attempt many farmers, through mere reporting, but not through actual oil crop cultivation in possession of what is so urgently needed Nitrogen to reach. [220]

The propaganda applied in combination with these incentives and the massive pressure through the Reich nutritional level led during the war to a de facto compulsory cultivation of these cultures.

The susceptibility to failure of oil crop cultivation hit itself in very fluctuating yields per hectare

low. The harvest quantity was despite the additional fertilizer applications had to be granted because of the eminent importance of domestic fat production, not through high area yields, but primarily through extensification of cultivation.

The Meaning the domestic Fat production took still to, there the Developments in the course of the war not only compensated for the missing imports, but also compensation of reduced volume Layer greasing required.

The Cultivation conditions between those examined above Cultures conveyed following table:

Table 187
Development of cultivation ratio on dem Farmland in Germany 1933-1944 (selection), (in 1000 ha and Percent)

Year	Bread grains		Fodder grains		Root crops		Oil crops	
	Ha	%	Ha	%	Ha	%	Ha	%
1933	6842	42.7	5140	32.1	4020	25.1	10	**0.1**
1934	6689	41.8	5169	32.3	4098	25.6	39	0.2
1935	6646	42.6	4915	31.5	3970	25.5	69 *	0.4
1936	6598	42.1	4932	31.4	4026	25.8	106	0.7
1937	6131	39.2	5154	33.0	4198	27.0	120	0.8
1938	6302	37.9	5951	35.9	4210	25.4	123	0.7
1939	6281	40.0	5134	32.7	4182	26.6	109 * *	0.7
1940	5872	37.7	5296	34.0	4236	27.2	167	**1.1**
1941	6037	39.0	4977	32.2	4215	27.2	247	1.6
1942	5096	33.9	5370	35.8	4294	28.7	245	1.6
1943	5773	38.9	4450	30.0	4180	28.2	422	2.8
1944	5632	38.3	4339	29.4	4252	28.9	494	3.4

• Without hemp and poppy seeds without poppy seeds

Source: On roughly calculated on the basis of the relevant tables in the *Statistical Handbook* .

219 StAM, State farming community Saxony-Anhalt, No. 479, BI. 42ff., State farmer leader at District farming communities, 13. 4. 44.

220 Ibid.; s. also *weekly paper the State farming community Danzig-West Prussia,* No. 43, 18. 12. 43.

The information makes it clear that it succeeded in preventing major deformations of the cultivated structure.

A reduced but sufficient supply of bread and the satisfaction of an essential necessary feed requirements let more restrictions of G grain cultivation not to and formed the economics and economic limits of the cultivation of root crops and oil crops. The changes that had occurred in the structure of consumption also had to be taken into account. The loss of fat and meat caused efforts towards relative compensation through increased consumption of bread, foodstuffs. and Table potato consumption.

The basic relationships between grain and root crops remained essentially untouched during the war. A certain decrease in the cultivation of bread grains and even more so of feed grains in favor of a stable and slightly increased area under cultivation of root crops compared to the pre-war years can be seen. The expansion of oil crop cultivation took place primarily in Cost of feed grain. The expansion of cultivation went beyond the extent that the experts from the Reich Ministry of Food had considered economically in 1939 for justifiable **had** been held **221 ,** should not, In addition to difficulties in crop rotation, there is unpleasant competition for sugar beet cultivation .

In general, it should be noted that the area under cultivation for these important crops, which are crucial for food production, fell from around 990,000 hectares between 1939 and 1944, more than double the loss of arable land in the same period period decreased.222

The Relationship between arable land and grassland with the special importance of the latter for the feed base remained in the overview disregarded.

Plant production had immediate effects through the provision of appropriate amounts of feed Advance payments **for** animal production.

In addition to domestic production, the feed requirement was largely covered by imports. In 1938, 3.7 million tonnes of various feed grains were imported. The corresponded to about a third of that to amount fed at that time. The origin of these quantities is important for assessing the war situation .

Table *188*
Origin the German Grain imports 1938 (in Percent)

Area of origin	Wheat	Corn	barley
countries, with which the fascist Germany at war at the end of 1939 located	22.4	2.0	13.9
USA	19.2	57.5	29.9
Medium- and South America	12.3	31.9	2.1

Quelk: ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 392, BI. 29, Doc. NG- 453.

221 ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 392, BI. 21, 55, Memorandum Darres "Tasks the Production in agriculture in war"; BI. 77, Darre's statement on "Suggestions for the war production plan in the German Agriculture". Both from the 11/27/39.

222 Please refer S. 595, Table 159.

In fact, over half came from wheat and over 80 from corn percent and for barley over 45 Percent of imports from countries that lost supply sources during the war. Particularly serious were the war-related failures at Oil cake imports, resulting in corresponding changes in the feed base with increasing demands on production in Germany obligation.

Table189
Conversion the feed base for the Milk production in Germany 1939-1944, Reich territory 1937

year	available Amount of oil cake	Harvesting alfalfa hay	Harvesting sugar beet leaves and - behead	Capacity the firmly attached fermentation feed container
	1000 t	1000 t	million t	1000 cbm
1933	2051	1791	6.43	920
1934	1583	1611.	7.80	2320
1935	1229	2334	7.93	3920
1936	1164	2997	9.07	5220
1937	1244	2988	11.78	6620
1938	1475	2797	11.66	7523
1939	1220	2999	12.57	8078
1940	800	2504	12.38	
1941	500	2523	12.06	
1942	345	2232	12.30	
1943	375	2010	10.96	
1944		2139	10.25	

Source: Hanau/plate, S. 82.

Already 1933 became the Imports throttled and through one Monopoly levy more expensive. The incision with Start of war is noticeable. Orientations went in Direction the expansion of the the farm's own fodder bases through cheapening of commercial fertilizer, subsidized Grassland plowing with the aim of intensive use as meadow and pasture. In Dependency from the Overall development trends in the Plant production during the war could increase at Rough and fermented feed increased become. The significant one Development at the Silo construction sat down in the wars because of the general problems regarding building materials and labor did not continue.
The Overall situation of crop production led to demands for intensified fodder cultivation. However, this brought, be It is the relatively lowest in meadows, pastures or in arable fodder production, with a requirement of around a third of the agricultural land Nutritional yields per unit area.
The collision between the primacy of human nutrition related to modified Consumption structures[223] and dem Feed requirements led to feeding

223 See table 181, 184. During of war was the human consumption at vegetable !food around 25 percent gone up (ZStA Potsdam, case XI, No. 411, BI. 201, Doc. iR-124, The Nutritional situation and the Production performance the German Agriculture, :Presentation Woermanns on the 57. meeting the Headquarters Planning, 18. 5. 44); *NS country post,*

9. 7. 43.

forbidden and replacement solutions from of dubious value, How for example the feeding of green fodder and Turnips to pigs.224

For pure fodder crops, such as fodder beet, significant declines in yield had to be accepted when cultivation was significantly expanded. Based on 1939, the harvest volume decreased until 1944 around 7450000 t, the yield per hectare by almost 150 German back, and this at one Cultivated area expansion of more than 160,000 hectares. The competition between human and animal stomachs that can be observed everywhere, with the narrowing of the food base as a result, could also be increased Hay cultivation cannot be defused.

Table 190
Hay (containing KT,ee-, Alfalfa- and meadow hay); cultivation, Yields and Harvest 1933-1944, Reich territory 1937

Year	Cultivated area in ha	Yields per hectare in German	Harvest quantity in t
1939	7276031	43.6	36237804
1940	7459325	45.1	32533664
1941	7418575	41.9	33441466
1942	7361120	41.3	30821186
1943	7502738	42.1	31000005
1944	7565366	42.1	31837318

Source: Statistical manual, La b 34.

The harvest volume of lupins, which were increasingly grown during preparations for war, also decreased from 1939 to 1939 1944 from 100438 79645 t.22.5 The domestic corn coming up went as well as because of decline in cultivation as also because of sinking Yields per hectare of 103,514 tons in 1939 39263 t returned in 1944.226

At the end of 1944, an assessment of the situation had to conclude that "the greatest difficulties in the sixth year of the war were undoubtedly to be overcome in the area of fodder management." 22 7 The remaining concentrated feed available from imports and from German production was from 25.1 million t at the start of the war to 15.5 million tons sunk in 1943/44.228

The examples presented of the production development of fruit types that are particularly important for nutrition and feeding allow a comprehensive assessment .

The resources available to German imperialism, including in the agricultural sector, may have been sufficient within the framework of the blitzkrieg strategy.

With the failure of this adventurous concept, more and more economic decisions had to be made Laws come into effect and itself against the fascist aggressors turn. Woermann drew attention to the crux of fascist agricultural policy in April 1943: „... on the a Page the aspiration the Agriculture, working and fertilizer-

224 *VB,* 21. 9.44, report above Work meeting of Reich Committee for Slaughter cattle production at the Reich peasant leader.
225 Calculated after ibid, La b 17, La b 18.
226 *Statistical manual,* La b 9.
227 The food industry at the turn of fifth war year, in *DAP,* H.12/1944.
228 Please refer Note 223, presentation Woerman.

the cultivation of intensive crops that are particularly efficient in terms of nutrition , on the others Page strong diminished Nutrient intake (Nitrogen and phosphoric acid) and worse care with resources (Fuel, machines and Devices Etc.). In the Cultivation structure 1942/43 are certain expanding tendencies ... not to misjudge. *The* charts show aside from that a decline the ha yields, which _ both fertilizer intensive cultures and at the Straw harvest [22 9] at the strongest prevails."[230]

Looking at crop production Overall, it remains to be seen that the intensive preparation for war in this area was a relative success Direction showed that in its course *it* was possible to produce harvests with a fundamental downward trend, with differences with the individuals cultures, about one longer Period on to maintain a level that prevented a food catastrophe.

Compared to the First World War, the decline in crop yields was considerably slower (Table 191).

Table 191
Development the To harvest 1914-1918 and 1939-1944, Reich territory September 1, 1939, selected cultures (in percent of pre-war average)

	Grain	potatoes	sugar beet
Annual average			
1908--1913	100	100	100
1914	98	99	110
1915	80	118	67
1916	80	55	66
1917	56	76	64
1918	64	64	60
Annual average			
1935-1938 _	100	100	100
1939	104	105	126
1940	90	106	122
1941	84	88	119
1942	86	101	120
1943	92	75	117
1944	78	80	100

Source: Woermann, diagrams, quote at *Riecke,* p. 324.

The decline in harvests had an impact on supplies as long as imports compensated for them.[231] These so-called imports consisted mainly of the results the Plunder from occupied countries Europe or. out of Deliveries

229 Straw was particularly important in its dual function as fodder and as bedding for livestock breeding .

230 ZStA, case XI, **No.** 411, doc. R-124, BI. 135, The nutritional situation and the requirements for maintaining the production performance of German agriculture, presentation by Woermann the 39th Central planning meeting on March 23rd 4. 1943.

231 Please refer Tab. 180, 181, 184.

the satellite states of fascist Germany, whose agriculture meets the needs of fascists War machine rigorously subordinated became. 232

Until the 1942/43 marketing year , the declines in harvest were not decisive, unless they were clearly due to the weather. From then on, however, there began to be a general progressive decline in yields per hectare and thus in harvest quantities was caused by the limitations in operating resources caused by the war. Also at this point in time, the long-term effects gradually diminished fertilizer applications and the Neglects at the Tillage from previous years a.

b) Animal production

An assessment of animal production the overall tense Nutritional situation must take into account that at the recycling plant-based products a significant loss of calories occurs through the animal's stomach. This resulted in efforts that have already been described, the human consumption plant-based food increase and At the same time, reduce the intake of animal products.

This intention and the economic requirements resulted in the need to adapt the livestock population to the remaining feed after deducting human food requirements. In this context, the already mentioned interaction between the reduced overall food supply must be taken into account .Wars and the resulting uncontrolled relocation of human resources Nutrition towards plant-based products.

The The connection between the amount of feed and the number of livestock Accordingly, policy in this area was decisive from the outset, essentially influenced by the fundamental importance of cattle and pig populations with their dual function as suppliers of fat and meat.

The cattle population and their performance was primarily under the aspect of butter production. All measures of fascist agricultural policy with regard to the preservation and supply of cattle are to be classified from the perspective that Butter as the most important domestic Source of fat for the nutritional balance was viewed. (Table 192)

The Declarations clarify one only low loss at the Total inventory while of the war. In Dependency from the feed location is one inconsistent, however definitely not sinking tendency to hold on. The Number the Dairy cows took from 1939 to 1944 even continuously to. The losses in the Duration at the eve of war and in the In the first year of the war there must be an increase in the number of mouths and Attributed to foot disease become. Such remarkable developments are from the cardinal function of the cattle population as a fat supplier to explain and also out of the fact of better Energy utilization of feed at the Milk production in the Comparison with the Meat production.233 (Table 193)

232 See. *Lehmann,* agricultural policy, S. 948ff.

233 *DAP,* H. 12/1944. One calorie beef required 24 calories, eme calorie **milk** 4 Calories Feed use.

Table 192
Cattle population 1933-1944, Reich territory 1937 (in 1000 pcs.)

Year	Cattle, total	including dairy cows	on 100 hectares total area	per 100 inhabitants
1933	19811	9994	42.1	30.0
1934	19266	10154	40.9	29.0
1935	18938	10059	40.2	28.3
1936	20088	10038	42.7	29.8
1937	20503	10173	43.6	30.2
1938	19434	10108	42.4	29.2
1939	19948	9881	42.4	28.8
1940	19663	9962	41.8	28.2
1941	19432	9979	41.3	27.7
1942	19102	10051	40.6	27.0
1943	19589	10139	41.6	28.1
1944		10258		

Source: Statistical Manual, S. 190, 215.

Table 193
generation and use from Cow's milk 1933-1944, Reich territory 1937

Year	Average yield per cow kg	Total production 1000 t	as Fresh milk consumed 1000 t	processed 1000 t
1933	2484	24829	7674	14142
1934	2419	24558	7935	14142
1935	2406	24200	7815	13885
1936	2530	25400	7941	14759
1937	2501	25445	7666	15034
1938	2492	25185	7900	14545
1939	2567	25363	7324	15441
1940	2445	24358	5083	17058
1941	2387	23816	4700	17091
1942	2242	22531	4681	15980
1943	2252	22839	4641	16320
1944	2265	23231	4549	16848

Source: Statistical Manual, S. 215.

Those in the pre-war years increased total production fell from 1939 to 1942 fell to a low, recovered somewhat in the following two years, but not to the same magnitude until 1941 ever again to reach. The explanation lies in the acceptance the milk production the cows, the because of the Feed situation not maintained become could, despite a certain increase from 1942 onwards. Under these conditions, the recovered total stock could only have a limited influence on total production.

Comprehensive efforts to collect and use milk as optimally as possible resulted in a reduction in fresh milk consumption and a high proportion of processing wars, the highest in 1944 level reached.

Reached this was done by the with everyone means of regime enforced Obligation to deliver milk and the associated rigorous restrictions of feeding of fresh milk, for their own use Cow farmers and sales directly from the farm.2:¼ General surveillance led to closure more private centrifuges, for the Test milking in the stables and ended in Warnings and Punishments. Such more massive had pressure to Consequence, that finally 1943/44 around four fifth the Total production 235 in the also sharpest monitored dairies delivered and processed were thus was an essential one Requirement this important one Source of fat by the responsible main association of the German dairy and dairy industry Fat economy given.

Table 194
Manufacturing Pon butter 1933-1944, Reich territory 1937 (in 1000 t)

Year	in dairies	in agriculture	In total
1933	254.6	195.9	450.4
1934	282.5	170.8	453.2
1935	312.0	140.0	452.0
1936	383.6	112.5	496.1
1937	416.9	100.0	516.9
1938	410.0	97.5	507.5
1939	463.1	84.4	547.5
1940	573.0	54.0	627.0
1941	591.4	39.3	630.7
1942	595.1	27.9	623.0
1943	615.7	20.7	636.4
1944	606.7	18.0	624.7

Source: Statistical Manual, S. 215.

Under these conditions, butter production increased by more than 23% from the last year before the war to 1944 Percent. At the same time, the proportion of butter produced in agriculture was reduced from just under 20 to just around 3 percent. In addition to the better control options, buttering in dairies avoided losses that were unavoidable in the in-house buttering process were.
the real effect of increased butter production on fat supply must be taken into account Reserved considered become. (Tabel 195)
While Milk fat production fell and butter production increased. The surplus production of butter but was on Costs of increasingly limited consumption of drinking milk and rearing feed he buys. The Butter Statistics made only a Part of so far
„invisible" of fat consumed is statistically recognizable. A real increase in the Consumption, as suggested by the statistics of butter production, lacked elementary prerequisites. This is also why the increased butter production did not result in any real increase in production represent, because diverse Measures, from those the Fresh milk skimming and the increase of water content the butter at the most famous are, the otherwise in others

234 Ibid, S. 215.
235 *Hanau/plate,* p. 76.

Table 195
oil production, -use and Butter production 1933-1944, Reich territory 193'1

Jahr	0 Fettgehalt in Prozent	Milchfetterzeugung in 1000 t	davon: verfüttert in Prozent	als Trinkmilch verbraucht in Prozent	zu Butter verarbeitet in Prozent	Butterproduktion in 1000 t
1933	3,21	793	17,3	31,9	46,4	448
1934	3,21	786	15,0	32,2	47,1	451
1935	3,24	784	14,5	32,3	1,7,3	452
1936	3,27	831	14,2	31,2	49,0	496
1937	3,30	838	**14,1**	30,0	50,6	517
1938	3,31	834	14,0	31,4	49,9	508
1939	3,31	841	13,2	28,7	53,5	51,9
1940	3,32	810	**11,7**	21,4	63,5	627
1941	3,32	790	11,0	20,1	64,4	621
1942	3,30	743	10,8	18,2	66,6	619
1943	3,27	746	10,5	17,6	68,0	634
1944 *	3,25	566	10,6	**17,7**	67,1	475

• January until September

Source: Hanau/ plate, S. 79.

Milk fat consumption contained in dairy products, such as cheese and quark, could only be statistically recorded.

An important measure that was effective for actual milk production was the milk performance tests, which were initially introduced selectively from 1935 onwards. They made it possible for authorities to intervene in business management with regard to performance-related feeding. Among the Conditions the feed location in the Wars were theirs Meaning only Hand. Despite major staffing problems, there was a decline Start of war Proportion of checked inventory with With the exception of 1943 (49 percent), it was always more than half salary 2 36 There was also an increasing shift in the nature of milk performance testing there to monitoring of delivery.

In comparison to the fundamental importance of milk production had the Beef meat production relative unlcrgcordnetcs weight. 237

Table 196
Cattle slaughter 1933-1944, Reich territory 1937 (in pcs.)

Year	Total cattle	including foreign animals	Cows	including foreign animals
1933	3507716	35764	1549294	18929
1934	4058967	74043	1891780	39111
1935	4078147	117856	2095994	60595
1936	3148716	198275	1729436	106603
1937	3842536	190373	1965036	100199
1938	4271479	166723	2107592	78296
1939	3867573	196194	2017396	124595
1940	3836140	301974	2031420	212544
1941				
1942	3346000	594029	1870000	348439
1943	3368719	405103	1838756	196247
1944	2430032	263067	1530537	148218

Source: Statistical Manual, S. 222.

What is characteristic is a slow decrease in the number of slaughters in war, the pace of which is increasing from 1943 to 1944 increased. This is partly explained by the slight increase 1943, the out of requirements the fascist \Vehrmacht resulted and from the could not be covered by the decimated population of pigs that were in the process of being rebuilt. From land animals had 1940 to In 1943 it gained exceptional significance due to the robbery in the occupied areas. Their declining share towards the end of the war proves that they are increasingly limited Possibilities the Plunder. For the Slaughter numbers \es In the year 1944, it should be noted that in the second half of the year there were evictions of livestock from war-threatened areas Germany an increased slaughter rate originated.

236 Ibid, S. 81t.

237 This statement relates exclusively to the relationship between milk and meat. In terms of the amount of meat available per capita of the population, the proportion of beef (beef and veal) in relation to the amount of pork increased from 58.3 percent in 1939 to 81.9 percent in 1943 and 77.4 percent in 194!

The prices for beef stayed so low that they maintain a productive dairy herd stimulated.238 For the concrete Consumption options were the real available Amount of meat of crucial importance.

Table 197
Available Amount of beef 1933-1944, Reich territory 1937

Year	Quantity in 1000 t		quantity ever Head the population in kg	
	Beef	Veal fl.	Beef	Veal fl.
1933	820	190	12.58	2.91
1934	900	213	13.72	3.25
1935	935	206	13.98	3.08
1936	790	192	11.73	2.85
1937	910	212	13.42	3.12
1938	1080	211	15.70	3.07
1939	1010	197	14.57	2.84
1940	911	189	13.05	2.74
1941				
1942	788	200	11.14	2.83
1943	697	164	9.73	2.29
1944	522	183	7.08	2.49

Source: Statistical Manual, S. 230.

Immediately with the start of the war, a decline began 1942 the values of the crisis years 1932/33 significantly below and at constantly increasing pace 1944 reached its lowest point. The changeable course of veal was caused by a lack of feed to per se not desired slaughters obligation. For the Statistical per capita consumption finally stood at 1944 available in half of 1938.
A comparison of the average slaughter weights allows the quality to be reduced in the Slaughtered beef offer recognizable become. The decline of Weight explains the decline in available Amount of meat partly with.

Table 198
Average slaughter weights 1938 and 1944, Reich territory 1937 (in kg per piece)

Year	Bovine	Oxen to 2 J.	Bulls up 2 yrs .	Cows	Heifers	Calves
1938	255	228	216	251	219	42
1944	231	192	184	229	186	31

Source: Statistical Manual, S. 230.

238 See *Lehmann, Joachim,* Animal production in Germany under the conditions of the Second World War. To the economic requirements for the post-war development, in: *WZ the WPU Rostock,* Ges.- u. linguistic knowledge Row, H. 1/1981, p. 45, (hereinafter: animal production).

The decrease in slaughter weights was primarily due to the deterioration in the quality and quantity of concentrate feed.

In summary it can be said that despite the restrictions already made, milk production in association with the Expansion of oil crop cultivation contributed decisively to this, especially in the second half of the war collapse to prevent the fat supply. Beef also became more important given the overall decreasing amount of meat available.

Such relative Take place on In contrast to the area of milk and butter production, there was a completely different process in the area of slaughter fat production through pig farming.

Within the War food economy had the Pig Meaning as Supplier of meat, fat and leather.

In addition to butter and vegetable oils, pig fattening was the third important source of fat in the country. However, fat was only produced secondarily in meat-oriented fattening. Four fifths of the fattening was used for meat production and only one fifth for fat production. In the last years before the war, more than 60 percent of the available meat was consumed Pork.239

The extent of pig farming depended particularly on the amount of feed available away. In the Difference to Cattle farming - the with approximately 90 percent Rough and juice food was made possible, which was not immediately usable for human nutrition become could - The main pig feed was potatoes and grain direct Competition between humans and animals to.240

The fluctuating feed base, before especially with potatoes, required one appropriate adjustment of the Stocks. The production was not by the number of pigs, but also determined by the amount of feed, which also influenced the degree of fattening. The desired high fattening with accordingly higher Fat gain required so progressive

Table 199
Pig herd 1933-1943, Reich territory 1937 (in 1000 pcs.)

Year	In total	including breeding boars	Breeding sows	Battle- and fattening pigs
1933	24014	113	2026	6309
f934	23298	107	1791	6744
1935	22827	109	1958	6409
1936	25892	108	2039	7574
1937	23847	87	1657	7991
1938	23567	87	1840	7664
1939	25240	88	1869	7782
1940	21578	84	1567	7621
1941	18303	68	1302	7024
1942	15025	62	1187	6323
1943	16549	98	1531	5874

-*Source: Statistical Manual,* S. 190.

239 After *Statistical Manual,* S. 231, calculated.
240 See. S. 616ff.

growing Feed quantities. The ones given here Boundaries would have such a Away just about the further one Reduction of the already devastated stocks possible.

In connection with the The situation in crop production, the loss of imports and people's changing consumption habits with the increasing lack of meat and fat resulted in the table 199 reproduced development of the pig population.

The drastic one reduction since the beginning of the war led to an all-time low in 1942 an inventory of only around 62 percent of pre-war average. The The poor potato harvest of 1941 had a major impact here. This situation and, above all, the serious decline in breeding sows 241 gave rise to fears that in the future there would not be enough recyclers even for a normal harvest.

Organizationally prepared through the establishment of so-called performance committees at all levels of the Reich Nutrition Organization, the countermeasures were concentrated Agricultural planners focus primarily on the feed sector through price incentives and sales guarantees. 242

A whole bunch from Measures brought certain Successes. The Stocks overall and especially that of the breeding pigs recovered 1943 at one further decline of slaughter and fattening pigs. The limits of this reproduction were determined by the feed base. The one that is particularly important for the reconstruction of the stocks As early as mid- 1944 , the pool of breeding animals showed a clear interruption in the upward development.24 3

All plans for stock replenishment were determined solely by the availability of fodder.

Table 200
Pig herd and Perf available Potato feed quantity
1934/35- 1943!44

September/August	available each Pig in kg	quantity of potatoes
1934/35	736	Reich territory 1937
1935/36	705	
1936/37	765	
1937/38	1008	
1938/39	953	
1939/40	814	
1938/39	962	Reich territory 1. 9. 1939
1939/40	797	
1940/41	861	
1941/42	604	
1942/43	845	
1943/44	591	

Source: Hanau! plate, S. 105.

241 *Hanau! Plate,* p. 104.
242 See. *Lehmann,* animal production, S. 44; *Hanau/ plate,* S. 110f.
243 See. *Lehmann,* animal production, S. 45.

The information in Table 200 makes this connection just as clear as the fact of the operational fluctuations in the quantity available per pig, a result of the need to adapt described, and the momentous low in 1943/44.
The amount of feed provided under pig fattening contracts also decreased and ultimately only covered 50 to 70 percent of the required amounts. Lack of protein feed due to the discontinuation of skimmed milk and almost meaningless fishmeal imports led to an extension of the fattening period, which forced the minimum slaughter weights to be reduced.244

Table 201
Slaughter Pon pigs 1933-1944, Reich territory 1937 (in pcs.)

Year	Home slaughter	commercial slaughtering	including foreign animals
1933	8547888	13946553	13587
1934	9174842	14969478	12873
1935	8659349	14128411	101021
1936	8906862	14532249	380796
1937	9369898	15287728	464000
1938	8588309	14012504	482597
1939	8650367	14147 770	535227
1940	8350613	12897883	554509
1941			
1942	6485000	4328000	97157
1943	6489236	4469134	117917
1944	4906547	6973712	122495

Source: Statistical Manual, S. 223.

The Number the Home slaughter took while of war nearly continuously from 1940 to 1942 there was a noticeable one There was a jump. Until 1942 they can be explained by the decimation of the population due to food. From 1943 onwards, efforts to achieve his reconstruction a light one increase in Slaughter.
At the commercial ones Slaughter became after one already significant Waste in 1940 was rigorously further reduced in the following years. The increase in 1944 can be explained by a renewed adaptation to leftover feed as well as limited options for home slaughter and certainly additional slaughter in evacuation areas.
The amount of meat available, which is important for possible consumption is probably the clearest evidence for the Effects of war. (Table 202)
The effects of the decimated herd were reflected in the reduced average slaughter weights - of 102 kg 1938 on 96 kg per year 194424 5 - even more aggravated. Based on 1939, stood finally 1944 only still 44 percent the Amount of meat and 41 percent of the per capita share available.

244 ZStA Potsdam, RMEL, No. 2340, BI. 6, Reich peasant leader to the head of the state department III, March 1, 44.
245 *Statistical Manual,* S. 230.

Table 202
Available Amount of pork 1933-1944 ,
Reich territory 1937

Year	quantity of meat in 1000 t	Amount of meat ever head of the population in kg
1933	1654	25,37
1934	1791	27,31
1935	1757	26,28
1936	1878	27,88
1937	1874	27,63
1938	1863	27,09
1939	2071	29,89
1940	1800	25,76
1941		
1942	1304	18,42
1943	927	13,08
1944	911	12,36

Source: Statistical Manual, S. 231.

The reduction in pig populations had two main effects. For one thing, allowed he one increase in direct human consumption of grain and potatoes. For the others moved in temporary benefit to consumers during the first years of the war out of the dismantling.
What was crucial, however, was that the substance was used without being reproduced become could. The reduced Pork production obligation In 1943, there were limited interventions in cattle stocks.246 Hopes of compensating for the precarious situation through increased imports were dashed by the war situation .
In the Connection to the treatment of the oil crop cultivation, butter production and the Pig production Is it possible to reduce the fat balance? fascist war food economy illuminate. (Table 203)
In the Comparison to the strong sinking Slaughter fat production and the uncertain generation
vegetable fats was the Butter production proportionately how also in the Continuity is the most stable factor in fat supply.
At slaughter fats How at margarine raw materials and cooking oil was the Portion in the Wars in dependency from the pig population or from the cultivated area quite fluctuating.
For both groups took the Meaning the domestic production until End of the war in total significant reduced consumption constantly too.
The increasingly critical feed situation became relatively insignificant part of Livestock farming, small animal husbandry, became the focus of fascist agricultural policy during the war. Actually had the keeping of small animals with the exception of chickens unlike other animal species in the During the war there was an increase, sometimes several times over.

246 *Jaw,* generation battle, S. 105.

Table 203
Fat11 consumption and domestic Fat production 1933-1943!44, Reich territory 1937 or. September 1, 1939 (in 1000 t pure fat) •

	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939/40	1940/41	1941/42	1942/43	1943/44
Fettverbrauch insgesamt	1818	1839	1786	1859	1847	1883	1420	1332		1114	1162
davon Nahrungsfette	1431	1405	1408	1491	1457	1503	1318	1294	1180	1089	1134
darunter Butter	417	422	429	469	497	492	610	665	622	627	664
Margarine u. Speiseöl	575	549	544	559	467	515	347	306	320	297	262
Schlachtfette	439	434	435	463	1,93	496	361	323	238	165	208
davon aus inl. Erzeugung											
Butter	368	370	371	407	424	416	558	563	555	568	546
Margarinerohst. u. Speiseöl	12	56	31	40	45	56	45	48	122	85	249
Schlachtfette	358	383	396	420	423	416	332	281	224	171	207
Anteil der inl. Erzeugung in %											
des Fettverbrauchs	40,6	44,0	44,7	46,6	48,3		65,8	67,0		74,0	86,2

• as Pure fat content became underlying placed: at butter 82 % (away spring 1942 80 %), at pork fat 75 until 78 %, at tallow 80 %, at Mar **garine** 84 %, at introduced bacon 85 %, at introduced lard 95 %

Source: Hanau/ plate, S. 88.

Table 204
Development the Small animal husbandry 1932-1943, Reich territory 1937 (in 1000 pcs.)

Year	Chicken	laying hens	Geese	Ducks	Rabbits
1933	87923	63522	6162	3407	
1934	86377	57722	5856	2739	7524
1935	86084	55366	5473	2588	
1936	88423	58781	5890	2724	8008
1937	85393	53312	5465	2403	
1938	88638	52337	7969	2641	8080
1939	89777	50065	4763	2577	
1940	88277	49360	4841	3514	10703
1941	73961	39660	4450	3706	
1942	65274	34469	5111	3863	24096
1943	66715	31741	6545	3911	28283

Source: Statistical Manual, S. 191.

The development was quite different for the individual animal species. However, it illustrates the efforts of the population to at least partially compensate for the meat shortage. The expansion of the stocks took place, using the example of Rabbits are particularly noticeable, especially in non-agricultural businesses and private households. In addition, must currently at one in this area significant statistical unreported figures are assumed become.

The feed for the Small livestock farming outside the Agriculture became in the Usually procured from the farmers, who “with good persuasion and exchange of things missing from the economy always again agricultural Products for the feeding" gave out.247

The huge problems for the satisfaction of feed requirements the Pig fattening led to Attempt, through Limitation the Small animal husbandry one source for to access additional feed. 248 They finally culminated in the consideration of “the entire small animal husbandry up to the necessary Breeding stock to abolish." 24 9

For the assessment the Overall performance the Animal production must also the until now Meat production from other animal species that has not yet been taken into account can be used. (Tables 205 and 206)

The information shows the decline in C'iner meat production, which ultimately amounted to around 60 percent of the quantity in 1944 years of crisis the global economic crisis.

Here, for 1944, there is also the increased production of meat due to slaughter in areas threatened by war to be taken into account.

At one summary consideration applies it at the livestock species important for supply different tendencies to hold on.

247 ZStA Potsdam, RMEL, No. 2009, BI. 211, Summary the Quarterly reports of the state farming communities, completed on **4/1/43** .

248 In more detail *Lehmann, Joachim,* animal production in Germany under the conditions of the Second World War. To the economic ones Prerequisites for post-war development - Part II in: *WZ the WPU Rostock,* Ges.- and linguistic knowledge Series, H. 112, 1982, pp. **13f.**

249 *Jaw,* generation battle, S. 106.

Table 205
Available Amount of meat 1933-1944, Reich territory 1937 (in 1000 t)

Year	total quantity	including sheep meat	Goat meat	Horse meat
1933	2742	41	10	27
1934	2979	36	11	28
1935	2973	33	11	31
1936	2938	37	12	29
1937	3078	38	13	31
1938	3243	46	10	33
1939	3386	44	9	35
1940	2991	37	7	47
1941				
1942	2370	28	13	37
1943	1859	25	8th	28
1944	1684	26	8th	34

Queue: Statistical Manual, S. 231.

Table 206
Available Amount of meat 1933-1944, Reich territory 1937 (in kg ever Head the population)

Year	total quantity	including sheep meat	Goat meat	Horse meat
1933	42.05	0.63	0.15	0.41
1934	45.42	0.50	0.17	0.47
1935	44.46	0.49	0.17	0.46
1936	43.62	0.54	0.18	0.44
1937	45.38	0.47	0.19	0.45
1938	47.14	0.67	0.13	0.48
1939	45.58	0.64	0.13	0.51
1940	42.90	0.54	0.11	0.70
1941				
1942	33.49	0.40	0.18	0.52
1943	25.95	0.34	0.11	0.40
1944	22.17	0.36	0.11	0.47

Source: Statistical Manual, S. 231.

The cattle populations suffered the smallest losses because of their dual function as suppliers of fat and meat and because of their special feed requirements. The pigs were different, with a feed requirement that particularly competed with human consumption. Here the causal chain of lack of feed, reduction in stocks, limited supply of meat and fat, further restriction of remaining feed, etc. was particularly evident concise.

In addition to the quantitative ones losses The qualitative impairment of the stocks must also be taken into account. She resulted among other things, from increasingly inadequate veterinary care Care and the neglect the Performance tests and main licensing through the

Animal breeding offices.250 Admittedly, the declining number also had an effect in this context Protein supply. 2 5 1

Stocks suffered significant losses and domestic meat consumption had to be drastically reduced as a result. The civilian population was affected by these restrictions particularly hard hit. With a reduction in consumption The civilian population even received a total of 37 percent 58 percent less meat.252

The basic features of the development had also led to fears among leading representatives of the fascist regime that Backe's policy was gradually becoming a complete one Devastation ours Manage livestock would." 253

Representatives and apologists of fascist agricultural policy tried to do so by paying particular attention to the Cattle herds to conceal the situation.

Furthermore, the "planning" the Adapting the livestock to the leftover feed compared to the "haphazard murder of pigs" in the first World War emphasized.

Given the given facts, even Rieckc, who otherwise does everything, can do one "successful" Agriculture- and Nutrition policy in the second Constructing a world war is not avoid noticing that in the course of During the war, "the supply of animal protein to the civilian population was close to the minimum and below it" .2M

However, it succeeded the fascist agricultural leadership in general and in contrast to the first WdL war, the minimum requirements **for** the German population and the fascist armed forces to secure food.

This was due to ever-increasing state monopoly pressure on the German rural population forced, but especially through the unrestrained and brutal exploitation of millions of foreign forced laborers and prisoners of war, in the who fed Hegel catastrophically, had to create crucial conditions for this through their work.

This result of fascist agricultural policy was an essential condition **for** the leadership of war. However drew itself already 1943 weaknesses the Agriculture in clear Contours starting in the last two war years and far beyond that The devastating effects were fully realized at the end of the war. Also in this field revealed itself the ultimately insoluble contradiction between the existing economic one potential and the broad criminal war aims.

250 ZStA Potsdam, RMEL, No. 2009, BI. 210, summary of Quarterly reports of the state farming communities, completed at the **4/1/43** .

251 Ibid, Case XI, No. 411, BI. 136, Doc. R-124, presentation Woermanns on the 39th session the headquarters planning at the 4/23/43.

252 *The Effects,* S. 134.

253 *Goebbels,* diaries, S. 357f., registration from the 22. 5. 43 (above one utterance from Ley).

254 *Riecke,* S. 344.

ATTACHMENT

1. Output overview 1940-1944: Weapons, Devices and Ammunition*

Weapons, Devices and ammunition

	1944	1940	1941	1942	1943
weapons					
carbine in total	2585600	1351700	1358500	1370180	2244100
automatic lnf. weapons in total	787100	170880	324800	316691	435400
Grenade launcher in total	30860	4380	4230	9780	22970
le. Flak. u. automatic On-board weapons	320110		22850	56685	130390
Guns from 7.5 cm upwards	40684	5499	7092	11988	26904
„(incl. gep. vehicles (without Sf.))	55936	5964	8124	14316	35796
Airplanes					
Frontline aircraft in total	34350	8070	9540	12950	22050
warplanes (without glider)	37950	10250	11030	14700	25220
motor vehicle and *traction means* in total	89069		62400	81276	109483
unpainted Traction vehicle	7644	3224	7489	7620	9821
Rail vehicles					
locomotives	3495	1688	1918	2637	5243
Wagons	45189	28200	44845	60892	66263
Armored car Quantities					
le. Pzkpfwg. in total	10012	795	2263	3614	7927
medium-heavy Pzkpfwg. total	12096	1359	2875	5595	9398
superheavy "	5232			78	2499
Sat.: gep. vehicles	27340	2154	5138	9278	19824
combat weight in to					
le. Pzkpfwg. in total	73149	6537	18125	24194	52944
medium-heavy Pzkpfwg. total	305249	30698	65063	111814	199173
excessively heavy	243924			4446	117299
Sat.: gep. vehicles	622322	37235	83188	140454	369416
ammunition (in 1000)					
Weight u. Pist.- Mun.	5375400	2952500	1343700	1340300	3174800
Inf. Weapons Ammunition Sat. (without Weight u. Pist.- Mun.)	180723	29420	197!,0	40010	118440·
le. anti-aircraft u. On-board weapon ammunition	263257		77366	129767	196332
Mun. above 7.5 cm up to	107900	27000	27075	56800	92950
dav.: for Pak u. Kw K19400		1738	875	5250	18000
Flak	18400	3664	15400	16700	16600
„ Art.	67600	20290	9400	32500	56000
„ Nb. W.	2500	1308	1400	2350	2350
Ammunition production in Gen.-Qu.- to (in 1000)	3350	865	540	1270	2558

* ZStA Potsdam, FS, Movie 42948, 6. 2. 1945.

Munitionsart	Kalenderjahr						
	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	Jan.•	Febr.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
						393	
Infanterie [mun.] (Mio)		917	781	2441	4732	294	311
		100**	85	266	516	102	120
						110	
dav.: Sturmgewehr 44 (Mio)			5	23	580	6	6
			100	460	11600	**1**	2
						2298	
Gewehr-Granaten (1000)			8236	22251	31884	2037	2797
			100	270	387	1341	1582
						2060	
Minen		949	6694	18830	43676	1808	2321
		100	705	1984	4602	1521	2055
						482	
dav.: metallos					1 094		
						2472	
Handgranaten (ohne Nb.)		14562	17603	59107	46363	3669	3374
		100	121	406	318	5300	4361
						1206	
Faustpatronen				350	5662	170	221
				100	1618		
						120	
Ofenrohr				173	1806	149	160
				100	1044		
						185	
7,5 cm Pak 40			1296	4180	4895	400	465
			100	323	378	311	328
						111	
" KwK 40 u. Stuka 40			1282	4906	6066	555	615
			100	383	473	300	279
						125	
„ Kw K42				1847	2794	208	217
				100	151	8	46
						80	
8,8 cm KwK 43 u. Pak 43				2006	2293	222	207
				100	114	10	37

• The top Number (outside the Row) gives respectively the number of pieces for January 1945 at
** Respectively the second Number series (until including Split 6) gives, based on the first Row, the percentage Development again (EN)

1944 1943 **March**	April	**May**	June	July	August	Sept.	Oct.	**November**	Dec.
9	10	11	**12**	**13**	**14**	15	16	**17**	18
			Mts - 0		194 : Mts-0 IV/44 = %		394	461 = 117%	
388	366	387	321	417	431	434	451	486	446
151	**151**	182	194	214	231	246	270	281	299
							48:	98 = 203%	
12	16	29	29	47	63	76	88	104	103
2	2	3	2	2	1	1	2	3	3
							2657	2782	105%
3076	2576	2538	2362	2117	2625	3410	2988	2987	2371
1833	**1727**	1841	1824	1996	1902	2312	2023	2030	2040
							3640	3688 = 100%	
2353	2732	3630	3759	5242	5561	5204	3801	3821	3443
1886	1672	1306	1494	1400	1405	1700	1513	1425	1453
	350	1166	1162	2500	2595	961	438	507	415
							3864	3657	95%
4065	3364	4054	3568	4100	4447	4750	4522	3050	3400
5349	5010	5639	4595	5000	4900	4342	4936	5000	4675
							472	918 = 194%	
258	331	433	323	220	412	487	425	1084	1296
					7	**17**	65	97	164
							150	150 = 100%	
145	**132**	68	122	180	200	200	170	129	150
						1	15	63	94
							408:	288 = **71%**	
472	470	470	401	487	450	416	300	356	207
338	**317**	354	220	300	401	400	409	400	400
							505	278 = 55%	
610	600	600	592	700	580	379	375	294	166
267	274	328	208	400	465	583	600	600	600
							233	205 = 88%	
209	255	250	220	268	300	252	246	155	**214**
79	135	161	197	170	200	157	219	235	240
							191 :	171 = 90%	
226	203	206	193	190	175	159	181	182	150
72	162	**191**	245	270	200	220	210	206	183

Munitionsart	Kalenderjahr						
	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	Jan.	Februar y
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8 th
12.8 cm Pak 80					70	12	
m. Gr. W. 34 (8th cm)		1616	6790	16151	35693	2500 1904	2152
		100	420	999	2209	1300	1400
s. Gr. W. 42 (12cm)				1208	3798	180 280	290
				100	314		
21 cm Gr. W.					4	12	
le. I G. 18		977	4145	9448	10732	596 736	792
		100	424	967	1098	805	858
P W. K.8 H63					6	11	
s.I. G. 33		420	606	2236	2293	97 176	179
		100	144	432	546	134	182
15cm Nb. W. 41		418	1208	1096	1985	1120 120	124
		100	289	262	475	113	83
21 cm Nb. W. 42			9	120	258	12 14	21
			100	1333	2867	3	3
28/32 cm Nb. W. 41		125	169	143	140	4 10	12
		100	135	114	112	12	16
30 cm Nb. W. 42			24	106	145	6 6	14
			100	442	604	6	5
s. 10 cm K18 _		295	778	1711	2755	105 183	203
		100	264	580	934	135	154
1. F H. 18		3552	18460	29441	38056	1923 3452	3370
		100	520	829	1071	2364	2340

1944 1943 March	**April**	May	June	July	August	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	15	17	18
							6	19 =	315%
			4	2	8th		8th	22	26
							2973	3440	115%
2287	2504	2573	2756	3329	37!,6	4020	3895	3600	2827
1456	1275	1393	1240	1274	1036	1257	1299	1446	1775
							316.5 :	322.7 =	102%
279	288	322	259	322	400	400	346	322	300
	69	30	62	110	190	197	140	210	200
							0.3 :	1.3 =	433%
								1	3
							894.3	927.7	103.7 %
865	916	884	846	922	977	1010	970	979	834
957	1055	1021	683	660	666	651	714	607	770
							0.5 :	2.0 =	400%
									6
							191.1 :	218.9	114.5 %
206	168	183	164	166	193	201	230	238	189
218	221	216	208	139	193	192	180	174	176
							165.4 :	187.3 =	101.1%
98	141	138	124	163	170	175	167	136	120
41	81	108	90	95	102	110	80	90	102
							21.5 :	23.5 =	109.4 %
18	8th	13	16	31	32	34	23	26	21
4	4	9	10	11	11	14	18	18	14
							11.7:	9.6 =	82.1%
16	15	14	12	10	9	13	10	9	10
13	11	10	11	11	11	12	15	12	8th
							12.9 :	11.9	90.7%
15	13	15	13	13	14	16	15	12	8th
7	6	8th	8th	9	13	12	12	13	6
							229.6 :	169.4 =	73.8%
278	237	240	230	303	304	269	222	162	124
156	160	160	160	158	99	135	102	142	150
							3171.3 :	2790.9	88%
3401	3126	3164	2806	3474	3376	3513	3206	2815	2352
2571	2129	2201	2137	2087	2234	2249	2708	3031	3389

Munitionsart	Kalenderjahr						
	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	Jan.	February
12	_	3	4	5	6	7	8th
						335	
s. F H. 18		2656	5078	7546	7171	672	616
		100	191	284	270	605	651
						70	
12.2 cm s. F H. 396 **(r)**				424	745	75	70
				100	176		
						52	
15.2 cm " 433 (r)				256	428	26	30
				100	167		8th
						9	
17 cm Kin Mrs Laf.		22	74	212	238	18	15
		100	336	964	1082	14	16
						25	3
21 cm Mrs. 18		268	236	440	459	41	42
		100	88	164	171	41	34
						12413	
2 cm German		51493	68875	117971	144444	9989	9654
		100	134	229	281	8660	9033
						2390	
3.7cm Flak German		10623	7332	11191	29213	2035	2194
		100	69	105	275	629	584
						1312	
8.8 cm Flak		11958	12942	12467	13649	998	1214
		100	108	104	114	965	769
						94	
dav.: Brd. Very.					615		
						155	
10.5 cm Flak 38/39		619	857	1170	1898	145	145
		100	138	189	307	30	33
						53	
12.8 cm Flak		18	44	548	895	47	92
		100	244	3044	4972	9	11
ammunition army in Gene. Qu. to		540	1270	2558	3350	253.5	269.2
		100	235	475	620	183.7	200.0

1944 1943 March	April	May	June	July	August	Sept.	Oct.	November	Dec.
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
							597.6	552.1	92.4 %
649	599	500	523	635	663	657	657	600	399
652	765	672	626	461	609	617	617	624	647
							621	83.6 =	134.6 %
63	40	50	24	52	60	60	69	92	90
	38	26	50	53	46	47	32	87	45
							35.7 :	66.3 =	185.7 %
22	21	22	16	23	30	40	57	91	51
11	18	28	27	26	39	31	26	21	21
							19.8	20.3	102.5 %
16	19	18	17	24	25	24	22	22	17
17	17	20	20	20	17	20	15	16	20
							38.3	38.2	98.7 %
41	40	36	26	38	40	40	41	41	33
39	40	35	29	31	39	34	37	40	41
							12037.0:	13032.2 =	108.3 %
11582	11083	12400	11060	12942	13481	13154	14247	12899	11950
9533	8810	10570	9525	11648	10748	10487	10200	10455	8303
							2434.4:	3089.9 =	126.9 %
1541	2102	2172	1906	2582	2666	2744	3099	2855	3316
482	451	798	770	1028	1082	1180	1178	1409	1598
							1137.4:	1184.3 =	104.1 %
1233	1074	944	942	1224	1228	1237	1276	998	1279
768	768	783	786	1153	1175	1455	1399	1309	1136
							51.3	75.3 =	146.8 %
	42	28	66	73	100	80	60	30	136
							158.2	152.0 =	96.1%
148	155	232	175	182	188	172	164	142	150
26	21	5	45	137	121	201	202	183	166
							74.6	83.9	112.5%
76	57	79	64	53	95	82	101	87	63
27	31	41	39	50	56	79	60	64	81
							280:	273	98%
281.0	281.7	259.9	287.0	293.7	298.3	305.5	287.7	310.7	221.6
209.7	214.0	219.3	201.2	187.2	219.6	214.5	224.3	243.1	241.4

Device	calendar year						
	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	Jan.	Februa ry
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8th
carbine, weight,						281803	
Storm weight u. MP		1597844	1601780	2509591	3096495	225121	213631
		100	100	157	194	134537	143988
						162783	
dav.: K 98K _		1358544	1363428	2149256	2261263	189208	179996
		100	100	158	166	114415	125116
						38000	
K41 u. 43			6778	94806	324266	15013	19623
			100	1399	4784	2311	2655
FG					524	–	
						41513	
Storm weight 44			91	31218	281860	3400	4050
			100	34305	309736	500'	**1217**
						27800	
MP 40 **u.** 38 a (i)		239340	231483	234311	228582	17500	9962
		100	97	98	96	**17311**	15000
						30693	
MG in total		85510	85150	169855	276639	16740	17070
		100	99,6	199	324	11587	10495
						23573	
dav.: MG 42			17915	119875	215297	13700	13568
			100	669	1202	6095	6014
						7050	
MG34		85510	67235	49980	61342	3040	3502
		100	79	58	72	5492	4481
						1700	
Flam. **W.41**			4618	11480	44280	3200	3620
			100	249	959	600	600
						2700	
46					11500	–	
						139	
15 cm Nb, W. 41,650		_	970	1188	2336	113	120
		100	149	183	359	76	83
						73	
21 cm" 42		648	970	100	835	**12**	63
		100	150	15	129	45	38
						50	
30 cm" 42				380	544	–	
				100	143	25	75

1944 1943 March	April	May	June	July	August	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
							258041 :	284160 =	110.1 %
221252	223555	252329	277299	300040	284365	246423	247520	307764	297196
181491	196786	203792	215959	225636	221822	246526	251285	240429	247340
							187522 :	175623 =	93.6%
182758	175525	195845	215694	235070	201494	158803	147460	197419	181991
156241	169910	175920	188041	195730	189191	212850	214270	200419	207153
							27022 :	32872 =	121.6 %
18594	24500	28020	30600	33010	29271	27020	29700	32500	36415
4850	5297	5228	5800	7406	10000	11040	12015	13010	15194
								5	519
							23495 :	50300 =	214.1 %
7000	9000	9500	1300	20510	29500	35000	46000	55100	49800
900	2179	3044	1898	1520	1631	1636	4000	6200	6493
							19048 :	25190 =	132.2 %
12900	14530	18964	18005	11450	24100	25600	24360	22740	28471
19500	19400	19600	20220	20980	21000	21000	21000	20800	18500
							23054	29711 =	128.9 %
18618	19265	20253	20803	24141	24788	25829	29052	28741	31339
11570	11451	12001	13303	14641	17225	16867	17148	17259	16308
							17942	21863 =	121.9 %
14612	15263	16247	16803	19127	19788	20599	21032	21231	23327
6020	7012	8000	9501	10650	13500	13006	13100	13577	13400
							5112	7847	153.5 %
4006	4002	4006	4000	5014	5000	5230	8020	7510	8012
5550	4439	4001	3802	3991	3725	3861	4048	3682	2908
							3690 :	3160 =	85.6%
4080	4000	4100	4000	3800	4000	4000	4000	3300	2180
600	600	800	900	800	1000	1400	1600	980	1600
							958:	3833 =	400.1 %
							1000	3500	7000
							195	464 =	237.9 %
84	98	72	72	72	96	217	758	484	150
105	90	104	97	107	120	104	108	104	90
							70:	127 =	181.5 %
43	38	57	43	57	50	92	260	60	60
17									
							45:	119 =	264.5 %
	20	20	15	35	36	60	255	53	50
70	40	20			60	60	19	11	

Devices	calendar year						
	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	Jan.	Februa ry
12	_	3	4	5	6	7	8th
8th cm Gr. W. 34		4230 100	9780 231	19588 463	26341 623	1564 1320 1555	1420 1904
12 cm Gr. W.42				3367 100	4557 135	151 322 76	400 41
7.5 cm Pak 40			2112 tOO	8739 414	11739 556	301 1007 500	877 550
8.8 cm Pak 43				1155 100	2017 175	115 31	170 23
le.l G.total		1115 100	1188 107	1965 176	4818 432	379 207 130	195 132
dav.: le.l G.18		1115 100	1188 107	1965 17/i	2309 207	204 207 130	195 132
l G.37					2211		
l G.42					2f\8	109	
PW. K.8H63					40	60	
s.l G.33		492 100	420 85	862 175	1613 328	230 84 60	83 65
Bldg. 36		84 100	216 257	242 288	456 543	34 15 11	30
10.5 cm Bldg. Hau 40			30 100	104 347	223 743	1 9	11
le. F H.		1164 100	1285 110	4337 373	10070 865	397 659 246	625 180

1944 1943 March	April	May	June	July	August	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
							2195 :	3273	149.1 %
1420	1650	1916	1980	2225	2340	2250	2190	3680	3950
1943	1852	1909	1698	1636	1721	1495	1290	1295	1290
							380:	389 =	101.1 %
333	410	400	400	390	400	350	415	400	337
240	548	324	301	389	335	379	304	400	30
							978 :	1032 =	105.5 %
976	986	1014	1016	1000	690	1078	1054	1035	1006
610	651	700	751	800	850	800	950	645	932
							169 :	216 =	127.8%
162	143	161	176	180	181	165	200	216	232
62	152	288	120	120	81	116	67	40	86
							388:	335 =	86.3%
195	195	303	445	798	776	700	424	225	355
143	154	165	170	170	170	170	170	195	196
							192 :	179 =	93.2%
195	195	195	195	190	200	200	157	186	194
143	154	165	170	170	170	170	170	195	196
							184 :	73 =	39.7%
		108	250	608	576	450	177	9	33
							21 :	69 =	328.0%
						50	90	30	88
							3 :	13 =	433.4 %
									40
							135	191	141.5 %
86	92	103	130	145	160	156	173	201	200
69	76	77	66	77	41	75	80	80	96
							38:40	_	= 105.3%
21	45	50	31	50	45	50	50	32	37
30		23	8th	18	25	30	25	25	47
							18:	17	94.5%
18	28	20	18	20	24	24	17	22	12
8th	12	4	4		16	18	13	12	17
							839 :	977 =	116.4 %
797	802	857	862	869	936	733	929	919	1082
322	288	429	288	300	323	380	472	449	660

Devices	calendar year						
	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	Jan.	Febr.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
dav.: 10.5 cm Stu Hau 42			12	236	1053	33 60	60
			100	1967	8775	5	17
8th. 10 centimeters K		108	135	454	701	31 52	45
		100	125	420	649	20	35
8th. F.-H. _		516	636	1221	3019	140 192	180
		100	123	237	585	70	45
17 cm Kin Mrs. Laf.		91	126	78	40	4	3
		100	138	86	44	7	9
21 cm Mrs. 18		167		100	103	4 12	12
		100		60	62		
21 cm K 39, 39/40 u. 52		22	3	11	17	1 2	2
		100	14	50	77		1
2 cm Flak weapon		11006	22371	31503	42688	4547 3071	2943
		100	203	286	388	1916	2780
dav.: 2 cm Quadruple		865	1774	3836	4950	271 334	345
		100	205	443	572	210	233
3.7 cm Flak		1188	2136	4077	8229	696 371	325
		100	180	343	693	361	302
dav.: as Device 18, 36 u. 37		540	823	2818	2405	37 224	179
		100	152	522	445	145	129
Flak 43 Tube				54	4609	587 7	33
				100	8535	–	5
dav. Device 43 twin					705	161	5
3.7 cm Flak C 36 and H42		648	1313	1205	1215	72 140	113
		100	203	186	188	216	168

1944 1943 März	April	**Mai**	Juni	Juli	August	Sept.	Okt.	**Nov.**	Dez.
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
							88	100 = 116,3%	
69	100	83	80	39	162	100	138	10	152
20	15	52	25	**12**	10	13	13		54
							58:	75	129,0%
50	43	56	60	65	60	45	75	75	75
35	35	35	45	35	43	27	47	45	52
							252:	293 = 116,3%	
198	227	256	265	273	240	308	264	**315**	301
59	63	72	68	**131**	115	124	142	150	182
							3:	3 = 100 %	
5	2	3	3	4	5	3	4	1	3
6	10	8th	13	6	3	4	6	3	3
							8th:	3 = 37.5%	
12	10	11	11	12	9	5	4	4	1
6	6	7	6	11	**12**	12	6	18	**16**
							1	2 = 200 %	
2	2	2	**1**				2		4
				2	2	2	1	2	**1**
							3557:	3890 = 109.4 %	
3073	2931	2933	3187	3933	4419	4529	4606	3863	3200
2375	2032	2686	2605	2566	3180	2643	2581	3054	3085
							413:	480 = 116.2%	
361	**371**	383	351	464	452	449	393	576	471
259	304	331	307	358	358	313	374	409	380
							686:	882 = 128.6%	
416	497	607	659	865	964	879	898	744	1004
273	334	345	331	344	314	361	336	352	424
							200:	100 = 50 %	
238	303	281	231	258	195	195	143	102	56
176	222	243	255	300	273	294	284	237	260
							384:	714 = 185,9%	
74	88	197	312	498	675	582	704	585	854
					5	10	7	3	24
							59:	149 = 252,6 %	
3	12	16	29	49	70	75	150	83	213
							101:	67 = 66,3%	
104	106	129	116	109	94	102	51	57	94
97	112	102	76	44	36	57	45	112	140

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Devices/ammunition type	calendar year						
	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	Jan.	Februar y
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8th
8.8 cm Anti-aircraft gun		1872	2876	4416	5933	480 440	403
		100	154	236	317	325	328
dav.: 8.8 cm 41			48	122	290	23 12	12
			100	254	604	**11**	6
10.5 cm Flak		509	701	1220	H31	35 98	98
		100	138	240	222	84	88
dav.: 10.5 cm 39		220	332	932	833	25 71	73
		100	151	424	379	52	69
12.8 cm Flak (Tube)			65	298	664	53 37	40
			100	458	1022	16	20
dav.: 12.8 cm 40 simply			45	282	612	51 33	40
			100	627	1360	16	14
12.8cm twin			10	8th	26	**1** 2	
			100	80	260		3
heavy Flak Tube total		2381	4147	6864	8402	583 656	626
		100	174	288	353	503	534
Aviation board MK 103				290	3896	223 100	103
				100	1343		
MK 108				1874	32530	1273 510	1500
				100	1736	-	
MG 131		1857	7275	35022	93029	5157 595	3694
		100	392	1886	5010	1390	1861
MG 151		8805	24909	57647	139745	9757 7350	8100
		100	283	655	1587	2619	2400
v 1 (Fi 103)					23748	2000 -	

1944 1943 March	April	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
							494:	575 =	117%
402	500	423	529	486	528	498	503	506	715
347	361	366	358	373	370	419	390	377	402
							24 :	38 =	158%
12	3	10	33	29	40	25	41	20	53
18	12	12	5	7	12	12	7	6	14
							94:	61 =	65%
115	10',	93	118	103	104	103	60	55	77
112	99	115	110	99	105	106	95	90	117
							69:	38 =	55%
93	85	74	92	81	78	73	34	31	48
75	73	91	82	83	82	83	71	72	99
							55:	67 =	122%
47	39	50	62	67	76	44	64	44	94
23	18	22	24	22	31	27	17	36	42
							51 :	60 =	118%
43	39	50	60	61	62	42	60	38	84
21	18	22	24	22	27	23	17	36	42
							2 :	3 =	150%
2			1	3	7	1	2	3	5
1					2	2			
							700 :	726 =	104%
680	734	651	780	686	742	668	652	632	895
578	598	539	588	554	566	634	592	596	582
							333:	490 =	147%
125	325	260	303	410	350	450	340	576	554
		11	29	41	41	40	57	8th	60
							2710 :	3523 =	130%
1750	2302	2800	3029	3267	3619	3184	3500	3050	4019
		26	48	110	26	108	167	489	900
							7752 :	8327 =	108%
6582	6354	8550	9270	11000	t1004	11000	8015	8833	8132
2740	2451	3009	2800	1073	3012	4475	5626	5020	1565
							11645 :	15707 =	135%
8308	8992	9400	10600	12100	14800	12975	15500	15600	16020
5281	2595	2781	5466	5349	4841	6313	6902	6350	6750
							1979 :	2627 =	133%
						3419	3387	1895	2600

Devices	calendar year						
	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	Jan.	Februar y
12	_	3	4	5	6	7	8th
v 2 (A 4)					4145	700	
60 cm Headlight		3264	1932	1991	1651	201	205
		100	59	61	51	152	130
150cm „		1392	1610	2182	3308	241	240
		100	116	157	238	162	208
200cm „			250	998	2449	107	
			100	399	980	152	166
						54	60
Kettenkrad		420	985	2450	4480	**191** 295	335
		100	235	583	1069	110	130
total Truck.		62400	81276	109483	89069	4319 9871	8601
		100	133	175	143	9606	8160
dav.: until 1.5 to		9504	15888	30377	32938	2559 2984	2889
		100	167	372	347	2625	2635
dav.: RSO			1452	14012	11921	344 1094	1078
			100	965	821	802	1237
3 **to**		43800	53436	62472	45363	1143 5836	4842
		100	122	143	104	5891	4475
dav.: Mule			1632	1300	7310	1170	1019
			100	797	448	2176	670
4.5 t and more		9096	11952	11634	10768	617 1051	870
		100	131	128	118	1090	1050
dav.: Mule				594	886	206	200
				100	149	–	
gep. **Zgkw.** (Sd.Kfz.)			2532	7143	9499	536 760	877
			100	282	375	253	413

1944 1943 **March**	April	**May**	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
							345:	639 =	185 %
						601	650	650	618
209	202	100	100	94	104	130	150	156	-
128	148	175	182	200	177	168	178	171	182
275	283	247	255	338	328	358	373	370	-
155	155	172	178	177	165	121	166	275	248
							204 :	213 =	105%
184	198	201	227	240	227	214	193	233	214
66	67	80	81	87	70	99	94	115	125
							374 :	252 =	67.4%
360	415	425	535	468	530	370	269	296	192
140	130	180	210	220	240	265	265	275	285
							7422 :	4031 =	54.3%
9897	8390	8652	9159	8522	7872	6013	4796	4093	3203
10595	9538	9175	9899	9425	8372	8588	9382	8661	8082
							2745 :	2604 =	94.9%
2793	2320	2373	2569	2822	3354	3021	3062	2727	2024
3368	2974	2739	4018	3168	2841	2838	2835	2737	2599
							993 :	955 =	96.2%
806	838	970	1260	1222	1055	734	1185	1125	554
1105	871	657	1992	1474	1399	1175	1133	1101	1066
							3780 :	819 =	21.7 %
6035	5259	5064	5487	4608	3439	2325	1126	700	632
5951	5664	5522	4915	5154	4548	4832	5716	5157	4647
							609:	13 =	2.1%
1086	1053	669	581	495	820	379	34	4	-
1343	1031	1089	850	871	1040	920	1297	769	944
							897 :	607 =	67.7%
1069	811	1215	1093	1092	1079	667	608	666	547
1276	900	914	966	1103	983	918	831	767	836
200	10	190	48	32	-				
					40	80	100	180	194
							791 :	677	85%
950	753	829	665	698	1038	897	804	549	679
439	440	501	530	554	712	906	778	730	887

Devices	calendar year						
	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	Jan.	Februa ry
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8th
						91	
dav.: 1 to			1344	2895	1694	220	184
			100	215	126	127	288
						445	
3 to			1188	4248	7805	540	693
			100	358	657	126	125
						380	
Zgkw.			7620	9821	7644	480	529
			100	129	100	798	782
dav.: 1 to			2868	2724	873	116	70
			100	95	30	240	265
						145	
3 to			1572	2133	1308	90'	30
			100	136	83	172	147
						28	
s. Ws. (or. 5 to)		360	564	563	729	5	9
			100	100	129	53	61
						117	
8th to		1320	1392	3251	3298	159	305
			100	234	237	191	176
12 to		828	840	507	602	48	62
			100	60	72	105	90
						90	
18 to		240	384	643	834	62	53
			100	167	217	37	43
						916	
total Sd. motor vehicle u. Zgkw.			10152	16964	17143	1240	1406
			100	167	169	1051	1195
(The top Row at Tanks: Pay d. respectively. program for 1944]						716	750
						447	
Armored car		3250	4224	5947	8339	684	628
		100	130	183	256	260	310
						320	320
						232	
dav.: Panthers				1850	3964	279	276
				100	215		

1944 1943 March	April	May	June	July	August	Sept.	Oct.	November	Dec.
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
							141	146 =	104%
103	103	110	64	130	201	142	204	28	205
289	210	250	271	251	290	279	252	73	315
							650 :	532 =	82%
847	650	719	601	568	837	755	600	521	474
150	230	251	259	303	422	627	526	657	572
							637	430 =	68%
662	652	801	948	867	759	656	425	470	395
949	965	1003	954	863	793	760	720	596	638
							73	45 =	62%
150	70	130	115	37	25	25	27	108	
265	265	250	255	240	220	255	200	148	121
							109 :	56 =	52%
45	101	219	170	175	170	140	24	75	69
237	225	272	306	233	177	109	129	57	69
							61 :	80 =	131%
23	49	46	84	95	87	90	112	92	37
61	56	65	64	60	56	34	19	29	5
							275 :	177 =	64 %
269	313	320	376	360	360	306	194	133	203
295	322	344	264	264	266	275	267	264	323
							50:	7 =	14%
92	58	1	109	111	60	40	21		
43	48	23	14	13	19	27	40	40	45
							70:	65 =	93%
83	61	85	94	89	57	55	47	62	86
48	49	49	51	53	55	60	65	58	75
							1429:	1107 =	78%
1612	1405	1630	1613	1565	1797	1553	1229	1019	1074
1388	1405	1504	1484	1417	1505	1666	1498	1326	1525
796	827	865	900	876	880	900	920	920	920
							695:	566 =	81.4%
718	749	792	831	840	767	632	566	575	557
320	316	689	506	535	502	594	666	525	724
355	370	395	430	430	430	430	430	430	430
							330 :	314 =	95.2%
296	320	360	390	400	347	355	303	330	308
		324	172	213	135	217	274	216	299

Devices	calendar year						
	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	Jan.	February
12	_	3	4	5	6	7	8th
						96	100
						40	
tiger I and II			78	647	1002	98	100
			100	830	1280	35	32
						542	588
						1259	
Stu. business u. Pz. Hunter		550	828	3411	9512	386	442
		100	150	620	1715	130	140
						510	550
						508	
dav.: Stu. business III/IV		550	828	3245	5884	331	373
		100	150	590	1070	130	140
						434	
Hunting tank 38					1598		
						10	15
						72	
Hunting panther					215	5	7
						2	3
						10	
Hunting tiger				2	51		2
						1258	1318
						1706	
total Pzkpfwg., Stu. business		3800	5052	9358	17851	1070	1070
u. Pz. Jg.		100	133	245	470	390	450
						230	230
						60	
self-propelled guns			1248	2657	1248	175	250
			100	213	100	140	126
						1488	1548
						1766	
total Pz. Kpfwg., Stu. business,		3800	6300	12101	19223	1286	1370
Pz. Jg. u. Sf.		100	166	320	510	530	576
						2869	
total Hunter's staff		4620	7128	15151	30511	1340	1323
		100	155	348	660	707	1105

1944 1943 March	April	May	June	July	August	Sept.	Oct.	November	Dec.
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	**17**	18
101	107	120	120	96	100	120	140	140	140
							85:	36 =	42.4%
92	110	115	107	109	90	73	26	35	47
41	46	50	60	65	60	85	50	60	63
622	708	815	945	1090	1240	1400	1690	1980	2250
							793:	1166 =	147%
545	613	725	821	818	766	899	1039	1199	1259
207	312	405	305	306	296	355	407	304	244
580	640	690	740	750	760	800	870	940	1000
							490:	531 =	108.4%
446	485	556	585	562	412	541	509	543	541
207	262	305	305	306	296	355	406	299	234
3	20	52	100	200	300	400	600	800	1000
							133:	347 =	260,9¾
		66	70	83	180	158	306	387	348
25	40	60	85	105	130	150	170	190	200
							18	43 =	238,9%
8	10	10	6	**15**	3	21	8	55	67
4	8	15	20	35	50	50	50	50	50
							4	**12**	300%
				3	3	8	9	6	20
							1	1	
1418	1535	1680	1845	1966	2122	2300	2610	2900	3170
							1488 :	1732 =	116%
1263	1362	1517	1652	1658	1533	1531	1605	1774	1816
527	628	1094	811	841	798	949	1073	829	968
227	210	180	130	80	80	80	80	80	80
224	180	198	45	22	83	35	7	5	24
156	312	236	223	252	196	243	300	249	224
1645	1745	1860	1975	2046	2200	2380	2690	2980	3250
							1602	1744 =	109%
1520	1542	1715	1697	1680	1616	1566	1612	1779	1840
683	940	1330	1034	1093	994	1192	1372	1128	1229
				3216	3806	4415	4542	4956	5171
							2543 :	3048 =	120%
1830	2034	2377	2760	3115	3051	3538	3106	3304	2733
1277	1232	1285	1330	1505	1347	1338	1406	1281	1338

Devices	calendar year						
	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	Jan.	Fehr.
12	_	3	4	5	6	7	8th
						2251	
dav.: Day- hunter		2964	4476	9121	20042	931	941,
		100	151	308	676	359	619
						251	
Night hunter			432	1066	3763	86	46
			100	247	871	58	56
						365	
Battle aircraft		696	1092	2817	4971	151	237
		100	157	405	714	146	225
						2950	
total Frontline aircraft		9540	12948	22059	34347	1820	1717
		100	136	231	360	1249	1754
						34	
dav.: Fighter aircraft		3456	4428	5019	2596	325	282
		100	128	145	75	420	499
						3135	
total War aircraft		12324	15456	25668	38122	2077	1979
		100	125	208	309	1495	2002
Blue program LP 226/2 (change status from the 28. 8th. 44) [i.e. i. the respectively top Number series July -December)							
						32	
total Submarines 201 _			238	284	248	22	24
		100	113	141	123	22	21
						17	
dav.: gr. boats new					80		
" old		45	58	62	24	6	4
		100	128	138	53	6	5
m. boats new							
" old		154	180	219	107	16	20
		100	117	142	70	16	16
						14	
kl. boats new					35		
						1	
" old		2		3	2		

1944 1943 March	April	May	June	July	August	Sept.	Oct.	Novem ber	Dec.
9	10	**11**	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
				1926	2480	3155	3445	3770	3945
							1670 :	2274 =	136%
1040	1125	1372	1664	1901	1852	2388	2271	2432	2122
714	732	789	894	979	837	795	757	716	930
				425	490	540	464	560	555
							314 :	336 =	107%
200	350	383	374	404	421	490	353	426	230
69	65	66	117	75	48	116	156	156	84
				607	578	570	483	475	500
							414	336	81%
453	446	489	506	622	524	535	403	294	311
308	266	248	227	254	225	224	287	256	151
				3770	4165	4796	5054	5554	5949
							2862 :	3171 =	**111%**
2329	2391	2728	3202	3678	3252	3717	3265	3407	2841
1856	1800s	1856	1964	2133	1969	1889	1952	1820	1817
				396	269	301	435	524	713
							216	61	28%
383	241	250	299	386	140	108	105	42	35
406	396	407	461	474	459	409	393	369	326
				4147	4535	5122	5383	5884	6474
							3178	3450 =	109%
2661	2637	3027	3597	4075	3672	4047	3551	3694	3105
2166	2095	2194	2311	2474	2310	2213	2239	2095	2074
							21 :	26 =	124%
20	20	18	12	17	14	24	24	15	38
27	23	22	24	29	19	25	20	27	25
							7	18 =	247%
			1	7	5	13	17	9	28
4	5	4		1					
9	4	5	5	4		5	3	5	5
					6 -				
16	14	14	9	5	3	6 -		1	3
18	19	17	19	24	13	20	17	20	20
							3 :	6 =	200%
			2	4	6	5	7	5	6
	1							2	**1**
				1					

Devices	calendar year						
	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	Jan.	Feb.
12	_	3	4	5	6	7	8 th
War barrier breaker							
marine driving credit		70 100	300 430	156 223	157 225	5	4
marine Lighter					50	3	
Outpost- u. Security vehicles					287	**1** 17	23
Hansa program 3000 to					34	**1** 3	
5000 to					1		
9000 to					2		
S-boats		36 100	36 100	41 144	63 175	3 3 3	6 3
R-Boats		30 100	30 100	48 160	81 270	6 7 4	6 3
M boats u. Torp. Fishing boats			36 100	66 184	32 89	4 5	4
T-boats		6	6	6	6		**1**
destroyer		5 100	3 60	6 120	2 40		**1**

1943 1944 March	April	May	June	July	August	Sept.	Oct.	November	Dec.
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
							13	9 =	70%
9	21	19	21	21	13	21	15	8th	5
				33	25	9	7	8th	3
							4	3 =	75%
	9	6	7	5	9	2	4		8th
							24	10 =	44%
39	27	31	34	37	27	22	13	8th	9
2	2	3	2	10	7	1	2	2	
							2	**1**	3
		1							
									1
			1					1	
							5	3	60%
5	3	7	7	6	8th	8th	4	3	3
3	3	4	2	4	3	4	3	4	5
							7	8th	114%
5	6	5	8th	9	7	4	10	8th	6
4	2	4	6	5	3	5	6	3	3
							7	8th	114%
3	2	**1**	2	2	4		3	2	4
				3	2	3	9	4	3
		1	**1**		**1**		**1**		**1**
					1		**1**		
		1							
					1	**1**			

2. Committees and Rings of RMfBuM

Please refer garnish

3. Distribution of tasks at RMfRuK and GB Rüst according to the decree the distribution of tasks in the war economy dated October 29, 1943

Please refer garnish

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206 Available Amount of meat 1933--1944, Reich territory 1937

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Reich Chancellery, Reich Ministry of
Economics
Reich Ministry for armor and War production Reich
Ministry of Finance
Reichsbank Statistical
Reich Office of the
Reich Ministry of
Justice
Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture Court of
Auditors Of the german Rich
Foreign affairs Government office

Deutsche Bank
Siemens AG

Nuremberg Succession processes:
Case II (Milk Trial) }
Case V (patching process)
case VI (IG-farben process) partial stocks on Microfilm
case X (Krupp trial)
Case XI (Wilhelmstrasse
Proceedings B) Case XII (OKW
process)

Holdings of the film collection (FS), especially
OKW/Wehrwirtschafts· and Armaments Office of the
Reich Ministry for armor and War Production Personal
Staff Reichsführer-SS
Goebbels diary
Reich works "Hermann Goering"

For some Source complexes become abbreviation used:

timeline the Departments of Reich Minister Albert spear= *timeline of RM{BuM* or. *RM{RuK* (film collection, Movie 42948)

"Leader meetings" Albert Speers (conferences Hitler - spear)= FB (ibid., film 1750 and 3399)

News from the Reich Minister for Armaments and Ammunition or for armaments and war production (Ministerial Gazette)= *News of RMfBuM* or. *RM{RuK* (Reich Ministry ür Armament and War Production, No. 51)

Headquarters Planning, Stenographic Transcripts the Meetings= ZP-P (Film collection, film 42223 and 42224)

Headquarters Planning, „Results" the meetings (Result logs)=ZP-E (Case XI (Wilhelm stra.ßenproze.ß), No. 411, Doc. R-124)

b) State Archives Magdeburg (StAM)

State farming community Saxony-Anhalt

c) State Archives Schwerin (StAS)

Special archive VdgB

d) State Archives Weimar (StAW)

State farming community Thuringia
Thuringian Ministry of Inside
Thuringian Ministry of Economic Affairs

e) Federal Archives, Koblenz (B.A Koblenz)

R 2 Reich Ministry of Finance
R 3 Reich Ministry for armor and war production
R 4 Inspector General for Water and energy
R 6 Reich Ministry for the occupied Eastern areas
R 7 Reich Ministry of Economics
R 11 Reich Chamber of
Commerce R 12 I Reich Industry
Group
R13 I Economic Group iron creating Industry R 13
III Mechanical engineering business group
R13 V Electrical Industry Economic
Group R 13 XX Mining Economic Group
R 22 Reich Ministry of Justice
R 41 Reich Ministry of Labor
R 43 II Reich Chancellery
R 58 Reich Security Main Office
R70 German Police departments in the occupied countries
NS 6 deputies of the leader/party office

Abbreviation:

Karl Otto Sour, keywords for the Armament index (of the technical office)= sour, Keywords (R 3/1989)

f) Archivum Glowney Komis;i Badania Zbrodni Hitlerovsky w Pol,sce, Warsaw

Process materials the Nuremberg Succession processes:
Case II (milk process)
case v (Flick process)
case VI (IG Farben trial) Case
X (Krupp trial)

g) Wojewodzkie Archivum Panstwowe w Katowicach, Katowice
Upper Silesian Institute for Economic research

h) Company archive of V E.B Pentacon, Dresden

i) Company archive of v E.B Porcelain factory Kahla
Duration Hescho (Hermsdorf-Schomburg Isolator Society)

k) Company archive of v E.B Carl Zeiss Jena

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